The Obama Doctrine: Hindering American Foreign Policy, Heritage Lecture

8/12/2019 The Obama Doctrine: Hindering American Foreign Policy, Heritage Lecture

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The Obama Doctrine:Hindering American Foreign Policy

Kim R. Holmes, Ph.D., Henry R. Nau, Ph.D., and Helle C. Dale

Abstract:The President has not yet defined the ObamaDoctrine but its features are emerging through his state-

ments and actions. These include a growing reliance oninternational organizations, a greater sense of humilityabout American values and foreign policy achievements, areliance on foreign aid rather than military power, amongother things. It is a value-neutral approach that rejects theconcept of American exceptionalism. Essentially, the Pres-ident hopes that if every nation can be brought to the table,they will eventually agree. In this analysis, the world is likea puzzle of equally valuable pieces that can be made to fittogether. Unfortunately, other nations like Russia and Chi-na look at the world as if it were a game of chess and are

moving swiftly to outmaneuver the United States. In theshort term, American foreign policy is difficult to changedramatically because there are so many nonpolitical actorsinvolved throughout the permanent government. TheIraq and Afghanistan deployments have been harder towind down than President Obama foresaw, and Guantan-amo Bay remains open for business. Yet with two presi-dential terms, much damage could be done with seriousconsequences for Americas ability to be a global leader.

HELLE C. DALE: The question before us today is

whether President Obama will follow in the footstepsof other American Presidents and have a doctrineattached to his name. If we think back to RonaldReagan, it was peace through strength; for George W.Bush there is identification with a freedom agendaand, of course, protecting Americans in the war onterrorism.

No. 1172Delivered September 30, 2010 November 29, 2010

This paper, in its entirety, can be found at:http://report.heritage.org/hl1172

Produced by the Douglas and Sarah AllisonCenter for Foreign Policy Studies

of theKathryn and Shelby Cullom DavisInstitute for International Studies

Published by The Heritage Foundation214 Massachusetts Avenue, NEWashington, DC 200024999(202) 546-4400 heritage.org

Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflect-ing the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attemptto aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.

Talking Points The emerging Obama Doctrine is focused on

risk aversion, humility on the world stage,and international cooperation at all cost.

President Obama considers the United Statesjust one of many nations and an equal part-ner, while others like Russia and China playa game of chess to outmaneuver the UnitedStates wherever possible.

The Presidents commitment to internationaltreaties reflects a belief that they should con-

strain the U.S. in some ways and that ourlegal system should adapt to internationalnorms rather than conform to such internalrestraints as our Constitution, our history,and our traditional understanding of free-dom and liberty.

If this doctrine continues to inform U.S. for-eign policy, it will do real damage to Amer-icas security and ability to lead in the world.


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No. 1172 Delivered September 30, 2010

I see roughly four characteristics of the Presi-dents approach that we believe define the ObamaDoctrine. The first is Obamas repeated emphasisthat the United States is not, as historically under-stood, an exceptional nation, but rather an equalpartner with other countries.

I realize the first objection to that point will bethat all Presidents talk about the U.S. being a part-ner. When I worked as Assistant Secretary of Statefor International Organization Affairs, whichincluded the U.N. system, we used the partnerlanguage all the time. But here I am not talkingabout day-to-day diplomatic partnerships and bilat-eral relationships or partnering with this or thatinstitution; Im talking about the position of thecountry in the world and how it relates to the tradi-tional position of American leadershipnot only

through its alliances, but also its global role.In many of the Presidents statements, he seems

at the very least uncomfortable with the idea ofAmerican exceptionalism, this idea that Americahas a special role to play in the world and a specialresponsibility based upon its unique history. It is aunique kind of responsibility, not only in terms ofour military power and our alliances, but also interms of the value system that led many other Amer-ican Presidents to identify America as global leader.

Obama is uncomfortable with that; sometimes

he talks about American exceptionalism, but thenhe says it is no different from Greek exceptionalismor British exceptionalism. He seems uncomfortableeven with the appearance that hes asserting thisidea of exceptionalism, which he seems to equatewith arrogance just as some of Americas critics do.

But why should this make him so uncomfort-able? He is, after all, the President of the UnitedStates, not a professor at Harvard. U.S. Presidentsare supposed to be highly sensitive to Americaninterests and history. Instead, Obama appears tohave carried with him the value system of the fac-ulty lounge in which American exceptionalism isequated with arrogance, imperialism, and otherassorted evils.

The second pointand, as with our otherpoints, I think the President sees himself over andagainst the legacy of George W. Bush and thus often

asserts rhetoric that is intended to distinguish him-self from Bushis that Obama, in his statementsand also in the National Security Strategy, empha-sizes the importance of international treaties. Thisincludes not only the New START treaty with Rus-sia, but reviving some treaties that have been dor-

mant in the U.S. Congress like the Law of the SeaTreaty, the Convention on the Elimination of Dis-crimination Against Women (CEDAW), and others.

They are being explained not just as utilitarian,

but as good for the U.S. and good as part of a largervision that the U.S. needs to more fully engage theinternational legal community in the UnitedNations and in international conventions. The ideaalso appears to be that international treaties shouldconstrain the U.S. in some ways and that this is avery good thing. It implies also that treaties will helpadapt our legal system to international norms thatexist outside the U.S. rather than conforming toinside restraints: our Constitution, our own history,and our traditional understanding of freedom andliberty.

In President Obamas speeches in Cairo, at theAmericas Summit, and elsewhere early in his presi-dency, he projected the need for America to adopt amore humble attitude. By humble, he doesnt nec-essarily mean humility the way it was discussed,ironically, in the Bush Administration before 9/11.There was actually talk then of being more humblevis--vis Bill Clinton, but what they meant was thatthey would challenge some of the assumptionsabout the humanitarian interventions Clinton usedin Bosnia and elsewhere that projected his liberal

internationalist agenda. The Bush Administrationwas going to be more realist and therefore moreprudential in a conservative sense.

Then 9/11 happened; Iraq happened; Iran hap-pened; and that all changed. Then Bush went theother way and developed the Freedom Agenda,which many people saw as neoconservative. But I

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Obama appears to have carried with him thevalue system of the faculty lounge in which

American exceptionalism is equated with arro-gance, imperialism, and other assorted evils.

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think it was more a reaction to the 9/11 event andthe fact that George W. Bush saw himself as a warPresident and was challenged to deal with that.

In that sense, what Barack Obama means abouthumility is the need to apologize for parts of Amer-ican history. Obama is essentially saying that Bush

and other past Presidents have not only not lived upto American ideals, but to international ideals aswell. This was not a realist critique, but a moralistone arising from decades of critiques in the Ameri-can and European left.

The offspring of humility is restraint, and inObamas foreign policy this translates not only intoengaging rivals like China and Russia and evenenemies like Iran, but to distancing the UnitedStates from potentially troublesome allies.

This has produced some ironic results. ManyEuropeans have, in fact, become disappointed thatObama has not fulfilled some of their hopes andexpectations, not just on climate change, but mov-ing closer to the European Union on other issues.Obama seems largely indifferent to closer ties withEurope, so even those who are perhaps more ideo-logically predisposed to agree with his worldvieware disappointed. On the other hand, this approachhas not resulted in much cooperation from Iran orNorth Korea. In fact, if anything, these countrieshave become even less cooperative than when Bush

was President.

The practical but ironic effect of this worldviewis that the U.S. is starting to pull back on supportingits allies, and even on interventions in the U.N.,while focusing more of its diplomatic activity on theextremely difficult task of mollifying Americas crit-ics and rivals. In other words, the focus of U.S.diplomacy now is to find marginal gains fromchanging the often intractable behavior of rivals andenemies, even if the results are poor and even if italienates friends and allies.

This approach is in some ways the inevitableconsequence of a more humble, more restrained

America. It is being motivated in many ways by the

Presidents ambivalence about Americas power andposition in the world, perhaps even shame, if youwill, about some of the things he perceives the Unit-ed States has done. You can see it in his Afghan warstrategy; he campaigned by saying the Afghan warwas the good war, but the first thing he does whenhe gets into power is try to find a way out of it, onlyto find out that his generals are looking at it quitedifferently.

I am using the word ambivalence intentionally.

Im not saying hes opposed to American power; Iam saying hes uncomfortable with it. After all, heuses fairly aggressive drone attacks in Pakistan. Insome ways, hes authorized a far more ferocious tac-tic against some Taliban leaders in Pakistan and

Afghanistan than George W. Bush ever did. Ofcourse, hes killing rather than capturing and bring-ing them in for interrogation, which causes prob-lems for those arguing for the rights of those inGuantanamo Bay; nevertheless, it is a fairly forward-leaning strategy.

Once again, it is ambivalence; Obama seemsuncertain about where this country should be head-ing. I think hes uncomfortable with the traditionalsense of American leadership. He seems to haveinternalized many of the criticisms of Americanpower that originate in Europe and other places,and he seems to believe the best way to keep ourenemies at bay is to give them less of a reason tooppose us. The way you deal with that is by accom-modation: trying not to be terribly concerned abouthard power, military deterrence, and the like andalways trying to find a diplomatic or soft power

way out of a problem.Unfortunately, as we have seen with Iran in par-

ticular, a lot of countries looking at American powerand leadership do not mirror how we or the Euro-pean Union think the world should work. And veryoften they draw the opposite conclusion of what it iswe would wish them to do.

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The focus of U.S. diplomacy now is to find marginalgains from changing the often intractablebehavior of rivals and enemies, even if the resultsare poor and even if it alienates friends and allies.

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What Barack Obama means about humility is theneed to apologize for parts of American history.

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HENRY R. NAU: I agree with many of thepoints Kim has made, but let me take a bit of a dif-ferent stab at it. I will take Obama at his word thathe is a pragmatist. Ive heard the label used by manyof his supporters, pragmatic internationalist, and Iwould be more comfortable with that if I knew

exactly what kind of internationalism one was talk-ing about, because Ive been puzzled by the fact thathe doesnt seem to be a traditional liberal interna-tionalist; that is, where you would put very high onyour agenda the promotion of freedom and democ-racy and human rights around the world. Its veryclear that hes not in that mainstream liberal interna-tionalist tradition.

So if hes a pragmatic internationalist, he obvi-ously sees the world in somewhat different termsthan a liberal internationalist would. I think he does

have a worldview, and therefore I think his pragma-tism is used in the service of that worldview. Youcould think of that worldview as an ideology, acoherent sort of sense of how the world works. Illmake several points about how that world works asfar as hes concerned.

The first very important point for him is that theworld works like an interconnected set of materialproblems; that is, there are a series of things outthere that were confronted with. We dont choosethem; were confronted with themlike an eco-nomic crisis in the world economy, for example; likethe spread of nuclear weapons and the existence ofloose nuclear weapons; like an energy problem thatis going to get worse and worse as countries developand grow as China is doing; and like a climatechange problem.

These are largely material problems; they resultfrom conditions out there that we could resolve ifwe could just get together and fix them. They arenot problems that derive in any way from somekind of moral trouble going on in the world. Theyrenot problems that originate in some sort of confron-

tation of political ideological views in the world.So I think the first point I would make is that the

world of internationalism that he sees is much moreof what we would call in the academic world func-tional internationalism; that is, its internationalismfocused on problems, specific big problems, not onmoral challenges. Not on the struggle for freedom in

the world today, or not on the struggle of dissidentsfor more open governments around the world, ornot even the confrontation with authoritarian pow-ers in the world. Thats just not central to Obamasunderstanding of the world.

I dont mean to say that he doesnt have a moral

sense. Im just saying that its very clear from hiswords and his deeds that he believes you need todefine problems in a way in which you can bringeverybody together to the table to solve, and so hewants to focus on problems that he says are shared.

Youll remember a year ago The Washington Posthad a front-page story about the importance ofshared interests in Obamas view of the world. Ithink they were onto something. He said, for exam-ple, at the U.N. last year, I hold deeply the beliefthat in the year 2009, more than any point inhuman history, the interests of people and nationsare shared. He wants to define the world in a wayin which we can look at common problems.

In Prague, just a couple months before the U.N.

speech in 2009, he made it clear why he doesntwant to focus on moral differences, why he doesntwant to focus on political conflicts. He said, Whennations and people allow themselves to be definedby their differences, the gulf between them widens.So he doesnt want to pick up these issues of strug-gle for freedom, for human rights. He doesnt wantto pick them up directly because he has the sensethat that is going to simply divide people. He wantsto bring them together, and he wants to focus onthese common problems.

He repeats those problems over and over again,and they always come before any discussion ofdemocracy or any discussion of economic develop-ment or any of the other aspects of American foreignpolicy. Central are the campaign to deal with nucle-ar weapons, loose materials as well as the prolifera-tion of nuclear weapons, climate change, energy,and the like.

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The struggle for freedom, the struggle ofdissidents for more open governments, even theconfrontation with authoritarian powers are notcentral to Obamas understanding of the world.

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Now, when you try to fix problems rather thandefine themtheyre defined for you already;youre simply trying to fix them, and youre tryingto bring people together to do thatyou approachthe world the way Obama has approached it; that is,with all sorts of diplomatic efforts and diplomatic

surges. He has flooded the international system inthe first couple of years with initiatives in all direc-tions. These problems are interconnected, so youcant solve them individually; you have to solvethem all together. Hes given us no clear idea of,among these problems, which is a priority andwhich can unlock progress in other areas; you sim-ply deal with them all at the same time.

If you ask the question, what are Obamas prior-ities aside from this view of the world and all ofthese material problems that exist out there? I think

you would have to just say, all of them. All of themare his priorities. You get the world together to fixthese problems. Thats why theres a tremendousemphasis in Obamas worldview on multilateralism,

as Kim suggested. Everybody has to be at the table;

everybody has to participate in solving these prob-lems. He is very concerned about bringing adversar-ies to the table no less than allies. In fact, hes morefocused perhaps on the adversaries because maybethey have more of a role in creating the problems;therefore, youve got to bring them to the table inorder to solve the problems.

Thats certainly true in the case of nuclear prolif-eration. He wants to bring the adversariesIran,North Koreato the table to solve these problems.So you have to have everybody at the table, and you

have to work on these problems and put themtogether almost like a jigsaw puzzle.

I think if there were a catchphrase I would use todefine Obamas view of the world, he sees the worldvery much like a jigsaw puzzle. Its all of these inter-related problems that have to be fit together. Youhave to have everybody at the table to do that.

Theres an implicit assumption that you all know thepicture that youre putting together, that everyonewants a world free of nuclear weapons and with allnuclear materials locked down, that everybodywants a world of green energy and costly efforts todeal with climate change.

I think many aspects of Obamas view of theworld fit into the picture. He does not see the worldas, for example, Ronald Reagan did, as a moralchessboard, as a game of chess in which youre outnot simply to fix problems; youre out to shapeproblems and to ultimately win. Youre engaged in amoral conflictin Reagans case, with Commu-nism. In my view, were not facing a threat todaycomparable to the Cold War and to the SovietUnion, but I do think we are facing moral conflicts.I do think were facing moral issues, and I think ulti-

mately they underlie many of the problems thatObama is focused on.

The nuclear weapons themselves are not a prob-lem, you could argue; weve just allowed India tohave nuclear weapons, so why couldnt we allowother countries to have nuclear weapons? Its thekind of countries who have the nuclear weapons.Thats the problem. The problem is the kind ofcountry that Iran is or that North Korea is, and thatsa totally different perspective than the one thatObama has.

In other words, you could argue that the nuclearweapons are there as a consequence of a moral con-flict going on in the world and a set of political con-frontations going on in the world. What Iran doesntlike is the character of the picture on the cover of the

jigsaw puzzle that Obamas trying to get them to thetable to help him put together.

In contrast to other PresidentsIm talkingabout two ways of thinking about the world, andIm trying to understand the proportions betweenthe twoI think in Obamas case there is muchmore of the jigsaw puzzle view of the world than

there is of a moral chessboard view of the world.KIM R. HOLMES:You are absolutely right, par-

ticularly on this whole question of valuesdemoc-racy, freedom and human rightsthough PresidentObama seemed to make a correction to that in hisrecent speech at the United Nations. We will have tosee how far that goes in reality.

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Obama sees the world very much like a jigsawpuzzle. All of these interrelated problemshave to be fit together. You have to haveeverybody at the table to do that.

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There is this functional aspect to his policies thatyou mention, but we also need to ask what under-lying reality motivates this pragmatism. Early in hispresidency, there was talk about a kind of liberalrealism, if you will, in the sense that Obama, bypulling back from George W. Bushs freedom agen-

da, was addressing the world more as it really is andnot trying to transform it. It sounded very pragmat-ic and realistic, because it wasnt as forward-leaningin its perceived idealism as we saw from George

W. Bush.

I would argue that there is more to his motiva-tion than just realism or pragmatism. I think Obamafirmly believes, as you mentioned, in his worldviewthat most countries in the world actually share thesame worldview and interests, as he says repeatedly,and therefore, it is this kind of functional approach.

As you rightly point out, the problem is particularlythose adversaries who do not share that worldview.

Yet he wants to believe they do; therefore, he impos-es this kind of diplomatic strategic approach toplaces like Iran and North Korea and almost seemsbefuddled when they dont respond to it, because it

is not conforming with the way he thinks theyshould see their self-interest.

And so theres a mirror imaging going on, whichis very common in many of the circles Obama was inbefore becoming President, about the way the worldworks, which frankly is not realistic. It may be prag-matic, but only in the sense that it is somewhatrestrained compared to what happened before.

But if pragmatism is about actually solving prob-lems, I do not see us making great progress either inNorth Korea or Iran, and in some ways some of

these problems are actually getting worse. The rea-son they are getting worse is there has not been aproper diagnosis of the problem. The reason the Ira-nians want nuclear weapons is to deter us, to detertheir neighbors, and to be a dominant power in theregion, not because they feel offended or becausewe look down on them in some way. Obama seems

to believe if we simply accommodate that idea, theywill come around, but it is completely misreadingwhy they want the nuclear weapons to begin with.

It also fundamentally goes back to the point Imake about his ambivalence about American pow-er. He made this statement once: Whether we like

it or not, we remain a dominant military superpow-er, and when conflicts break out, one way or anoth-er, we get pulled into them, and that ends upcosting us significantly in terms of both blood andtreasure. He obviously is thinking of Iraq. It revealsnot only an ambivalence about American militarypower, but that one of the reasons he thinks theseconflicts happen is because we have projected our-selves too much, in the past particularly, with mili-tary power, and therefore, if we restrain ourselves,other people will reciprocate.

As we have seen with countries that share ourvalues, that we are allied with in Europe and manyother places in the world, we dont have this prob-lem. It is the ones who dont share our values, whodont buy into the functional approach you talkedabout, that we have problems with, and there seemsto be a complete blind spot because that world doesnot conform to Obamas worldview. And he franklydoes not know how to deal with it, particularlywhen it comes to the use of military power.

HELLE C. DALE: I think it might be worth

remembering that French President Nicolas Sarkozyaccused President Obama of living in a virtualworld and that all the American soft power in theworld had done absolutely nothing about Iransnuclear program.

HENRY R. NAU:To be fair to Obama, his speechin Oslo was one of the best he ever gave, and he gaveit to an audience that was not likely to appreciatewhat he had to say, because what he said in thatspeech was that evil does exist in the world. What hesaid in that speech is that sometimes you do have tofight. That was an audience that was not receptive tothat messagebelieve me, he got applause onlyonce when he mentioned Guantanamo.

But thats the problem with Obama. He did go onin that speech to say that war was both sometimesnecessary and always a tragedy, so we must find away to avoid it. He challenged the Europeans and

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The reason that problems like Iran and NorthKorea are getting worse is that there has notbeen a proper diagnosis of the problem.

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said that means weve got to strengthen our collec-tive capacity to deal with the bad guys. That meansweve got to work on sanctions, and if we do that, hesays, we wont have to go to war.

Thats Obamas worldview. I think he knows inreality that you dont get to choose all of your wars;

he certainly acknowledged that when he said thatAfghanistan was a necessary war. But his hearts notin it. Its going to take a lot for him to acknowledgethat a situation is warlike, because hes going to lookfor every possible way around it. Theres going tobe a cost to that. I think the cost is already becom-ing evident.

Ill take three countries: Russia, China, and Iran.While Obama has been holding the door open forall of these countries, in fact working assiduouslywith those three countries on his agendaclimatechange with China, economic crisis with China,nuclear weapons with Russia, non-proliferationwith Iranthose countries have been pursuing atotally different agenda.

Look whats happened in China in the past two

years now. It predates Obama, so I dont think whathappens in China is necessarily a response toObama. Its not. Its a response to a lot of things thatare going on in China and going on in Asia.

But China has become much more belligerent inits foreign policy. After a decade or less of reachingout to Asia, the sort of soft power approach thatChina allegedly was engaged in, in the last coupleyears, its gotten increasingly assertive, and it is notvery apologetic about it; its not very ambivalentabout it. It has made it very clear that these islandsin both the East China and the South China Sea areChinese territory and that they are core elements ofChinese interests.

I continue to wonder what Chinas doing inNorth Korea. For years weve hoped that Chinawould put the pressure on North Korea that wouldbe needed to bring North Korea to the table, but we

always knew that the one thing China didnt wantwas a collapse of the North Korean regime, becausethat would bring chaos to its borders, and it certain-ly didnt want an integration of the Korean Peninsu-la on the terms laid out by South Koreathat is, ondemocratic terms.

Frankly, I think China has an interest in the sta-tus quo in North Korea, and if relations were to heatup with the U.S., it could potentially use NorthKorea actively in an effort to try to chip away at

American and Western dominance around theworldprincipally through, in fact, the provisionof nuclear capability and nuclear technology andother sorts of assistance, as we have already seen inthe case of North Korean assistance to some coun-tries in the Middle East like Syria.

Russia has been delighted, I think, with Obamas

reset policy. It has given Russia a world stage again.Its back in the business of being a great power, andwhat has it been doing while all thats been happen-ing sort of in the klieg lights? Its been reinforcing itstroops in Abkhazia, in South Ossetia. Its buildingbases. Its settling in for the long term in those prov-inces in Georgia, its occupation not recognized byanybody else other than Venezuela, Nicaragua, andmaybe Nauru. Its just been quietly doing that.

Whats it been doing in Eastern Europe? Its beenquietly moving things in Ukraine in directions

more favorable to Russia; they have a new govern-ment, which isnt maybe as favorable as Moscowwould like, but nevertheless more favorable thanthe previous one. And once againits interest-ingtheyre starting to talk about their gas issue.This is the way the Russians ratchet up the pressurewhenever they want to move forward another stepin Ukraine or in another part of Eastern Europe.Theyll use the leverage they have to cut off gas sup-plies in order to shift the politics inch by inch in adirection favorable to them.

Moscow wants a larger sphere of influence.They talk about it openly. They talk about asphere of privileged interest. This is the Moscowwere dealing with. Im not against cooperatingwith them on the things that we can cooperate on,but to close your eyes to these other developmentsand not to say anything about them, and more-

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While Obama has been holding the door openfor China, Russia, and Iran, those countries havebeen pursuing a totally different agenda.

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over not to say very much about the repressionthat is going on in Russia under the PutinMedvedev regime, is really irresponsible, especial-ly for the leader of the free world.

I wonder to myself: How can we be so indiffer-ent? Were on schedule to withdraw from Iraq.

Weve withdrawn from combat. We hope to be outof there by the end of next year. Not a word aboutIrans escalating intervention in Iraq. I mean, Iran isa neighbor. They have easy access; they have all

kinds of friends in Iraq.Wouldnt it make sense, while youre trying to get

Iran to stop its nuclear program and while youretrying to contain Iran in that sense, wouldnt it makesense to say to Iran, look, were not sure when weregoing to get out of Iraq. Its not going to be an openfield for you guys to go in and mess things up ordestabilize things, if thats what you have in mind.

Were there for the long term, were there to protectthe security of that country. But we send the othermessage: that were trying to stop you from gettingnuclear weapons; were going to contain you if youdo get nuclear weapons, but were heading out ofIraq as fast as we can.

What kind of message does that send to Iran? Idont have any doubts about the present administra-tion in IranI dont mean there arent some ele-ments inside Iran who are now obviously in theopposition and who are under severe restraintand what theyre up to. I doubt seriously if sanctionsare going to bring them around on stopping theirnuclear program. Thats Obamas view of the waythe world works, and theyre going to continue to

make trouble. The more we make clear that werenot up to that trouble, then I think the more the tideturns against us.

Ill close by saying I dont think theres a wave ofChinese aggression or Russian or Iranian aggres-sion; thats not what Im saying. I think theres a pat-tern, and I think its incremental, and I think its

happening as a result of our not focusing on theseproblems, because in this case, Obama has hisfocus on other things, and he has a way of thinkingabout the world, as I suggested, that pays less atten-tion to these questions of moral struggle and polit-ical conflict.

HELLE C. DALE:The problem for Obama, ofcourse, is whatever you want to say to the Americanpeople, such as we want to get out of Iraq, is a mes-sage that is boomeranged around the world. TheIranians are going to listen to that message just aswell as the domestic audience here in the U.S. Sohes not able to have one message for his voters hereat home and one message for the Iranians. That is anunfortunate conundrum for the President.

Dr. Holmes, are there any specifics of theObama Doctrine or manifestations you wanted to

touch on, like some of the treaty negotiations?KIM R. HOLMES: With respect to Russia and

China, whether it is in the name of reset or inthe name of engagement, if the U.S. perspectiveinternalizes the claims they have against us and therest of the worldand, of course, the Russians andthe Chinese have all kinds of claims: China on Tai-wan and the Russians in the area around their so-called sphere of influenceit will have conse-quences. It is not just rhetoric. At that point, it isnot a far step to adopting their ideas or essentially

adopting a double standard.

For example, the Russians are talking about sell-ing missiles to the Iranians. Theyve gone back andforth on it, but they have been talking about it forsome time and selling some missiles and arms toSyria. Yet this Administration finds it very difficultto give military assistance to Georgia. And the rea-son? It does not want to provoke Russia. Yet Russiadoes not worry too much about provoking us withthese particular actions or other actions. This is adouble standard, and the reason it is there is

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Were on schedule to withdraw from Iraq.Weve withdrawn from combat. We hope to beout of there by the end of next year. Not a wordabout Irans escalating intervention in Iraq.

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The Russians are talking about selling missilesto the Iranians for some time and selling somemissiles and arms to Syria. Yet this Administration

finds it very difficult to give military assistanceto Georgia.

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because the Administration has internalized theirnarrative and their justification of what is properand not.

The same thing with China. We have had nego-tiations for a long time about selling aircraft to Tai-wan, and there has been some progress in the

previous and even in the existing Administration.But there is in this Administration a reluctance tomove too fast, primarily because of Chinas objec-tions. There is even a reluctance, for example, to

join the Trilateral Commission with India and Aus-tralia vis--vis China, because doing so mightappear too provocative to China, since China is leftout of this grouping. Yet China does not think twiceabout joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-tion or any other regional grouping that leaves theUnited States out, because they believe this is their

area and, therefore, they have a right to claim thatthe U.S. has no right to be there, implying thatAmerica is not a Pacific power.

This may be very subtle stuff, but my point isthat this approach has real consequences. The samething with respect to the missile defense deal inEurope that President Bush made and Obamareversed. At least the implicit idea behind that deci-sion was that if the Russians had a right to claimthat somehow this was aimed at them, even thoughwe said it was not and we still say it was not, at leastwe understood why they might think that it was.

Therefore, in order to accommodate that concern,well refashion the missile defense program inEurope to make it less provocative to the Russians,and maybe that will make the Russians moreaccommodating.

The Russians came back and basically said theystill were unhappy and they will continue to beunhappy with the decision, because it is not aboutwhether or not that system can really deter a Rus-sian missile; it is about the fact that the U.S. is put-ting strategic systems inside what they perceive to

be their sphere of influence. That is the issue. That iswhat we are doing with Poland and the CzechRepublic. That issue is non-negotiable to us, and yetwe dont want to talk about it that way because itwould appear to be provocative.

So these double standards get adopted and haveconsequences, not only in terms of the actual bal-

ance of power, but also in the messages it sends toRussia and China.

Henrys exactly right; China has been increasing-ly provocative in the last year or so. They move for-ward, they pull back, then move forward dependingon what the issue is. It is a chess game to them. They

do not look at the world the way President Obamadoes. That is, I think, the fundamental differencebetween a view of the world that is actually basedupon seeing the world as it really is rather than asyou would like it to be.

HELLE C. DALE:I think theres almost some-thing immature in this view, because it seems tohave internalized all the arguments of the opposi-tion so that that kind of pressure comes from inside;that restraint comes from inside.

KIM R. HOLMES:He seems to believe that anassertive American posture is implicitly arrogantand there is something wrong with that. I am nottalking about rhetoric. Anybody could come upwith something George W. Bush said and say, well,wasnt that arrogant? It may or may not have been.

Im not talking about words. Im talking aboutwhat you actually do. President Obama seems to gobeyond the rhetoric and actually believes that thepresence of the American military, its prowess andposition and even preeminence, is somehow pro-vocative to the world, and therefore, by restrainingit, we will get a more peaceful world. The implica-tion is that, in some fashion, the problem is us.

HENRY R. NAU:I think thats really central toObamas core view. He said it in Prague; its a very

interesting comment: When nations and peopleallow themselves to be defined by their differences,the gulf between them widenswhich means thathe doesnt want to confront these differences. Hellfind ways around, find ways to avoid them, or findways to take up problems where you have someshared interests.

_________________________________________

President Obama seems to believe that thepresence of the American military is somehowprovocative to the world. The implication is that,in some fashion, the problem is us.

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Its interesting because in one sense, you can beso humble you can be ultimately incredibly arro-gant. When youre so humble that you think thatother people act only in reaction to youthat is, ifyoure going to do something to stand up for yourrights, the other side is going to be provoked by it,

and otherwise theyre going to cooperate; theyreonly going to be provoked if you provoke them. Inother words, their behavior is entirely determinedby what you do.

KIM R. HOLMES: This is incredible arro-gance, ultimately. Russia and China have theirown core interests. They have their own corepolitical philosophies. They have their own coreunderstandings of the world. Were not even talk-ing about our immediate problem of militantIslam and the terrorists understanding of the

world. These actors are acting on the strength oftheir views and their ideas and their capabilities;they are not acting simply in reaction to us. It maynot even matter that much what we do in terms oftheir core interests.

What puzzles me is that we have been incrediblyopen and generous to China over the last 20 years,maybe more. We have welcomed China into a glo-balized world and encouraged them to grow at phe-nomenal rates, picking up 300 to 400 million oftheir people and putting them into the middle class.They could not have done any of that without theworld system that we superintend and withoutaccess to our markets, because we are still the larg-est recipient of Chinese goods.

It is in our common interest. I am not saying thatwe paid a price for that. We both grew together, andnow we have this deep interdependence because wetake their goods and they take our debt. But in thosecircumstances, wouldnt you think that Chinawould be talking about common global interestsand working to try to help strengthen those com-mon global structures instead of talking about a

first ring and a second ring?HELLE C. DALE: We have some questions

from the audience, and some of them take us ininteresting directions. One here that I thoughtwould be interesting to explore when I was think-ing about what we should talk about today: Can

the speakers discuss Obamas approach to theworld? Does more humble, less arrogant fit betterwith the role that the American people want for

America in the world?

There was a poll recently published by the Chi-cago Council on Global Affairs which indicated that

Americans view their countrys role in the world asdiminished, as becoming more diminished downthe road; theyre still fairly internationalist, but donot really desire the U.S. to take a strong leadershiprole. I was reflecting on this and thinking, well,maybe there is a fatigue among Americans, lead-ership fatigue or war fatigue or however you wantto call it.

Dr. Holmes, is Obama in tune with the Americanpeople, or would a different leader strike a differentchord with them?

KIM R. HOLMES:Yes and no; these are two dif-ferent things. One, I think the American public, asyou see in the opinion polls, do have war fatigue,not only with Iraq, but also Afghanistan. But Iwould not necessarily draw the conclusion fromthat or extrapolate from it that therefore they arebuying into all the assumptions and ideas we aretalking about in the Presidents and his Administra-tions mindset.

Most Americans still believe the United States ofAmerica is an exceptional nation. Most of them do

not like to see their country lose wars. Most of themdo not like to see their country go into perpetualdecline, economically or on the world stage. Theystill are proud of their country. They still believe inthe sort of traditional idea that this is an exceptionalnation; we have a role to play, we have to figure outhow to do it, and we have all these problems athome. On the other hand, they are not ready to giveup on America.

To that extent, some of the ambivalence thatunderlies the point we are discussing here about

Americas position in the world and its leadershiprole is not, I think, shared by the majority of theAmerican people, although they may have fatiguewith a specific issue like the war in Afghanistan.

I think the real issue isand Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen said this


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at Brookings, I believethat the greatest threat tothe future of America and to national security isour growing debt. By that he meant not just thecapacity to fund the armed forces, but also how itwill sap the will of the American people to do any-thing abroad because we will be focused internally

on our own problems, preoccupied with Medi-care, Social Security, and all the problems there.Many things the government does here for many

Americans will become such a primary focus thatwe could not be able to play that great a role in theworld. And that worries him because what hashappened in the 20th century (and I hope willhappen in the 21st century) is because of anengagement of American power, values, anddiplomacy in the world, rather than a more isola-tionist approach.

Yet if we do not solve the debt problem, Ameri-can decline will come from within, and therefore,American decline abroad will reflect the internaldecline if we do not fix the debt problem. We candebate this until we are blue in the face. I can haveall the ideas about American leadership I want. Butwe will not have the capacityand most impor-tantly, the confidence and the willto act as theworlds leader, and if we do not have confidence inour economic future, then inevitably the idea of

America having an exceptional responsibility indefending freedom and its allies in the world will in

fact retreat.

I often say to my friends in Europe, be very care-ful what you ask for. They often think that duringthe years of George W. Bush, we were too aggressive,too forward-leaning, and all of that. Now they are

seeing a more restrained American posture, andtheyre saying, Wait a minute; I didnt really meanthat you had to withdraw from the world; you justhad to be more like us. Then I say, but thats pre-cisely the point: If we are more like you, we will bewithdrawn from the world, because that is why theEuropean Union is not a superpower. America is

different, and if you do not recognize the difference,then I dont think you have recognized the real rolethat America has played over the last century inglobal politics.

HENRY R. NAU:I think in the end you find outwhat the American people want through elections,and thats what we do pretty regularly. I think its agreat thing. I think Obama has a great opportunityto sell his first two years of stewardship in the fallcampaign, another opportunity in two years to sell

his stewardship and his style of leadership and hisway of thinking about the world, and lets find outwhat the American people believe and what theyprefer.

I think he is selling a much more restrained typeof American leadership in the world, one in whichwe are much less self-confident. Were always ask-ing questions about whether we should be doingthat: Is that too arrogant, or is that too much, or arewe provoking somebody here? Thats the style ofleadership that he has been practicing and I thinkthat he is selling to the American people.

Obama is a remarkable man, and in my view, heis a tribute to the country I love. I think he knows,too, that he probably could not be elected Presidentin any other white country in the world. Maybe Imwrong there, but I think he has that sense. He doessay that repeatedly overseas; he points out the factthat hes where he is because of who America is. Andso I want to give him all the credit in the world. Lethim make his case; let us make our case. Im lookingfor Ronald Reagan for the 2012 campaign becauseIve been through this before.

I went through the 1970s, and I sufferedthrough this period where we were told that wecouldnt lead anymore; we couldnt grow anymore;we were at the end of the line; it was a new worldthat had been taken over by the OPEC countries,and energy and other resource shortages; stagfla-tion meant you had to have a certain level of infla-

_________________________________________

America is different, and if you do not recognizethe difference, you have not recognized thereal role that America has played over the lastcentury in global politics.

____________________________________________

_________________________________________

The real issue is that the greatest threat to thefuture of America and to national security isour growing debt.

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tion to lubricate all the conflicts in society becausesociety was becoming increasingly ungovernable. Iwas a young man in my 30s, and I suffered throughthat period, and then, all of a sudden, this voicecame out of the wilderness. I didnt know whoRonald Reagan was, but then in the late 70s I

began to hear it, and I thought to myself, my God,hes talking about the things that I actually believein, and I think he hit a stream across America,three-quarters of the American people who reso-nated with it, so he won that debate.

Theres another debate going on, and well seewho wins, and its up to the American people. Ihope somebody does lay out a candidate, a style ofleadership that contrasts with Obamanot neces-sarily widely contrasts, but clearly contrasts. Onethat says look, of course we can cooperate with

countries that we have problems with. If its in ourinterest to cooperate with Russia, assuming theverification procedures are in fact good in theNew START agreement, okay, thats a positive forthat kind of thing. But at the same time, you canhold Russia accountable for what its doing inGeorgia; you can hold Russia accountable for anyattempts it makes to increase its influence inUkraine. You can hold Russia accountable for itsinternal affairs. You can speak about it, and youcan talk about it.

Ronald Reagan kept talking about human rightsand problems with repression in Russia right upuntil the end of the Cold War. In May of 1988, hemade a speech in Moscowyou should read thatspeech, because he told the Russian people thatthis was not the way to go in terms of treating yourown people.

So we can do both. We can be a beacon forandby the way, were the only ones who can be a beaconforthis kind of voice for freedom and for liberty inthe world and for open markets; were it. If we dontdo it, I dont see the Europeans stepping forward to

do it. I dont see Japan stepping forward to do it.And I think Kim is right: They damn us for what wedo and for what we dont do. That just goes with theturf, and I would say have a good sense of your ownleadership, and the Europeans will follow. I thinktheres a lot of opportunity there.

Democracy is still strong around the world. Itsstronger than its ever been in my lifetime, and wehave lots of efforts underway to try to strengthencivil society and non-governmental groups. Obamahas finally addressed that in his development pol-icy speech.

Weve got NED, the National Endowment forDemocracy, a creation in fact of Ronald Reagan, andweve got all the activities that go with NED. Weshould be going to the Europeans and saying, gosh,

do you guys have an activity like this? If you dont,you should. We dont need to multilateralize orinstitutionalize them, but we can collaborate, andwe can talk and energize and encourage each otherto seed our non-governmental groups all aroundthe world, helping people to strengthen the smallzones of freedom in those countries.

Meanwhile, we in governmentand this is themessage that I think the American President has toprovideare going to be talking to these govern-ments about this. We dont necessarily have to talkabout it publicly. Reagan was very good aboutunderstanding that you dont put your partner in abox from which they cant escape, but he was cer-tainly not shy about making it clear in bilateral con-tacts and private contacts his concern for the peoplewho were being put in prisons. In the case of acountry like Iran, Im sure President Reagan wouldhave been saying some things vocally and repeated-ly about the treatment of the Iranian people whohappen to have a different point of view from thisparticular government.

I think you can be both understanding and forth-

rightAmerica is. Look at the world America hascreated over the last 75 years. Not just from ourstandpoint, but from the standpoint of hundreds ofmillions of other people in numerous other coun-tries, its been a great world. Its been a world inwhich people have progressed. So America does

_________________________________________Democracy is still strong around the world,and we have lots of efforts underway to try to

strengthen civil society and non-governmentalgroups.

____________________________________________


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have a capacity to empathize. We can be both lead-ers and good partners.

HELLE C. DALE:I think that was a very stirringspeech. For a change of pace here, a question I sus-pect maybe from a reporter in the audience, if eitherof you would like to comment on the Obama

Administrations attitude toward a long-standingally of the U.S., Japan. We had talked a bit about dif-ferent styles of communication with our allies inthis new age. Has Japan suffered as much in terms ofdowngrading relations in some ways as Europeanshave or as Israel has?

HENRY R. NAU:I do help Congress run a pro-gram that brings together members of Congress andmembers of the Japanese Diet and members of theSouth Korean National Assembly twice a year to talkabout issues. These are the three countries, of

course, that are absolutely key to anything that hap-pens in Asia politically, economically, or militarily.The conversations have been very robust in the lastfew years because of the whole question of how dowe restructure our forces in Asia.

Japan is openly discussing more of these issues.Japan has crossed a number of Rubicons in the last10 years, putting naval forces into the IndianOceantheyre not there anymore, but they werethere for awhile, supplying fuel to the ISAF forces in

Afghanistan. Japan has ships now in the Indian

Ocean, south of the Arabian Peninsula, against pira-cy. Japan has had much more open debates abouttheir military role, I think very healthy debates. Ihave no preference as to where the Japanese comeout on this, but theyre becoming more open andmore self-confident in discussing it.

Ive been a little concerned that Japan has beenoff our radar screen for the last couple years, just asother allies have been. China has been much moreimportant, Russia has been much more important,and now Obama is going to Japan this fall. Theyneed our attention, and they need a strengtheningof this relationship.

I wonder why we cant utilize the Futenma2

issue, which is a really difficult one, because its gotall the elements to it: Whats the best posture for

American forces in terms of dealing with threats inthe region? Those threats are not getting any less,but potentially worse with whats going on in NorthKorea and the Korean Peninsula. They go all theway down to the most local political level you canimagine, and that is the mayor and governor races

in Okinawa where the people are genuinely fed upwith the way that theyve been treated, largely bytheir own government. They host most of the U.S.forces, and theyve been promised for years thatthose forces would eventually be spread out moreevenly throughout Japan, but that hasnt happened.

So its a difficult issue but one that we ought to betrying to transform into an opportunity, and thatopportunity, in my judgment, would be if weregoing to restructure forces, lets at the same timetake another strong big step forward in terms of

strengthening and maybe trilateralizing these alli-ances. We dont have to do that in any kind of a for-mal way, but we should be doing it in an informalway; that is, mutual exercises, planningespeciallyas China begins to think in terms of exerting itsinterest in the first island chain and then in the sec-ond island chain. I think theres an opportunity inboth Japan and South Korea to work on that, butweve been focused on just sticking with that Futen-ma agreement of 2006.

I understand the reasons for wanting to holdonto that agreement. I wouldnt give it up for any-thing, except something bigger, something largerlike what Im talking about, and that is a forwarddevelopment of the alliance relationships in thatregion in the interest of quietly making it clear to theChinese that if they go that route, theyre going toconfront a strong allied presence.

KIM R. HOLMES:I would agree that it is morea matter of emphasis than anything dramaticallydifferent. There has been substantial continuity inU.S. policy toward Japan. Theres also been signifi-cant political turmoil in Japan over the past year

that has sort of caught the Obama Administrationoff guard. It did not know how to deal with theformer government when it was reopening ques-tions about our military bases and the like, and a

2. Futenma Marine Corps Air Station, located on the island of Okinawa.


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few months went by where both sides were veryuncertain. I think we have passed that point.

But I think the larger point, which is the rightone, is really not so much about continuing thestrong alliance with Japan, which we should do for awhole variety of reasons, but also about understand-

ing how all of our alliances and our relationships inAsia work vis--vis China. We have a profoundambivalence about that as well because our relation-ship with China is ambivalent. We like to trade withthem, and yet we are also concerned about whatthey are doing in certain areas. That is translated intopolicies throughout the entire region.

So how do you work India, how do you workAustralia into this picture when any time you doanything diplomatically or strategically with thesecountries, the first thing China says is, Youre justtrying to contain me. That kind of defensiveness isactually quite revealing. The Chinese immediatelyleap to the conclusion that we are trying to containthem. Why? Because they think they have a certainright to do things. Their definition of containment isany objection to what they are doing. And yet do weonce again internalize that narrative to the pointwhere we and Japan and other countries are soaccommodating that we dont take even modeststeps to deter China from taking certain actions?

Thats really the name of the game in East Asia.We will get to the point where we have enough dip-lomatic agreements under our belt, to where Chinabasically has laid down the claimwhether it is theSouth China Sea islands or something elseandthat becomes pretty much accepted in our diploma-

cy and cannot be reversed without appearing to beprovocative.

That is probably more of what is at stake with theObama Administrations policy toward China thananything else, because on the face of it, there hasbeen continuity. A lot of the people here, including

those who work in our Asian Studies Center, lookaround the world and find there is less to disagreeupon regarding Asia policy than anywhere else, andthat is partly because the region is relatively stableand there has been continuity.

On the other hand, how do we back up these

subtle signals we are sending out to Beijing nowwith respect to Taiwan, with respect to its island dis-putes with Japan? Do we back them up or not?

What is China doing with respect to providingnuclear reactors to Pakistan, and what do we sayabout that? All of this is part of a chess game, and ifwe dont play it well, we could end up sending outthe wrong signals for the future.

HELLE C. DALE:Id like to combine two ques-tions from the audience. The question of forwarddeployment of American forces: If Obama is ambiv-

alent about the use of American power, why do westill remain forward deployed all over the world?

Why do we have bases in so many different loca-tions? Could this possibly be because, even with aPresident who has a dramatically different view ofthe world from his predecessors, there is an under-lying continuity in U.S. foreign policy that sort ofdefies easy changing?

KIM R. HOLMES:I think thats right. You caneven see it in the debate over the new Afghan strat-egy, where the President came in with a certain view,

and he was running right up against the militarysview that what we are supposed to do is prevail inconflicts, and back and forth it went. So eventhough he brought that view to the table, at the endof the day what came out was not really what he wascomfortable with.

That is why I call it ambivalence; Im not callingit anything more than that. This is true in intelligence;it is true across the board. There is a permanent gov-ernment, and theres a lot more continuity in theend than probably we would even like to admit.

But thats not really what we are discussing here.We were discussing the predisposition and the out-look of the President and then asking ourselves,what effect does that have on all these questions?

Whoever wrote that question and the assumptionsis correct. I think there is a lot of continuity; but on

_________________________________________

The larger point is really not so much aboutcontinuing the strong alliance with Japan, butabout understanding how all of our alliances

and our relationships in Asia work vis--vis China.____________________________________________


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the other hand, if Obama is reelected in 2012 andwe have eight years of attempts to have his world-view prevail, it will have a lasting effect in somefashion even on the permanent government.

HENRY R. NAU:Obviously, the U.S. position inthe world is a huge vessel which takes a long time toturn or steer in one direction or another. Justbecause of our sheer size and our presence aroundthe world, things dont happen overnight. But Ithink these incremental changes in emphasis are

important because, over time, they could move usin a very different direction.

I like to think that where we are todayand wecan debate thisis a consequence of the very strongmoves we made 30 years ago to strengthen Ameri-can defenses around the world and shore up ourbases and alliances around the world. Its a conse-quence of the enormous economic success whichweve enjoyed over the last 30 years and which wevebeen able to share. Weve created a world in whicheconomic prosperity has been shared by countrieslike China and now India, Brazil, and others.

And so we have moved the big ship in what Ithink is a very, in general terms, healthy direction.Sure, you trim the sails as the world changes, andwe trimmed some after the end of the Cold War.Theres no question about that; it was justified.

Weve had to reconfigure that vessel to deal with9/11. But if we have leadership for eight years or for12 years in the direction that I think Obama wouldlike to take us and weve been talking about allmorning, I think it will move the ship, and we willbe in a less favorable place 10 years, 20 years, 30

years from now as a consequence of that.

Some people will say thats inevitable, and it istrue that we have superintended a world for 75years in which others have increasingly gained inpower relatively to us. Weve continued, by the way,absolutely to gain. We havent suffered at all, butweve clearly created a world in which others

think of Europe, think of Japan, and now think ofChinacan become more powerful, and were will-ing to take that risk. So yes, over time, power isgoing to become more evenly distributed, but itmeans that American leadership is going to be evenmore important in terms of keeping that vesselpointed in the right direction of freedom and openmarkets.

Obama has been practically silent on trade fortwo years. I understand were in an economic crisis,but this is the heart of the world economy, and if

you dont say things about it, if you dont provide astructure where you can once again get back on thattrack of opening marketshe did in the recentdevelopment speech talk about open trade, opensocieties, so he may be starting to hit that point onthe nose, but its awfully late, and I dont know thathis hearts in it, and I dont know that his partysheart is in it. Well have to wait and see.

But thats just an indication of how you can mod-ify at the margins the clear directions in which wewant that ship to move. And the ship will move. Itwill take time; its not going to turn overnight.

Kim R. Holmes, Ph.D., is Vice President for For-eign and Defense Policy Studies and Director of theKathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for Inter-national Studies at The Heritage Foundation and authorof Libertys Best Hope: American Leadership for the21st Century (2008). Henry R. Nau, Ph.D., is Pro-fessor of Political Science, The Elliott School of Inter-national Affairs, George Washington University. HelleC. Dale is Senior Fellow for Public Diplomacy in theDouglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign PolicyStudies, a division of the Davis Institute, at The Heritage

Foundation.

_________________________________________

If Obama is reelected in 2012 and we haveeight years of attempts to have his worldview

prevail, it will have a lasting effect in somefashion even on the permanent government.

____________________________________________

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The Obama Doctrine: Hindering American Foreign Policy, Heritage Lecture

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