This article was downloaded by: [University of Chicago Library] On: 27 September 2013, At: 05:58 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Middle Eastern Studies Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fmes20 The Nusayri and Druze Minorities in Syria in the Nineteenth Century: The Revolt against the Egyptian Occupation as a Case Study Yvette Talhamy Published online: 02 Nov 2012. To cite this article: Yvette Talhamy (2012) The Nusayri and Druze Minorities in Syria in the Nineteenth Century: The Revolt against the Egyptian Occupation as a Case Study, Middle Eastern Studies, 48:6, 973-995, DOI: 10.1080/00263206.2012.723624 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2012.723624 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms- and-conditions
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This article was downloaded by: [University of Chicago Library]On: 27 September 2013, At: 05:58Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Middle Eastern StudiesPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fmes20
The Nusayri and Druze Minorities inSyria in the Nineteenth Century: TheRevolt against the Egyptian Occupationas a Case StudyYvette TalhamyPublished online: 02 Nov 2012.
To cite this article: Yvette Talhamy (2012) The Nusayri and Druze Minorities in Syria in theNineteenth Century: The Revolt against the Egyptian Occupation as a Case Study, Middle EasternStudies, 48:6, 973-995, DOI: 10.1080/00263206.2012.723624
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2012.723624
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever orhowsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arisingout of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
The Nusayri and Druze Minorities inSyria in the Nineteenth Century: TheRevolt against the Egyptian Occupationas a Case Study
YVETTE TALHAMY
The Egyptian army began its campaign to conquer Greater Syria in October 1831.According to Muhammad Ali Pasha (d. 1848) the reason for this military expeditionwas to punish Abdallah Pasha, the governor of Acre, for giving refuge to desertersfrom the Egyptian army and over-taxing Egyptian traders coming up the coastthrough Sinai and Gaza.1 But the real reason behind his offensive was thatMuhammad Ali had coveted Syria for years, and it had been promised to him bySultan Mahmud II (1808–39) himself in return for help in subduing the revolt inMorea (1826). However, the attempt to subdue this revolt had ended in total failuredue to the intervention of the British and French fleets and the destruction of theentire Ottoman and Egyptian fleets (1827).2 In an interview with Henry Salt, theBritish consul-general during 1825 or 1826, Muhammad Ali had already thought ofconquering Syria and stressed that he enjoyed immense support within thatcountry – ‘Abdallah Pasha is with me, the Druses are on my side. I can command theArabs of the desert’3 – and thus anticipated little resistance during his campaign.Though his campaign did not face much resistance, it was not due to the support heenjoyed from the different branches he mentioned. For instance, although AbdallahPasha was Muhammad Ali’s friend during the 1820s, he did not join him during hiscampaign to conquer Syria, but rather took the sultan’s side, and his actions were the‘reason’ for this invasion.
The Egyptian army was placed under the command of Ibrahim Pasha (1789–1848), Muhammad Ali’s son. The well-trained Egyptian army easily overran theOttoman army, and within a few months it reached Kutahiya (Kutahya) in WesternTurkey. In May 1833 the Ottomans and the Egyptians signed the Kutahya peacetreaty which was regarded by Egypt’s viceroy as a temporary ceasefire rather than alasting one. According to the treaty, the Eyalet of Egypt, Hijaz and Crete weregranted to Muhammad Ali and his descendants and the Eyalet of Acre, Tripoli,Damascus and Aleppo were granted to his son Ibrahim Pasha, who was alsoappointed as the tax collector (muhassil) of Adana. Although the Ottomans wereobliged to sign this peace treaty, they still wanted to regain these territories andtherefore retained their contacts with the local population, stirring them up to act
Middle Eastern Studies,Vol. 48, No. 6, 973–995, November 2012
ISSN 0026-3206 Print/1743-7881 Online/12/060973-23 ª 2012 Taylor & Francis
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2012.723624
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against the Egyptians, supplying them with weapons and assuring them that theywould soon recapture Syria.
The aim of this article is to examine the revolts against the Egyptians of the tworeligious minorities – the Nusayris and the Druze. Both of them are heterodoxreligious minorities and are considered heretical and outside Islam; both werepersecuted by successive Sunni authorities until they found refuge in the mountainareas of Greater Syria, where they enjoyed semi-autonomous rule; and they bothrevolted against the Egyptians. But the outcome of their revolts, which lasted ninemonths each, was quite different. While the Nusayris were fiercely subdued,disarmed and conscripted, we find that the Druze, although also subdued, were ableto obtain such favourable agreements with the Egyptians that made it seem as if theyhad won the battle. In the current article we will try to understand the reasons for thedifferent results of those two similar revolts through presenting the structure of thetwo societies, their leaderships, the course of their revolts and the externalcircumstances that led to such dissimilar outcomes. It is worth mentioning thatthere is a huge difference in the historical coverage of these two revolts. While theNusayri revolt was only briefly mentioned in the different sources, the Druze revoltwas extensively presented.
During their expedition to conquer Greater Syria the Egyptians did not face anysignificant armed resistance, in spite of local resistance from a small number ofSunnis, Druze and Nusayris. The local population was more or less submissiveunless the conquest harmed them personally. According to a manuscript written in1843 by Fath Allah Bin Antwan al-Saigh, a traveller from Aleppo who worked as adragoman in the French consulate, the local Syrian Muslims, Christians, Jews andNusayris were tired of bad Ottoman rule and wanted a change. When they heardduring 1831 that Ibrahim Pasha was heading an army to conquer Syria they werethrilled, and many of the local leaders began sending him letters informing him of the‘right’ way to conquer the different cities, besides sending him presents and food forthe soldiers.4
After the Kutahya peace treaty Muhammad Ali considered Greater Syria, Creteand Adana as much part of his domain as Egypt, which had been under his rule since1805. Muhammad Ali, like the Ottoman Sultans Selim III and Mahmud II, thoughtit was essential to reform the region in accordance with the Western model. Asviceroy of Egypt he had begun to introduce a series of reforms which covered almostall spheres of life – the economy, education, administration and the military. Hetherefore sought to implement in his new dominions the same reforms that he hadalready carried out in Egypt. At first Muhammad Ali fulfilled his promise to the localpopulation to abolish some of the taxes that the Ottomans had burdened them with,but he soon discovered that in order to keep his new dominions he needed money,workers and soldiers. Since he had already demanded these from the regions thatwere under his control, the inhabitants of the new regions, Crete, Adana and GreaterSyria, were to be the source for supplying those demands. Soon after establishinghimself as their new governor, Muhammad Ali demanded new taxes, recruited someof the young men as corvee and declared mass conscription in order to fortify hisnorthern border with the Ottoman Empire.
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The taxes levied by the Egyptians were themiri (land tax) paid by agriculturists andthe kharaj (toleration tax) paid by non-Muslims, which were the same taxes that hadbeen levied by the Ottomans. But due to the need for money to maintain the army andfortify the northern frontier, the Egyptians imposed new taxes to be paid by all, suchas the ferdah (capitation tax) and the baltz (house tax), especially in Mount Lebanonwhere it was levied by and for the Emir Bashir, as well as other taxes that were leviedfrom certain districts. In addition, the old imposts were doubled.5
Another step in Muhammad Ali’s reforms was the implementation of militaryreforms, including the disarming of the local community as a preliminary stage formass conscription, which resulted in the eruption of several revolts in different partsof Greater Syria. The Egyptians had their own estimations of the number ofweapons that every tribe, town and district possessed, and they demanded that theseweapons be delivered to them. In some areas where the number of weapons wasmuch less than the Egyptian estimate, the local people had to buy weapons to meetthe number claimed by the Egyptians or be severely punished and sent to prison inAcre.6 According to Charles Addison (d. 1866), an English barrister and historical,traveller and legal writer:
Soon after Ibrahim Pasha had established himself in Syria, to render hisauthority more secure, and to repress the lawless disposition of the people,which indisposed them to settled government, he caused the whole Syrianpopulation to be disarmed, and forbad weapons of any kind to be carried aboutthe person. . . . the necessity of disarming them was evident.7
For the local people, mainly the mountaineers and the villagers, carrying weaponswas a regular matter; weapons were part of their daily life. They used these weaponsfor various tasks such as to protect themselves from attacks, to protect their herdsfrom wild animals and bandits, while some used weapons as a means of living, tohunt animals. Carrying weapons was also a matter of social status for these people.
Muhammad Ali, despite his treaty with the sultan, felt that his northern front wasunsafe. According to John Barker, the British consul-general in Egypt during theSyrian campaign,8 there were no towns in Syria or Adana of any importance wherethe Egyptians did not build barracks or military hospitals.9 According to Addison,Ibrahim Pasha spent a lot of time at the northern frontier strengthening his post andquelling local disturbances:10 ‘Large sums continued to be expended in fortifying thenew frontier, and men and money continued to be unrelentingly exacted.’11 Besidesfortifying the northern frontier, he sought to conscript the young Muslim men ofSyria to reinforce his army and prepare them for the inevitable confrontation withthe Ottomans. And so in the spring of 1834 he called for mass conscription.Conscription was new for the inhabitants of Syria. Even though they were used tocarrying weapons, especially the mountaineers, and to fighting on the side of theirlocal leaders, they had never been forced to do so. They usually did so to defend theirvillages from aggressors and participated in raids or fights that lasted for just a fewdays, afterwards returning home to their families, but they had never been in aregular army. The English geographer and explorer Andrew Paton (1807–74), whovisited Greater Syria during the early 1840s, heard from the local population storiesabout the horror of the Egyptian mass conscription:
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The Mode in which the conscription was carried on added greatly to the horrorthat was felt against it. Thus, if ten or twenty soldiers were wanted from a givenplace, a hundred or a hundred and fifty persons, who appeared of age for theservice, were indiscriminately seized in the streets, and indeed anywhere, by theagents of the government, and carried to a public building. There, those thathad money soon found means of liberation, by bribing the inferior agents; andfamilies of the poorer classes would sell their rags in the hope of obtaining thebenefit in favour of their relation.12
In addition to the fact that conscription was new for the citizens of Syria, the meansby which the soldiers of Muhammad Ali enforced the conscription caused distressand fear to the people, according to Addison:
The villages and the towns were surrounded by troops, and the youngest, thehealthiest, and the strongest of the population were marched off into Egypt, tobe trained as soldiers. Of all the arbitrary measures, none created suchabhorrence as this; young men maimed themselves, and women maimed theirchildren; some were blinded, and others had their fingers cut off to avoid theconscription, until the Pasha enforced a stern decree to shoot all such offenders.All the avenues of the town were guarded by sentinels, and sentinels were placedat the doors of the different consulates to prevent individuals fleeing there forprotection. Men were knocked down in the streets amid the screams of womenand children; the doors of the houses of all ranks were indiscriminately brokenopen, and the aged and the infirm were driven into the streets for a properselection to be made for the service of the army.13
Amongst those who were to be disarmed and conscripted we find the Nusayris andthe Druze, two religious minorities, both of which were considered by the SunniMuslim community as extremists or heretics outside Islam.
After the death of Prophet Muhammad, the first split within the Muslim communityoccurred around the question of the succession. The majority of the Muslimcommunity believed that since the Prophet had no sons and did not proclaim an heir,any religious Muslim was eligible to be his successor. A minority of the Muslimcommunity claimed that, on the contrary, the Prophet Muhammad did announcethat his heir was Ali bin Abi Talib, his cousin and son-in-law, the husband of hisdaughter Fatima. Those who supported Ali were called the Shiites – the followers ofhis party. But since they were a minority, their claims were not accepted, while theShiites, for their part, considered the first three Caliphs as usurpers. Ali was notnamed as the Prophet’s heir until 656 when he was chosen to be the fourth Caliph ofthe Muslim community. But even this event did not pass smoothly, and Ali’s reignwas unstable. Ali was killed in 661 while praying in a mosque. After his murder hissupporters claimed that those who had the right to inherit him were his sons by hiswife Fatima, the Prophet’s daughter. They were called the Imams, and the Shiitesbelieve that there were 12 of those; this is why the Shiites are also called the Twelvers.In the course of time there were many splits among the Shiite branch of Islam
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around the question of who had the right to be the Imam. According to the Shiitesthe line of inheritance runs through the descendants of Imam al-Husayn Ibn Ali, andthe firstborn son of each Imam is the one chosen by God. A major split occurredduring the lifetime of the sixth Imam, Ja ’far al-Sadiq. According to the Shiitetradition the heir of Ja ’far was supposed to be his firstborn son, Ismail Bin Ja ’far, butIsmail died while his father was still alive, and so Ja ’far decided to name his sonMusa al-Kazim as his heir. Some of the Shiites refused to accept Musa as the seventhImam, claiming that Ismail was the legal seventh Imam, and that after his death hisfirstborn son, Muhammad (d. 796), should inherit his place as the Imam. Those whosupported Ismail’s right to be the Imam were called the Ismailis. There were severalsplits among the Ismaili branch of the Shiites, and from those splits sprang theFatimi Branch, named after Fatima, the daughter of Prophet Muhammad and wifeof Ali, the first Imam. The Fatimids (909–1171) established for themselves an empirein North Africa and in 972 they ruled over Egypt, which became the centre of theirEmpire.
During the reign of the Fatimid Caliph, al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah (996–1021), the Druzefaith was founded, and the public declaration of their doctrine was made in 1017. Theyannounced that al-Hakim was the Mahdi, the guided one, for whom they had beenwaiting. Among those who supported al-Hakim we find twomain figures – Hamza BinAli and Husayn Nashtakin al-Darazi. When al-Darazi died in 1019 (410 AH), Hamzabecame the leader of the new faith. When al-Hakim disappeared in 1021 (411 AH)Hamza proclaimed that he went into occultation to test his supporters, and that hewould return one day. When Al-Zahir li I’zaz Din Allah, the successor of al-Hakim,decided to destroy the new movement, Hamza’s religious-call (da‘wa) moved fromEgypt to the region of Syria. The most active centres for the propagation of the Druzefaith were Wadi al-Taym and South Lebanon. Soon after al-Hakim’s disappearanceHamza also disappeared. The only remaining leader of the new faith was Baha’ al-Dinal-Muqtana who also disappeared in 1043. Both Hamza and al-Muqtana were theones who founded the Druze doctrine. They wrote 111 ‘Rasa’il al-Hikma’ (theWisdom Letters or Epistles), which are arranged in six books. In that year the gates ofthe Druze mission were closed and new supporters were no longer admitted. TheDruze faith became a hidden and secret creed. The Druze are also called theMuwahhidun (Unitarians/Monotheists) or Ahl al-Tawhid (people of Monotheism),since at the centre of the Druze faith stands the principle of the unquestionable unity ofGod. God manifested himself in flesh and blood, and the last of those manifestationswas in the person of al-Hakim, who would return at the end of days to deliver thebelievers and punish the heretics. The Druze believe in reincarnation (taqamus), thatall the souls were created on the same day and their number is permanent. When aperson dies, his soul moves to another human body, and this process continues untilthe Day of Judgement. They believe that history is divided into seven periods, and thatin each period a prophet appeared who delivered only part of God’s message tohumanity. Each prophet was accompanied by a mysterious figure who possessed thereal power – the Cosmic Intellect/Universal Mind – and which links God to creation.During the final period of al-Hakim, Hamza held this position as the Cosmic Intellect.The Druze believe in the following seven principles:
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. Sincerity and truthfulness in speech.
. The members of the community are committed to the protection and mutual aidof their brethren in faith.
. Rejection of all other forms of worship and false beliefs.
. Keeping away from heretics.
. Confessing the unity of God.
. Acquiescence and acceptance of God’s acts no matter what they are.
. Absolute submission to God’s divine will.14
Like other Shiite creeds, during times of danger the Druze resort to the principle oftaqiyya, religious dissimulation. Their place of prayer is called the Khalwa (house ofreligious retirement) a place where the believer spends time reading the holy books.
The Druze are divided into two groups. The first group, which consists of themajority, is the seculars who are called the Juhhal (the ignorant) since they do notknow the contents of the Druze religious books. The second group, which is aminority, is called the ‘Uqqal (the knowledgeable initiates) and includes both menand women. The ‘Uqqal are distinguished from the rest of the community by specialattire, including white turbans.15 The more pious and morally circumspect amongthe ‘Uqqals are accorded special authority and are called sheikhs. A sheikh al-‘aql ischosen and he acts as a religious, social and political leader of the Druze. The Juhalcould become ‘Uqqal, but they have to learn the Druze religious books and live inaccordance with the principles of the Druze doctrine.
The Druze do not perform the Hajj or fast on Ramadan, but they celebrate Id al-fitr (breaking of the fast), practice circumcision and visit the shrines and tombs of thesaints and prophets.16 Their marriages are monogamous and they practiseendogamy, which means marriage within the same creed; mixed marriages areforbidden.17
The Druze community is composed of several sub-groups of extended familiesheld together by a supreme communal authority. Leadership of the community isgenerally given to the most powerful and prestigious families and tribes.18 Patondescribes the Druze as follows:
There is no nation in the world which carries the principle of mutual assistanceand co-operation so completely into practice, in fact; they are more like a largefamily or clan than a nation . . . If Druse families act apparently in a manneropposed to the general policy of the nation, it is with the full understanding ofthe others, and with a view to serve a particular purpose. The abandonment orbetrayal of the interest of the nation is apparent, not real.19
The Druze live in the Shuf mountains and in adjoining districts in south-centralLebanon, in Wadi al-Taym on the western side of the Mount Hermon and along thenorthern and eastern flanks of this mountain, in northern Palestine and northernSyria, in Hawran, Jabal Barisha, Jabal al-‘Ala’ and in Ma’arrat al-Ikhwan. From theseventeenth century there was immigration to Jabal Hawran, which became knownas Jabal al-Duruz. By the end of the seventeenth century a few Druze, the sheikhs ofthe Hamdan family, settled permanently on the western slopes of the Jabal. OtherDruze families settled in the Jabal during the eighteenth century, especially after the
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internal Druze battle of ‘Ayn Darah in 1711. At the beginning of the nineteenthcentury some Druze sheikhs who were exiled by Emir Bashir al-Shihabi also went toHawran.20
The Laja, which spreads from the northern corner of Jabal Hawran, is a lava flowthat makes it difficult to march in that area. This is why it became a safe haven forfugitives and outlaws, and this is the reason for its name, Laja, which means to takerefuge. The Laja area was uninhibited until the beginning of the nineteenthcentury.21 To survive in the Hawran the Druze needed to maintain the socialstructure of the extended family or hamula in a place where its value became moresignificant. According to Kais Firro, since the Druze of Hawran lived adjacent to theBedouins who were divided to several ‘asha’ir, the term ‘ashira was also adopted bythe Druze and replaced the term bayt (house).22 Each ‘ashira had a sheikh whorepresented it at meetings and on different occasions. The sheikh also led the fightersduring times of war and had economic power, which led to a kind of feudalismknown as the mashyakha system.23
The Nusayris are adherents of Ali bin Abi Talib, the cousin and son-in-law of theProphet Muhammad. The Nusayri creed first appeared in Iraq in the ninth century,during the lifetime of the eleventh Shiite Imam, Hassan al-Askari. The founder ofthis creed is supposed to be Abu Shu‘yb Muhammad Ibn Nusayr (d. 883/270), whowas close to the Shiite Imam but was denounced by him due to his extreme beliefs,which included the claim that God had manifested himself in Ali bin Abi Talib. Theybelieved that God had manifested himself in human form seven times, and the lastand most perfect manifestation was in Ali. According to the Nusayris, Ali is a deity,the first of a Trinitarian hierarchy which is known by the secret term AMS:
A: Ali bin Abi Talib – the ma‘na – the essence – God, the meaning, the sense, thereality of all things.
M: The Prophet Muhammad – the Ism – the name or the veil which conceals thema‘na.
S: Salman al-Farisi – the bab – the door or gate through which the people attainknowledge of the former two.24
According to the Nusayris, Ali created Muhammad from the light of his essence andMuhammad in his turn created Salman.
The Nusayris resort to taqiyya, dissimulation. They believe in metempsychosis(tanasukh), according to which when the soul leaves the body it enters a new body,not necessarily a human one; it might be the body of an animal, insect, plant orinanimate object. They have no special building for worship, and religiousceremonies are usually held in private houses. The Nusayris do not perform thehajj or fast on Ramadan. They have their own festivals, which are a mixture ofMuslim festivals (both Sunni and Shiite) as well as Christian and Persian ones, thatthey celebrate in a different way from the original festivals.25 They practisecircumcision and visit the shrines and tombs of saints and prophets.26
Due to their extreme beliefs, the Nusayris were persecuted by the successive Sunnigovernments that ruled over Syria. They found refuge in the northern region of
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Syria, mainly in the mountain known as the ‘Nusayriyya Mountain’, which is arocky region that faces the shores of Syria, and some of them also settled in theHatay region. Entrenched in their mountain during the period of Ottoman rule(1516–1918), the Nusayris enjoyed semi-autonomous status.27 By the tenth centurythe Nusayris already had two main religious missionary centres, one in Iraq and theother in Syria, but as the years passed by the Syrian centre remained the only one inexistence.
Nusayri society was constructed of four main tribal federations – al-Kalbiyya, al-Khayattin, al-Matawira and al-Hadadin. The Nusayris were also divided into fourreligious sects – al-Shamsiyya (from the word ‘shams’ – sun, known also as al-Shamaliyya), al-Qamariya (from the word ‘qamar’ – moon, known also as al-Kalaziyya), al-Ghaybiyya and al-Haidariyya. The first two sects were the dominantones, and the last two were integrated into them and ceased to exist. Each of the twomain sects, al-Shamaliyya and al-Qamariyya, had their own religious leaders. Eachtribal federation was in turn composed of small tribes, and those small tribes werecomposed of houses. Each tribe and each house had its own secular and religiousleader who was not subject to the authority of the head of the tribe or tribalfederation to which they belonged. In addition, Nusayri society was divided into twomain groups, and the second group included two classes. The first was the smallgroup of sheikhs or ‘uqqal, the religious leaders, which comprised only men; andtheir position was handed down from father to son. They were also called the‘chosen ones’ or the merit holders, were knowledgeable about religious matters, andknew all the secrets of their religion. Although they were very much respected by theNusayris, their control over Nusayri society was very limited and they could notrestrain lawlessness and violence among their people. The second was the groupcomprising the secular majority or the ignorant, those who knew only general thingsabout their religion. This group was divided into two classes. The first class consistedof the Muqadims, the secular chiefs who are usually appointed by the government,and their position was usually inherited. The second class of this group were thecommoners or peasants who were subordinate both to the sheikhs to whom theygave alms and to the Muqadims to whom they paid taxes and who sometimesovertaxed them so as to get a percentage for themselves.28
This social structure made it difficult for the Nusayris to act as a single ethnicgroup, causing a continuous state of rivalry among the tribes and sometimes evenbetween houses of the same tribe. Nusayri society suffered from internal disputeswhich were frequently bloody; they fought each other as if they were enemies andusually had long-standing internal blood feuds. Another problem that destroyedNusayri society was the fact that the tribes were scattered all along the mountain,which made it impossible for a tribal federation to act in unison.29 They did not haveany distinct religious or secular leadership. Even external threats did not cause theNusayris to unite. Although the Nusayris are known for their courage and had thereputation of being fierce warriors, they could not ignore their internal differences inorder to benefit themselves. The tribal and religious divisions, the competitionbetween the different leaders, and the harsh nature of their mountain always led totheir failure in any battle or encounter they had with the authorities.
The Ottomans had ruled Syria from 1516, but their control in the region waslimited to collecting revenues, performance of the hajj to Mecca and maintaining the
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status quo. Most Syrian districts were ruled by rebellious or autonomous governors,either Ottoman or native, and by independent Bedouin chieftains and mountainchiefs. In Syria, besides Mount Lebanon which was ruled by semi-autonomousleaders, there were two places which were held by Islamic minority groups – theDruze and the Nusayris, the former at Jabal Hawran or Jabal al-Duruz and thelatter at Jabal al-Nusayriyya.30
As a result of the disarmament and the call for mass conscription, there were severalarmed revolts in different parts of Greater Syria, such as Aleppo, Damascus, Tripoliand Beirut. But the main revolts erupted, consecutively, in three places among theSunnis of Palestine, mainly in Jabal Nablus, the mountains around Jerusalem, andHebron during May 1834, among the Nusayris in the Nusayriyya Mountain fromSeptember 1834 to May 1835, and among the Druze of Mount Lebanon whereconscription began in October 1835 but did not cause a revolt worth mentioningamong them. The main revolt of the Druze was the one that occurred in the Hawranfrom November 1837 to July 1838. All these three revolts were quelled with force. Tosuppress the revolts the Egyptians employed ‘scorched earth’ tactics and some of theleaders of the insurgents were executed.
The revolt that erupted in Palestine was swiftly suppressed by the Egyptians.Although at first they had a hard time to quell the insurgents, so that MuhammadAli himself had to arrive in Palestine with reinforcements, the revolt was soon over.The next revolt erupted in the Nusayriyya Mountain and was much fiercer than thatin Palestine. It lasted for almost nine months and caused the Egyptians great losses.Muhammad Ali’s soldiers could not quell the first two revolts due to the roughterrain of the mountains. He needed the help of the Druze under the command of hisfriend Emir Bashir al-Shihaby, mainly in the Nusayriyya Mountain, as mountaineersagainst mountaineers.
Prior to the arrival of the Egyptians in the Nusayriyya Mountain, the Nusayrishad enjoyed semi-autonomous rule: they were ruled by their own local chiefs andpaid their taxes to the Ottoman governor of Tripoli. When at the end of April 1832the Egyptians overran Syria, some Nusayri leaders, such as Dahir Saqr al-Mahfuz,the governor of Safita, expressed his loyalty to the Ottomans and arranged an armedforce of 3,000 Nusayri fighters to help the Ottomans recapture Tripoli from theEgyptians. The Nusayri fighters were beaten by the Egyptians; many of the Nusayriswere killed including Dahir himself, and the rest of the Nusayri local leaders whohad participated in the battle were taken prisoner. This was the only confrontationbetween the Egyptians and the Nusayris. The whole region then fell under Egyptianrule, and for over two years a period of tranquillity prevailed until September 1834,when Muhammad Ali issued his orders for disarmament and mass conscription inthe region, this time in the Nusayriyya Mountain.
Muhammad Ali had already sought to reinforce his army in September 1832 byconscripting the citizens of Syria, but his son Ibrahim Pasha advised him not to doso, since their grip on the country was not firm enough. Ibrahim believed that theyfirst had to earn the trust and support of the local population prior to implementingthe conscription. He was sure that such a major step would create massive unrest inGreater Syria since its citizens had not been conscripted before and thus it might
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cause them to join forces with the Ottomans. According to Addison, ‘Ibrahim Pasha,to keep the people in due subjection to his government, disarmed the wholepopulation, and forbade any individuals, on pain of the bastinado, to carry dirks,daggers, or muskets about with them’.31
Ibrahim’s estimations were not far from the truth. In May 1834, when theEgyptians began to enforce disarmament and mass conscription in Palestine, severalarmed revolts erupted in different parts of Palestine and the Egyptian army had ahard time subduing those revolts, which lasted until August 1834. They weresubdued only after the arrival of large army reinforcements under the command ofMuhammad Ali himself, who punished the rebels brutally and afterwards continuedthe task of disarmament and conscription.32 According to Addison ‘the orders givento the Egyptian soldiers were to take all males available for the army and navy andto exterminate the rest of the inhabitants’.33
After subduing the rebels in Palestine it was time to enforce the orders in Syria. Asin Palestine, the Muslim citizens of Syria were horrified since this was their firstexperience of conscription. Although Muhammad Ali was certain that his orderswould cause unrest, he was not going to change his decision. He knew that despitethe peace treaty that he and the sultan had signed, it was more of a truce or atemporary ceasefire that might be violated at any time, and he was preparing for thismoment. He had fortified the northern frontier with cannons and he needed moresoldiers to man them.
During September 1834 Ali Bey, the commander of the cavalry regiment, reportedto Ibrahim Pasha that several revolts had erupted in the Nusayriyya Mountain inreaction to the disarmament orders, which were no more than an introductory stepto ease the implementation of the approaching conscription orders.34 The firstoffence of the Nusayris against the Egyptians was when 4,000 Nusayri warriorsattacked a regiment of Egyptian regular cavalry marching from Latakia to Aleppo,causing them to lose half of their men and retreat to Latakia.35
The Nusayris did not fight against the Egyptians as one group but, due to theaforementioned internal differences, acted sporadically. Nusayris from differenttribes acted against the Egyptians without collaborating with Nusayri tribes fromother parts of the Mountain and without having a distinctive leadership. The first torevolt against the Egyptians were the Nusayris settled in the northern part of theNusayriyya Mountain, from Jablah northwards. By the end of September 1834 sevenNusayri districts refused to hand in their weapons, declared themselves rebels andbegan attacking the Egyptians. The seven districts were al-Bahluliya (Matawira),Bani Ali (Hadaddin), Sahun (Khayattin), al-Qirdaha (Kalbiyya), al-Mreqib, Jabalal-Akrad and Bayt al-Shalfi (Kalbiyya).36 This act of rebellion was undertaken bythe Nusayris after the Egyptians had ill-treated them and put a number of them inprison. Some of the prisoners were executed and the rest were tortured and were tobe sent to prison in Acre.37 In his manuscript Saigh confirms this and adds that, as aresult, their economic situation deteriorated because the Nusayris were afraid to gonear Latakia to buy necessities such as coal, chicken, eggs, fruit and otherprovisions.38
It seems that the Egyptians had feared the reaction of the Nusayris to their ordersfor disarmament and conscription and therefore acted ferociously against them as awarning that they would enforce these orders so as to avoid the trouble they had
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implementing them in Palestine. But the Nusayris were not intimidated by these acts.On the contrary, these actions of the Egyptians stirred up the Nusayris, who decidednot to let it pass by without response. According to Saigh, after several encountersbetween the two sides the Nusayris felt that the Egyptians were very weak, so theydecided to attack the city of Latakia.39 Knowing that Ali Bey, the commander of thecavalry, was away enforcing the orders in the Nusayri district of Bahluliya, theNusayri warriors fearlessly attacked the city of Latakia. They attacked the houses ofthe military officers and laid siege to the house of the mutasalim, Said Agha al-Intabi.40 In this attack, besides freeing the Nusayri prisoners, they stole the mirimoney and the horses of the mutasalim and also the belongings of the injuredsoldiers found in the hospitals.41 The Nusayris declared publicly that they wereacting in the service of the sultan and they therefore dismissed the mutasalim whohad been appointed by the Egyptians and appointed a new one in his place.42
During this time the Nusayris in the surroundings of Tripoli were being disarmedby Salim Bey. But Nusayris in this district also refused to hand in their weapons, andentrenched themselves in the mountain peaks. Salim Bey, the general of artillery andgovernor of Homs, warned them that if they did not hand in their weapons he woulddestroy their houses, vineyards and fields. In fear or as a strategy, the Nusayrispromised to hand in their weapons, but only some of them did so. Salim Bey wasadamant in his decision to implement the disarmament, and through his agents hediscovered the hiding place of the Nusayris and surprised them with his men. Duringhis raid many weapons and flocks were captured and several Nusayris fell captive.Salim ordered the villages of the Nusayris to be burnt as an act of collectivepunishment. Unfortunately for the Nusayris, one of their leaders, known as Ahmadal-Qarqur, was captured and executed by the Egyptians, and his corpse was hungoutside his house so that everyone could see it.43
From this district alone, which had at least 865 armed Nusayri warriors, theEgyptians managed to collect 400 rifles, 100 pistols and many other weapons andwere sure that there were still no fewer than 200 rifles which they hoped to collectwithin a few days.44 While enforcing the disarmament of the Nusayris in this district,the news about the Nusayri attack on the city of Latakia reached Salim Pasha, thegeneral of the foot guards and governor of Latakia, who was furious and decided topunish ‘those aggressors’ severely. Salim and his troops headed towards Latakia,reinforced by new troops. Knowing that Salim was heading towards Latakiatogether with a large army, the Nusayris fled towards their mountains. Several ofthem were killed while running away and others were captured. Salim decided topunish them harshly for their boldness. The two sides fought fiercely, but theEgyptians were able to overcome the Nusayris. In this battle over 300 Nusayris werekilled, and the village of al-Qantara, where the Nusayris took refuge from theEgyptians, was burned down. Five of the Nusayri leaders were taken prisoner by theEgyptians and decapitated. The heads were exhibited in the main market of the cityof Latakia, and on the heads there was a sign stating the crime of those men.45
Salim continued his attack against those rebellious regions. He attacked al-Mreqiband the adjacent Nusayri villages, such as Qadmus, al-Khawabi and Sultan Ibrahim,where he collected 3,200 rifles, 260 pistols and many other weapons.46 The Nusayrisfought fiercely. They were said to have contact with the Ottomans, who hadpromised to aid them against the Egyptians.47 When the Egyptian soldiers could not
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move forward in the rocky mountain and requested backup, Ibrahim Pasha askedfor assistance from his allies.48
According to Barker: ‘All the endeavors to subdue the mountaineers of Latakiaand Tripoli failed. These are the ‘‘Ansairee’’ they used to come down and pillage his[Ibrahim Pasha’s] granaries and kill his officers, and return to their fastnesses.Whenever any were caught they were decapitated.’49 Barker continues by sayingthat: ‘Ibrahim Pacha could not subdue the people of the mountainous parts of Syria,who had never been subject to the Porte because his regular troops could notperform their maneuvers among rocks and trees, and his recruits from Egypt hadnever seen a mountain, and were totally unacquainted with guerilla warfare.’50 TheNusayris vowed to fight the Egyptians by every means possible, even by targeting therelatives of Ibrahim Pasha. When they heard that one of his relatives was coming totheir region they decided to attack him. According to Barker:
The Ansairee mountaineers, who inhabit the high mountainous range betweenLatakia and Tripoli, heard that the nephew of Ibraheem Pacha, Ismaeel Bey,would land at Souedeeyah, on his way to Aleppo, and sent 100 of their peoplethere in the hope of taking him, and carrying him off as hostage. They came atday break on 3 November 1834, and must have been at least three days on theroad. . . . They did not find Ismaeel Bey.51
Though their mission failed, this was a bold move by the Nusayris, and Ibrahim hadto subdue them as quickly as possible.
Ibrahim Pasha sent Salim some Arab al-Hanady52 soldiers in addition to thereinforcement of the Shihabi princes along with their Druze soldiers,53 comprising atotal of 6,000 soldiers that arrived at the beginning of November.54 Altogether, theEgyptian army consisted of 10,000 soldiers ready to attack the Nusayris. This armycamped at the city of Latakia and the Egyptians had problems providing them withsufficient supplies.55 The commander of the army was Salim Pasha. Within a weekSalim, along with the huge number of reinforcements, managed to subdue theNusayris of the Northern part of the Mountain and disarm them after burningseveral of their villages.56
After fulfilling their mission, the Druze troops which were under the command ofPrince Khalil, the son of Prince Bashir, returned to Lebanon, but the Nusayriswanted revenge against the Druze for the part they had taken in support of theEgyptians against them. They followed and overtook them in the defile of Ehdin(North Lebanon) and many of the Emir’s troops were killed in this encounter.57
According to the report given by the British consul-general in Egypt, Colonel P.Campbell, after this encounter with the Druze the Nusayris ‘voluntarily submitted toSalim Bey; giving up their arms, and sending 4,000 of their men to enter the ranks ofthe Egyptian army, which Ibrahim Pacha very willingly accepted, and distributedamong his guards. His Highness, as a mark of his ‘‘solicitude,’’ as he said, ‘‘for theirtranquility,’’ left with the Ansaries a garrison of 2,800 men’.58
Yet other Nusayris in different parts of the mountain refused to give up and keptfighting the Egyptians despite the severe punishments they suffered. For instance, byDecember 1834 the Egyptians had already burnt more than 420 Nusayri villages,59
besides cutting down many fruit trees,60 and burning their crops in the fields.
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According to Reverend Lyde, who stayed in the Nusayriyya Mountain during the1850s, even after more than ten years had passed since the Egyptians were driven outof Syria, he still could see the marks of the Egyptian occupation: ‘We looked throughthe vast arched cellars in which the remains of burnt wheat still testified theoccupation to the place by the troops of Ibraheem Basha.’61
The Ottomans, who had remained in touch with the local Syrians, sent theNusayris an emissary encouraging them to continue their revolt and not to hand intheir weapons to the Egyptians.62 They promised the Nusayris that they would cometo their assistance, but due to the hard winter in the region they postponed theirattack until the spring. The Nusayris, who had hoped for the return of Ottoman rule,since they enjoyed semi-autonomous rule under them and were not conscripted ordisarmed, kept resisting the Egyptians until April 1835.63 But as time passed itbecame more evident that the Ottomans were not coming. Although their revolt wassubdued, the Nusayris were still only partially disarmed and there were even someareas in the Mountain that Ibrahim’s soldiers had never entered.64
Before the Egyptian conquest of Greater Syria, Emir Bashir Shihab II (1767–1850),who ruled over the Druze of Lebanon in Mount Lebanon and surrounding areas,had problems with the Druze leadership. During 1822 the rivalry between EmirBashir and one of the Druze sheikhs called Bashir Jumblatt (1775–1825) broke intoopen warfare when one of Bashir’s friend’s, Abdallah Pasha, the governor of Acre,had problems with the Ottomans. Sheikh Jumblatt, due to his rivalry with EmirBashir, supported the Ottomans against the Emir and Abdallah Pasha. EmirBashir fled to Egypt where he became a close friend to Egypt’s viceroy MuhammadAli.65 A year later, Emir Bashir’s relations with the Ottomans had improved. Hereturned to the Mountain and decided to avenge himself against Sheikh BashirJumblatt and other Druze sheikhs for supporting the Ottomans against him.
In 1825 there was an encounter between Emir Bashir who was backed by troopsfrom the Wali of Acre and the Druze. The Druze were defeated, Sheikh Bashir wasexecuted and his holdings were confiscated by the Emir.66 Some of the Druze sheikhsof Hasbaya were imprisoned and others were forced to leave the region.67 The Druzewho had supported Sheikh Bashir were also punished by the Emir, their propertyconfiscated and their houses destroyed, acts which led them to migrate to theHawran.68 Besides this, he also alienated some of the Druze sheikhs and leaders, afew of whom were in exile. This is why when Muhammad Ali, Emir Bashir’s friend,invaded Syria, some of the Druze leaders supported the Ottomans, thinking thatonce Muhammad Ali was beaten, his ally Emir Bashir would be punished by theOttomans and they might regain their position in the Mountain. The leaders in exileand the Ottomans69 made contact with those still in Mount Lebanon, andencouraged them to join the Ottoman side.70 Many of the Druze families of MountLebanon did join the Ottoman side against the Egyptians.71 The Druze secretlycorresponded with the Ottomans72 and sent a letter to Uthman Pasha, thecommander of the Ottoman troops, in which they declared their loyalty tothe sultan.73 The leader of the Druze was Na‘man Bashir Jumblatt, the son of theexecuted Sheikh Bashir, who had been appointed by Uthman Pasha as governor ofthe Mountain instead of Emir Bashir.74 But Uthman Pasha, who was supported by
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the Druze, the Nusayris and some local Sunnis, was beaten both in Tripoli andAkkar.75 Due to Druze support for the Ottomans, Ibrahim Pasha tried to ensure hishold on the region of Mount Lebanon by sending troops to Dayr al-Qamar andtaking two hostages from each important Druze family.76 Most of the Druze leadersleft Dayr al-Qamar and joined the Ottomans in Hammah.77 No Druze leaders wereleft in the Mountain and their dwellings were destroyed.78
According to Colonel Campbell, after Ibrahim Pasha subdued the revolution inPalestine and then in the Nusayriyya Mountain, he decided to demand the arms ofthe whole population ‘under pretence that he had secret intelligence with therebels’.79 The Druze under Emir Bashir together with the Christians were used tosubdue the various revolts that erupted in Syria, especially that of the Nusayris. Itwas then that he decided to disarm the Druze and conferred with Prince Bashir onthe measures for the execution of this plan.80 According to Addison:
Syria was tranquil, and he [Ibrahim Pasha] was on an amicable footing with theEmir [Bashir]. Suddenly, he dispatches orders to some newly arrived regimentsfrom Egypt, and to all garrisons in Syria, to march on Bteddin [Bayt al-Din], theresidence of the Emir Beshir, and Deir el Kammar, the capital of the Drusecountry, about two miles distant from each other. He sends to the Pashas ofDamascus, Beirut, and Acre, to meet him there with the forces under theircommand, and so arranges his orders, that 16,000 men are assembled in one dayat Deir el Kammar, in the heart of the Druse country. The Pasha, first, however,writes to the Emir ordering him to disarm the Druses, then shortly afterwardssends a message saying that he is coming himself to assist him. News of theseevents have just arrived in Beirut, and have created great sensation; many areprophesying a general insurrection, saying that the Druses are too spiritedtamely to submit, and that the rest of Syria will rise, now that the troops aredrawn off to the mountains.81
In June 1835 Muhammad Ali issued an order to disarm and conscript the Druze ofMount Lebanon, and Emir Bashir was asked by Ibrahim Pasha to deliver 1,600young Druze, between the ages of 15 to 25,82 to be enrolled in the Egyptian army.83
According to Fahmy, as early as 1825 Muhammad Ali is said to have had in mindthe possibility of conscripting the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon, ‘who were reputedto make brave and strong soldiers’,84 which meant that by then he already had inmind the idea of conquering Greater Syria.
According to Addison, Emir Bashir was helpless. Although he did not want toobey the orders of Ibrahim Pasha, he was obliged to do so, ‘lying as he was at themercy of Ibrahim Pasha, his palace and capital surrounded by troops, andcompanies of soldiers penetrating in every direction through his mountains,disarming his people’.85 Emir Bashir in his turn summoned the Druze sheikhs andasked them to provide the required young men. Some of the sheikhs were preparedto do this if they were enrolled into a Druze corps and not in the regular Egyptianforces, while other sheikhs pointed out that this might affect the economy of thevillages if their young men were conscripted, since most of the working hands wouldbe absent. After leaving the Emir, the Druze sheikhs held a meeting and decided toinform the Egyptians that they did not have the power to conscript the young men,86
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and that the young men would rather die than voluntarily surrender themselves toconscription.87 Emir Bashir then summoned the sheikhs of the prominent families ofthe region and informed them of the Egyptian request for conscripts andrecommended that they begin rounding up the required number of conscripts.88
This caused agitation in the Mountain. They claimed that their refusal sprang fromthe fear that a long absence from home would undermine their traditional values andbeliefs.89 They refused to furnish conscripts but were willing to offer volunteers.Hanna Bahri Bey, a Greek Catholic entrusted by Muhammad Ali with financial andclerical administration, met with the Druze leaders and tried to convince them tosend Ibrahim the conscripts he had asked for,90 but they refused to do so. Bahri Beyassured them that Ibrahim Pasha was not going to accept the Druze refusal and theiroffer to send volunteers.91 According to Henry Guys, the French consul, Bahri Beywarned the Druze of Ibrahim Pasha’s reaction and that the Sultan himself had beenhumiliated by him: ‘You know Ibrahim Pasha, he added, you know what he iscapable of. Take care not to excite his anger or remember the ills you will draw onyourselves.’92
Muhammad Ali knew that he would not be able to conscript the Druze beforedisarming them.93 Shortly after Ibrahim Pasha arrived at Bayt al-Din, 15,000 troopspoured in from various parts of the region.94 Suliman Pasha, then in Beirut, washastily summoned to appear with his troops in the neighbourhood. A decree wasnext issued by the Emir Bashir ordering the Druze to deliver up their arms withinthree days on pain of having their dwellings burnt. An announcement was publicizedin the district of Matin (Mount Lebanon), and criers were dispatched to summon theinhabitants to arms.95
Addison continues describing the situation of Emir Bashir as follows:
Parties of soldiers are dispatched from the head quarters to all the villages in themountains. When they arrive, proclamation is made to the inhabitants to bringtheir arms and pile them in the street, on pain of death, and a certain time isallowed for that purpose. These parties are accompanied by guides who knowpretty well the number of inhabitants, and if suspicion is excited that arms havebeen concealed, the most rigorous search is made. As yet the inhabitants haveall been taken by surprise, and no resistance has been offered; nor is it likely tobe, for the communication of the mountaineers with the Emir has been cut off,and no time has been allowed for combination. Ibrahim had gained his point,and has rendered the Emir powerless at a blow.96
The Druze began preparing themselves to resist the Egyptians,97 while the Egyptianson their part punished the insurgents severely. Houses were set alight, a few villageswere partly destroyed,98 some of the insurgents were imprisoned and, since most ofthe Druze leadership was absent, the Druze had no alternative but to surrender, bedisarmed and conscripted.99 Approximately 2,000 Druze of Mount Lebanon wereconscripted100 and the number of arms that were taken was estimated to be 22,000muskets besides many pistols and sabres.101 Emir Bashir had to pay an annualtribute to the Egyptian government of 1,300 purses valued at 650,000 piasters, whichwas later reduced by Ibrahim Pasha to 800 purses, or 400,000 piasters, as a mark ofhis satisfaction at the Emir’s conduct in the final disarmament of the Druze.102 ‘The
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mountaineers of Lebanon have been entirely disarmed, and the trained regiments ofIbrahim Pasha, everywhere overawe the population into obedience to thegovernment’, stated Addison.103
According to Colonel Campbell, in less than 16 months the whole of thepopulation of Syria was disarmed,104 except the Druze of the Hawran. TheEgyptians decided to postpone conscripting the Druze of Hawran until 1837,105 sincethey were responsible for keeping the peace along the border and protectingthe region against the incursions of the Bedouin.106 According to Henry Guys, theFrench consul in Beirut, Ibrahim Pasha had promised the Druze residing in theHawran exemption from conscription and taxation.107 To avoid conscription,disarmament and taxation, some of the Druze began to migrate from MountLebanon and Wadi al-Taym to the Hawran.108
The Egyptians had great respect for the warlike Druze but feared that if they kepttheir weapons, those weapons would one day be turned against the Egyptian troops,as had happened in Mount Lebanon during the Egyptian invasion.109 So in late 1837the Egyptians asked for 170 or 180 Druze conscripts from the Hawran region. JabalHawran has always been a place for Druze fugitives, both sheikhs and peasants.110
As mentioned before, during Egyptian rule it became a place of refuge for those whowanted to avoid conscription, disarmament and taxation. Sheikh Yahya al-Hamdan,one of the prominent sheikhs of the Hawran, was summoned to Damascus to meetSharif Pasha, the governor of Syria, to receive the conscription order. SheikhHamdan requested an exemption, and in return he offered to pay grain.111 SharifPasha was furious at the sheikh’s answer and it is said that he struck him on the face.When Sheikh Hamdan went back to the Hawran he called the Druze sheikhs andleaders for a meeting in Suwayda where he informed them of what had happened inDamascus. This meeting soon turned into a war council. The Druze of the Hawranrefused to furnish this small number of conscripts, thus declaring war against theEgyptians. Two commanders were appointed: Husayn Abu Assaf and HusaynDarwish.112 The Egyptian army could have done perfectly well without those 170Druze conscripts, but it seems that the Egyptians felt it was time to enforce Egyptianrule over this region which had given refuge to so many defectors and taxavoiders.113 During this year the Egyptians also called for a general conscriptionbecause they feared a possible Ottoman attack against them. Muhammad Ali knewthat the Ottomans, with the backing of the European powers, were preparing theirarmy for a possible encounter since he had already begun to talk of independencefrom the Ottoman Empire and announced his intentions to the Western consuls.114
He feared a possible collaboration between the Druze of the Hawran and theOttomans.
The Druze withdrew into al-Laja, where they had the Slut Bedouin tribe as theirallies.115 The first encounter between the two sides was in January 1838, at a placecalled al-Tha‘la, where 400 Egyptian troops under the command of Ali Agha al-Busayli and the governor of the Hawran Abd al-Qadir Agha Abu Habib attackedthe Druze. The Egyptian troops, which had underestimated the strength of theDruze, suffered badly; many troops were killed, including the governor of theHawran.116 Another Egyptian force of 6,000 regulars under the command ofMuhammad Pasha, general of the infantry, was sent to the Hawran region, and theDruze retreated into the interior hilly and rocky villages of the Laja,117 where they
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knew they could outmanoeuvre the Egyptian soldiers. The Egyptian troops followedthem there, but were easily repulsed by the Druze,118 and suffered extremely heavylosses, including the commander of the expedition, Muhammad Pasha.119 TheEgyptians then asked Emir Bashir for Christian reinforcements from MountLebanon.120 A third expedition under the command of Minikly Pasha, the Egyptianminister of war, along with Sharif Pasha the governor of Syria, was launched againstthe Druze and once again the forces were beaten by the Druze under the commandof Shibly al-’Aryan.121 The defeat of Egyptians by Druze insurgents made theOttomans happy; they hoped that if the internal situation in Syria was in a state ofunrest it would affect Egyptian rule over Syria. An internal revolt with an externaloffensive might help them regain possession of Syria.122
After those three successive defeats of the Egyptian troops, Ibrahim Pasha decidedto take care of this problem himself.123 He sent his most skilful soldiers, theAlbanians, to the region and asked for reinforcements from Aleppo, Acre andHammah. The total number of the Egyptian troops was 15,000.124 Instead ofentering the dangerous region of the Laja, like his predecessors, Ibrahim Pashadecided to blockade the Laja region while Sharif Pasha opened negotiations with theDruze insurgents. Once again they were ordered to surrender and furnish theconscripts, which the Druze refused to do. To fight the Druze, Ibrahim Pasha usedlocal manpower, the Bedouin tribes of Anaza, Wild Ali and the former allies of theDruze, the Slut tribe. A body of Christian irregulars was sent by Emir Bashir toassist in the offensive against the Druze. To relieve the pressure in the Laja region,the Druze tried to expand the revolt to other parts of Syria and Lebanon. They sentletters to prominent leaders in Damascus urging them to revolt against theEgyptians, but they failed.125 To face the army of Ibrahim Pasha, the Druzeemployed a three-stage plan:
. To relieve the pressure on the Laja and open new fronts in the Ghuta, Iqlim al-Billan and Wadi al-Taym regions.
. To disrupt communication between Damascus and Beirut, Jerusalem and Cairo.
. To negotiate an amnesty.
The most prominent leader of the Druze was now Shibly al-’Aryan, who led a partyof the insurgents to instigate revolts in Wadi al-Taym and Iqlim al-Bilan. ManyDruze villages joined him and the total number of Druze insurgents was 8,000. Soonthe Druze of Mount Lebanon began to join their brethren, and the number of theDruze insurgents grew daily. Ibrahim Pasha once again asked Emir Bashir to sendChristian troops against the Druze, this time to the Wadi al-Taym. The encounterbetween the Druze and the Egyptian troops took place during April. This time theDruze were beaten.
After his defeat, the Druze leader Shibly al-Aryan took his men towards Hasbaya,and when he reached Wadi al-Taym he went to Rashaya where he killed thegovernor, took over the town, began to levy the miri from the surroundingvillages,126 and urged their inhabitants to join him against the Egyptians.127 Thenumber of Druze insurgents continued to grow daily and reached a total of 4,000.128
To fight Shibly and his insurgents, Ibrahim sent 1,000 Egyptian soldiers, who wereseverely beaten.129 Ibrahim Pasha also reinforced his troops in Wadi al-Taym and
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asked Emir Bashir for more Christian irregulars. Meanwhile the Druze chiefs of theHawran were negotiating with the Egyptians to put an end to their uprising. TheBritish consul saw this as a manoeuvre to gain time while waiting for the Ottomansto come to their aid, since at that time there were rumours that the Ottomans werepreparing an offensive against the Egyptians to regain Syria. Ibrahim, who also knewof the Ottoman intentions, wanted to end the Druze revolt as soon as possible andwas ready to negotiate with them. There were some Ottoman preparations for waralong the borders, and the Egyptians feared these actions.130 Although he was readyto grant them pardon he was not yet ready to give up his two conditions for a truce –to lay down their arms and to furnish the previously required number ofconscripts.131 The two sides could not reach an agreement.132 Meanwhile, IbrahimPasha continued his tactics to defeat the Druze. He knew that the water sources ofthe Laja region were scarce and that if he could get control over them now, when thesummer season would soon begin, he could easily beat the thirsty Druze. The waterwar between the two sides began. The Druze tried to recapture some water sourcesthat the Egyptian troops had taken control of,133 but were unable to do so. Afterfierce fighting, the Egyptians were driven out of Laja, but still they kept control oversome of the water sources and destroyed those that they could not hold or poisonedtheir water, which caused many deaths.134 The resistance in Laja was diminishedconsiderably, and only 1,000 insurgents remained in Laja to fight the Egyptians.135
During July 1838 there was another encounter between the two sides in WadiBakka, and once again the Druze, under Shibly al-Aryan,136 were severely beaten bythe Egyptians. The remaining Druze under the command of Shibly al-Aryan movedto the southern part of Wadi al-Taym, where they were attacked by the Christianirregulars of Emir Bashir, but this time the Druze fought for several days before theywere beaten by the Egyptians. Al-Aryan then took the rest of his warriors to theregion of Mount Hermon, where most of them surrendered to the Egyptians andwere given amnesty.137 The successive defeats of the Druze convinced their chiefsthat it was time to reach an agreement with Ibrahim Pasha and end the revolt.138
In the agreement reached between the two sides, the Druze insurgents weregranted amnesty and exempted from conscription and corvee in return for handing in700 of their guns and another 200 that they had captured from their battles with theEgyptian troops. The Druze surrendered on 23 July. Even though the agreement wasextremely lenient for the Druze, yet they did not abide by it. They did not deliver the700 arms they had promised, nor did they deliver the arms they had captured fromthe Egyptian troops.139
In al-Laja a group of insurgents under the command of Sheikh Husayn Abu Assafrefused to surrender and so did a group of insurgents under the command of Shiblyal-Aryan in the Hermon district. Al-Aryan was wanted by the Egyptians and hecontinued to escape from one village to another until he finally surrendered toIbrahim Pasha. He was first employed by him as an irregular and later was sent on amilitary expedition to Sinar.140 But, like the Nusayris, there were still some Druzeinsurgents who refused to surrender to the Egyptians.141
First of all it should be stressed once again that there is an enormous difference in theamount of historical coverage given to these two revolts. While the Druze revolt was
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extensively covered in various books and articles depending upon archival resourcesand biographies, the Nusayri revolt was paid little attention. The present researchrelies mainly upon archival material and biographies to try and present this revolt asobjectively and reliably as possible. Both revolts were of heterodox religiousminorities that were obliged to furnish conscripts to the army, yet as we have seenthere were several factors that caused different outcomes for these two revolts.
The first difference between the two was the organization of the revolts. While theDruze revolt in the Hawran had its distinct commanders and a distinct leadership –Yahya al-Hamdan, Husayn Abu Assaf, Husayn Darwish and Shibly al-Aryan – theNusayris lacked this important element. We can see that there was even a differencein the resistance of the Druze of Mount Lebanon and that of the Druze of theHawran. While the former were easily conscripted and disarmed since they lackedleadership, the latter fiercely resisted the Egyptians. The Druze revolts and warfareagainst the Egyptians were tactical and well planned, in contrast to those of theNusayris which were much more sporadic and lacking collaboration between thetribes of the different parts of the Mountain. They organized no war assembly suchas the Druze did when they decided on reacting against the Egyptians as a singleentity.
The second difference was the timing of the revolt. The Egyptians had first tried toconscript the Nusayris during 1834, shortly after Syria was officially granted toMuhammad Ali by the Kutahiya peace treaty. Although the Ottomans supportedthe Nusayris, mainly morally, and the latter believed they would come to their aid,this was not a realistic possibility since the Ottoman army had recently been beatenby the Egyptians and was not likely to have re-established itself within the short timethat had passed. The Egyptians decided to conscript the Druze of the Hawran onlyin late 1837 knowing that the Ottomans were making military preparations along theborder to regain Syria, if not through diplomacy then by force. The Egyptians, whounder-estimated the strength of Druze resistance, thought that it would be better toguarantee Druze submissiveness because they feared collaboration between Druzeand the Ottomans. During the Egyptian invasion of Greater Syria the Druze hadaided the Ottomans against them.
International circumstances had also become different now that the Europeanpowers had abandoned Muhammad Ali after he stated that he was not going to giveSyria back to the Ottomans and wished to declare his independence from them. Inreaction to Muhammad Ali’s statements, the European powers decided to supportthe rights of the Ottoman sultan. Ibrahim, who noticed the Ottoman militarypreparations along the border, wanted to end the problem with the Druze as soon aspossible and to minimize his losses. He therefore reached an agreement that was verylenient to the Druze, releasing them from conscription, only partly disarming themand not imposing forced labour upon them.
On June 1839 the Ottoman sultan backed by the European powers felt he wasstrong enough to go to war against Muhammad Ali to regain Syria. But once again,the Egyptians defeated the Ottomans in the battle of Nezib. After this defeat and thedeath of Sultan Mahmud II, the European powers – England, Austria, Prussia,Russia and France, Muhammad Ali’s former ‘ally’, went over to the side of the newand young Ottoman Sultan Abd al Majid and publicly declared their support forhim to regain Syria. During October 1839 Rashid Pasha, the Grand Vizier, met with
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the exiled Druze sheikhs and asked them to inform their countrymen that the sultanwould do all in his power to release them from the oppression they were under whenhe had the opportunity.142 According to Wood, Rashid Pasha asked him to inducethe sheikhs to write to their friends to continue their opposition to the Egyptians.143
During the winter of 1840 there were several uprisings in various parts of GreaterSyria including among the Nusayris, mainly in the surroundings of Antioch, amongthe Druze insurgents of al-Laja and the Hawran who had refused to surrender toIbrahim Pasha in the previous encounter, as well as among the Christians of MountLebanon. According to Wood, the Druze sheikhs assured him that they wanted tothrow off Egyptian rule and return to their former loyalty towards the sultan.144 OnSeptember 1840 the attack began and Muhammad Ali’s army was beaten. Many ofthe Syrian soldiers, who had been forcibly conscripted, defected from MuhammadAli’s army and went back home. During November 1840 Shibly al-Aryan along with400 horsemen also fled from the Egyptian army and joined the sultan’s side.
The Egyptian troops left Damascus in December 1840 and in June 1841Muhammad Ali retained the hereditary title of ruler over Egypt and Sudan, but gaveSyria and the rest of the regions given to him in the Kutahiya treaty back to thesultan, thus ending nine years of the Egyptian rule in Syria.
Notes
1. A. al-Latif Tibawi, A Modern History of Syria – Including Lebanon and Palestine (London:
Macmillan, 1969), p.65.
2. K. Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men: Mehmed Ali, his Army, and the Making of Modern Egypt (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.48–9. According to Fahmy (ibid., p.38): ‘In 1825 in a
frank and candid interview with one of his French military advisors Mehmed Ali is reported to have
said: ‘‘I am the most important man in the entire Ottoman Empire . . . My right hand, my son
Ibrahim, will conquer Morea and the moment his mission is crowned with success, I shall call him
back and return these lands to their legitimate master. I will call back my forces, raise [new]
conscripts, complete my regiments and then grab the pashaliks of Damascus and Acre . . . I will
organize une grande armee and I shall not stop except at the Tigris and Euphrates’’.’
3. Ibid., p.49.
4. F.A.A. Saigh, Al-Mughtarib fi hawadith al-hadar wa-l-‘Arab, MS. Paris (Bibliotheque Nationale),
Fonds Arabe 1658, pp.71–3.
5. J. Bowring, Report on the Commercial Statistics of Syria [1840] (New York: Arno Press, 1973), p.118.
6. C. Bazili, Zikhrunut mi-Livanon 1839–1847 (1862) (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Bin Tzvi, 1983), p.97;
Bowring, Report, p.121.
7. C.G. Addison, Damascus and Palmyra: A Journey to the East (Philadelphia: E.L. Carey & A. Hart,
1838), Vol.II, p.19.
8. John Barker (1771–1849) was a well-known diplomat and horticulturist. From 1799 to 1825 he was
consul of the Levant Company in Aleppo. During 1826 he was appointed consul in Alexandria and in
1829–33 he acted as the British consul-general in Egypt.
9. J. Barker, Syria and Egypt under the Last Five Sultans of Turkey (1876) (New York: Arno Press,
1973), Vol.2, p.204.
10. Addison, Damascus and Palmyra, Vol.II, p.19.
11. Ibid., p.253.
12. A.A. Paton, A History of the Egyptian Revolution from the Period of the Mamelukes to the Death of
Mohammed Ali (London: Trubner and Co., 1870), Vol.2, pp.121–2.
13. Addison, Damascus and Palmyra, Vol.II, p.253.
14. N.L. Zion, Ha-Islam (Tel Aviv: Open University Press, 2003–08), p.167.
15. M.G.S. Hodgson, ‘Duruz’, Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol.III (1965), pp.631–7.
16. Ibid., p.633.
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17. K.M. Firro, A History of the Druzes (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992), pp.24–25.
18. Ibid., pp.24–5.
19. A.A. Paton, TheModern Syrians or Native Society in Damascus Aleppo and theMountains of the Druses
(New York: Elibron Classics; replica of London: Longman, Brown and Longmans, 1844), p.88.
20. N.N. Lewis, Nomads and Settlers in Syria and Jordan 1800–1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1987), pp.74–8.
21. Ibid., p.76.
22. Firro, A History of the Druzes, p.178.
23. Ibid., p.179.
24. For more about the Nusayri religion see M. Bar-Asher and A. Kofsky, The Nusayri–Alawi Religion
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2002).
25. See ibid., pp.111–51.
26. S. Lyde, The Asian Mystery: Illustrated in the History, Religion and Present State of the Ansaireeh or
Nusairis of Syria (London: Longman and Roberts, 1860), pp.166–75, 182.
27. M. Ma’oz, Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine 1840–1861 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), pp.4–
6.
28. Lyde, The Asian Mystery, p.214.
29. K.L. Mendenhall, Class, Cult and Tribe: The Politics of Alawi Separatism in French Mandate Syria
(Austin: University of Texas, 1991), pp.88–90.
30. Ma’oz, Ottoman Reform, pp.4–6.
31. Addison, Damascus and Palmyra, Vol.II, pp.252–3.
32. Ibid., Vol.II, p.252.
33. Ibid.
34. A. Rustum, Al-Mahfuzat al-malikiyya al-Misriyya (Beirut: al-Matba’a al Amrikiyya, 1941), Vol.2,
p.457.
35. Bowring, Report, p.129.
36. Dar al-Wath’iq al-Qawmiyya (Egyptian National Archives; Henceforth: DWQ) File 250, doc.52, 12
Jumadi al-Akhir, 1250, From Salim Bik to Ibrahim Pasha [15 Oct. 1834].
37. DWQ File 249, doc.350, 28 Jumadi al- Awal, 1250, From Salim Bik to Ibrahim Pasha [1 Oct. 1834].
38. Saigh, Al-Mughtarib, p.61.
39. Ibid., p.62.
40. According to Saigh the name of the mutasalim was Asad Agha al-Intabli.
