The NPT on the brink of

WNU – Summer Institute 2009– Bruno Pellaud 1

The NPT on the brink of ...The NPT on the brink of ...

Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya, Syria .....and Pakistan

Bruno Pellaud, Switzerland

WNU – Summer Institute 2009– Bruno Pellaud

Iraq: backgroundIraq: background• Early activities: Large Osirak reactor built by the French in

the 70s, bombed by Israel in 1981. Then a 10 billion $

clandestine programme with 10’000 persons.

• Safeguards: agreement since 1972; sharpened controls

after the 1991 Gulf War by decision of the Security

Council. No IAEA inspections between 1998 and 2002.

• Violations: totally clandestine weapon programme.

• Danger level: was high; in 1990, two years from a first

device; reduced to nil in the 90s; between 1998 and 2003.

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The Tuweitha Research Centre

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Calutron destroyed in 1991

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Russian research reactor destroyed in 1991

..... and searched by international inspectors


What did the IAEA do?Before 1980, the IAEA did not see the clandestine programme of Iraq in the 80s and90s. Intelligence services did not see as well (or did not tell the IAEA…)

Between 1991 and 1998, 30 inspection campaigns:> 50,000 m2of factory space destroyed~ 2,000 equipment items destroyed> 600 tonnes of special alloys destroyed

All HEU material removed from Iraq

In early 2003, international inspectors announced the absence ofweapons of mass destruction. The US Government elected to ignorethese findings and went to war. In late 2003, 1400 American inspectors confirmed the findings!

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Iraq: the lessons learned

• The IAEA failed to detect the Iraqi weapons programme.

Not that the inspectors failed; it’s the politically‐defined

verification system that was not adequate.

• Reason? The political constraints imposed to inspectors,

which limited verification to declared facilities.

• Iraq led to a major revamping of the IAEA safeguards

system in the 90s ‐ with strengthening measures targeted

at undeclared clandestine activities, the objective being

more information about and more access to facilities.

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North Korea: backgroundNorth Korea: background• Early activities: in the 80s, 5 MWe research reactor,

followed by two unfinished “power plants” of 50 and 200 MWe with gas‐graphite reactors.

• Safeguards: agreement since 1992; no inspection since 2002. NK has stepped out of the NPT without sanctions!!

• Violations: undeclared plutonium separation detected by the IAEA in 1993; then denial of international inspections. With Pakistani help, uranium enrichment since 1998.

• Danger level: very high; has separated 30‐50 kg of Pu. Has exploded a nuclear device on October 9, 2006 and May 25, 2009. Enough Pu in store to assemble many more nuclear devices/weapons.

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The Yongbyon nuclear sites


The 5 and the 50 MWe reactors

Reactor

Fuel storage


Discharged fuel in baskets


Yongbyon’s reprocessing facilities


North Korea: the outlook• The weak 1994 Framework Agreement between NK and the US did not

stop the clandestine activities that led to the 2006 and 2009 tests. The

agreement stopped the IAEA to look at past activities, offered free‐of‐

charge oil and two nuclear plants!! Bribing a crook helps little...

• After two nuclear tests, China may finally use its patronage and

leverage to force North Korea to the negotiating table.

• The “six‐party negotiations progress failed and are unlikely to resume.

NK wants to negotiate directly with the US.

• The risk remains high: there is a large hidden store of good quality

weapon grade Pu. The nuclear threat from North Korea could

destabilise the whole region. China should awake!

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• Early activities: thousands of scientists and engineers were trained in Western countries under the Shah in the 60s and 70s; an American 20 MW research reactor fuelled with HEU was bought in 1961. Interruption of nuclear programme between 1979 and 1981.

• Safeguards: agreement since 1972 (under the NPT).

• Violations : undeclared purchase from China of 1800 kg of UF6, UF4and UO2, undeclared Pu separation; undeclared equipment and facilities;work with metallic uranium and polonium sources; etc. In the 80’s and 90’s, an embryonic, unsuccessful, but real weapon programme with purchases of equipment (centrifuges) from Pakistan and many others.

• Facilities: labs, uranium conversion, heavy‐water reactor, pilot centrifuge facility and large‐scale enrichment plant in Natanz.

• Risk level now: low, but increasing. No known HEU production, but some 1000 kg of low‐enriched U. On‐going IAEA inspections.

Iran: nuclear historyIran: nuclear history


TRIGA Mark II – purchased from the US General Atomics in 1961


Entrance to the underground industrial facility. Some 7000 P1 centrifuges are installed.

Pilot facility: Where the new IR‐2 centrifuges are now being tested.

ISIS


Natanz industrial facility

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Entrance to the underground industrial facility designed to receive 50’000 P1 centrifuges. Each centrifuge is capable of producing 2 SWU per year, yielding altogether 100’000 SWU, that is the yearly requirement of ONE 1000 Mwe LWR!


Centrifuges ‐Model P1

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Installed in Natanz (Iran) From Pakistan, seized in Libya


On April 8, 2008, the President visited Natanz. Its Office released 48 photographs of the tour, providing a broad look inside the research facility (New York Times – 29 April 2008). The Minister of Counter‐intellignce and the Minister of Defence are shown on the picture...

The new IR‐2 centrifuges


Iran: the outlook• NPT: Iran is entitled to uranium enrichment, as are Brazil and others

• IAEA: All nuclear materials are said to be accounted for; but what about

clandestine activities and facilities? They are likely to exist.

• US intelligence agencies: No credible evidence of a weapon programme

after the 2003 elimination of Saddam Hussein (at least until 2007)

• Disturbing mismatch between the enrichment and the power plants

programmes. Iran is indeed acquiring a “virtual weapon capability”. Today,

the weakening of the religious leadership and the dominant position

acquired by army and revolutionary guards create a new perspective.

• Yet, no sense at all in bombing facilities, as rumoured... “Room for

negotiations” said US Adm. Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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Libya and SyriaLibya and Syria• Libya launched clandestine activities around 1985. It started to work

with A.Q. Khan in 1984, placing an order for 10’000 centrifuges with the Pakistani in 2000. Libya was engaged in weaponisation activities as late as 2001.

• Under a grand bargain with the US and UK started in 1999 under the Clinton Administration, Libya abandoned all illicit nuclear activities.

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• Syria committed several violations before collaborating with North Korea in 2005 for the construction of a large Pu production reactor. The building was destroyed by Israeli warplanes in September 2007. The Syrians did not complain; they just cleaned up the site!

• The IAEA gained access to the site and found traces of reprocessed uranium. Similar traces were found in a hot cell in Damascus.

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Pakistan wrecks the NPTPakistan wrecks the NPT• Pakistan has not adhered to the NPT and has manufactured nuclear

devices/weapons. It had the right to do so.

• Still, with the support of the whole Pakistani government, the head of the programme, A.Q. Khan, peddled his nuclear ware around the world with i.a. the help of three Swiss engineers, the Tinner family.

• Khan had been an employee of the Urenco enrichment company in the Netherlands. He stole critical technical documents and was about to be arrested when he fled. He fled because the then Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers was asked by the US (CIA) to let him go …

• The Tinners are jailed in Switzerland since 2005. Hundreds of folders and compact discs were found, containing bomb designs and more. Surprise! Besides working for Khan, the Tinners were on the payroll of the CIA! Hence, the US Government refused judiciary assistance to Swiss courts to help convict them; it even asked for the destruction of the documents! Quite meekly, the Swiss Government accepted – creating thereby a major domestic crisis with Parliament and the courts!

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Post‐mortem on Pakistan• The spread of nuclear weapons over the past thirty years is to a large

extent the story of A.Q. Khan: Pakistan's own program, North Korea,

Iran, Libya and the emergence of a black market in nuclear

technology. A.Q. Khan of Pakistan is either centre‐stage or lurking in

the shadows.

• The U.S. knew a lot about Pakistan's program. Just at the point at

which pressure was being put on Islamabad, in the late 1970s,

suddenly the U.S.‐Pakistan relationship was transformed by the

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Pakistan became this

indispensable ally in fighting the Soviet Union. So proliferation was

pushed way down the agenda, and basically, the intelligence was

ignored or it was twisted.

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Post‐mortem on Pakistan (cont.)• There was also a general European failure of intelligence, because the

supply network involved primarily European businessmen who were also well‐known to Europe's authorities and intelligence services. Their phones were monitored. Their order books were monitored. Yet, too little was done.

• The value system underpinning the non proliferation regime is collapsing. Non‐Nuclear States are resentful of the failure of existing Nuclear States to disarm. They are angry at attempts to deny them civilian nuclear technology. Nuclear states follow their own narrow interests – protecting and making exceptions for their allies (North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, India, Israel). As a result, the middle ground which held together the non‐proliferation regime is weakening.


Have the NPT/IAEA failed?Have the NPT/IAEA failed?

• No, in general not. Don’t forget President Kennedy who in 1963 predicted some 25 Weapon States by 1990.

• Iraq was indeed a failure (IAEA verification constrained to declared facilities).

• North Korea was a success. The IAEA detected the concealments through chemical analysis.

• Iran was not a failure (conventional safeguards were too weak to expose the concealments in the 80s and 90s).

• Trafficking: IAEA is not mandated and equipped to detect trafficking of nuclear equipment.

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The NPT, wobbly, but necessary • Discriminatory, yes. Nuclear Weapons States have an

unhealthy influence on world affairs.

• No significant disarmament efforts, yet.

• Not universal – the three non‐NPT States (India, Israel and Pakistan) will sooner or later all enjoy the full benefits of nuclear trade without having to join. The US‐India nuclear deal was a stab in the back of the NPT.

• No sanctions on North Korea, which left the Treaty and “went nuclear” unhampered, well protected by its friends.

• In spite of all this, NPT and IAEA safeguards remain essential tools to prevent further proliferation.

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How to firm up the NPT?

• No to prohibitions imposed to Non‐Nuclear Weapons

States (e.g. that all enrichment activities be provided by

an inner club of mostly Nuclear Weapons States).

• Yes to Multilateral Nuclear Arrangements (MNA) and to

regional facilities replacing one‐nation facilities.

• Yes to predictable guidelines to handle violations of the

Treaty in the IAEA Board of Governors and in the UN

Security Council (where permanent members shelter their

protégés rather than promoting non‐proliferation)

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The NPT on the brink of

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