The politics of identity in Myanmar: the Rohingya, Kachin ... · PDF fileThe politics of...

The politics of identity in

Myanmar: the Rohingya, Kachin

& Wa ethnic minorities

Mahalia Gaskin McDaniel

Arts internship

Mr John Leake

Host supervisor

The Institute for International Development

Dr Thomas Wanner

Academic supervisor

The University of Adelaide

03 July 2017


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Acknowledgements

I would like to offer my thanks to Mr John Leake for allowing me to benefit from the wealth

of formal and personal knowledge and experience represented by both himself and IID. His

thoughtful guidance has made for an invaluable internship experience.

Additionally, Dr Thomas Wanner has been of great help navigating the vastness of available

literature and directing my research towards a cohesive report.

From the day, she accompanied me to the IID office, Amanda Phillis and her colleague Robert

Ewers have been greatly supportive. I will always be appreciative for the opportunity to be

involved with IID and such absorbing research.


03 July 2017

Cover photo: Men walk at a Rohingya village outside Maugndaw in Rakhine state. Source:

(Rueters/Tun SZ 2016)


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Table of Contents

Table of Figures ............................................................................................................................ 3

List of Abbreviations ..................................................................................................................... 4

Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................... 5

Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 6

Methodology ................................................................................................................................. 8

Background.................................................................................................................................11

Rohingya ..............................................................................................................................16

Kachin ...................................................................................................................................20

Wa ...........................................................................................................................................24

Discussion ..................................................................................................................................26

Racial dimension ..............................................................................................................26

Socio-economic dimension ...........................................................................................28

Geopolit ical dimension ..................................................................................................31

Poli t ical dimension ..........................................................................................................32

Mil itary dimension ...........................................................................................................34

Conclusions & Recommendations ............................................................................................35

References ..................................................................................................................................37


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Table of Figures

Figure 1: Map depicting the states, regions, zones and divisions of Myanmar. Source:

(MIMU 2013) ................................................................................................................................ 9

Figure 2: Map depicting the topography of Myanmar. Source: (MIMU 2013) ....................... 10

Figure 3: Map depicting IDP sites in Kachin and northern Shan States (August 2016).

Source: (UNOCHA 2016) ............................................................................................................ 20

Figure 4: Ethnic militant groups of Myanmar. Source: (Colling 2016) .................................... 23

Figure 5: Graphs of religion statistics according to the 2014 census. Data source: (Ministry

of Immigration and Population 2016) ...................................................................................... 30

Figure 6: Regional map of Myanmar. Source: (Google 2017) ................................................. 31

Figure 7: United Wa State Army (UWSA) soldiers march during a media display in

Panghsang, Wa territory in northeast Myanmar October 4, 2016. Source: (Reuters/Tun SZ

2016) .......................................................................................................................................... 34

Figure 8: Kachin Independence Army (KIA) cadets follow drills at a training school in the

Burmese town of Laiza, on the border with China. Source: (Vrieze 2016)............................. 34


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List of Abbreviations

ANP Arakan National Party

ARIF Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front

IDP International Displaced Person

KIA/~O Kachin Independence Army/~Organisation

KDA Kachin Defence Army

RNDP Rakhine Nationalities Development Party

RSO Rohingya Solidarity Organisation

SLORC State Law and Order Restoration Council

SPDC State Peace and Development Council

TRC Temporary Registration Certificate

Ma Ba Tha Patriotic Association of Myanmar

MIMU Myanmar Information Management Unit

MPC Myanmar Peace Centre

NDAK New Democratic Army-Kachin

NLD National League for Democracy

NGOs Non-governmental organisations

NSAG Non-state armed groups

UNFC United Nationalities Federal Council

UNHCR United Nations Refugee Agency

UWSP/~A United Wa State Party/~Army


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Executive Summary

This report was written in collaboration with the Institute for International Development

(IID)’s John Leake and the University of Adelaide’s Dr. Thomas Wanner in fulfilment of the

requirements of its Arts Internship program. It attempts to address a gap in studies offering

a deeper insight into the situation of the persecuted Rohingya minority in Myanmar, by

comparatively researching them against the Kachin and Wa. Entirely secondary sources, via

the University of Adelaide’s database academic database resource, and the personal

collection of John Leake were relied upon in collecting research material to cross-analyse. At

least six broad, interrelated dimensions of difference were found to underlie the

disproportionate persecution of the Rohingya compared to the Kachin and the Wa: race,

religion, socioeconomics, geopolitics, politics and military force. Perceived differences in

racial attributes correlating with a threatening form of Islam distinguish the Rohingya from

the Kachin, Wa and other Muslim minorities that enjoy an official status. These differences

are compounded by geographical ties to South Asian states of India and Bangladesh as

opposed to enduring bilateral ally, the East Asian state of China. Their status as a political

target for influential Buddhist movements is heightened by their lack of political agency, both

due to an absence of citizenship rights, and a lack of a coordinated, strong military force.

These findings were used to create a set of recommendations moving forward for the

Myanmar and Bangladesh governments, multilateral institutions and non-governmental

organisations (NGOs), including online hate speech mitigation strategies, forums hosted by

the government in which a) representatives of the Rohingya and recognised Muslim groups

can discuss the role of Islam in Myanmar, and b) representatives of the ethnic Rakhine and

Rohingya can discuss key gripes and come to an agreement, the strengthening of policies

and documentation provisions for immigrant minorities, and the formulation of a

Myanmar/Bangladesh cooperative solution regarding the Rohingya.


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Introduction

The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, colloquially known as Myanmar, and formerly

as Burma, is a country of interest for the Institute for International Development (IID). The

organisation has a branch office in the capital of Yangon, and IID members have had over 30

years of experience conducting a range of development work there, from disaster risk

reduction to HIV/AIDS prevention. Myanmar has a history of weak governance and capacity,

which are attempting to be addressed through recently implemented reforms, and

aspirations for democratization. Multi and bilateral aid donors, as well as NGOs like IID are

increasingly active in Myanmar, coordinated by the Myanmar Information Management Unit

MIMU (Dugay 2015). After over 50 years of military dictatorship, the transition to civilian rule

began with the enactment of the 2008 Constitution (UNDP 2017). In November 2015, the

first free and fair general elections were held across the country. Aung Sun Suii Kyi led the

NLD to victory. Hailed as a momentous step towards democracy, the new government was

expected to initiate an upward trajectory of economic development. Within its first year, it

implemented economic reform, strategies for the health and education sectors, affirmed its

priorities for nutrition and rural development, and accelerated peace process efforts (World

Bank 2017). However, the country continues to face considerable development challenges,

including poverty, malnourishment, low education rates, and internal displacement which are

reinforced by a complex array of social, cultural and historical factors. DFAT (2017)

recognizes 3 mutually reinforcing objectives for its aid program in Myanmar: enhancing

human development, promoting peace and stability, and promoting inclusive economic

growth and government management. The second, peace and stability, is crucial for the

achievement of inclusive and equitable growth. A primary barrier to such is the complex

ethnic politics and armed conflict that continues to divide the country (Farrelly 2014: 251).

Most recently, the case of the Rohingya has emerged as a barrier to sustainable peace.

The Rohingya are a Muslim ethnic population whom are disputably indigenous to

Rakhine State, formerly Arakan. The state and non-state armed group (NSAG) inflicted

persecution of the Rohingya is now an established fact worldwide. Since the Burma

Citizenship Law of 1982 rendered them stateless, the Rohingya have become vulnerable to

systemic persecution, with substantial implications for international development activities.

International media and human rights bodies have heavily documented pivotal crises

affecting the Rohingya, as they occur. There have been many ‘ethnic conflicts’ in Myanmar

since decolonisation, yet none have garnered such concentrated international attention.

Identifying the uniqueness of the Rohingya problem is vital in pursuing long-term solutions.

The situation of this ethnic minority in relation to others is relatively unexplored.

IID has conducted work in Kachin and northern Shan States, areas home to the Kachin


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and Wa ethnic minorities which both share with the Rohingya cultures that are distinct from

the majority Bamar, complex histories of conflict, and a high level of cross-border mobility.

Unlike the Rohingya, the Kachin and Wa are recognized ethnic minorities. These groups are

the focus of this research report. The broad objective of this report is to provide a preliminary

answer into the question: what are the factors that underlie the disproportionate treatment

of the Rohingya in contrast to the Kachin and Wa? Both the Kachin, Wa, and most recently

the Rohingya, have recently been involved in armed struggles against the Tatmadaw

(Myanmar Armed Forces), which tend to be branded as ‘ethnic conflict’. This report aims to

transcend this generalisation to explore interrelated dimensions between ethnic groups. The

research will be presented in the form of an overview of the methodology, a background of

ethnicity in Myanmar, and findings structured as three sub-sections on the Rohingya, Kachin

and Wa respectively. The discussion will analyse and expand upon key findings in relation to

the research question. Finally, conclusions and recommendations will be made, extrapolating

the information presented to the broader aims of IID, the international development field,

and key stakeholders.


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Methodology

This research is qualitative as it seeks to uncover underlying reasons rather than

drawing definitive conclusions. It is pragmatic, using whatever sources are both readily

available and relevant. The limited time and nature of the internship on which this report is

based did not allow primary research. Instead, secondary research was relied upon, reviewing

available work. This took the form of texts found through the University of Adelaide’s online

library database resource. Academic journal articles, factual and anecdotal books, online

news media, and government publications were used in addition to the personal

understandings of John Leake. The academic work of Mikael Gravers of Aarhus University,

Denmark and the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies was particularly useful in informing this

report, as was a book, published by Thaksin University and edited by Trevor Gibson et al

(2016), that sparked IID’s initial interest into this research.

This research is intended to be both preliminary, seeking to determine what is already

known. It is also exploratory, addressing a problem lacking an established research base. It

utilises abductive reasoning as it takes the initial observation of disproportionate persecution

and seeks to establish the most likely causes. A comparative approach was adopted in the

discussion by identifying similarities and differences across the case studies of three, intra-

national ethnic minorities.

There are significant limitations to this research including the absence of primary

research, a general scarcity of literature available on the Wa, and the inability to engage with

sources written in Burmese, including many government and local media sources.


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Figure 1: Map depicting the states, regions, zones and divisions of Myanmar. Source: (MIMU 2013)


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Figure 2: Map depicting the topography of Myanmar. Source: (MIMU 2013)


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Background

Myanmar’s geography, bordering Bangladesh, India, China, Laos, and Thailand, has

lent itself to a high level of ethnic diversity (Smith 1994: 17) (see Figure 1). Its subnational

political structure consists of seven regions and seven states based on ethnic identity (Burke

2016: 262; Holliday 2014: 118). The majority Burman or Bamar comprise 60 – 70% of the

population and reside predominantly in the Yangon, Mandalay, Ayarwaddy, Sagaing, Magway,

Bago, and Tanintharyi regions (Walton 2013: 6) (see Figure 1). Additionally, there are seven

‘dominant’ ethnic groups: Shan, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon and Rakhine, who mainly

occupy their semi-autonomous, respectively named states. Five self-administered zones and

one self-administered division (Wa Self-Administered Division) exist for “national races with

a suitable population” (Gravers & Ytzen 2014: 79) (see Figure 1). While the Bamar

dominated regions are central, the states, zones and divisions assigned to the minority ethnic

groups constitute the mountainous borderlands (IWGIA n.d.).

This heterogeneity has significantly featured in Myanmar’s political history. Renard

(1987) describes their minority problems as some of the “most perplexing” and notes that,

prior to colonisation by the British from 1824 to 1886, ethnic identity was not as correlated

with political identity (Renard 1987: 255). While pre-colonial wars were fought between

kingdoms, Walton (2013: 7) refrains from describing them as ethnically driven. Many argue

that the politicization of ethnicity arose during colonialism, when policies were pursued upon

ethnic lines (Taylor 2005: 269; Holliday 204: 117). It was the colonial rulers that traversed

the country, documenting cross-ethnic cultural differences for the purposes of effective

population management. This strategy has been described as ‘divide and rule’ (Gravers

2015: 7). A two-tiered administration system was established, separating ‘Ministerial Burma’

inhabited mainly by Bamar, from the hilly ‘Frontier Areas’, occupied by ethnic minorities

(Walton 2013: 7). In Ministerial Burma, a form of parliamentary Home Rule was

implemented, while the Frontier Areas were left to the devices of traditional authorities. This

resulted in an ‘ethnic division of labour’, had implications for their relative rates of

development, but most relevantly recast ethnic identities that were previously more

fluctuating and contingent (Lichter 2007; Smith 1994: 22).

The opposition to British rule in the early decades of the twentieth century was largely

in the form of Bamar nationalism (Walton 2013: 8). For example, during the anti-colonial

strikes of 1938, the Dobama (We Burmans) movement adopted the slogans ‘Burma for

Burmans and ‘Master Race We Are, We Burmans (Gravers 2015: 8). By 1942, a Bamar group

allied the Japanese invasion that forced the British, and their Indian and non-Bamar ethnic

group forces, out of Myanmar. By the end of WWII, Bamar, non-Bamar ethnic groups and

British officers then joined to expel the Japanese (Walton 2013: 9). During independence


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negotiations, the Panglong Conference and Agreement of 1947 was supposed to represent

an inclusive forum for ethnic groups to determine their united political objectives for

independence. However, the resulting quasi-federal arrangements in the 1947 Constitution

were largely unsatisfactory (Holliday 2014: 117). In addition to the Bamar General Aung San,

only the Shan, Kachin, and Chin minority groups were present, lacking Karen and Mon

representation (Wilson 2017: 142). Ethnic unrest, exacerbated by ‘Burmanisation’ policies,

erupted in Kayin State during the late 1940s (see Figure 1). It was also around this time that

the 1948 Citizenship laws came into effect, defining the indigenous races of Burma as (see

Table 1). By the turn of the 1950s, ethnic discord was extensive, and by 1962, the perception

that insurgent ethnic groups seeking to secede were going to divide the Union, contributed

to the military coup of General Ne Win (Holliday 2014: 118; Gravers & Ytzen 2014: 63).

Tension between ethnic groups continued from the 1962 coup to the State Law and Order

Restoration Council/State Peace and Development Council (SLORC/SPDC) military

government lasting from 1988 to 2011.

In 1982, the new nationality law replaced that of 1948, asserting the right of the State

Council to determine who qualifies as a ‘national race’. The law demarcates 135 ‘national

races’, or taing – yin – thar meaning ‘sons/offspring of the geographical division’– an

estimate typically cited for which there is no reliable evidence (Smith 1994: 18;

Thawnghmung 2016: 528). This figure is disputed as a likely residual of the aforementioned

‘divide and rule’ strategy, which functioned to diminish the presence and impact of larger

groups and discourage unity between distinct ones (Walton 2013: 6). Those belonging to

these 135 races are entitled to de jure citizenship and the entailed rights, however the extent

to which those on the periphery can access de facto citizenship is questionable (Holliday

2014: 404). Descendants of migrants is not included as a category nor is mixed ethnicity

(Burke 2016: 262). In any case, it has been argued that in Myanmar, the Bamar hold a

structurally privileged position in society akin to “whiteness” in Western societies. (Walton

2013: 18). Religion plays a substantial role in this identity, evidenced by the common adage

“to be Bamar is to be a Buddhist” and most of the population subscribing to Buddhism (see

Figure 5) (Taylor 2005: 264). fe

It is important to clarify what relevant terms mean in the Myanmar context, as

interpretations differ across academia. The word ‘ethnic’ originates from the Greek ethnos –

“a constituent of a nation” (Gibson et al. 2016: 49). Various criteria have been postulated as

composing ethnicity. Burke (2016: 261) employs the term in a constructivist sense, meaning

that features and distinctions between ethnic groups are socially created. While enduring,

they are changeable. This holds true in Myanmar, as evidenced by the previously detailed

influence of the British. The flexibility and hybridity often underlying individual ethnic


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identities are well documented (Taylor 2005: 263). Intermarriage has contributed to an

absence of ethnic ‘purity’, yet mixed race is not assigned a separate category (Holliday 2013:

408). Thus, self-identifying with ethnicity plays a critical role in the sense of belonging to a

community with a common culture and history (Gravers 2016: 2). The distinction between

concepts of race and ethnicity is important, with race generally describing a more permanent,

category founded in physical features (Holliday 2014: 415). ‘Indigenous’ is a descriptive

category that Myanmar’s government and civil society refrains from using, in favour of the

135 ‘national races’ including the Bamar. Thus, everyone is regarded as ‘indigenous, bar the

Indian and Chinese majorities, rendering the terms unhelpful (IGWIA n.d.: 341; Smith 1994:

36). Instead, non-Bamar ethnic groups are labelled ‘ethnic minorities’. Renard (1987: 257)

explains how, although minority is technically defined as a group different from the larger

group it is part of, either racially, religiously, politically, etc., it implies more than mere

numbers, inferring a level of disadvantage or antagonization. Thus, as Smith (1994: 36) also

concludes, the term ‘ethnic minority’ will be used to denote all other groups distinct from the

Bamar majority, including the case-studies of the Rohingya, Kachin and Wa.

Another important note concerns the theoretical status of the Rohingya, Kachin and

Wa as ethnic minorities. Renowned liberal political theorist Will Kymlicka distinguishes

between minorities that are immigrant groups, historic national minorities such as the Welsh

and Scottish in Britain, and indigenous peoples such as the Aboriginal people of Australia.

While the extent to which this framework, which was developed as a model for

multiculturalism in liberal democratic societies, is appropriate for Myanmar is arguable, it is

useful for clarifying the variations within the term ‘minority’. In Myanmar’s case, the national

minority and indigenous categories are synonymous, and describe the status of the Kachin

and Wa (Holliday 2014: 414). He also identifies a fourth ‘metic group’, whom are typically

established but denied citizenship and stigmatized. The Rohingya are given as example of

‘metics’ (Kymlicka & He 2005: 53).

People Main language Language family Native speakers (million)

Bamar Burmese Tibeto-Burman 33.0

Rohingya Rohingya Indo-Aryan/European 1.80

Kachin Jingpho Tibeto-Burman 0.94

Wa Wa Austro-Asiatic 0.90

Table 1: The main language (families) of the Bamar majority and Rohingya, Kachin and Wa minorities. Data

source: (Simon & Fennig 2017).


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Figure 3: Map depicting main spoken languages of Myanmar. Source: (MIMU 2015).


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Table 2: Past and current Myanmar government legislation and its implications for the Rohingya, Kachin, and

Wa.

Legislation Implications for case studies Date Name Relevant clause(s) Rohingya Kachin Wa

1947 Panglong

Agreement

5. “Though the Governor's Executive

Council will be augmented as agreed

above, it will not operate in respect of

the Frontier Areas in any manner which

would deprive any portion of those

Areas of the autonomy which it now

enjoys in internal administration Full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas is accepted in principle.”

NA Promised full

autonomy

Unclear

1948 Union

Citizenship

Act

III) 1. “For the purposes of section 11 of

the Constitution the expression ‘any of

the indigenous races of Burma’ shall

mean the Arakanese, Burmese, Chin,

Kachin, Karen, Kayah, Mon or Shan

race and such racial group as has

settled in any of the territories included

within the Union as their permanent

home from a period anterior to 1823 A.

D. (1185 B.E.)”

4. “Any person, who under sub-section

(i), (ii) and (iii) of section 11 of the

Constitution, is a citizen of the Union or

who, under sub-section (iv) of section

11 of the Constitution, is entitled to

elect for citizenship and who has been

granted under the Union Citizenship

(Election) Act, 1948 a certificate of

citizenship, or who has been granted a

certificate of naturalization or a

certificate of citizenship or who has

otherwise been granted the status of a

citizen under this Act, shall continue to

be a citizen of the Union, until he or she

loses that status under the provisions of

this Act.”

Not classified as

an indigenous

race but entitled

to citizenship, if in

possession of the

correct

documentation

(Gibson et al

2016)

Classified as an

indigenous race

and granted

citizenship

Classified as an

indigenous race

and granted

citizenship

1982 Burma

Citizenship

Law

II) 3. “Nationals such as the Kachin,

Kayah, Karen, Chin, Burman, Mon,

Rakhine or Shan and ethnic groups as

have settled in any of the territories

included within the State as their

permanent home from a period anterior

to 1185 B.E., 1823 A.D. are Burma

citizens.”

6. “A person who is already a citizen on

the date this Law cones into force is a

citizen. Action, however shall be taken

under section 18 for infringement of the

provision of that section”

Not classified as

an indigenous

race but legally

should be granted

citizenship

according to the

1948 Citizenship

Act.

As above As above

2015 Race and

Religion

Protection

Laws

(Equality

Myanmar

2016)

Monogamy Law: Criminalises having

more than one spouse or living with an

unmarried partner other than the

spouse

Prohibited from

practising the

Muslim custom of

polygamy

NA NA

Religious Conversion Law: Requires

citizens to undergo an interview,

undertake religious study and finally

obtain a certificate from Registration

Board to change their religion.

Limits freedom of

religion

Limits freedom of

religion

Limits freedom of

religion

Interfaith Marriage Law: Regulates the

marriage of Buddhist women to non-

Buddhist men.


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Findings

Rohingya

The Rohingya comprise

approximately 800 thousand people,

concentrated in the Maungdaw,

Buthidaung and Rathedaung

townships (Mayu Frontier) of Rakhine

State (see Figure 4). Another 300

thousand reside in Bangladesh

(Kipgen 2014: 237). Rakhine State is

in southwest Myanmar, bordering

Bangladesh, Chin State, Magway and

Bago Regions and the Bay of Bengal

(Thawnghmung 2016: 529).

Historically, it has been relatively

autonomous due to the mountainous

buffer between it and the centre (see

Figure 2). The dominant ethnic group

are the Rakhine ethnic minority and

various other groups, including the

Kaman Muslims, are recognised as

sub-groups. The Rohingya claim to be

a national minority, yet are regarded by the State and their adversaries as immigrants, and

treated as a ‘metic’ group. (Gibson 2016: 2). The term ‘Rohingya’ is itself politically charged.

It is a historical term, derived from Rohang—the old word for Rakhine State. Despite being

accepted in 1950s and 1960s, its validity is now rejected by the government, ethnic

Rakhines and other Buddhists (Ahsan Ullah 2016: 286; Dapice 2015: 7). Instead, the

government identifies this group as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, passing through via

the northern Mayu Frontier (Kipgen 2014: 236-7; Thawnghmung 2016: 527). Leaders of the

Rohingya community have promoted the ethnic label to foster group solidarity and assert

their identity as a legitimate minority. Resultantly, the international community has adopted

the name, yet many Muslims in Rakhine do not use the term (Burke 2016: 265). Rohingyas

described as distinctive due to their religion, customs and physical features (Holliday 2010:

121). They practice a “Sufi-inflected” (CFR 2017) version of Sunni Islam and their ‘Rohingya’

language is the only spoken in Myanmar, belonging to the Indo-European language (see Table

1 and Figure 3). Literature on their cultural traditions is sparse, however Farzana’s fieldwork

Figure 4: Map depicting townships of Rakhine State. Source:

(MIMU 2016)


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(2015: 299), notes the taranas or songs played with traditional tabla and juri instruments

that are common among the Rohingya refugees. Physically, linguistically and culturally they

are like South Asians (Bengalis), and the majority are purportedly descended from Bengali

immigrants (Parnini 2013: 281; Thawnghmung 2016: 527). This has contributed to

widespread negative stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination (Gibson 2016). As a result,

their history is marked by episodes of forced displacement (Ahsan Ullah 2016: 287). Many

have crossed into Bangladesh, where they are also not recognised as indigenous (see

refugee camps in Figure 5). Thousands also attempt to flee to Thailand or Malaysia on boats

each year, in 2013, approximately 35,000, many not surviving the journeys (Southwick 2015:

141). Thawnghmung (2016) has written an entire paper on the contested historical

narratives regarding the Rohingya, which is a primary point of difference between them and

the Kachin and Wa. Nevertheless, a basic history is given below:

Timeline of key historical junctures:

Pre-modern period: There is evidence

of a great diversity of ethnic origins and

social backgrounds of Muslims in

Rakhine State (Thawnghmung 2016;

531). Allies of the Rohingya believe that

they settled in Myanmar during the

seventh, eighth, or ninth century and

mixed with Bengalis, Persians, Moghuls,

Turks and Pathans (Ahsan Ullah 2016:

286; Thawnghmung 2014: 535).

1823: Proponents of the Rohingya

cause cite evidence of their presence in Myanmar prior to this date, qualifying them for

recognition as an indigenous minority. Such evidence includes “eighth century Rohingya

stone monuments” conducted by Australian National University (ANU) and linguistic work

conducted by a colonial scholar (Green 2013: 9).

1920s: Significant numbers of Muslim Bengalis migrate to Rakhine State from Chittagong,

following British annexation, where they settle with the existing Muslim population (Smith

1994: 55).

Figure 5: Rohingya refugee camps in Chittagong,

Bangladesh. Source: (Joyce/Getty Images 2017)


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1942: According to some Rakhines and others in Myanmar, and in the context of ethnic

polarization, Muslims conduct a massacre, although it is unclear towards whom it is directed

(Burke 2016: 264).

1946: A Muslim delegation visits Pakistan to discuss the incorporation of the Mayu Frontier

into territory that now belongs to Bangladesh (Thawnghmung 2014: 335). Their request was

not supported due to prior reassurance given by General Aung San (Gibson et al. 2016: 67)

1947: Rohingya activists create The Mujahid Party for the purposes of demanding an

autonomous Muslim state of ‘Arakanistan’ in Rakhine State, recognition as a national

minority and resettlement of Muslim refugees in Rakhine State. Their requests are ignored


1948: Local mujahedeen are involved in the ‘Mujahid Rebellion’, taking to arms to advance

their separatist cause (Yegar 1972: 98).

1948: The first independent government of U Nu recognises the Rohingya’s legitimacy and

awards temporary citizenship to Muslims in Buthiaung and Maungdaw townships through the

issuing of temporary registration certificates (TRCs), which allow them to vote (Thawnghmung

2016: 531; Parnini 2013: 282)

1962: The military coup led by General Ne Win, imposes restrictive policies for foreigners,

including the Rohingya. Trade and education is nationalised and ‘illegal’ immigration

curtailed (Thawnghmung 2016: 531). Mayu Frontier Muslims once again propose an

autonomous Muslim state (Thawnghmung 2014: 335).

1978: The Tatmadaw carry out the Nagamin (operation Dragon King) campaign. It involves

wides-spread identity card checks targeted at Muslims, causing mass deaths and expulsion

of Rohingya, and triggering the movement of 200, 000 to Bangladesh (Smith 1994: 56;

Parnini 2013: 286).

1979: Pressure from the UN causes the government to initiate UNHCR-led operation Shwe

Hintha, taking back Rohingya refugees and sparking initial debates about their origins


1982: The enactment of a new Citizenship Law denies Rohingya both full and associated

citizenship (the Kaman Muslims were awarded and continue to enjoy full citizenship) (see

Table 2).

1991 to 1992: The SLORC military junta implements a border development program that

Muslim leaders claim aimed to eradicate the Muslim population. This triggers a fresh exodus


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of around 250,000 more Rohingya to Bangladesh. Some are unable to register and take their

own shelters in Chittagong (Parnini 2013: 281, 291) (see Figure 5).

1994: The government issues TRCS to Rohingyas (Jones 2015:70).

1995: By July, 75% of Rohingyas who fled to Bangladesh in 1991/2 have been repatriated

to Myanmar due to negotiations with the UNHCR (Parnini 2013: 291).

2008: Once again, the government issues TRCs to Rohingyas, granting them the right to vote

in the 2008 referendum and 2010 election (Gibson et al. 2016).

2012: Two major incidences of anti-Muslim violence take place in Rakhine State,

perpetrated by Buddhist networks, ethnic Rakhine political networks, and in some cases

supported by government forces (Holliday 2014: 409). On June 3rd, it is sectarian clashes in

4 townships, and on October 23rd, it is a more methodical effort launched against both the

Rohingya and Kaman Muslims in 9 townships. In both cases, it results in the killing of over

200 and the internal displacement of around 125,000 (Holliday 2014: 409; Southwick

2015: 139). The Bangladesh government cuts off all humanitarian assistance to Rohingya

to minimise ‘pull factors’ (Southwick 2015: 141).

2013: The government implements policies that restrict Rohingya couples in Buthidaung

and Maungdaw townships without citizenship to two children (Kipgen 2014: 244).

2014: The government conducts the Population and Housing Census, requiring Rohingya to

either identify as ‘Bengalis’ or not be counted (Southwick 2015: 140).

2015: The government introduces four so-called ‘race and religion’ laws targeting Muslims

(Thwanghmung 2016: 532) (see Table 2). They also revoke the previously administered

TRCs.


Page 20 of 40

Kachin

The Kachin are a group of 1 to

1.5 million people that reside

predominantly in the hilly areas of

Kachin State and Northern Shan State

(see Figure 1 & 2). They are thus

referred to as one of the ‘hill’ or

‘frontier peoples’ of Myanmar. Their

traditional heartland is called ‘The

Triangle’ in English and is located

around the upper reaches of the

Irawaddy River, with a comparable

level of isolation to the centre as the

Rohingya. Due to the Kachin’s border

location, they have close ties with

communities in India and China (Moe

2014: 262). Following the

establishment of China and the former

Burma in 1949 and 1948, the Kachin

population was essentially divided into

both sides. As such, the boundary

between China, specifically the Dai-Jingpo Autonomous Prefecture of Yunnan, is linked to the

Kachin through social, religious, political, and business networks (Dean 2005: 810). Unlike

the Rohingya, the Kachin are recognised as a group in their neighbouring State, albeit under

different names and groupings. After fieldwork with the Kachin, Dean (2005: 810) concludes

that they have dealt with the physical national border that divides their homeland by

constructing intangible ethnic borders and networks. Kachin run all manner of businesses

both in Yunnan and other Chinese areas and the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO)

has liaison offices there (Moe 2014: 263). Within this group there are six sub-groups:

“Jinghpaw, Lawngwaw, Lachik, Zaiwa, Lisu and Nun-Rawng”, which have have come to form

a strong collective political identity, connected by a clan system (Moe 2014: 263; Smith

1994: 38). Most Kachin speak the Jingpho language or a dialect of it (see Table 1). Unlike

the Rohingya, there is no question about the Kachin’s legitimacy as an ethnic minority—

indeed they belong to the same Tibeto-Burman ethnolinguistic family as the Bamar. This

legitimacy is further demonstrated by the prevalence of Kachin society as a subject of

anthropological studies, notably in the work of Edmund Leach and Jonathon Friedman

(Nugent 1982). Despite initial resistance, many Kachin people converted to Christianity

Figure 3: Map depicting IDP sites in Kachin and northern Shan

States (August 2016). Source: (UNOCHA 2016)


Page 21 of 40

during the colonial period, and two thirds of their population now identify with the religion

(Smith 1994: 38). Although Aung-Thwin & Aung-Thwin (2013:50) suggest that most

indigenous Christians still believe in some form of animism. A notable feature of the Kachin

is their political group (KIO) and associated military branch, the Kachin Independence Army

(KIA), that were established in 1961 in response to perceived infringements on their

autonomy (Gravers & Ytzen 2014: 167). While the capital of Kachin State is controlled by the

central government, various areas on the fringes are under KIO/KIA control (Ho 2016: 89).

Like the Rohingya, the Kachin have actively pursued an independent nation-state. Their

nationalist desires were recognized in the 1947 Constitution with the designation of the

89,042km of territory for Kachin State. However, their situation is largely characterized by a

vying for power with the central government, with period of protracted conflict and

intermittent ceasefires. Within Myanmar, this sporadic conflict has internally displaced tens

of thousands of Kachin (see Figure 5). Not unlike that of the Rohingya, the ‘Kachin’ dilemma

also has significant regional cross-border implications, mainly for the Chinese who do not

recognize internally displaced persons (IDPs) on their side of the border (Diantan & Yanjing

2013). The Kachin’s history is complex and spans back centuries. However, a brief picture is

given below:


British rule: The colonial army and military police prefer recruiting Kachin (along with Karen

and Chin) over the Bamar and create ethnic regiments (Smith 1994: 23). This fosters a

heightened sense of pride and loyalty to the British.

WWII: The ‘Northern Kachin Levies’ Special Forces are created to fight for Britain against the

Japanese.

1947: Six Kachin delegates attend the Panglong Conference and sign the resulting Panglong

Agreement to form the Union of Burma (Kipgen 2015: 22).

In the drafting of the 1948 Constitution, the Kachin are denied the right to succession given

to the Shan and Kayah (Gravers & Ytzen 2014: 183).

1960/1: The KIO and KIA insurgent army are formed, partly due to the nullification of the

Panglong agreement, and establishment of Buddhism as the official religion (Kipgen 2015:

22)). They commence their armed movement against the government and form their own

government near the Chinese border (Ho 2016: 89).


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1991: SLORC carry out large-scale attacks on KIO bases, leading to the defection of the KIO’s

4th Brigade and a peace agreement (Smith 1994: 40).

1988 to 1992: One hundred thousand Kachin are displaced because of counter-insurgency

efforts, with around 11,000 escaping to China.

1994: A ceasefire is agreed upon, leaving the KIO and KIA controlling essentially

independent territory in Kachin State (Moe 2014: 262). Other Kachin NSAGs the New

Democratic Army-Kachin (NDAK) and Kachin Defence Army (KDA) also sign on (Kipgen 2015:

23).

2008: In response to pressure from the government to participate in the Border Guard Force,

Kachin and Wa leaders send a letter to Beijing, asking for support in establishing a similar

autonomy such that Hong Kong has within China (Moe 2014: 217).

2009: The KIA refuses to join the state’s Border Guard Force Scheme, established under the

new constitution (Moe 2014: 265).

2011: The cease-fire is broken, due to confusion over construction of the Myitsone dam in

Kachin territory. Over 100,000 Kachin are displaced, with many fleeing to Yunnan, China.

Churches and schools are destroyed (Moe 2014: 265).

In response to resistance from civil society and anti-Chinese tensions, President Thein Sein

suspends the US/Chinese $3.6 billion hydroelectric dam project that would have caused

environmental damage in Northern Kachin State (Lintner 2014: 96; Kiik 2016).

2012: There is sporadic conflict in Kachin state. The Tatmadaw attacks KIO HQ to ‘give it a

lesson’. Some artillery fire lands on Chinese soil, sparking Chinese involvement in 2013

facilitating peace talks. There are 5,000 government troops reportedly killed during KIA

conflict during this year (Moe 2014: 266).

2013: More peace talks occur in Myitkyina, capital of Kachin state. There is no real outcome

for peace, due to disagreement regarding the term ‘ceasefire agreement’. They do agree to

form a ‘Peace Technical Team’ composed of members of the MPC and KIO officers (Moe

2014: 267).

There is an altercation between Tatmadaw and KIA forces in Machanpaw Township.

Tatmadaw/KIA clashes during 2013 and 2014 were over deployment territories and

management of natural resources and trade.

New peace talks are held in Myitkyina. The UNFC outline conditions for previously agreed

upon ceasefire (Moe 2014: 267).


Page 23 of 40

2014: The KIO announce they will not be participating in the census due to their exclusion

from discussions with census officials and because of the armed conflicts in KIO territory

(Moe 2014: 269).

Figure 4: Ethnic militant groups of Myanmar. Source: (Colling 2016)


Page 24 of 40

Wa

The Wa are a group totalling 1 to 200 thousand that mainly reside in the autonomous

Wa State in the hills of Shan State, eastern Kachin State and Yunnan Province in China

(Gravers & Ytzen 2014: 158). They speak one of three (Parauk or Baraog, Vo, Awa) varieties

of Wa (see Table 2), but their working language is Mandarin. Like the Kachin, the Wa are

perceived by the majority Bamar and the international community as ‘hill peoples’, inhabiting

the mountainous land east of Mandalay and Lashio, north of the prior Kengtung and west of

Puer in China (Fiskesjö 2015: 1). The war-time practice of ‘headhunting’ or kieb ndoung, or

maog came to characterise outsiders’ early perceptions of the Wa, such as Winnington’s

1962 account. It was regarded both as primitive and ‘grotesque’, as well as a cultural

spectacle. In China, Wa headhunting paraphernalia features in themes parks for tourists

(Fiskesjö 2015: 509). Anthropological-style studies and accounts on the Wa’s cultural history

have documented their ancient rock art, deep oral traditions, and writing system which was

‘perfected’ by American missionaries to better represent the spoken language (Fiskesjö

2013). During colonialism, their geographical isolation meant that they were largely left alone

by the British, who did not control their land nor outline their border with China. This also

meant that they were not exposed to the same level of Christian missionary engagement,

and thus have retained their traditional Animist beliefs. Instead, from the period of

approximately 1971 to 1989, they were highly involved with the communist insurgency led

by the Chinese-supported BCP with whom they formed a strong alliance, even crediting them

with the eradication of their feudalist system, headhunting practices, and tribal conflicts.

Their presence also had the effect of uniting the multiple, distinct Wa groups in the region,

who had previously been loosely dispersed tribes (Renard 2013: 146-7).

Along with subsistence agriculture, they have an extended history of poppy cultivation,

exporting both opium and mining products (Fiskesjö 2015: 2). Their NSAG, the United Wa

State Army (UWSA), has played a large role in drug production. It is also comparable to that

of the Kachin, but is three times larger, making it the largest private army in the world (see

Figure 6). Their links with China are also comparable, having also had their independent land

divided into two because of the creation of the formerly Burmese and Chinese states

(Fiskesjö 2015: 2). While not recognised as one of the eight national races, they are

recognised as one of the 135 indigenous races, and furthermore, as having a large enough

population to warrant their own self-administered division (Gravers & Ytzen 2014: 79). They

are regarded by the neighbouring ethnic groups in Shan State as indigenous and having lived

there before the rest (Fiskesjö 2015: 2). In China, they are also recognised as an ethnic

minority, with similar arrangements of limited autonomy. While knowledge is sparse of the


Page 25 of 40

Wa’s early history, they are believed to have inhabited Myanmar since “the beginning of time”

(Fiskesjö 2013: 3).


1946: The Wa are represented in the Panglong Conference via the attendance of Shan

princes (Gravers & Ytzen 2014: 183).

1947: Wa leaders are interviewed by the ‘Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry’, in

preparation for the drafting of the 1948 Constitution, during which they state their

independence requests, and allegedly repeat the statement “we are wild people” (Fiskesjö

2013: 3).

Early 1960s: Traditional Wa land is split by the newly demarcated border between China

and Myanmar (Fiskesjö 2015: 499).

Late 1960s: The Burmese Communist Party (BCP), which is heavily supported by China,

loses its headquarters in central Myanmar, turning its attention to Wa land instead (Renard

2013: 146).

1967: Anti-Chinese riots take place in Rangoon, due to protestation in a school over Chinese

students wearing Chairman Mao badges (Smith 1994: 26).

1969: The BCP joins forces with guerrilla Wa militia leaders (Renard 2013: 147).

1989: The Wa split with the BCP, and agree upon a ceasefire with Myanmar’s military junta.

The UWSP/A is formed and the Wa Special Region 2 is created (Fiskesjö 2013: 3).

1990s: The UWSA is involved in heroin production

1993: The Wa Self-Administered Division is created. 1 of 6 of its kind, special status (Kramer

2015: 358) (Smith 2014: 60)

1994: Displacement due to political and economic crises (Smith 1994: 30).

2005: The UWSA imposes a ban on poppy cultivation, slowing opium production. However,

production has been increasing in recent years, funding NSAGs (Gravers 2014b: 150).

However, Chinese objections seemingly influenced the UWSA to not participate in the UNFC.

The Kachin are active participants (Moe 2014: 272).


Page 26 of 40

2008: In response to pressure from the government to participate in the Border Guard Force,

Kachin and Wa leaders send a letter to Beijing, asking for support in establishing a similar

autonomy as Hong Kong has within China (Moe 2014: 217).

Discussion

Racial dimension

A foremost and most palpable dimension underlying the disproportionate treatment of

the Rohingya in contrast to the Kachin and Wa, is the physical dissimilarities signalling racial

difference, that may create a visual trigger for underlying prejudices towards the Rohingya.

Farrelly (2014: 264) notes the extra hate directed towards the Rohingya over any other ethnic

minority. In the collective conscious of ethnic Rakhines, there is a stereotype of Rohingya

perceiving them as of disparate physical appearance. The accuracy of this is disputed,

according to Gibson et al (2016). However, it does appear that the distinction between

ethnicity and race is pertinent. Although the Rohingya, Kachin, and Wa are all ethnically

different from the majority Bamar, the Rohingya are perceived as the most racially different.

The South Asian origins of the Rohingya, who are typically darker in skin colour, are seen to

distinguish them from the Bamar in a way that the Kachin and Wa. Although in China, the Wa

ethnicity has been ‘commodified’ for tourists as “dark exotics” due to their darker tones

(Thwanghmung 2016: 528; Fiskesjö 2015: 512). The hate speech directed towards the

Rohingya by nationalist Buddhist movements are varied in nature, with insults including

“crude and savage”, and “a most dangerous and fearful poison” (Southwick 2015: 139).

However, many of the terms they use have distinctly racist undertones including “Muslim

dogs”, and the racial slur “kala” or “black foreigners from India” (Gravers 2015: 13). Such

language is often propagated through online forums, including Facebook (Holland 2014). The

government itself has even referred to the Rohingya as ‘kala’ in a publication (Hindstrom

2012). This issue is exacerbated by the method of self-identification which means there is

no objective way to distinguish the Rohingya identity, fostering racial wide-spread profiling.

Religious dimension

As evidenced by the term “Muslim dogs” the racial dimension is heavily correlated with

that of religion. As Taylor (2005: 269) notes, perceptions of religion and ethnicity coincide in

Myanmar. Since pre-colonial times, religion has been an institution through which ethnic

elites have built political bases. Buddhism is the dominant religion, comprising the

overwhelming majority (see Figure 5). Prime minister U Nu declared it the state religion, and

the Buddhist monks are politically authoritative, touting the phrase “to be Burman is to be


Page 27 of 40

Buddhist” (Ahsan Ullah 2016: 289; Gravers 2015: 8). As shown in Table 2, recently

implemented and heavily condemned ‘Race and Religion Protection Laws’ evidence the

saliency of religion in Myanmar society. There has been a tendency for international

organisations and media to blame Buddhist discrimination, driven by nationalist movements

like Buddhist 969 and the Ma Ba Tha using their influence as a platform to spread anti-

Muslim propaganda. As shown in Figure 5, although the total number of Muslims is actually

higher in Kachin State, and the Muslim percentage of all states similar in Rakhine State the

Buddhist percentage in Rakhine State is markedly higher. However, anti-Muslim violence in

Myanmar is not a new occurrence (Green 2013: 95). It was supposedly sparked around

1931 when a book was published by a Muslim disparaging Buddhism (Gravers 2015: 7).

However, if it is the religion of the Rohingya that is a primary factor separating them from the

Christian Kachin and Animist Wa, the question arises of: what sets apart the Rohingya from

other Muslim groups?

The ‘Kaman’ are another Muslim group who inhabit southern Rakhine state. Their

appearance is Burmese, whereas Rohingya appear more South Asian. Their presence in

Myanmar dates to the 17th century when they were invited by the Arakan monarchy to work

in the palace guard. They differ from the Rohingya in that they are recognized as an ethnic

group and thus have citizenship status. (Dapice 2015: 7). They have also been subject to

racist state-sponsored violence, but not to the same extent (Green 2013: 95; Burke 2016:

265). The ‘Panthays’ or ‘Chinese Muslims’ are a group who inhabit the south-western

Chinese province of Yunnan, and along the border with Myanmar in the Shan Hills. They are

typically Chinese in appearance but some resemble Arabs/Turks. Proud of their Arab origins,

many speak in Arabic, and have mosques. They have a verifiable 150-year history in

Myanmar, and maintained valuable, Chinese-Burman trade routes during British rule (Yegar

1966). Like the Rohingya, they do not hold citizenship yet are not subject to comparable

persecution. There is a tendency for younger generation to assimilate with Burmese Buddhist

majority, thus are seeking recognition as an official ethnic group to protect their ethnic

identity (Mullins & Aye 2014). The ‘Pashu’ or ‘Burmese Malays” are a Muslim group who

inhabit Tanintharyi Region in the south (Hunter 2014: 89), and the ‘Zerbadi’ Muslims refer

to those people with foreign Muslim fathers and mothers from Myanmar.

Thus, while religion is relevant, it is the historical narrative locating Muslim groups in

Myanmar’s history, classifying them as indigenous, that is most important. The histories of

the Kaman, Panthays, and Pashu have excluded them from the previously mentioned

negative associations of Islam that the Rohingya are conflated with. Instead, the specific

history of the Rohingya is tied to a problematic, extremist version of Islam. There is a local

Muslim maxim: "If the Burmese army sees a Muslim in the village he is an alien; if he is fishing


Page 28 of 40

on the river he is a smuggler; and if he is working in the forest he is an insurgent." (Smith

1994: 56). It seems that the Rohingya, identifiable through their physical features, have

become the scapegoat for a general fear of Islam.

Additionally, considering the hegemonic status of Buddhism in majority ethnic identity,

the question exists: why haven’t the Buddhists campaigned against other ethnic groups with

a religion, other than Buddhism—namely, the Christian Kachin and Animist Wa. It is obvious

that these religions do not carry with them comparable implications of mujahedeen and

Islamic State-building. However, these religions have historically also been perceived as an

attack on Bamar culture, at least in the case of the Kachin (Gravers 2014a: 144). The spread

of Christianity under colonialism saw Christian networks, in addition to the monkhood,

gaining importance in the civil society sector, establishing schools and churches (Gravers &

Ytzen 2014: 88). Since 1721, Christian missionaries representing a range of denominations

have played a significant role, as evidenced by their influence on the Kachin (Green 2015:

182). However, there could be a significant distinction to be made between the importance

of Islam in the Rohingya’s culture, and that of the Kachin and Wa. The Kachin converted to

Christianity, and the Wa’s Animist beliefs were also watered down during their stint with

communism. Renard (1987: 260) notes the tendency for Wa or Kachin to convert to

Buddhism when becoming a state ruler. Thus, the dimension of religion seems to underlie

the disproportionate persecution of the Rohingya, because their religion is perceived to pose

a challenge to Buddhism in a way that the Kachin and Wa’s religions do not.

Socio-economic dimension

Another relevant dimension that distinguishes the Rohingya from the Kachin and Wa

relates to the socio-economic level in Rakhine State, where the Rohingya live along with the

predominantly Buddhist Rakhine ethnic group. This state has one of the highest (44%)

incidences of poverty in the country, with extremely poor infrastructure and limited availability

of electricity (Ditlevsen 2014: 121; Dapice 2015: 8). The religious-based grievances that the

Buddhist Rakhine economic have with the Rohingya are largely to do with socioeconomic

factors that have becomes associated with religion. That is, the common stereotypes that

Muslims have higher birth rates, placing a strain on resources, and only trade amongst

themselves, shutting other people out, has led to the development of a siege mentality in

Rakhine State (Burke 2016: 264; (Gravers 2014c: 311). Fishing is a primary source of

income in Rakhine State. Burke (2016: 267) describes the common complaint made by local

ethnic Rakhine that Muslim fisherman do not abide by informal arrangements. This

resentment is augmented by the international attention that the plight of the Rohingya have

procured, leading to support from large international aid agencies like the UNDP. Thus, in an


Page 29 of 40

already socio-economically unstable landscape, the Rohingyas are resented for being

supported by international agencies, and Muslim bodies like Al-Qaeda and have become a

political scapegoat (Gravers 2015: 3).


Page 30 of 40

Figure 5: Graphs of religion statistics according to the 2014 census. Data source: (Ministry of

Immigration and Population 2016)


Page 31 of 40

Geopolitical dimension

Figure 6: Regional map of Myanmar. Source: (Google 2017)

Geopolitics is one factor that has not been given due attention within the Rohingya

discussion, and is significant in relation to the Kachin and Wa. A concern primarily cited by

the Myanmar government is illegal immigration from Bangladesh, and the national security

threat that immigrating Islamists pose, making it a transboundary problem (Thawnghmung

2014:323). However, as the findings have shown, the Kachin and Wa are also by definition,

ethnic minorities with a high number of cross-border engagement. Notably, according to

Kymlicka’s minority classification framework which describes the Rohingya as metics, the

government’s preoccupation with illegal immigration would more suitably place them in the

‘immigrant’ category, if not the national minority/indigenous. The Rohingya are physically and

symbolically tied to India, and Bangladesh, i.e. South Asian states (see Figure 8). The Kachin

and Wa are mainly tied to China, an East Asian state. Myanmar’s relation with Bangladesh

has largely been characterised and strained by the Rohingya problem, hindering the potential

to foster a bilateral friendship (Parnini 2013: 292). There is also the historical memory of


Page 32 of 40

mass migration of Indian labourers starting from the 19th century, which was protested by

the majority Bamar due to the perceived threat, ultimately leading to the separation of Burma

and British India (Green 2015: 175). On the other hand, the shared history of Myanmar and

China is far more intertwined, comprising a tight, yet complex bilateral relationship described

as pauk-phaw, meaning brothers of siblings (Ganesan 2011: 103). Myanmar was an early

recogniser of communist China, and the latter has been an important supplier of arms. China

represents Myanmar’s closest ally since independence and is the international actor that

exerts the most military and economic influence, despite isolated incidences of anti-Chinese

sentiment, such as that 1967 riots (Graves & Ytzen 2014: 109).

The geography within Myanmar is also relevant. As the findings illustrate, the Rohingya,

Kachin and Wa share a location relatively removed from the Bamar dominated centre, with

the Rohingya residing in Rakhine State, and the Kachin and Wa occupying their own assigned

territories. However, the fact that the Rohingya reside in a State assigned to another

recognized ethnic group means that they are essentially a minority within a minority.

Contrastingly, the Kachina and Wa are the majority groups of their own states, and, as their

status as ‘hill people’s entails, have historically ‘kept to themselves’. According to Scott (13),

the borderlands of Myanmar have historically been non-state spaces, where the centre has

been hard-pressed to maintain authority, allowing groups like the Kachin and Wa to organise

themselves relatively indecently. While Rakhine State is somewhat isolated due to the

mountainous divide from the centre, the presence of the majority ethnic Rakhine means they

are perceived as infringing upon physical and metaphorical ‘Rakhine space’.

Political dimension

Political factors play a significant role in the disproportionate persecution of the

Rohingya, in contrast to the Kachin and Wa. In terms of the political climate, avenues for

participation have greatly increased since the military allowed elections in 2010, allowing

pre-existing prejudices, such as that based on race and religion, to come to the fore (Gravers

2015: 3). It is likely that, after years of military rule, the relaxation of media restrictions

exacerbated anti-Rohingya propaganda to gain traction (Gravers & Ytzen 2014: 39). The

political clout of Buddhist monks is also significant. Monks have long had immense political

and social influence. They effectively controlled Mandalay at one point, opposed the military

rule, and aided in steps towards democracy (Gravers 2015: 9). Thus, the Buddhist

monkhood’s gripes with the Rohingya is not only significant in terms of the religious

dimension, but also has political ramifications that further distinguish the Rohingya from the

Kachin and Wa. The government’s affinity with Buddhist monks, in combination with general

prejudice among the polity has created a double-edged sword as such that the Rohingya have


Page 33 of 40

been unequipped to combat. Kymlicka identifies 4 main avenues by which minorities may

gain political traction: mass emigration, integration into majority culture, self-government to

defend the minority culture, or permanent marginalisation (Holliday 2010: 114). While the

Kachin and Wa have relatively sophisticated organisational structures and political parties,

namely the KIO, KDSP, UWSP and WNUP that can represent their interests, as well as varying

levels of self-government, the Rohingya have been restricted, largely due to their lack of

citizenship, from accessing these avenues, leaving them with permanent marginalisation. In

addition, the Kachin and Wa do not face opposition from a ‘majority minority’ like the ethnic

Rakhine to actively campaign against them. For example, in Rakhine State during the 2015

elections, the ethnic nationalist Arakan National Party’s (ANP) ethnic nationalist discourse

arguably encouraged violence towards Muslims, also benefitting their campaigns by isolating

Muslim voters (Burke 2016: 269). While parties like the ANP coalition could represent the

ethnic Rakhine’s wishes to limit Muslim’s electoral rights, the Rohingya themselves were

unable to vote for their oppositions, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) or

National League for Democracy (NLD), because they were not permitted to vote (Burke 2016:

268). The administering and subsequent withdrawal of citizenship and other civil

documentation from the Rohingya suggests they have been taken advantage of as a political

tool. This is especially so given Gibson et al’s argument that the Rohingya are legally entitled

to citizenship given Citizenship law provisions (see Table 2).

Articles of the 2008 Constitution Stipulations Executive

232 The ministers of defence, home affairs and border

affairs are to be active military personnel nominated

by the commander-in-chief of the defence services

201 The commander-in-chief, deputy commander-in-chief

and all three ministers are to be in the 11-member

National Defence and Security Council

Legislature

109, 141, 161 One quarter of the members in the bicameral

national parliament, and 14 regional and state

assemblies are to be military personnel nominated

by the commander-in-chief

40 Direct authority is given to the commander-in-chief in

the provisions for declarations of a state of

emergency

Militaristic duties

383 Duty to uphold three national causes of:

1) Non-disintegration of the union

2) Non-disintegration of national solidarity

3) Perpetuation of sovereignty

386 “Every citizen has the duty to undergo military

training… and to serve in the Armed Forces to defend

the Union”

387 Duty to enhance national unity

Table 3: Instances of militarization in the 2008 Constitution of Myanmar. Source: (Holliday 2014: 407)


Page 34 of 40

Military dimension

The last dimension underlying

the disproportionate persecution of

the Rohingya in comparison to the

Kachin and the Wa, relates to the

political dimension and is that of

military power in the form of NSAGs.

This is especially so given the history

of military rule and the extent to

which the military still retains political

influence under the current 2008

Constitution. This constitution refers

to “a genuine disciplined multi-party

democratic system”, and this emphasis on discipline is evidenced in Table 3. Even now,

discipline and order remain characteristic values of the state of Myanmar, which, as the

cases of the Kachin and Wa show, is manifested beyond the state level through the presence

of highly organised private armies or NSAgs. Figure 6 shows the relative sizes of the KIO and

UWSA, depicted in Figures 7 and 8, which are the 2 largest militias in the country. On the

other hand, the Rohingya do not possess a comparable army, travelling back and forth across

the Bangladeshi border instead of participating in relatively balanced armed conflicts (Kipgen

2015). The 2 small Mujahid groups that are associated with the Rohingya, the Rohingya

Solidarity Organisation (RSO) and Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF) do not begin to

compare in terms of scale and action (Smith 1994: 56). The KIO and UWSA have been central

to these groups respective demands for autonomy and representation. Parnini (2013: 292)

notes that the high level of organisation within groups like the Kachin have meant that have

the capacity to defend themselves against the power of the centre. In Myanmar, wherein

military power has historically been

a significant source of authority and

legitimacy, it is likely that the

Rohingya’s lack of a coordinated

military force has significantly

contributed to their

disproportionately experienced

persecution.

Figure 8: Kachin Independence Army (KIA) cadets follow drills

at a training school in the Burmese town of Laiza, on the

border with China. Source: (Vrieze 2016).

Figure 7: United Wa State Army (UWSA) soldiers march during a

media display in Panghsang, Wa territory in northeast Myanmar

October 4, 2016. Source: (Reuters/Tun SZ 2016)


Page 35 of 40

Conclusions

International development and human rights attention towards Myanmar has largely

been dominated by the situation of the Muslim Rohingya, the persecuted group who claim

the status of ethnic minority yet are identified by the government as an immigrant group, and

treated as a metic group. This report sought to offer preliminary insight into the question:

what are the factors that underlie the disproportionate treatment of the Rohingya in contrast

to the Kachin and Wa –two recognised ethnic minorities that have simultaneously been

involved in conflictual situations, without a comparable level of attention. Through secondary

research and the application of a comparative line of reasoning, it has been made clear that

is reductive to merely distinguish the Rohingya by their adherence to Islam. A complex,

historically based, nexus of dimensions exist that continue to work against the Rohingya in a

way that the Kachin and Wa do not experience. To some extent, the uniqueness of the

Rohingya in the context of Myanmar lies in perceived physical differences demarcating race,

associated more with South Asia than East Asia, to whom Myanmar maintains strong bilateral

ties. Although the Kachin and Wa also practice religions other than the majority Buddhism,

they are possibly not as central to their ethnic identity and autonomy demands and thus are

not perceived as a threat. And while Islam is tolerated in other ethnic groups, the Rohingya

have borne the brunt of negative stereotypes of this religion, tied to now familiar broader

fears of extremism. The respective geographical location of the groups means that while the

Kachin and Wa occupy assigned spaces, the Rohingya occupy the assigned space of an

antagonistic ethnic group whom, amid socio-economic hardship look to the Rohingya’s

disparate race and religion as problematic. These dimensions are exacerbated by the strong

relationship between political and military power that exclude the Rohingya from both

adequate physical defence and political representation – which - in the Kachin and Wa’s

case, have aided in establishing them as a legitimate collective and political agent.

Considering these nuances, the following recommendations are set forward to key

stakeholders, including local and international NGOS, the governments of Myanmar and

Bangladesh, and multilateral institutions in the interests of promoting peace and stability:


Page 36 of 40

Recommendations

1: Local and international NGOs should continue to implement online hate speech

mitigation initiatives such as that promoted by USIP (2017) both at the civilian level,

particularly in Rakhine State and, if possible, within the ranks of the Tatmadaw and higher

levels of government.

2: In the pursuit of the religious freedom necessary in true democratic societies, the

government should provide opportunities for discussion between recognised Muslim

minorities such as the Kaman and Panthays as well as the Rohingya to better understand

the constructive role that Islam can play in Myanmar.

3: A multilateral institution like the UN should aid the government in establishing a

supervised forum for Rohingya and Rakhine representatives, akin to peace agreements

participated in by the Kachin and Wa.

4: In the short term, regardless of their current position regarding the Rohingya’s origins,

the government of Myanmar should recognise their duty to facilitate rights for immigrant

minorities through the re-administering of TRCs and other relevant documentation to the

Rohingya. In the long term, they should take steps towards establishing a more informed

account of the Rohingya’s status based on objective facts.

5: The governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh should learn from the cases of the Kachin

and Wa on the Chinese border to work towards a cooperative solution to the Rohingya

problem and immigration more generally that provides the simultaneous benefit of

strengthening bilateral relations and relaxing their dependence on China.


Page 37 of 40

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