The Potential Populist Voter

The Potential Populist Voter

A Comparative Study About The Rebellious Voter In Europe

Bachelor Thesis

Author: Juan Manuel Fernandez

Supervisor: Yonhyok Choe

Examinator: Daniel Silander

Term: Spring 2020

Course code: 2SK31E

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Abstract

This quantitative paper explores the mean value between selected countries with the ambition

to compare the different regions and to understand the conditions in which populist parties

grow. The main question that runs through this paper is “How does the potential populist

support vary between different regions in Europe?”. This was done by drawing a framework

based on the theory of the four D’s of Distrust, Destruction, Deprivation and De-alignment.

The selected countries were divided in a similar order from the comparative study of 2015

conducted by Kriesi and Pappas. A survey from 2014 provided the necessary variables in order

to measure the mean value of each category and summed up together in order to measure the

“pool of potential populist voters”. The paper concludes that the regional and theoretic

framework is validated judging upon the mean numbers in each country.

Key words

Right-wing, left-wing, populism, comparative, quantitative analysis, 4 D’s,.

Acknowledgments

I want to thank Yonhyok Choe for his invaluable help with the software and professional

critique when writing this paper.

I also want to thank Marcus Karlén who helped me to brainstorm, organize my thoughts and

helped in making a study schedule during the process of writing this paper.

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Table of contents

1 Introduction ..............................................................................................................................1 1.1 Main Question ....................................................................................................................2

2 The Populist Research Divide ...................................................................................................4 2.1 Previous Demand Research ................................................................................................5 2.2 Lacking Research Area.......................................................................................................7

3 Defining National Populism ......................................................................................................8

4 Theoretical Presentation ...........................................................................................................9 4.1 Presenting Distrust .............................................................................................................9 4.2 Presenting Destruction ..................................................................................................... 10 4.3 Presenting Deprivation ..................................................................................................... 10 4.4 Presenting De-alignment .................................................................................................. 11

5 Necessity Of A Comparative Research ................................................................................... 13 5.1 Hypothesis ........................................................................................................................ 13

6 Materials and Methods ........................................................................................................... 14 6.1 Material ............................................................................................................................ 14 6.2 Problems With The Material ............................................................................................. 14 6.3 Methods ............................................................................................................................ 15 6.4 Methodological Problems ................................................................................................. 16

7 Statistical Presentation And Analysis ..................................................................................... 17 7.1 All mean values ................................................................................................................ 18 7.2 Distrust ............................................................................................................................. 19 7.3 Destruction ....................................................................................................................... 21 7.4 Deprivation ....................................................................................................................... 22 7.5 De-alignment .................................................................................................................... 23

8 Discussion ................................................................................................................................ 24 8.1 Future Research ............................................................................................................... 25

9 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 26

Bibliography.................................................................................................................................... 28

Appendix 1 – Regional Organization On The Comparative Study ............................................... 32

Appendix 2 – ESS14 Measured Countries ..................................................................................... 32

Appendix 3 - Selected Questions..................................................................................................... 32

Appendix 4 – Reliability test for the four D’s as shown on software ............................................. 33 Appendix 4.1 Distrust ................................................................................................................... 33 Appendix 4.2 Destruction ............................................................................................................. 34 Appendix 4.3 Deprivation ............................................................................................................. 35 Appendix 4.4 De-alignment .......................................................................................................... 36

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1 Introduction

The latest general elections over the last ten years have shown that right-wing populism

continues to grow throughout Europe without any signs of changing in the close future (Müller,

2018: Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017: Mouffe, 2018: Norris and Inglehart, 2019: Eatwell and

Goodwin, 2018).

The electoral success can be seen throughout the European continent. Most of the successful

parties over Europe have been parties with a populist nature and stands on the right side of the

political spectrum, although there exist some anomalies in the southern regions of Europe where

left-wing populist parties have gained a significant representative influence (Mudde, 2007:

Inglehart and Norris, 2019). This modern phenomenon has affected the political landscape over

Europe and the US, challenging the status quo over the western world, it has also shaped the

European integration due to its politicization (Bickerton et al, 2015: Schimmelfennig et al,

2015).

The populist parties and movements have also put the liberal free trade expansion on hold and

hindered international free trade agreements such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment

Partnership between the United States and European Union, putting the typical liberal free

transatlantic trade since the second world war in question. Furthermore, Brexit followed by the

electoral victory of Boris Johnson managed to put the European integration on the defence (EU-

LAC, 2018: BBC, 2019). This political move was made possible only because of UKIPs

instance of having a referendum on the British membership of the EU. The electoral results

shook the European establishment to its core when it was clear that the pro-Brexit campaign

won in 2016 (Norris and Inglehart, 2019: Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018).

An example of how populist parties are gaining momentum can be seen in Hungary, where the

election in 2014 the resulted 20,3% for Jobbik while Fidezs enjoyed 45,05% of the total vote

(OSCE, 2014). This means that the populist parties had managed to enjoy 65,35% of the total

vote, cementing a clear hegemony in its country. This hegemonic order has managed to be

maintained and was reflected in the last election results of 2018 where 19,06% of the vote went

to Jobbik and 49,28% of the vote went to Fidesz. This means that the last election gave the

populist parties a total vote share of 68,38% (OSCE, 2019).

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Furthermore, the Austrian populist party FPÖ presents an interesting anomaly where it initially

gained momentum from the election of 2006, receiving 10,01% and the election of 2017 where

it received 26% of the eligible vote (Bundesministerium, 2006: Bundesministerium. 2017).

However, the FPÖ suffered a major setback due to a major scandal that triggered a snap election

in 2019 and remained with 19,02% of the total vote, losing a substantial number of votes

compared to the election of 2017 (Bundesministerium, 2019: France 24, 2019)

The Swedish political sphere had during the last years been shaped under the populist party of

SD. The party entered the parliament during the election of 2010 with 5,7% of the eligible vote.

SD maintained its political momentum and grew electorally towards 12,9% in 2014 and

increased its share of the vote up to 17,5% in 2018. The party has thusly gained a large influence

in the Swedish Parliament (Valmyndigheten, 2010: Valmyndigheten 2014: Valmyndigheten

2018).

In addition, new populist parties are continuing to grow and take political space, the last

elections in Spain saw VOX entering the parliament due to the total collapse of the regular

right-wing party in the wake of a major corruption scandal (Jones. 2018: infoelectoral, 2019).

It was the third new party that entered the parliament after the moderate populist party

CIUDADANOS and leftist populist PODEMOS had entered in parliament just three years

before in a dramatic manner (infoelectoral, 2011: infoelectoral, 2016).

It can by this reason be argued that the populist parties are shaping the political map in relation

to how the established parties have failed to maintain authority towards its populace in different

countries and in different ways that varies between countries and regions during the last

decades.

1.1 Main Question

The papers aim is based upon how one is to understand the appeal of populist parties between

different regions.

It is widely acknowledged that populist parties grow electorally from the distrust and frustration

against already existing parties that are established in the political order due to a lack of

authority from the ruling parties (Müller, 2018: Laclau, 2005: Kriesi and Pappas 2015: Mouffe,

2018: Loxbo: 2016: Kitschelt, 2007: Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018: Norris and Inglehart, 2019:

Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017: Laclau, 2005: Hoare and Smith, 1999: Mudde, 2010 ).

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However, this is where the consensus ends. The academic discussion surrounding the root cause

of the authoritative erosion and its process for such a political development to take place is

widely discussed in the academic field with different conclusions, negating the possibilities for

an academic consensus (Manonova and Franquesa, 2020).

The fact that there is little to no consensus surrounding what factors leads to a populist party

growth and the fact that there are different kinds of populist party support in different countries

leads me to ask the following question which will run through this paper:

• How does the potential populist support vary between different regions in Europe?

I will begin the paper with a presentation of the previous research, followed by a definition of

populism and a presentation of the four D’s theory, this will be followed by a presentation on

the materials and methods which will also be made up for operationalization. The

operationalization will be conducted by comparing answers from a 2014 survey and select the

relevant questions which will be transformed into variables and then be sorted and categorized

in accordance to the presented theoretical framework. The mean value from these variables will

then be presented in the form of diagrams with a short analysis of each diagram. The result will

then be discussed with the previous research and the theoretical presentation in mind.

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2 The Populist Research Divide

There is a shortage of theories regarding populism, despite a lively debate and discussion about

the populist parties successes and failures that challenges the status quo. The lack of theories is

in turn divided into the viewpoints from a demand and supply side, where the latter describes

the populist parties behaviour and inner logic while the former describes its support and

conditions in which a populist party can gain influence amongst the electorate. The demand

side is divided further between scholars who place the primary demand factor on cultural issues,

while other scholars argue that the populist demand factor is triggered mainly by economic

factors. This division of the previous research has thinned out the already small numbers of

theories about the subject due to its dependence on which factor is going to be researched and

complicates a scientific exploration of the phenomenon (Mudde, 2010: Norris and Inglehart,

2019: Kriesi and Pappas, 2015: Loxbo, 2016: Manonova and Franquesa, 2020).

However, much of the previous research has been concentrated on the demand side with no

measurement of the variations between each country. On the contrary, a comparative study

between different nations has remained largely untouched (Mudde, 2010). The first large scale

comparative work on populism was published just as recently as 2015 where the analytical areas

were divided into regions instead of nation states (appendix - 1). The research concluded that

each region had a different result and depending upon the area one looked into after the

European monetary crisis in the wake of the banking crisis in 2008, it was clear that some

populists parties gained momentum while others did not grow electorally due to the banking

crisis consequences depending upon the region where they were active. The populist surge was

most prevalent in the southern and anglo-celtic regions together with the eastern-central region

albeit with different styles. The Nordic region on the other hand, did not experience any populist

surge due to its institutional stability while the western region experienced a modest surge with

France acting as an anomaly due to a substantial growth on popularity for its populist right-

wing party lead by Le Pen (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015).

Populism seem to follow an inner logic outside of the left and right political spectrum. A

populist can draw up “the people” as a homogenous righteous entity against other elected

representatives and undercut their own electoral failures by relying on the “silent majority”

during electoral defeats. This constant “shadow of a representative democracy” is the result of

its own failures (Müller, 2018).

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These failures can be seen through a set of links of crises on the economic situation or corruption

scandals. The loss of authority towards the status quo, creates an opportunity for populist parties

to success electorally (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017: Laclau, 2005: Kriesi and Pappas, 2015:

Hoare and Smith, 1999: Mudde, 2010). This can however be contested since other findings

concludes that populism and Radical right parties are not dependant on economic factors for it

to succeed and depends more on identity amongst the citizenry such as immigration, culture

and morals than on economic woes. The success of the radical right can therefore rely heavily

on the identity factor (Oesch. D, 2008: Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018).

Another failure is the lack of ideological competition between the dominating parties and the

resulting ideological vacuum. The same vacuum creates a space for other opinions to grow in

importance and is filled by identarian populist issues which previously were not so important

on the political stage (Kitschelt, 2007).

The common goal for national populist parties is their intention to halt or heavily reduce

immigration. However, they don’t necessarily share a common ideological background (Loxbo,

2016). Another observation that was found when touching upon the subject of the right-wing

populists. By following its thinkers who have enjoyed an international audience and recognition

from the time of the first world war until recently, it was concluded that the philosophy follows

four themes in which the first is Apocalyptic thoughts, this theme is made up from a fear for

the decline of the western Judaeo-Christian civilisation by mass immigration from Muslim

countries. The second theme is fear of global liberal elites in which the apocalyptic fear is

knitted together in which a cosmopolitan elite will contribute to the decline of the western

civilisation by its universalism. The third theme is the friend-enemy distinction. This concept

is made up from the idea of a political class which is incompatible with the classic definition

from the state or nation and is the fundamental basis of the liberal democratic society. The

fourth and most important theme for the radical right is metapolitics. This theme circulates

about how people behave and think about certain issues will lead to a change of a concept on

the political and social sphere and is based on a Gramscian perspective (Sedgwick, 2019).

2.1 Previous Demand Research

One of the existing theories regarding the demand side of populism, is the theory of the four

D’s. This theory acts as a framework for mapping out the term “pool of potential”. The term is

related to the demand side of which voters are open for right-wing populist rhetoric. This “pool

of potential” is mapped out by four categories, the four D’s, a combination of these dimensions

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explains the growth and the demand side of the populist right-wing parties. It is in theory

possible to measure the demand for right-wing populism by measuring the categories of

Distrust, Deprivation, De-alignment and Destruction by using a quantitative method. This

theory will be explained in more detail in the chapter of theoretical presentation (Eatwell and

Goodwin, 2018).

A critical point of view is the discussion circulating around populism and its discursive

approach whereas populism is used as a tool for constructing a political frontier between the

underdog and the powerful in a liberal democracy. This perspective argues that the vague

concept of populism is not to be linked with an ideology but is linked to a variety of institutional

frameworks. A populist moment is seen from the context of the Gramscian term hegemony in

which the dominant hegemony has lost its authority due to pressures of political or

socioeconomic factors. Populism and liberal democracy are thusly linked together (Laclau,

2005). This view is built upon a Gramscian perspective on society which views the society

through social consent, it has coined the terms social hegemony and interregnum. The term

social hegemony adheres to two power factors which can be observed when analysing the

societies social consent. The first is seen as the spontaneous consent by the public to the

dominating power which with its prestige sets the direction in which the society follows. The

second is the legal coercive power that is possessed by the state to suppress any active or passive

consensual anomalies, this second factor is however only used when the first factor fails to

uphold the hegemonic façade of consent The term interregnum adheres to the moment when

the social hegemony is widely rejected and non-existent in a society while the coercive force is

unable to restore normalcy inside of its society. A crisis of authority becomes a fact, forcing the

hegemonic power to rely on more coercive force to uphold its status. The interregnum can

thusly be viewed as the period between the old ideology which has been rejected by the public

and a new one which has not yet unfolded, rendering the future ideological arrangement of a

society into obscurity (Hoare and Smith, 1999).

Populism can be understood when approaching the democratic core in which agonism is seen

as a central part for democracy to thrive, the Gramscian term hegemony is found again in this

theory in relation to agonism and a populist moment. Another term is also used which is

agonism. Agonism is described as a defused stage of antagonism in which a ‘we/they’ relation

between opposing hegemonic projects is defused from enemies to be destroyed into political

adversaries whose existence is legitimate. This interpretation suggests that an ideological

conflict existence is necessary for a democracy to exist. This view of democracy and conflict

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approaches the central nature of the liberal democratic system in which its conflicts cannot be

solved through a consensus and that any attempts to strive for it leads to an erosion of the liberal

democracy’s nature. Agonism is thusly the very condition for the existence of a democracy. An

abandonment of the agonistic structure inside a democracy leads by this reason to a post-

democracy. This term is referred to as the political relationship of democracy in which free

market is central to the established political order. The word democracy has been reduced to

only signify free elections and a defence of human rights while the other liberal aspects have

been reduced in importance or eliminated. This erosion of democratic ideals lays the

foundations of a populist moment where democracy can be radicalized or weakened (Mouffe,

2018).

2.2 Lacking Research Area Despite a major research effort and several electoral gains as previously mentioned, there is

little research done that measures the different areas or countries between each other to map out

the populist appeal and by this way either prove or disprove populist theories.

This fact about the small number of measurements between different areas or countries makes

it necessary to build upon this research area. With only one large comparative study that touches

upon the electoral results depending on each region and its common factors makes it necessary

to explore whether demand is varying between each country and by this way find out the

electoral support for populist parties.

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3 Defining National Populism

A definition of populism is necessary to map out the types of parties that are populist. Populism

can be described as a thin ideology which can be on either side of the left-right political

spectrum in nature and works more as a framework without any particular set of goals (Eatwell

and Goodwin, 2018: Müller, 2018: Laclau, 2005: Norris and Inglehart, 2019: Manonova and

Franquesa, 2020).

Populism bases its values on three factors:

1. A striving for making the popular will to be heard and acted upon (Eatwell and

Goodwin, 2018: Müller, 2018: Laclau, 2005: Norris and Inglehart, 2019).

2. A defense of the interests of the ordinary people (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018: Müller,

2018: Laclau, 2005: Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018: Norris and Inglehart, 2019: Manonova

and Franquesa, 2020).

3. A desire to replace distant and corrupt elites (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018: Müller, 2018:

Norris and Inglehart, 2019: Kitschelt, 2007: Manonova and Franquesa, 2020)

A populist party turns into a national populist party when adding a fourth factor.

4. An emphasis on nationalism in which a desire to preserve a territorial identity from

radical change and promote a national interest (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018)

This broad definition is defined within the possibility of being both right-wing and left-wing. It

is in theory possible for the Scottish Nationalist Party in Great Britain to be classified as a

national populist party just as Jobbik in Hungary to be classified as such. The definition is thusly

made with an exclusion from identity, class and ethnicity as defining factor for national populist

parties and can stretch from left to right (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018).

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4 Theoretical Presentation

The four D’s acts as a theoretical framework in which the different dimensions are put under a

set of variables, this makes it possible to map out the different factors contributing to the

creation of a “pool of potential” in which a demand side is created for a national populist party

to rise. However, it is necessary to account them together in order to have a clear analysis on

the popular rise of popularity at a national level. The theory centralizes in a bottom up trend but

can also be criticised for lacking on the perspective from the supply side.

Furthermore, it is important to take into account that populist parties started to grow and enter

the parliaments in different European countries prior to the economic recession in 2008 and that

economic factors alone are not the reason for populist parties to grow into a relevant

parliamentary force (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018)

4.1 Presenting Distrust The divorce between the represented and the representatives is closely linked in the behavioural

patterns by the politicians who behaves increasingly alike, with its own rules and norms and

thusly behaves less like the people they are supposed to represent. This argument relates

especially when discussing different moral values regarding diversity which voters to a large

degree think have gone too far (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018).

Distrust is by this reason presented as the following:

- A widespread feeling of a relational distance between the represented and

representatives in terms of background, lifestyle and values (ibid).

- Frustration about the way representative democracy is working leads to a growing

support for direct democracy (ibid).

The relation between the frustration between the elected and the electorate can often be seen in

relation to the European Union (EU) and the binding nature of different policies due to the top

down design by its foundation. This top down approach was relatively stable were the

population passively accepted decisions taken by the European Community and was called the

period of “permissive consensus”. This started to decline however, after the Maastricht treaty

was implemented (Bickerton et al, 2015: Schimmelfennig et al, 2015).

The argument can be strengthened by analysing the integration process post-Maastricht where

the problems of the European integration has started to show due to a divorce between the pro

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integrational elites and a more sceptical population in the persecution of policy implementations

on the European level (Bickerton et al, 2015).

Another argument for the divorce between the electorate and the politicians can be seen in the

aftermaths of the monetary crisis of 2008 in which the monetary crisis in 2008 paved the way

for populist parties to grow in Germany and the southern Europe and formed the European

integration. (Guerra and McLaren, 2016: Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018).

4.2 Presenting Destruction A fear for a destruction of the popular culture in a nation due to immigration and hyper ethnic

change is a factor which is taken into consideration in relation to the “pool of potential”. This

fear does not mean necessarily that it is based on facts. This leads however to xenophobic fears

due to the strong sentimental feelings that exists between a national identity and the fear for

losing it (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018).

Destruction is by this reason presented as the following:

- A widespread anxiety of a looming destruction of society caused by hyper ethnic

change and immigration (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018).

This fear can be traced in different regions throughout Europe and is reflected in the western

and nordic parts of Europe where the fear of change of the national culture is greater than

economic issues amongst the national populist electorate and thusly plays a smaller role

amongst the electorate (Oesch. D, 2008).

The nationalistic sentiment or patriotism which some might call it during a time of a widespread

fear is seen as a virtue amongst nationalists but does not necessarily mean that it is racist in its

core nature. Nationalistic fear regarding the cultural core moral concerns comes in conflict with

the neoliberal vision of open borders, particularly during immigration crises events such as the

one that took place during 2015 (Haidt, 2016). When these concerns are not taken into

consideration in the established political order amongst the electorate but rather converge into

a consensus without any discussion, this creates a vacuum in which the national populist can

fill with their rhetoric (Haidt, 2016: Kitschelt, 2007).

4.3 Presenting Deprivation A widespread deprivation became a dominating phenomenon in Europe due to the eurozone

monetary crisis. The political backlash in response to this had a decisive impact on the European

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integration due to the unpopular policy implementations in exchange for loans (Eatwell and

Goodwin, 2018).

The sentiment of a widespread deprivation is presented as the following:

- An economic environment which creates a widespread feeling of economic

deprivation in relation to others in society (ibid).

- A widespread belief of an economical priority which favour of the rich and powerful

at the cost of others in society (ibid).

- A widespread fear of the future (ibid).

The answer to the monetary crisis of the eurozone came in the form of austerity measures which

the European Monetary Bank, International Monetary Fund and the European Commission (the

troika) insisted on implementing in exchange for loans. The end result was a systemic override

of democratic national institutions in its implementation of policy, which created a deep

division between the troika and the citizens of the eurozone. The resistance to these austerity

measures would serve as catalyst for populist parties, particularly in the southern region and

would for example in Spain lead to the emergence of the 15-M movement. This movement

would in turn serve indirectly as a catalyst for the populist party of PODEMOS (Iglesias, 2015,

Errejon and Mouffe, 2015: Guerra and McLaren, 2016). The monetary crisis led to a mixture

of authority crises over Europe where the nordic and western regions (with the exception of

France) did not experience any surge of populist parties. This comes into contrast with the

southern and Anglo- Celtic region that experienced a populist rise in direct correlation to the

aftermath of the economic crisis. The central and eastern regions were more complicated in

relation to the monetary crisis due to the populist presence before the crises but the conclusion

was that this regions populist growth is not in a direct correlation to the recession that started

in 2008 even if populist parties are present in the region (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015).

4.4 Presenting De-alignment The term De-alignment refers to the abandonment of the traditional parties and a more volatile

electorate that are not particularly loyal to one party. The growing centrism from the traditional

left has particularly meant an abandonment of the working class creating a vacuum to be filled

(Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018).

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A period of de-alignment is presented as:

- A widespread abandonment of loyalty towards previously dominant parties (ibid).

- A widespread practice of party switching between elections (ibid).

- Larger sections of non-voters (ibid).

The growth of populism can be attributed towards a decline of the rhetoric between the right

and left that dominated the modernistic cold war era. This abandonment of former political

ideals has led to a vacuum in which other policy questions are prioritized due to the rising

similarities between the traditional left- and right-wing parties (Loxbo, 2016: Mouffe, 2018:

Kitschelt, 2007). This means that the democratic system as it exists today, is discouraging

participation amongst the citizens instead of encouraging it by making it meaningful in any

way. The conventional politics has been degraded and people are not engaging in any

meaningful way on the political arena due to the consensual nature of the established political

parties. With no signs from the political establishment of any change have resulted in a political

rupture between the established non-political experts and populists, making people more

volatile when voting. This is shown by the electoral behaviour on election day for making a

decision on who to vote for instead of making a long-term commitment, if they vote at all (Mair,

2013).

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5 Necessity Of A Comparative Research

It is necessary to explore the underlying reasons for the growth of populism and why it has

become a constant phenomenon in the political scene all over Europe. The liberal established

order has been shaken to its core, thusly it has in turn, shaped the European integration during

the last decade. A comparative exploration through quantitative means over different areas of

Europe is by this reason the best way to find out how the electoral support varies between each

country to understand this phenomenon on a deeper level.

5.1 Hypothesis

I intend to use the theory of the four D’s to draw a map over the fertile soils in which populist

parties can grow. I will do this by doing a quantitative comparative research study in European

countries in order to draw a statistical map over the areas in which the national populist parties

can grow. The main Hypothesis (U) and UnderHypotheses (UH) are the following:

H: Based on the four D´s, a low mean value of each D leads to a high pool of potential.

UH1: A low Distrust mean score contributes to the pool of potential

UH2: A low Destruction mean score contributes to the pool of potential

UH3: A low Deprivation mean score contributes to the pool of potential

UH4: A low De-alignment mean score contributes to the pool of potential

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6 Materials and Methods

6.1 Material The primary source of this paper for testing the theory will be the European Social Survey from

2014 (ESS, 2014) in which I will measure the different D’s. The survey consists of answers

from ca 40 000 participants spread throughout Europe in which the respondents gave a variety

of answers regarding their opinions on a range of relevant subjects suitable for the testing of

the four D’s. These subjects touches on the political opinions about what the theoretical section

above mentions which are: the amount of distrust between the electorate and the politicians, the

conceived deprivation amongst the respondents in relation to others, the de-alignments resulting

volatility amongst the electorate and lastly the fear of destruction of its own culture. The large

number of participants gives a stable base for measuring the opinion in different European

countries. The surveys answers from the respondents will therefore be the main data for the

paper in which the questions and resulting answers will be translated into variables.

The secondary sources will come in the forms of books and scientific articles to add into the

academic discussion regarding the theory of the four D’s. Many of the sources touches upon

populism from left to right but also the voter’s behavioural nature and philosophy about the

reasons for the existence of populism and the behaviour of populist actors.

6.2 Problems With The Material One of the problems which can be visible in the mapping of the four D’s as a tool for a general

mapping of populist voter behavior is that it is compatible with local nationalistic parties with

separatist tendencies in countries which might consist of several cultures or states. This means

that the four D’s cannot stand on its own when measuring radical right-wing populist parties

and its success in an individual country.

Another problem is their concentration on populism from a demand side point of view which

comes at the cost of a nearly total abandonment on the supply side. This research is by this

reason formed more of a behavioral pattern amongst the electorate in relation to populism,

rather than a theory about a nationalistic right-wing populism with radical historic roots.

The authors of the theory also mention these problems. They argue however, that the primary

goal with this broad definition is to map out the radical right parties such as UKIP and political

phenomenon’s like Donald Trump in the US (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018).

Furthermore, their assumption regarding the theory in relation to left-wing parties can be

contested. They argue that the arguments presented by left-wing populism are only compatible

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with three of the four D’s left-wing populism, they continue to argue that this is the main reason

why these parties found themselves unable to draw support in equal numbers for radical right-

wing parties. The problem with this argument is that the left-wing populism is a phenomenon

that only recently grew in relevance. Populist parties on the left like SYRIZA and most notably

PODEMOS used populist theory for the launching of its own political project by using populist

analytical tools from Laclau and Gramsci, which was frowned upon by the traditional left

initially (Mouffe, 2018, Iglesias, 2015, Errejon and Mouffe, 2016).

6.3 Methods The method of choice will be a quantitative research of the gathered material from ESS14 which

gathered material from 21 countries from which I will draw up the mean value of each variable.

In addition, I will also test the statistical reliability by measuring the ANOVA results.

These variables will be divided up into regions in a similar fashion as the comparative work of

2015, with the exception of adding Spain from ESS14 in the southern region. I will in turn

choose one variable from each of the region.

Furthermore, the mean value will be used for drawing four charts for measuring each of the

four D’s throughout the European countries in which the survey took place (appendix -1).

To narrow down the number of variables, I will choose the parties of one country in each region

to spread out the variables over Europe for a bigger variance between the regions (appendix -

2). The selective process will then be selected to avoid the extremities of each region and thusly

avoid a selection of any anomalies, France was for example not chosen due to the growth of the

populist party in the wake of the financial crisis while the rest of the countries in the western

region had little to no growth of any populist party. The results will be followed by a comparison

to each other to give an approximation of the four D’s levels between the countries.

Table 1

Nordic region Sweden

Western region Austria

Southern region Spain

Central and Eastern region Hungary

Anglo- Celtic region United Kingdom

(Kriesi and Pappas, 2015)

The four D’s will be measured by the categories they consist of, which are Distrust, Deprivation,

De-alignment and Destruction (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018). Each one will be measured by the

16

relevant variables in relation to these categories. The independent variables of Distrust and

Destruction will by this reason consist of three variables. While the variables of Deprivation

and De-alignment will consist of two variables. These dependent variables were selected in

relation to the theoretical presentation of the four D’s which were presented earlier in this essay.

The questions were selected to be as relevant as possible to the categories with little room for

interpretation, they were also selected in proportion to each other to avoid any imbalance in the

analysis section.

6.4 Methodological Problems One of the problems I encountered was the lack of variables in the deprivation and de-alignment

factors which lead to the analysis consisting of unequal number of variables in the categories

leading to a small imbalance in the research. The lack of a third variable in the deprivation and

de-alignment variables was due to the absence of a question regarding the future prospects

amongst the participants, nor was there any closely related question about these issues and I

had no other choice but to content with two variables since it is not practical to try and find

similar surveys that were taken during the same time with the same amount of people in the

relevant areas.

Another issue I found was the absence of Spain or Portugal in Kriesi and Pappas comparative

research, this is unfortunate since the main source did not conduct any research on Greece or

Italy. I found it therefore necessary to implement Spain as the acting representative country of

the southern region in this essay. Another reason for choosing Spain was the fact that populist

parties gained a sudden political momentum in the year 2014, the same year in which the ESS14

survey took place, making it possible to arrange the Spanish nation into the southern region in

this essay.

Addressing the issue of validity, the choice of theory provided the necessary framework in

choosing the variables in which its reliability would be tested and explored in correlation to

each other. The usage of a theoretical construction organized the variables into four categories

where the main source (ESS14) provided with some but limited variables in each category, this

shaped the design of the method. It is by this reason that there are two categories with three

variables and two other categories with only two. The validity of the method can therefore be

argued to be high which is imperative when exploring an empirical question (Esaiason et al,

2017, p 65).

17

Addressing the issue of reliability, the nature of the method in which the mean is measured,

and the theoretical framework provides a stable systemic assurance against any systematic

empiric errors. This stable theoretic ground in combination of an explorative measure of the

mean values negates the necessity of having a high reliability when measuring the reliability

and correlation of the variables due to the explorative nature of the main question in this paper

(Esaiason et al, 2017, p 65).

7 Statistical Presentation And Analysis

The following chapter consists of presentations and analyses of each of the four D’s. This

chapter is therefore divided into five different sections that addresses all the mean values and

reliability testing observation followed by a presentation of each D with its relevant variables.

I will start with presenting a table which presents the total mean count and it will be followed

by a reliability testing in which I will address its results. The four sections that follows will start

with a chart presenting each mean value of each country and a total sum of the mean value of

the D’s of the countries together. The sections are shortly followed by an observation of the

differences of the mean value between the countries and finished with a summary of the

observation.

18

7.1 All Mean Values The mean values were drawn together and have a wide array of results with no clear uniformity

except for some minor repetition and become problematic in its statistical reliability (which are

presented and discussed in appendix 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4).

Table 2 (Some numbers are rounded of)

Austria Spain United

Kingdom

Hungary Sweden Total

Distrust Political

system allows

people to have

a say in what

government

does

3,11 2,84 3,74 2,2 4,47 16,36

Politicians

care what

people think

2,7 2,32 3,51 2,21 4,72 15,46

How satisfied

with the way

democracy

works in

country

5,27 4,16 5,17 4,06 6,69 25,35

Total mean of

Distrust

3,69 3,1 4,14 2,82 5,29 19,04

Destruction Immigration

bad or good

for country's

economy

4,76 4,91 4,91 3,58 5,62 23,78

Country's

cultural life

undermined or

enriched by

immigrants

4,87 5,94 5,07 4,83 7,12 27,83

Immigrants

make country

worse or better

place to live

4,39 5,00 4,91 3,98 6,5 24,78

Total mean of

Destruction

4,67 5,28 4,96 4,13 6,41 25,45

Deprivation How satisfied

with present

state of

economy in

country

4,92 2,85 4,74 3,72 6,1 22,33

Government

should reduce

differences in

income levels

4,3 4,5 4,00 4,5 4,1 21,4

Total mean of

Deprivation

4,61 3,67 4,37 4,11 5,1 21,86

De-

alignment

Trust in

political

parties

3,5 2,2 3,8 3,6 5,00 18,1

How close to a

party

4,7 4,4 3,6 4,4 4,9 22

Total mean of

De-alignment

4,1 3,3 3,7

4,00 4,95 20,05

Pool of

potential

Combined

D Score

17,07 15,35 17,17 15,06 21,75 86,4

19

7.2 Distrust

Table 3 presents the points from 0 representing the lowest negative score and highest on 10.

The overall mean of all countries in the political system lies above the third point with the

variable that touches open the satisfaction of the countries democracy clearly lying on a higher

value than the other variables.

Regarding the variable “Political system allows people to have a say in what government does”

It becomes clear that neither country manages to extend its favourability above the fourth

parallel except the mean value of Sweden. Hungary scores the lowest on its trust with the

government which barely reaches two points. The variable consisting of “Politicians care what

people think” reflect the results of the previous variable with the Swedish mean value is the

highest score and the Hungarian mean value reaching the lowest, What becomes interesting to

observe is the Spanish mean value which almost reaches the same levels of the Hungarian value.

What can be observed on the variable of “How satisfied with the way democracy works” are

the general higher values with three reaching above the fifth level and thereby gaining a small

majority on the mean value, although the Swedish mean value is consistent on also scoring the

highest value in this variable. Although it is worth mentioning the observation of the Hungarian

consistency on reaching the lowest levels out of the other countries.

All in all, when measuring the mean value of the distrust factor one can see that Hungary on

average had the lowest score on all the variables, followed by Spain on low point scoring. This

comes into contrast with the mean value on the Swedish mean opinion but most notably on the

variable surrounding its satisfaction with the way democracy works in its country. Despite this,

3,11

2,84 3,

74

2,2

4,47

3,3

2,7

2,32

3,51

2,21

4,72

3,1

5,27

4,16 5,

17

4,06

6,69

5,07

3,69

3,1

4,14

2,82

5,29

0123456789

10

Austria Spain United Kingdom Hungary Sweden Mean of allcountries

Mean Value Of Distrust

Political system allows people to have a say in what government does

Politicians care what people think

How satisfied with the way democracy works in country

Total Mean of Distrust

20

it is worth mentioning that the mean value on the variables regarding trust to the government

and politicians does not surpass the five point threshold for a net positive feedback on these

issues in a meaningful manner. It is also worth mentioning that the extremes on both the

Swedish and Hungarian countries affect the mean between the countries, this is also reflected

on the total mean of each country with Sweden having the highest and Hungary the lowest.

The numbers that are shown on the Distrust factor enjoyed a considerable set of reliability with

the exception of the United Kingdom and Austrian respondents, which is rather curious and

raises a set of questions since the other variables enjoyed a reliable outcome and remained

below the four point score on the diagram. The mean value in these countries can with other

words be tested again in a different setting whereupon the mean value can be calculated upon.

It is also curios that these variables are the variables above the mean threshold of five points in

order to have a positive outcome in term of the distrust level. A removal of these variables

would affect the whole mean value of the combined countries and the country itself and lower

the total mean score considerably with Sweden being the only country with a mean value above

five points.

The unsure number of different variables in Austria and the United Kingdom poses certain

questions regarding the Distrust factor but it does not affect the main question, nor does it affect

the general public relation towards the democratic process in their respective country. The

pattern one sees in every country except Sweden is that the Distrust factor remains below the

five point threshold and therefore is either in a delicate balance between a polarised nation or

deeply mistrusting public relation between the democratic representatives and its process. The

results can however be discarded due to the low correlation numbers as shown on the eta

calculations if one is going to follow the numbers that are shown on the statistical software.

21

7.3 Destruction


The mean value on all the variables are all lying around the five point threshold which signals

a certain uniformity about immigration between the countries. Although Hungary and Sweden

affect the mean value by lying on the more negative and positive side respectively than the rest.

Touching upon the variable “Immigration bad or good for country’s economy”, it becomes clear

that Austria, Spain and the United Kingdom have similar stances while Sweden remains on the

positive side, Hungary on the other hand are on the negative side of the variable. When one

looks at the variable “Country’s cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants”, it is worth

noting the Spanish and Swedish cases where the majority has a positive stance on immigration.

Hungary is consistent in its negative stance but is more closely in line with the United Kingdom

and Austria. Lastly, the variable “Immigrants makes country worse or better place to live” is

again reflected by the positive attitude by the Swedish country while remaining low on the

Hungarian side.

To sum it up, it seems as if the immigrational attitude is fairly divided between the respondents

in each country. The relative uniformity signals however that there exists a net division between

the respondents when addressing the immigrational attitude. However, the Swedish are seen to

be more optimistic when addressing the immigrational issue with the highest total mean score

while Hungary has the lowest total mean score. Regarding the reliability of the variables it is

only the Spanish mean that comes into question, affecting its total mean value. The real issue

4,76

4,91

4,91

3,58

5,62

4,8

4,87

5,94

5,07

4,83

7,12

5,6

4,39 5 4,

91

3,98

6,5

54,67 5

,28

4,9

6

4,13

6,41

0123456789

10

Austria Spain United Kingdom Hungary Sweden Mean Of allcountries

Mean Value Of Destruction

Immigration bad or good for country's economy

Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants

Immigrants make country worse or better place to live

Total Mean of Destruction

22

comes when one is addressing the eta score that shows a low correlation, which according to

the software makes the numbers disposable as a scientific issue.

7.4 Deprivation


The mean of all countries is presented and appear to be relatively balanced and below the five

point threshold. With Spain and Sweden affecting the mean value the most on the first variable,

although Hungary also affects the mean on the first variable.

Sweden is the only country with a positive mean value when addressing the first variable

concerning the economical satisfaction in its country while the Spanish satisfaction lies below

the three point threshold. Spain is followed by a Hungarian negative score hitting clearly below

the four point threshold. The variable “Government should reduce differences in income levels”

is presented as a fairly balanced and uniform attitude which is reflected on the mean score. Yet

Sweden is the country that reaches the lowest score on the scale.

To sum it up, it appears as if the uniformity of the variables is a reflection of a relative silence

in the economical subject. Even the sum lies below the five point threshold to show a mean

satisfaction it instead shows a mean dissatisfaction. The total mean value continues to stay high

in Sweden while Spain achieves the lowest score. The reliability of these numbers are uniformly

positive except for the mean value of the United Kingdom. The eta score shows a low

correlation however which puts the destruction factor according to each country in jeopardy.

4,92

2,85

4,74

3,72

6,1

4,5

4,3 4,6

4,5

4,5

4,1 4,44,

61

3,67 4,

37

4,11

5,1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Austria Spain United Kingdom Hungary Sweden Mean of allcountries

Mean Value of Deprivation

How satisfied with present state of economy in country

Government should reduce differences in income levels

Total Mean of Deprivation

23

7.5 De-alignment


The de-alignment variables mean value between the countries lies clearly on the negative side.

With the mean value lying around the third parallel, it becomes clear that the values here are

uniform.

This uniformity is demonstrated on the first variable where neither country surpasses the fourth

point and it is by this reason that the mean result is negative. The same can be applied on the

second variable where the mean value of the identity lies on low levels.

All in all, the de alignment factor is clearly on the low side with Sweden having the highest

score and Spain the lowest.

Touching upon the reliability, it is the United Kingdom and Austria that comes into question

when summing up the total mean score. But the eta test shows a low correlation score which

puts the whole diagram in a negative light.

3,5

2,2

3,8

3,6

5

3,6

4,7

4,4

3,6

4,4 4,

9

5

4,1

3,3 3,

7 4

4,95

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Austria Spain United Kingdom Hungary Sweden Mean of allCountries

Mean Value of De-Alignment

Trust in political parties How close to party Total Mean of De-alignment

24

8 Discussion

The software showed a significant low level of correlation between the participants of the

survey and the factors that were measured. However, it can be considered questionable to

simply discard the numbers that are presented in this paper. The electoral success of the populist

parties in each country only a few years after the survey took place is undeniable. The numbers

follow a clear pattern which is reflected on the different theories presented earlier in this paper.

Not least on the comparative study of 2015 where Nordic region was concluded to be the most

stable while the southern and central-eastern regions were the most volatile.

The Hungarian combined mean score of 15,06 and the Spanish total mean score of 15,35 does

reflect the fact about this issue. Both countries summed up a considerable total number of

populist representatives of a range of different parties mostly from the right end of the political

spectrum but also on the left during the elections that took place the same year as the survey

took place. This can be compared to the high level of the Swedish pool of potential with its high

number of 21,75. It is however noticeable that the Sweden Democrats have grown considerably

since the survey was conducted.

In addition, it is also noticeable that Austria and the United Kingdoms accumulated pool of

potential stands on 17,07 to 17,17 points respectively which is below the line of mean

satisfaction. These results are later followed in the Austrian parliament which had an increase

in the growth of its populist party while the United Kingdom marched further down the line of

what would eventually become a Brexit vote.

When comparing the total mean of each factor it is noticeable that Hungary is constantly scoring

low and this can be compared to the electoral results which gave the populist parties a

considerable majority. A low score on the D of Destruction is also noticeable. This can be

compared to the Spanish case which also had low scores and therefore a very high pool of

potential populist growth, the differences become visible however when comparing the higher

score of Destruction which does not seem like a polarizing issue amongst the participants of the

survey at the time. This might explain why the populist party of moderate and leftist ideas grew

instead of national populist parties the same year that the survey was conducted (although the

low significant level on the reliability scale might be problematic in this kind of discussion).

In addition, it is also noticeable how corruption scandals affect the pool of potential and its

destructive factor in favour of populist parties due to the power vacuum amongst the electorate

25

when the de-alignment factor becomes a major factor in combination with the distrust factor as

the Austrian and Spanish case shows.

When touching upon the loss of the established orders authority and the resulting interregnum,

it appears as if a hypothesis can be formed on which a score below 16 points out of 40

(maximum 10 in each D) creates a period of an interregnum by which the authority of the

political establishment is especially vulnerable to sudden political blows by outsiders due to the

loss of spontaneous consent and the social hegemony being open for change in the political

field which will shape the agonism in the future.

The constellations of the score divisions in the framework of the four D’s might tell if the

political setting for a left-wing or right-wing populist party can make a breakthrough, mostly

surrounding the Destruction factor which in Hungary’s case showed a score that was closer to

the third point rather than the fourth while the Spanish mean barely lied on the positive side

(5,28) rendering the factor dormant during the survey while other factors scored low. It is also

noticeable that the Hungarian participants scored a higher mean value on deprivation than

Spain, which might suggest that the destruction and deprivation categories are at odds on how

the populist agonism will be shaped electorally during the period of interregnum.

If these numbers are to be followed, it might give an insight into how the rebellious voter

behaves and why these parties become a relevant factor in the mainstream political field, this is

however not necessarily news. What could be considered as new with these numbers however,

might be the fact that the Deprivation and Destruction could be at odds with each other where

fear of the economic future turns into a fear of identity and by this reason moves the political

spectrum from a modernistic view into a postmodern one. This could offer a sort of academic

compromise between the populist scholars who are divided between an economic camp and the

identity camp where both sides argues that their side is correct while the other is wrong, when

it can be argued both sides to be correct depending on which region is being analysed due its

regional agonistic condition.

8.1 Future Research It appears as if the age-old debate between the qualitative and quantitative schools of thought

is at an impasse in this subject. It might also be worth asking oneself a question about the choice

of method, maybe it is more suitable for a univariate method to compare the regions or a

multivariate method to add more independent variables into the equations.

26

However, it is relevant to study these tendencies between the countries in different contexts and

situations in more detail. It would have been interesting to be able to analyse more variables in

a similar framework and analyse the results with high significant rates and compare these in

relation to each other and the countries or regions.

The lack of comparative research is problematic. Mostly because of the lack of knowledge for

the populist parties to grow in each region, which might in turn contribute to the lack of

consensus on the academic field. The comparative work could also in the future help guide

qualitative researchers and help with a framework to work from.

It also appears as a mean score around five suggests that a factor is relatively apolitical which

in this case might be worth researching more about if one is to explore the validity of the four

D’s theory. This kind of research would benefit in a substantial manner if more variables and

countries could be measured to increase the reliability and accuracy when conducting research

in a certain area.

Another area that could be researched is the psychological relation amongst vast swathes of a

population in relation to the Destruction factor which in turn is related to the identity of the

voting citizens and thusly appeal much to the fear of losing an identity. One could argue that

the Destruction factor hangs almost exclusively on fear and identity. It would by this reason be

necessary to try to incorporate a psychological discussion into the populist debate in a serious

manner.

9 Conclusion

This paper started with an ambition to explore the mean value between each region in

accordance to the comparative work from 2015. A framework was developed by using the four

D’s theory from 2018 whereupon a hypothesis with four underhypotheses was created. A survey

from 2014 was used to provide the mean numbers to compare the numbers, these numbers were

in turn summarized as a point counter to measure the total pool of potential for national populist

parties to grow.

What can be concluded is that the numbers follow a pattern where the total score of the pool of

potential is equivalent to the popularity of populist parties on its extremities while countries

that stayed around the 17 point score remained with a clear populist presence that would

eventually affect the political field in the future in a decisive manner.

27

The Swedish case shows a certain mean satisfaction, but the electoral gains of the Swedish

Democrats the same year it was conducted shows that the pool of potential starts to grow with

the mean values being above half of the total numerical value, showing that a breakdown of an

authoritative order starts to take place and might grow in the future due to the same parties

successes in the election of 2018.

Another observation that can be seen is the difference between the Spanish and Hungarian mean

value for Destruction which differentiates with 1,15 where the Spanish mean was more dormant

than Hungary. Although both had a similar point score of the total pool of potential, the numbers

showed that Hungarian participants worried more about than Spain during the time of the

survey. The electoral result of the respective parliaments the same year in combination with

this comparative study might explain the differences of the populist electoral results.

The validity of the 4D’s remains intriguing just as the comparative study of 2015. They show a

certain pattern in their conclusive understanding of the populist factor. Their theories can by

this reason be validated and the hypothesis be confirmed as correct.

However, the low score of reliability remains a constant thorn in the side for this research.

28

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Appendix 1 – Regional Organization On The Comparative Study

The comparative study organized the European nations into the following regions:

- A nordic region with Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden

- A western region with France, Belgium, Netherlands, Austria and Switzerland

- A southern region with Italy and Greece

- A central and eastern European region with Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary

- An Anglo – Celtic region with the United Kingdom and Ireland (Kriesi and Pappas 2015).

Appendix 2 – ESS14 Measured Countries

The ESS 2014 survey measured the opinions in the following countries:

1) Austria 2) Belgium 3) Switzerland 4) Czech Republic 5) Germany 6) Denmark 7) Estonia

8) Spain 9) Finland 10) France 11) United Kingdom 12) Hungary 13) Ireland 14) Israel 15)

Lithuania 16) Netherlands 17) Norway 18) Poland 19) Portugal 20) Sweden 21) Slovenia.

Appendix 3 - Selected Questions Table 7

Question Number ID

Distrust • Political system allows people to have a say in what

government does

• 8

• Politicians care what people think • 12

• How satisfied with the way democracy works in country • 35

Destruction • Immigration bad or good for country's economy • 45

• Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants • 46

• Immigrants make country worse or better place to live • 47

Deprivation • How satisfied with present state of economy in country • 33

• Government should reduce differences in income levels • 38

De-alignment • Trust in political parties • 18

• How close to party • 30

33

Appendix 4 – Reliability test for the four D’s as shown on

software

Appendix 4.1 Distrust

Anova results

Table 8

Eta measurements

Table 9

Austria Spain United Kingdom

Hungary Sweden

F Sig. F Sig. F Sig. F Sig. F Sig.

Political sys-

tem allows people to have

a say in what

government does

33,826 0,000 114,784 ,000 29,339 ,000 420,877 ,000 295,096 ,000

Politicians

care what

people think

80,484 0,000 261,097 ,000 35,647 ,000 288,289 ,000 715,129 ,000

How satisfied

with the way

democracy

works in country

,679 ,410 338,276 ,000 1,098 ,295 334,661 ,000 613,478 ,000

Respondents 1795 1925 2264 1698 1791


Kingdom

Hungary Sweden

eta Eta2 eta Eta2 eta Eta2 eta Eta2 eta Eta2

Political sys-tem allows

people to

have a say in what

government

does

,029 ,001 ,054 ,003 ,027 ,001 ,103 ,011 ,087 007

Politicians care what

people think

,045 ,002 ,081 ,007 ,030 ,001 ,085 ,007 ,133 ,018

How

satisfied with the way

democracy

works in country

,004 ,000 ,093 ,009 ,005 ,000 ,092 ,009 ,125 ,016

34

When testing the statistical reliability of the variables of the distrust factor, it becomes clear

that the significance level is significant in all but two variables regarding the democratic

satisfaction in Austria and the United Kingdom. This notion is strengthened by the F value

that keeps being below the number of respondents of each country.

The eta values in all variables show no significant correlation between each other, neither

mean value from each country can be traced back to the participants country. They are

however, higher on the Swedish side in all variables.

Appendix 4.2 Destruction

Anova results

Table 10

Eta measurements

Table 11


Hungary Sweden


Immigration bad or good

for country's

economy

4,553 ,033 ,248 ,619 ,382 ,003 471,784 ,000 170,385 ,000

Country's cultural life

undermined

or enriched by immigrants

139,912 ,000 46,738 ,000 89,615 ,048 137,336 ,000 753,189 ,000

Immigrants

make country

worse or better place to

live

133,337 ,000 ,000 ,984 4,554 ,011 324,631 ,000 819,235 ,000

Respondents 1795 1925 2264 1698 1791


Hungary Sweden


Immigration bad or good for country's

economy

,011 ,000 ,003 ,000 ,003 ,000 ,110 ,012 ,066 ,004

35

The reliability testing showed a significant value with the exception of the Spanish mean

opinion regarding the immigration in relation to the economy and its effect of the living

conditions.

Although the F value on the mean stance of the Swedish opinion regarding immigration and

its living condition with its highest F value it remains below the total number of participants.

Just like the table above the eta values remain low also in the Destruction graph, negating any

indication on a correlation between the mean opinion and the participants nationality.

Appendix 4.3 Deprivation Anova results

Table 12


Kingdom

Hungary Sweden


How

satisfied

with present state of

economy in

country

9,137 ,003 243,479 000 ,000 ,987 302,750 ,000 570,185 ,000

Government

should

reduce

differences in income

levels

108,164 ,000 296,325 000 145,136 ,000 303,016 ,000 20,406 ,000

Respondents 1795 1925 2264 1698 1791

Country's cultural

life undermined or enriched by

immigrants

,060 ,004 ,035 ,001 ,048 ,002 ,059 ,004 ,138 ,019

Immigrants make

country worse or better place to live

,059 ,003 ,000 ,000 ,011 ,000 ,091 ,008 ,144 ,021

36

Eta measurements

Table 13


Kingdom

Hungary Sweden


How satisfied with

present state of

economy in country

,015 ,000 ,175 ,031 ,000 ,000 ,087 ,008 ,119 ,014

Government should

reduce differences

in income levels

,052 ,003 ,086 ,007 ,061 ,004 ,087 ,008 ,023 ,001

When testing the statistical reliability of the deprivation factor, it was only the variable

regarding the economic satisfaction of the United Kingdom that showed a low significance.

The F value does not exceed any participative number in the countries, although the Swedish

variable on the economic satisfaction is the highest.

The eta value persists on keeping itself below the 0,5 threshold to lean on a positive

correlation.

Appendix 4.4 De-alignment Anova results

Table 14


Kingdom

Hungary Sweden


Trust in

political party

2,616 ,106 627,038 ,000 ,005 ,943 135,624 ,000 653,736 ,000

How close to a

party

10,482 ,001 10,092 ,001 18,346 ,000 123,254 ,000 46,657 ,000

Respondents 1795 1925 2264 1698 1791

Eta measurements

Table 15


Kingdom

Hungary Sweden

37


Trust in political

party

,008 ,000 ,125 ,016 ,000 ,000 ,059 ,003 ,128 ,016

How close to a party ,024 ,001 ,024 ,001 ,032 ,001 ,083 ,007 ,051 ,003

At first glance, one can see that the significant levels of the variables touching upon the trust

on political parties in Austria and the United Kingdom lacks a significant value while having

a low F value. The F value does not exceed the number of participants from the countries.

The eta results from the last theoretical factor of “de-alignment” shows a low correlation

persistently.

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