The Next American Voter

The Political Demography of American Partisanship

Eric Kaufmann – Birkbeck College, University of London, e.kaufmann@bbk.ac.uk

Anne Goujon & Vegard Skirbekk- IIASA, Austriagoujon@iiasa.ac.at

American Political Demography• Kevin Phillips' The Emerging

Republican Majority (1969)• Teixeira and Judis, The

Emerging Democratic Majority (2004)

• ‘Key’ segments change: Blue-collar whites, soccer moms, Latinos, young, old, ‘metro’

• Field dominated by partisans and pundits. Teixeira 2008 an improvement

• Still, need a more rigorous demographic approach that accounts for all trends

American Macropartisanship• Party Identification vs. Voting• How Stable is Party Identification?

Partisanship, GSS and NES Compared, Major Parties Only, 1972-2004

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

Dem-GSS

Dem-NES

Rep-GSS

Rep-NES

Theories of Macropartisanship

• Green et al. 1998, 2002 – party identification becomes part of self-identity. Affective, durable, resists vicissitudes

• Fiorina 1991; Erikson, Mackuen et al. 1998; Achen 2002 – unstable‚ running tally

• Moving equilibrium: Meffert, Norpoth et al. 2001

• Our method compatible with either stable or moving equilibrium theories

Why Demography?

• Demography the most predictable of the social sciences. Electorate of 2026 is alive today

• Plea from APSA presidents and foreign policy community to incorporate demography

• Not futurology: multivariate models posit a universal predictive model y=f(x1, x2...).

• But what happens between now and equilibrium?: Demographic models can predict at a point in time by accounting for current composition, age structure, fertility, migration

Fixed, Base Parameters

• Largely drawn from GSS 2000-6• Two-Party Population at start year, by sex, 5-

yr bands. Independents held to 15 pc, excluded.

• Partisanship transmitted from parents to children. Neither mother, father, Democrat or Republican advantaged in transmission

Parameters Which Could Change

• Unlike base population, these could change, so we need to develop an expected scenario and alternatives

• Net immigration by party id (by age, sex)• Children per woman by party id • Mortality assumed the same

Immigration • 1.2m per year (many regularized illegals)• Immigrant partisanship = ‘Other Race’ party id• Flow reduced to 863k due to 28 pc of ‘other

race’ with no party idPartisanship, All Americans,

2000-2006 Period (GSS)

Democrats 44%

Republicans 37%

Others 19%

Partisanship, 'Other' Race, 2000-2006 Period (GSS)

Democrats 51%

Republicans 21%

Others 28%

Fertility: A Shift to the Republicans• 1972-84, Democratic Advantage: 2.85 to 2.59

among 40-59 women• 2001-6 Even: 2.39 Democrat v 2.38 Republican

for 40-59 women• 2001-6 Republican Edge Among women over 17:

4 %• Why?: Lower-status v. Upper-status whites,

second demographic transition. • Possible Scenario: growing Republican

advantage: (1.8 v. 1.4 in 2043)

Location of states with respect to the total fertility rate (TFR) in 2002 and the index of fertility

postponement in 2002: non-Hispanic white women

Source: Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2005

Which Will Win?: Fertility vs. Immigration

• ‘Liberals have a big baby problem: They're not having enough of them, they haven't for a long time, and their pool of potential new voters is suffering as a result'. (Brooks 2006)

• 'In Seattle,' adds Longman, 'there are nearly 45% more dogs than children. In Salt Lake City, there are nearly 19% more kids than dogs.' (Longman 2006)

How Important is Demography?• Korey and Lascher (2006): doubling of non-white

electorate during 1990-2001 in California, but only 3-point shift to Democrats

• Here we find just 2.4-point shift to Democrats despite growth of minorities from 30 to 50 percent of the total

• Partly because younger minority voters less Democratic than elders (an assimilation/upward mobility effect)

• Age structure has locked in growing diversity, but stable partisanship

Conclusion• Partisanship stable, no dramatic shift to Democrats.

Much less change in partisan composition than racial composition

• Still, we expect 2.4-point shift to Democrats between 2003 and 2043. Most of this is due to immigration

• Reduced immigration will affect this projection• Not enough of a shift to lead to a natural party of

government• Republicans could gain from growing fertility

advantage, but only after 2050

The Next American Voter

The Political Demography of American Partisanship

Eric Kaufmann – Birkbeck College, University of London, e.kaufmann@bbk.ac.uk

Anne Goujon & Vegard Skirbekk- IIASA, Austriagoujon@iiasa.ac.at

Partisanship and the Vote

• Consistently a leading, if not the leading predictor• Lag effect: previous immigrants naturalize and

their children are more partisan, so immigration matters more; new immigrants (whom we assume become partisans) vote at lower rates, so immigration matters less

• I.e. Nevada: Hispanics are 20 percent of population but just 10 percent of voters.

• Why?: Citizenship, Registration, Participation

Partisan Age Structure 2003 (GSS 2000-2006)

•Democrats more female, but only slightly younger

Partisan Age Structures in 2043 (Expected)