The Open Instruction Theory of Attitude Reports and the ...

volume12,no.14 september2012

The Open Instruction

Theory of Attitude

Reports and the

Pragmatics of Answers

Philipp KoralusPrinceton University

© 2012 PhilippKoralusThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/012014/>

1. Introduction1

Itisaquotidianthoughextremelyremarkablefactthatbyassertivelyutteringsentenceswecanmakeclaimsabouttheworld.Whydowetake anutteranceof a sentence to conveyone claim rather than an-other?Ourunderstandingofcontextandintentionsplaysanimportantrole.Butthemostimportantfactorarguablyisourgraspofthelinguistic meaningassociatedwiththesentence.Somemaythinkofthisasthese-mantic contributionofthesentence.Onstandardtheoriesinphilosophyandlinguistics,weunderstandanovelutteranceinlargepartbyderiv-ingitslinguisticmeaningfromthelinguisticmeaningsofitspartsanditsgrammaticalstructure.

According to one commonsensical view, the linguistic meaningofpropernames isunproblematic:names juststand for things.Thelinguisticmeaningof‘Otto’justistheindividualOtto,etc.Wecouldaddthatthelinguisticmeaningofasentencelike‘Ottosmokes’justisthesingularpropositionthattheindividualOttohasthepropertyofsmoking.Letting‘<P<Y>>’standforthepropositionthatthepropertyPappliestotheindividualY,wecanregimentthisviewasfollows:Thelinguisticmeaningof‘Ottosmokes’is<smoke<Otto>>.Thisnowclas-sicalviewfamouslyrunsintotroublewhenweconsidersentencesthatreportonbeliefs,desires,andotherattitudes.

1.1 Complex interpretations and Kripke’s PuzzleImaginethescenarioofSupermancomics.Intuitively,anassertionof(1)inthescenariowouldbetrue,whileanassertionof(2)wouldbe

1. Thispaperhasbeenlonginthemaking,benefitingfromdiscussionswithseveralaudiences,beginning in2008with thePhilosophySociety,Austra-lianNational University, and followed by the Philosophy Program at theGraduateCenter,CityUniversityofNewYork,andtheDepartmentsofPhi-losophy andPsychology atPrincetonUniversity. I amgreatly indebted toGideonRosen,GilbertHarman,PhilipJohnson-Laird,andtwoanonymousreferees.Forhelpfuldiscussionsandcommentsovertheyears,IalsothankAngela Mendelovici, as well as Sarah-Jane Leslie, Paul Benacerraf, DeliaGraffFara,andWillStarr.IoweaspecialdebtofgratitudetoJayAtlas,whoseseminalworkonsemanticnonspecificityandneo-Griceanpragmaticspro-videdthecrucialstartingpointfortheviewsIdevelopinthispaper,andwhoprovidedinsightfulcommentsandcriticismsthroughseveraldrafts.

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ourpurposes,complexinterpretationscorrespondtopropositionslike(3)and(4)thatincludepropertiesofrepresentations,whichIwillcall“PoRs”forshort.5

Intheaboveexample,distinctpropertiesofrepresentationsareas-sociatedwithdifferentnames,butthisisinessential.Thesamenamecan be associated with distinct properties on different occasions.6 ImaginePeterdoesnotknowthatPaderewskithe pianististhesameperson as Paderewski the former Prime Minister of Poland. Peter hasheardPaderewskigiveastunningrecital,andasaresult:

(5) PeterthinksthatPaderewskiistalented.

However,Peterdoesnotthinkmuchofpoliticians,andhence:

(6) PeterdoesnotthinkthatPaderewskiistalented.

Paradoxically,thereisatrueutteranceof ‘PeterdoesnotthinkthatPaderewskiistalented’eventhoughPeterbelievesthatPaderewskiistalented.Theapparentparadox,duetoKripke,isresolvedifonegives(5)aninterpretationveryroughlyglossedas‘PeterthinksthatPaderewskirepresented in a pianist-wayistalented’and(6)onerough-ly glossed as ‘Peterdoesnot think thatPaderewski represented in a politician-wayistalented’.

1.2 Default singular interpretationsNotall attitude report interpretations seem to involvewhat I calledcomplexinterpretationsthatwouldincludeacharacterizationofhowindividuals are represented. Imagine three of your colleagues arenamedNancy,Ruth,andTerence.SupposeNancyreports,

(7) TerencebelievesthatRuthsmokes.

likelytomisleadwhenappliedtotheregimentationsuggestedhere.

5. Idonotuse themore familiar term ‘MoP’ (ModeofPresentation), since itseemstohavebecomestronglyassociatedwiththe“token”viewmentionedinfootnote2.

6. Kripke(1979)

false.Atthesametime,‘ClarkKent’and‘Superman’standforthesameindividuals, sopurelysingularpropositionsarenotsufficienttodistin-guishwhatisintuitivelyconveyedby(1)and(2).

(1) LoisbelievesthatSupermanflies.

(2) LoisbelievesthatClarkKentflies.

Anattractiveresponseis tosaythatwemustdistinguishwhat isbe-ingrepresentedandhowitisbeingrepresented.(1)and(2)arepartlyinterpreted asmaking different claims about the properties of cer-tain representations that Lois has of s. It seemsnatural to say thatweinterpret(1)asconveyingthatLoisbelievesthatscanfly,whereLois’srelevantrepresentationofshasthepropertyofpresentings asasuperhero.Bycontrast,weinterpret(2)asconveyingthatthatLoisbelieves thatscanfly,whereLois’srelevantrepresentationofshasthepropertyofpresenting s asanerdy reporter.Putdifferently, (1)and(2)areinterpretedasmakingdifferentclaimsaboutthetypeofguiseunderwhichLoisrepresentss ashavingcertainproperties.2Thetruthconditionsof these interpretationsare independent.This sug-geststhefollowingregimentationofwhat(1)and(2)convey,where‘Superhero’and‘NerdyReporter’denotedifferentpropertiesofrepresen-tations,tobedistinguishedfrommoreordinaryproperties:

(3) <belief<Lois,<fly<s, Superhero>>>>

(4) <belief<Lois,<fly<s, NerdyReporter>>>>

Schiffer has recently argued for a regimentation along those lines,originallydue toRécanati.3 Iwill call interpretationsof this sort, in-cludingpropertiesofrepresentations,“complexinterpretations”.4For2. Contrast a view likeCrimmins’ (1992), onwhichwe specify tokenwaysof

representing,whichSchiffer(2000)andothershavecriticized.

3. Schiffer(2000);Récanati(1993).Intheinterestsoffocusingthediscussion,Iamsettingasidethequestionofwhetherwesometimesincludepropertiesofrepresentationsalongwithapropertylikesmokingaswell.

4. Iadoptnovelterminologyheresinceexperiencehasshownthatexistingter-minology like “Fregean interpretations” and “MoP-laden interpretations” is



anybodybelieved tobeofgoodcharacterbyacertainMs.Smith isguilty.Onedetectiveasserts(9)tohiscolleagues.

(9) SmithbelievesthatSuspectAisanupstandingcitizen.

Itseemstomethatwedonotinterpret(9)asmakinganyparticularclaimabouthowSmithrepresentsSuspectA,letalonethatshethinksofthesuspectas a suspect.For(9),asintheeverydaycaseexemplifiedby(7),thenaturalinterpretationissingular.

Now,theviewduetoSchifferdiscussedabovetakesthesemanticcontributionofattitudereportsentencestobepropositionsincludingpropertiesofrepresentations,asin(3)and(4),whereattitudereportsentencesaretakentobeindexicalwithrespecttothoseproperties.Incaseslike(7)and(9),itseemsmorenaturaltosaythatnoinformationisconveyedaboutwaysofrepresenting.AsIseetheissue,thiscreateswhatSchiffercallsthe“meaningintentionproblem”fortheindexicalview:Often,ifnotmostofthetime,wedonottakeattitudereportsen-tencestobeutteredwithanyintentiontoconveyinformationaboutwaysof representing,nordowehaveany inclination todistinguishwaysofrepresentinginourinterpretation,butthepresenceofanin-dexicalforpropertiesofwaysofrepresentingmakesithardtorespectthat in interpretation.10 Ifanattitude report sentence includesan in-dexicalforaPoR,thensomethingmustbeassignedtothatindexical.

1.3 The task ahead Iproposethatitwouldbeattractivetohaveatheoryofpropernamesandattitudereportsentencesthatallowsustosaythatthelattercanbeliterallyinterpretedasconveyingcomplexpropositionslike(3)and(4)aswellassingularpropositionslike(8),dependingoncontext.11

10. Schiffer (2000).AsSchiffermakesclear, thisproblem isnotdirectlyaboutcapturingtruth conditionsofintuitiveinterpretations.

11. Idonothavethespacetoconsiderotherproposalsthatbeginwithadifferentanalysisofwhat isconveyedbyattitudereportsentences.Foraprominentexample,seeRichard(1990),whoincludesexpressionslike‘Paderewski’inthesemantic contributionofanattitudereportandarguesthatcontextsupplies

Does the report convey informationabouthow Terence representsRuth? Intuitively, theanswer is “No”.Everydayattitudereports like(7) do not seem to be interpreted as conveying such information.What(7)conveysseemstobeadequatelyrepresentedbythesingu-larproposition(8):

(8) <belief<Terence,<smoke<Ruth>>>>

Thesesortsofcasesgiveinitialplausibilitytowhatissometimescalledthe“naïveneo-Russellian”viewthatthesemanticcontributionofanattitude report sentence just is a singular proposition after all.7 Onsuchaview,acomplex interpretationmightbetakentoresult fromapragmatic implicature,added toa semanticallydeterminedpurelysingularinterpretation.Fewpeoplenowaccepttheviewthatattitudereportsentenceslike(1)and(2)havethesametruthconditions,bar-ring“bribery,threats,hypnosis,orthelike”.8Butthen,whyhasnaïveneo-Russellianismbeensoinfluential?Ibelieveoneimportantreasonisthatsingularinterpretationsare,infact,thedefaultinterpretationofattitudereports,assuggestedbyexampleslike(7).9Whatthismeansisthatsingularinterpretationsarechosenintheabsenceofaspecialreasontopromptthehearertodootherwise.Inmyview,thisexplainswhy,tomanypeople,includingthepresentauthor,somethingaboutthenaïveneo-Russellianviewsomehow“seemsright”,evenafteronemeditatesoncaseslike(5)and(6),etc.

Evennamesthatarestronglyassociatedwithacertainwayofrep-resentinganindividualwillnotalwaysleadtocomplexinterpretations.Imaginedetectives inacovert investigationsosecret thatwitnessesarequestionedundera ruse.Let’s further imagine that theyaredis-cussingwhatvariouswitnesseshavesaid,togetapreliminarynotionofwhoislikelytobetheculprit.Allbelievethatitisveryunlikelythat

7. Forexample:Soames(1987);BraunandSaul(2002)

8. To use Richard’s phrase. Richard (1990), p. 125. Soames himself has aban-donedtheviewinSoames(2004).

9. Jaszczolt(2000)seemstosharethisview.



todifferentwaysofexecutingtheinstructionsthatarethelinguisticmeaningofattitudereportsentences.Myaccountiscalledthe“OpenInstruction Theory” (OIT) because linguistic meaning leaves open which of these interpretations is the correct one. These sentencesarejust silentontherelevantdifferencesininterpretation.Inparticu-lar,therelevantdifferencesleaveno traceinthelinguisticmeaningofattitude report sentences andhavenothing to dowith syntax. Theframework of linguistic meanings as instructions to create mentalrepresentationsmakesitpossibletogiveclearcontenttothedistinc-tionthathasbeendrawnbytheorists likeAtlas,Bach,andSoamesbetweenambiguity,indexicality,andnonspecificity.16Intheproposedframework,wecanconceptualizeambiguityasacaseofmultipledis-tinct instructions that correspond to the same surface form,whichwould be independently lexicalized or correspond to different syn-tacticstructures.Wecanconceptualizeindexicalityasacaseofasetofinstructionsincludingacontextuallyfilled-invariable.Finally,wecanconceptualizenonspecificitywithrespecttoarangeofinterpreta-tionsasacaseofstaticinstructionsthatleaveopenarangeofpossiblewaysofexecutingthem,leadingtoarangeofmentalrepresentationsthatcorrespondstotherangeofinterpretations.17

Ofcourse,wedonot intendattitude reportutterances toassertinstructions: weintendthemtoassert truth-evaluableclaims.Wesim-ply do not assert the linguisticmeanings of the sentenceswe use.Linguistic meaning is one particularly important part of what sys-tematicallyaccountsforourintuitivejudgmentsofthe“meaning”ofsentencesweencounterineverydaylife.Linguistic meaning isnottobeconfusedwiththepre-theoreticalnotionof“meaning”thataccom-paniesthesejudgments.

16. Atlas(1977;2005);Soames(2004);Bach(2000).Thisdistinctionisalsodis-cussedindetailinKoralus(2011;2010).

17. Contrasttheoriespostulating“weak”existentiallyquantifiedlinguisticmean-ingsordisjunctivelinguisticmeanings,criticizedasinadequateanalysesofnonspecificitybyAtlas(2005).

Asnoted,oneproposaltomakeattitudereportsentencesrelevant-lycontext-sensitiveistosaythattheyinvolveindexicality,though,asnoted, this routemakes ithard to capturebothpurely singular andcomplexinterpretations.12Anotheroptionthathasbeenexploredbyvariousauthorswouldbetoletattitudereportsentencessemanticallyencode singular propositions, which can be supplemented by prag-maticimplicatures.13

Takingamoreunusualstartingpoint,Iproposeaviewonwhichpurelysingular interpretationsofattitude reportsandwhat I calledcomplex interpretations, involving a characterization of how indi-viduals are represented, are both literal interpretations, while thelinguisticmeaningofattitudereportsentencesisneitherambiguousnorindexicalwithrespecttothem.Attitudereportsentencesarese-mantically nonspecific with respect to the interpretations discussedabove.ThisputsmeinatleastpartialagreementwithBachandwithmorerecentworksofSoames,whohaverecentlyarguedthatattitudereport sentenceswithpropernames in the that-clauseare semanti-callynonspecific.14Whatseemstobemissingsofarisacleartheoryofwhatexactlycompositionalsemantics doesspecifyonsuchaviewandwhatpragmaticprinciplescanyield thevarious interpretationsincontext.Inthefollowing,Iwillexpoundsuchatheory.Iwillthendiscusssomeofitsadvantages.

2. The Open Instruction Theory of attitude reports

IproposetofollowChomskyinsupposingthatthe linguistic meaning ofanexpressionconsistsinasetofinstructionstoconceptualsystemsforconstructingmentalrepresentations.15Iaddthatthevarietyofin-terpretationsofattitudereportsdiscussedintheintroductionreduces

atranslationmanualthatdetermineswhichexpressionscanbeusedtoreportonaperson’sbelief.Forsomecriticismsofthisapproach,seeSoames(2002).

12. Schiffer(1977;2000)

13. Soames(1987);McGlone(2007)

14. Soames(2004);Bach(2000)

15. Chomsky(1965;2000)



powersimilartothosethatmotivateChomsky’sminimalistprogramin syntax, which attempts to do awaywithmultiple levels of syn-tax-internal representations (Chomsky 1995; 2000).19 I am highlysympathetictothespirit ofStanley’s(2002;2005)principleinsistingon linguistic constraint in semantics that these concernsmotivate.However, I think this principle is ultimately too strong.20 I believethatwherewehavereasontobelievethatlinguisticmeaningissilent,wejusthavetofindotherwaysofconstrainingourtheoriesbeyondlinguisticmeaning.Sincewecharacteristically reasonwithwhat isconveyedinconversation,itseemsnaturaltolooktothepsychologyof reasoning tomotivate asmany aspects of theOpen InstructionTheoryaspossible.Evenifwecannotimmediatelyfindindependentsupportforeverymovingpartofthetheory,whatcountsisthatweopenourselvestoanewrangeofindependentconsiderations,wheresyntactictheorynolongerprovidesany.

According to Johnson-Laird’s influential theory,peopleordinarilyreasonbybuildingmental modelsthatstandincertainrelationshipstoeachother.21Thetheory is intendedtoexplainourcompetenceandperformanceinreasoningevenwithnonverbalinputs,andneuroim-agingevidenceisbeginningtobeavailabletoshowthattherelevantoperationsareprocessedinareasofthebrainthatarelanguage-inde-pendent.22Thoughreasoningandlinguisticinterpretationarecloselyrelated,thestudyofreasoninghasitsownsubject,whichallowsustolooktothetheoryofreasoningforindependentsupportintheorizingabout semantics andpragmatics, just aswemight look to syntactictheoryforindependentsupport.Nearlyallaspectsofmytheorythatgobeyondwhatissyntacticallydeterminedwillbedescribedinterms

19. Thesesortsofconsiderationscreatesomeappealforformalreconstructionsof themachineryofDRT in terms thatdonot requirea fully independentlevel of representationof discourse, as inGroenendijk andStokhof (1991)andMuskens(1996).

20.Foracritique,seeRécanati(2002).

21. Johnson-Laird(1983;2008);Barrouilletetal.(2000);Byrne(2005)

22. BauerandJohnson-Laird(1993);Knauffetal.(2001);Krogeretal.(2008)

OIT shareswithKamp’s (1981)DiscourseRepresentationTheory(DRT)andHeim’s (1982)file change semantics (FCS) theview thatliteral utterance interpretation involves a level of representation be-yondwhatisdirectlyconstrainedbysyntax;theyarerepresentational-isttheoriesofinterpretation.However,adoptingarepresentationalisttheoryofinterpretationdoesnotyetguaranteethatthenonspecificityofattitudereportsentenceswillbeanalyzedintherightsortofway,asdistinctfrom,forexample,ambiguityoranaphora.18ThesedistinctionshaveimportantempiricalconsequencesthatIwilldiscussinsections5and6.Nordoesadoptingarepresentationalisttheoryguaranteethatwecancapturedefaultinterpretationsofattitudereportsentencesaswell as departures from these defaults. Ifwe assign nonspecific lin-guisticmeanings,westillneedapragmatictheorythatworkswithin-puts thatdonothavedeterminate truthconditions,whichrulesoutclassical Gricean proposals. As Levinson (2000) observes, the con-nectionbetweenpragmaticsandrepresentationalisttheoriesofinter-pretationisunder-theorized.ThismaybepartlyduetothefactthatrepresentationalisttheorieshavereceivedsomewhatlessattentioninmainstreamphilosophyoflanguagethanIbelievetheymerit.

Hereiswhatmay,inpart,beresponsibleforthiscomparativelackofattention:manyhaveworriedthatrepresentationalisttheoriesofinterpretation are generally less attractive, because they can helpthemselves to linguistically unconstrained postulates. On the onehand,thisraisesthethreatofhavingthesystemovergenerateinter-pretations.Ontheotherhand,appealtoalevelofrepresentationthatisnotsyntacticallyconstrainedmightmakeproposalsseemlessex-planatorilypowerful,duetoworriesaboutunconstrainedexpressive

18. So-called “underspecification” in discourse representation theory, as dis-cussedbyAsher andLascarides (2003), is taken to encompass lexical am-biguityandquantifierscopeambiguity,aswellasanaphora.Thisnotionof“underspecification”,unlikethatputforthbyAtlas,Bach,andSoames,seemstoo broad. Atlas (1977; 2005), Koralus (2011; 2010), and Zwicky and Sa-dock (1975)discuss someof theempirical consequencesof thedistinctionbetweennonspecificity, lexicalandquantifierscopeambiguity, indexicality,andanaphora,suchasdifferentconstraintsoninterpretationimposedbyVPellipsis,whichIwillturntolater.



2.1 Capturing the interpretations of attitude report sentencesSupposeyouaregivenaninstructiontocreateamodelrepresentingSupermanatacertainplace.Youcouldjustfixapinonanappropriatemap,asin(10).

(10)

It is not conceptuallymysterious that such instructionsmight leaveopenhow individualsshouldberepresented.YoucouldinsteaduseadetailedSupermanfigurethatpresentstheindividualinamoreelabo-rateway:

(11)

ofoperationsandrepresentationsindependentlyrequiredbymentalmodel theory. For now,what Iwill take frommentalmodel theoryis that individuals are represented by individual “tokens” in amen-talmodel,andpropertiesandrelationsarerepresentedby“features”bound to those tokens,where featuresand tokensaremental repre-sentationsandwherebindingisapsychologicalrelationshipbetweenmentalrepresentations.Wewillsaythat,foreachpropositionwecanentertain, we can build amentalmodel that represents that propo-sition.Singularpropositionsdecompose into individuals,properties,relations, and propositions.Mentalmodels correspondingly decom-pose intomentalmodel tokens, features, and othermentalmodels.Forexample,MaryisrepresentedbythementalmodeltokenMARY.Theproposition<smoke<Mary>>isrepresentedbythementalmodelSMOKE(MARY).Theproposition<love<Mary,John>>isrepresentedbythementalmodelLOVE(MARY,JOHN),etc.

Mentalmodeltheoryrequiresanoperationthatassemblesmentalmodels,whichIwillcall the“modelbuilder”(MB).OntheOpenIn-structionTheory,utteranceinterpretationproceedsasfollows:Givenanutteranceof a sentenceS, the language faculty computes the lin-guistic meaningofS,whichIwillwriteas ‘||S||’,nottobeconfusedwiththedenotationofS.Asnoted,thelinguisticmeaningofSisasetofin-structionstobuildmentalmodels.Themodelbuilderthenconstructsamentalmodel,byexecuting ||S||.Theresultingmodelexpressesorrepresentsaproposition.Theclaimwetaketobemadebyanassertive utteranceofasentenceSisthepropositionrepresentedbythementalmodelMthatisobtainedastheresultofapplyingthemodelbuilderto||S||.WejudgetheutteranceofS tobetrueifandonlyifwejudgethepropositionrepresentedbyMtobetrue.

Tofleshoutthispicture,weneedanaccountofthosementalmod-els thatamount to the interpretationsdiscussed in the introduction.We thenneed recursive rules allowingus to compute the linguisticmeaning of attitude report sentences and arrive at correspondingmentalmodels.Finally,weneedapragmaticcomponentofOITthatcanmakesenseofbothsingularandcomplexinterpretations.



Wetake(14)torepresentapropositionthatincludesapropertyofrep-resentations,viz.thepropertyofpresentinganindividualasafamouspianist.Forexpositoryconvenience,Iwillusecombinationsofcapitallettersinitalicstodenotepropertiesofthissort.

(15) <belief<Terence,<smoke<Ruth,FAMOUSPIANIST>>>>

(15) is apropositionof the sort suggestedbyRécanati andSchiffer,discussed in the introduction, as corresponding to what I called a“complexinterpretation”.Asnoted,thetruthconditionsofaproposi-tionlike(15)areindependentfromapropositionlike(16):

(16) <belief<Terence,<smoke<Ruth,FAMOUSPOLITICIAN>>>>

Whatabouttherelationshipbetween(16)and(13)?Itseemshardtoavoidtheviewthat(16)hastoentail(13).Intuitively,wewant(13)tobeverifiedbyanysituation inwhichTerence representsRuthassmokingandtakesthatrepresentationtobetrue,regardlessofhowherepresentsRuth.Thishastheconsequencethat(16)hastoentail(13).This,inturn,quicklyleadstotheconsequencethat(17)isconsistentanddoesnotentailthatTerenceisirrational:


&<belief<Terence,<¬smoke<Ruth>>>>

Similarly:

(18) <belief<Terence,<¬smoke<Ruth>>>>

⊬ <¬belief<Terence,<smoke<Ruth>>>>

Giventheresourceswehaveappealedto inordertoaccountforvarious interpretations of attitude reports, the question arises as towhattomakeofamentalmodellike(19)thatinvolvesnorepresenta-tionofattituderelationsandrepresentsapropositionlike(20).

(19) SMOKE(TERENCEFAMOUSPIANIST)

Youcanrepresentanindividualinyourmodelwithmoreorlesselabo-ratedplaceholders.Inadditiontowhatisrepresented,thereisawayinwhichitisrepresented.Theinstructionsleft it openhowSupermanwastoberepresented.

Justasinstructionsintheabovetoyanalogycanleaveopenhowanindividualistoberepresented,theinstructionsthatamounttothelinguisticmeaningof an attitude report like (7) leaveopenhowanindividual,e. g.,Ruth,istoberepresented.


Thesimplestwaytorepresentanindividual inamentalmodel istouseamentalmodeltokenthatsimplystandsfortheindividual(likeasimplepininthetoyanalogy).For(7),thiswouldgiveusthefollowingmentalmodel:

(12) BELIEF(TERENCE,SMOKE(RUTH))

Wewilltake(12)torepresentthesingularproposition(13).


Othermentalmodelscouldserveasaninterpretationof(7).RuthmightbelikePaderewski,knownbysomeasafamouspianistandbyothersasafamouspolitician.PerhapsTerencebelievesthatonlyRuthrepresented in a pianist guise smokes.Inthatcase,ourinterpretivemodelmightinvolvearepresentationofRuthwiththepropertyofpresentingRuthasapianist.Iwilltaketherelevantinterpretivemodeltoincludea complex mental model token, comprising a mental model tokenrepresentingRuthbound toamentalmodel feature that representsthe property of presenting Ruth as a pianist.Iwillwritethesymbolforamentalmodel featureof this sortasa superscript to the symbol forthementalmodeltokentowhichitisbound.Weobtainthefollowinginterpretivemodel:

(14) BELIEF(TERENCE,SMOKE(RUTHFAMOUSPIANIST))



(R1)

τ, where τ represents i ifXisapropername oftheindividualiMB(||X||)è ϕ, where ϕ represents PifXisaverbthatdenotes thepropertyorrelationP

Thekeytocapturingthefullrangeofattitudereportinterpretationswastoleaveopen how individualsarerepresentedintheinterpretivemodel.Welett, above,rangeoverbothsimpleandcomplexmentalmodeltokens.IwillthinkofMB(||X||)asamappingthattakesusfromthelinguisticmeaningofXtomentalmodelconstituentsthatarecorrectexecutionsofit.Forexample,MB(||Superman||)canmap||Superman||toanyofthementalmodeltokensin(23).Whichmen-talmodeltokenwill,infact,enterintotheinterpretivemodelwilldependonpragmaticprinciplesdescribedinthenextsection.Sometokensarecomplex,inthattheyincludefeaturesrepresentingprop-ertiesofrepresentations:

(23) MB(||Superman||) SUPERMAN Simple token for singular interpretations

SUPERMANS Complex token with feature S representing the PoR of presenting as a superhero

SUPERMANR Complex token with feature R representing the PoR of presenting as a reporter

SUPERMANX Complex token with feature X representing some other PoR

(20)<smoke<Terence,FAMOUSPIANIST>>

Intuitively, it is truth-conditionally irrelevant how we represent Ter-ence,ifwewanttoaskifwearerightabouttheworldinrepresentingthathesmokes.(20)hasthesametruthconditionsas(21).

(21) smoke<Terence>

Thisdoesnotmeanthattherearenogenuinedifferencesininterpreta-tionhere.SupposeTerencealsogoesbythederogatorynickname‘Nit-wit’.Aninterpretationof‘Nitwitsmokes’mayleadtoamentalmodelinwhichTerenceisrepresentedinaderogatoryway.Yet, intuitively,NitwitsmokesifandonlyifTerencesmokes,becausethepropertyofsmoking has nothing to dowithhow a smoking individual is repre-sented.Ordinarypropertiesandrelationsdifferfromattituderelationsinthisregard.

Thenextstepwillbetogiveanaccountofthelinguisticmeaningof attitude report sentences that allowsus to generate the rangeofinterpretationsjustdiscussed.

2.2 Primitive instructions for proper names and verbsWe need recursive rules that generate the linguisticmeaning of at-titudereportsentences,basedonprimitive instructions.Where ‘||X||’denotesthelinguisticmeaningofX,and‘PN’and‘V’arevariablesforpropernamesandverbs:

(22) ||PN||=“createamentalmodeltokenrepresentingthebear-erofPN”.

||V|| = “create a mental model feature representing thepropertydenotedbyV”.

(22)isaninformalgloss.Withthemodel-buildingoperationMB,wecanimplicitlydefineinstructionstocreatementalmodelconstituentsintermsoftheresultofapplyingMBtothoseinstructions.Lettingtbeamentalmodeltoken,jamentalmodelfeature,thefirstruleis:



thefollowingtwosorts:BELIEF(TERENCE,SMOKE(RUTH)),fora sin-gularinterpretation,orBELIEF(TERENCE,SMOKE(RUTHF)),whereFisa featurerepresentingapropertyofrepresentation,asneededforwhatIcalled“complexinterpretations”.


Asimplifiedsyntacticanalysisof(7)willsufficeforourpurposes:

(24)

Howdoweletmentalmodelfeaturesbindtotherightmentalmodelconstituents? For simplicity, I assume a syntactic theory thatmarksargumentrolesinthesyntacticstructure.Weneedanoperationthatbindsmentalmodelfeaturestomentalmodelconstituentsindifferentargument roles.Call thatbindingoperation ‘B’. For amentalmodelfeatureϕandamentalmodelconstituent£,where £couldbeeithera tokenτora (sub-)mentalmodelM, B can, inprinciple,bindϕ to£ agent-wiseorobject-wise.Syntaxdetermineswhetherbinding istobeagent-wiseorobject-wise.23ThebindingoperationB has twoinputs:a set, {ϕ, £},andanargument roleparameter,θ,whichcan

23. Anotheroptionwouldbe tomathematicallymodelmentalmodel featuresaslambdaabstractions,mimickingmoreclassicalapproaches.Wewouldget

λ£.λτ.BELIEVE(τ,£) forBELIEVE.On thisoption,mentalmodelbindingismodeledasfunction-application.Argumentrolemarkinginsyntaxwouldeffectivelybemaderedundant.

Informalterms,(R1)isaproductionrulethatallowsustotransitionfromMB(||PN||)toanyavailablementalmodeltokenthatrepresentsthebearerofPN (moreonconstraintsontherangeoftokensinsec-tionstofollow).

2.3 Complex instructions and binding

Mentalmodel features bind to oneormorementalmodel constitu-ents.Forexample,amentalmodelfeatureSMOKEthatrepresentsthepropertyofsmokingbindstoonementalmodeltokenrepresentinganindividual.AmentalmodelinwhichSMOKEisboundtoJOHNrep-resentsthepropositionthatJohnsmokes.WeshouldthinkofSMOKEashavinganattachmentsiteforan“agent”ofthepropertyrepresentedby the feature. The feature representing smoking can bewritten as‘SMOKE(△)’,where△ isaplaceholderforamentalmodeltokentowhichthefeatureSMOKEisbound.

Mentalmodelfeaturesrepresentingrelations,suchasthementalmodelfeatureLOVE,canbindtotwomentalmodeltokens.Depend-ingonhowLOVEisboundtoamentalmodeltoken,thattokenrep-resentseithertheagentortheobjectoftheloverelation.Hence,thementalmodelfeatureLOVE(△, £),‘LOVE’forshort,hastwositesforattachingtomentalmodeltokens:onefortheloverandoneforthebeloved.LOVEisatwo-placefeature.Iadopttheconventionthattheleft-boundmentalmodelconstituent in thesymbolic representationofatwo-placementalmodelfeatureistherepresentationoftheagent,andtheright-boundconstituenttherepresentationoftheobject.At-titudefeatureslikeBELIEF(△, £)bindtotwomentalmodelconstitu-ents,likeLOVE.BELIEFbindstoa(sub-)mentalmodelM,astheob-ject (therepresentationofwhatisbeingbelieved),aswellasamentalmodeltokenτ,astheagent(therepresentationofthebeliever).Wewill shortlyhave tospecifyhow languagecontrolshowfeaturesgetbound.

Now,thetaskistogiveanaccountonwhich(7)determinesanin-structiontocreateamentalmodelthatMBmapstomentalmodelsof



MB(||CP||)è B(θ,{MB(||NP||),MB(||VP||)})[R4, R2]

è B(subject,{MB(||Ruth||),MB(||smokes||)})

So,

MB(||IP||) è B(subject,{MB(||Terence||),B(complement,{MB (||believe||),B(subject,{MB(||Ruth||),MB(||smokes||)})})})

MB(||IP||)è B(subject,{MB(||Terence||),B(complement, {BELIEF,B(subject,{MB(||Ruth||),SMOKE})})})

By(R1),wecaninserteitherasimpleoracomplexmentalmodelto-keninplaceof‘MB(||Ruth||)’.Forasimpletoken,weget:

MB(||IP||)èBELIEF(TERENCE,SMOKE(RUTH))

ForacomplextokenwithaPoRfeatureF,weget:

MB(||IP||)èBELIEF(TERENCE,SMOKE(RUTHF))

Hence,(R1)–(R4)allowustogeneratebothsingularandcomplexin-terpretationsofattitudereportsentences.Ofcourse, therulesallowustogenerateevenmoreinterpretations,suchas(26),withsomePoRfeatureXforTerence:

(26)BELIEF(TERENCEX,SMOKE(RUTH))

EventhoughaddingPoRfeaturestoTERENCEdoesnotleadtodifferenttruthconditions,asdiscussed,wewilleventuallyneedanexplanationofwhyweordinarilydon’tgetsuchinterpretationsinpractice(settingasidecaseslike‘NitwitbelievesthatRuthsmokes’,discussedabove).

Somemayfinditobjectionablethatonthisaccountofthelinguis-ticmeaningofattitudereportsentences,asmanyinterpretationsarepossibleasthehearercan,inprinciple,distinguishpropertiesofwaysofrepresenting.Butthisishowitshouldbe!AsBachhasconvincinglyargued,foranytwosuchdistinguishableproperties,wecanconstruct

takethevalues“subject”or“complement”,wheretheformerspecifiestheagentrole andthelattertheobjectrole.Let‘__’standforbindingsitesthatBignores.

(25)

ϕ{£} if ϕ is one-place and θ = subject B(θ,{ϕ, £}) è ϕ{£, _} if ϕ is two-place and θ = subject ϕ{_, £} if ϕ is two-place and θ = complement

Now,wedonothavetoexplicitlyformulatetheinstructionsassociat-edwithcomplexexpressions,aslongaswecandefinetheapplicationofMBtocomplexinstructionsintermsoftheprimitivesjustdiscussedtogetherwiththebindingoperation.

ThemodelbuilderMB appliestocomplexexpressionsasfollows.With(R4),Iassume,forsimplicity,that‘that’isnotdirectlycontribut-ingtothementalmodel.

(R2)MB(||IP||)è B(θ,{MB(||NP||),MB(||VP||)})

(R3)MB(||VP||)è B(θ,{MB(||V||),MB(||X||)}),X ∈{NP, CP} for VP ≠ V

(R4)MB(||CP||)èMB(||IP||)

Let’sapplytheserulesto(7).

MB(||IP||)è B(θ,{MB(||NP||),MB(||VP||)}) [R2]

è B(subject,{MB(||Terence||),MB(||VP||)})

MB(||VP||)è B(θ,{MB(||V||),MB(||CP||)}), [R3]

è B(complement,{MB(||believe||),MB(||CP||)})



beinapplicabletoattitudereportsentencesandtocreatedifficultiesIwouldliketoavoid.AtlasandLevinsonreduce“inferencetothebestinterpretation”to“inferencetothemostinformativeinterpretation”.28 Morespecifically,theyproposethattheinformationcontentofagiveninterpretationis tobeunderstoodinsomecasesasthesetof itspo-tentialfalsifiers,followingPopper,orinothercasesasitssetoflogicalconsequences,followingCarnap.Theproposalhasconsequencesthataresomewhatpuzzling,inmyview.29

IsuggestthatweshouldsaveAtlasandLevinson’scrucialinsightthatpragmaticprinciplesbridging thegapbetween linguisticmean-ingandparticularinterpretationsamounttoprinciplesofinferencetothebestinterpretationandlookforanewsetofpragmaticprinciplesthatcanbeappliedtoattitudereportsentencesinthesemanticframe-workIproposed.Thekeyideabehindinferencetothebestexplanation isthatwebeginwithasetofhypothesescompatiblewiththedata.30 Wewouldthenchoosethebesthypothesis,“basedonconsiderationssuchaswhichhypothesisissimpler,whichismoreplausible,whichexplainsmore,whichislessad hoc, andsoforth”.31Now,onthepropos-aloflinguisticmeaningdevelopedintheprevioussection,asentence

28.AtlasandLevinson(1981);Atlas(2005)

29.The proposal is operationalized via the idea that normalized statementsfrontedbymoreexistentialquantifiersare less informativeby thePopperi-anmeasure.Yetempiricalexistentialstatementswithnon-finitedomainsofdiscoursejustdonothave(finite)falsifiers.Itispuzzlingwhyaddingmoreexistentialquantifierswould,inanysense,furtherdecreaseinformativeness.Moreover,consider:‘(A)Thereisapinkelephantinyourroom.’‘(B)Thereisapinkelephantinyourroom,andthereisabluerhinocerosinyourcar.’Regimentingthepredicateswithsomeharmlesssimplifications,weget:‘(A')∃x(Ex&Px).’‘(B')∃x∃y((Ex&Px)&(Ry&Cy)).’BythePopperianexistentialquantifiermeasure,(B)islessinformativethan(A),eventhough(B)entails(A).Thisseemsodd.Anyfalsifierof(A)isalsoafalsifierof(B),soitjustcan-notbethecasethat(B)hasfewerfalsifiers.Atlas(p.c.)holdsthatweshouldsaythat(A)isintuitivelymoreinformativebecauseitismore“specific”.Ipre-fertoavoidthecomplicationsjustsketched.

30.Harman(1965)contraststhiswithenumerativeinduction,whereonewoulddeduceahypothesisfromalistofobservationsviaaninductionprinciple.

31. Harman(1965)

aPaderewski-stylescenariothatrequiresdistinguishingthemtomakesenseofanattitudereport.24Thequestionofwhywedonot,inprac-tice,havetoconsideranarbitrarilylargesetofpossibleinterpretationstomakesenseofanattitudereportwillbeansweredbythepragmaticcomponentofmytheory,suppliedbelow.

Takingstock,bothsingularandcomplexinterpretationsofattitudereportsentencesareaccommodatedbytheproposedcharacterizationoflinguisticmeaning,withoutappealtoambiguityorindexicality.Ontheaboveproposal,attitudereportsentencesareindeednonspecificwithrespect to the interpretationsat issue.Thedistinctionbetweentheseinterpretationsisnotmarkedinthegrammar.Atthesametime,wehavegivenaprecisecharacterizationofhowthenonspecific lin-guisticmeaningofattitudereportsentenceswithpropernamesinthethat-clauseissystematicallygeneratedfromsyntaxandthelexicon.25

Whatremainsistogiveanaccountofhowwesettleonaparticularmentalmodelfromtherangeofmentalmodelsthatwouldcountascorrectexecutionsoftheinstructionsthatarethelinguisticmeaningofattitudereportsentences.Thistheoryhastoexplainwhysingularinterpretationsarethedefault.Italsohastoexplainwhenthemodelbuilderdepartsfromthedefaultinterpretation.

2.4 From inference to the best interpretation to inference to the most respon-sive interpretationIwilladopt the following insightdue toAtlasandLevinson:We in-terpretanutteranceby tacitlymakingan inference to thebest inter-pretation.26Here, inference to the best interpretation is roughly anal-ogousto inferencetothebest explanation inscience.27Unfortunately,AtlasandLevinson’sparticularinterpretiveprinciplesseemtometo

24. Bach(2000)

25. Bycontrast,fromSoames(2004)andBach’s(2000)discussions,itisnotclearhowtoprovideacompositionalaccountofthelinguisticmeaningofattitudereportsentencesthatreflectstheirnonspecificity.

26.AtlasandLevinson(1981);Atlas(2005);Levinson(2000)

27. Theterm“inferencetothebestexplanation”isduetoHarman(1965).



role toquestions, Iwill call theproposal “Inference to theMostRe-sponsiveInterpretation”(IMRI):

(IMRI)GivenanutteranceofasentenceS, amentalmodelofbackgroundbeliefsBG,andamentalmodelofbackgroundquestionsQ, themodel builderwill produce thementalmodelMthatrepresentsthebestinterpretationofS.Misthementalmodelthat satisfiesthefollowingconstraints:34

(Literality)Letthesetofmentalmodelsthatcanbegeneratedbyexecuting||S||beIS.M isamemberofIS.

(Responsiveness)IfamodelM1conjoinedwiththementalmodelBG(representingbackgroundbeliefs)representsmorean-swers toquestions (representedby thementalmodelQ)thatthehearerwantstoanswerbyengagingindiscoursethanM2 similarly combined, thenM1 ismore responsivethanM2 relative toBG andQ (see (E1)–(E3) below). LetthesetofallmentalmodelsinIS suchthatnoothermentalmodelinIS ismoreresponsivewhenconjoinedwithQ andBGbeJBG,S.M isamemberofJBG,S.

(Simplicity)LetKBG,SbethesetofmentalmodelsinJBG,S suchthat,foreachmodelconjoinedwithBG, theresultingmodelissuchthatnoothermentalmodelinJBG,S conjoinedwithBG hasfewerconstituents.35 M isamemberofKBG,S.

IwillassumethatBGismadeupofthesamesortsofconstituentsasinterpretivemodels.Wenowneedaworkingaccountofhowback-groundquestions are represented inmentalmodels, andweneed

34. For now, I will postpone a discussion of what happenswhen there is nouniquementalmodel.Moreover,Iwillnarrowmyviewexclusivelytoliteral utteranceinterpretation.

35.Wewillcountconstituentsinourregimentedrepresentationofmentalmod-elsthewaywecountfreevariables.Forexample,‘xlovesxandwishesxtosucceed’hasonefreevariable;‘xlovesy’hastwofreevariables.Forexample,onthiswayofcounting,thementalmodelLOVE(JOHN,JOHN)hasonecon-stituentlessthanLOVE(JOHN,MARY).

encodes instructions that allowvariousmentalmodels to be gener-ated.Wewillsaythatthesetofthesementalmodelscorrespondstowhatwouldbethesetofalternativehypothesesforinferencetothebestexplanation.Thebestinterpretationthencorrespondstothebestmentalmodel.Toobtainsubstantivepredictions,weneedaproposalaboutthefactorsthatdeterminewhichmentalmodelisthebest.Isug-gestthatonefactorissimplicity,inthesenseofthenumberofmentalmodelconstituents.Morewillbeneeded.32Itisafamiliarmoveinthe-oreticaldebatestosayofasetofcompetingtheories(nonefalsifiedbyextantdata) that thebest theorywouldanswersuch-and-suchques-tionswhencombinedwithourbackgroundbeliefs.ThismaybepartofwhattheIBEtheoristwantstocapturewiththenotionofacertaintheorybeingmoreexplanatorythanothers.Isuggestthatliteralutter-anceinterpretationinvolvessomethingsimilar,proceedingrelative to a background question.Onemightplausiblysupposethat,bydefault,thebackgroundquestion is something like, “Whataresome factsabouttheenvironmentIdon’tknowyet?”,whichisnarrowedtosomethingmorespecificinalmostanyactualdialogueandmaybeshiftedto,e. g.,“Whataresome facts Idon’tknowyet thathold in theworldof theIliad?”,say,whenwelistentoastory.Iwillcallthevirtueofaninter-pretationof answering relativelymorequestions “responsiveness”. Iproposethat,forahearerH,inputstoliteralinterpretationareasen-tence,backgroundbeliefsofH,andquestionsH wouldliketoanswerbyengagingindiscourse.Moreover,Iproposetodefinetheprinciplesofinferencetothebestinterpretationusingresourcesindependentlyrequiredbythementalmodeltheoryofreasoning.33Toavoidconfu-sionwithAtlasandLevinson’sproposalsthatdonotassignaspecial

32.Needlesstosay,itisaseparatequestionwhetherinferencetothebestexpla-nationisthenormativelycorrectaccountofhowweshoulddrawconclusionsabouttheoriesinscience.Totheextentthatwehavereasontobelievethatit iscorrect, there is thepotential toarguethat theproposedviewofutter-anceinterpretationisarational modelinafairlystrongsense.ComparetheGriceanprojectofaccountingforimplicaturesintermsofarationaltheoryofcommunication.

33. Johnson-Laird(2008)



moreor less responsive than its alternatives,with the consequencethatJBG,S = IS.Finally,toforestallapossiblemisunderstanding,notethattheprinciplesof(IMRI)applyonlytoliteralutteranceinterpretation;theydonot,intheirpresentform,yieldpredictionsaboutmoregen-eral “conversational implicatures” that are not literal interpretations.Bydesign,(IMRI)onlygeneratespredictionsabouthowsentencesareinterpretedrelativetoaparticularanalysisoftheirlinguisticmeaning,whichhastoleaveopenarangeofliteralinterpretationsinorderforthepredictions tobenontrivial. (IMRI) isconcernedwithobtainingliteralinterpretationsinthefaceofsemanticnonspecificity.ClassicalGriceanpragmaticsbeginsonlyoncewehavealiteralinterpretation,anditcould,inprinciple,becombinedwith(IMRI).MovingbeyondGrice,a revieweralertedmeto theneedtodistinguish(IMRI) fromHobbsetal.’stheoryof“interpretationasabduction”.40Ontheirview,“theprocessofinterpretingsentencesindiscoursecanbeviewedastheprocessofprovidingthebestexplanationofwhythesentenceswouldbetrue”.41Ontheirtheory,theinputtotheirpragmaticprocessisase-manticallydeterminedlogicalformin“first-orderpredicatecalculus”.42 Thepragmaticcomponentthenproducesan“elaboratedlogicalform”,which entails the semantically determined logical form. The addedmaterial amounts to the explanation ofwhy the semantically deter-mined logical form is true.Bycontrast,onmyaccount, the input tothepragmaticcomponentdoesnothavedeterminatetruthconditions,whichastatementinpredicatecalculuswouldhave,merelydetermin-inga rangeofpossible interpretations.Theresultofpragmaticprin-ciplesisaninterpretationwithtruthconditions.Inaddition,myview,unlikeHobbsetal.’stheory,isdefinedintermsofresponsivenesstoabackgroundquestionthatthehearerseekstoanswer.Finally,abduc-tiveprinciplesthatwouldyieldanexplanationofwhyanutteranceis

question:theinterpretationcouldsomehowraiseaquestion.

40.Hobbsetal.(1993)

41. Hobbsetal.(1993),p.69

42. Ibid.,p.75

anaccountofhowmentalmodelsareconjoined.Iwillprovisionallyadopttheviewthatabackground-questionmentalmodelhasthesetofitsexclusivealternativeanswersasitsrepresentationalcontent.36 A background question is then represented in the mental modelframeworkasasetofmentalmodels,eachrepresentinganalterna-tive answer to the question.37 Johnson-Laird’s theory of reasoningwithmentalmodelsindependentlyrequiresmentalmodelsconsist-ingof furthermentalmodels representing alternatives.38 Iwill use‘[M1/M2/…/Mn]’tostandforamentalmodelthatconsistsofmentalmodelsM1M2,…,Mn,whereeachmentalmodelhasanalternativepropositionasitsrepresentationalcontent.

Ihaveencounteredtwoobjectionstotheviewjustpresented.Oneobjectioncentersonanallegedviciouscircularity.Theworry is thattheproposedtheoryof interpretationpresupposesaquestion that it-self needs tobe interpreted.But, of course, thementalmodel repre-sentingourbackgroundquestiondoesnothavetoenterourcognitiveeconomybyverbalmeans,anymorethanourbackgroundbeliefshavetocometousthroughaverbalbriefingbeforethebeginningofacon-versation.Anotherobjectionisthatitdoesnotseemintuitivelyimpos-sibletoapproachanutterancewithoutaparticularquestioninmind.Nothingin(IMRI)forcesustodenythisintuition.Ifwehavenoback-groundquestion—ifweareinastatethatwecanthinkofasanemptyquestionmodel—nointerpretationcan(withanimportantcaveat39)be

36.Note that, at least inprinciple, theviewaboutbackground questions for thepurposesof (IMRI)doesnot commitone to theview that this is the rightaccountofthesemanticsofinterrogativesentencesinnaturallanguage.SeeMascarenhas(2009).SeeHamblin(1973)fortheoriginalnotionofquestionsdenotingsetsofalternatives.

37. Since this yieldsmentalmodels with infinitelymany compartments for aquestionlike“Whatisyourfavoritenumber?”,wewillneedtosaysomethingaboutthepossibilityofrepresentingalternativesimplicitlyinmentalmodels,which Johnson-Laird’s (2008) theory of reasoning independently requires.Moreonthisbelow.


39.Thereis,infact,awayinwhichwecouldusefullythinkofaninterpretationaslessresponsivethanitsalternatives,evenintheabsenceofabackground



Besidesmentalmodelswithmultipledistinctsub-models,wewillneedmentalmodelsofalternatives.Wewill takeamentalmodelofalternativestobeasetofsets—namelyasetofmentalmodels,whichare,inturn,setsofmentalmodelfeaturesboundtomentalmodelto-kens.Foreaseofexposition,wewilluse‘[’and‘]’insteadof‘{’and‘}’and ‘/’ insteadof ‘,’ torepresentsetsofmentalmodels.Forexample,‘[{GUILTY(SUSPECTA), ¬BELIEF(SMITH,UPSTANDING(SUSPECTA))}/{¬GUILTY(SUSPECTA)}]’denotesthesetofalternativementalmod-els comprising {GUILTY(SUSPECTA), ¬BELIEF(SMITH,UPSTAND- ING(SUSPECTA))}and{¬GUILTY(SUSPECTA)}.Moregenerally,ifM1 andM2 arementalmodels,then[M1 / M2] isamentalmodelrepresent-ingthealternativesrepresentedbyM1 andM2.Finally,wewilladdtoourinventoryaspecialprimitive“null”mentalmodelM∅ thatrepre-sentscontradiction.

WecannowgiveasimplifieddefinitionofJohnson-Laird’smainpro-cedureforconjoiningmentalmodels,whichappearstoworkasfollows:

(Conjoin) Given two mental models M1 and M2 , CONJOIN(M1 , M2) è MX.

If M2isamodelofalternatives[M2/M3/…],then

MX = [CONJOIN(M1 , M2)/CONJOIN(M1 , M3)/…].

If M2 is drawn froma set of alternativementalmodels[M2 /M3 /…]andasub-modelM ofM1isalsoasub-modelof at leastoneof thealternativemodels in [M2 /M3 /…] butnotasub-modelofM2,thenMX = M∅.

If M1 , M2arementalmodelsandthereisanMsuchthatoneofM1 , M2hasM asasub-modelandtheotherhas¬M asasub-model,thenMX = M∅.

truearefarmorepowerfulthanwhatIpropose.Inmyview,AsherandLascaridescorrectlycriticizeHobbsetal.forfailingtodistinguishlit-eralutteranceinterpretationfromageneralaccountofhowweupdateourbeliefs.43

Movingon,wewillalsoneedamentalmodelconstituentthatrep-resents negation,which is also already a component of thementalmodel theoryofdeduction.44 Iwilluse thesymbol ‘¬’ todenote thementalmodelconstituentrepresentingnegation,whenitoccursinthecontextofmentalmodels,andtodenotenegation,whenitoccursinthecontextofpropositions.

Next,weneed an account of howmentalmodels are conjoined.Johnson-Laird is committed to a certain procedure governing howmentalmodelsareconjoined.Thisprocedurecanberegimentedfor-mally,thoughasketchwillsufficeforthepurposesofthispaper,withmoretechnicaldetailgivenelsewhere.45

So far, we have talked only about mental models representingsimplepropositions. Forwhat follows,wewillneedmore structure.We will say that mental models are sets of mental model featuresboundtomentalmodel tokens.So,wherewepreviously just talkedabout amentalmodel SMOKE(JOHN) as representing the proposi-tionthatJohnsmokes,wewillnowtalkaboutthatmentalmodelasa set {SMOKE(JOHN)} that has, as its unique element, the featureSMOKEboundtothetokenJOHN.Torepresentboththepropositionthat Johnsmokesand theproposition thatMarysmokes inasinglementalmodel,wetake{SMOKE(JOHN),SMOKE(MARY)},whichhastwoelements,etc.Wewillsaythat{SMOKE(JOHN),SMOKE(MARY)}has {SMOKE(JOHN)}asasub-model.As inprevioussections, ifap-plicationsofmentalmodeloperationsarenotdirectlyatissueandwearedealingwithmentalmodelsthathaveuniquesub-models, Iwillsuppresssetnotationinexposition.

43. AsherandLascarides(2003)


45. Koralus(in preparation)



inwhichnoalternativesinQ havebeeneliminated(i. e.,noreductioninoccurrencesof‘/’intheregimentation).

(E3)FortwointerpretationsI1andI2 thatruleoutsomebutnotallalternativeswhenconjoinedwithBG andQ, I1ismoreresponsive to Q than I2 iff more (explicit48) alternativemodels are ruled out byCONJOIN((CONJOIN(I1, BG)),Q) than byCONJOIN((CONJOIN(I2, BG)),Q) (i. e., oneeliminates more occurrences of ‘/’ in the regimentationthantheother).

Bothmentalmodelconjoiningandtheabilitytocomparenumbersofalternativesarecognitiveresourcesthatareindependentlyrequiredbythementalmodeltheoryofreasoning.49Thus,theproposedtheoryofinferencetothebestinterpretationcanbedefinedintermsofcogni-tiveresourcesthatareindependentlymotivated.Itmustbenotedthatthenumberofmentalmodelsthatcanbeentertainedatatimeisfinite.Yetpotentiallyopen-endedquestionslike‘Whowillcometotheparty?’maycorrespondtoanunboundednumberofalternativesthathavetoberepresentedbymentalmodels.Wecanonlyimplicitlyrepresentthementalmodels that represent those alternatives.Thementalmodel

48. ThoughIhavenospaceforaformaltreatmentinthispaper,onceweaddJohnson-Laird’s distinction between explicit and implicitly representedmentalmodels,we can account for the fact that, even given backgroundquestionswithinfinitelymanyalternatives,someincompleteanswersseembetterthanothersbecausetheymayeliminatemoreexplicitly representedal-ternatives.Forexample,suppose thatsomeonewhoknows thatMikehasagirlfriendaskshim,‘Whowillcometoyourparty?’IfMikeisanordinaryperson,itwouldseemmuchmoreresponsiveforMiketosay,‘Well,mygirl-friendwon’tcome’thantosay,‘Well,BillClintonwon’tcome.’TheaccountarguedforbyJohnson-Laird,Legrenzi,etal. (1999)suggests thatordinaryreasonerstendtorepresenttherelativeprobabilityofaneventviatherela-tivenumberofexplicitalternativementalmodelsthatrepresenttheeventasoccurring.Ifthisiscorrect,thenapartialanswerthatrulesoutaneventwe considered relatively likelywill be relativelymore responsive by (E3),because iteliminatesmoreexplicitly representedalternatives.There isnoneed to stipulate an independent preference for information-theoreticallymoreinformativeinterpretations.

49. Johnson-Laird(2008);Johnson-Lairdetal.(1999)

If M1 , M2 arementalmodelsandoneofM1 , M2 = M∅, thenMX = M∅.

Otherwise, MX = M1 ∪ M2.

A fullaccountof thementalmodel theoryof reasoningrequires fur-therprinciples,andsomerevisionsmaybenecessary.Yettheabovesufficestodescribethecoreof(IMRI)intermsofmentalmodelpro-cedures.Background-questionansweringcorresponds toconjoiningquestionmodelsandmodelsrepresentingputativeanswers.Wecanthendefineprinciplesgoverningrelativeresponsivenessasfollows:

(E1) An interpretation I is maximally responsive to Q ifCONJOIN((CONJOIN(I, BG)),Q) yieldsamentalmodelinwhich thealternatives inQ havebeenreduced toone(i. e., no occurrences of ‘/’ in the regimentation), distinctfromM∅. If the one remaining alternative isM∅,we saythatI rejectsthequestion.46

Itmaybehardforaninterpretationtobeless responsivethananinter-pretationthat leavesthebackgroundquestionas it isorthatrejectsthequestion.47

(E2)An interpretation I has zero responsiveness to Q ifCONJOIN((CONJOIN(I, BG)),Q) yieldsamentalmodel

46. Suitablyanalyzed,thismightbeobservedincaseslike ‘A:WhomdidJohnkiss?B:Johndidnotkissanyone.’

47. Forthepurposesofthispaper,I’msettingasidethepossibilityofaninterpre-tationgeneratingadditionalquestions.However,wecouldaddaprinciple(E4)along the following lines:An interpretation I isnegatively responsive(“inquisitive”)ifconjoiningIwithBGandQ yieldsamentalmodelwithmore alternatives than inQ. Such anotionmay capture the intuitive sense thatsome interpretations “raisemore answers than theyprovide”. It shouldbeexploredwhether there are language-independent reasons to believe thathighly controversial or unlikely propositions tend to independently raisequestionsinbeingcombinedwithbackgroundbeliefsandwhetherthisac-countsforwhywemayprefer,allotherthingsbeingequal,uncontroversialandlikelyinterpretations.



correspondtointerpretationswithsomePoRfeatureonmentalmodeltokensoutsideoftheattitudecontext.Asnotedearlier,interpretationsofthissortarepossiblebutnonstandard.

2.5.1 Default interpretations in unembedded sentencesConsideranutteranceof(31)withnorelevantbackgroundbeliefsandadefaultbackgroundquestionalongthelinesof“WhataresomefactsabouttheworldIdon’tknowabout?”

(31) Johnsmokes.

As far as OIT semantics is concerned, MB could generateSMOKE(JOHN)oranynumberofmodels likeSMOKE(JOHNPOR) in-cludingsomePoRfeatureorother.Asdefinedearlier,thepropositionsrepresentedby thosemodelsare true inall thesamecircumstances,corresponding to the intuition that the truth conditionsof literal in-terpretationsof(31)arebasicallycontext-invariant.AsIsuggested,bydefault, thebackgroundquestion is about (non-mental) facts abouttheworld.Thismeansthat,givenadefaultbackgroundquestion,theliteralinterpretations(inthesenseof(IMRI))of||Johnsmokes||wouldtendtoruleoutthesamesetofalternatives.IfJOHNPORisrecognizedasacorrectexecutionof||John||,thenitmustbeabackgroundbeliefofthehearerthatanyordinaryfeatureapplyingtoJOHNPORalsoappliestoJOHNandviceversa.Asaresult,SMOKE(JOHNPOR)combinedwithbackgroundbeliefswould,atmost,beasresponsive inthesenseof(IMRI)asSMOKE(JOHN).However,SMOKE(JOHN)is thesimplestmodel,so(IMRI)correctlypredictsthataPoR-freesingularinterpreta-tionisthedefaultinterpretationof(31).

2.5.2 Default interpretations with attitude verbsWhyarewegenerallysogoodatmakingsenseofotherpeople?Ona veryplausible view,wehave considerable success at figuringoutotherpeople’smentallivesbecausewetendtoattributeourownback-groundbeliefsandsimpleinferencepatternstothepeoplewearetry-ingtounderstand,exceptforthosebeliefsandinferencepatternswe

theoryofreasoningitselffundamentallyrequiresapreciseaccountofimplicitmentalmodels,butextendingmyformaltreatmenttocapturethisfactis,asareviewerhasconvincedme,beyondthescopeofthispaperandistobediscussedelsewhere.50Wecannowconsiderwhatpredictionsthetheorymakesabouttheinterpretationofsimplesen-tencesaswellasaboutattitudereportsentences.

2.5 IMRI and the interpretation of attitude report sentencesOn the view presented so far, syntax and lexical items generate in-structionstocreatementalmodels.Dependingonthesentence,theseinstructionscanallowforarangeofmentalmodels.Giventhisrangeofmentalmodels, (IMRI)determines thementalmodel thatwill, infact,begeneratedandwhoserepresentationalcontentcorrespondstotheintuitivecontentoftheutterance.Theinstructionsencodedby(7)(seederivationattheendofsection2.3)allowforinterpretivementalmodelsofthefollowingsort:


(27)BELIEF(TERENCE,SMOKE(RUTH))

(28)BELIEF(TERENCEX,SMOKE(RUTH))

…

(29)BELIEF(TERENCE,SMOKE(RUTHY))

…

(30)BELIEF(TERENCEX,SMOKE(RUTHY))

…

Thementalmodelsofparticular concernare (27), corresponding toasingular interpretation,andinterpretationsof theformof(29)cor-respondingtocomplexinterpretationsinvolvingPoRfeaturesofthesort involved in ‘Superman’ and ‘Paderewski’ cases. (28) and (30)

50.Koralus(in preparation)



Intheintroduction,Inotedthatwedonotintuitivelyinterpret(9)asmakinganyparticularclaimabouthowSmithrepresentsSuspectA,letalonethatshethinksofthesuspectas a suspect.For(9),thenaturalinterpretationissimple.

ThebackgroundquestioniswhetherSuspectAisguilty.Conjoin-ing thisquestionwith thebackgroundbelief thatSuspectA’sbeingguiltyis(simplifyingabit)incompatiblewithSmithbelievingofthatindividualthatheisupstanding,wegetamentalmodelofalternativesofthefollowingsort:

[{GUILTY(SUSPECTA),¬BELIEF(SMITH, UPSTANDING (SUSPECTA))}/{¬GUILTY(SUSPECTA)}]

Aninterpretivemodelofthefollowingsortwouldthenbemaximallyresponsive:

(32)BELIEF(SMITH,UPSTANDING(SUSPECTA))

Thekeyideaisthatifourbackgroundbeliefsandbackgroundques-tiondonot already involvedistinctionsofwaysof representinganindividual that bear on how the alternatives in a question can bereduced,an interpretivementalmodelofanattitude report that in-cludesPoRfeaturescannotbemoreresponsivethanasimpledefaultinterpretation. Unless our background beliefs conjoined with ourbackgroundquestionindependentlyleadtoasetofalternativeswheresomeofthosealternativesaredistinguishedbydifferentpropertiesofwaysofrepresenting,thennoPoR-ladeninterpretationisgoingtobemoreresponsivethanasimpleone.Ontheassumptionthatthealter-nativesdeterminedbybackgroundquestionsandbackgroundbeliefsnormallydonothingeondistinguishingdifferentPoRs,because,bydefault,wetendtobeinterestedinwhattheenvironmentislikeandwhatfactsabouttheenvironmentarerepresentedbypeople,(IMRI)predicts that simple interpretationsofattitude report sentences,cor-responding to singular propositions, are the default.One upshot isthatprocessingthelinguisticmeaningofanattitudereportsentence

havespecialreasontothinkarenotshared.51Onewaytofollowthisstrategywouldbetoexplicitlyrepresentthatweandotherpeoplerep-resentalike.However,thisseemsneedlesslycomplicated.Unlesswehaveaspecialreasontothinkthatourwayofrepresentingdivergesfromothers’ in respects thatmake a difference for our purposes, itseemseasiestsimplynottomarkanydifferences.Let’stakeacasewithadefaultbackgroundquestion(e. g.,“WhataresomefactsIdon’tknowyet?”)andabackgroundbeliefmodelthatincludesonlytheinforma-tionthatNancy,Ruth,andTerencearecolleaguesofthehearer.Now,Nancyutters,


IfthesimplestwayforustorepresentthefactthatRuthsmokesistoentertain themodelSMOKE(RUTH), thenunlesswehavea specialreasontocontemplatethepossibilitythatTerencerepresentsthisfactinsomedifferentway,wecanjustinterpret(7)asBELIEF(TERENCE,SMOKE(RUTH)).Ifweassumethatwedonotdistinguishourwayofrepresentingfromthatofotherpeopleunlesswehaveaspecialreasontodoso,andweassumethatwenormallyrepresentfactsinthesim-plestwayavailabletous,thennocomplexinterpretationinacaselikethatof(7)isgoingtobebetterthanasimpleinterpretation.

Now, let’s return to theexample involvingdetectives ina covertinvestigation so secret that witnesses are questioned under a ruse.Again,imaginethattheyarediscussingwhatvariouswitnesseshavesaid,togetapreliminarynotionofwhoislikelytobeguilty.AllbelievethatitisveryunlikelythatanybodybelievedtobeofgoodcharacterbyacertainSmithisguilty.52Onedetectiveasserts(9)tohiscolleagues.

(9) SmithbelievesthatSuspectAisanupstandingcitizen.

51. NicholsandStich(2003),p.65

52. The fact that Smithmay not arrive at the right judgment if, say, Jack theRipperwereintroducedtoherinasheepcostume,andinnumerableotherpossiblethingsthatcouldcauseabreakdownofSmithasareliablejudge(drugs,sleepdeprivation,etc.),maysimplybefoldedintoageneralmeasureofuncertaintyofSmith’sreliabilityinpractice.



CONJOIN({¬BELIEF(JOHN,SMOKE(RUTH)),BELIEF(JOHN,SMOKE(RUTH)),…},Q)

This reduces toCONJOIN(M∅, Q) and further reduces to [M∅] , re-gardlessofthecontentofQ. By(E1),thismeansthatthisinterpretationamountstorejectingthebackgroundquestion,changingthesubject.Theconversationcannotproceedinanormalincrementalfashion.

IfweinsteaduseaninterpretivemodelforthesecondsentencethatincludesaPoRfeature,thenthecollapseintoM∅ isblocked.However,nothingincontexttellsuswhatsortofPoRfeatureweshoulduse.Asaresult,neitherstayingwithadefaultinterpretationnordepartingfromitintheabsenceoffurthercontextualinformationmakesitpossibletoproceednormally.Thisseemstocorrespondwelltotheintuitivereac-tionthatwouldbeproducedby(33)intheabsenceofaspecialcontext.

In contrast to the case just discussed, the Paderewski examples,asnormallydescribed, includecontextual information thatsuggestswhatsortofPoRfeaturesweshouldincludeinourinterpretations.Pe-terdoesnotknowthatthefamouspianistbythenameofPaderewskiandthepoliticianbythenameofPaderewskiarethesameindividual.PeterfollowsanannouncementthatPaderewskiisplayingthepianoontheradioandcomestothinkthatPaderewski’sperformanceisrath-ergood.Someonereports:

(34)PeterbelievesthatPaderewskiistalented.

Inthiscase,weassumethatourmentalmodelofPeter’sbeliefsalreadyincludestwomentalmodeltokenswithdifferentPoRfeatures,wherebothof those tokens representPaderewski.Oneof the tokenshasa“pianist”PoRfeature,whiletheotherhasa“politician”PoRfeature.Thequestion,then,iswhichofthosetokenswillbeincludedininterpreta-tion,incasethisbecomesnecessaryforaresponsiveinterpretation.Itseems tome thatany successful theorywouldhave to invokeano-tionofarelativedegreeofsalienceofinformationestablishedintheinterpreter’s background in such cases. On the present theory, thiswouldmeana relativedegreeof salienceofdifferentmentalmodel

togetherwith(IMRI)neverrequiresconsideringmoredifferentPoRfeatures thanarealready included in thebackgroundquestioncon-joinedwith background beliefs, so the set of alternative interpreta-tionstoconsiderisnaturallylimited.53

2.5.3 Non-default interpretations involving attitude verbsSupposeTerencetellshiscolleagueNancy,

(33) JohnbelievesthatRuthsmokes.JohndoesnotbelievethatRuthsmokes.

Intuitively,wewould expect these utterances to give rise to a reac-tionlike“Hey,waitaminute!Whatisgoingonhere?”Facedwith(33)withoutspecialbackgroundinformation,itishardtofigureouthowtoproceedwithinterpretation.

Ontheproposedtheory,thisisnotsurprising.Supposewegiveadefaultinterpretationtothefirstsentencein(33).Wegettheinterpre-tivemodel:

BELIEF(JOHN,SMOKE(RUTH))

SupposethisthenbecomespartofourbackgroundbeliefmodelBG forthepurposesofinterpretingthenextutterance.Ifwenowweretogivethesecondsentenceadefaultinterpretationaswell,wewouldgetthefollowinginterpretivemodel:

¬BELIEF(JOHN,SMOKE(RUTH))

Now,toassesstheresponsivenessaccordingto(IMRI)ofthesecondinterpretation relative to abackgroundquestionQ andbackgroundbeliefsBG,wehavetolookatthenumberofalternativesin

53. Thisisnottosaythatthetheorypresentedsofarrequiresthatpeopleactu-allyconsiderafullrangeofexplicitlyrepresentedalternativeinterpretations.(IMRI)canbeseenasacompetencetheoryofutteranceinterpretationinaChomskyansense.



becomesassociatedwiththatname.Thismayexplainwhychoosinganame that is sharedbywell-knownpeoplewithsociallydesirabletraitsratherthanundesirableonesisconsideredimportantbymanypeoplewhoarechoosinganameforachild.There isawidespreadintuitionthatcommonassociationswithanameinfluencewhattraitsareperceivedas salient,particularly in theabsenceofbetterknowl-edgeoftheperson.55Toaccountfortheexampleathand,wesaythat‘Superman’makesa“superhero”PoRfeaturemoresalient,while‘ClarkKent’makesa“reporter”PoRfeaturemoresalient.

Intherestofthispaper,IwillbrieflydiscusssomeoftherelativeadvantagesoftheOpenInstructionTheory.

3. Modeling other minds and interpreting attitude reports

Intuitively,(36)feelsatleastasproblematicas(33):

(36)Johnbelieves thatRuth smokes. Johnbelieves thatRuthdoesnotsmoke.

Thisintuitionisinteresting,sinceitwouldbehardtoarguethat(37)isinconsistent:

(37) <bel ief<John,<smoke<Ruth>>>>&<belief<John,<¬smoke<Ruth>>>>

Believingof Ruththatshesmokesseemsindisputablycompatiblewithbelievingof Ruththatshedoesn’tsmoke.Onemaysimplynotrealizethatone’sbeliefsareofthesameperson,so(37)canbetrueofJohnevenifJohnisn’tirrational.Ifthisiscorrect,thenweshouldbeabletohavedefaultinterpretationsforthetwosentencesin(36)withoutissue.Butthen,whywould(36)seematleastasbadas(33)?

55. Oneadvicecolumnnotes,“Youwanttoavoidthebaggageattachedto in-famouspeopleorplaces”(http://baby-name-generator.com/BabyNaming4.html,accessedon1/13/11).Abest-sellingbookonbabynamesnotes,“Onthefirstdayinschool,theteacherdoesarollcall.Theonlythingtheotherstudentsknowaboutachildiswhatheorshelookslikeandwhathisorhernameis.Kidsare likelyto formaquickopinionfromjust thosefacts”(Lansky1999).

constituents.54Wewouldsaythat,withinthebackgroundbeliefmodel,somementalmodeltokensaremoresalientthanothersandthatthebestinterpretationwilluseamentalmodeltokenwhoseoccurrencesalreadyinBGaremoresalientthanalternatives.Thisavenuedoesnotseemaltogetherunattractive.Thismeansweneedtoaddthefollow-ingprincipleto(IMRI)fromsection2.4:

(Salience) If there isnouniquememberofKBG,S, thenM is themodelwhoseconstituentsarethemostsalienttothehear-eratthemomentofinterpretation.

Finally,consideracaseinwhichweknowfromcontextthattherearemultiplewaysof representingan individualbutwhere the localcontextdoesnot telluswhichtouse foraparticularutterance.Sup-posesomebodyreports,

(35) LoisbelievesthatSupermanistalented.Loisdoesnotbe-lievethatClarkKentistalented.

Asbefore,withoutaddingaPoRfeaturetoourinterpretationof(35),wewill again be rejecting the question, as in the case of (33), dis-cussedabove.However,ourbackgroundbeliefmodelofLois’sbeliefswill include at least two sorts ofmentalmodel tokens for the indi-vidualSuperman:onewitha“superhero”PoR-featureandonewitha“reporter”PoRfeature.However,nothingincontextistellinguswhichofthesetokensshouldbepreferred.

Obviously,whatbreaksthesymmetryarethenames.Itshouldbefairlyuncontroversialthatpropernamesareassociatedwithvariousproperties,inawaythatnobodywouldtaketobepartoftheirlinguis-ticmeaning.Theseassociationsplausiblyinfluencewhatinformationis salient to us. Presumably, themore a proper nameoccurs in thecompanyofcertaindescriptiveinformation,themorethatinformation

54. ThiseffectivelymeansadoptinganideathatwassuggestedbyLewis,whowrotethattomakesenseofhowcertainexpressionsareinterpreted,itmaybenecessary“toappealtoasaliencerankingnotofindividualsbutratherofindividuals-in-guises”(Lewis1979).



right.Itmighthaveseemed,atfirst,thatbuildinganintegratedrepre-sentationofsomeone’sbeliefsbasedonsuccessivebeliefreports,justaswemightintegrateourownmentalmodels,isinnocuous.However,onacloser look, itamounts toasubstantive furtherassumption. Ingeneral,thebeliefrelationisnotclosedunderCONJOIN.

Inthecaseathand,beliefconsolidationtogetherwiththenatureofmentalmodelsguaranteesthatfurtherbeliefreportscan’tgenuinelyaddtoourmodelofJohn’sbeliefs,leavingusstuckwithBELIEF(JOHN,M∅).Toacertainextent,therenolongerremainsasubstantiveques-tionastowhatJohnbelievesonceweadmitBELIEF(JOHN,M∅),soitpracticallywouldnotmakesensetocontinuethediscourseiftheback-groundquestionisconcernedwithJohn’sbeliefs.Ifwedobelievethatthere is a substantivequestionofwhat Johnbelieves, thenwemayhaveamongourbackgroundbeliefs¬BELIEF(JOHN,M∅).Inthiscase,defaultinterpretationsof(37)wouldleadtoarejectionofthequestion,inthesenseof(E1)and(Responsiveness).

Ifweinsteaduseinterpretivemodelsfor(37)thatincludePoRfea-tures, then the collapse intoM∅ is blocked.However, as in earlierexamples, nothing in context tells uswhat sort of PoR featureweshoulduse.Theprinciplesofinferencetothebestinterpretationcan-notsettleonauniquebestinterpretation.Asaresult,itappearsthattheoddnessof(37)outofcontextisexplained.Adefaultinterpreta-tionwouldbasicallyforceustochangethesubjectofconversation,while there isnodeterminatenon-default interpretationthatcouldavoidthis.Insum,oneadvantageofOITisthatitcanbereadilyin-tegratedwith independentlymotivatedviews abouthowwemakesenseofotherminds,whichcanhelpexplaincertainintuitionsthatarepuzzlingifweexclusivelyfocusonpropositionalcontent.

4. Interpretations that diverge from recognized communicative inten-tion without appeal to charity

(IMRI)predictsthatthebestinterpretationofcertainattitudereportsincontextissuchthatthehearerknowsthatthatparticularinterpreta-tionisnot intendedbythespeaker.Onthispoint,(IMRI)divergesfrom

Ipropose thatwhatexplains the fact that (33),withouta specialcontext,seemsbadhastodowithafurtherbackgroundassumptionabout other people’s beliefs that we naturallymake in interpretingmultiple attitude reports. There seem to be good empirical reasonsto think thatwhenweprocess informationabout aperson’sbeliefs,weusethisinformationtobuildanintegratedrepresentationofthatperson’sbeliefs,anditseemsveryplausiblethatweordinarilyusethesamereasoningproceduresappliedtoourownmodeloftheworldtogaininsightintothebeliefsofotherpeople.56IntheframeworkofOIT,Iproposethatthisisreflectedinabackgroundassumptionthatwecanconsolidateourmentalmodelsofotherpeople’sbeliefcontentsinthesamewayinwhichwecanconjointhementalmodelsthatcorrespondtoourownbeliefs.Thiswouldamounttotheassumptionthatthebe-lowconsolidationruleisfreelyapplicable.

(E4)CONSOLIDATE(BELIEF(T, M1),BELIEF(T, M2))èBELIEF (T, CONJOIN(M1, M2)

Withthisconsolidationassumption,ifwegivethesecondsentencein(37)adefault interpretation,afteradefault interpretationofthefirstsentencehasalreadypassedintoourbackgroundbeliefs,weget

BEL IEF ( JOHN,C O N J O I N ( {¬SMOKE(RUTH) } ,{SMOKE(RUTH)}))

whichreducesto

BELIEF(JOHN,M∅)

Thismeansthat,givenourbackgroundassumptionofbeliefconsoli-dation, (36)uttered in theabsenceof a special context seems to at-tribute irrationality to John. Togetherwith a further plausible back-groundassumptionthatpeopleareminimallyrational,wecanexplaintheeffect that suchanutteranceof (36) seems like it can’tbequite

56.NicholsandStich’s(2003)discussionofourmentalizingcapabilitiescontainsmanyobservationsthatsupportthisview.



FromtheperspectiveofJohn,thereshouldbenointentiontoconveyaPoR.Fromhisperspective,thereisnomoreneedforaPoRtodistin-guishwhathetakestobetwoPaderewskisthanthereisaneedforPoRtodistinguishthetwoHarmansfromourperspective.IfJohneverhasanintentiontoconveyPoR-free,singularattitudereports,heshouldhavethatintentionwhenheutters(38)and(39).

WenaturallyinterpretthesesentencesinawaythatincludesPoRstocompartmentalizeMary’sbeliefsaboutPaderewski-the-pianistandherbeliefsaboutPaderewski-the-statesman.Butagain,thisinterpreta-tioncannotplausiblybewhat John intends toconvey.AnadvantageoftheviewIhaveproposedisthattheintuitiveinterpretationispre-dictedbythesamepragmaticrulesthatwouldpredictinterpretationsinordinarycases(thecasehereisparalleltothecaseintheprevioussection).Unlessthebackgroundquestionofthehearerspecificallyisconcernedwithhowthespeakerrepresentstheworld,ourknowledgeofwhat the speakerdoesordoesnot likely intend tocommunicatedoesnotinfluencehow(IMRI)determinesthebestliteralinterpreta-tion.57Fromtheperspectiveof(IMRI),theexamplediscussedinthissectionisjustafurthermanifestationofthefactthatourdefaultback-groundquestionsareprimarilyaimedattheenvironment.Bycontrast,Asher,whodiscussesasimilarexample,hastosaythat“defaultrulescanbeoverriddenbyaconstraint[hecalls]‘charity’”.58Onmyaccount,theintuitiveinterpretationsaretheresultofadirectapplicationoftherules,notanexception.

It is very plausible that we do often employ some kind of char-ity principle in interpretation. However, to deal with the case de-scribed, quite a strong principle would be needed. Recall that <belief<i,<P<x>>>>&<belief<i,<¬P<x>>>>isnotacontradiction,nordoesitentailanattributionofirrationality.Infact,therelevantinstan-tiationofthispatternintheexampleistrue!Thismeansthat,forexam-ple,ifweweretopreferaweakprincipleofcharityalongthelinesof

57. Throughout,wehavebeenconcernedexclusivelywithliteralinterpretation,notwithageneralclassofconversationalimplicatures.

58.Asher(1986),p.146

amoretraditionalviewofutteranceinterpretationaccordingtowhichthehearer,asareceiver,triestorecoverthemessagethatthespeaker,asthesender,intendstotransmit.

You and I know that not everybody knows that Paderewski-the-statesmanisthesamepersonasPaderewski-the-pianist.JohnandMaryaretwopeoplewhoareignorantinthisway.ImagineJohnseesMaryhandingPaderewskiacigarette.HethinksheislookingatPaderewski-the-pianist.Johncommentstous,

(38)MarybelievesthatPaderewskismokes.

Later, John sees a similar scene.About togive a speechas a states-man,PaderewskiisofferedacigarettebyMary.Thistime,Paderewskirefuses. Johnthinkshe isseeingPaderewski-the-politiciananddoesnotrealizethatheisseeingthesamepersonasbefore.Marysimilarlyremainsignorant.Johncommentstous,

(39)MarybelievesthatPaderewskidoesnotsmoke.

Inthecontextdescribed,weintuitivelyinterpret(38)asconveyingabeliefaboutPaderewskirepresentedinonesortofwayandinterpret(39)asconveyingadifferentbeliefaboutPaderewskirepresentedinanothersortofway.However,wecannotobtaintheseinterpretationsifutterance interpretationconsists in recovering thecommunicativeintentionofthepersonmakingtheutterance,asIwillnowargue.

Asnotedbefore,interpretationsofattitudereportsthatconveyPoRsareconfinedtocasesinwhichtherearespecialfeaturesintheback-groundthatsuggesttousthatwehavetodistinguishdifferentsortsofrepresentationsof the same individual.Yet, from John’s perspective,(38)and(39)requirenomorespecialeffortstomakefine-graineddis-tinctionsaboutrepresentationsthan(40)and(41)requireforus:

(40)Marybelievesthat[Elizabeth]Harmanisatthedepartmentreception.

(41) Mary believes that [Gilbert]Harman is not at the depart-mentreception.



dependentonguessing intentions.62 Ihavepresentedsucha theorywiththeOpenInstructionTheorycombinedwith(IMRI).

5. Contrasting Discourse Representation Theory and “hidden anaphora”

The framework of Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) shareswiththeOpenInstructionTheorytheviewthatinordertomakesenseofutteranceinterpretation,weneedalevelofrepresentationbeyondwhatisgeneratedbysyntaxandlexicalitems.Now,AsherandKamp’sDRTaccountof attitude report sentences couldbe characterizedasa“hiddenanaphora”theory.63Thestartingpointforthistheoryisthenotion that the use of a proper namepresupposes that a referencemarkerstandingforthereferentofthenamealreadyexistsintherep-resentationofthediscourse,wherethisantecedentreferencemarkermustbelinkedtoasetofconditionsfordeterminingthereferent.Now,ifapropernameoccurswithinthethat-clauseofabeliefreport,theuseofthepropernamepresupposesthatthehearerhasanantecedentreferencemaker standing for the referent of the proper namewith-in a dedicated representation of the believer’s total cognitive state.64Asherholdsthat,“fromaDRtheoreticperspective,thegoalofthespeakeristogettherecipienttoapproximatethetruepicture(insofarasitisknowntothespeaker)ofthetargetBeliefanditsinternalconnectionstoothercomponentsofthebeliever’scognitivestate”.65Ifthereisnoantecedent representation representing referencemarkers in thebe-liever’scognitivestate,wehavetoaccommodatetheexistenceofsucharepresentation,including,onAsher’sview,connectionsto“schematic”

62.Atlas(2005)

63.Asher(1986;1993);Kamp(1988;1990)

64.Asher(1986),p.144.AlsoseeKamp(1990),p.41–87.Asher’spositionseemstobethatapropernameinanattitudereportcontextshouldintroducetwopresuppositions:oneforthehearerandoneforthetargetofthebeliefreport.IamnotsurewhetherKampwouldsaythatthebeliefreport“shifts”thepre-suppositionofthepropernametoapresuppositionaboutthebelieverorthatthebeliefreportgeneratesanadditionalpresupposition.

65. Ibid.

“maximizethetruthorrationalityinthesubject’ssayings”,59wewouldhavenoreasontodivergefromwhatwetakethespeakertohavehadinmindintheexampleatissue.(IMRI)allowsustoavoidhavingtopostulateaverystrongprincipleofcharityjusttodealwiththecaseunderconsideration.

OntheviewIhaveproposed,thepragmaticprinciplesthatarein-volved in arriving at literal utterance interpretations arenot directlyconcernedwith speaker intention, andmaking an appeal to a prin-cipleof”charity”isunnecessarytodealwiththeexamplediscussed.60 The speaker’s primary opportunity atmaking the hearer consider aparticularpropositionisinpickingsentenceswithacertainlinguisticmeaningthatconstrainstherangeofavailableliteralinterpretations.Whatquestionsthehearerwantstoanswerbyengagingindiscourseandwhatbackgroundbeliefsshehasdeterminewhethershewillin-cludeaPoRfeatureinherinterpretativementalmodelofanattitudereportsentence.Thequestion“Didthespeakerintendtoconveythiswayofrepresentingso-and-so?”arisesonlyifthehearerisespeciallyconcernedwithwhatexactlyisonthespeaker’smind.NothingIhavesaidrulesoutthatweoftendo particularlycareaboutrecoveringthepropositionthatthespeakerspecificallyintendedtobringacross.Theclaimissimplythatreflectionsaboutaspeaker’sintentionsarenotby defaultdrivingliteralutteranceinterpretation.

General utterance interpretation as the recognition of particularcommunicativeintentionsisnot“cognitivelyencapsulated”inFodor’ssense,soastrongpredictivetheoryishighlyunlikelyinthisarea.61Yet,asAtlashas argued,we can give a theoryof default literal interpre-tationswithsomepredictivesuccess, if sucha theory isnotdirectly

59.Blackburn(1994),p.62

60.Itisaseparatequestionwhatprinciplesgovernconversationalimplicaturesbeyondwhat is involved in literal interpretationandhow thoseprinciplesrelatetoperceivedintention.

61. Fodor(1983)



cognitivestates.As Iarguedwithrespect tovariousexamples,evenifwe do have additional information about peculiarities of people’scognitivestates,westillgo forsingular interpretationsbydefault. IfwehadthepresuppositionthatAsherandKamppostulate,itwouldbesurprisingifwegotdefaultsingularinterpretationsevenwhenweare inapositiontotakeintoaccounttheinternalconnectionsofthebeliefsofthetargetoftheattitudereport.Toinvolvearepresentationofanythingclose tosomeone’s “totalcognitivestate” in interpretinganattitudereportseemstobetheexceptionratherthanthenorm,soitseemswrongtobuildapresuppositionofsucharepresentationintoattitudereports.

Evenifwegrantthat,withasuitablyrevisedversionofAsherandKamp’sviewthat relies lessonconditions fordeterminingreferentsinsteadofPoRs,acorrectlyaccommodatedpresuppositioncan fullymimicadefaultsingularinterpretationintermsoftheresultingcon-tentof theutterance incontext, there isstilladifferencebetweenatheory thatgets the result viaaccommodation anda theory thatgetsitviadefault interpretation.Sincepsycholinguisticshasbeguntoshedsome lighton theprocessingcostsofpresupposition failureandac-commodation,therelevantdifferencebetweenmyviewandtheDRTtheory of attitude reports is amenable to experimental inquiry. Vio-lationsofpresuppositions followedbyaccommodationyield longerreadingtimesonthecriticalwordthatengendersthepresupposition,asempiricallydemonstratedbyTiemannetal.(2011).Myviewpredictsthesamedefaultinterpretationsinvariouscasesindependentlyoftheavailabilityofbackground informationabout the cognitive statesofthetarget.AsherandKamp’sviewpredictspresuppositionfailureandsubsequent accommodation for cases without relevant backgroundinformation,butnotforcaseswiththerightbackgroundinformation.AssumingTiemannetal.’sresults,thismeansthatAsherandKamp’sviewpredictsadifferenceinreadingtimesbetweencertaincasesthatone could construct, where my theory predicts no such difference.Designingacarefullymatchedsetofcases foranactualexperiment

representations of the believer’s conditions for determining the ref-erent.66Differentwaysof representing an individualwould roughlycorrespondtodifferentinternalconnectionstoothercomponentsofthebeliever’s cognitive state.Oncewehave at least accommodated arepresentationaltokeninarepresentationofsomeone’stotalcognitivestate,wegetaninterpretationofapropernameinanattitudereportbyresolvingtheanaphorapostulatedinthepropernametothattoken.

This view faces a versionof themeaning-intentionproblemdis-cussedintheintroduction.Whilethereisasenseinwhichtheuseofpropernames tends topresuppose familiaritywith the referent,67 itjustdoesnotseemrighttosaythatpropernamesinthethat-clausesof attitude reports carry thepresuppositionof anantecedent repre-sentationof the cognitive stateof thebearerof a reportedattitude.SupposeMike seesananonymousvalentine in John’smailboxandtellshisneighbor,

(42)SomeonelikesJohn.68

ItisimplausiblethatthisutteranceinanywaypresupposesthatJohn’sneighbor has an antecedent representation of “someone’s” mentalstate,anymorethanMike’sutteranceconveysacertaintypeofwayofrepresentingJohn.OntheDRTaccount,therearenodefaultsingularinterpretations,becausethecoreideaisthatwehavetotieourinter-pretationstoanexistingrepresentationofthetarget’stotalcognitivestate. Insteadofdefault singular interpretations,youhavea formofaccommodationifthepresuppositionofanexistingrepresentationofthetarget’s totalcognitivestate fails.However,whatIarguedintheintroduction, inseemingagreementwithSchifferandJascszolt,wasthatunlesstherearespecialcontextualfeaturesthatpromptustodootherwise,ourinterpretationsofattitudereportsareconcernedwiththeenvironmentratherthandirectlywiththepeculiaritiesofpeople’s

66.Asher(1986),p.145;Kamp(1987),p.172

67. SeeHeim(1982).

68.I take forgranted that therelevantsenseof ‘likes’behaves likeanattituderelation.Cf.‘LoislikesSuperman,butsheonlytoleratesClarkKent.’



respecttoanindividualreferent.Aninterestingfeatureofindexicalexpressionsisthatonecannotshifttheirinterpretationacrossvariousellipsisconstructions.Considerthefollowingsentenceswithuncon-troversialindexicalexpressions:

(43)Loisownsthat,andsodoesMary.

(44)[LoishatesonlyScorsese,andMaryhatesonlyLukas]Loishithim,andsodidMary.

(45)Loiscameyesterday,butMarydidnot.

TheindexicalintheelidedVPcannotindependentlycontributeanov-elreferentininterpretation.Wehavetointerpret(43)asclaimingthatLoisandMaryownthesamething(orkindofthing),(44)asclaimingthattheyhitthesameperson,and(45)asclaimingthatMarycameonadifferentday.Thattheseconstraintsexistisnotparticularlycontro-versial,thoughthereisanopenquestionastowhatgeneralprincipleaccountsforthem.AtleastpartoftheconstraintseemstobeduetoagrammaticalrequirementthattheelidedVPhastobesyntactically“parallel” to its antecedentVP in certainways.70On a classical viewonwhichsyntaxencodes indices for indexicals (or some functionalequivalent),aversionofthisprinciplecanexplaintheconstraintsoninterpretationintheexamples.Incontrasttoindexicals,certainotherkindsofexpressionsthatalsoinvolveinterpretationsthatcanvaryincontextdonotseemtoincurthisconstraintoninterpretationunderellipsis.

Anon-indexicalkindofcontextsensitivityisplausiblyinvolvedinthefollowingexample:

(46)[MikeisthrowingapartyinNewYork;Bill isthrowingapartyinBoston.]

70.FiengoandMay(1994)

wouldbeadifficulttask,butthepointisthatthedebateisamenabletoexperimentalinquiryinprinciple.

AgeneralworryaboutDRTapproaches,raisedbyLevinson(2000),isthatthereisalackofpredictivepoweraboutwhichinterpretationswillbedominant invarious typesof contexts.69Different interpreta-tionsofattitudereportsentencesaretreatedasdifferentwaysofresolv-inganaphora(hencethecommitmenttoapresuppositionofasuitablerangeofantecedents),withoutafullysystematicdecisionprocedurebetweencompetinginterpretations.Bycontrast,oneofthekeymoti-vationsofthetheoryIhavepresentedwastoaccountforwhatseemedtobestrikingregularitiesinhowcontextinfluencestheinterpretationof attitude report sentencesand in the sortsof intuitionsgeneratedby“null”ordefaultcontexts.Moreover,everyeffortwasmadetobuildthosepartsofOITthatarenotsyntacticallyconstrainedoutofcompo-nentsthathavebeenindependentlypostulatedinthepsychologyofreasoning,while littleeffortseemstohavebeenmadetoconcretelymotivatethecomplexmachineryofDRTindependently.Thatsaid,iftheworries justdescribedareproperly takenintoaccount, thereap-pearstobenoin-principlebarriertointegratingvariousinsightsDRThasyieldedintovariousotherfragmentsoflanguagewiththeOpenInstructionTheoryofattitudereports.

6. Interpretation shifts across VP ellipsis

Asnotedintheintroduction,therearedifferentwaysinwhichthelin-guisticmeaningofattitudereportsentencescouldrelatetothevarioustypesof interpretations thatwecanobtain indifferentcontexts.OntheOpenInstructionTheory,asontheviewsproposedinrecentworkbySoamesandBach,thelinguisticmeaningissilentonthedifferencebetweentheseinterpretations;itisnonspecificwithrespecttothem.

Nonspecificity theories contrast with views on which attitudereport sentences includea constituent that is indexical with respecttotypesofwaysofrepresenting, justas,say, ‘that’ is indexicalwith

69.Levinson(2000),p.248



(48)SpielbergbelievesthatHathawayistalented,butCoppoladoesnot<believethatHathawayistalented>.

Inthecontextprovided,(48)seemstrueandintuitivelyconveysthatCoppolaandSpielbergrepresentHathawaydifferently:Spielbergbe-lievesthatHathaway,presented as Viola,istalented,whileCoppoladoesnotbelievethatHathaway,presented as Sebastian,istalented.Ofcourse,theybothbelieveofHathawaythatsheistalented.

Consideranotherscenario:LikemostordinaryGothamCitycrimi-nals,mafiabossZuccoisterriblyafraidtomeetBatman.However,heisverykeentomeetBruceWayne,becausehewantstoconvincehimtojoinhisPonzischeme.HedoesnotknowBruceWayneisBatman.Bycontrast,TheRiddlerhasnointerestinWaynebutwantstochallengeBatmantoafight.Bruce’sbutler,whoknowsallofthis,sumsitup:

(49)The Riddler hopes to meet MasterWayne, and so doesZucco.

Intuitively, (49) can convey in context thatTheRiddlerbears an at-titude towardWaynerepresented inoneway,whileZuccobearsanattitudetowardWaynerepresentedinanotherway.

Examples like (48) and (49) suggest that the relevantdifferencesinhowwecaninterpret‘believesthatF(x)’incontextismoresimilartothesortofcontextsensitivitywefindin‘come’thantomoregram-maticallyconstrainedcontextsensitivityofindexicals.Theavailabilityof interpretations like theonewecanobtain from(48) incontext is,attheveryleast,surprisingonthehypothesisthatattitudereportsen-tencesareindexicalwithrespecttotypesofwaysofrepresenting.OntheOpenInstructionTheory,thelinguisticmeaningissilentontypesofwaysofrepresenting,soitisnotsurprisingthatwedonotfindrel-evantgrammaticalconstraintsoninterpretation.Notethattheissueisnotwhethercontextscanshiftmid-sentence;theyclearlycanbeshifted.Theissueisthatsomechangesininterpretationseemtobegrammati-callyblockedregardlessofcontextwhileothersarenot.Attitudereport

(47)MikehopesMiawillcome,andsodoesBill.Oneofthemwillbedisappointed.71

Here,MikeandBillarecharacterizedashopingthatMiawillarriveatdifferentlocations,eventhough‘hopesMiawillcome’iselided.Whileit is possible to shift relevant aspects of context across ellipsis con-structions,indexicalexpressionsdonotseemtobeabletoshifttheircontribution across ellipsis, in contrast to cases like (47). There aregrammaticalconstraintsonhowindexicalscanbeinterpretedunderellipsis,regardlessofwhetherwehaveashiftofcontextmid-sentence.

A theory like theOpen InstructionTheory thatcharacterizesatti-tudereportsentencesasnonspecificwithrespecttotypesofwaysofrepresentingpredictsthatitshouldbepossibletofindcasesinwhichweswitchour interpretationofaVPlike ‘believesthatF(x)’withre-specttotypesofwaysofrepresentingacrossellipsis,givenasuitablecontext.Inotherwords,weexpectthat,withrespecttotypesofwaysofrepresenting,attitudereportsentencesshouldpatternwith‘come’,ratherthanwith‘that’or‘him’.

Considerthefollowingscenario:SpielbergandCoppolahaveanunshakablebeliefthatHathawayisatalentedShakespeareanactress,andbothinvitehertostarintheirrespectiveupcomingrivalproduc-tionsofShakespeare’sTwelfth Night.Asapersonalchallenge,Hatha-way decides to audition incognito for both Spielberg andCoppola,appearingasViola forSpielbergandasSebastian forCoppola.Weknowaboutallofthisandhaveaninformantwhospiesonbothaudi-tions.HathawayhasabaddayanddoeswellforSpielbergbutnotforCoppola.Ourinformantreports,

71. Ifoneisworriedaboutthepossibilityofareflexiveinterpretationof‘come’,onecouldchangethescenarioto:‘MikeisthrowingapartyinNewYork;Billis inTimbuktu,buthissoniscelebratinghis21stbirthdayinBoston.MikehopesMiawill come,andsodoesBill.Oneof themwillbedisappointed.’Contrastthiswith‘MikeisthrowingapartyinNewYork;BillisinTimbuktu,buthissoniscelebratinghis21stbirthdayinBoston.#MikehopesMiawillbehisguest,andsodoesBill[understoodinacrossedway].’



OITdirectlystartswiththeproblemofgivingasystematicaccountoflinguisticmeaning.Thelinguisticmeaningofasentenceisfullycom-positionallydeterminedbyrulescontinuouswithgenerativegrammar,andtheinterpretationsatissuearestillliteral interpretations.Therangeof literal interpretations is systematically determined by linguisticmeaning,notjustassumed;thereisnorelianceonageneral-purposeenrichmentprocess.Thepragmaticcomponentof thetheorymakesclearpredictionsabouthowparticular featuresof contextdrivepar-ticularinterpretationsandappearstopredictcorrectlythedefaultin-terpretationsofattitudereportsentencesaswellastherangeofnon-defaultinterpretations.

8. Mental models, content, and truth conditions

OntheOpenInstructionTheory,attitudereportsentences,takenbythemselves, do not have truth conditions. Their contributions arepartiallyopeninstructionstoconstructmentalmodels,whichconsti-tutepossibleinterpretationsofutterancesofattitudereportsentences.Mentalmodels expresspropositions thathave truth conditions.Wemay identify thetruthconditionsof themodelwiththetruthcondi-tionsofthepropositionitexpresses.Whenanutteranceofanattitudereportsentencecanbeassociatedwithacorrectinterpretation—thatis,acorrectkindofmentalmodel—(orifallcorrectmodelshavethesametruthconditions),weidentifythetruthconditionsofthatutter-ancewiththetruthconditionsofitscorrectmentalmodel(s).

Not every sentence in natural language can be associated withunique truth conditions. On this point, theOpen InstructionTheo-ryisinagreementwithearlytheoristslikeAtlasandChomskywhoheld that linguisticmeaningsareoftensemanticallynonspecific,aswellaswiththeoristslikeBachandSoames.75Atthesametime,wegivespecificinterpretationstoutterancesofsemanticallynon-specificsentences, because (IMRI) assigns interpretivementalmodelswithspecifictruthconditions.Bydefault,theinterpretation(IMRI)assigns

75. Atlas(1977;2005);Chomsky(2000);Soames(2004);Bach(2000)

sentencesdonotseemtorelevantlypatternwithindexicalexpressionsinthisregard.

Schifferhasexploredother syntacticargumentsagainst indexical-ismaboutattitudereports,promptingvariousrevisionstohisview.72 Iargueelsewhere that the intuitionsdiscussedabovepresentachal-lengetovariousversionsofindexicalismthatseemssurprisinglyhardtoavoidbytechnicalmodifications,butIdonothavethespacetopur-suethisissuehere.73Forthepurposesofthispaper,IsimplywanttoobservethatitisavirtueoftheOpenInstructionTheorythatitmakesitunsurprisingthatthewayattitudereportsbehaveunderVPellipsispat-ternswithcaseslike‘come’ratherthanwithcaseslike‘that’,‘him’,etc.

7. The overgeneration objection

Onegeneralobjection thathasbeenraisedagainst theories thatdonotderivealldifferencesininterpretationfromassociateddifferencesin semantics is that those theoriesovergenerate interpretations.Forexample,Stanleyhasattacked so-called “freepragmaticenrichment”theories on these grounds.74 Unlike the “free enrichment” tradition,

72. Schiffer(1992);Ludlow(1995)

73. SeeKoralus(2010).Iwilljustbrieflynotethatitwillnotdo,forexample,topostulateareflexiveconstituentratherthananindexical,ontheanalogyof‘hismother’. It isclearlypossibleto interpret ‘Johnlikeshismother,andsodoesJack’assayingthatJohnlikesJohn’smotherwhileJacklikesJack’smoth-er.Onethenmighttrytocircumventtheellipsisproblembyabandoningin-dexicalisminfavorof“reflexical-ism”aboutattitudereportsentences,whichwouldroughlyinvolveparaphraseslike‘Peter1believesthatPaderewskicanfly,involvinghis1PoR.’Figuringoutthereferentof‘hisPoR’isratherdifferentfromfig-uringoutthereferentof,e.g.,‘John’smother’.Johnpresumablyhasonlyonemother.Bycontrast,Peterhasatleasttwotypesofwaysofrepresent-ingPaderewskifortheindividualPaderewski,andhecouldhavearbitrarilymany.WhichPoRentersintoaninterpretationofanattitudereportsentencedependsoncontext.Giventhedialecticalsituation,itwillnotdotosaythat‘hisPoR’isambiguousorindexicalaswellasre-flexive.ThiswouldbringusbacktotheVPellipsisproblem.AfullerdiscussioncanbefoundinKoralus(2010),whereIalsoconsiderandrejecttheproposalthattheinterpretationatissuecouldbecapturediftheindexicalresidesonwhatsyntacticianscall“little”vP.

74. Stanley(2005);Hall(2008);CarstonandPowell(2006)



thetheoryofutteranceinterpretationbeyondsyntaxandthelexiconisapathtowardtheunityofcognitivescience.

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