The Phenomenology of Memory in Roman Culture

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The Phenomenology of Memory in Roman CultureAuthor(s): Joseph FarrellSource: The Classical Journal, Vol. 92, No. 4 (Apr. - May, 1997), pp. 373-383Published by: Classical Association of the Middle West and South, Inc. (CAMWS)Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3298408Accessed: 12-11-2015 21:36 UTC

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2/12

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

OF MEMORY

IN ROMAN

CULTURE

Dis

manibus

A.

K.

Michelssacrum

ust as

in

many

other

areas,

the theoretical

discourse

on

memory

produced

in

antiquity,

while of tremendous historical and

in-

tellectual importance per se, does not provide us with an adequate

conceptual

basis

for

understanding

the various forms of mnemonic

activity

in which the ancients

engaged.1

Ancient

theory

uniformly

conceives

of

memory

in

decidedly

objectivist

terms:

the

thing

re-

membered

is indeed

a

thing,

while

memory

itself

is

a

transparent

medium that

provides

access to

things

separated

from the

rememberer

by

time

or

space.

Some

common

images

of

memory

include

wax

writing

tablets

or

books,

signet

rings,

bird

cages,

store-

houses,

and so

forth.2 To be

sure,

all these

images

have different

purposes in the ancient discourse on memory: the wax tablet

pressed

by

a

signet ring

provides

an

image

of the

similarity

between

our

memory

of

a

thing

and the

thing

itself;

casting

about in a

cage

for

one

particular

bird

suggests

the

process

of

trying

to retrieve

one

particular

memory

out

of

many, perhaps

similar

ones;

the

orderly

house

or

city corresponds

to

a

properly

trained and

organized

1

My

interest

in

memory

dates back to the

fall of

1978

when I had

the

great

pleasure

and good fortune of taking

part

in my first graduate seminar,which was

taught

by

Nan Michels. That course

proved

to be the

beginning

of

what has been

for me one the most fruitful

and

formative

influences

of

my

career. When

I

learned

of

Nan's

death

I was at work on

a

version of this

paper,

which

I

read as

part

of a

panel

on "New

Approaches

to

Memory"

at the

1993 annual

meeting

of the Ameri-

can

Philological

Association. On that occasion it seemed

fitting

that

I

dedicate the

paper

to

her

memory.

It

is an honor

to

repeat

that dedication

in

this revised and

expanded

version.

I

also wish to thank the

organizers

of

the

APA

panel,

Jocelyn

Penny

Small

and

James

Tatum,

our

fellow

panelist

Michael

Koortbojian,

and all

those

who attended the

panel,

for

their

respective

good

offices and

advice;

and

the

editor

of

CJ,

John

Miller,

for

putting

together

this commemorative issue.

2

Wax tablets:Plato,Theaetetus91c-d, [Cicero],Rhet.adHerenn. .30, 31, Cicero

Part. orat.

26,

De oratore

.360;

papyrus:

[Cicero],

Rhet.ad Herenn.

2.30;

signet rings:

Aristotle,

De memoria

50

a-b;

birdcages:

Plato,

Theaetetus

97c-199c;

storehouses:

[Cicero],

Rhet.

ad

Herenn.2.28.

The

Classical

Journal

2.4

(1997)

373-383

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3/12

374

JOSEPH

FARRELL

memory

in which one can

conveniently

store

and

later

find

vast

quantities

not

only

of

individual

data

but also

of

the

relationships

that these data bear to one another. But

despite

these

differences,

all of

these

images

of human

memory

lend themselves

to

interpre-

tations

in which

remembering

is conceived as

a

relatively

simple

process

of

storing

and

retrieving

some sort

of

object.

On

this

reading,

the

thing

that is

remembered

possesses

an existence

independent

of the

storage

medium,

of the

person

or

persons

who remember

it,

and of

the culture that

produced

it and that it

represents.

This

conception

of

memory

has

been

extraordinarily powerful

and

long-lived,

and continues

to

be influential

upon contemporary

efforts

to understand

memory:

witness,

for

example,

the extensive

system

of mnemonic

metaphors

now

current

in the fields

of

com-

puter

science and

artificial

intelligence.

Here

"memory"

denotes a

particular

configuration

of

magnetic particles

on a

tape

or

disk

(or

of electrons

in

a

silicon

chip)

which

a machine "reads"

as

a

series

of

digits-ones

and

zeroes

only,

to be

specific-and

which

a

program

interprets

at

a

slightly higher

level

in

order

to

display

information

in

a

graphic

form

that

human

beings

can understand.

And when

I

say

that

the

program "interprets"

what

has been

stored

in

memory,

I

mean

this

in

only

the

most

basic

sense:

the entire

process

depends

on a

totally

unambiguous,

error-free

mechanism

of

storage

and

re-

trieval;

the

process

itself

must

not

alter

what

it

is

told

to remember

in

any

way,

or

the

system

will fail.

We will

say

that

something

is

wrong

with our

computer's

memory.

Such

a

conception

of

memory,

however,

when

applied

to

human

affairs,

inevitably figures

the

past

itself

as a kind of

object

in

ways

that

have

become

increasingly

difficult

to

accept.

Humanists,

cog-

nitive psychologists, and social anthropologists have been working

in

parallel

if

not

always

in concert

to

develop

and articulate new

models

for

understanding memory

and

the roles

it

plays

in the

ex-

perience

both of

individuals

and

of

cultures.

These

models hold

3

For

different

aspects

of

this

general

approach

see

Frederick C.

Bartlett,

Re-

membering:

Study

n

Experimental

ndSocial

Psychology

Cambridge

1932);

Maurice

Halbwachs,

The Collective

Memory

(Paris

1950;

English

tr.

Chicago

1992);

Ulric

Neisser,

Memory

Observed

San

Francisco

1982);

Edward

S.

Casey,

Remembering:

Phenomenological

tudy (Bloomington

1987);

Ulric

Neisser

and

Eugene

Winogard,

ed., Remembering econsidered:cological nd TraditionalApproacheso the Studyof

Memory

(Cambridge

1988);

Natalie Demon

Davis

and

Randolph

Starn,

edd.,

"Memory

and

Counter-Memory,"

Representations

6

(1989);

David

Middleton and

Derek

Edwards,

Collectivze

emembering

London

1990).

On the

application

of this

work

to classical

studies

see

Jocelyn Penny

Small and

James

Tatum,

"Memory

and

the

Study

of

Classical

Antiquity,"

Helios22

(1995)

149-77,

with

further

bibliography.




4/12

THEPHENOMENOLOGY F MEMORY 375

great

promise

for

those who wish to understand

the

non-objectivist

aspects

of mnemonic behavior that

pervade

Roman culture.

What

these

approaches

share is the

understanding

that memories are not

independent

and

unchanging

things

that

are stored

in

a

place

and

retrieved

when needed.

Rather,

memory

is conceived as a

process

through

which

artifacts

representing

the

past

are

constantly being

consumed

and

reproduced,

whether

by

the

individual

subject

or

by

social

groups,

whether

by

particular

acts of reminiscence and

commemoration

or

in

ritual

practice,

whether

in the form

of

un-

conventional,

even

willfully quirky personal

behavior or of

repetitive,

established,

collectivist

institutions. On this

reading memory

is

not an

object

but a

phenomenon,

a

process

in

which

an

individual

mnemonic act

represents

a

specific

memory

of the

past,

embodies

this

memory

in

a

new form

appropriate

to

the

present,

and

pro-

duces

new memories destined to serve

the

future.

What

distinguishes

this

approach

from

the dominant

ancient

theories

is its

dynamism.

Here memories

are not

things

handed

down

unchanged

from

the

past

to

the

future,

but rather are

patterns

of

cognition

and behavior

by

which

the

past

creates the future. As

an

example

of how

this

process works,

I

refer

again

to the

metaphor

of

computer

memory.

When we realize

that the material form of

computer

memory depends

on a

metaphor

promulgated by

ancient

theorists to

explain

the

workings

of

human

memory-the

metaphor

of

"writing

on

a tablet"-it

becomes

apparent

that

the use of the

word

"memory"

to denote various

aspects

of mechanized data re-

trieval

and

manipulation

is

anything

but

natural or

inevitable.

Further,

it

is

clear that the

acceptance

of the term to denote the

specific

ways

in which

computers

work comes to

influence

in turn

our perception of how the human mind works, especially but not

exclusively

with

respect

to

memory.4

Thus

the

objectivist

concept

of

memory

itself

can be shown to be a

part

of

a

dynamic

process

whereby

a

supposedly

fixed

past begets

a

cognate,

but

significantly

altered

future,

which

in

turn

remembers

a "new"

past

created

in

its own

image.

The

subject

of

memory

in

Roman culture is

large,

and the

goal

of this

paper

quite

modest.

To

gain

some

specific

understanding

of

the forces that

shaped

Roman

memory

practices,

it

will be

useful

to examine a sort of foundation myth, one that concerns the very

"invention" of

memory

itself.

The

story

is

well known as an

anecdote

4

J.

D.

Bolter,

Turing's

Man: Western

Culture

in

the

Computer

Age (Chapel

Hill

1984).




5/12

376

JOSEPH

ARRELL

put

by

Cicero

into the

mouth of

Antonius,

one

of

the

interlocutors

of

the

De oratore. I

quote

the relevant

passage

in full

(2.351-535):

I

thank the

great

Simonides

of

Ceos,

whom

they

credit

as

first to

produce

an

art

of

memory.

For

they say

that Simonides

once was

dining

at

Cranno

in

Thessaly

at the house

of

Scopas,

a

wealthy

nobleman,

in

whose honor

he

performed

a

song

that

incorporated

a

great

deal

of

poetic

embellish-

ment

having

to

do with

Castor and Pollux. After

hearing

the

song,

Scopas

quite

shamefully

told Simonides

that he would

pay

him

half of what

they

had

agreed upon,

and

that he

should

if he liked

apply

for the rest to

his

beloved

Dioscuri. A bit

after this

they say

that Simonides was asked to

come

out

of the room:

a

pair

of

young

men

were said to be at

the

door

urgently

requesting

him. He

rose,

went

out,

and saw

no

one;

but

while

this

was

happening

the

room where the feast was

taking place collapsed,

and

Scopas

was crushed

and killed

along

with his

guests.

Now,

when their

relatives

wanted

to

bury

these

people

but

were unable

to tell them

apart

in their

mutilated

condition,

the

story goes

that Simonides

was able to

advise

them

because

of

the

fact that

he remembered

where

everyone

had

been

seated

at

the

banquet;

and

as a result

of this

experience

Simonides

realized

that

arrangement

is

the

factor that

most illuminates

the

memory.

It is at first glance almost irresistible to read this story as an account

of

how a

system

that

would

transparently

preserve

objective

memories

came

to be

invented.

Indeed,

the

story

seems to

privilege

the truth

that

this form

of

memory

makes

accessible

over what is available

via

direct,

unmediated

experience.

Following

the

collapse

of

Scopas'

house,

the

dead are

plainly

visible

to all.

Their

identities, however,

are

known

only

to

Simonides,

thanks to

his

memory

of their

posi-

tions at

the

banquet.

Memory,

then,

is revealed

to be a more

potent

and

seemingly

objective

form

of

cognition

than

direct,

unmediated

5

Gratiamque

abeo imonidi

lli

Cio,

quemprimumferunt

rtemmemoriae

rotulisse.

[352]

Dicunt

enim,

cumcenaretCrannone

n Thessalia imonides

pudScopamfortunatum

hominem

t

nobilem

ecinissetque

d

carmen,

uod

n

eum

scripsisset,

n

quo

multaornandi

causa

poetarum

more

n Castorem

cripta

t

Pollucemfuissent,

imis

llum

sordide imonidi

dixisse

se dimidium

ius

ei,

quodpactus

esset,

pro

illo

carmine

daturum;

eliquum

suis

Tyndaridis,

quos

aeque

audasset,

peteret,

si ei uideretur.

[353]

Paulo

post

esse

ferunt

nuntiatum

Simonidi,

ut

prodiret:

uuenis

stare

ad

ianuamduo

quosdam, ui

eum

magno

opere

evocarent;

urrexisse

llum,

prodisse,

uidisse

neminem;

oc

interim

patio

conclaue

illud,

ubi

epularetur

Scopas,

concidisse;

a ruina

ipsum

cum

cognatis oppressum

uis

interisse.Quoscumhumareuellent sui nequepossentobtritos nternocscere llo modo,

Simonides

icitur

ex

eo,

quod

meminisset

uo

eorum

oco

quisque

ubuisset,

demonstrator

unius

cuiusque

sepeliendi

uisse:

hac

tum re admonitus

nuenisse

ertur

ordinem

esse

maxime,

qui

memoriae

umen

adferret.

The same

story

is

repeated

about

a

century

later

by

Quintilian

(IO

11.2.11-16),

citing

Cicero

and others

but

handling

the

story

in

his

own

way.




6/12

THEPHENOMENOLOGY

F MEMORY 377

experience.

If we continue

to

probe,

however,

we notice

a

few details

in the

story

that are somewhat

at

odds

with

our

initial

conclusion

that the kind of

memory

represented

here is

totally

transparent

and

value-free.

The first

thing

to

consider

is

the motif of

professionalism.

Simonides

is

represented-though

without much

emphasis,

on

which

more later-as

a

professional

praise poet.

We are

not

told

why

Scopas

commissioned Simonides

to

compose

and

perform

a

song

in his

honor-whether

he was a victor

in an athletic contest or

the

recipient

of

some

other distinction-but

it

is

clear

that this

was

a

commercial

transaction

and

that

the

poet

and his

client had

negotiated

a

price

in advance.

The content

of the

poem,

too,

which

involves

praising

not

only Scopas

but also Castor and

Pollux,

indi-

cates

a familiar

procedure

analogous

to that

normally

followed

by

Pindar in his

epinicians.

Simonides can thus be

represented

as a

professional

memory-manager:

drawing

upon

his

store

of

mythic

material

he creates

associations

between

such forms

of

cultural

memory

and the

achievements

of

his

clients,

thus

insuring

that

they

will

be

remembered

in

certain

flattering

ways

in the future.

Scopas, however, proves to be the type of client that all artists

sometimes

get.

He doesn't

understand

how

flattering

it

is to

be

as-

sociated

in

song

with the

Dioscuri,

and decides

to withhold

half

of

the

payment

for which

the

professional

craftsman

had contracted.

His

attitude

is that

he

should

pay

only

for what the

poet

has said

in

his

honor,

and

the Dioscuri

can

pay

for

themselves. This is of course

what

they

do:

not

only

do

they

save Simonides'

life

by calling

him

out of the

room,

but

they

create

thereby

the circumstances

under

which

Simonides

discovers

the

importance

of

place

as

a

memory

aid. Thus the invention of artificialmemory is represented as com-

pensation

to

a

professional

for

services

rendered;

and since this

professional

is

actively engaged

in

transactions

involving memory,

he is able to

plow

this

particular

payoff

into

capital

investment and

thus

to

solidify

his

position

in the

memory

trade.

My

reading

of

Simonides

as

magnate/entrepreneur

of artificial

mnemonics

may

seem

eccentric

and

even false to the

spirit

of the

anecdote.

The latter

charge

certainly

bears

some

truth,

for Antonius

does

nothing

to

emphasize

the

commercial

nature of

the

relation-

ship between Simonides and Scopas. Indeed, the sentence in which

the

table,

so

to

speak,

is set

is constructed

with

great cunning.

The

story begins

with the

poet

as a dinner

guest

at

Scopas'

home,

as if

he

just happened

to be

traveling

in

Thessaly

and

naturally

stayed

with

a

guest-friend

of

long

standing

(cum

cenaret

Crannone in




7/12

378

JOSEPH

FARRELL

Thessalia imonides

pud

Scopamfortunatum

ominem

t

nobilem),

nd,

while

at

dinner,

had

naturally

used

his

poetic

and musical skills

to

pay

his host a handsome

compliment

(cecinissetque

id

carmen).

Only

with

the

clause

quod

in eum

scripsisset

are we

given

our first real

indication

that Simonides'

performance

was even

premeditated,

let

alone commissioned.

The next clause

(in

quo

multa ornandi causa

poetarum

more in

Castorem

scripta

et Pollucem

fuissent)

emphasizes

the motif

of

technique:

Simonides

is,

after

all,

a craftsman

here,

not

just

a

dinner

guest.

Finally,

it is revealed that

he

is a

professional

as

well: a

price

has

been

negotiated,

and

the

client,

nimis

...

sordide,

as

Antonius

editorializes,

decides

to

renege

on the

agreement.

With

this

it is

fully

disclosed

that

Simonides'

presence

at the

banquet

is

purely

mercenary.

He is not a friend or

a

guest

of

Scopas,

but a

performer

not

invited,

but

hired

to

provide

a certain cultural

tone

for

the event

and

to enhance the

prestige

of

the

host

both

by

his

presence

and

by performing

an encomium

in

Scopas'

honor. Un-

fortunately,

Scopas

turns

out to be a

boor;

but divine intervention

turns

this

boorishness

to Simonides'

advantage

(and

to the extreme

detriment

of

everyone

else

present).

This sentence

is

clearly freighted

with

a cultural

message

that it

cannot

straightforwardly

express.

Antonius hides

as

long

as

he can

the

fact

that Simonides

sang

for

hire. In

doing

so

he

clearly

takes

Simonides'

part

and

speaks

from

a

point

of view

which,

he

no doubt

imagines,

the

poet

would

endorse. The

commercial

element

is

the

main

reason

behind

Simonides'

performance,

but

in

this

telling

of

the

story

the social

role

that the

praise

poet plays requires

that he

hide his

professional

status.

The first

part

of

the

sentence,

which

concerns

Simonides'

presence

at

the

banquet

and his

performance

of an encomium of his host, itself reflects the professional's occlusion

of

his

professionalism.

The second

part

concerns

Scopas'

transgres-

sion.

Scopas

breaches

the social code

in

three

respects:

first

by

failing

to

understand

the conventions

of

encomiastic

poetry,

which

virtually require

that the

encomiast

praise

his human

subject

by

comparing

him to

a

god;

then

by refusing

to

pay

Simonides

the fee

to

which

he

had

agreed.

These first two

transgressions

I

have

men-

tioned

already. Equally important

is the

fact that

he

fails

to

conspire

with

the

poet

in the occlusion

of mercantile

considerations-not

the fact that he refuses to pay the full price, but the fact that he

allows

financial

considerations

of

any

sort to intrude

themselves

upon

what

is

supposed

to be a cultural

and social

event.

In order

to

maintain

this

appearance

the

underlying

nature

of Simonides'

participation

in the

banquet

as

part

of

a business

transaction

must




8/12

THEPHENOMENOLOGY

F

MEMORY 379

not be

acknowledged.

Scopas brings

this hidden

aspect

out

into

the

open,

and

the

transgression proves

to be fatal.

It

is, however,

distinctly

odd that Antonius shows such

delicacy

in

handling

the

theme of

professionalism

where

Simonides

is con-

cerned; for,

in

addition

to

many

other

firsts,

including

the invention

of the

first

memory

system,

Simonides

was considered

to have been

the first Greek

poet

to have worked for

pay;

nor,

unlike Pindar for

instance,

was

he reluctant to

speak

openly

about

earning money

by

his

poetry.

Indeed,

he was

specifically

and

universally

remembered

in

later

tradition as

(pyhpyopo.6P

Stories

such as the one in

De oratore

are

thus

part

and

parcel

of the tradition

that remembered Simonides

not as

a

gifted

gentleman

amateur,

but

as a "hired

gun."

In

light

of

this

well-attested

tradition,

Antonius'

delicacy

in

broaching

the

matter

of

payment

is

striking,

to

say

the

least.

If we

ask what it

means that Antonius

frames

his

anecdote

in

this

way,

answers

are

not

far

to seek.

It is notable that Antonius

begins

by putting

himself

in

the

position

of the Dioscuri

in

contrast

with

that

of

Scopas

by thanking

Simonides

(gratiam

habeo

Simonidi

illi

Cio)

for

his invention

of artificial

memory.

He

aligns

himself

with

Simonides

as well

in

that the anecdote

that

he

relates,

like

Simonides'

poem

about

Scopas,

is a

kind

of

encomium.

There

is

thus

a close

resemblance

between

the

circumstances

of

the

narrator

Antonius

and

the hero

of his

story.

We

might

even

say

that

his

affinity

in

equal

measure

to Simonides

on the

one hand

and to

Castor

and

Pollux

on the

other recalls

Simonides'

epinician song,

which

had

divided

its

praise

between a human

honorand

and

the

Dioscuri.

Thus

the

narrator's

involvement

in

his

own

story appears

to

be

great;

but

this

involvement, too,

Antonius'

language

works to

oc-

clude. He constantly stresses the traditional, tralatician character of

the

story

he tells

(ferunt

. . .

dicunt

. . .

ferunt

. . .

dicitur

. .

.

fertur),

suggesting

that

he,

Antonius,

is

but one

in

a

series of

no

doubt

faithful

transmitters

of an

accurate

account

of

an

objective,

ontologically independent

event.

But Antonius

qua

encomiast does

have

a clear

narratological affinity

with

his

subject.

Moreover,

he

begins

his

story

by

explicitly

thanking

Simonides

for

his

discovery

of what became

rhetorical

mnemotechnics,

thus

advertising

his

indebtedness

to the

poet

and

inviting

the reader

to

consider the

aetiological tale that follows as a kind of reward. We may therefore

ask: does

the

similarity

between

narrator

and narration extend to

the theme

of

money

as well?

6

The

relevant testimonia

are assembled

by

F.

G.

Schneidewin,

SimonidisCei

carminum

eliquiae

Braunschweig

1835)

xxiv-xxxii.




9/12

380

JOSEPH

ARRELL

In

the reader's

eyes,

Antonius

is

ultimately just

a character

whose

contribution

on

the

discovery

of artificial

memory

is

part

of

a

long

dialogue

on the orator

composed by

Cicero.

Consequently,

the

purpose

of Antonius' encomium

of

Simonides

must be

judged

in terms

of

Cicero's

overall

plan

in

the

dialogue.

The

anonymous

author

of

the

Rhetorica ad Herennium

clearly

conceives of technical

or artificial

memory

in

much the

same

way

as Cicero does

in

De

oratore

-namely,

as a

system

of

relationships

based

primarily upon

the

arrangement

of

mental

"objects"

in

an

imaginary

facsimile of

an actual

space.7

But

it

is

equally

clear that Cicero's

handling

of

memory

is

very

different

from that of

his

predecessor.

Instead of

trying

to

give

a

practical

account

of how someone

might go

about

arranging

a

personal

system

of artificial

memory

such as we find

in

the

Rhetorica ad

Herennium,

Cicero instead

has the character

Antonius

pronounce

the encomium

of Simonides

that

I

have dis-

cussed

above.

The difference between

these treatments

is

partly

explained

by

the fact

that De oratore s

not

merely

a

manual of

rhetoric

in

the

same

sense

as the

anonymous

treatise is.

Rather,

in this

wider-

ranging

essay

Cicero

uses the

figure

of the orator as

a vehicle for

developing

and

expressing

his ideas

on

a

variety

of issues

that are

by

no

means

merely

technical,

ideas

that

involve

many

of the most

important

issues

that concern Cicero

as a

person

in

every

sense

of

the

word;

and

inevitably

these

concerns

are determined

in

large

part

by

Cicero's

position

as a member

of a certain

class,

profession,

and economic

stratum

possessing

the

political

and social

outlook

characteristic

of those

groups.

Accordingly,

the

importance

of

memory

to the

orator

is

stressed

throughout

the

dialogue

not

in

abstract,

but

in

culturally

engaged

terms; and,

of

course,

all

oratory,

like Simonides' poetic encomium of Scopas, has some purpose.

Both these

points

appear

clearly

in the

proemium

to Book

1

of

De

oratore,

where

Cicero

depicts

himself

as lost

in

contemplation

and-significantly-remembrance

of

days gone

by

(Cogitanti

mihi

saepe

numero

et

memoria

uetera

repetenti).

He

thinks

specifically

of

the

period

when

the

republic

truly

flourished

(perbeatifuisse

...

illi

uideri

olent

qui

in

optima

e

publica,

um

et honoribus

t

rerum

gestarum

gloria

lorerent,

eum

uitae cursum

tenere

potuerunt).

Then,

he

recalls,

it was

possible

to

lead

a life of

unperiled

activity

or

one of

dignified

leisure (ut uel in negotiosine periculouel in otio cum dignitateesse

possent);

and

he once

thought

that

his

own

time

of forensic

labor

7

[Cicero],

Rhetorica

d Herennium .28-40.

I

hope

to examine

the

representa-

tion

of

memory

in

this

treatise

in a

future

essay.




10/12

THEPHENOMENOLOGY

F MEMORY

381

and

political preoccupation

would

give way

to relaxation

once he

had

held

virtually

all

possible

offices and reached

old

age

(ac

fuit

cum

mihi

quoque

nitium

requiescendi tque

animum

ad

utriusque

nos-

trum

praeclara

tudia

referendifore

ustum

et

prope

bomnibus

oncessum

arbitrarer,

i

infinitus forensium

rerum

labor et ambitionis

occupatio

decursu

honorum, etiam

aetatis

flexu

constitisset);

but the

turbulent

conditions

that

supervened

had

cheated

him of this

expectation

(quam

spem cogitationum

t

consiliorummeorum

um

graues

commu-

nium

temporum

um uarii nostri

casusfefellerunt).8

If

we

compare

the situation in which Cicero

places

himself here

with that

in

which

Antonius later

places

Simonides,

we

immediately

notice

some

striking parallels.

Both

Cicero

and Simonides are as-

sociated

with

memory;

both

are

men of

letters;

both

expect

their

literary

activities

to

bear

fruit,

which

for Cicero means

a

succession

of

public

offices

(honores)

and

eventually

a

dignified

retirement,

while

Simonides

expects payment

in

cash.

Finally,

both are

cheated

of their reward

by unjust

circumstances.

In

light

of

these

similarities,

it

seems clear that Simonides

is

represented

in this

anecdote not

just

as

the

inventor

of

mnemotechnics

but

as one of

the founders of

that art to which Cicero devoted his career, the pursuit of which

ultimately

cost the statesman

his life. Simonides

is

also a

type

of

Cicero

in that he meets-and unlike

Cicero,

ultimately triumphs

over-the

ingratitude

of those who

should thank

him

most. It

is

this last

point

of contact

that

chiefly

interests us. Both

as

an orator

and

as a member

of

the Roman

aristocracy

Cicero adhered to an

ideology

that

required

lavish cultural

display

and

tactful,

even

duplicitous

concealment

of

the resources-or

at least of

the effort

that went

into the

acquisition

of

those resources-that made

this

display possible. In particular, it was essential that the orator qua

orator

not

appear

to be

using

his craft to

earn

money.

If

the Roman

orator was like the modern

lawyer,

the

similarity

breaks down

over the issue of

payment.

In

the first

place,

advocates

were

forbidden to

accept payment by

the

lex Cincia de donis et muneri-

bus

of

204

B.C.Not that

an

advocate

of Cicero's stature did not

receive

specific

and sometimes

very

material benefits

as a result of

his

plead-

ing;

in

some

cases the

gratia

that results

from a

specific

instance

of

advocacy

can be traced

pretty

clearly

to

a

particular payoff,

though

normally either the transactions themselves or our information

about them

is

too

vague

to

allow

us to

keep

an accurate

ledger.

Ac-

tually working

for hire was

supposed

to be out

of

the

question,

but

8

De oratore 1.1.




11/12

382

JOSEPH

ARRELL

the

rewards were there: as Cicero

himself

put

it,

"Opportunities

to

reap

favor and

patronage

are

open

to a man

who can

speak

well,

work

tirelessly,

and, in accordance with ancestral custom, defend

many

clients

without reluctance or

direct

compensation."9

It is

not

entirely

clear that the lex Cincia was often

enforced

in

Cicero's

day.

However

this

may

be,

the law

was

certainly

not for-

gotten-least

of

all

by

Cicero,

who

in

spite

of

his

fine-sounding

words about

the orator's

obligation

to

speak

without

payment,

seems

to have

regarded

the law as

something

of a

joke. Having

run

afoul

of

it when his client Publius Sulla

lent

him

two million

sesterces,

a favor

that did not

go

unnoticed

by

opponents,

Cicero

first lied

about the

arrangement

and

then

excused

his behavior with

a

joke.10

Again,

after

accepting

a

gift

of

books from his

friend

Papirius

Paetus,

he

commented

to Atticus that the modest

gift

was

allowable

under

the lex Cincia-a

passage

that,

in

light

of the

larger

gifts

that

Cicero

is known to have

accepted,

has also been inter-

preted

as

a

joke.11

And Cicero mentions

the law a third time

in the

same

book

of De

oratore

in

which the Simonides

anecdote occurs.

The

passage

involves

the use

of

witty

counterattacks

by

the skilled

speaker (2.28612):

And

there

is

often

humor

in

a

pointed

retort.

For

instance,

on

the

day

when Marcus

Cincius

passed

the law

on

gifts

and

rewards,

when

Gaius

Cento

came

up

to

him

and asked

rather

insultingly,

"What

are

you selling,

Cincy?",

he

replied,

"That

if

you

want

to use

something,

Gaius,

you'd

better

buy

it "

Cincius'

ironic

summary

of the

provisions

of

his

law,

which

actually

tried to

forbid cash transactions

between

advocates and

their clients, sorts well with the theme of reward, compensation,

and

remuneration

that broods beneath

the surface

of De oratore and

runs

like

a red thread

through

Cicero's

entire career.

In

this re-

spect,

too,

and

not

just

for his technical contribution

to the

pursuit

of

rhetoric,

Antonius'

Simonides

is the

ideological

ancestor

of

the

Roman

orator.

In

spite

of the consummate

craftsmanship

that he

9

Diserti

igitur

hominis

etfacile

laborantis,

quodque

in

patriis

est

moribus,

multorum

causas

et non

grauate

et

gratuito defendentis

beneficia

et

patrocinia

late

patent

(De

officiis

2.66).

10

Gellius,

NA 12.12.

11

Ad Att. 1.20.7 with

Shackleton

Bailey's

comment

ad

loc.

12Saepe

etiam sententiose

ridicula

dicuntur,

ut

M.

Cincius,

quo

die

legem

de donis

et

muneribus

tulit,

cum

C.

Cento

prodisset

et satis contumeliose

"quid fers,

Cinciole?"

quaesisset,

"Vt

emas,

"

inquit,

"Gai,

si

uti uelis.

"




12/12

THE

PHENOMENOLOGY

F MEMORY 383

lavishes

on his encomium

of

Scopas,

his

professionalism,

like

that

of

the Roman

orator,

conceals

itself,

requiring

him

to

play

the

role

of

another

cultivated

guest

at

Scopas'

table.

When

Scopas destroys

the

illusion

that

his

relationship

with Simonides

is other than that

of

a

paying

customer

with a

paid professional,

he suffers for

his

transgression.

Antonius' commemoration

of Simonides'

discovery

is

thus

given

a form

specific

to

the cultural

pressures

that limit

and

define

the

professionalism

of

the orator

as a

craftsman who is com-

pensated

for

his

work.

I

hope

that

my reading

of this anecdote

supports

the idea that

memories

actually

have no

existence

independent

of

"storage

media,"

be

they

cd-roms

or anecdotes like

these.

Instead,

I

would

agree

with

those

who

believe

that

mnemonic

behavior

should be understood

in terms

not of

storage

but of

enactment.

The Romans

in

particular

were

to a

very

large

extent

in

the habit

not of

storing

memories

but

of

performing

them,

much

as Antonius

performs

the

discovery

of

the

rhetorician's

artificial

memory

in the anecdote

about Simonides.

Cicero

surely

knew

this anecdote

in a form that laid

greater

stress

on

the Greek

poet's legendary

and

unabashed

ptXapyupia,

but in

his

retelling

he

problematizes

the issue

of

payment

in

a

way

that

corresponds

both to

the social and even

legal

parameters

of

his own

profession

as an advocate

and even

more

poignantly

to the

trajec-

tory

of

his own career

as a statesman

in

ways

that

speak

to the

role

of

the advocate

and

that of the statesman

in a

specifically

Roman

context.

Handing

on an accurate

memory

of whatever

"originary

event"

inspired

this

tale

clearly

takes second

place

to the

story's

plasticity,

its

capacity

for

adaptation

to needs

that

change

over

time and

across cultures.

Both

in this anecdote

and

in

the meta-

phor of performance lies a much clearer sense of the way in which

memories are

not

simply

retrieved

but

are

actually produced

in

unprecedented

versions

that bear

a

family

resemblance

to earlier

performances

without

conforming

to a

single unvarying type

or,

indeed,

bearing

the same

meaning, produced

as

they

are

in

ever-

differing

social contexts.

To

explore

the further

implications

of this

insight

must remain

a

goal

for the future.

In this

paper,

I

hope

to have

contributed to

the

work

of

refashioning

our own

memory

of

ancient

Roman culture

and, in the process, to have made some small contribution to the

commemoration

of

a

distinguished

Romanist,

an

inspiring

teacher,

and

a beloved

friend.

JOSEPH

FARRELL

University of

Pennsylvania

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The Phenomenology of Memory in Roman Culture

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