The Northern Way

NORTHERN WAY

North-South Connections

Report

August 2007

Prepared for: Prepared by:

The Northern Way Steer Davies Gleave

West Riding House 67 Albion Street Leeds LS1 5AA +44 (0)113 242 9955 www.steerdaviesgleave.com


\\Douglas\Work\Projects\6700s\6745\Outputs\Reports\HSL Report\High SPeed Rail paper final.doc

Contents

Contents Page

SUMMARY

1. INTRODUCTION 1

The Northern Way Growth Strategy 1

The Strategic Direction for Transport 1

The Eddington Transport Study 2

The Rail White Paper 3

The Need for a North South Rail Strategy 4

This Report 5

2. THE IMPORTANCE OF LINKS TO LONDON 7

Estimates of agglomeration benefits of high speed rail network in the UK. 11

Summary 15

3. CURRENT AND FUTURE CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS ON THE EXISTING NETWORK 17

Passenger rail services 17

Freight traffic 20

Summary 23

4. A LONG-TERM STRATEGY: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 24

Twin strategic goals 24

Responding to the capacity problem 24

Questions of focus 26

5. CONCLUSIONS 28

APPENDICES

A AGGLOMERATION METHODOLOGY



Summary

SUMMARY

1. Links to World City functions in London are of fundamental importance to Northern productivity. Over time these north-south links will become more important to the Northern economy.

2. The road and rail networks linking the North with the South also have to accommodate growing volumes of freight and numbers of commuters. As demand grows important business traffic could be squeezed out, and this is a risk factor for the North’s economy.

3. The future state of the transport links from the North to Heathrow is also a fundamental concern, exacerbated by the potential loss of domestic air services from the North as a result of the Open Skies agreement which is deregulating the trans-Atlantic market, and planned increases in charges at Heathrow.

4. The Government’s July 2007 Rail White Paper notes future capacity pressure on north-south links and suggests addressing capacity pinchpoints, providing new higher capacity trains and new in-cab signalling will deliver adequate capacity to 2030. There are risks in this approach, including higher than anticipated demand and delays and cost escalation in capacity enhancement schemes. A resurgent Northern economy will lead to faster growth in rail demand (passenger and freight) on the routes from the North to London than assumed by the Government in its White Paper.

5. There is also particular short and medium term uncertainty over future plans for the East Coast Main Line. While the commitment from Government to trial the new generation inter-city train on the East Coast Main Line from 2012 is welcome, there appears to be no other major funding commitment to this route in the period 2009-14, yet it is already acknowledged to be running in effect at capacity.

6. While ruling out a number of longer term strategic options for enhancing north-south capacity, including maglev systems and freight-only lines, the Rail White Paper suggests new passenger line options are worthy of further consideration. The Government’s view from the evidence that it has considered is that the balance of advantage is with the construction of new lines operating at conventional (current) line speeds rather than the higher speeds found on new lines across Europe.

7. The Northern Way urges the Government to note the importance of additional capacity for north-south links and also the additional productivity benefits that quicker journeys will bring to the North.

8. The Northern Way has important new evidence that supports this point. There is significant wider economic benefit, additional to that identified by the Eddington Transport Study, in the form of agglomeration benefit. This additional benefit is worth as much as £10bn over 60 years and has a significant contribution to the economic growth of the North. There are similar levels of impact on London’s economy, so the case for high-speed rail is not just about connecting the North to London – it is about integrating the North’s and South’s economies. High-speed rail may, therefore, have a stronger overall economic case than other candidate transport investments, and a stronger case than has thus far been recognised by Government.



Summary

9. The Northern Way agrees with the White Paper conclusion that line-of-route enhancements are to be avoided, noting that the West Coast Main Line Upgrade programme will have entailed about ten years of disruption when completed. The Northern Way wants to see improvements that will protect and, if possible, enhance the quality of the links in terms of journey times and reliability of journey times; but it will also like to avoid a period of extended disruption on the East Coast Main Line as has happened on the West Coast.

10. The Northern Way also notes that the Department for Transport’s own evidence suggests that the problem of capacity appears to be just as great on the eastern side of the country as the western. Furthermore, expressed as a proportion of regional GDP, the wider benefits of high speed links are greatest in the North East. It is also from this region (and Yorkshire and the Humber) that Heathrow air links are most at risk.

11. This leads to the conclusion that what is required is a strategy for north-south high-speed rail serving both east and west sides of the Pennines and London.

12. In addition, a trans-Pennine high-speed rail connector would deliver a substantial uplift in agglomeration benefits. A trans-Pennine high-speed connector, integrated as part of a national network of high-speed rail links, will facilitate not only a new economic geography of faster city to city links across the North but also nationally through faster linkages between the North East and Yorkshire and the West Midlands, and between the North West and East of England growth areas.

13. Developing a north-south rail strategy will need the involvement of Government and Network Rail, as well as stakeholders from across the North. The Northern Way’s March 2007 submission to Government committed the Northern Way to contribute to the development of such a strategy. In its White Paper the Government has stated that it will consider further the case for additional north-south capacity in time for the planned 2012 High Level Output Statement. It goes on to say that any proposal must:

• Tackle congestion on key rail routes; • Be affordable and deliver good value for money • Be environmentally sustainable and deliver a good environmental return for the

investment committed.

14. The Northern Way supports these objectives, but while these are important ambitions from the Northern Way’s perspective the future assessment of proposals must also recognise that:

• Growth in the North’s economy will generate and will require additional business travel between the North and London and the South East for which capacity needs to be provided.

• The successful delivery of the Northern Way’s goal of closing the output gap between the North and the national average will result in faster rates of growth than anticipated in the White Paper.

• There are significant and substantial wider economic benefits to the North (and the rest of the Country) that have not yet been taken into account.

• That an opportunity exists to support the development of a new economic geography by connecting the growth areas in the South with resurgent Northern City Regions.



1

1. INTRODUCTION

The Northern Way Growth Strategy

1.1 The Northern Way Growth Strategy Moving Forward: The Northern Way set out how the Northern Way would seek to bridge the £30 billion output gap between the North and the English regional average, over a 25 year period, by growing the North’s economy faster. The Growth Strategy was developed to build on the North’s three Regional Economic Strategies and Regional Spatial Strategies.

1.2 The Growth Strategy identified three transport investment priorities:

• to improve surface access to the North’s airports; • to improve access to the North’s sea ports; and • to improve links within and between the North’s City Regions.

The Strategic Direction for Transport

1.3 To support its September 2006 submission to the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR), the Northern Way developed its Strategic Direction for Transport. This is an evidence-based assessment of the most appropriate transport interventions that will promote productivity gain, while at the same time seeking to protect and enhance the North’s natural and built environment, and contributing to meeting the nation’s commitments regarding climate change. Looking over a 20 to 30 year time horizon, it sits below the three high-level transport goals of the Growth Strategy and above the level of individual schemes and projects. The Strategic Direction sets out the types of interventions which will have a productivity impact, as well as where in the North those interventions will have the greatest impact.

1.4 The Strategic Direction identifies connections from the North to London and to Heathrow as critical issues for businesses in the North, as well as for inbound tourism. It also reports preliminary evidence that reducing journey times between the North and London and the South East could further stimulate productivity growth in the North. The importance of rail freight and, in particular, the growing inter-modal market is also noted. The Strategic Direction goes on to highlight the finite capacity of the East Coast, West Coast and Midland Main Lines to cater for additional passenger and freight traffic and the need for additional capacity if the detrimental effect on productivity growth in the North is to be avoided once these lines reach capacity.

1.5 As a consequence, the Strategic Direction says:

“The Northern Way supports the development of the case for measures which will increase the capacity and speed of rail links between the North’s City Regions and between the North and London, Heathrow and the Channel Tunnel. Because of the very substantial wider economic benefits it would bring, including opportunities it ought to create for improving the use of local rail networks (by removing express



2

services) a north-south high speed fixed link should be considered in the longer term, as should more immediate proposals to enhance the network”. 1

The Eddington Transport Study

1.6 In 2005, Sir Rod Eddington was commissioned jointly by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer and Secretary of State for Transport to examine the long-term links between transport and the UK's economic productivity, growth and stability, within the context of the Government's broader commitment to sustainable development. The Study was announced in the 2005 Budget and was published on 1st December 2006 to accompany the 2006 Pre-Budget Report. 2

1.7 The findings of the Eddington Transport Study echoed those of the Northern Way, namely that the most significant productivity gains are through addressing the problems of congestion within and between City Regions, and by enhancing access to international gateways.

1.8 The report drew on new research commissioned and undertaken on behalf of the Eddington Transport Study and published alongside it, including forecasts of growth in inter-urban rail prepared by Atkins.

1.9 The Eddington Transport Study was on publication interpreted as being unsupportive of high speed links and other step-change infrastructure projects, preferring instead measures which make better use of the existing transport system and relatively modest investment to increase capacity.

1.10 However, as Sir Rod’s evidence to the House of Commons Transport Select Committee demonstrates, the notion that his report recommends against new high speed links is incorrect. 3 Sir Rod maintained that he was modally agnostic and that the decisions on what to invest in should be evidence-based, determined by the business case vis-à-vis alternatives and the impacts on productivity and the economy. He went on to say that he had dismissed innovative approaches such as maglev. This was because he saw the benefits as being speculative, the costs as being both high and at high risk of being higher than suggested by proponents of such approaches. Consequently he did not see there being a business case. In contrast, he also pointed out that established technologies such as high speed lines found in Europe tend to have a lower cost and lower risk than newer innovative approaches such as maglev, and that they should be considered further. Importantly, he also suggested that proposals that provided relief to crowded sections on rail main line were likely to have greater benefits than other proposals. In this respect, he highlighted the corridor from London to Birmingham, Manchester and beyond as having potential to deliver a strong business case.

1 Northern Way (2007) Strategic Direction for Transport § 2.11 2 Eddington, R (2006) The Eddington Transport Study Main Report: Transport’s Role in Sustaining the

UK’s Productivity and Competitiveness 3 House of Commons Transport Committee (2007) Uncorrected Transcript of Oral Evidence of 16th April

2007 to be published as HC-458-i: The Eddington Transport Study



3

The Rail White Paper

1.11 The Government’s Rail White Paper Delivering a Sustainable Railway4 was published in July. In it the Government recognised the importance of providing adequate capacity to support growth in passenger and freight demand as well as to deliver a punctual and reliable railway. In the short and medium term, the Government stated that its preferred approach is to get the most from the established network by:

• lengthening trains and addressing key capacity pinchpoints; • bringing the new generation of Intercity Express (IEP) trains into full service

from 2015; • development of radio-based in-cab signalling (ERTMS) to allow an increase in

train frequencies.

1.12 More specifically the Government also indicated:

• support for the completion of capacity works needed on the West Coast Main Line, including provision of additional capacity in the Stafford area as well as lengthening the Pendolino fleet and commuter trains on the southern parts of the route;

• in the light of projected demand growth, it may be necessary to undertake a substantial programme of investment on the East Coast Main Line to address bottlenecks, in addition to the extra capacity that could be provided by IEP trains.

• delivery of journey time reductions on the Midlands Main Line through the East Midlands franchise and in the future additional capacity could be provided with new IEP rolling stock.

• commitments to lengthen trains operated by Trans Pennine Express and reduce journey times between Manchester and Leeds, and Manchester and Liverpool.

1.13 The Government’s forecast is that in the period to 2030 passenger rail demand will grow by 73%, although it notes that there is a degree of uncertainty surrounding this forecast and that some routes will grow at faster rates than others. The Government concludes that with a rate of spend at levels similar to those planned to 2014, the principal measures described in the White Paper (addressing bottlenecks, train lengthening and in-cab signalling) will be sufficient to meet growth on all routes until about 2030. However, the Government also recognises that only so much can be achieved with the current network. If demand grows at faster rates than anticipated, additional north-south network capacity will be required and a genuinely long term strategy for the railways should look at the options for further increases in capacity. Likewise, if the programme of addressing bottlenecks, new trains and new signalling does not provide the anticipated degree of capacity uplift then additional north-south capacity will be required.

1.14 The White Paper then goes on to consider a number of strategic options to enhance north south capacity. In particular, the Government rules out three possible strategic options, namely the construction of a freight-only north south line, the construction of

4 Delivering a Sustainable Railway Cm 7176 July 2007.



4

additional tracks adjacent to the current north-south main lines and maglev. It published a separate report on maglev which expands on the reasons why it was not prepared to support such an idea.5

1.15 The Government concludes that any future long term option should focus on new line options. However, it expressed concern over environmental (carbon) impacts of higher speed and therefore suggested that any such new route might be more appropriately operated at current main line speeds (c.200 km/h) instead of the higher speeds (c.300 km/h) now common across Europe. It stated further work would be needed to establish the costs and benefits of these two alternatives and to understand the environmental consequences of new routes. The White Paper stated that as well as north-south routes, east-west links (including trans-Pennine) needed to be assessed, although it also noted that, from the Department’s perspective, the balance of advantage currently appeared to favour services at conventional speeds on reopened alignments between London, Birmingham and Manchester.

The Need for a North South Rail Strategy

1.16 As part of its September 2006 CSR submission the Northern Way undertook to make a further submission to Government setting out its short, medium and long term priorities for investment in the North’s transport system. This submission was made at the end of March 2007. What the Northern Way’s prioritisation work shows is that while the transport proposals being pursued by stakeholders across the North will make worthwhile contributions to productivity growth, taken together they do not allow the Strategic Direction to be met. Consequently, if the North’s productivity growth is to be maximised the strategic “gaps” between what is currently being promoted and what the Strategic Direction suggests will be required need to be addressed. One of these gaps identified in the March 2007 submission is the absence of a medium to long term strategy for the enhancement of rail links between the North and London and the South East.

1.17 The July publication of the Government’s Rail White Paper and the associated High Level Output Statement (HLOS) and Statement of Funds Available (SOFA) has provided a degree of clarity on the Government’s view on the future development of north south rail links. The Government has set out what it sees being implemented in the short to medium term, as well as narrowing the options for medium to longer term investment. Longer term, the White Paper approach to enhancing main line capacity is predicated on a delicate balance between the rate of future growth in demand and incremental capacity enhancements being sufficient to deliver adequate north south capacity. From the Northern Way’s perspective there remains a long term strategic gap between what is currently being promoted and what is needed to meet the Northern Way’s Strategic Direction.

1.18 The purpose of this report is to elaborate the rationale for a strategy for north-south links and to provide additional evidence on the wider economic impacts of such

5 Professor Roger Kemp and Professor Roderick Smith (2007) Technical Issues Raised by the Proposal to Introduce a 500 km/h Magnetically-Levitated Transport System in the UK



5

improvements. It is intended to set the context for the development of the scope of such a strategy and action required.

1.19 Like all the Northern Way’s work it is rooted in evidence. Both the beneficial impacts of enhanced connectivity between the North and South and the negative impact of future rail capacity constraints are considered. The range of possible interventions and the likely scale of their impacts are also considered. The evidence cited in this report reaffirms the position the Northern Way reached when it established its Strategic Direction for Transport: if the North’s productivity growth is to be maximised both greater capacity and faster journey times between the North and South are required. The report shows, in particular, the potential scale of agglomeration benefits from improved north-south links.

1.20 Developing a north-south rail strategy will need the involvement of Government and Network Rail, as well as stakeholders from across the North. The March 2007 submission to Government committed the Northern Way to contribute to the development of such a strategy. In its White Paper the Government has stated that it will consider further the case for additional north-south capacity in time for the 2012 HLOS. It goes on to say that any proposal must:



1.21 The Northern Way supports these objectives, but while these are important ambitions from the Northern Way’s perspective the future assessment of proposals must also recognise that:





This Report

1.22 In this report we set out the evidence of why from the Northern Way’s perspective it is important that, when looking at how to enhance connectivity between London and the South East and the North, the case for high speed links has to be considered. By high speed links we mean services that offer a step-change reduction to journey times between the North and South by operating at maximum line speeds greater than those of the current main line network.



6

1.23 First we demonstrate the economic importance of such links between the North and South and how there can be additional productivity gain as a direct result of reducing journey times. This includes new work which explores the substantial scale of agglomeration benefits that high speed rail could potentially generate and which thus far have not been considered by the Eddington or the Government when developing their positions on north south links.

1.24 As the Government notes in its White Paper there is uncertainty around long term forecasting. It assessment that the rail network will have adequate capacity until 2030 is based upon a view on the rate of future demand growth and the rate which additional capacity is provided. We go on to show that there are other contemporary forecasts which suggest that growth in the demand for passenger and freight movements between the North and South will result in increasing capacity constraints on the current rail network, with consequent adverse impacts of suppressed demand, on-train over-crowding and on punctuality and reliability.

1.25 Finally we agree with the Government’s own assessment that while enhancements to the existing network will no doubt bring worthwhile benefits, they also come with a cost in terms of significant disruption during construction. Moreover, they are also unlikely either to provide a long-term sustainable solution to meeting the needs of a resurgent Northern economy or to maximise the additional economic growth required to narrow the £30bn productivity gap between the North and the English average.



7

2. THE IMPORTANCE OF LINKS TO LONDON

2.1 The Northern Way’s Strategic Direction for Transport notes that evidence exists on the strength of economic links between London and those parts of the North which are anticipated to have the greatest quantum of economic growth. For example, there is research focussed on the North West. In this work the University of Salford et al identified commuting and supply chain links between five economic ‘hotspots’ in the North West, each displaying favourable economic characteristics.6 A significant proportion of major firms interviewed by the study team “were found to source a significant proportion of services from the capital.” Figure 2.1 shows the key organisational linkages between financial services firms identified by the study team. Supply chains for other types of services, especially goods, were found to be more internalised within the region.

FIGURE 2.1 ORGANISATIONAL LINKS BETWEEN FINANCIAL SERVICES FIRMS IN THE NORTH WEST7

Source: University of Salford et al (2006) Figure 2

6 University of Salford Centre for Sustainable Urban & Regional Futures, University of Manchester Centre of Urban Policy Studies and Institute of Political & Economic Governance and Salford GIS (2006) Rethinking the North West Spatial Economy (Strengthening the evidence base of key economic and spatial strategies in the Northwest) Summary of Key Findings

7 In this work linkages between the Manchester and Leeds economies were explored, as well as the links from Leeds to London. However, the work did not comprehensively consider the links between Yorkshire & the Humber and London. We are confident that if this research was fully extended to look at other regions similar strong linkages to London will be found.



8

2.2 Given this pattern of business linkage, both within the North and between the key cities of the North and London, it is clear that the performance of the northern economy will be affected by the quality of its transport links, in terms of reliability, frequency and journey times on offer for the economically important business trips between the key cities (east-west and north-south). The future of north-south links is therefore extremely important. Already London has a very widely spread commuting hinterland, which is anticipated to grow further. This creates what for the North is ‘intervening’ demand, using the same road and rail networks that link the North to London and the South East. Growth in the East and West Midlands, and the the ‘Growth Areas’ in the South East, will add further demand to the north-south links.

2.3 The on-going work to enhance the capacity of the West Coast Main Line is welcomed as are the short to medium term measures put forward in the Rail White Paper for the East Coast and Midland Main Lines, but while there are general aspirations of addressing capacity bottlenecks, introducing new stock and a new signalling systems there is currently no medium to long term agreed way forward for the East Coast and Midland Main Lines. Moreover, for the strategic highway network decisions on the M6 between Birmingham and the North West and some parts of the M1 remain outstanding. As the Eddington Transport Study has shown there are also no plans to deal with traffic growth on the motorway network in the longer term, which in part contributed to Eddington arguing in favour of the introduction of a national road user charging scheme. Without a strategy for enhancing north-south links regional productivity growth will be damaged by the deterioration of rail and road network performance which will occur as congestion levels increase over the next 10 to 20 years.

2.4 The SURF research is clear that London stands at the apex of a national hierarchy of business services.8 This is due to links between regional centres and London-based parent companies and importantly, the higher-order services that London offers, not only because it is the largest centre of business services in the country, but also because of its role as a World City, competing with New York, Frankfurt, Tokyo and the like. As the North’s economy grows, especially with the anticipated and planned growth in the business services sector, the importance of links to London will also grow over time. Growth of the Northern economies will both generate additional demand for travel to/from London and will also be dependent upon those links.

2.5 Boddy et al, in seeking to explain the determinants of inter-regional productivity differentials identify short travel times to London as being one of the most important variables in determining high productivity levels.9 Journey time (rather than distance) to London (and possibly other regional centres) is identified as the key variable in terms of proximity/peripherality along with labour force composition, company ownership, market sector and population density. Other factors, such as capital employed per worker, qualification levels and industrial mix appear to have a weaker effect on regional productivity.

8 University of Salford Centre for Sustainable Urban & Regional Futures et al (2006) ibid 9 Boddy, M; Hudson, J; Plumridge, A & Webber DJ (2006) Regional Productivity Differentials: Explaining

the Gap



9

2.6 The authors point out that “travel time to London may also be picking up agglomeration effects rather than simply penalties in terms of travel time as such. Proximity to London is likely to generate significant agglomeration effects over and above those already accounted for by population density.”10 In other words, shortening journey times to London will result in beneficial regional economic impacts.

2.7 The importance of links from the North to Heathrow Airport, and to the southern ports and the Channel Tunnel are also recognised in the Strategic Direction. Manchester Airport is the North’s principal air international gateway providing direct links to inter-continental destinations and to Europe, and the other Northern airports are growing quickly providing links to European Hub airports, extending the number of destinations served and the frequency on established routes. Nonetheless, Heathrow Airport which provides services to an unrivalled set of international business destinations will remain important to the North’s economy. However, over the last two decades there has been a steady diminution in the number of domestic destinations served from Heathrow, and for many an increasing reliance on surface transport to access it. As we move forward, there is a significant risk that increased charges at Heathrow (which could increase by as much as 70% over the next five years) and the commercial pressures to make best use of Heathrow’s limited runway capacity will continue this trend. Moreover this trend is set to be reinforced as airlines take advantage of the “Open Skies” agreement between the EU and the US to deregulate the trans-Atlantic market. A key risk to the Northern Way is that the quality and capacity of surface access links to Heathrow will become of increasing importance for businesses in the North to access their international markets, as well as for the growth industry of in-bound tourism to the North at the same time as regional air services to Heathrow come under even greater pressure.

2.8 The North’s ports are growing their share of the national market, but access to the Channel Tunnel and the South Coast and Channel ports will also remain important. Increasing congestion and the associated unreliability of the South East’s road network is contributing to the growing attractiveness of the North’s ports. Nonetheless many goods imported and exported from the North will continue to use southern ports. Road congestion is also making more attractive rail access between the North and southern ports, especially for inter-modal container traffic, but these rail routes are subject to gauging constraints for which the necessary investments to overcome them are yet to be confirmed.

2.9 Already London is the largest generator of inter-city rail flows. High speed rail proposals linking London and the regions have been subject to traditional cost benefit analysis. Such work identifies the monetised benefits of:

• increased rail revenue;

10 Whilst the research of Boddy et al was based on car journey times, we believe that the same principles will apply to journey time to London by rail (and indeed other modes). We are currently discussing the possibility of re-running the model underpinning this research using rail journey time to London as an additional variable.



10

• journey time savings to users; • road accident savings; and • other non-user benefits.

2.10 This cost benefit analysis work shows that the conventional transport benefits of high speed rail to the economy are substantial. Research for the SRA in 2002/03 for example identified total benefits of a new high speed network between linking London to the North West and North East and Scotland of £89.8 billion giving a benefit cost ratio of over 2:1.11 These benefits comprised £20.6 billion in additional revenue, £64.4 billion in non-financial benefits (i.e. welfare gains by users and non-users) and £4.8 billion in benefits from freeing-up capacity on the existing network. Of course traditional cost benefit analysis of this type does not include other potential benefits of transport investment including the benefits from reduced emissions of carbon dioxide and the wider economic benefits of such investments.

2.11 The Eddington Transport Study commissioned various pieces of work to attempt to quantify the wider economic benefits of a wide range of transport interventions, based on guidance published by the Department in 2005.12 It was found that these typically add anywhere between 5% and 30% to the conventionally measured benefits. As shown in §2.10 the conventional transport benefits associated with high speed rail are substantial. The wider economic benefits are also clearly substantial and worthwhile.

2.12 Work by Atkins in support of the Eddington Transport Study sought to quantify the wider economic benefits of planned major upgrades of inter-urban rail routes, including a series of infrastructure improvements intended to reduce journey times

11 Atkins (2003) High Speed Line Study Addendum to Summary Report Table 2.1 (HSL Option 8) 12 DfT (2005) Transport, Wider Economic Benefits, and Impacts on GDP, DfT website

The environmental costs and benefits of high speed rail

The Eddington Transport Study made a strategic assessment of the effectiveness of high speed rail in reducing carbon emissions. Despite rail being acknowledged as producing lower carbon emissions per passenger at average load factors, Eddington suggests that the carbon benefits resulting from a modal shift from air to high speed rail “would be small relative to the very high cost of constructing and operating such a scheme”.

The report admits that there remains uncertainty over the potential modal shift to rail should air passengers be required to pay the full external costs of their travel. However, there is already evidence to suggest that reduced rail journey times can result in a substantial switch from domestic air services. Between September 2004 and April 2006, the number of rail journeys between London and Manchester increased by 194,000 compared to a fall in journeys by air between the same locations of 154,000. This represents an increase in rail’s share of the rail/air market from 40% to 56%.

There are potentially large environmental benefits which could arise from high-speed rail, especially where it is implemented where demand (and passenger congestion) is highest and through the delivery of average load factors in excess of the current experience on intercity main lines. It is on the question of



11

between Derby and London on the Midland Mainline by seven to eight minutes (a 7-8% saving). 13

2.13 Times saving benefits of £581 million from this upgrade generate a benefit cost ratio of 11:1, although this is slightly eroded by additional crowding arising from additional patronage14. Atkins estimated additional wider economic benefits of £142 million, representing 20% of the conventional time saving (welfare) benefits. To quote the findings: “The figures presented also show that the effect of including the additional welfare benefits alongside the conventional benefits in the business case would be marked. The net present value (NPV) of the intervention would increase by 25% (from £580 million to £720) with an associated 20% increase in the BCR (from 11.0 to 13.5). 15 What the Atkins work demonstrate is that enhancements to longer distance inter-urban rail will generate significant and worthwhile wider economic benefits, benefits which have not previously been considered within the appraisal of high speed rail proposals.

Estimates of agglomeration benefits of high speed rail network in the UK.

2.14 With this in mind we have developed an outline forecast of the level of agglomeration benefits, usually the most important wider economic benefit, which may arise from a one or two line high speed rail network in the UK. This is a key piece of evidence missing from the Rail White Paper, the Eddington Transport Study and from the earlier work that looked at high speed rail by Atkins for the SRA.

2.15 Agglomeration benefits are productivity gains firms experience from being located near other firms and having access to a large labour market. According to the now well established theory of agglomeration, small but significant reductions in the cost of travel increase firms’ accessibility to other firms and workers – in other words, the affected locations are more agglomerated. This in turn drives small but significant productivity gains, which can be large when aggregated across all affected firms. Importantly, these are additional to benefits normally captured in appraisal. The Department for Transport is currently in the process of integrating the assessment of Wider Economic Benefits, including agglomeration benefits, into their standard appraisal guidance, as part of their refresh of the NATA framework.

2.16 The Department’s guidance intends to base such an analysis on transport model outputs. In this case, we have not sought to develop a national-scale detailed network model, but we can achieve a sound broad level assessment by creating a simulation model of the UK rail network and its economic geography. Appendix A contains a further description of our approach to assessing agglomeration impacts, including on the simulation model.

2.17 We tested three versions of a high speed rail network:

13 Atkins (2006) Inter Urban Rail Forecasts, Final Report Table 4.10 14 Atkins (2006) ibid Table 4.13 15 Atkins (2006) ibid paragraph 4.75



12

• an eastern line running from London via the East of England and East Midlands to Yorkshire, the North East and on to Scotland;

• a western line from London to the North West with connections to Heathrow and the West Midlands, and

• a full network consisting of both of these north-south routes and a trans-Pennine link.

2.18 Shown in Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 below are the increases in productivity from agglomeration in different locations in the UK as a result of the introduction of either one of the two north-south high-speed lines or both together including a trans-Pennine connection. For the purposes of this analysis, journey time calculations have been based on ‘conventional’ high –speed rail technology (300km/h operation), with the capability to operate as appropriate over existing lines at existing line speeds too.

FIGURE 2.2 NETWORK: INCREASE IN PRODUCTIVITY

The colours represent the scale of productivity gain, where the lightest blue shows increase of less than 0.01% and the darkest more than 0.05%.



13

FIGURE 2.3 WEST AND EAST COAST LINES: INCREASE IN PRODUCTIVITY

The colours represent the scale of productivity gain, where the lightest blue shows increase of less than 0.01% and the darkest more than 0.05%.

2.19 We can see the locations that benefit are those along the improved routes. Typically locations in the urban areas in the North benefit strongly. The smaller impact on the South East is caused by the wider South East’s already very high level of agglomeration in the base case. London sees a significant increase in productivity as it is located at the end of both lines. For Scotland, air is a much more dominant mode for domestic travel than for the North16, which means that high speed rail has a smaller impact on the average travel times and therefore the level of agglomeration.

2.20 For the western and eastern High Speed Lines, the increased agglomeration leads to annual productivity gains across the UK in the order of £80m and £130m, respectively. The full network brings more than £270m. Table 2.1 shows how each Region benefits. All figures are for per year and reported in 2002 prices and values.

16 Air has 50% and 80% market share for journeys between Scotland and the South East and London, respectively. For the North East, and North West the similar figures are between 5% and 15%.



14

2.21 Note that agglomeration benefits are not driven by growth in demand per se, but rather by better integrating the regional and national economies. As such, their distribution is likely to differ from that of user benefits.

TABLE 2.1 ANNUAL PRODUCTIVITY GAIN FROM INCREASED AGGLOMERATION

Productivity gain (£m) % of GDP

Government Office Region West East Network Network

East Midlands 0.0 24.5 26.4 0.04%

East of England 0.0 4.2 7.7 0.01%

London 31.1 51.1 82.3 0.04%

North East 0.0 13.4 19.9 0.06%

North West 27.4 0.0 44.1 0.05%

Scotland 0.0 13.7 27.4 0.03%

South East 5.4 0.0 16.5 0.01%

South West 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00%

Wales 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00%

West Midlands 17.8 0.0 21.2 0.03%

Yorkshire & Humber 0.0 24.2 28.6 0.04%

UK 81.6 131.3 274.1 0.03%

2.22 Not unexpectedly, London receives the largest absolute gains for the full network option, £82million. The North West benefits by £44m, whilst Yorkshire and Humberside and the North East get about £30m and £20m, respectively.

2.23 There are various reasons for this distribution of impacts. Clearly London benefits by being served by both lines, but it also has a large economy. If we consider the productivity gains in proportion to GDP, we get a different and arguably more balanced picture. In terms of relative impact, it is the North West and the North East that benefit the most, each with 0.05% to 0.06% (one-off) increase in GDP, whilst Yorkshire and Humberside (and London) grows by 0.04%. This equals a growth in annual productivity in the range of £15 to £20 per worker in these four regions, and an increase of £10 on average for the UK. Although these figures may seem small, they add up to large economic impacts for the economy of the North and the UK as a whole (as illustrated in the above table). And these are the GDP effects from agglomeration benefits alone: there are other factors that could contribute to economic growth.

2.24 We can also illustrate the relative impact on the North vs. the rest of England. The North gains nearly £93 million (0.05%), while the rest of England benefits by around £154 million (a GDP increase of 0.02%).

2.25 The Net Present Value of the agglomeration impacts over a typical 60 year appraisal period is more than £10bn. This is more than twice the agglomeration impacts found



15

in the Department’s analyses of the wider economic benefits of Crossrail and Thameslink put together.

2.26 These results represent the likely impact of a two-line high speed rail service including the trans-Pennine link. The one line options offer substantially less agglomeration benefits and they are naturally much more concentrated to the parts of the country the lines run.

2.27 It is interesting to note the impact of the trans-Pennine link. The difference between the benefits for the two-line option and the sum of the two single line versions can roughly be attributed to this link. The agglomeration effects offered by adding the trans-Pennine corridor are significant for the more northerly regions, adding 50% to the North East and the North West, but are more modest for Yorkshire and the Humber. We find that a high speed line is most effective in increasing accessibility for medium distances – for shorter distances car has a higher mode share and for longer distances air is dominant. So the trans-Pennine link gives the North East much better access to the North West and West Midlands (and the wider South East too, in this particular network assumption, because it provides access to Heathrow), and the North West better access to growth areas in the East of England. But since Yorkshire and the Humber is closer than the North East to the West Midlands and the South East, the link has a proportionally smaller impact – only some 20% on top of the east coast high-speed line. Of course, these findings are a function of the assumed journey time savings that the tested options will bring. Alternative and equally reasonable assumptions may shift the balance of benefits between the three Northern regions. Nonetheless, there is a clear finding that a trans-Pennine link will bring substantial additional benefits by joining the two north south links.

2.28 These results support the argument of Boddy et al 17 that proximity to London is likely to generate significant agglomeration benefits. Importantly, the outcome of improved North – South links is not just experienced by northern businesses with better access to London. Improving London’s access to the North also means a very significant increase in the agglomeration of the capital with large productivity gains as a result.

Summary

• Research has shown the importance to the North’s economy of links between businesses in the North and London. Overtime as the North’s economy grows such links should also be expected to grow. Maximising growth of the North’s economy will increase demand for travel to/from London and will require provision of adequate capacity.

• Notwithstanding growth in national market share of the North’s airports and ports, access to Heathrow, the Channel Tunnel and the South Coast ports will be critical for growth of the North’s economy.

• Conventional cost benefit analysis has shown that the introduction of high speed rail will bring substantial economic benefits. But this work excludes the benefits that will come from lower carbon dioxide emissions and the wider economic

17 Op. cit.



16

benefits that will accrue. The most significant of these wider economic benefits are those that arise from agglomeration.

• North-South high-speed line(s) will contribute significantly to the UK economy, both to the Northern regions as well as to London and the South East. Benefits from agglomeration alone (note that these are additional to conventionally measured benefits in appraisal) could be more than £10bn in PV terms.

• Importantly these benefits do not just arise to business in the North, but are relatively evenly spread across both the northern and southern regions of the country.

• The agglomeration benefits amount to a productivity increase of about £10 per annum per UK worker and the total productivity gains are more than twice that found for Crossrail and Thameslink put together.



17

3. CURRENT AND FUTURE CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS ON THE EXISTING NETWORK

Passenger rail services

3.1 Research was commissioned by the Department for Transport to assist the Eddington Transport Study to understand where and when demand pressures on the inter-urban network will occur.18 With regard to routes serving the North, the research identified the following sections of route as having the highest levels of crowding (in terms of the proportion of daily seats occupied):

• on the Midland Main Line south of Wellingborough; • on the East Coast Main Line south of Peterborough and between Doncaster and

York; and • on various sections of Cross-Country and Trans-Pennine networks in the North.

3.2 The West Coast Main Line between Euston and Milton Keynes would also have been identified on this list if not for the assumption that longer trains would operate in the future. In almost all cases, the sections of inter-urban routes with the highest passenger crowding levels are contiguous with those sections with the highest proportions of total passengers being commuters. This is true both on the approaches to London and, in particular, on the east-west routes across the North.

3.3 Atkins forecast a 17% increase in demand for rail trips from 2006 to 2016 and a further 16% growth from 2016 to 2026. Over the same two periods business trips are forecast to increase by 28% and 31% respectively19. Trips are also forecast to get longer so this growth translates as a 30-40% increase (to 2016) and 80-90% (to 2026) increase in loadings on the three north-south inter-urban TOCs, but rather less (10% to 2016 and 40-50% to 2026) on Cross-Country and Trans-Pennine services.20 21 In percentage terms, increases in demand will be greatest in the business and leisure markets (up 90-130% to 2026 on the north-south routes). Commuting is expected to grow at a slower rate although commuter journeys account for a significant proportion of the current market and therefore overall levels of growth are high.22 The Government’s White Paper forecasts suggest all-day passenger demand will grow at around 2.5% per annum to 2014 and in the period to 2030 by 73% in total23.

18 Atkins (2006) ibid 19 Strategic and non-strategic journeys in PLANET Strategic Model, Central Case. Atkins (2006) Table 3.1 20 Passenger kilometres. Atkins (2006) Figure 3.2 21 Forecasting work undertaken for the Department of Transport has indicates that even with do-minimum growth (i.e. growth following current trends), passenger rail traffic on the East Coast Main Line between the North East and London will grow by 35% by 2021 (North East RPA), and between the North West and London by 46% by 2031 (North West RPA). Both of these forecasts were undertaken in 2004 using now superseded versions of the rail industry framework. More contemporary work is showing much faster rates of growth.

22 Atkins (2006) Figure 3.3 23 Delivering a Sustainable Railway Cm 7176 Paragraph 6.6.



18

3.4 The effects of this growth on daily crowding levels is shown in Figure 3.1. The Rail White Paper shows loading levels in the AM three hour peak for 203024 and this shows trans-Pennine loadings between Leeds and Manchester in excess of 100% as well as high loadings on the main lines serving the North, particularly on the approaches to London.

FIGURE 3.1 ALL DAY-CROWDING ON INTER-URBAN TOCS (VOLUME TO SEATED CAPACITY) – 2026 CENTRAL CASE

Source: Atkins (2006) Inter Urban Rail Forecasts, Final Report Figures 3.6

3.5 Atkins conclude from their analysis for the Eddington Transport Study that with no additional supply (with the exception of the post 2008 West Coast Route Modernisation timetable):

i. Utilisation on the ECML approaching London will increase from 44% in 2006 to 78% in 2026 across the day as a whole. At peak times by 2026 there will be ‘serious levels of crowding’ on this section.

24 Figure 6.3



19

ii. Demand on the MML approaching London will increase by 69% between 2006 and 2026 when crowding on this section will reach 93% across the whole day. This will result in ‘the majority of services over capacity’ even by 2016.

iii. The biggest growth occurs on the WCML (boarders up 74% by 2026) with flows into London up 89% in this period to 92,800 per day. Seat utilisation approaching London is lower than on the other north-south routes, at 64%, as a result of the assumed 2008 timetable upgrade.

3.6 These results are based on a modelling framework in which demand growth is not constrained by available supply. Sensitivity tests in which the effects of crowding were taken into account suggest that the levels of growth to 2026 shown above would fall, but would remain very significant. 25

3.7 Further tests taking into account proposed upgrades of the ECML and MML showed that the upgrades themselves will result in an increase in demand for travel, particularly on commuter services on the WCML and on the MML. Whilst the additional capacity from the ECML upgrades does result in lower daily seat utilisation levels, the reductions are modest.26 By comparison, the MML upgrade actually results in increases in utilisation as passenger numbers increase but supply remains constant. 27

3.8 One of the key assumptions that underpins the Atkins forecasts for the DfT is that the economies of the North will continue to grow at the trend rate observed in recent years. The Northern Way has been established at the invitation of Government to contribute to accelerating the North’s economic growth and thereby close the productivity gap between the North and the English average. If the trend forecasts that underpin the Atkins forecasts arise, the Northern Way, and the Government’s Regional Economic Policy Public Service Agreement target, will have failed in their objectives. The established rail industry forecasting framework suggest that with all other things being equal a further 1% growth in the North's productivity will lead to a growth of over 2% in rail trips to/from London. Clearly successful delivery of the Northern Way’s and the Government’s regional economic goals will result in greater growth in rail trips to/from London and on-train crowding becoming a problem sooner than Atkins has forecast.

3.9 The level of passenger growth, and resulting capacity issues, predicted by DfT/Atkins for the West Coast Main Line is broadly in line with the findings of the National Audit Office (NAO). In assessing the benefits of the West Coast Modernisation Programme and prior to introduction of the December 2008 timetable and additional coaches to the Virgin fleet, the NAO notes that passenger growth during 2005/06 exceeded 20%

25 From +97% to +68% on the ECML, from +113% to +91% on the MML and from +75% to +69% on the WCML 26 From 81% to 72% in 2026 on GNER/HT as a result of ECML 2A (Atkins, 2006 para. 4.23), from 85% to

68% on WAGN services and 66% to 62% on GNER services as a result of ECML 2B (Atkins, 2006 Table 4.6)

27 From 122% to 128% of daily seats occupied in 2026



20

on Virgin West Coast services and that, “In 2006, some parts of the route were operating at or near capacity”.28

3.10 The NAO quotes DfT forecasts of further growth in journeys of around 10% per annum from 2006/07 to 2012/13 which, despite planned enhancements at Rugby, Trent Valley and Stafford, will mean that the line “will have insufficient capacity to sustain growth in passenger and freight traffic beyond 2015 to 2020 if current levels of growth continue.” 29

Freight traffic

3.11 Rail’s share of freight carriage is a relatively static share of a market which grew by 8% in the ten years to 2004. 30 The level of growth in rail freight has not been uniform across all commodities: growth has been highest in the haulage of coal and construction goods whilst haulage of metals and petroleum, two of the largest markets, has remained constant or declined. 31

3.12 Figure 3.2 below shows the actual average weekday usage of the rail network by freight trains. The sections with 50 or more trains per day are shown in red. There are several very busy sections of line in the North of England including:

• the South Humberside Main Line at Barnetby; • the East Coast Mainline, particularly north of York; • approaches to Leeds from the north, south and west; and • the West Coast Mainline, especially between Warrington and Nuneaton.

28 National Audit Office (2006) The Modernisation of the West Coast Main Line section 3.6 29 NAO (2006) ibid section 3.6 30 Network Rail (2007) Freight Route Utilisation Strategy section 3.2. Total rail and HGV market in 2004

was 1.933 million tonnes lifted. 31 Network Rail (2007) ibid Tables 3.1 and 3.2



21

FIGURE 3.2 AVERAGE DAILY FREIGHT TRAINS

Source Network Rail (2007) Figure 3.1. Numbers of trains in 2004/05 in peak direction on busiest

weekday (Thursday)

3.13 The map shows the number of actual trains as opposed to the number of dedicated freight paths in the working timetable for each route. More paths are required than are actually used to give the freight operating companies operational flexibility and to allow them to respond to client requirements. The proportion of paths utilised varies significantly by commodity and location. On many of the busiest sections of line for freight in the North, the utilisation of paths in general does not exceed 80% across the region.

3.14 Network Rail forecast that rail tonnage lifted will grow by 26-28% in the ten years to 2014/15. 32 This is expected to result in the need for significant additional freight trains on both the East and West Coast Mainlines and on routes to and from Manchester and Leeds.

3.15 The Freight Route Utilisation Strategy has considered the implications of this growth in demand on current capacity. This work has assumed that no freight paths on the working timetable will be lost to initiatives designed to enhance capacity for

32 Network Rail (2007) ibid Table 4.1 (base case forecast)



22

passengers however such an assumption could be considered questionable. The key capacity gaps identified on north-south routes and within the Northern regions are:

• on the route between the Haven Ports, Midlands, the North West and Scotland (on the West Coast Main Line between Crewe and Runcorn; at Stafford; between Daventry and north London; and in central Manchester);

• on the Southampton - West Coast Main Line route (between Southampton and Basingstoke; at Reading, Nuneaton, Coventry and Oxford);

• on routes to the east coast ports (between Wrawby and Scunthorpe; and on the Hull Docks Branch);

• on the route between the Haven Ports, Yorkshire and the North East (on the East Coast Mainline (between Crofton and South Kirkby, north of Doncaster; and between Doncaster and Peterborough); and

• on the South Trans Pennine route33.

3.16 Like all Route Utilisation Strategies, the Freight RUS has looked forward over the next ten years or so. Furthermore, it has considered the impacts on rail freight demand of committed developments (ports, terminals etc.). Over the 20 to 30 year time horizon of the Northern Way’s Strategic Direction for Transport further capacity gaps are anticipated, in particular resulting from a number of port expansion proposals at Teesport, the Port of Liverpool and other ports in the North. Proposals for new Rail Freight Interchanges in the North West may further affect the volume and pattern of demand.

3.17 With Network Rail, the Northern Way is currently developing projections of long term rail freight demand for inter-modal containers from the North’s principal ports. This work will inform a subsequent consideration of the need for capacity and loading gauge enhancement to cater for future traffic.

3.18 The RUS proposes a strategy to ensure that sufficient capacity is provided to meet the expected growth in rail freight to 2014/15. Options include a range of solutions to overcome the identified capacity gaps including train lengthening, re-routing, axle weight and gauge enhancements and signalling modifications. On the whole, the strategy elements are said to have little or no detrimental effect on passenger capacity on shared sections of the network. The degree to which the identified freight capacity gaps could be resolved by the transfer of some passenger services onto new high speed lines was not considered in the RUS. However it is likely that construction of new alignments for passenger services on key routes would in the longer term reduce or remove altogether the need for many components of the freight RUS strategy, although there would remain potential issues associated with gauge clearance for intermodal containers.

3.19 The White Paper outlines a £200m investment in a Strategic Freight Network, as well as specific schemes that it indicates should be progressed during the period 2009-14 to assist rail freight movements. In this regard for implementation by 2014 the ECML RUS Consultation Draft puts forward a reinstated chord at Boldon to allow Tyne Dock

33 Network Rail (2007) ibid Tables 5.1 to 5.5



23

traffic to be routed via the Durham Coast, and potentially a major scheme in Yorkshire (Shaftholme Junction) to segregate coal traffic to power stations from north-south inter-city flows. The commitment to a Strategic Freight Network and the recognition that a proportion of this will need to be able to accommodate inter-modal containers is welcomed by the Northern Way which will continue to work with its regional partners, Network Rail and the Government to develop the case for freight-focussed enhancement.

Summary

• Contemporary forecasts of growth in rail demand show that even in a scenario with trend-based economic growth in the North there will be significant growth in trip making on the East Coast, West Coast and Midland Main Lines. The largest rate of growth will be in business trips.

• In the Rail White Paper the Government suggested that growth to 2030 could be accommodated by capacity enhancement through addressing bottlenecks, longer trains and new in-cab signalling. The success of this approach is reliant on a delicate balance between the rates of future growth in demand and incremental capacity enhancements being sufficient to deliver adequate north south capacity.

• Additional growth, delay in capacity enhancement, or enhancement programmes delivering a smaller quantum of uplift than that currently planned will lead to significant on-train overcrowding, especially on (but not limited to) those sections of the main north-south lines that are also used by London commuters as well as the trans Pennine link between Leeds and Manchester.

• The faster economic growth that the Northern Way and its partners are seeking to promote and has recently experienced will lead to even faster growth in rail trip making. Each percentage point growth in Northern GVA will add at least 2% to the demand for rail trips between the North and South.

• Freight routes in and to the North are operating at high levels of utilisation and growth in rail freight will increase this utilisation further.



24

4. A LONG-TERM STRATEGY: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

Twin strategic goals

4.1 As we have demonstrated in Chapter 2:

• rail links between the North and the South are vital for the functioning of the North’s economy;

• the increased economic growth that the North anticipates, as the policy initiatives of the Northern Way, the three Northern RDAs and stakeholders across the North become increasingly effective, will increase this demand further;

• there is a strong conventional economic case for reducing rail journey times between the North and South; and

• there can be significant additional benefits to the economy.

4.2 In the Rail White Paper the Government has suggested that rail demand will grow by 73% by 2030, but has noted that there is a level of uncertainty around this forecast. In Chapter 3, we showed that there are other contemporary forecasts that suggest with do-minimum (trend) economic growth demand for inter-city rail passenger travel between the North and South is forecast to grow by at least 90% by 2026 and freight by up to 28% by 2014/15. This analysis has suggested that even with trend growth the limitations on providing additional capacity on the rail network in the short to medium term will result in many north-south services exceeding capacity by 2016 and serious levels of overcrowding on north-south routes by 2026. Should growth rates exceed recent trends, and recent evidence suggests this is likely, actual capacity problems would be worse still.

4.3 This will result in a railway that becomes increasingly unreliable and unpunctual, as well as resulting in on-train over-crowding. This will have negative economic impacts both directly, and by suppressing business-related rail travel and rail freight traffic.

4.4 A strategic approach is needed for the development of rail links between the North and South and this must have twin goals:

• the provision of adequate capacity to allow the rail network to operate to expected standards of punctuality and reliability; and

• to accommodate and facilitate the accelerated economic growth of the North.

Responding to the capacity problem

4.5 The analysis undertaken by Atkins shows that lack of capacity is already a pressing issue on both London-focussed and other inter-urban routes, and that demand for rail travel is expected to grow rapidly with or without additional capacity. In the short-term, opportunities for providing additional capacity are extremely limited on all the routes discussed here and even after major planned upgrades on all three north-south routes, utilisation levels will be significantly higher than today. Work by Atkins stated that “Our analyses suggest that, to meet forecast increases in demand, an expansion



25

in rail capacity is required, on the WCML by 2016 and on all three north-south routes by 2031.” 34

4.6 That Atkins report goes on to conclude:

“Our demand forecasts suggest that HSL could attract considerable levels of demand, driven by the stepchange in journey time and quality that HSL could deliver over current services. Much of the patronage on HSL services would be passengers shifting from existing VWC, MML and GNER services. Even if these competing TOCs’ services are scaled back, HSL could reduce crowding quite substantially. Moreover, the capacity on the existing network that is released can be used to generate further benefits: either to existing VWC or GNER passengers, by retaining as many of these long-distance services as possible, thereby providing considerable capacity for strategic travel and choice for long-distance passengers; or to stimulate new rail markets by providing new local or regional passenger services or additional freight paths.” 35

4.7 Currently there is no long-term rail strategy for catering for the major growth in rail travel identified by forecasting work undertaken for the DfT and for the Eddington Transport Study. The Rail White Paper supports incremental upgrades of the current main lines serving the North but does not offer a clear prescription for their longer term future development.

4.8 A number of options have been put forward for increasing the capacity of north-south links as well as reducing journey time between the North and London and the South East. These include (but are not necessarily limited to):

• the construction of a new transport system separate from the existing rail network utilising maglev (magnetic levitation) technology operating at speeds greater than conventional rail systems;

• the construction of new additional rail lines which could allow operation at higher speeds than today’s network (such lines could be similar to the High Speed 1 line, the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, that has been constructed in two phases and links London St Pancras station with the Channel Tunnel), or could be operated at line speeds similar to today’s main line network;

• the implementation of programmes similar to West Coast Route Modernisation to the East Coast Main Line and Midland Main Line (these would be intended to increase the number of trains that can operate, the length of these trains as well as the speed at which they can run);

• more modest Main Line enhancement proposals targeted at relieving capacity pinch points, as well as increasing train lengths;

• the introduction of new signalling systems (ERTMS) that would allow trains to be run at a greater frequency as now; and

• combinations of new in-cab signalling systems, network enhancement and train lengthening.

34 Atkins (undated) High Speed Line Study Summary Report paragraph 2.15 35 Atkins (undated) ibid paragraphs 5.29-5.30



26

• construction of new freight only lines.

4.9 In its Rail White Paper the Government backs the combinations of new signalling systems, network enhancement and train lengthening as the way forward to about 2030. Longer term, the White Paper dismisses the option of new freight lines as an ineffective and inefficient means of addressing what is essentially a passenger problem. The construction of a maglev system would clearly produce significant station to station journey time savings compared with what could be delivered by conventional high speed rail services. However, this too is dismissed in the Rail White Paper principally because the Government regards the options as too costly and too risky and as offering less potential flexibility than a conventional railway. Also, the Government does not accept the benefits put forward by proponents of this technology.36 By comparison, conventional high speed rail is a proven technology and offers the potential to serve city centre pairs by connecting into the existing rail network and stations suitably expanded. The White Paper suggests further work is needed to consider new conventional rail line options and that this should include consideration of a potential trans-Pennine route as well as north south links.

4.10 As the Atkins/Ernst & Young work for the SRA has shown, a high-speed system has a good traditional transport economic case and as this report has demonstrated, there is a prima facie case that it would bring significant wider economic (productivity) benefits too. By providing new express links between city centres, a high speed system offers the opportunity to free up capacity on the existing network for additional inter-regional passenger services, and for freight.

4.11 Of course, upgrades to the existing network either thorough signalling or network enhancement offer the opportunity to operate more inter-city trains and operate longer trains, as well as address some of the most significant capacity pinch points and such options must be considered when identifying the optimum value for money solution. As experience with the West Coast Route Modernisation (WCRM) shows, such upgrades have a high cost (although in the case of WCRM much cost was associated with renewing infrastructure that had fallen into a dilapidated state) and, significantly, they result in major service disruption over a period of many years. The level of growth is such however, that the construction of new alignments appears to be the only option which will provide sufficient capacity for the future both to the east and west of the country. Further, it is the use of these lines for high speed services which will bring the greatest benefits for inter-urban journeys and for shorter journeys where separation of high and lower speed services will allow for more efficient use to be made of existing capacity.

Questions of focus

4.12 Analysis undertaken for the Eddington Transport Study has demonstrated that there will be significant levels of congestion and over-crowding on the three main lines that link the North to London and the South East. To maximise the economic growth of the North it is clear that the focus of work most be on developing cost effective solutions

36 See Delivering a Sustainable Railway, paragraph 6.24 et seq.



27

to these projected problems. As indicated in the White Paper, a full range of proposals will need to be considered and the relative costs, benefits and risks of each option should be assessed against other options designed to achieve the same ends. The White Paper says that any proposal must:



4.13 The Northern Way supports these objectives, but while these are important ambitions from the Northern Way’s perspective the future assessment of proposals must also recognise that:







28

5. CONCLUSIONS

5.1 Our overall conclusions from the research presented in this paper can be summarised as follows:

i. There is evidence that links to World City functions in London (as well as links between the North’s City Regions) are of fundamental importance to Northern productivity. This evidence was not presented in the Eddington Transport Study nor in the Rail White Paper and therefore appears not to have been taken into account by Government.

ii. North-south links, particularly to London will become more, not less, important over time in economic terms.

iii. The road and rail networks linking the North with the South also serve growing volumes of freight and numbers of commuters. Important business traffic could be squeezed out, and this is a risk factor for the North’s economy.

iv. The future state of the transport links from the North to Heathrow is also a fundamental concern, including the potential loss of domestic air services from the North.

v. As well as the completion of the West Coast project, the White Paper puts forward a number of short to medium term proposals to increase capacity on the Midland and East Coast Main Lines but there is no specification of the works required nor a programme for implementation.

vi. The White Paper notes future capacity pressure on north south links and suggests the introduction of higher capacity IEP trains and new in-cab signalling will provide adequate capacity to 2030. There are risks in this approach. Success is dependent on the timeliness of delivery of sufficient additional capacity to meet anticipated growth in demand. A resurgent Northern economy will lead to faster growth in rail demand (passenger and freight) on the routes from the North to London than assumed by the Government in its White Paper.

vii. There is particular short and medium uncertainty over the future of the East Coast Main Line. While the commitment from Government to trial the IEP train on the East Coast Main Line is welcome, there appears to be no other major funding commitment to this route in the period 2009-14, yet it is already acknowledged to be running in effect at capacity (although in the following five years, the benefits of rolling stock replacement will be available). Neither the White Paper nor Network Rail’s Route Utilisation Strategy for the East Coast Main Line which is currently at the consultation stage identifies a means of restoring reliable operation over the route: currently services manage only around 83% on time performance and the government’s target is 92.5%. Intensity of use and unreliability are related.

viii. In its Rail White Paper, the Government has ruled out three broad longer term strategic proposals to increase north south capacity, namely the construction of a new north south freight only line, the construction of new lines adjacent to the existing north south main lines and a maglev option linking Scotland, the North and London.

ix. The White Paper suggests two longer term strategic options are worthy of further consideration. These are the construction of new lines operating at either



29

conventional (current) line speeds, or at the higher speeds found on new lines in Europe. The White Paper also indicates that from the evidence it has considered the Government’s view is that the balance of advantage is with the construction of new lines operating at conventional line speeds rather than the higher speeds.

x. The Government should be urged to note the importance of additional capacity for north-south links and the additional productivity benefits that quicker journeys will bring to the North.

xi. We have important new evidence that supports this point. There is significant wider economic benefit, additional to that identified by Atkins for the Eddington Transport Study, in the form of agglomeration benefit. It adds up to a lot in terms of NPV (as much as £10bn over 60 years) and has a significant contribution to the economic growth of the North (a 0.05% annual difference in output). This includes similar levels of impact on London’s economy, so the case for high-speed rail is not just about connecting the North to London – it is about integrating the North’s and South’s economies. High-speed rail may, therefore, have a stronger overall economic case than other candidate major rail investments

xii. We also believe that the prospect of continuing disruption from line of route upgrades (WCRM programme was 10 years, we note) is also to be avoided if possible. The Northern Way will want to see improvements that will protect and, if possible, enhance the quality of the links in terms of journey times and reliability of journey times; but it will also like to avoid that type of disruption on, say, the East Coast Main Line.

xiii. We also note that that the problem of capacity appears to be just as great on the eastern side of the country as the western and that, expressed as a proportion of regional GDP, the wider benefits of high speed links are greatest in the North East. It is also from this region (and Yorkshire and the Humber) that Heathrow air links are most at risk as the Open Skies agreement for trans-Atlantic air travel will encourage airlines to transfer landing and take-off slots at Heathrow from marginal domestic routes to potentially more lucrative international services.

xiv. This leads us to conclude that the Northern Way should argue not for one corridor rather than the other but the development of a strategy for north-south high-speed rail serving both east and west sides of the Pennines and London.

xv. To this should be added a trans-Pennine high-speed connector in the light of the substantial uplift in agglomeration benefits that it would deliver. A trans-Pennine high-speed connector as an integral part of a national network of conventional high-speed rail lines will facilitate not only a new economic geography of faster city to city links across the North but also nationally through faster linkages between the North East and Yorkshire and the West Midlands, and between the North West and East of England growth areas.

xvi. Developing a north-south rail strategy will need the involvement of Government and Network Rail, as well as stakeholders from across the North. The Northern Way’s March 2007 submission to Government committed the Northern Way to contribute to the development of such a strategy. In its White Paper the Government has stated that it will consider further the case for additional north-south capacity in time for the planned 2012 High Level Output Statement. It goes on to say that any proposal must: • Tackle congestion on key rail routes;



30

• Be affordable and deliver good value for money • Be environmentally sustainable and deliver a good environmental return for

the investment committed. xvii. The Northern Way supports these objectives, but while these are important

ambitions from the Northern Way’s perspective the future assessment of proposals must also recognise that: • Growth in the North’s economy will generate and will require additional

business travel between the North and London and the South East for which capacity needs to be provided.






Appendix

APPENDIX A

AGGLOMERATION METHODOLOGY



Appendix

A1.1 In 2005 the Department for Transport (DfT) released guidance on the quantification and valuation of Wider Economic Benefits (WEBs) and GDP impacts of transport37. One of the objectives of the guidance is to provide an objective basis for the Department to assess the contribution to national GDP and productivity of schemes seeking funding under the Transport Innovation Fund (TIF). From spring 2008, this guidance is anticipated to become part of the Department’s standard NATA appraisal guidance (WebTag). Previous reports to Northern Way have described the guidance in more detail and will not be repeated here.

A1.2 The two most significant productivity impacts of schemes tend to be time and cost savings to business users (in-work travel and freight) and agglomeration benefits. The former is routinely captured by appraisal, whilst the latter requires additional analysis.

A1.3 Agglomeration benefits arise if firms become more productive as a result of being closer or more accessible to other firms, workers and markets. Agglomeration is a type of economy of scale. When located in a larger city, firms can better access skills, suppliers, knowledge and markets and are therefore more productive.

A1.4 The measure of agglomeration is effective density. Effective density is essentially a measure of the number of jobs and workers that are accessible to a firm. Since accessibility depends on transport costs, transport directly influences agglomeration. In addition transport can lead to the relocation of activities, which may have further agglomeration impacts, but this effect is harder to assess and is generally thought to be less important outside London and the South East.

A1.5 A full assessment of agglomeration impacts following the Department’s guidance would require the application of a transport model to the scheme. The required information, crucially matrices of the ‘before and after’ demand and generalised costs of travel for all possible combinations of origins and destinations, are then derived from model outputs. This information is then used to assess the change in accessibility38 delivered by the scheme and evidence from DfT enables us to convert this into productivity gains from agglomeration.

A1.6 Since a model is not available, we instead set up a simulation model with a simple representation of the UK rail network and its economic geography. By making assumptions on the magnitude of time savings delivered by a high speed rail link, the model calculates the change in effective density, or in other words how well locations are integrated with the rest of the economy.

A1.7 We then use the DfT evidence on agglomeration to convert the changes in effective density into changes in productivity from increased agglomeration. This set up allows us to get a good understanding of the potential size of any agglomeration benefits.

37 http://www.dft.gov.uk/stellent/groups/dft_econappr/documents/page/dft_econappr_038893.pdf 38 By accessibility we here mean accessibility to workers and to other firms.



Appendix

The model

A1.8 The model represents journey (generalised) costs for rail and other modes between the 128 NUTS3 zones in England, Scotland and Wales. We develop a matrix of time savings between key stations in the UK to represent the impacts of a high speed line. These savings are then attributed to rail journeys between all 128 zones according to the part of the flows that are likely to utilise the improved rail network. In other words a rail journey from London to Glasgow will experience the same absolute reduction in time as one from Kent to Inverness, as both journeys utilise the same link. Naturally, the initial journey cost from Kent to Inverness is higher, so flows between these locations have a smaller proportional benefit.

A1.9 Of course, not all journeys take place by rail even when it is a viable alternative. We therefore constructed matrices of average journey costs across all modes using evidence on journey costs and the proportion of flows by road and other public transport modes. Doing so enables us to assess agglomeration benefits in accordance with the Department’s guidance.

A1.10 The change in journey costs between locations means increased integration of economic centres across the UK. For instance, the reduction in journey costs for the average journey (all modes) between London and Glasgow is 2.4%, whilst from Kent to Inverness the change is 0.7%. Table 2.1 shows the average reduction in journey cost for typical journeys between Regions (again across all modes).

TABLE A.1 CHANGE IN JOURNEY COSTS FOR TYPICAL JOURNEYS

EM E L NE NW S SE WM YH

East Midlands 0.0% 0.0% 5.5% 6.8% 0.0% 2.6% 0.6% 0.0% 1.3%

East of England 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 0.0% 0.9% 0.6% 0.0% 1.7%

London 5.8% 0.0% 0.0% 11.6% 6.1% 2.0% 0.0% 3.0% 8.3%

North East 5.9% 0.0% 8.9% 0.0% 1.7% 2.0% 4.5% 2.7% 0.5%

North West 0.0% 0.0% 7.3% 1.2% 0.0% 0.5% 1.6% 1.4% 2.5%

Scotland 2.5% 0.0% 1.2% 2.5% 0.6% 0.0% 2.5% 3.0% 1.0%

South East 0.7% 0.5% 0.0% 3.1% 1.5% 0.9% 0.0% 0.2% 1.3%

West Midlands 0.0% 0.0% 3.7% 2.9% 1.4% 2.1% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0%

Yorkshire & Humber 1.4% 1.9% 8.0% 0.4% 0.0% 1.6% 2.4% 0.0% 0.0%



Appendix

A1.11 The table does not include Wales and the South West as they are assumed to be largely unaffected by the high speed line.

A1.12 We see that in our simulation the largest changes in the cost of the average journey are experienced on the links between London and Northern England. From the South East the impacts are smaller as most journeys to the North need to interchange in London and this means higher initial journey costs (so that a given time saving is proportionally less important) and a higher share of journeys by air (so that the impact of a high speed rail is less relevant for connectivity). The latter also partly explains the lower journey costs reductions seen for connections between Scotland and most locations in England.

Detailed results for the Northern Way Regions.

A1.13 The following tables show results for the Northern Regions disaggregated to NUTS3 areas, which broadly corresponds to LA Districts.

TABLE A.2 WEST COAST LINE - AGGLOMERATION BENIFITS BY LOCAL AREA (£M)

North East North West Yorkshire & Humberside

Darlington - Blackburn with Darwen 0.4 Barnsley, Doncaster and Rotherham -

Durham CC - Blackpool 0.3 Bradford -

Hartlepool and Stockton-on-Tees - Cheshire CC 4.7

Calderdale, Kirklees and Wakefield -

Northumberland - East Cumbria 0.8 East Riding of Yorkshire -

South Teesside - East Merseyside 1.0 Kingston upon Hull, -

Sunderland - Greater Manchester North 3.2 Leeds -

Tyneside - Greater Manchester South 7.4 N and NE Lincolnshire -

Halton and Warrington 1.8 North Yorkshire CC -

Lancashire CC 4.6 Sheffield -

Liverpool 1.4 York -

Sefton 0.6

West Cumbria 0.6

Wirral 0.6

Total 0 Total 27.4 Total 0

Total Northern Way 27.4 London 31.1 Total UK 81.6



Appendix

TABLE A.3 EAST COAST LINE - AGGLOMERATION BENEFITS BY LOCAL AREA (£M)


Darlington 0.7 Blackburn with Darwen - Barnsley, Doncaster and Rotherham 3.2

Durham CC 2.4 Blackpool - Bradford 1.9

Hartlepool and Stockton-on-Tees 1.5 Cheshire CC -

Calderdale, Kirklees and Wakefield 4.2

Northumberland 1.2 East Cumbria - East Riding of Yorkshire 1.5

South Teesside 1.1 East Merseyside - Kingston upon Hull, City of 1.2

Sunderland 2.2 Greater Manchester North - Leeds 4.0

Tyneside 4.2 Greater Manchester South - N and NE Lincolnshire 2.5

Halton and Warrington - North Yorkshire CC 2.8

Lancashire CC - Sheffield 2.2

Liverpool - York 1.9

Sefton -

West Cumbria -

Wirral -

Total 13.4 Total - Total 25.5

Total Northern Way 38.9 London 51.1 Total UK

131.3



Appendix

TABLE A.4 HSL NETWORK - AGGLOMERATION BENEFITS BY LOCAL AREA (£M)


Darlington 1.1 Blackburn with Darwen 0.7 Barnsley, Doncaster and Rotherham 3.8

Durham CC 3.6 Blackpool 0.5 Bradford 2.2

Hartlepool and Stockton-on-Tees 2.3 Cheshire CC 6.3

Calderdale, Kirklees and Wakefield 5.0

Northumberland 1.8 East Cumbria 1.4 East Riding of Yorkshire 1.7

South Teesside 1.7 East Merseyside 1.5 Kingston upon Hull, City of 1.5

Sunderland 3.2 Greater Manchester North 6.2 Leeds 4.8

Tyneside 6.2 Greater Manchester South 12.4 N and NE Lincolnshire 3.0

Halton and Warrington 2.7 North Yorkshire CC 3.3

Lancashire CC 7.7 Sheffield 2.6

Liverpool 2.1 York 2.3

Sefton 0.9

West Cumbria 0.9

Wirral 0.8

Total 19.9 Total 44.1 Total 30.1

Total Northern Way 94.1 London 51.1 Total UK 274.1



Control Sheet

CONTROL SHEET

Project/Proposal Name: NORTHERN WAY Document Title: North-South Connections Client Contract/Project Number: SDG Project/Proposal Number: 206745

ISSUE HISTORY

REVIEW Originator: GGH Other Contributors: NCC, LAR Review By: Print: NCC Sign:

DISTRIBUTION

Clients: Electronic distribution Steer Davies Gleave: Project Folder

Issue No. Date Details 4. 28.8.07 Final

Date post:	21-Oct-2014
Category:	Government & Nonprofit
View:	104 times
Download:	1 times

The Northern Way

Government & Nonprofit