The new phenomenology of carrying forward

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Continental Philosophy Review37:127151, 2004.C 2004Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

The new phenomenology of carrying forward

E.T. GENDLINDepartment of Psychology, University of Chicago, 5801 South Ellis Avenue, Chicago, IL

60637, USA (e-mail: [email protected])

In this paper I show a new approach to what phenomenologists call phenom-

ena, a deliberate way to think and speak withwhat is more than categories

(concepts,theories, assumptions, distinctions. . .

). Some categories are alwaysimplicit in language, and language is always implicit in any human experi-

encing. So what I just called the more cannot be separated from implicit

categories and language. This is well known. What is little known is that expe-

riencing always goes freshly beyond the categories and the common phrases.

I have been establishing a deliberate way to think with more. This is crucially

needed in philosophy, but it has seemed impossible. We can reformulate the

problems it involves.

Most philosophers gave up on phenomenology long ago, because it was

recognized that neutral description is impossible. Description involves cat-

egories. Sartres dialectical categories differed from Merleau-Pontys func-

tional approach. Therefore their descriptions differed from each other and

from Husserls. It was soon said that phenomenology finds no phenomena

at all, only the same philosophical issues that have always been contested.

The phenomena seemed to depend entirely on the categories (through history,

culture, and common language forms). Philosophers were tempted, like Hei-

degger in the years afterBeing and Time, to deal with categories apart from

phenomenology, from the top down. Everyone can now see that working with

the categories alone is not at all hopeful. None are ultimate and their use al-

ways involves an excess which fits neither within categories nor can it be

had separately. This impasse has led to the dead-end aspect of postmodernism.

It frees us from any privileged set of categories, but leaves us only with an

aporia, still only on the level of concepts. But if one recognizes that language

is inherently metaphorical and not controlled by concepts, then there need beno dead end.

It is now evident that philosophy needs to employ more than conceptu-

ality, but the current return to phenomenology need not be a retreat from

postmodernism. Phenomenology need not back away from the problem of

the relativity of descriptive categories and approaches. We have ways to think

with the so-called excess. I have shown that it is much more than a texture of


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128 E.T. GENDLIN

old concepts. What I call experiencing is not separable from concepts, but

it plays crucial, directly demonstrable roles in ongoing thinking. It performs

functions that concepts cannot perform.

The excess is our situated experiencing in the world, in situations with

others. It does not utterly depend on categories. History and culture are insuf-

ficient to handle even an ordinary day. The common phrases do not limit our

next steps of action and thought. Applying different categories does indeed

bring forth different phenomena, but the direct experiencing of whatever we

study always responds very precisely, always just so and not otherwise, and

always with more than what could follow just from our categories. Experi-

encing is a responsive order, as I call it.1 This order is always unfinished

in regard to further conceptual form, but always more finely organized thanany conceptual forms. If you are willing to think with the excess rather than

leaving it behind, you can attend to it directly at any juncture of thinking. Then

you can notice that it will not permit you to say most of the cogent things

you can easily say. It will stay opaque, stuck and mum unless and until just

certain sentences come to open it. Such freshly formed, often metaphorical

sentences show that language is deeply rooted in experiencing and not con-

trolled by extant concepts or categories. If we think from where these arise, we

can examine and redirect some of the functions which implicit experiencing

provides at that particular juncture of thought.

I am summarizing what I call a reversal of the usual philosophical order

in my philosophical work. Philosophies have long claimed a basis in experi-

ence, but experience was always construed according to the concepts and

categories of that philosophy. The concepts were always read into experience.

This is still done today when the excess is understood as just a texture of

old concepts. Only a phenomenology can employ the functions of experienc-

ing beyond the variety of concepts. In works I summarize here, one can find

a philosophical way to show and directly employ some of its functions in

thinking and speaking.

We find neither objectivism nor indeterminacy. Where others see indetermi-

nacy, we find intricacy an always unfinishedorder that cannot be represented,

but has to be taken along as we think. It is a much finer, more organic order

that always provides implicit functions, whether we attend to them or not. I

will try to show some of these functions in the first part of my paper.To speak with and from what is more than the categories, we employ the

capacity of language for new sentences. This capacity of language is rooted in

the human body as reflexively sensed from inside. The reflexivity is currently

being missed, because attention is understood along the lines of perception, as

if a neutral and unexamined person over here directs a neutral beam at some

already separate object over there. If we attend to experiencing directly we find


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THE NEW PHENOMENOLOGY OF CARRYING FORWARD 129

that we live with situational bodies which always sense themselves in sensing

anything else. So the first half of my paper concerns the functions of what

is more than categories, especially the inherent interrelations of language,

situations, and the human body. The second half of my paper concerns the

reflexivity of attention, self-consciousness and first-person process.

1.

Phenomenology as I understand it, determines its own use of language. It

can develop new categories of description. It can examine and direct the use

of logic and theory. Phenomenology for me is not the small phenomenologywhich understands itself as only describing conscious experiences cut off

from the universe, from other persons, and from the unconscious depths

of person and body. I will touch on these topics to show that they are not

beyond phenomenology as I have always understood it. Phenomenology is

small when it accepts a small corner within the world-picture of the reductive

sciences.

A philosophy that can think with more does not assume the science picture.

It does not assume, in Russells words, that logic is the furniture of the

world. We want to derive and understand the great power of logic and science,

and grasp how these are embedded in more than themselves. We badly need

to add a new and different kind of science to augment that world-picture.

Husserls refusal to assume the reductive ontology was sound, and we can go

much further in the direction he opened. We can derive this and also other

ontologies in and from phenomenology.

In use, all concepts involve more than their clean logical patterns. But if

we do not pay more attention to this, then we seem to have nothing left, when

the concepts fail. There is no new road, only arbitrariness where the concepts

break. We find ourselves in a welter of conceptual possibilities, a mix of all

the concepts and theories we have read and thought. We can move in all sorts

of possible directions, old and new. Many analytic distinctions can always

be made, and need not be foolish. In this plethora what we choose to say is

arbitrary.

Where I wish to point is a little further. The welter of old concepts is here,but they do not alone determine what we find. Let me ask you: When no

concept seems to work, what more do you find here? I think you find that

youare still here, of course, in midst of your situation, and you can still find

your hope for something from your foray into the topic. Perhaps you were

pursuing an unclear lead, the sense of something promising. In that case this

is also still here. Along with this you feel implicitly all you ever learned and


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130 E.T. GENDLIN

thought, but not as a welter, rather as it relates in a focal way to what you are

tracking. None of this goes away.

What you find is not disorder, not limbo, not just flow, not some concept

together with the opposite of that concept. Rather, you find an intricacy, preg-

nant, implicitly ordered, perhaps partly opaque. From this intricacy you may

at times be unable to go on, at least for a while. This implicit intricacy is quite

different than the welter of analytic concepts and possibilities.

There are phenomenological variables at this edge. Sometimes the sense

of such an edge is already there, calling for our attention, but usually we need

a quiet minute of attending to where it can come. And when it has come, if we

leave it even for a moment, then we only remember it. We need another quiet

minute to find it again. When it comes, it may be open to be spoken-from. Or,it may be closed and opaque, requiring us to return repeatedly before it opens.

It may be a diffuse sense from which many strands can be articulated. Or,

there may be one single focal implying like a felt lead or an insistent sense of

something. InExperiencing and the Creation of Meaning, I found interesting

relations among these variables.2 Much work has since been done on this kind

of datum.

I have been speaking about concepts breaking down, but even when they

work well, we canalways go to the implicit intricacy. It is a more organic order,

a morepreciseand more demanding kindof order, a very finely determined

order, very differentfrom logic, yet responsive to logic. It contains a great

many implicit distinctions and entities, but you can easily assure yourself that

it has much more order than these, and an order of a different kind.

Now I must point to the mode of language I have already used here. Can I

really use words such as organic, order, precise, kind, determined,

and different, to speak of more than conceptual distinctions? These words

seem to mean certain conceptual distinctions. Does not order always consist

of discrete entities and patterns? Does not organic refer to certain defined

entities? But in my sentences the words have not remained within their old

meanings. When we speak from the intricacy, the sentences can add to the

meanings of the words. We notice this especially when we have trouble finding

words. Then we can sense the physical strain as the implicit words rearrange

themselves in our bodies, so that when they come, they arrive newly arranged.

Words can acquire more meaning when they come in sentences that comefreshly at the edge of the implicit intricacy.

You need not be a philosopher to find yourself at such an edge. You might

be tracking a half-formed new observation in any field. Or, you might be in

midst of writing a poem. Or, you might find yourself in a troubling situation

which no obvious action can resolve. With the usual view of the body as a

machine, it may seem surprising that the body can feel a situation, and what


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is more, can imply and demand a next step of speech or action that has never

been seen before. But we are familiar with this bodily knowledge from

many practical situations. We know that we cannot base our actions just on

what we can conceptualize. We have to use our implicit bodily sense of the

whole situation. We may find a way that resolves our bodily unease, or not. We

decide when we must, but perhaps a large discomfort remains hanging there.

This bodily discomfort knows some of the intricacy which the decision did

not take account of. But when a decision does sit right in our bodies, how well

we sleep that night!

Right now, for example, where do you sense your reaction to what I am

saying? If you have not stopped to articulate it, then it is still only a physical

sense of implicit meaning, perhaps excitement, perhaps discomfort, at anyrate a bodily sense which only a philosophical body could create. It is not an

emotion, not a mere feelingaboutthis discussion, but an implicit intricacy, a

cluster of implicit philosophical thoughts.

But I am getting too far ahead. Let me choose one example and go into

some detail. I hope the example will let me point to the close relation between

language and the body. In my example you will note the physicalcoming

of words. The example should also show how we can find where the implicit

intricacy opens. Thirdly it should show how we recognize when we did not

speak from the implicit intricacy, and when we did.

Say you are writing a poem. You have six or eight lines but the poem is

not finished. It wants to go on. In an implicit way you feel (sense, have, live,

are. . .

) what should be said next, but you do not know what to say. The phrases

that come do not precisely say it. You reject one phrase after another. How

are you able to do this? You do not know what to say, but you recognize that

these phrases do not say it. Something implicit is functioning in your rejection

of them. Lovely phrases come. Some are so good, you save them for another

poem. But THIS demanding implicit sense still hangs there.

You may be distracted for a moment. Now the demanding sense is gone.

You quietly re-read the poem so far, and there, at the end of what you have,

there it is again! And you still cannot say it.

What or where is that, which is there again? It is so stubborn and precise.

Your body understands the phrases that come. It knows the language and

demands I say implies something more precise.Your hand rotates in midair your body knows what needs to be said and

has never as yet been said in the history of the world (if it is a good poem).

Eventually the right phrasescome!

What does the word come say here? How do words come to us? This

coming needs to be studied. How do the right phrases come and how are

they recognized?


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132 E.T. GENDLIN

As a poet you need not worry over these questions. Poets work in what

Husserl called the natural attitude. But as philosophers and phenomenol-

ogists we want to think with, from, and into this unclear but more precise

demanding edge, and think into this coming of words. When we then speak

from there, these three words language, concept, and body will have

acquired more meanings.

As philosopher observing yourself as poet, you find that THIS, which

needs to be said, is more precise than the common phrases. How or where do

you have this? Your rotating hand almost says it. Your whole body demands

(implies) THIS. But now the word body speaks from your body as sensed

from inside, not only your externally observable body.

The implicit meaning does not exist before or without language. In animalsthe inwardly sensed body exists before language. But the human body is never

before language. But the implied meaning is not the result onlyof language.

The relation of language to the body is more intricate than just with or without.

Your body understands well the language and the phrases it rejects. But it can

generate a bodily implying that goes beyond what the already-shared common

meanings could imply. The body knows the language, and is always moves

on freshly again, beyond the already existing meanings.

The body physically rearranges the same old words, so that they come to

us already arranged in new phrases and sentences. This is so in all ordinary

speech, not only in fresh thinking. We do not look up single words and paste

them together. If we hear ourselves saying the wrong thing, we can only stop,

regain the implicit sense of what we were about to say, and wait for another

set of words to come.

The coming of words is bodily, like the coming of tears, sleep, orgasm,

improvisation, and how the muse comes. But here we have to be careful. The

higher animals also sleep and have orgasms, and very complex lives even

without language. But language is implicit in the whole human body (not

only in our brains). Language is implicit in our muscular movements and in

every organ. It is implicit in what rouses or spoils our appetites, and in what

disturbs our sleep. The language is part of culture and history, but the body is

always freshly here again, and can say no, even when culture and reason say

yes. If you enter there, you find a finely ordered cluster of strands, far more

intricate than culture. The body can insist on some new and more sophisticatedway that has never as yet been found, and may never be found. We often need

to find our way beyond the cultural forms. Similarly, improvisation and the

muse come in a bodily way beyond the already existing forms.

Although what we called you does not control what comes, the implying

is not an otherness(not an alterity), notanother self, not unreachable. Rather,

what comesin this way feels more deeply and uncensoredly from yourself,


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134 E.T. GENDLIN

not in is more complex than representation. We are speaking from it; we are

taking it along.

Does the implying become explicit? No, not at all! The implying does not

become words, even after the newly-phrased words arrive. The implying never

turns into something explicit, as if now it is no longer there. If the implying

were no longer there, the poet would not know to prefer just these words.

Rather, these words carry the implying along with it. They bring it. They carry

it forward. They take it along. They bring this implying with them, which is

how the poet knows to keep just this line.

At last the poet knows what the implying was, but is this quite the same

implying that was there before? We cannot say yes because the poet didnt

quite know what was implied. We cannot say no because then there wouldbe no connection and no reason to keep these lines. Here again the old con-

cepts break, and again I point to the more intricate pattern we find, and to

the power of fresh language to speak from it. We can do much more than

deny that the implying is the same or different. As philosophers we recog-

nize the same and different as the arch principles of the logical use of

concepts.

In commenting on my philosophy, Mohanty wanted to divide carrying

forward. He wanted to know which part was there before and which part is

new and different. Instead, let us speak from the pattern that we do find here. 4

The fresh language of no longer hanging there and carried forward now

becomes a new concept, but also an instance of a new way to use concepts.

Fresh language leads to a new concept when there is a pattern, something we

can see also in many other places. I think you will find yourself using the

concept of carrying forward at many junctures. There has been no way to

speak from this relation between implying and words, but now there is .

As a concept, carrying forward does also have the usual kind of pattern,

a structure, a kind of diagram in empty space. It contains the spatial pattern

of forward (and backward), and also the pattern of carrying, i.e., something

taken and moved by something else. But this alone says very little. The concept

means our use of it at this juncture, where words (it could be actions) let a

precise implying no longer hang there, but take it along. Without taking this

juncture along, the concept does not say much. So it does not substitute for the

role which the implicit intricacy plays here. We do not substitute the conceptfor the intricacy; rather we take the intricacy along so that the concept can

speak-fromthis intricate juncture.

But is not something a concept only because its pattern goes free from

the juncture at which it first arises, so that it is applicable elsewhere? But the

pattern of this concept is not only a separable spatial diagram. The pattern

is also its relation to the carried-forward intricacy. When we apply carrying


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forward elsewhere, we apply this juncture. Let me explain how such a concept

is applicable at other junctures.

Concepts that carry their implicit junctures with them are much more pre-

cise. They mean what they do at that juncture in that situation. When applied

elsewhere they bring their first implicit juncture intothe new implicit junc-

ture. So they do not have the same effect there, nor just a different effect, but

again more than same or different. Can language say what we do find? The

concepts first implicit juncture crosses with the new juncture, to produce

just this next change at this new juncture. We can enter into its effect. Then

we find that crossing opens every concept so that it can do more than be-

fore. We also find that it opens each new juncture so that there is more there

than before. The crossing of two junctures does not bring the lowest com-mon denominator but rather a great deal that is new to both of the two that

cross.

In a logical order every additional meaning is a further limitation of the

result. It decreases the degrees of freedom. But intricacy has the responsive

order in which, the more requirements have been formulated, the more further

possibilities are thereby opened. I was able to show this in Experiencing and

the Creation of Meaning.

When two patterns function only logically, they do limit each other down to

their lowest commonality. Our capacity for logical patterns is an enormously

valuable human power, but we do not lose it if we also use the kind of pattern

which happens with intricacy. Carrying forward and crossing are two

more-than-logical concepts I have introduced. In the crossing of two intrica-

cies, each becomes implicit in the other insofar as it can. This is an extremely

precise implicit process. When we enter into this implicit effect, we find that

the new possibilities are much more precisely differentiated than what we had

before.

(See C&D for this philosophy of language and word-use.)

Forexample, earlier I distinguished experiencing from the arbitrary analytic

plethora. This distinction has its meaning just at that juncture, in order to find

both. I said only: If you go further; what do you find you have there? Other

than for the sake of finding them, I did not distinguish them. Even so I had to

say that the analytic one is already implicit in the experiential one. So this was

not the separable pattern of two. When we apply this odd diad elsewhere, wecan expect it to do more there, than can follow from it here. But concepts really

always bring their intricacy along. When we apply any concept elsewhere, we

can enter the intricacy to find what effect it has had there.

Things do not come separately with external relations between already-

cut units. Experiencing precedes units. We create units. We fashion them

retroactively, and thereby gain the powers of logical inference. We can create


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136 E.T. GENDLIN

logical theory without assuming a reality that consists of logical units. And,

we can always re-enter the intricacy after any logical inference.

It has long been known that concepts bring their implicit junctures and are

not the same in different contexts, but this was always considered a terrible

limitation which has to be ignored if we want to make sense. Concepts were

therefore said to drop out all their intricacy, as if the actual intricacy con-

sisted only of particulars subsumed under them. But concepts do not drop

out their intricacy, and the intricacy does not consist only of subsumed detail.

When concepts are treated as empty patterns, they seem to close the intricacy

which is always there and can always be entered. Although this closing is vital

for logic, it has given concepts a bad reputation as if they must always close

us to more. This is not so.In contrast to spatial patterns which have no inherent value-direction, we

find that experiential implying has a life-enhancing, forward-moving charac-

ter. The implied new steps (of language or action) are in a life-forwarding

direction. What we usually call the direction is defined by some external

aim or mark. The externally-defined direction can change at each step, but

in its implicit intricate meaning we say, looking back, that the surprising steps

of carrying forward were in the same direction all along. The bodys organic

direction is prior to the externally defined direction. As a society we must

be careful that the great progress of the logically reductive sciences does not

lead us to lose this little-understood characteristic of body process.

We see that language, body, and situational interaction are a single system

together. Every situation consists of hundreds of possibilities for actions and

speech-acts. Those are culturally given routines, but an individual body can

sense not only the routine patterns, but also new life-enhancing steps beyond

the forms and routines.

Experiencing is always a sequence. If we apply carrying forward to a

whole sequence, the concept has a new effect. We can think of the sequence

as a constant carrying forward of implying into new implying which is in

turn carried forward into still newer implying. This process is a zig-zag

between what is implied on the one hand, and statements or actions on the

other. Implying and occurring respond to each other.

If we employ the zig-zag, we can monitor whether we are speaking from

the implicit intricacy, or not. Suppose you have some half-formed new ideasfor a paper, and now you have a chance to talk about it with someone. You

have a rich implicit sense of what you want to say, but nothing written. Talking

about such an implicit sense may kill it. You seem to have had only two dull

ideas. But we know that talking about it can also maximize and expand it.

Then you are amazed to find so many strands, all still developing. What does

this depend on?


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My point here is: You need not wait till you get home, and either deplore

speaking prematurely, or happily laud the power of dialogue. If you keep

returning to the implicit, you can check step by step whether the implicit

is being carried forward. If it shrivels, quickly discard the statement. Better

words will come.

This example will now help me to discuss a far-reaching conclusion:

Whether you will say retroactively that you had a rich idea or a thin one

depends not only on what you had, but also on whether it was carried forward

or not. Carrying forward has two past times, both the recorded time behind

it, and the retroactive past looking back from now. In the recorded past you

might remember how it seemed before you began speaking. In the retroactive

time you now say what the implying really was. Neither is invented. Bothare very precisely just what they are.

The carrying-forward sequence gives us a new concept of time. For exam-

ple, the new line lets the poet know what was really meant by the previous

lines. Now they may need revising, but this will be a sharpening, not just a

change. The process has reached back behind itself to carry forward what

the previous lines meant. Retroactively one can now explain just what it

was in the earlier lines that has led to this new one. There is not only the

remembered past, but also a new past, a second past which is experienced

from the present, back, but very precisely, not arbitrarily.5

I call the carrying forward sequence nonlaplacian. Laplace said if he

could know all the particles and their velocity at any one moment, he could

tell us everything about the past and the future. The zig-zag stands in contrast

to the Laplacian logic. We need both. Logical inference is indispensable and

arrives where nothing else can. You might often want to pursue 39 purely

logical steps in a row, but after that, or at any point, you can institute the

zig-zag process in which each step can revise the whole.

Action and speech-acts occur into implyingso that it becomes a next im-

plying. The present is constantly also the going back behind itself to bring

the past implying into the newly implied future. This pattern is more intricate

than linear time. It is a time of internal relations, rather than the usual time

which consists of perfectly present positions that are not related to each other

unless an observer externally relates them.

What I have presented are small samples, small bits from a philoso-phy. My intention is only to indicate a new way in which we can do phe-

nomenology of language, phenomenology of the body, and phenomenology of

concepts.

To move to the second section of this paper, I must rely largely on references

to the detailed philosophic work I have written elsewhere. I have to mention

it and then skip it.


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138 E.T. GENDLIN

I could show only a little here. We have become able to employ and (by

means of the employment also characterize) many of the ways in which the

intricacy functions in thinking, in language, and in action, as well as in logic

and science.

Thereby the philosophy has also developed several practices which are

being widely taught. I will mention them at the end.

In addition to carrying forward and crossing we have developed other

such more-than-logical concepts, for example implicit governing, and un-

separated multiplicity.

We have also found certain characteristics of more-than-logical processes.

The one I mentioned is that more conditions increase the degrees of freedom.

I have already mentioned theProcess Modelin which the carrying forwardprocess exhibits itself and develops concepts with which to understand itself.

These non-Laplacian concepts are both internally and logically connected.

They are inherently phenomenological, but also have the powers of logical

inference. They consist partly of the implicit functions themselves, but they

can also serve as purely logical concepts which can apply to the data of the

reductive sciences. This makes it possible to augment the latter so that we can

think also about living things and human beings.6

This philosophy provides a new way to go on from where most philosophers

stop. Of course they all employ the intricacy. Philosophy sharpens and usually

repositions the main terms, which can happen only because terms work in the

intricacy. Some philosophers also point to the intricacy. We can stand on their

shoulders and go on from their work, both because we can enter the intricacy,

and because we can let fresh language speak from it in new sentences and

with new patterns. In this way we can employ a philosophers contribution

more effectively. Also in this way we can go on from Husserl.

2.

Husserl discovered what I call the intricacy. And then he did not stop short

of it, as so many others did. He entered it and classified a thousand or so

facets, like Adam in Paradise naming all the animals.

In his way, Husserl already found that the presentoccurs intothe previous

implying and brings it forward as the new implying. He denied that timeconsists only of pure presents. He found that there is always also a protension

of the not-yet. For example, as I now begin this very sentence, you are already

. . . Yes. And, if I stop, you feel as if we had stopped in midst of a broad

jump. Phrased in my terms, he found that the presenthappens intoa previous

protension, and is also a new protention. If we enter further into the intricacy

here, we find carrying forward.


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Husserl also found that the intricacy cannot be exhausted. He says:

dass jede noch so weitgespannte Erfahrungsmannigfaltigkeit noch nahereund neue Dingbestimmungen offen lasst, und so in infinitum.7

that every manifold of experience, however far extended, leaves open stillcloser and new determinations of things and so ad infinitum.

He says as I just did, that the application of a concept requires us to enter into

the intricacy again, to find what the concept did there:

Der Ausdruck ist nicht so etwas wie . . . ein darubergezogenes Kleid; er

ist eine geistige Formung, die an der intentionalen Unterschicht neue in-tentionale Funktionen ubt, und von ihr korrelativ intentionale Funktionenerfahrt. Was dieses neue Bild wieder besagt, das muss an den Phanomenenselbst . . . studiert werden (IdeenI, para 124, p. 307).

An expression is not as one might suppose . . . like a covering dress; it is apsychic formation which performs new functions at the intentional under-layer, and experiences correlative functions from it. The import of this newpicture must be . . . studied at the phenomena themselves.

Husserl approached the intricacy with certain unquestioned categories, for

example his top divisions between perceiving, feeling, and willing. He did

not question linear time, geometric space, and mathematical logic, because it

was his project to derive these from the intricacy. He saw that he could derivethe clear and stable forms. He considered that his project would be completed

if he could find all that is involved in deriving these. And, he also assumes

that the intricacy is finite in this regard:

Der Ausdruck is vollstandig, wenn erallesynthetischen Formen und Ma-terien der Unterschicht begrifflich-bedeutungsmassig auspragt; (Ideen I,para 126, p. 309, my italics).

An expression is complete when it conceptually and meaningfully expli-catesall synthetic forms and materials of the underlayer.

Here I find in the margin my own note from when I first read this text many

years ago. It says: Is there an all?Even in regard to any one concern, the intricacy can always lead further,

and can enrich and complicate the earlier findings. But that never makes them

wrong or useless. Unless one finds an error (which is something distinctly

different, but this demands another intricate and unfinishable discussion), one

retains the earlier steps, although the further intricacy becomes implicit in

them.


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140 E.T. GENDLIN

Had Husserl not so often re-entered, he would have thought early on that he

had completed the work and made everything clear that could be clear. But he

was frustrated in his assumption that phenomenology reveals a singlerealm

of permanent objects and relationships. Whenever he returned where he had

found all his specific detail, he found that it had opened and developed further.

Now he had to write a more differentiated description. Others build edifices

he said, whereas I only dig further and further into the ground. In other

words, he found carrying forward and the responsive order, but did not rec-

ognize it as an inherent characteristic of experiencing and phenomenological

speaking-from.

If we enter the intricacy at any of the junctures Husserl opened, and if we

are not bound by his logical concern and his categories, we can go further atany point. We cannot go further just with his concepts and essences alone, but

we can, if we let them take the intricacy along, if we think not just with his

concepts but rather with the intricacy and the concepts.

With old habits we might wrongly assume that such a spot is entirely the

result of his categories, so that it would disappear if we question them. But this

is not so. AsExperiencing and the Creation of Meaningshows, the intricacy

we find by means of concepts and categories is not controlled by the concepts

and categories. In the intricacy they do not act as if they were logical premises

which control what we will find. What we find with them does not need to

remain consistent with them. What we directly find at any juncture where we

apply concepts, can immediately require a further differentiation in the very

concepts which led to it. The intricacy is not determined by any hierarchy

of concepts. Even the smallest detail, seemingly subsumed under a lower

concept, can lead to an experiential differentiation which reformulates the

top categories. I showed this reversal inExperiencing and the Creation of

Meaningand in a new procedure, thinking at the edge (TAE).8

Husserl found the implicit too, but he thought of it as a halo around

the edges of clear perceptions, like peripheral vision. He assumed that if he

looked directly at anything implicit, there would be only clear perceptions

there. We need not assume this. Husserl extended this perceptual model to all

other reports from the reflective phenomenological level.

The highest honor we can bestow on a philosophy is to make it fruitful

and significant in the future, by thinking further with it, across its limitations.For Husserl the unclear halo is only at the edge of what we perceive. This

is largely true for perception, although Merleau-Ponty showed that even a

head-on perception can include much that is not clear. But with perception

what is unclear is usually at the periphery. If instead of perception we con-

sider language and meaning, we find, instead, that the halo is the center.

To find what a statement means, we have to understand its implicit meaning.


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This is the central meaning, not the edge. Words mean the change they make

when they are said. The change happens implicitly in the situation. If we

examine what it is that functionsas the statements meaning, what difference

it makes to say it, what the point of it is, we discover that the implicit intri-

cacy is what actually functions when a statement functions. When we say I

understand it, the understanding is an implicit intricacy. When we do not un-

derstand a statement, we can only repeat the statement. We repeat its form of

words. But when we understand the statement, we can speak from it in many

ways.

For philosophy the model of clear perceptual objects found over there

and capable of being formulated alone, utterly breaks down. We cannot use

perception as the model for language or most everything else. An implicitintricacy functions centrally, and we have to study how speech, thought, and

actionfunctionin relation to it. Philosophy cannotmodel itself on the reception

of external perceptual objects. It has to study the process by which the

external/internal distinction comes about (A Process Model, VIIB).

The limitation of the model of perception is related to the problem about

the categories of description. The two problems go together. With perception

as the basic model, the categories of thinking, feeling, and willing seem apt.

A percept seems to be a mere apprehension. It seems to split itself off from

our affect about it, and our will to do something about it.

Husserls work is phenomenological in that he always begins from the

intricacy and finds much more there, than can follow from what he brought.

But, by reentering one can follow how the intricacy differentiates itself further.

Husserl knew not to attempt one logically coherent system from his many

independent articulations from intricacy. Each of these provides access to

reenter the intricacy. It is because Husserl enters the experienced intricacy

that he can generate so many new terms and distinctions at points where there

had been only a supposedly simple pattern before. But it is also for this reason

that he does not make analytically desirable distinctions when he does not

directly find them.

For example, among the many questionsZahavivery justly raises, it seems

true to me that Husserl does not make the following distinctions. Zahavi says:

Ultimately Husserl tends to equate (1) the first-personal mode of givenness,(2) self-awareness, (3) a certain basic sense of ego-centricity, and (4) thevery life of consciousness.9

The phrase tends to equate says a little too much, but I think Zahavi is right

that Husserl does not make the distinction which would set apart how the egos

self-awareness is a structural characteristic inherent in all experience. Zahavi


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142 E.T. GENDLIN

is also right to argue that this is Husserls view. Self-awareness is structurally

inherent,not merelythe perceiving of,or thepresence to experiences.Zahavi

is pursuing a cogent line of argument against Pothast, who seems to reduce

Husserls account just to the Is perception and ownership of experiences.

Zahavi writes:

If the ego is conceived as something standing opposed to or above the expe-rience, it is difficult to understand whythe egos awareness of theexperienceshould count as a case ofself-awareness. [In] Husserls discussion . . . theego . . . is not [just] something standing apart from the stream of conscious-ness, but isa structural part of its givenness (my italics)

I think Zahavi is right, that Husserl did not construe the I onlyas a pres-

ence over against experiences. But given the juncture at which what Husserl

describes what is directly experienced, and given Husserls logical categories,

I think that Husserl is right not to make the distinctions which Zahavi makes

in (1)(4) above. As Zahavi says, Husserl finds and says that self-experience

is inherent in the very structure of any experience. There are many places

where Husserl obviously speaks-from more than mere ownership. But I think

one cannot distinguish the inherent self-consciousness with the language and

kind of concepts Husserl had available.

Let me first cite the evidence to support Zahavis reading, and then show

what would be needed to provide phenomenologically the distinction which

Zahavi proposes.Husserl includes (without making a distinction) not just the presence of

experiences to the I, but also my what I do and suffer along with my

consciousness.

Husserl says:

Auch mein Leib ist mir gegenuber als Korper, aber nicht als Leib; derStoss, der . . . meinen Leib trifft, trifft mich. (Beilage VI of Ideen II)

Also my body is over against me as K orperbut not asLeib. The blow whichhits. . .my Leibhits me. A stab into my hand: I am stabbed.

It is interesting here to compare Wittgenstein on the relation of person andpain in the body.10

The blow to Husserls Leib which reaches what he calls mich clearly

goes beyond what is presented over against his I. I might see my knees and

feet over against me, but the stab reaches not just my hand but me. It opens the

body directly to phenomenology, not just as a mere pre-condition, as Merleau-

Ponty usually discusses it. And it supports my reading of his my what I


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do and suffer which I quoted above. In reading Husserl we can definitely

establish his finding of an I that goes beyond mere consciousness-of(mere

presence to, ownership of), although one has to search for special spots. As

Zahavi says, Husserl gives no distinctaccount of how the I is inherent in

the very formation of experiencing rather than only present to experiences.

Husserl puts his self-observations in quotation marks because he maintains

the reflective stand of the pure phenomenological I, but what he finds within

the quotes is his me which includes much more than this supposedly pure

I. I dont agree that the reflective phenomenological reporter is a pure per-

ceiving, but I can credit the report on the bodily I as much more than what

is perceptually presented in front of us.

Zahavi rightly seeks an account of the Ias a self-awarenessthat is inherentin every experience. But on what phenomenological grounds could we devise

such an account? Of course we would not want just to invent one of many

possible purely analytic theories. To go further we need to:

(a) return to Husserls source, the implicit intricacy where he found what he

wrote about,

(b) enter further into the intricacy which opens at this edge,

(c) let language form itself newly in relation to the intricacy, and

(d) allow the language to speak-from nonlogical patterns which (by applying

them) we can elevate to the role of new concepts.

The intricacy will respond variously to various kinds of attention and dis-

tinctions. If we come with the familiar distinctions and look for the familiar

result, we can find the old familiar things once again. Of course one can find

the familiar, already entitized packages such as memory, imagery, emotions,

perception, feeling, and willing. So we can surely alsofind the way in which all

experiences are inherently mine. Experiences are not things that exist alone.

We easily find the I which issues our ray of attention. And as Husserl

says, we can indeed shift this attentional viewing beam (Blickstrahl). We

just did this by shifting our attention to the body from inside. But do we find

these many experiences there? For example, take yesterday. Is yesterday

an experience, or is an experience rather that moment yesterday when . . . ,

or perhaps just only one of the many strands of relevances and consequenceswhich went into that moment? Now we can say that experiences are not

waiting there, in advance of our attention. They are not pre-cut.

Any way of attending toanexperience or experiencesis already a carrying

forward from the implicit intricacy. What seemed to be one experience can

become articulated into several, and each can be further articulated into many

more directly experienced strands. The common philosophical language has


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144 E.T. GENDLIN

no way to speak of an implicit multiplicity, a multiplicity that is not already

separated. If we speak from what we just found in new phrases, we can call

experiencing an unseparated multiplicity. This is a third non-atomic concept

we need.

By shifting the relevance implicit in our attending, we can take the smallest

most specific experience and find inside of it myriad strands which could

each again be an experience. In this respect this moment or yesterday

do not contain less than what we can come to notice in life or the human

condition.

Now we can say that there are no experiences as an already separated

multiplicity like stamps in an album or marbles in a bag. Experiencing is

variously and endlessly differentiable not only by speech and action, but alsoby attending to this, rather than to that. Mere attention is not mere. What

attending lifts out is a product. Attention has the same power to lift something

out, as any distinction in a phenomenological treatise does. Attention is an

active symbolizing, but never arbitrary. The response to it can surprise us and

force us to change our categories.

What attention brings is not arbitrary because experiencing is always sym-

bolized at least by the events that led up to this moment, and it almost al-

waysimplies, demands, and pre-figures a next step. Attention, (consciousness,

awareness, presence-to, . . .) is no merely neutral beam of light, although in

some respects this can be said of it. It is always also a special kind offurther

symbolizing and entitizing.

Of course the categories and concerns we bring are not just arbitrary either.

We respond within an ongoing continuity, or to an implicit demand. We can

evaluate this by entering into the implicit sense of it.Or, if such a demand is not

already there we attend with the project of letting such a demand form so that

we might know what to do next. No attention operates alone. It always comes

from and with a mesh of physically sensed relevance just as any other kind of

symbolizing does, and it is therefore questionable, relative, and various, and

yet also always in a precise and demanding relation to the implicit intricacy

which motivates it.

The attentional beam emerges from an intricate mesh of knowing, bod-

ily feeling, and doing which are not separate departments. When this mesh

changes, what attention can possibly bring, changes as well. We can enter thismesh at any time and carry forward some of what was functioning in it.

We can study various kinds of attention. Rather than imposing some old

classification, we can know that there will never be one final list of kinds.

Instead, we can let newly relevant kinds emerge here, as I will do now.

Rarely although very pleasantly, we attend just in a neutral way,just being

and looking. We might manage such neutral attending for some time. Usually


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we soon notice a distinct this or that. This is a second kind of attention.

We feel our felt intricacy being carried forward into the constellation ofjust

thisdetail. And as we attend to it, it may become insignificant, or grow and

develop. This is a third kind of attention.

More often our attention is not a peaceful neutral just being and looking.

Rather, we attend in order to search for something or keep track of something.

We attend only in a certain relevance, which is part of our situation and which

we know and feel without going into it. Recall Sartre in a restaurant looking

everywhere for the absent Pierre, thereby seeing none of the people who were

there.

We have already discussed the kind of attention which turns to a bodily

sense of implicit intricacy. Sometimes we find that it is already there (as inmy poetry example). But usually a felt sense comes in the body only if we

attend to its bodily coming before it comes. This is easy once one is familiar

with this kind of attention, but when new it seems odd and difficult.

A special kind which we have discussed, is attention to the sense of an un-

resolved philosophical problem. A forward step, sometimes a whole series of

such steps, may come if we just keep our attention on it. But if we enter what

is happening at such times we find that fresh philosophical thinking involves

an amazingly sophisticated type of attention. It involves making a bodily

change in which we set ourselves in a certain way. Now we will reject the

endless streams of distractions. We will constantly return to just this pregnant

spot. Each time we check again: Have we returned? Do we indeed have back

again that unresolved physical sense for the problem? We are very stubborn

and deliberate about holding our attention there, and yet also very delicate and

permissive to allow whatever comes to come, so long as it comes from it.

In an experiment by Vermersch you are asked to do three things which

require your attention at the same time.11 You find you cannot do it until

you place them into a rhythm so that they really become one thing, one pattern

of activity. You discover that the beam of attention is not loose. It cannot

oscillate quickly. You discover why. The reason is yourself! The beam is YOU

and you cannot bring yourself so quickly back and forth.

Thefact that so much andespecially we ourselves are implicitly involved

in the humble beam of attention can now come together with what I have

said about experiencing as a carrying forward process, and about internaltime. We might miss the inherent togetherness of self-consciousness and the

internal time of carrying forward, because we so accustomed to read the model

of perception into everything, as if our consciousness were only a perceiver,

added on to percepts. But here we have been pursuing a philosophical lead,

the sense that self-consciousness is structurally inherent in the very making

of experiencing, not just the perceiver of it.


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146 E.T. GENDLIN

Experiencing, I argue, is inherently a process of carrying forward,occurring

into implying, reaching back behind itself in going forward. The carried-

forward implying is also the present and also the next implying. The sequence

generates itself by means of the carrying forward relation.

Carrying forward is the continuous recognition that what is happening is

what was implied. Experiencing involves theinherent re-reception of itself

from moment to moment, a re-having of experiencing internal to the self-

generating of experiencing.

Now we can enter directly into our experiencing of what we call mere

attention, to see if we have spoken from it, and if it responds with more.

Is this intricacy carried forward if we say that attention is also a self-

reception? Of course, I find myself saying, I always felt implicitly thatIwas meant by pay attention! If I was not paying attention, it meant that

I myselfhad wandered away inside, and was not there with the event. So, of

course.

The concept of carrying forward lets us think how we differ from ma-

chines. The process ofconstant re-recognition of the implying differs from

mere reception considered as mere impact, for example on a film in a camera.

The film does not know that it received anything. There is only impact. Of

course there is impact also in experiencing, but the reaching behind itself in

going forward constitutes are-reception, a reception of the fact of reception,

which is also the further implying that brings the further occurring. In my

model the feedback generates the next step so that awareness is inherent in

the moment to moment genesis of behavior. There can be no division between

awareness and events that could supposedly happen without it. In the animal

world, even the lower animals, such event series do not exist. I have devel-

oped a conceptual model in which the usual flat is and the separated of is

replaced by a single implying-occurring pattern. We can build sophisticated

concepts using this pattern which we actually find when we articulate expe-

riencing. Phenomenology can develop its own concepts, and become able to

think beyond the inanimate model of time-space-fillers.

Without the continuous recognition inherent in carrying forwardwewould

not be there. There would notbe consciousness or attention, only some hypoth-

esized third-person events. Rather than a merely added light, consciousness

isthe self-generating ofexperiencing.I must point out the sharp difference between this reflexive re-reception

internal to experiencing, on the one hand, and what we call reflection on

the other hand. The reflexive re-reception generates the process. It generates

each next bit of process. A first-person process happens through this reflexive

re-reception. On the other hand, when we reflect, we take a separate stand

in relation to the past. The reflexivity of carrying forward is not the past,


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not reflection. It is the self-generating of the present. Reflexivity is a more

complex concept of the present.

Now we must ask: Is that what a personis, a bodily-situational mesh gen-

erating itself by its implying into occurring, its self-sensing? Is that you? Is

that me? I go to see directly: The concept does indeed speak-from how I am

always there again having already been there before. This is certainly enough

reason to keep the concept and the intricacy it carries forward. It has powerful

logical implications despite not consisting of logical units itself. I think you

will find it a very useful concept. But of course it is only a thin little pattern,

very far from carryingme forward in my myriad ways that I sense implicitly

as me. So, of course, when we think about ourselves or self-consciousness,

we think from THAT, and not just from this concept, or just from any concept.We think from the intricacy from which it speaks, which is always capable of

much that cannot follow from the concept.

Leibnitz said that each person is a differentmirror of the whole. Nobody

else can replace you. You cannot define you. A person is anoematic. You

cannot become an object of your knowledge. To think about what a person is,

you have to think you.

I want to conclude by touching on the topics I mentioned at the outset, to

show that phenomenology can be basic to them and is certainly not excluded

from them.

Levinas said that another person is not just your other, not alive to fit you

or to frustrate you by being other than you need. The other person is not your

other. Another person is alive in different dimensions, another life with its

own issues, and not the issues seem to you to be, not how they seem to be

other-than yours. Levinas is right about this. But this does not mean that you

are not connected. The other person is already inherent in your bodily carrying

forward of your situation. How you are a self remains mysterious; how you

are the other people and the things is obvious.

The reality of the other person who keeps me company is not based on

same or other. Implicit intricacy gets past the old notions. Another person

keeps me the most company when we touch or look at each other silently and

implicitly. Each of us is a thick implicit process. If we relate to each other

from there, then we can be very close with very little content shared. Or, we

can share a lot but the company is thick only if we relate from there. Of courseanother person may not choose to interact from the implicit level. Then we

are at a distance. Even so I can relate to that implicit level, since it is there.

Phenomenology has no problem going beyond a single persons private

experiencing, because experiencing is inherently an interaction process in

a situation with other people and things. What appears is neither internal

nor external, neither just private nor just interactional. My situation is not


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148 E.T. GENDLIN

subjective since the others in it are more than I can experience, but neither

is it objective since my situation does notexist apart from me.My situation is

a function of me, although the other people and things in it are not a function

of me. Again we find a pattern that is more complex than subjective or

objective, or a combination of these artificial two. Rather, our interpersonal

interactions are patterned so that we count on the ways in which the others

have private experiencing, while the process of private experiencing is itself

always the carrying forward of situations with the others. This is a more

complex pattern that can be reduced to logical units. Yet it is totally familiar.

Each is inherently implicit in what the other is.

My body is a situational body environment interaction. Rather than just

a structure in space and time, every organ of the human body is better thoughtof as a carrying forward. The body is situational, suffused by me and how

I live in my situations.

Phenomenology does not exclude the unconscious. A few steps into im-

plicit intricacy reveal what wethensay was implicit. After many zig-zag

steps we can look back and apply the phrase was unconscious, knowing of

course that this is the retroactive past from here. About the earlier time we

know that it was not there as it is now formed, but whatever was there could

give rise to these steps through which it has now appeared.

We can phenomenologically study how we use logic for examples in

philosophical analysis, or in computing our bank account. We do it by holding

the implicit intricacy aside, it is always there. We know why we are pursuing

this logical chain just now, and what it means for our philosophy or our

finances. We keep all this aside so as to follow only the logic. Without

this implicit holding-aside, the logical thinking would not be possible. Logic

brings out what nothing else can.12 Logic has remade the world so that it can

support six billion people. But logical analysis must always be positioned by

someone, and it can be repositioned. The results of the logical chain have their

meaning within the context that is being kept aside. Logic does not control

where it begins and ends. It also does not control the creation of the defined

units it requires. One slight shift in the implicit meaning of any one unit can

utterly undo a logical conclusion. By entering the implicit directly, we can

generate a whole territory of distinctions and new entities, and then position

the logical analysis where it is informed by the implicit intricacy. We can muchbetter use the great human power of logic when we can enter the implicit and

consider where to position and re-position the logic, and how to create its

units. We do not need the assumption that reality consists of defined units.

Phenomenology does not exclude science; rather it derives the forms of

science as well as alternatives to them. One of the major implications of my

argument concerns what I call third-person science, especially the relation


23/25


of consciousness to neurology. I argue that third-person events supposedly

just filling empty space and time constitute an obvious construction, a wild

assumption, floating as they seem to do over there at separate points alone,

requiring an idealized observer to interconnect them. This kind of science

has made more progress than any other in human history, but we can surely add

another kind of science which can also employ a more complex first-person

model. We have developed such a model far enough to show its possibility.

I have been arguing against the assumption that consciousness is a mere

addition to events considered as if they could happen in the same way without

consciousness. The reflexivity of the person is not a mere consciousness-

of, not an addition to perceived things, as if percepts existed as mechanical

events, leaving consciousness an empty of, which can seem unnecessary.The current concept of consciousness is the poor remainder that is left-over

when reductive science defines the content as if it consisted of events that can

occur alone. To split the things away makes us a mere of, of events in a third-

person world without us. The third-person science needs to be augmented by

a first-person science.13

From this philosophy of the implicit have come two practices. Yes, phi-

losophy now comes with practices, just as philosophy did in ancient times.

What is now called Focusing consists of simple steps to attend in the body

where the implying can come. We have a lot of phenomenology on how this is

done. Focusing is useful in many ways, and has now generated a world-wide

network of trained teachers and focusing partners. Focusing is often done

alone, but is also practiced regularly with a listening partner. One need not

understand the philosophy to do this practice. It enables one to find and enter

the intricacy.

A second practice has developed just in the last three years. It enables one

to find that use of language which brings fresh phrasing, not caught within

the old assumptions. It is called TAE. As in focusing, one takes turns with

a listening partner. We find that most people have a deep response to the

following question:

In your professional field or in your life, what do you know and cannotyet say, that wants to be said?

When we enter the implicit we find not just a plethora of unseparated strands,

but also something known that seems in need of being said, something de-

manding which could not be said something that was perhaps hanging there

for many years. People find no words to say it. Each word that is attempted

couldbring some vital strand, but of course the word means something else

and would be misunderstood. By letting whole sentences come from what


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150 E.T. GENDLIN

they wish this old word could mean, people soon find fresh phrases coming

from several strands of what had been one dark knot. These new sentences do

not say something else. They cannot be misunderstood. If they make sense at

all to someone, they say their new sense.

If TAE is followed all the way, it leads to the formation of a theory, by

which I mean a set of concepts that are implicitly-emergent and also logically

interlinked. Most people do not come so far, but they find it exciting and

politically empowering to become able to speak and think from what had

been a mute knowing. The usual report after TAE is Ive been talking about

it ever since!! Also, I love being able to think. I did not know I could think.

For us as philosophers, the process develops concepts. Any topic that is

articulated from the implicit will go much further into that topic.The directly sensed intricacy vastly exceeds the common generalities. In

any field almost anything we wish to think about lies waiting with its much

finer intricate order. If we make our home at the edge of the implicit intricacy,

we can employ all formulations, all logic and mathematics, all measurements

and third-person variables, and we can then also enter the implicit intricacy

to which they have just led.

Speaking-from implicit intricacy can revolutionize most any topic. One

can transform any topic by thinking with, and also about how the implicit

functions in that topic. Once you know how to let this datum come from the

implicit, you can use it in anything you are investigating. You can find some of

what was hidden in what seemed clear. You can find what needs to be said and

has not been possible to say, a gift and a demand. Then your bodys language

can rearrange its words to speak from it.

Notes

1. The Responsive Order: A New Empiricism,Man and World30/3 (1997): 383411.

2. Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning(New York: Free Press, Macmillan, 1962); 2nd

paperback edition (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1997).

3. See www.focusing.org for an overview of the research. Twenty-seven successive studies

have shown that higher levels on the Experiencing Scale (applied to the tape-recorded

interviews) correlate with more successful outcome in therapy. The philosophy has led to

wide applications in psychotherapy and other fields.

4. Reply to Mohanty, in Language Beyond Postmodernism: Saying and Thinking inGendlins Philosophy, ed. David M. Levin (Evanston: Northwestern University Press,

1997). See also Crossing and Dipping: Some Terms for Approaching the Interface Be-

tween Natural Understanding and Logical Formation, Minds and Machines 5/4 (1995):

547560; and Thinking Beyond Patterns: Body, Language and Situations, in The Pres-

ence of Feeling in Thought, ed. B. den Ouden and M. Moen (New York: Peter Lang, 1992),

pp. 25151, also at www.focusing.org.

5. For the new time model, seeA Process Model, IV, V (available at www.focusing.org,


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printed from Focusing Institute, 1997), here, IVB.

6. Much of the philosophy is available at www.focusing.org, click philosophy.

7. Edmund Husserl,IdeenI and II (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950 and 1952), IdeenI,

para 3.

8. Introduction to Thinking At The Edge (TAE),The Focusing Folio, 2004.

9. Dan Zahavi, Self-Awareness and Alterity (Evanston: Northwestern University Press,

Evanston, 1999).

10. If someone has a pain in his hand . . . one does not comfort the hand, but the sufferer:

One looks into his face (Philosophical Investigations286). See also my What Happens

When Wittgenstein Asks: What Happens When . . .? in Zur Sprache Kommen: Die

Ordnung und das Offene nach Wittgenstein, [conference paper, University of Potsdam,

1996]Philosophical Forum28/3 (1997), also at www.focusing.org.

11. Pierre Vermersch,Carbondale Conference, Southern Illinois University, 2001.

12. See the power of patterns, derived inA Process Model, VIIA.13. SeeFirst-Person Science, www.focusing.org.

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The new phenomenology of carrying forward

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