This article was downloaded by: [University of Limerick] On: 16 April 2013, At: 16:31 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK India Review Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/find20 The Politics of History and the Indo-Tibetan Border (1987–88) Elliot Sperling Version of record first published: 29 Aug 2008. To cite this article: Elliot Sperling (2008): The Politics of History and the Indo- Tibetan Border (1987–88), India Review, 7:3, 223-239 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14736480802261608 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/ terms-and-conditions This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
Transcript
This article was downloaded by: [University of Limerick]On: 16 April 2013, At: 16:31Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,London W1T 3JH, UK
India ReviewPublication details, including instructions forauthors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/find20
The Politics of History andthe Indo-Tibetan Border(1987–88)Elliot SperlingVersion of record first published: 29 Aug 2008.
To cite this article: Elliot Sperling (2008): The Politics of History and the Indo-Tibetan Border (1987–88), India Review, 7:3, 223-239
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14736480802261608
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private studypurposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution,reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden.
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make anyrepresentation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up todate. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses shouldbe independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall notbe liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs ordamages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly inconnection with or arising out of the use of this material.
FIND1473-64891557-3036India Review, Vol. 7, No. 3, July 2008: pp. 1–12India ReviewThe Politics of History and the Indo-Tibetan Border (1987–88)The Indo-Tibetan Border (1987–88)India ReviewELLIOT SPERLING
In Tibetan affairs the year 1987 is best known for the mass demonstra-tions against Chinese rule that erupted unexpectedly in Lhasa thatSeptember. Such demonstrations had not been seen in Tibet indecades and – like the protests that started on March 10 of this year –served to remind the outside world that the Tibet issue was far fromsettled. But until the protests, what international attention wasfocused on Tibet in 1987 was directed at the tense situation along theSino-Indian border. Starting in 1986 a confrontation developed in thearea of Sumdurong Chu (Tib . Sum-mdo-rong chu?), near the junc-ture that marked the boundary lines separating Bhutan, India andChina. Displays of force had built up into actual clashes and over thecourse of a year military deployments and counter-deploymentsoccurred that were hardly secret. Anyone passing through Tibet’smain airport in the summer of 1987 could not but notice the militaryplanes lined up and positioned for obvious effect on the side of therunway. The message intended by these formations was easily trans-mitted to New Delhi via any and all persons flying into or out ofTibet.1
The Sino-Indian Border DisputeThe root of the long-running conflict lay in the dispute over the Sino-Indian border, a dispute that remains unresolved. In the eastern sectorChina claims the regions south of the main ridge of the Himalayasdown to the bottom of the foothills that run eastward from Bhutan.India, however, insists that the McMahon Line, negotiated at the tri-partite Simla Conference of 1914, is the valid border. The Simlaconference produced maps setting the border where India claims it,
Elliot Sperling is Associate Professor of Tibetan Studies in the Department of CentralEurasian Studies at Indiana University.
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initialed by the British and Tibetan plenipotentiaries but not by theChinese. During the Sino-Indian War of 1962 this region became oneof the major areas of combat, as Chinese troops swept down from theheights and captured large swathes of territory all the way down tothe plains where China places the traditional Sino-Indian border.China’s position was and remains that the boundary agreementsreached between Britain and Tibet in 1914 are invalid because Chinawas not party to them. For China, the legal border is at the base of theHimalayan foothills. The broader basis of this assertion is China’sclaim to unbroken sovereignty over Tibet from the thirteenth centuryto the present. In contrast, India has consistently held that Tibetanaccession to the terms of the Simla Convention was enough to renderthe arrangements valid, though when called on to support Tibet’sindependent status at the United Nations in 1950, India, in the face ofChina’s invasion, averred that Tibet’s status was unclear, underminingany basis for intervention by the world body, much to the palpabledisappointment of Tibetans who had been trying to secure such help.
The 1962 war with India brought China widespread condemnationand forced it to make its case in a number of different ways: lobbyingmembers of the non-aligned movement and circulating materials thatsupported its case. One of the most well-known instances of the latterwas the publication and distribution of official statements and sup-porting reproductions of maps relating to the border issue (includingsheets from the maps initialed by the British and Tibetan plenipoten-tiaries at Simla) which were gathered into a volume published underthe title The Sino-Indian Boundary Question.2
In the wake of the war, China pulled its forces back from the easternsector, though it did not relinquish its claim to the territory; intermit-tent periods of tension followed during subsequent years. In addition,Sino-Indian relations have been strained by matters that go beyond theborder issues: India’s grant of asylum to the Dalai Lama in 1959 and thesupport – albeit at fluctuating levels – afforded the Tibetan exile com-munity in India since then have been viewed by China as somethingakin to interference in Chinese domestic affairs. Not that China’sbehavior provided an example of strict adherence to principles of non-interference: during the 1960s and 1970s China supported separatistmovements in India’s Northeast, particularly among the Nagas.3
China has looked askance at any unilateral Indian actions in thedisputed territories, viewing such moves as provocations. Thus, the
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vote by the Indian parliament in December 1986 to elevate ArunachalPradesh to a state within the Indian Union added to the confronta-tional atmosphere. Known as the North East Frontier Agency(NEFA), until it was designated a Union Territory and renamedArunachal Pradesh in 1971, the new state comprised the territoriesclaimed by China that lay in the eastern sector of the disputed bound-ary, south of the McMahon Line, as well as territory that China didnot claim. China’s political tactics in the dispute have led it to refuseto recognize Sikkim’s incorporation into India as a state, in spite ofthere being no Chinese claim on Sikkim.4
Thus, when the tensions erupted in 1986–87 they were hardlyunexpected. But the intensity of the conflict that year was surprising,particularly as China had indicated its willingness since 1960 to reacha settlement essentially based, with some adjustments, on Chinaaccepting India’s claims in the eastern sector while India acceptedChina’s claims in the west, i.e., the Aksai Chin area. But the new crisishardened positions on both sides; in the face of Indian moves Chinaindicated an abandonment of its willingness to swap territory.
Although both sides ultimately climbed down from the precipiceat which they stood, the basic problem between them remained – andremains – unresolved. And so at that point history and historicaldocumentation were brought into the picture. However, while theaftermath of the 1962 war saw China’s release of The Sino-IndianBoundary Question, the 1986–87 hostilities were notable for the 1988publication of a collection of Tibetan documents relating to the areasouth of the McMahon Line, brought out as evidence of the area’sfirm ties to China; this is, of course based on the understanding thatTibet is and has been an inalienable part of China since the thirteenthcentury.
Making the Chinese Case for the Mon-yul BorderThe volume of materials in question appeared as volume 10 in theseries Bod-kyi lo-rgyus rig-gnas dpyad-gzhi’i rgyu-cha bdams-sgrigs(“Selected Research Materials for Tibetan History and Culture,”henceforth SRM 10) as part of the ongoing series of materials in Tibetpublished by the Tibet Autonomous Region’s branch of the ChinesePeople’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), an organ underthe United Front Works Department (UFWD).5 Volumes in the seriesare published in both Tibetan and Chinese; SRM 10 is no different.
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The Political Consultative Conference has served as an organ for theassimilation of what are termed “patriotic” but non-communist fig-ures into the Chinese socialist system.6 In Tibet in the 1980s this hadthe practical effect of providing sinecures for former aristocrats withinthe unit. One of the tasks given to many of them was the preparationof short memoir pieces that were then included in these volumes. Inthat respect, SRM 10 is very much like the others.
However, the volumes in the series do vary in their contents; somecontain materials that go well beyond the memoirs of political eventsthat occurred during the earlier years of their aristocratic authors.Indeed, SRM 10 contains one work that is of particular value foranyone interested in the broader history of the disputed areas in theNortheast. This is the Rje-’bangs rnams-kyi rigs-rus gsal-ba’i sgron-me(“The Lamp that Illumines the Lineages of the Lords and TheirSubjects”), also accorded the short title Mon chos-’byung (“TheHistory of the Dharma in Mon-yul”).7 It is a traditional history ofMon-yul, although its content also takes in eastern Bhutan as well asLho-yul, the area to the east of Mon-yul. Lho-yul, Mon-yul andRdza-yul (which lies even further east) encompass most (but not all)of the territory of Arunachal Pradesh. This version of the work wasunavailable until its publication in this collection, though another ver-sion has been studied by Michael Aris.8
The documents in SRM 10 would seem to have been written origi-nally in Tibetan and then translated into Chinese for publication inthat language as well.9 It need not be stressed that their appearance in1988 was as part of a campaign aimed at making China’s case in thedispute. But interestingly, unlike the documents published in 1962,these materials were not published in English for wider distribution.The documents in the 1962 collection were largely official governmentstatements plus various map facsimiles. Such materials were easilyunderstood by the target international audience for which the Englishtranslations were produced. By contrast, SRM 10 was effectivelymarked for circulation among Tibetans, Chinese, and perhaps a smallnumber of international academics and other specialists simply bydint of the publication languages. Curiously, though, the series inwhich the volume appeared had previously been designated neibu
and therefore formally restricted to internal circulation withinthe People’s Republic of China (PRC). SRM 10 was not marked assuch and was openly available.10 Nevertheless, though easily found in
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Tibet, the series in which it appeared was not widely distributedwithin the PRC. It is worth noting too that in 1988 publishing housesand bookstores were both less numerous in Tibet than they are today.The documents in SRM 10 were therefore at most designed to makethe Chinese case better understood within the PRC, particularlyamong sections of the Tibetan population. Since the volume was notwidely distributed beyond Tibet, we might assume that the Chineseversion was essentially aimed at Chinese readers in positions specifi-cally connected to Tibetan affairs.
Aside from the Mon chos-’byung (the last work in the volume) thecontents of SRM 10 are as follows:
“Historical Evidence that Mon-yul Has Been a Part of China SinceEarly Times” (Mon-yul ni sngar-nas Krung-go’i mnga’-khongs yin-pa’i lo-rgyus dpang-rtags) by Chab-spel Tshe-brtan phun-tshogs
“The Secret Correspondence Exchanged with Delhi Received NoAssent From the Tibetan Local Government” (Di-lir gsang-ba’iyig-rigs brje-len byas-pa dir Bod sa-gnas srid-gzung-gis khas-lenbyas-rigs med-pa) by Lha-klu Tshe-dbang rdo-rje
“The Truth About the Invading Indian Army’s Aggression in the MonArea” (Hin-rdu btsan-’dzul dmag-gis Mon-khul-du btsan-’dzulbyas-pa’i don-dngos) by Thub-bstan chos-’phel
“Denouncing the Invading Indian Troops Face-to-Face” (Hin-rdubtsan-’dzul dmag-la gdong-gtugs-kyis kha-rdung btang-ba) byMar-kong Ye-shes dgra-’dul
“My Argument with the Invading Indian Troops” (Nga dang Hin-rdubtsan-’dzul dmag dbar byung-ba’i rtsod-gleng zhig) by Smin-glingZla-mchog
“Sbas-chags-shri11 Is Unquestionably a Part of Our Country” (Sbas-chags-shri ni rang-rgyal-gyi mnga’-khongs bsnyon-med yin) byShing-sdong
“The Real Circumstances of the Invading Indian Army’s Occupationof Sbas-chags-shri at the Time I Was Serving at Sgar-chagsgzhis”12 (Nga Sgar-chags gzhis sdod las-thog-skabs Hin-rdu’ibtsan-’dzul dmag-gis Sbas-chags-shri btsan-bzung byas-pa’i gnas-tshul dngos) by Bde-rab Tshe-rdor
“The Real Circumstances of My Obstruction When I Went to Smag-sgo13
to Collect Taxes” (Nga Smag-sgor khral-bsdur bskyod-skabs’gog-rkyen ’phred-pa’i gnas-tshul dngos) by Dpal-’byor
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“Observations from a Trip to Tawang in 1962” (1962-lor Rta-dbang-la bskyod-skabs-kyi mthong-thos) by Bsod-nams dpal-’byor
The intent of these pieces is naturally to strengthen popular feelings ofindignation about India’s claims to Mon-yul and associated areas andthe contents make this obvious. But this does not run across theboard, since the Mon chos-’byung, at least, is a pre-modern work thatevinces none of the pointed political and emotional rhetoric of theother pieces. But the sense that a reader is meant to bring away fromSRM 10 is that India’s claims are baseless and deceitful and the Indianmilitary has committed aggression against China.
While the Tibetan term most generally encountered for thedisputed territories in the eastern sector is Mon-yul, we ought tounderstand from the outset that we are dealing with territories that donot conform to modern boundaries (disputed or not) in the sense thatthe territories covered in the Mon chos-’byung include parts of mod-ern Tibet, India and Bhutan. In SRM 10 some of the twentieth-century articles also clearly deal with the regions Tibetans designate asRdza-yul and as Lho-yul.14
“No One Mentioned McMahon . . . I Never Heard of Him”The first of the articles in SRM 10 is an account of Mon-yul’s past,and cites several Tibetan histories to make the case for the area’s iden-tity as a part of China. At the time of writing, the author, Chab-spelTshe-brtan phun-tshogs, was one of the foremost Tibetan historiansin the PRC. Within the piece he clearly places Mon-yul’s rulerswithin the ranks of Tibetan local aristocratic rulers who can tracethemselves back to the Tibetan emperors of the imperial period (i.e.,the seventh–ninth centuries). Describing the mention of three puta-tive ancestors of the Mon-pa, the people of the region, in the Lde’uchos-’byung, he asserts that there are almost no Tibetan historicalwritings, voluminous or not, that do not mention the Mon region,15
noting further that the term “Mon” is attested in the earliest Tibetanlexicons as a word designating a region of lush forests, lowlands,mountains and valleys.16 Other important sources cited as placing theorigins of the Mon-pa within the Tibetan cultural milieu are the FifthDalai Lama’s history of Tibet, the Rgya-Bod yig-tshang, the Mkhas-pa’idga’-ston and of course, the Mon chos-’byung contained within thesame volume.
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These textual references are quite interesting; the Rgya-Bod yig-tshang, for instance, an important text for the history of thirteenth- andfourteenth-century Tibet describes one lineage of the Mon-pa asoriginating in the Tangut state which ruled a significant portion ofnorthwest China before its destruction by the Mongols in thethirteenth century.17 Chab-spel concludes that “from the above-citedwritten sources, it is shown that the ancestors of the lineages of theMon-pa (including the Lho-pa), came from the early people ofthe high Tibetan Plateau in far antiquity.”18 More specifically, he citesthe Mon chos-’byung to the effect that after the ninth-century reign ofthe Tibetan emperor Glang dar-ma, whose assassination marked thecollapse of the Tibetan empire, ministers of his son Yum-brtan(himself the ancestor of the later kings in Western Tibet, includingthose in Gu-ge, Spu-rang and Ladakh) fled and established themselvesin Mon-yul.19
Lha-klu Tshe-dbang rdo-rje’s contribution to SRM 10 is targetedat the modern period. He notes that political rule over the Mon-yularea by “China’s Tibet” dates to the time of the Fifth Dalai Lama (i.e.,the mid-seventeenth century) and then mentions the establishment ofspecific administrative divisions for the region in the eighteenthcentury. But most of his commentary relates to the twentieth century:as concerns the Simla conference Lha-klu writes that the exchange ofletters between the Tibetan Government and the British did not pro-duce a definitive result regarding the border; and that before hisuntimely death the Tibetan plenipotentiary never produced theaccount of what had transpired at Simla that the Dalai Lama had askedhim to prepare, leaving the Tibetan Government in the dark as to thecourse negotiations had taken and the maps drawn up there.20
Lha-klu’s piece clearly draws on Tibetan materials. He discusses anaudience that Charles Bell had with the Dalai Lama, in which theBritish official sought the implementation of the provisions of thesecret letters exchanged with Delhi, dating the meeting according tothe Tibetan calendar: the twentieth day of the tenth month of theIron-Monkey Year (= November 29, 1920). The conversationbetween Bell and the Dalai Lama is cited to show that as far as theDalai Lama was concerned the results of the Simla conference hadnever been finalized and that while he hoped Bell would remedy thesituation, nothing of the sort happened. Lha-klu writes that the SimlaConvention was thus without effect.21
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Lha-klu also tells of a letter of Tibetan minister (Tib. bka’-blon)Zhol-khang22 dated the thirteenth day of the twelfth month of thesame Tibetan year, describing Charles Bell’s further machinations,while in Lhasa, to get the Tibetan Government to agree to a separate,secret treaty concerning British rights to territory south of the McMahonLine. The activity was rather shadowy (Lha-klu claims never to haveseen this document) and ultimately unsuccessful: he states that theTibetan Government never accepted the McMahon Line.23 Finally, onthe basis of his personal knowledge as a former official of the TibetanGovernment he recounts the resistance of the Tibetan Governmentand local Mon-pa to British attempts to enforce jurisdiction in the areain 1938, and 1944 and to similar attempts by the Indian Government in1947 and 1951.24
The next article in SRM 10, Thub-bstan chos-’phel’s account of theIndian takeover of Tawang (Tib. Rta-dbang) and other areas, is morepersonal than Lha-klu’s piece. The author had been sent to the regionby the Tibetan Bka’-shag (i.e., the Council of Ministers)25 to serve assteward (Tib. bla-gnyer) in Tawang monastery. He recounts variouselements of life in the region (only Tibetan currency was used, noother language was used there except for Tibetan, etc.), noting theinstructions he had received from the Bka’-shag; he was to monitorthe Indian troops in the area and seek to remain on friendly termswith them, but not cease regional tax collections. He then describesthe arrival of Indian troops, led by one called “Me-car” (i.e., “major”),in Tawang on February 9, 1951, along with a medical officer called“Keb-gran” (i.e., “captain”).26 In the course of discussions the Indiansstated that their presence in the region was a response to the arrival ofthe Chinese communists in Chab-mdo, but in accord with the SimlaConvention. Thub-bstan chos-’phel stated that none of the Tibetanofficials was told anything about Simla or the McMahon Line by theBka’-shag. The troops entrenched themselves in the area but alsoattempted some diplomacy, inviting the Tibetans for entertainmentand a banquet; seeing it as a trick, they still accepted, the better toobserve the new interlopers.27 Serious problems arose later, however,when Thub-bstan chos-’phel began sending secret letters to both theBka’-shag and Yang Gongsu , a Chinese Central Governmentofficial posted in Tibet, giving a full account of the arrival of theIndian troops and officials and of their activities in Mon-yul (including,one assumes, the daily airdrops to the military that Thub-bstan
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chos-’phel describes).28 His brother, Rgyal-mtshan brtson-’grus wasarrested carrying such letters, accused of espionage and held by Indiafor two years.29 Not surprisingly, the piece closes on a strong note:
Since ancient times Mon-yul has stood out as an indisputable andinseparable part of China’s Tibet. Thus, from the 17th century, thetime of the 5th Dalai Lama, the Tibetan local government estab-lished its administration over the whole of Mon-yul and fromthen on exercised effective administrative management there.When I was appointed as Tawang treasurer (Tib. gnyer-tshang),other than being ordered to collect taxes in Mon-yul and applythe laws as per previous traditions, no one mentioned McMahon,etc. I never heard of him.30
The final lines of the Tibetan and Chinese versions diverge signifi-cantly. The Tibetan states: “In consideration of the traditionalharmony between the peoples of India and China and in accord withthe Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, I hope that through theunfinished goodwill talks there will be a just and comprehensive settle-ment of the border issue.”31 However, the Chinese version writes:“[T]he emphasis to us on collecting taxes and applying the law as wascustomary also proves that the so-called annexation of Mon-yul toIndia never received recognition from the Tibetan local government.”32
The next piece, by Mar-kong Ye-shes dgra-’dul, similarly detailshis experiences with the Indian army. He was in the Lho-yul area, eastof Mon-yul proper, collecting taxes – in his case as part of his dutiesworking for the Lha-klu family which had an estate holding grantedby the Tibetan Government, Sgar-chags gzhis-ka, which took in thearea of Sbas-chags-shri. In 1952, Mar-kong and those who workedwith him observed Indian officers and troops arriving by helicopter.A day later they were told to come to Indian headquarters. He and acompanion went and in the presence of two Tibetan interpreters theywere queried about their activities and told they could not collecttaxes in this region, as it was under India. Mar-kong produced hisorders from the Tibetan Government, and read them out loudly.Finally the Tibetans were allowed to depart to Bde-chen-thang33 (withone of the translators and about ten Indian soldiers in tow), the Indianofficers telling them that they would seek instructions about the matterfrom Delhi via telegram. When they went about any business they
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were under Indian surveillance and at one point were threatened withimprisonment as communist agents.34 Though ultimately able to leave,Mar-kong recounts his face-to-face argument with the Indians, bringingforth various points to prove that the area was not Indian, while hisinterlocutors responded with pronouncements along the lines of theregion having been given to the British by Bshad-sgra (“LonchenShatra”)35 and having been paid for in English guns. Mar-kong statesthat the Indians had not the least knowledge of history.36
Smin-gling Zla-mchog’s contribution relates to an encounter withIndian officials in 1957, when he went into Indian-controlled Lho-yulto find two of his servants who had fled there the previous year. Theencounter became heated, as the Indian officials made it clear that thetwo servants (a husband and wife) would not be handed back. Aftertelegraphing New Delhi, the Indians offered Smin-gling compensa-tion of Rs 1,000 for each of the servants. He refused, and when theIndians asserted that the British had drawn the area into the borders ofIndia he retorted “If that’s how it is, would it be alright then for us todraw all of India into our map?”37
Shing-sdong’s article is a brief account of Sbas-chags-shri. Hedates the region’s opening to the arrival there of the well-knownfourteenth- and fifteenth-century Tibetan siddha Thang-stong rgyal-po, and then describes the regional religious traditions and taxationpractices. He closes with a short description of the Indian entry in thearea which mirrors that given by Mar-kong. He notes that in 1951 anairplane made several overflights of Sbas-chags-shri and in 1952troops arrived and began setting up a base and an airplane landingstrip.38
The next piece in the volume, by Bde-rab tshe-rdor, is anotheraccount of the Indian army entrenching itself in Sbas-chags-shri. Theauthor notes that the area came under the jurisdiction of Sgar-chagsgzhis-ka, the estate of the Lha-klu family, located in Rtse-lha rdzongin Kong-po.39 Bde-rab, like his father, held a position in the manage-ment of the estate.40 He recounts the receipt of a letter from the “head-man” (Tib. ’go-dpon) in the area about the arrival of Indian troops byair in 1951. They came, Bde-rab says, with porters bearing goods andequipment and proclaimed that Bshad-sgra had given them the region.Lha-klu informed the Bka’-shag about this but no decision was takenby them. As a result, Bde-rab notes, from 1952 the estate could nolonger collect the traditional taxes in Sbas-chags-shri.41
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Dpal-’byor, the author of the next article, was a servant of theBsam-grub pho-brang family.42 Sent in 1951 to collect taxes in Smag-sgo (which he describes as being one day distant from Mtsho-snardzong, north of the McMahon Line), he too encountered Indiantroops. He and a companion, Byams-pa ngag-dbang, were takenunder escort to an Indian command post and told that they could notcollect taxes in the region. Subsequently Byams-pa ngag-dbang wasinvited by the Indians to a party. With marked suspicion, Dpal-’byorwrites that whether it was the alcohol that was served or somethingelse, his companion fell ill and 20 days later died. When his body wasopened and cut up to be scattered to the birds, according to Tibetanfunerary customs, his insides were found to be all black. Even thevultures would not eat his remains.43
The next article departs from the general contents of most thosethat we have examined by jumping ahead a decade. Its author, Bsod-nams dpal-’byor, was a bla-phyag official44 in the pre-1959 TibetanGovernment who continued in service to the new government followingthe flight of the Dalai Lama and the subsequent implementation of“democratic reforms.” After noting evidence of the traditional tiesbetween Mon-yul and other parts of Tibet (e.g., the fact that woodfrom the region was used for Tibetan printing blocks and buildingmaterials in and around Lhasa, etc.) he tells of his dispatch with PLAforces to Tawang during the Sino-Indian War of 1962. The Indianadministration under which Tawang had been governed was inabeyance for the short period during which China controlled the areaand Bsod-nams dpal-’byor remarked that the monastery was still gov-erned according to the charter granted by the eighteenth-centuryTibetan ruler Pho-lha Bsod-nams stobs-rgyas. He further assertedthat the local people submitted petitions urging that the Indians beexpelled and describing their behavior as unbearable.45
The Mon Chos-’ByungThe last work contained in this volume is undoubtedly the most inter-esting, and from a larger historical perspective perhaps more impor-tant; this is the aforementioned Mon chos-’byung. As noted, itspublication in this collection marked its first appearance of this ver-sion in any manner accessible to the scholarly community.46 The workprovides a date of composition, not in the colophon but in the body ofthe text: “From the previous Fire-Male-Dragon Year [896/97] to the
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present Earth-Male-Monkey Year [1728/29] of strife in Central Tibet833 years have passed . . .”47 Its authors are identified in the colophonas Ngag-dbang phun-tshogs and Rgyal-po, both monks of royallineage. As a Tibetan text describing culturally Tibetan areas that aretoday governed by India it is of course not unique. There are similarhistorical texts describing the history and rulers of Ladakh andSikkim. The history of the Mon-yul area is a welcome addition tothese materials. The work is of interest to us here for the circum-stances of its publication; i.e., as an element in the internal polemicsagainst India’s claims to Arunachal Pradesh. Thus our comments on itwill be brief.
As already noted, the area delineated in the history is not limited toArunachal Pradesh. Modern boundaries do not overlap exactly withpremodern ones; the Mon-yul of the Mon chos-’byung also includesplaces north of Arunachal Pradesh and places within Bhutan. This isportrayed in the text as the realm of rulers who trace their line back tothe lineage of Tibet’s emperors, the lineage that presided overthe Tibetan Empire of the seventh to ninth centuries.48 Specifically, theline of local rulers goes back to Lha-sras Gtsang-ma, the son of theemperor Sad-na legs and an important figure for Bhutan as well. Lha-srasGtsang-ma, who is said to have been the first member of the Tibetanimperial family to be ordained as a monk, was banished to Mon-yul inthe ninth century by the Emperor Glang Dar-ma.49 In spite of hismonastic status, the Mon chos-’byung ascribes progeny to him afterhis arrival in Mon-yul,50 though it does say that the tradition regardinghis royal descendants is rather confused as a result of what has beenrecounted out of pride and arrogance.51 Here the Mon chos-’byung isvery much like other Tibetan local histories: the rulers in these histo-ries are also accorded descent from the Tibetan emperors. In addition,the Mon chos-’byung mentions (among others) the presence in theregion of a member of the lineage of the Rlangs clan, the clan of thePhag-mo gru-pa which took power in Tibet in the fourteenth century.
It ought to be clear that the text is presented in this collection withan eye toward establishing the clear linkage of the region with Tibetand hence (since China maintains that Tibet has been a part of Chinasince the thirteenth century) with China. But since the area coveredby the text is not limited to the territories disputed by China andIndia, eastern Bhutan also figures in the work and one section is givenover to the clans of Bum-thang.52 Within the text itself, China per se
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really does not figure. There are, however, several mentions of India.Among these we read that within the lineage of the Mon-yul rulersChos-ka rdo-rje clashed with one “Bhorong Raja of India,”53 whileseveral generations later, we find that Rje Dpal Mthong-legs “exer-cised rule over ministers and subjects, and over India; and his strengthand power were great.”54 It is obvious that there is a good amount ofinformation concerning the history of the region that ought to bestudied and made known apart from any considerations of the borderissue and the McMahon Line.
Keeping the Polemics within Domestic LimitsThis brings us back to the issue of the intent behind the publication ofSRM 10, which we raised earlier. The entire collection of articles andtexts contained in SRM 10 was designed to argue a case for claims thatthe Mon-yul region is part of China. Nevertheless, the argument, atleast as discerned in this volume, is meant for a domestic audience; thelack of translations into languages other than Chinese makes thisclear. It might be argued that this reflects a certain lack of finesse inpolemical enterprise on the part of China. And indeed, China’s asser-tions regarding its position on Tibet during the 1980s were oftenclumsy, and certainly lacking in sophistication. That much was cer-tainly in evidence in China’s pronouncements on the protests in Tibetduring the period 1987–89. However, it is worth considering that atthe time of publication the restriction of these materials to audiencesliterate in Tibetan and Chinese was pointedly designed to limit theargument, to prevent it from spinning out of control or reigniting justone year after tensions had subsided. This would assume that, whilenot wishing to upset the calm that had returned, the Chinese Govern-ment clearly wished to strengthen popular support for claims to theareas south of the McMahon Line. Indeed, the circulation of many ofthe pieces in SRM 10 serves this purpose well. And even though thevolume was the first in its series that was not restricted to internal cir-culation, given the languages of publication and the difficulty of acqui-sition, the only foreign readers that might have been anticipated wouldhave to have been those with some expertise in Tibetan matters.
Finally, the conjecture that the aim of publication was indeed tobolster support among Tibetans for Chinese claims on the border issupported by the fact that references to the old society, includingmentions of servitude, pass with no judgmental condemnation. There
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is implicit criticism of the Tibetan Government’s inability to copewith the Indian presence, but even that is mild. By and large the oldgovernment is represented as steadfastly unyielding to British Indiandemands. Aristocrats and officials, whether they possess servants orpeasants (and note that most of what transpires in the pieces in SRM10 happens within a social structure and society that China otherwiseterms feudal), are portrayed as patriotic figures pushing back againstIndian attempts to encroach on their country’s territory. The theme ofthe Tibetan narratives is unity, the unity of Tibetans of different strata(with the possible exception of a few Tibetans translating for the Indians),all equally determined to defend Tibet’s territory and thus, byextension, China’s territory. This last element, however, is dealt withvery lightly, as if to suggest limits to where that sense of unity couldrealistically be extended.
NOTES
1. This crisis has been described variously by Sumit Ganguly, “The Sino-Indian BorderTalks, 1981–1989: A View from New Delhi,” Asian Survey Vol. 29, No. 12 (1989),pp. 1129–1131; and John Garver, Protracted Contest. Sino-Indian Rivalry in theTwentieth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), pp. 104–106.
2. The Sino-Indian Boundary Question (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1962). This wasfollowed by a slim volume of further official statements, The Sino-Indian BoundaryQuestion II (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965).
3. Garver, Protracted Contest, p. 94.4. Garver, Protracted Contest, pp. 167–168 and 172.5. The series has published most volumes under a slight variant of the title: Bod-kyi
rig-gnas lo-rgyus dpyad-gzhi’i rgyu-cha bdams-sgrigs.6. On the CPPCC and its place within the UFWD, see Lyman P. Van Slyke, Enemies and
Friends. The United Front in Chinese Communist History (Stanford: Stanford UniversityPress, 1967), pp. 237–238.
7. Ngag-dbang phun-tshogs and Rgyal-po, Rje-’bangs rnams-kyi rigs-rus gsal-ba’i sgron-me(Mon chos-’byung), in Bod-kyi lo-rgyus rig-gnas dpyad-gzhi’i rgyu-cha bdams-sgrigs Vol. 10[hereafter SRM 10], (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1988), pp. 87–130. The Chinesetranslation of the Mon chos-’byung is worth noting as well: Awang pingcuo
8. Michael Aris, Microfiche Supplement to Bhutan. The Early History of a HimalayanKingdom (Warminster: Aris and Phillips, 1979), pp. 1–66.
9. With regard to the composition of the articles in SRM 10 and in other volumes in the sameseries it must be pointed out that in the June 1988 issue of the Tibetan-exile publicationShes-bya, Bsam-pho Bstan-’dzin don-grub, the co-author of an article in volume 2 of theseries, asserted that he and his collaborating author did not actually write the piece thatappeared under their names but simply edited it, the text having been written by others.
10. It should be noted though that the neibu designation had no real effect for those seekingto purchase these volumes in Tibet. The implicit restrictions on circulation were mostlyobserved in the breach.
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11. Sbas-chags-shri is marked on other maps as “Pachakshiri,” and located in the northernportion of the West Siang District of Arunachal Pradesh. The PRC Tibetan-languagemap of the Tibet Autonomous Region shows the town of Sba-chag-shri (i.e.,Sbas-chags-shri) marked slightly to the south, but located along the Sba-chag-shri chu, ariver flowing from the north. See Bod rang-skyong-ljongs srid-’dzin sa-khul-gyi sa-bkra(n.d., n.p.).
12. As will be seen, Sgar-chags-gzhis-ka was the estate presided over by the Lha-klu family.It took in the area of Sbas-chags-shri, (which fell under Indian control) at least for taxpurposes.
13. On Smag-sgo, which is located just south of the Mon-yul border in Arunachal Pradesh,see Michael Aris, “Notes on the History of the Mon-yul Corridor,” in Michael Aris andAung San Suu Khyi, eds., Tibetan Studies in Honour of Hugh Richardson (Warminster:Aris and Phillips, 1980), p. 19 (“Rmag-sgo”).
14. On the question of the territory and peoples covered by the term Mon, properly speak-ing, see Michael Aris, “Mon-yul Corridor,” pp. 9–10.
16. Chab-spel, Mon-yul, p. 2.17. Concerning the Tangut element in Tibetan and Himalayan lineages, see Elliot Sperling,
“Rtsa-mi lo-tsa-ba Sangs rgyas grags-pa and the Tangut Background to Early Mongol-Tibetan Relations,” in Per Kvaerne, ed., Tibetan Studies. Proceedings of the 6th Seminarof the International Association for Tibetan Studies (Oslo: The Institute for Compara-tive Research in Human Culture, 1994), p. 807.
18. Chab-spel, Mon-yul, p. 3.19. Chab-spel, Mon-yul, p. 3. This is made clear in the Mon chos-’byung, as will be seen
below. Concerning the lineage of the kings of Ladakh and Western Tibet, see LucianoPetech, The Kingdom of Ladakh (Rome: IsMEO, 1977).
20. Alistair Lamb, The McMahon Line (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), pp. 546and 618–619; these are the “secret” letters exchanged with Delhi.
21. Lha-klu Tshe-dbang rdo-rje, “Di-lir gsang-ba’i yig-rigs brje-len byas-pa dir Bod sa-gnassrid-gzung-gis khas-len byas-rigs med-pa,” SRM 10, p. 15. The Chinese translation (p. 9)states here that the thirteenth Dalai Lama never recognized the McMahon Line. Bothversions also have Bell relating that the chaos in early republican China precluded defin-itive Chinese action on the Simla Convention, which accords quite well with later Chi-nese rationales for not ascribing any significance to actions by the Tibetan governmentundertaken independently of Republican China. We might add that the Dalai Lama’sbiography makes no mention of discussions with Bell at this time, not that this consti-tutes definitive evidence on the issue. See Thub bstan byams pa tshul khrims bstan ’dzin,Lhar bcas srid zhi’i gtsug rgyan gong sa rgyal ba’i dbang po bka drin mtshungs med skuphreng bcu gsum pa chen po’i rnam par thar pa rgya mtsho lta bu las mdo tsam brjod pango mtshar rin po che’i phreng ba, in Collected Works of Dalai Lama XIII, Vols. 6 and 7(New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1982).
22. This would be Zhol-khang Don-grub phun-tshogs. Concerning him, see LucianoPetech, Aristocracy and Government in Tibet, 1728–1959 (Rome: IsMEO, 1973), pp.142–143.
23. Lha-klu, “Di-lir,” p. 16.24. Lha-klu, “Di-lir,” pp. 16–22.25. Bka’-shag is often rendered as “cabinet,” or “council of ministers,” but in many materi-
als coming out of the PRC it is simply used to indicate the Tibetan government directlyunder the Dalai Lama or his regents.
26. Thub-bstan chos-’phel, Hin-rdu btsan-’dzul dmag-gis Mon-khul-du btsan-’dzul byas-pa’i don-dngos, SRM 10, p. 34. Again, attesting to the use of Tibetan archival materials,the actual date is given according to the Tibetan calendar: the third day of the firstmonth of the Iron-Hare Year.
27. Thub-bstan chos-’phel, “Hin-rdu btsan-’dzul,” p. 38.
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28. Thub-bstan chos-’phel, “Hin-rdu btsan-’dzul,” pp. 39–40.29. Thub-bstan chos-’phel, “Hin-rdu btsan-’dzul,” pp. 40–41.30. Thub-bstan chos-’phel, “Hin-rdu btsan-’dzul,” p. 43: Nga-rang-la Rta-dbang gnyer-
, , .33. Bde-chen thang must be in the vicinity of Sbas-chags-shri, as the Bde-chen-mu chu
flows into the Sba-chag-shri-chu on the PRC map of the TAR.34. Mar-kong Ye-shes dgra-’dul, “Hin-rdu btsan-’dzul dmag-la gdong-gtugs-kyis kha-
rdung btang-ba,” SRM 10, p. 51.35. Blon-chen Bshad-sgra or Lonchen Shatra is well known as the chief Tibetan plenipoten-
tiary at the Simla Conference.36. Mar-kong, “Hin-rdu btsan-’dzul,” p.59.37. Smin-gling Zla-mchog, “Nga dang Hin-rdu btsan-’dzul dmag dbar byung-ba’i rtsod-
gleng zhig,” SRM 10, p. 63: de-ltar yin-na Rgya-gar hril-po nga-tsho’i sa-bkra’ nangbkod-de bdag-bzung byas-na ’grig-gam. The assumption, given the circumstances ofpublication, is that the “our” of “our map” refers to China.
38. Shing-sdong, “Sbas-chags-shri ni rang-rgyal-gyi mnga’-khongs bsnyon-med yin,” SRM10, p. 71. Note, though, that the Chinese version refers not to airplanes but to helicop-ters: see Xindong, , “Baiqiaxirao defang shi woguo wuke zhengyi de lingtu”
, SRM 10 Chinese, pp. 35–36.39. The Lha-klu family was a well-known aristocratic family (the twelfth Dalai Lama had
been born into it). Lha-klu Tshe-dbang rdo-rje served the Tibetan government in a vari-ety of capacities and had served in Khams prior to the Chinese assault in 1950. The fam-ily’s estate holdings in Mon-yul explains why Lha-klu tshe-dbang rdo-rje figures sooften in these accounts. On the Lha-klu family, see Petech, Aristocracy, pp. 43–49.
41. Bde-rab, “Sgar-chags,” p. 76. N.b., the other accounts give 1952 as the year of the arrivalof Indian troops in Sbas-chags-shri.
42. This is the family of the seventh Dalai Lama. See Petech, Aristocracy, pp. 32–39.43. Dpal-’byor “Nga Smag-sgor khral-bsdur bskyod-skabs ’gog-rkyen ’phred-pa’i gnas-
tshul dngos,” SRM 10, p. 81.44. The manager of a lama’s residence or bla-brang.45. Bsod-nams dpal-’byor, “1962-lor Rta-dbang-la bskyod-skabs-kyi mthong-thos,” SRM
10, p. 86.46. The work is mentioned by Dan Martin in Tibetan Histories (London: Serindia, 1997), p.
234. He lists it as undated, speculating correctly that it might be another version of a textby Byar Ngag-dbang in 1728. This latter text is extant as a manuscript kept in theLibrary of Tibetan Works and Archives and is the version of the text studied by MichaelAris. I am extremely grateful to Tashi Tsering of the Amnye Machen Institute, Dharam-sala, for sharing a copy of the other version with me and discussing the differencesbetween them (as well as their common date) with me.
47. Ngag-dbang phun-tshogs, Mon chos-’byung, p. 96: gong-gi me-pho-’brug-nas da-lta’iDbus-Gtsang ’khrug-pa’i sa-pho-sprel-lo yan-chod-la lo-grangs brgya-phra-brgyaddang sum-cu-so-gsum song. Note that the Chinese version of the text gives the date as1668/69: Awang pingcuo, Menyu jiaoshi, p. 50.
48. Ngag-dbang phun-tshogs, Mon chos-’byung, p. 95.
50. E.g., the account in Ngag-dbang phun-tshogs, Mon chos-’byung, p. 98, of his marriageto Bsod-nams dpal-sbyin, who was from the clan of one of Padmasambhava’s personaldisciples.
51. Ngag-dbang phun-tshogs, Mon chos-’byung, p. 96.52. Ngag-dbang phun-tshogs, Mon chos-’byung, pp. 117–124.53. Ngag-dbang phun-tshogs, Mon chos-’byung, p. 102.54. Ngag-dbang phun-tshogs, Mon chos-’byung, p.103: blon-’bangs dang Rgya-gar-la
dbang-bsgyur-nas stobs mnga’-thang ce-bar byung-zhing. It goes without saying thatthis cannot refer to any sort of domination over Indian territory of any great size.
