North American Philosophical Publications

The Paradox of LoyaltyAuthor(s): Philip PettitReviewed work(s):Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Apr., 1988), pp. 163-171Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical PublicationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20014235 .Accessed: 09/10/2012 00:07

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American Philosophical Quarterly Volume 25, Number 2, April 1988

THE PARADOX OF LOYALTY

Philip Pettit

INTRODUCTION

HTHE ideal of loyalty is at the heart of common -^ sense morality. That morality highlights our

special obligations to ourselves and one another and

duties of personal loyalty to other people bulk large

amongst these; they are the duties that we owe to

other people in virtue of more or less intimate

bonds, whether bonds of family, friendship, com?

radeship, collaboration, or whatever.1

Yet the ideal of loyalty generates a paradox, for it

requires that the loyal agent satisfy two apparently

conflicting assumptions. He must be sensitive to

considerations of a sort that we can all find com?

pelling; that is why it is an ideal. And he must

be sensitive to considerations relating distinctively to the welfare of a particular person; that is why it

is an ideal of loyalty. The first assumption casts

the loyal agent as praiseworthy from an impartial

point of view; the second presents him as the very

examplar of partial concern.

The paradox of loyalty will not be unfamiliar.

One relative of the antinomy lies behind the long? standing challenge to Christian beliefs, that no one

is loved who is loved just for Christ's sake; to be

loved one must be loved for one's own. And another

related antinomy is deployed against Kantian ideals

when it is said that the friend who sticks by a

colleague out of a sense of duty fails to display any sense of friendship.2 In each case we have a

tension between the impartial and partial aspects of the ideals invoked. Love is partial in a way that seems to conflict with the Christian motivation;

fidelity to a friend is partial in a manner that appears to conflict with the Kantian.

The ideal of loyalty is less exotic than the Chris? tian or Kantian ideals but it gives rise to just the same sort of problem. The trouble in those cases

is that if you really love someone you cannot love

them for Christ's sake and that if you really think

as a friend you cannot act out of a sense of Kantian

duty. The trouble in this is that if you are really loyal to a person, it appears that you cannot be moved by considerations that recommend themselves gen

erally. To be loyal is to be dedicated to a particular individual's welfare and that seems to conflict with

the idea that the loyal agent is idealistic or dutiful.

It is now common among philosophers to distin?

guish between considerations which play a critical

role in regard to our reasoning about what to do and

considerations which play a practical or operational role.3 Critical considerations are those we invoke

when we are under pressure to justify or revise our

habits of decision and action. Operational con?

siderations are those we deploy in the exercise of

those habits. This distinction suggests an easy resolution of the

paradox of loyalty. The resolution would be that

loyalty in operational practice means acting on

considerations that are relativized to particular

people but that such a practice can be justified at the

critical level by reference to considerations of a

wholly impersonal kind. The loyal agent is dedicated in practice to the welfare of a particular individual or individuals. But that sort of dedication can be

represented at the critical or reflective level as an

ideal worthy of universal admiration. This resolution will not do. If the operational

considerations deployed by the loyal agent were

purely partial, as the resolution suggests, then he could not invoke them in an attempt to justify him? self. Challenged about his favoritism towards a

friend or child, all that they would enable him to

do is make a confession of bias. But the consider? ations deployed by the loyal agent do serve him in a justifying role. It is not merely an admission of

bias, even a bias capable of critical vindication, if

he responds to a challenge by remarking that the

beneficiary is his child or his friend. It is a way, in itself, of legitimating his selective concern.

We are returned then to our paradox. How can

the reason on which a loyal agent acts serve him

163

164 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

in two quite different roles? How can it mark his

partiality towards his principal and still give an

impartial cast to his behavior?

I. The Source of the Paradox

We need to develop a more exact statement of

the source of our paradox, for otherwise there is

no hope of identifying what is necessary to resolve

it. In particular we need a more specific account

of the apparently conflicting requirements on the

reason with which a loyal agent acts. Before

offering such an account, however, it may be useful

to provide also a more specific account of a reason

for action.

My notion of a reason for action is abstracted

from the traditional concept of the practical syl?

logism. That syllogism is meant to represent an

agent's deliberation at the operational level, whether explicit or tacit. It begins with considera?

tions in virtue of which a certain state of affairs is

seen as desirable and worthy of realization: these

are the materials assembled in the major premiss. It proceeds in the minor premiss to considerations

that link?at the limit indeed, identify?that state

of affairs with an option which the agent can realize.

And it issues by way of conclusion in the choice

of the option or, more plausibly, in the judgment that the option is fit to be chosen, ought to be

chosen, or whatever.

A reason for action, as I use the notion here, is

the sort of proposition which may appear in the

major premiss of a practical syllogism. It consists

in the ascription of certain motivating properties to

the state of affairs it supports. These may be

intrinsic or relational, universal or particular, gen? eral or specific. All that is required of them is that

once recognized and appreciated they should be

such as to make the preference for the state of

affairs intelligible. The apparently conflicting demands on the reason

with which a loyal agent acts are that in some sense

it must be at once partially orientated and impartially

justifying. My more specific account of those

requirements amounts to a hypothesis. I claim that

the mutually antagonistic demands are, on the one

side, that the reason has to be particularized and, on the other, that it has to be universalizable.

A reason is universalizable if and only if it moti?

vates in virtue of just the non-particular or universal

features of any situation where it applies: that is, in

virtue of the features which can be realized across dif?

ferent places, times, persons, and other particulars.4 The properties of the situation to which the agent is

required to be responsive are all such that, if the rea?

son is a good reason, then the concurrence of those

properties would equally command the response of

any other agent faced with a similar situation.

A reason is particularized, on the other hand, if and

only if, whatever the properties in virtue of which it

motivates, it cannot present those properties for the

agent's consideration without directly referring him

to some particular: for our purposes, to some other

person. A reason directly refers to another person if it fixes him, for example, by name or demonstra?

tive. It refers indirectly to him if it is addressed, say

by definite description, to whoever satisfies or best

satisfies certain properties; it is addressed, not to

Fred, not to this person, but to the most deserving

party around, to the agent's oldest relative, or

whatever.5 Since the particularized reason cannot

present the motivating properties without directly

referring to someone, it cannot be replaced without

motivational loss by a consideration which employs

only indirectly referring expressions. Any such re?

placement would miss out on some of the moti?

vating properties; it would not be motivationally

equivalent to the original consideration.

Where universalizability requires that the moti?

vating content of a reason should be universal,

particularization requires that the conditions under

which the reason motivates an agent?the conditions

under which he is engaged with the motivating content?should involve his being focussed on a

given individual. The requirements of universaliz?

ability and particularization are not strictly incon?

sistent, but they are in tension with one another.

Suppose that a reason is universalizable and motivates

an agent to act suitably towards anyone displaying the universal properties F, G and H. We would

expect the reason to be presentable in a formula

which says that there is an x such that Fx, Gx

and Hx. And such a reason would not be particu? larized, for it would not refer directly to x or to any?

thing else. A directly referring expression might be

needed in the minor premiss of a practical syllogism

THE PARADOX OF LOYALTY 165

where the reason figures as major premiss; the

minor premiss would say that this or that person is an x of the motivating kind. But the expression

would not appear in the reason itself and so the

reason would not be particularized. Because loyalty is considered as a justifiable

ideal or duty, even by loyal agents themselves, the reason with which a loyal agent acts must be a

universalizable one. Were it non-universalizable, then the properties in virtue of which it motivates

would involve a particular person or other entity. And in that case it would be incapable of justifying the behavior to those who have no special relation?

ship with that individual or entity. If the fact that

the beneficiary is Dick is essential to the agent's

being motivated to help Dick, then the reason with

which the agent acts can hardly be invoked in an

attempt to justify his favoritism. In order to serve

in that role the reason must motivate in virtue of

properties whose concurrence would have had the same motivational hold on anyone else, in any other

company or context. In short, it must be univer?

salizable.

Because loyalty is seen as a form of dedication, however, and not just as fidelity to an ideal or the

exercise of a duty, the loyal agent is required to

act on a particularized reason which directly involves his principal. The notion of loyalty is that of a disposition to prefer, not anyone who satisfies certain universal conditions, but this or that contex

tually given person. This requirement will be ful?

filled so far and only so far as the agent's reason

depends for its motivational power?that is, for its

capacity to present the relevant motivating proper? ties?on referring him directly to the principal. That is to say, it will be fulfilled if and only if the reason is particularized.

My hypothesis as to the source of the paradox of loyalty is that it is difficult to identify a reason which is at once particularized and universalizable. For the moment I have nothing more to say in

defense of the hypothesis, but I hope that it may become more plausible in the light of the following two sections. In the next section it will become clear that there is a difficulty about finding reasons that display both of these characteristics. And in the section after that it will become apparent that once we have identified such a reason we are in a

position to resolve the paradox of loyalty.

II. The Materials for Resolving

the Paradox

If the hypothesis is correct then we shall only be able to resolve our paradox if we can identify reasons that are both universalizable and par? ticularized. In this section we review the different sorts of reasons for action in an attempt to find

suitable candidates.

The main distinction among reasons for action

is between agent-relative and agent-neutral consid?

erations.6 Any reason, as we know, ascribes

motivating properties to a state of affairs. With the

agent-relative reason the motivating properties ascribed include some which can be expressed only by pronomial back-reference to the agent who is

to act. With the agent-neutral reason this is not so.

Suppose that Tom is the agent. An agent-relative reason for Tom to prefer a state of affairs might be that it is in his interests; that it will save the

honor of his family; that it will confer some benefit on his dependants; and the like. The crucial,

motivating property in each case is that the agent, whoever he is, is served in a certain way by the state of affairs. It is not that it will benefit Tom's

dependants, for example; after all, the agent might not even be aware that he is Tom. It is that the state of affairs will benefit his, the agent's, depen? dants. The sort of reason on offer essentially involves pronomial back-reference; it is essentially indexical in form.

Agent-neutral reasons, by contrast with agent relative ones, are free of this relativization to the

agent. An agent-neutral reason for Tom to prefer a state of affairs might be that it is just; that it will

please Mary; that it will promote human happiness; and the like. When such a reason argues for action there will have to be an indexical involvement of the agent, as he is the one to be moved.7 But that

involvement will come only in the minor premiss of the deliberation, not in the major.

We want to identify reasons that are at once uni?

versalizable and particularized. We are unlikely to find any in the agent-neutral category. A particular? ized reason is bound to refer directly to some indi?

vidual, say by name or demonstrative; it cannot just refer to whoever satisfies certain properties. How can such a mode of reference be motivationally

166 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

necessary in an agent-neutral reason, if the reason

motivates an agent just in virtue of universal features

of the situation where it applies? The necessity of the reference is impossible to explain, if the moti?

vational properties in question do not involve the

particular individual referred to. Thus while "Jack is in trouble" may seem to be particularized and uni?

versalizable, the appearance withers once we see

that, not depending on the reference to Jack for its

motivational power, it is motivationally equivalent to "There is someone in trouble." The particularized consideration can be replaced without motivational

loss by the non-particularized surrogate; the two

formulations serve equally well to direct the agent to the relevant motivating properties.

We must turn to the category of agent-relative reasons if we are to have any hope of success in

our quest. But without one further distinction this

category is too coarse to be of help. The distinction,

ignored in the literature, is between agent-relative reasons that are context-free and agent-relative reasons that are context-bound.

Take an agent-relative reason which bears on the treatment of a person other than the agent; this is

the only sort that will be relevant for our purposes.8 Such a consideration will refer back to the agent,

involving an egocentric description of the person on whom the action bears as his child, his friend, his client, or whatever.9 The difference between

context-free and context-bound reasons relates to

the role which the egocentric description plays in

determining who is to be given special treatment.

The agent-relative reason will be context-free if the

intended referent is that person, whoever it may be, who satisfies?or perhaps best satisfies?the descrip? tion in question. It will be context-bound if the

intended referent is fixed, or partly fixed, by context:

fixed, for example, by whoever is actually present in some demonstrative context, or by whoever is at

the causal origin of the referential expression used.

The context-bound reason refers directly to the per? son; the context-free reason refers only indirectly to

him. Thus the egocentric description plays a dual role

in the context-free reason, serving to determine the

intended beneficiary and helping to explain why he

makes a claim on the agent. It plays only the second

role in the context-bound reason, for the identity of

the beneficiary is fixed with the help of context.

Consider the case of someone who contemplates what he owes a friend. If he thinks in the context

free way, the thoughts which move him will be that there is a friend of his who needs this or that,

who would benefit from one or another sort of

action, and so on. In those thoughts the identity of the particular friend is not relevant; it does not

matter to the agent's motivation. He is targeted on

whoever fits the description of being his friend. That it is this person rather than any other who does so is a matter only of incidental interest.

If the agent thinks in the context-bound way however, then the identity of the friend will be

taken as given independently of his satisfying the

egocentric description. The considerations which

engage the agent will be that this, his friend stands

in need of so and so or stands to benefit by such

and such. Considerations of that kind, as the demonstrative signals, presuppose that the identity of the friend is fixed with the help of context. The

agent is targeted then on that particular person, not on whoever happens to fit the egocentric descrip? tion. The description serves to present the person in a way which helps to make the claim on the

agent salient; he is a friend. It does not play the

further role of determining its own reference.

The contrast between the two sorts of reason comes out nicely in a familiar type of thought experiment. Suppose that Tom is subject to a con?

text-bound consideration for favoring Dick: This, my friend, is in need. Now compare his situation with that which he would be in if everything were

the same except for the absence of Dick. In the actual situation Tom has an agent-relative reason

of a context-bound kind for favoring Dick. In the

imagined situation he hasn't; Dick isn't there to

provide the referent for "this, my friend."

This does not hold of the context-free counter?

part: There is a friend of mine in need. If Tom is

subject to such a reason in the actual situation?a reason to take special account of anyone in Dick's

sort of position?then he may be equally subject to it in the imaginary situation where Dick does

not exist. All that is required for it to apply is that

he has some friend there who is in need. It happens in the imaginary world that Dick does not exist, but the consideration which is expected to move

Tom in the actual world may still be there to move

him in the imaginary.

THE PARADOX OF LOYALTY 167

Agent-relative reasons are particularized only if

they are context-bound, for it is only in that case

that they refer the agent directly to an individual

or individuals. Our search for reasons that are at

once universalizable and particularized must be

concentrated, therefore, on considerations in this

category. Do such considerations simultaneously

display the two characteristics?

If an agent-relative context-bound reason is uni?

versalizable, then it motivates in virtue of just the

non-particular features of any situation where it

applies. So what then are the universal features

made salient for an agent in the consideration "This,

my friend, is in need?" And are they such as can

be presented to the agent only if the reason refers

him directly to the potential beneficiary? At first sight there seem to be just two universal

features involved: that the person is in need and

that he is a friend. But while those features are

non-particular, they cannot be the only motivating ones. If they were, there would be no motivation

ally relevant difference between the consideration

given and the context-free reason expressed by "There is a friend of mine in need." Thus the reason

would not depend on directly referring the agent to the beneficiary for its having motivational power; it would not be a particularized consideration. The

agent might have been equally well moved by the

context-bound or context-free thought: each would

direct him to the same motivational properties. But there is a third, non-particular feature intro?

duced by the context-bound reason. This is

presupposed by the form in which the reason is

given and does not correspond to a predicate used

in the formulation of the reason. It is exemplified

by the formula used, not expressed in it. The feature is that the agent is confronted with

someone who is identified for him by context: some? one who is identified by being, brutely, there. It is this property which distinguishes a situation where

the context-bound reason of friendship is available

from any circumstance where the agent does not have his claimant independently individuated. In

the former situation the agent finds himself faced with the demands of a particular friend. In the latter circumstance he also finds himself confronted

with the demands of friendship, but in abstraction from the individual whom they would benefit.

Because of the three universal features on which

it turns?in particular, because of the third?"This,

my friend, is in need" cannot be replaced without

motivational loss by the consideration expressed in

"There is a friend of mine in need." Does this

mean, more generally, that the reason involved is

particularized as well as universalizable? Unfortu?

nately not. Although it cannot be replaced by "There is a friend of mine in need," the consider?

ation may still be replaceable by some other reason

which fails to refer the agent directly to the potential

beneficiary: in effect, by some other context-free

consideration. We have to consider whether there

is any context-free surrogate which could take the

place of the thought, "This, my friend, is in need," and do so without motivational loss.

Any context-free reason which directs the agent to the fact that the potential beneficiary is contex

tually individuated must register that fact in its

content. As to the example on hand, any prospec? tive surrogate must go something like this: "There is a friend of mine, identified for me by context,

who is in need." The question then is whether the

context-bound reason "This, my friend, is in need" can be replaced without motivational loss by such

a sophisticated context-free consideration. If it can, then it is not particularized: it does not depend on

directly referring the agent to the friend for the

motivational power it has; the agent could be pre? sented with the universal motivating properties

without being directly referred to anyone. But the context-bound reason cannot be replaced

without motivational loss by the sophisticated coun?

terpart. For it cannot be replaced by the counterpart at all. Suppose that the context-bound reason moti? vates an agent, so that he thinks "This, my friend, is in need." If the agent genuinely has that thought, notice that there must be a person there to provide the referent for the demonstrative.10 Consider now

whether the context-bound consideration could be

replaced in the agent's motivation by the context

free surrogate "There is a friend of mine, identified for me by context, who is in need." The answer is

clearly that it could not. If the agent is motivated

by the context-free consideration, and if there really is a person identified for the agent by context, then

things must be such that he is motivated also by the context-bound thought. They must be such that

168 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

there is a person of whom he thinks in the

demonstrative mode, or at least in some directly referential manner, and they must be such that he thinks of that person as a friend in need. If the context-bound consideration motivates an agent, then there is no way that it can be displaced in favor of the context-free surrogate; the surrogate

will motivate him only so far as he continues to

be motivated by the original. I conclude that context-bound, agent-relative

reasons satisfy the two requirements with which we have been concerned. They are particularized reasons which have their motivational power only so far as they refer the agent directly to another

person or persons. And yet they are universalizable considerations which motivate the agent just in

virtue of the universal features of any situation where they apply.

If this conclusion is counter-intuitive, that may be because it displaces an assumption which is

widely but uncritically made. The assumption is

that if an agent acts on a universalizable reason, then there must be a universal reason for what he

does which is available in common to him and his

counterparts in relevantly similar situations. But

that assumption is a mere prejudice, as the category of context-bound, agent-relative reasons shows. The counterparts who each act on such a reason act on distinct considerations in their different situ? ations: namely, those which are particularized in favor of their particular principals. And yet the reasons motivate in each case on the basis of the same universal properties. There is no universal reason available in common to those agents, though the reasons which are available motivate on the same universal basis.

III. The Resolution

The first section put forward the hypothesis that the source of the paradox of loyalty is the difficulty of

identifying reasons that are at once particularized and

universalizable; it seemed that such reasons must be

available to motivate the loyal agent, if he can espouse

loyalty as a duty or ideal. In the last section we identi?

fied reasons that have the two marks required, and it

remains now to show that those reasons do indeed serve to resolve the paradox. We are required to show

this, if the original hypothesis is to be vindicated.

There are two things in particular that we need to

show. The first is that there is nothing implausible about the idea of a loyal agent being motivated by a

context-bound agent-relative reason. And the second is that there is nothing implausible about the idea of

that agent's principal being suitably gratified by attentions that are motivated in such a manner.

If we are to show these things we are required in particular to be able to resist the thought that

loyalty presupposes motivation by a non-univer

salizable, particularized reason. Consider two

agents, one of whom is moved by the thought "This,

my friend, is in need," the other by the thought "Dick is in need"; we assume that these expressions are precisely tailored to the moving considerations.

What we have to demonstrate is that the giver and the taker of loyal attentions, the agent and the prin? cipal, can each be comfortable with the fact that the universalizable sort of motivation is that which

holds sway. We deal first with the perspective of

the agent, then with that of the principal. The agent who is moved by the thought "Dick

is in need" makes much of the particular identity of the person in question. The non-particular facts about Dick do not fully account for the claim he

represents. That claim turns essentially on the fact

that he is Dick. His thisness or haecceitas matters. The agent who is moved by the consideration

"This, my friend, is in need" does not make any?

thing of the particular identity of the person before him. He makes something only of the non-par? ticular facts that he is a friend, that he is in need,

and, as we might put it, that he is there.

This second story is surely a more plausible account of what counts with the agent. Loyalty can

hardly require the agent to prize the individual

essence of the principal; on the contrary, it is com?

patible with severe reservations about his particular worth. What it demands is rather susceptibility to

the fact that the principal is, relatively speaking, one of his own; he is one of the family, one of the

gang, one of the network, or whatever. And that

demand fits with the universalizable sort of motiva?

tion, not with the singular kind.

What now of the principal's perspective? Will

the beneficiary of putatively loyal attentions be suit?

ably gratified if the basis on which he receives

those attentions is universalizable? Will the friend

THE PARADOX OF LOYALTY 169

in need recognize loyalty in the agent who is moved

by the context-bound agent-relative reason, and not

by the consideration involving him by name? The ground on which the friend is singled out for

preferred treatment in each case contrasts with that

invoked when an agent acts on the non-particularized consideration "There is a friend of mine in need."

In this case the principal is benefitted for the more

or less incidental reason that he happens to fit the

description which activates the agent's concern. He

is not himself the target of concern; he falls on the

line of favor determined by that target. If the beneficiary is picked out by name or in

the demonstrative manner of the agent-relative, context-bound reason, then it is not incidental in the same way that it is he rather than anyone else

who is benefitted. He can feel in either case that

he matters in his own person, for the consideration is focussed on him in particular, not on anyone

fitting a certain bill; it is particularized in his favor.

But still there is a difference between how the

beneficiary matters in the two cases, and the ques? tion is whether this tells against the suitability of

the universalizable reason.

Take the case where the principal is picked out as "This, my friend." The principal knows that

were the agent to find himself in a world where

he, Dick, was replaced by another individual, then

though he would lack access to the reason for which

he benefits Dick in the actual case, still the agent would be moved by a replica consideration: the

consideration that that other person, his friend, was

in need. Take now the case where the principal is

picked out by name. Here he has no ground for

the same thought, for in the world imagined the

agent might be unmoved by the plight of the other

individual, just because that individual was not

Dick. Is this extra individuation of concern neces?

sary for the enjoyment of loyalty? Or is the univer? salizable individuation enough?

I think that the extra individuation is not required, however flattering and gratifying it might be. The

only ground on which a person can expect loyalty is that he has the good fortune to connect with the

agent; he counts in some sense as one of the agent's own. It would be comic or megalomaniacal of the

person to expect loyalty on the ground of who he

is; no one can reasonably think himself so special.

Everything suggests, then, that the principal can fully

enjoy the fruits of loyalty while recognizing that the

agent is moved by a universalizable consideration. The availability of context-bound, agent-relative

reasons is thus sufficient to resolve the paradox of

loyalty. We can coherently identify it as an ideal or duty for an individual that he be loyal to these, his children or those, his friends. The reason offered

to him thereby is universalizable, for it is allowed that for any agent and any corresponding claimants, that agent too should be loyal to those, his princi?

pals.11 Yet the reason offered is also, as required, a particularized consideration. It is a reason to care

for his principals which refers him to them directly and not just so far as they satisfy certain identifying descriptions; it is a consideration which makes them

matter in their own right, and not as opportunities for furthering some independent cause.

One further word may be useful. Although the

possibility of loyalty turns on the availability of

context-bound, agent-relative reasons, there is a

role too for context-free considerations. This is

worth noting, since otherwise it may be a source

of confusion. The primary demands of loyalty relate to

principals already recognized or owned by the

agent as children, friends and the like. This

recognition or owning is a social fact that usually comes to obtain beneath the level of agent choice.

But sometimes it can happen that an agent fails to own someone as a principal of a certain kind, even when it is appropriate for him to do so. In

such cases there are secondary demands of loyalty and these are naturally expressed by context-free

considerations.

The sort of demand in question is that the

loyal agent ought to own as a child or friend or

whatever any individual who meets suitable

equirements. Although it is a legitimate obli?

gation of loyalty, such a context-free demand

does not compromise the claim that loyalty re?

quires context-bound reasons. This kind of demand is an obligation to recognize or own

certain people in the role of principals. The primary sort of demand is an obligation consequent on the fact of recognition: not an obligation to own, but an obligation of

owning.

170 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Conclusion

There are at least two sorts of misgiving that may be raised about this resolution of our paradox and in

conclusion I wish to indicate why I do not think that

they have to trouble us. They are both misgivings about the status which the resolution gives to agent relative, context-bound reasons. One turns on the

fact that those considerations are agent-relative, the

other on the fact that they are context-bound. The

first is a misgiving in moral theory, the second a

misgiving in philosophy of mind.

The misgiving about agent-relativity is that it of?

fends against standard consequentialist assumptions. Those assumptions are that goodness is evaluator

neutral; that the Tightness of an option is a function

of the goodness it promises; and that moral agents

ought to train their sights therefore on the pro? motion, in the manner determined by that function, of goodness.12 You clearly reject that conclusion

if you endorse the idea that agents ought to act, even

act in restricted circumstances, on considerations

of an agent-relative kind.

If Tightness is a function of the impersonal good, then the consequentialist must certainly wish for the

promotion, in the appropriate manner, ofthat good. But that does not mean that the only sort of con

ideration he can allow an agent to be moved by is

the agent-neutral consideration of what maximizes

the prospect of good. It may be that by acting on

another type of consideration, at least within

certain limits, the agent will actually succeed

in better promoting the good. This will be so in

particular if acting on such non-consequentialist reasons produces a significant benefit which is

compromised by acting on consequentialist considerations.

Agent-relative context-bound reasons are certainly

non-consequentialist considerations. But if my

argument in this paper is sound, then agents pro? duce the benefits associated with loyalty if and only if they act on such reasons in appropriate circum? stances. On the assumption, then, that the benefits

associated with loyalty are important, it may well

be that the consequentialist should endorse such

a course of behavior. It may well be that he

ought to counsel a restriction of consequentialist

reasoning in favor of a dispensation where

agent-relative reasons have an important place.13

The misgiving about the context-bounded

aspect of the reasons I associate with loyalty comes up in the philosophy of mind. It is a common

dogma of psychologists, philosophical and scien?

tific, that properly psychological states must be

fixed by how things are within the boundary

assigned to subjects: this may be the boundary of the body, the central nervous system, the res

cogitans, or whatever.14 The dogma would mean that the state of being responsive to a

context-bound consideration cannot be properly

psychological. It cannot count among the springs of a person's action.

There are a number of possible views about what

the true spring of action must be when it is appro?

priate to ascribe a context-bound reason to an agent. Under all of these views however, a question must

be raised about how satisfactory our resolution of

the paradox of loyalty is. And that is why the

dogma creates a misgiving about the resolution.

We need surely not be troubled by this misgiving. The reason is that there is an alternative view of the mind available which fails to support the dogma; I have committed myself elsewhere to it.15 According to that view the mental states which explain our

actions may have contents that are context-bound, even though the states explain actions in virtue of

those contents. The springs of our actions may be tied

significantly to our surroundings. If one adopts this

broad view of mental states, then there is no difficulty with the fact that my resolution of the paradox of

loyalty requires people to be moved by context

bound reasons.16 We do not have to defend the view

in order to gain relief from the difficulty; it is suf?

ficient for our purposes that context-bound reasons

have not been shown to be psychologically impossible or suspect. But even if defense were necessary, we

would not be without resources. It will be defense

enough for many that the broad view of mind is

required for the possibility of loyalty.17

Research School of Social Sciences

Australian National University Received June 11, 1987

THE PARADOX OF LOYALTY 171

NOTES

1. See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). See also Philip Pettit and Robert Goodin, "The Possibility of Special Duties" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 16 (1986), pp. 651-676. For more general, related

considerations see Michael Ignatieff, The Needs of Strangers (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1986).

2. See Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality" in Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 13

(1984), pp. 134-171.

3. The distinction is invoked in Parfit, op. cit., in Railton, op. cit., and, perhaps most notably, in R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). It is also deployed in Philip Pettit and Geoffrey Brennan, "Restrictive Consequentialism" in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 64 (1986). We make use of it in the conclusion below.

4. See for example R. M. Hare, op. cit. and Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz, Universalizability (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 197?). See too

my paper "Universalizability without Utilitarianism" in Mind, vol. 96 (1987), pp. 74-82.

5. For a careful account of the sort of distinction I am drawing?the difference between descriptionally and nirpctly referring

expressions?see Nathan Salmon, Reference and Essence (Oxford: Blackwells, 1982), Chapter 1.

6. See Derek Parfit "Prudence, Morality and the Prisoner's Dilemma" in Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. 65 (1979),

pp. 555 ff.; Thomas Nagel "The Limits of Objectivity" in Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Vol. 1 ed. by S. M. McMurrin

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 75-139; and Amartya Sen "Rights and Agency" in Philosophy and Public

Affairs, vol. 11 (1982), pp. 03-39. See too Pettit and Goodin, op. cit..

7. See John Perry "The Problem of the Essential Indexical" in Nous, vol. 13 (1979), pp. 03-21.

8. Even with reasons which bear on an agent's treatment of himself, there is a parallel distinction to that introduced here. There

is a difference between having a reason to be true to that particular self one is and having a reason to be true to whoever one

happens to be.

9. Robert Pargetter has made the point to me that it is likely that the description required to express all the relevant aspects of

the potential beneficiary will be much more personalized than those given in these examples.

10. On related matters see Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).

11. This is to support the line taken in John Cottingham "Partiality, Favouritism and Morality" in The Philosophohical Quarterly, vol.

36 (1986), p. 359. It is to reject the claim of Andrew Oldenquist in "Loyalties" in The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 79 (1982),

pp. 185-86. I suspect that Oldenquist is swayed by the assumption mentioned at the end of section 2.

12. See Philip Pettit and Geoffrey Brennan, "Restrictive Consequentialism" in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 64 (1986),

p. 438.

13. See Pettit and Brennan "Restrictive Consequentialism" ibid. See also my papers "Social Holism and Moral Theory" in

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 86 (1985-86), pp. 173-198, and "The Consequentialist Can Recognise Rights" in

Philosophical Quarterly, forthcoming. One of the challenges to which this restrictive version of consequentialism is addressed is

the requirement that a moral theory should not undermine our spontaneous motives of love, friendship and the like. Thus the

present paper fits with that program. The challenge is best posed in Michael Stocker, "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical

Theories" in Journal of Philosophy, vol. 73 (1976), pp. 453-466.

14. For an overview of the issue see the introduction in Subject, Thought and Context, ed. by Philip Pettit and John McDowell

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

15. See my "Broad-minded Explanation and Psychology" in Subject, Thought and Context, ibid.. See also my "A Priori Principles and Action-explanation" in Analysis, vol. 45 (1986), pp. 39-45.

16. In "Social Holism and Moral Theory" op. cit.. I argued that the acceptance of such a view of the mind facilitates the recognition of agent-relative reasons. It was as a result of discussion of that paper at the Aristotelian Society that I came to see that, more

specifically, it facilitates the recognition of agent-relative, context-bound reasons. I am particularly grateful for comments by Mark Sainsbury and Richard Sorabji.

17. I am grateful for written comments on earlier drafts from Ted Bond, Jeremy Butterfield, Frank Jackson, Mark Sainsbury and

Michael Stocker. The paper was written during my tenure of an Overseas Fellowship at Churchill College, Cambridge and I am

also grateful to the College for the use of its facilities.