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The Other Side of the CNN Factor:the media and conflictVirgil HawkinsPublished online: 09 Dec 2010.

To cite this article: Virgil Hawkins (2002): The Other Side of the CNN Factor: the mediaand conflict, Journalism Studies, 3:2, 225-240

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Journalism Studies, Volume 3, Number 2, 2002, pp. 225–240

The Other Side of the CNN Factor: the mediaand con� ict

VIRGIL HAWKINS Osaka University, Japan

ABSTRACT Although its in�uence is somewhat disputed, the CNN factor has become well known as theprocess by which the media in� uence foreign policy by evoking responses in their audiences throughconcentrated and emotionally based coverage, which in turn applies pressure to governments to act inresponse to a particular con� ict. Intense coverage of one con� ict, however, comes at the expense of othercon� icts, some of which may be a great deal more pressing in nature. It is this “other side” of the CNN factoron which this paper focuses. Included in the study is a comprehensive statistical analysis of the amount ofcoverage throughout the year 2000 in Le Monde (France), the New York Times (USA), the Yomiuri (Japan)and CNN and BBC world news. The study argues that media agendas do in� uence a broad range of policyinitiatives, and that, by extension, lack of media coverage contributes to lack of policy.

KEY WORDS: CNN Factor, CNN Effect, Media, News Coverage, Con� ict, Agenda Setting, Foreign Policy

Introduction

The CNN factor—and its effects on foreignintervention in armed con�ict—is increasinglycoming under academic scrutiny. The basicconcept is as follows: concentrated and emo-tion-based media coverage of a select con�ict,packaged in an oversimpli�ed “morality play”format of good versus evil, evokes an emotionalresponse among the citizens of a distant coun-try, forcing that country’s government to takeinterest, and perhaps intervene, in some form,in the con�ict.

While there is considerable controversy overthe actual extent of the effect of media coverageon government policy in response to foreigncon�ict situations, it is generally recognisedthat, under certain conditions, the media canplay a role in agenda setting, and the formingor changing of such policy. The CNN factor isseen as one of the factors that was responsiblefor a complete reversal of policy by the US andUK in northern Iraq, where they intervened toprotect Kurdish refugees (Shaw, 1996).Although the role of the media in the interven-tion in and withdrawal from Somalia is criti-

cised as being exaggerated, even sceptics admitthat the television news contributed to policydecisions in that country (Mermin, 1997,p. 402). More recently, saturation coverage ofthe con�ict in Kosovo has also served to raisequestions about the role of the media in inter-vention decisions.

As Peter Jakobsen (2000, p. 132) points out,however, the focus on the extent of the directin�uence of the media on intervention deci-sions obscures an effect of media coverage thathas a far greater impact on con�ict manage-ment (or lack thereof). This effect stems fromthe failure of the media to cover most of theworld’s con�icts. If we accept that media cover-age can play a role in forming or alteringgovernment policy relating to foreign con�ict, itfollows that lack of media coverage can also bea factor in lack of policy. If the media play arole in policy agenda setting, then the mediablackout of most of the world’s major con�ictscan also be linked to the absence of thosecon�icts from the agendas of foreign countries.

This, in turn, can result in very little incentivefor unaffected countries to become involved in

ISSN 1461-670X print/ISSN 1469-9699 online/02/020225-16 Ó 2002 Taylor & Francis LtdDOI: 10.1080/14616700220129991

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any form of con�ict management, including theprovision of aid, mediation efforts and, in ex-ceptional circumstances, military intervention.A prominent example is Operation Assur-ance—the proposed intervention to facilitatehumanitarian assistance to refugees in easternZaire in 1996 that was cancelled after develop-ments on the ground led to a partial ameliora-tion of the situation. In an interview, a formerdiplomat at the UN revealed to the author thatthe US—which had initially decided to partici-pate—had decided against going ahead withthe operation when it became clear that themedia were not particularly interested. Thispaper is particularly concerned with the rela-tionship between lack of media coverage andlack of foreign policy—which will be referredto here as “the other side of the CNN factor”.After examining the factors that in�uencemedia coverage, this paper will quantitativelydemonstrate major imbalances in the amount ofmedia coverage of con�icts and world affairs ingeneral in the year 2000. It will then attempt touse the results to support the hypothesis thatlack of media coverage of con�icts contributesto lack of government policy in that regard.

Factors In�uencing Media Coverage

While the ability of the media to in�uenceforeign policy is by no means a new phenom-enon, its effects have become greatly pro-nounced since the 1980s, as was demonstratedby the response to saturation coverage of fam-ine in Ethiopia (Annan, 1994). Determination ofthe issues that will or will not become news ismade by “gatekeepers”—reporters in the �eld,bureau heads, producers and editors. In aworld over�owing with events, incidents andinformation, these gatekeepers decide whichparts to take up and to what degree, and towhat extent that information will actually endup in the �nished product as news. A numberof factors in�uence how much coverage themedia devote to certain issues or regions of theworld. These include: competition in the mediaindustry; advances in communication technol-ogy; accessibility; and the in�uence of thegovernment—or “reverse CNN factor”. Some

of the factors have recently emerged or grownin importance, and most of them are interre-lated.

Competition in the Media Industry

Increasingly �erce competition in the mediaindustry has led to several changes in the gath-ering and packaging of news. Television newsprogrammes and newspapers, vying for view-ers and readers, respectively, have begun totreat news as a consumer item, and concentratetheir efforts on creating a “product” that will beattractive to potential “buyers”. Such commer-cial demands mean that “the media have toresort to packaging news in a new form oftabloidism that mixes information with enter-tainment” (Minear et al., 1994, p. 35). In cover-age of con�ict, for example, intellectual analysisof the complexities of numerous distantcon�icts is less likely to attract and maintain theinterest of viewers/readers than an emotive,oversimpli�ed portrayal of good versus evil inone or two con�icts, with a continuous empha-sis on the suffering of the victims of oppression.

With necessarily lower budgets, and the sub-sequent lack of facility to adequately gathernews, news programmes and newspapers areincreasingly relying on wire services, such asReuters, Associated Press and Agence FrancePresse. Such wire services have consequentlyfound it necessary to alter their coverage tomatch the demands of their major customers,both in content and in style. This has wide-ranging effects on the coverage of internationalevents in newspapers and the electronic mediathroughout the world.

Advances in Communications Technology

Advances in communications technology havegreatly shortened the time required to bringnews from the �eld to the viewer or reader athome. In particular, the development of satel-lite communications technology has allowedand led to an overwhelming preference for livebroadcasts in the television media.

Ironically, technology has, in some ways,contributed to a situation in which remote

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con�icts are less covered. With greater compe-tition leading to budget cuts, priority is given totechnological advancement, such that resourcesfor newsgathering in the �eld are beingdiverted to the purchase and maintenance ofhigh-tech equipment. Foreign correspondentsare expected to cover larger areas of the globe,and, in the process, are becoming increasinglyunspecialised, as they race from one humani-tarian emergency to another, with little time orbackground knowledge to grasp the issuesbehind the con�icts they cover. Emotive imagesof suffering gathered by reporters who �y inand out of refugee camps within the space of afew hours have become the backbone of newscoverage of con�icts. There are notorious storiesof reporters who, upon arriving at refugeecamps, shout at the refugees, “Is there anyonehere who’s been raped and speaks English?”(Knightly, 2000, p. 511).

Using portable satellite uplinks, reporterscan, in theory, transmit images from anywherein the world. At the same time, if the correspon-dent cannot reach the �eld in a short amount oftime to cover the story, the technology is worthvery little.

Accessibility

For media corporations to remain competitive,television news cannot be more than a day old,and is best live—deadlines have assumed amuch greater importance. In the early 1990s,famine and war in Somalia attracted extensivemedia coverage, whereas a similar situation inthe Sudan attracted almost none. The primereason for this was that Somalia could be cov-ered from Kenya within a day, but to cover theSudan would require three days (Livingston,1996, pp. 38–40). As well as cost considerations,if it takes three days or more to travel to thearea in question, the news is no longer freshenough to be newsworthy, and producers andeditors are thus reluctant to include it. Most ofthe world’s major con�ict zones, however, arein areas with poor infrastructure that inhibitsrapid travel. Thus, stories in areas wherereporters are permanently stationed receive afar greater amount of extended coverage thanthose in which reporters are required to move

across large distances and station themselvestemporarily.

Other issues associated with accessibility arepermission to enter and safety. It is not uncom-mon for countries at war to impose restrictionson the entry of journalists to restrict the �ow ofdisadvantageous information. This affects theability of foreign correspondents to covercon�ict. Furthermore, entering a con�ict zoneis, by nature, hazardous, and such consider-ations also restrict coverage of con�icts.

The “Reverse CNN Factor”

Some academics point to the phenomenon bywhich the government in�uences the media, asopposed to the media in�uencing the govern-ment. Hallin (1986) and Bennett (1990) arguethat the content of the US media is a re�ectionof the agenda and the range of debate amongelites in the US government—that the media“index” the news according to governmentviewpoints (see also Mermin, 1999). I wouldlike to refer to this phenomenon as the “reverseCNN factor”. With low budgets for newsgath-ering, news corporations often interviewgovernment of�cials as a cheap alternative toactually travelling to the �eld. Using govern-ment of�cials as sources also adds perceivedreliability of information, and protection againstinaccurate reports. As such, a great deal ofreporting on “foreign affairs” is conducted fromthe domestic capitals. The result is an increasein the power of the government in choosingwhat will or will not become news, and adominance of the government spin on the news.

With regards to con�ict, Western militaries atwar increasingly restrict media access to theactual con�ict zone, instead providing corre-spondents with large amounts of their owninformation and video images at daily pressconferences. This is mutually bene�cial forcash-strapped news corporations and govern-ments intent on disseminating information thatis advantageous to their cause, but the result isvery little independent coverage from thebattle�eld, and a further ceding to the govern-ment, by the media, of the power to select thenews.

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The Resulting Imbalance: a case study ofmedia coverage

Television and Newspaper Coverage of the World inthe Year 2000

In order to quantitatively measure theimbalance of media coverage of both withregards to con�ict, and to world affairs in gen-eral, a case study was conducted of televisionnews and newspaper coverage in the year 2000.Given the ability of the West (Europe, NorthAmerica and Japan) to play an in�uential rolein foreign con�ict management (economically,diplomatically and/or militarily), this studywill focus on Western media sources.

The television news programmes selected forthe case study were CNN World News (US)and BBC World News (UK). These media wereselected for the size of their domestic and inter-national audience (including a large elite audi-ence), and for their considerable in�uence onthe media agendas of other news media. Foreach day in the year 2000, one 30-minute newsprogramme was recorded and the length (inseconds) of each news item was timed andgeographically categorised, according to con-tent, into one of the following areas: Africa(north, east, west, central/south), the Americas(north, central, south), Asia (west, south, south-east, northeast, Oceania), Europe (west, central,east), the Middle East, United Nations andother. Where a single news item includedcoverage of more than one geographical loca-tion, the time of the item was divided propor-tionately among the categories. Coverage ofindividual con�icts and peace processes wasalso compared separately (see below).

One newspaper each was selected from Asia,the Americas and Europe, based primarily onlevel of in�uence in their respective countriesor regions. The most in�uential newspapersfrom Japan (Yomiuri), the US (New York Times)and France (Le Monde) were selected. With aview to incorporating as broad a range ofsources as possible, publication in a languageother than English was a factor in the selectionof the Yomiuri and Le Monde. For each day inthe year 2000, the area (in square centimetres)of each news item on both the front page and inthe international section of the newspapers was

measured and geographically categorised,according to its content, into the same areas,and according to the same process as detailedabove for television news media. The area ofany related photographs was also included inthe measurements for newspaper media.Detailed �ndings of the study can be found inAppendices 1–6.

Overall, the study found that, with the excep-tion of the New York Times (which coveredEurope the most), the TV news programmesand newspapers gave the greatest amount ofcoverage to the continent in which they aregeographically situated. The Yomiuri’s focus onAsia and Le Monde’s on Europe were particu-larly prominent. In general, areas that receivedthe most coverage were Western Europe, NorthAmerica and the Middle East. Areas thatreceived the least coverage included con�ict-prone western Asia and North and East Africa.Le Monde’s relatively high coverage of NorthAfrica—when compared with the other mediasources—can be attributed to both geographicaland historical factors. In all of the media stud-ied, the least-covered continent was Africa,making up between just 1.9 and 9.3 per cent ofthe total coverage.

The coverage by the television news (particu-larly in the case of CNN) appeared to be moreerratic than that by the newspapers. This can beexplained partially by the fact that due to timeconstraints the television news is able to coverfewer news items than newspapers are, result-ing in less geographical consistency. Thereliance on moving images, however, leading toa greater tendency for sensationalism, is also akey factor, as was demonstrated in saturationcoverage of incidents such as the disputebetween the US and Cuba over the Elian Gon-zales incident, �oods in Mozambique and acoup d’etat in Fiji.

Coverage of Con�icts and Peace Processes in theYear 2000

Coverage of individual con�icts and peace pro-cesses (including UN or foreign involvement)by the same media sources over the sameperiod was also measured (in seconds for tele-vision media and in square centimetres for

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newspaper media), and the 15 most coveredcon�icts were ranked by volume of coverage.Violent clashes between national, ethnic andpolitical entities were included in the study, aswere related attempts at political settlements.Peace processes in cases in which there hadbeen no recent violence, such as those betweenIsrael and Syria, and North and South Korea,were excluded from the study. Small-scale viol-ence associated with elections and coup d’etats,such as those in Fiji and Cote d’Ivoire, werealso excluded from the study.

In balanced media coverage—“balanced”here referring to the quantity of coverage,rather than the content—one might expect tosee priority of coverage given to con�icts in theworld that were the largest in scale, or hadcaused the greatest loss of life or humanitariansuffering. However, although a slant in cover-age, caused by geographical, political, racial,historical or cultural closeness to a particularcon�ict, is to be expected, no semblance ofbalance could be found in the coverage ofcon�icts in any of the sources examined. Allmedia sources devoted a disproportionatelylarge amount of coverage to a single small-scalecon�ict with a relatively low level of death andhumanitarian suffering. Conversely, large-scaleinternational con�icts with massive death tolls,refugee numbers and related levels of humani-tarian crisis were largely ignored by all of themedia sources.

In all of the media sources studied, thecon�ict between Israel and Palestine was by farthe most heavily covered con�ict—in the caseof CNN, attracting more than �ve times theamount of coverage of the second most coveredcon�ict. This was despite the fact that, in theyear 2000, this con�ict resulted in only about300 deaths, negligible numbers of displacedpersons, and little life-threatening humanitariansuffering. While the resurgence of violence inlate 2000 was the object of massive mediacoverage, peace talks at Camp David in July—and other political developments—were alsoconsistently covered throughout the year.

Coverage of con�icts and peace processesalso re�ected (to a certain extent) the geograph-ical location of the media source. Four of theten most covered con�icts in the Yomiuri were

located in Asia, with East Timor the secondmost covered. Con�icts close to home inEurope were heavily covered by the BBC (theNorthern Ireland peace process) and Le Monde(violence in the Basque region in Spain). Con-sistently receiving high levels of coverage in allof the media sources—regardless of geographi-cal proximity—were con�icts and peace pro-cesses in Europe, such as Chechnya, Kosovoand Northern Ireland, despite the fact that thelatter two were relatively minor con�icts.

By contrast, con�ict in Africa, which hasbeen, in the post-Cold-War world, responsiblefor up to 90 per cent of the world’s total wardead, suffered an almost complete media black-out. Coverage of the massive war in the Demo-cratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), whichcaused in excess of one million deaths in theyear 2000, was almost insigni�cant, at bestbeing the eighth most covered con�ict. Othermajor African con�icts, including those inAngola (despite major and decisive offensivesthere) and the Sudan, were almost completelyignored by the media. Neither of these con�ictswas able to enter even the top 15 most coveredcon�icts in any of the media sources. Thecon�ict in Africa that received the most cover-age was that in Sierra Leone, which still failedto reach a level higher than �fth most coveredcon�ict. Minor racial violence in Zimbabwe andthe war (and peace process) between Ethiopiaand Eritrea were covered more than otherAfrican con�icts.

The argument that the media’s agenda isdetermined by the elites in the respective dom-estic political arenas can partially explain thedominance of the Israel–Palestine con�ict in theUS and UK, particularly considering thein�uence of powerful and well-organised pro-Israel (and less in�uential pro-Palestinian)lobby groups. At the same time, however, theyawning gap between the coverage of theIsraeli–Palestinian con�ict and that of all othercon�icts is far too great to be explained simplyby this hypothesis.

Ability to cover the con�ict at a low costwould appear to offer a more persuasive expla-nation for the priority level in the mediaagenda and the large gap in the level of cover-age—one that is consistent with the data

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obtained in this study. In the case of con�ict inthe Middle East, reporters are permanently sta-tioned in the immediate vicinity—in a positionto cover a sudden outbreak of violence at virtu-ally no additional cost, and without the need tobe cued to the con�ict by domestic elites. At amuch lower level of coverage are con�ict areasin which reporters are generally not perma-nently stationed, but that can be accessedat relatively low cost, namely those in Europe.Finally, at an almost insigni�cant level ofcoverage, are the con�icts in areas that arecostly and logistically dif�cult to access andreport from.

Several cases in this study clearly contradictthe theory that “news agendas typically re�ectthe agendas of of�cials” (Livingston andEachus, 1995, p. 427). The most glaring exampleis the massive coverage of the con�ict in theMiddle East in the Yomiuri newspaper, whichcannot be linked to any signi�cant level ofinterest in the con�ict or agenda priority in theJapanese government. The fact that Japanesereporters are permanently stationed in thecon�ict zone offers a much more credible expla-nation. Another contributing factor might be abandwagon effect—the Japanese media takingcues from other in�uential media sources in theUS or Europe. Such a bandwagon effect mayalso help to explain the fact that CNN’s cover-age of a minor con�ict in Zimbabwe exceededits coverage of the con�ict in Colombia, despitethe lack of interest in Zimbabwe in the US, anddespite the fact that US government elites werein the process of debating a bill to providemassive amounts of military support to Colom-bia.

Considerable differences in the levels ofcoverage of con�icts by CNN and the New YorkTimes (which work under the in�uence of thesame government elites) suggest that other fac-tors—namely the access (or lack thereof) tovideo footage of the con�ict zone—may play akey role in determining the media agenda.Comparatively low levels of coverage by CNNof the con�icts in Colombia and the DRC com-pared with the coverage in the New York Times,for example, may re�ect the dif�culties indirectly accessing a con�ict zone in a jungleenvironment with a camera crew.

While the issues of accessibility and thesafety of foreign correspondents are certainlymajor factors in the media blackout of con�icts,both in Africa and in other areas such as west-ern Asia (particularly Afghanistan) , in somecases race could also be seen as a contributingfactor. For example: while the proximity ofZimbabwe to media bases in South Africaseemed to provide partial explanation for suchheavy coverage of such a minor con�ict in thatcountry, the fact that the con�ict was betweenblacks and whites, as opposed to being acon�ict between blacks, was undoubtedly adeciding factor. Race also appeared to be afactor in propelling a small, obscure con�ict inthe Philippines to being CNN’s second mostcovered con�ict, as coverage focused largely onthe plight of Westerners who had been takenhostage by rebels there.

Whatever the reason, it is clear that the news-room truism that “One dead �reman in Brook-lyn is worth �ve English bobbies, who areworth 50 Arabs, who are worth 500 Africans”(Moeller, 1999, p. 22) is not an exaggeration: ifanything, it is an understatement. In terms ofthe level of coverage, in the year 2000, onemillion Congolese were worth far less than thefate of one Cuban boy, and in�nitely less than300 Arabs.

How No Media Coverage Does Not AffectForeign Policy

It is quite obvious from the above data thatthere exists a major imbalance in the media’shandling of con�icts in the world today. Themedia arbitrarily select and focus intently onone or two con�icts, overshadowing all othercon�icts, no matter how large in scale they maybe. If media coverage does indeed possess theability to affect policy decisions (especially inthese extreme cases that are covered intenselyby the media) or, at the very least, affect agendasetting, it follows that lack of media coveragemay be linked to a lack of policy. Thus, byignoring massive con�icts, the media contributeto the absence of government initiatives, or, atthe very least, a place on the policy agenda.This section will attempt to examine this possi-bility in light of the data obtained in this study,

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by exploring the relationship between mediacoverage and policy (both agenda setting andpolicy initiatives). It will also examine theextended effect of lack of media coverage—thatis, the effect on the response of the generalpublic and the academic community.

Agenda Setting

Studies on the agenda-setting function focus onthree main components: the media agenda, thepublic agenda and the policy agenda. Researchto date seems to support the hypothesis thatthe media agenda affects the public agenda (aswell as the policy agenda), and that the publicagenda in turn affects the policy agenda(Rogers and Dearing, 1994). The effect on thepolicy agenda will be dealt with in the sectionon policy initiatives.

The results of this study also support theeffect of the media agenda on the publicagenda. For example, each year the Yomiuritakes a survey on the top international eventsof the year, with the readers voting for eventsor issues that stood out in their minds. In 2000,the con�ict between Israel and Palestine wasthe top con�ict, ranked at eighth place. Othercon�icts listed included Chechnya (nineteenth),and Israel–Lebanon (twentieth). However, nota single event in Africa (con�ict or otherwise)appeared in the survey’s top 30 events. In fact,in the past �ve years, no African con�ict hasbeen ranked in the top ten of the survey. Thismatched the order of the top con�icts in theYomiuri (in the year 2000, East Timor andKosovo were essentially peace processes ratherthan con�icts). Rogers and Dearing (1994, p. 89)note that “one of the strongest pieces of evi-dence of the media’s agenda-setting in�uencemay consist of the fact that issues and eventsthat are completely ignored by the mass mediado not register on the public agendas” (see alsoMcCombs, 1976). The virtual absence of mostof the world’s major con�icts in the Yomiuri (asin all media sources studied), and from theresults of the survey, is a case in point.

Policy Initiatives

Using the data from this study, it is somewhat

more dif�cult to demonstrate the effect of themedia on policy priorities—for a number ofreasons. One is that in most cases the level ofcoverage was too low for it to have had anoticeable impact on policy priorities. Anotheris that, in the case of the Israel–Palestinecon�ict, while heavy media coverage coincidedwith vigorous peacemaking attempts and hu-manitarian assistance by the US and Europe,geopolitical concerns of elites in these countriescan also be seen as a compelling motivation intheir policy initiatives. It can be said, however,that, at the very least, the media acted as an“accelerant” (Livingston, 1997, p. 2–4) to policy-making in this instance.

It is therefore necessary to �nd examples ofpolicy initiatives that coincided with intensemedia coverage, but not with debate betweenpolicy elites, pre-established government policyor geopolitical concerns. The clearest examplescan be found in the Japanese press. Followingintense media coverage of the outbreak of viol-ence in the Middle East in late September 2000,the Japanese government decided, in October,to contribute US$500,000 worth of emergencymedical aid. This was followed by pledges ofadditional aid packages, altogether totallingUS$21 million. In the year 2000, Japan alsomade signi�cant contributions to reconstruc-tion efforts in East Timor and Kosovo. Whilegeopolitical interests are certainly a factor inEast Timor, the same cannot be said of Kosovo,for which coverage in the Japanese press re-mained relatively high in 2000.

The media in�uence on UK policy in SierraLeone and Zimbabwe is also supported by theresults in this study. While the UK has histori-cal ties to these countries, the political andstrategic importance of these areas to the UKis minimal. In the case of Sierra Leone,the intervention followed heavy andunprecedented media coverage of the con�ict(active since 1991), which included criticismof the UK government’s alleged involvementin sanctions busting in Sierra Leone. High-leveldiplomatic initiatives by the UK againstthe government in Zimbabwe also followedheavy media coverage of the situation there,despite a much greater amount of sufferingin neighbouring con�icts which failed to

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prompt notable diplomatic initiatives. Mediacoverage by CNN of the situation in Zimbabwewas also followed by policy initiatives in theUS, starting with the approval by the SenateForeign Relations Committee of a bill suspend-ing aid to Zimbabwe, despite the previouslylow level of interest by the US government inthat country.

On the other hand, a clear absence of govern-ment initiatives and policy agendas related tothe majority of the world’s major con�icts coin-cided with a lack of media coverage of the samecon�icts. Emergency humanitarian aid was aclear indicator of this. There was a considerablegap in the degree of humanitarian aid to allevi-ate con�ict-related suffering, between countrieswith and without the bene�t of heavy mediacoverage. In May 2001, the World FoodProgram announced that it had received only30 per cent of the funding required to continueits current operations (feed 1.4 million people)in the con�ict-ridden Democratic Republic ofthe Congo. Elsewhere, UN consolidated inter-agency humanitarian assistance appeals in 2001were not being met, with less than 20 per centof appeals for Burundi, the Republic of theCongo and Somalia being met as of 31 May. Atthe same time, media-intensive situations in theMiddle East, Kosovo and East Timor werethe recipients of large amounts of aid fromthe Western world. Support for diplomaticendeavours also suffered in under-reportedcon�icts, with the only high-level attemptsat peacemaking for con�icts in Africa beingmade by the governments of other Africancountries.

The policy–media interaction model holdsthat the media have the ability to in�uencepolicy when policy uncertainty is combinedwith “critically framed media coverage thatempathizes with suffering people” (Robinson,2000, p. 614). The above results support thismodel: where policy was non-existent orunclear, heavy media coverage appeared to belargely responsible for a number of policyinitiatives. Elsewhere, policy certainty sawgovernments withstand media-induced press-ure to create or alter policy, as seen in thecon�ict in Chechnya, which was the subject ofheavy and critical coverage.

The Extended Effect

Governments are not the only entities capableof becoming engaged in con�ict resolution oralleviation of con�ict-related suffering in for-eign countries. The general population can par-ticipate in the alleviation of suffering throughdonations as private citizens to aid appeals, orby establishing non-government organisations(NGOs). Such civilian participation is alsoextremely susceptible to the in�uence of mediacoverage (or lack thereof). During high-pro�lecon�icts, numerous private appeals (includinghotlines set up by television stations) are cre-ated to allow individuals to contribute tohumanitarian assistance.

Conversely, viewers will not contribute toassistance efforts in con�icts that they are notaware of. No humanitarian hotlines have beenset up to assist con�ict-affected people inAngola, the Democratic Republic of the Congoor the Sudan. Even within a con�ict, unbal-anced coverage will in�uence civilian partici-pation. Although the media remain focused onthe suffering of Albanians in Kosovo, it virtu-ally ignores that of Serbs. The results showed incivilian humanitarian efforts. In an article in theJapan Times (4 May 2001), a member of aJapanese NGO, working to assist Serbianrefugees from Kosovo, pointed out that assist-ance for Serbs from Western NGOs was scarce“because the West held the view that the Serbswere evil and the Albanians were good”.

The academic community too is able to makea contribution, whether it be through itsin�uence on the government, or through trackII meetings. The academic community hasshown, however, that it too is not immune fromthe other side of the CNN factor, by followingtrends set by media coverage. In 1999 (July/August), Keesings Record of World Eventsdevoted less than a quarter of a page to thedetails of a major peace agreement in SierraLeone, and about one-third of a page to thepeace agreement in the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo. In contrast, in the same year (June)it devoted 12 pages of explicit detail to thepeace agreement over Kosovo. With the excep-tion of Survival (Shearer, 1999), major Westernjournals have yet to devote a single article to an

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analysis of the con�ict in the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo, which has involvedmost of southern Africa. While the StockholmInternational Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),in its yearbook, frequently devotes chapters ofanalysis on security and con�ict to Russia,Europe and the Middle East, in the last �veyears, it has devoted but one to the continent ofAfrica—regarding South Africa’s issue of apart-heid. The reality is that the world’s worst warsand security issues are not being adequatelyaddressed by the academic community.

Conclusions

Sceptics of the independent ability of the mediato in�uence policy decisions focus on the caseof the US intervention in Somalia (Livingstonand Eachus, 1995; Mermin, 1997). While thepoints made in these arguments are valid, theexplanation provided for the relationshipbetween policymakers and the media is incom-plete and too simple to represent such a com-plex relationship. As already noted, even thosewho downplay the independent role of themedia note that it does indeed play a role inpolicy decisions (Mermin, 1997, p. 402; Gowing,1996). Furthermore, the policy–media interac-tion model demonstrates that where there ispolicy uncertainty, the media can be a powerfulforce in leading policymakers to intervene(Robinson, 1999; 2000).

The focus, in academic debate, on such a“push” effect of the media on intervention deci-sions, however, has meant that an issue withmuch greater implications remains mar-ginalised. If heavy coverage can lead to inter-vention decisions, lack of coverage can also belinked with lack of potential intervention deci-sions. It is important to note that interventiondecisions, however, are extreme examples ofcon�ict-related foreign policy decisions. Aca-demic discussion that is limited to interventiondecisions will neglect to examine the muchbroader effect of the media (or rather lackthereof) on foreign policy decisions. Policy

involving mediation (and other diplomatic)efforts between warring parties (at various lev-els), and the provision of humanitarian aid areamong the policy tools at the disposal of gov-ernments. While pushing a government tointervene militarily in a con�ict may usually bebeyond the power of the media, encouragingengagement in other such areas is not.

By focusing its gaze intensely on a singlecon�ict at the expense of all other con�icts, themedia are largely responsible for the absence ofthese con�icts from the public agenda or thepolicy agenda, and major con�icts (and themassive amount of human suffering that theyentail) will be ignored. The impact of the mediaon policy, in this sense, is much greater thanthat on individual intervention decisions. Fur-thermore, as Jakobsen points out, by focusingintensely on select con�icts only during theviolence phase, “the media helps to shift focusand funds from more cost-effective, long-termefforts directed at preventing violent con�ictand rebuilding war-torn societies to short-termemergency relief” (2000, p. 132). It is this otherside of the CNN factor that deserves greateracademic attention.

Attempting to �nd evidence that the otherside of the CNN factor has a signi�cantin�uence on foreign policy is no easy task,given that it essentially involves demonstratingthe in�uence of the lack of something, asopposed to that of the existence of something.As such, given that the other side of the CNNfactor is an integral part of the CNN factor, itshould be examined closely in conjunction withthe CNN factor, with both the in�uence ofcoverage and that of the lack of coveragecompared over a broad range of policy deci-sions.

Most of all, attempts to oversimplify the roleof the media in foreign policy—by overstatingthe importance of either independent mediapolicy or the policy agenda of elites—should beavoided. Both clearly have an importantin�uence on each other which should be exam-ined and tested from all angles possible.

References

Annan, Ko� (1994) “Peace-Keeping in Situations of Civil War”, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 26,pp. 623–32.

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Bennett, W. Lance (1990) “Toward a Theory of Press–State Relations in the United States”, Journal of Communication 40(2),pp. 103–25.

Gowing, Nik (1996) “Real-Time TV Coverage from War: does it make or break government policy”, in: James Gow, RichardPaterson and Alison Preston (Eds), Bosnia by Television, London: British Film Institute, pp. 81–91.

Hallin, Daniel (1986) The “Uncensored War”: the media and Vietnam, New York: Oxford University Press.Jakobsen, Peter Viggo (2000) “Focus on the CNN Effect Misses the Point: the real media impact on con�ict management is

invisible and indirect”, Journal of Peace Research 37(2), pp. 131–43.Knightly, Phillip (2000) The First Casualty: the war correspondent as hero and myth-maker from the Crimea to Kosovo, London: Prion.Livingston, Steven (1996) “Suffering in Silence: media coverage of war and famine in the Sudan”, in: Robert I. Rotberg and

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Livingston, Steven and Eachus, Todd (1995) “Humanitarian Crisis and US Foreign Policy: Somalia and the CNN effectreconsidered”, Political Communication 12, pp. 413–29.

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Political Science Quarterly 112(3), pp. 385–403.Mermin, Jonathan (1999) Debating War and Peace: media coverage of U.S. intervention in the post-Vietnam era, Princeton: Princeton

University Press.Minear, Larry, Scott, Colin and Weiss, Thomas G. (1994) The News Media, Civil War, and Humanitarian Action, Boulder: Lynne

Rienner.Moeller, Susan D. (1999) Compassion Fatigue, New York: Routledge.Robinson, Piers (1999) “The CNN Effect: can the news media drive foreign policy?”, Review of International Studies 25(2),

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Peace Research 37(5), pp. 613–33.Rogers, Everett M. & Dearing, James W. (1994) “Agenda-Setting Research: where has it been, where is it going?”, in: Doris

Graber (Ed.), Media Power in Politics, Washington, Congressional Quarterly.Shaw, Martin (1996) Civil Society and Media in Global Crises: representing distant violence, New York: Pinter.Shearer, David (1999) “The Con�ict in Central Africa: Africa’s great war”, Survival 41(2), pp. 89–106.

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Appendix 1. Average daily media coverage (per cent) by region in 2000

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Appendix 2.

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Appendix 3.

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Appendix 4.

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Appendix 5.

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Appendix 6.

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