Abstract In this paper, I argue against recent versions of justification norms of actionand practical deliberation (Neta, Nous 43:684–699, 2009; Gerken, Synthese 178:529–547, 2011, Synthese 189:373–394, 2012; Smithies, Nous 46:265–288, 2012). Idemonstrate that these norms yield unacceptable results in deception cases. However,a further modification of justification norms in the light of these results appears to bead hoc. Hence, I claim, we should reject justification norms of action and practicaldeliberation.
Presumably everyone will agree that rationality of an action and of a practical deliber-ation depends in part on some epistemic constraints. Divisions start when it comes todescribe what exactly such constraints amount to. Traditionally, such constraints havebeen determined in the framework of (subjective) Bayesian decision theory. Recentdevelopments in epistemology, however, have opened up new perspectives for thisdebate. In particular, it has been claimed, contra the traditional (subjective) Bayesianapproach, that the epistemic constraint on rational action and practical deliberation isknowledge (knowledge norms of action and practical deliberation).1
One such innovative formulation of a knowledge norm of practical deliberation isthe following one:
1See, for instance, Unger (1975), Hyman (1999), Hawthorne and Stanley (2008), Stanley (2005) andHawthorne (2004). See Ichikawa (2012) for an overview.
A. LoginsDepartement de philosophie, Universite de Geneve, Rue de Candolle 2, 1205 Geneve, Switzerlande-mail: [email protected]
Knowledge—Reasons Principle (KRP) Where subject S’s choice is p dependent,2
it is appropriate (=rationally permitted) for S to treat the proposition that p as areason for acting if and only if S knows that p (cf. Hawthorne and Stanley 2008,p. 578).
On the other side, it has been objected that there are a lot of counterexamplesfor such knowledge norms. In Gettier cases for instance, the subject has a justifiedtrue belief that seems to provide the needed epistemic ingredient for rational actionand deliberation. And similarly in some cases where the subject has all the justifica-tion needed for a given belief but that belief is—unbeknownst to her—false.3 In thelight of these objections to the knowledge norm, many philosophers have endorsedone or another version of justification norm, that is, one or another version of normwhich identifies necessary and sufficient epistemic conditions for rational action andpractical deliberation with justified belief rather than knowledge.4
In this paper, however, I show that justification norms deliver unacceptable resultswhen we consider possible deception scenarios. Namely, cases of radical deceptionwhere a person is epistemicaly justified in believing that p without even having inprinciple a possibility to act or deliberate on p. Such counterexamples, I argue, shouldmotivate us to abandon justification norms of action and practical deliberation sincethey show that justification is not sufficient for rational action/deliberation. I do notpretend, however, to provide an ultimate, knockdown reason to accept a knowledgenorm such as KRP or other. Nevertheless, if one can provide a plausible explanationof the lack of rationality of action or of practical deliberation in Gettier and falsebelief cases, then my argument supports the knowledge norm.5 Such task however isbeyond the scope of the present paper.
In what follows, I first examine justification norms of action and practical delib-eration in more detail. I then provide arguments against justification norms of actionand practical deliberation and consider some possible objections against them.
2“Let us say that a choice between options x1...xn is p dependent if the most preferable of x1...xn con-ditional on the proposition that p is not the same as the most preferable of x1...xn conditional on theproposition that not-p.” (Hawthorne-and-Stanley 2008, p. 578).3For counterexamples and arguments against the knowledge norm, see Brown (2008), Neta (2009),Littlejohn (2009a), Gerken (2011) and Smithies (2012).4See, for example, Neta (2009); Gerken (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014), Smithies (2012) and Smith (2012). Seealso Gibbons (2010) and Littlejohn (2009b) for an overview.5The proponents of knowledge norm have argued that in some controversial cases (i.e. false belief caseswhere we tend to judge that the subject’s action or deliberation that is based on the falsely believed propo-sition is still rational) a subject is excused for acting/deliberating on p, even though her action/deliberationis not fully rational (see, for example, Hawthorne and Stanley 2008). The main idea is to concede that insuch cases the subject’s acting/deliberating on p is not as bad (irrational) as in cases where she has noexcuses for her acting/deliberating on ignorance. This strategy has, however, been strongly criticized bythe opponents of knowledge norm (see, for example, Gerken 2011; Smithies 2012). The main objectionagainst it is that there is nothing to be excused in such cases, hence this line of defence is ad hoc. A morecomplete defence of knowledge norm should address this criticism in details.
The Problem of Massive Deception for Justification Norms of Action
2 Justification Norms
Before I proceed to arguments, let us consider in more detail justification norms ofaction and practical deliberation.
Here are three contemporary statements of justification norms. As I take them astypical statements of justification norms, I will concentrate exclusively on them inthe rest of my paper:
JBK—Reasons Principle (JBKRP) Where subject S’s choice is p dependent, it isrationally permissible for S to treat the proposition that p as a reason for acting ifand only if S justifiably believes that she knows that p (cf. Neta 2009, p. 686).6
The JK Rule One has justification to assert and to act on P if and only if one hasjustification to believe that one is in a position to know that P (cf. Smithies 2012,p. 270).7,8
WA “In the deliberative context, DC, S meets the epistemic conditions on rationaluse of (her belief that) p as a premise in practical reasoning or of (her belief that) pas a reason for acting (if and) only if S is warranted in believing that p to a degreethat is adequate relative to DC” (Gerken 2011, p. 530; see also Gerken 2012, 2013,2014).
First, here are some terminological remarks. The quasi-technical term “warrant”is coined to subsume both the property that internalists have called “justification”,
6JBKRP is a justification norm of a restricted kind since it specifies that only justified beliefs about one’sknowledge (a type of higher-order beliefs) constitute the relevant epistemic constraint on treating p as areason for action. But as it relies on justified belief (even if it is only a certain type of justified belief), it isstill a version of a justification norm.7The JK rule also restricts justification to assert and to act on P to a certain type of higher-order justificationto believe. Hence, we can observe that despite their differences, the JK rule and the JBKRP are similar inthis significant aspect: both state a requirement in terms of higher-order justification. Now, this higher-order requirement itself faces a certain kind of objection, namely, the objection of over-intellectualization.More specifically, it can be objected that, counterintuitively, the JK rule and the JBKRP seem to implythat children and animals (i.e. agents who do not possess higher-order beliefs) cannot treat a propositionas a reason for acting in a rationally permissible way (the JBKRP) or cannot have justification to assertand to act on P (the JK rule). Smithies responds to a similar challenge against his account of justificationto believe in Smithies (2014). A congenial line of defence here would be to insist that the objection ofover-intellectuaization does not raise a problem for the JK rule since the JK rule appeals to propositionalrather than to doxastic justification. The problem of over-intellectualization is a potential problem only toviews about doxastic justification (see Smithies (2014)). Neta for his part, might avoid the problem in adifferent way. His norm, the JBKRP, concerns higher-order practical deliberation (as we will clarify it in awhile). It is not unreasonable to suppose that animals and children do not engage in higher-order practicaldeliberation. Hence, as long, as one is willing to restrict higher-order practical deliberation in this way (i.e.not ascribing it to children and animals), one can also maintain that the objection of over-intelectualizationdoes not have a bite on the JBKRP. Thanks to an anonymous referee for this journal here.8Here, I will focus on action in general, leaving aside a more specific question about epistemic norms ofassertion. However, see “Conclusion”, where I indicate how a similar problem might affect justificationnorms of assertion.
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and the property that (some) externalists have called “entitlement”. In short, “justifi-cation” and “entitlement” are supposed to be two species of one genus—“warrant”.9
Concerning “deliberative context, DC” (in WA), I follow Gerken in considering itas corresponding to the description of a given situation from a subject’s perspective.For my purposes, it is important to note only that Gerken explains deliberative contextin terms of one’s rational presuppositions about circumstances one is in (cf. Gerken2011, p. 530, fn.2). Another way to put it might be—rational background beliefsabout circumstances one is in. Independently from the issue whether a presuppositionis a state of doxastic kind, or of some other kind, it is important to notice that apresupposition is surely not a factive state, i.e. it does not entail the truth of its content.
Another point that needs explanation is why WA leaves the left-to-right direc-tion in a parenthesis. According to Gerken, it indicates that the sufficiency of WAconstraints for a rational action/deliberation depends on further specifications ofnotions employed in WA. Notably, it depends on the specification of what exactlyconstitutes deliberative context (cf. Gerken 2011, p. 531). Again, for my purposesit is important just to notice that this sufficiency is determined by aspects of thesubject’s perspective—her presuppositions/beliefs and her psychological basis foraction. Gerken gives a list of some parameters that (partly) constitute one’s delibera-tive context: (i) one’s rational presuppositions (/background beliefs) about alternativecourses of action, (ii) one’s rational presuppositions (/background beliefs) aboutthe availability of further evidence, (iii) one’s rational presuppositions (/backgroundbeliefs) about urgency and (iv) one’s rational presuppositions (/background beliefs)about the stakes associated with the action (cf. Gerken 2011, p. 531).
One more important point to specify is that of course for an action or a practicaldeliberation to be overall rational, there are more than epistemic constraints. As manyhave noticed (see, for example, Gerken 2011; Smithies 2012), there are cases wherea practical deliberation is rational from the epistemic point of view but not “overall”(all-things-considered) rational. For example, it might be rational from the epistemicpoint of view to proceed to more clinical trials before authorizing a vaccine againsta rapidly spreading mortal virus but not rational from the overall rationality point ofview.
We should also specify what the justification norms are a little more exactly sincethey seem to use different formulations of action and practical deliberation.
9See Gerken (2011), p. 530; Gerken (2013): 3 and Gerken (2012), p. 374, fn.1, where he states that heuses “warrant” as a genus for internalist and externalist justification. Gerken follows Burge (2003) for thisterminology and dissociates it from Plantinga’s and Wright’s uses of “warrant”. Gerken also notices thatHawthorne and Stanley (2008) have used the term “justification” in a similar sense to Burge’s “warrant”(Gerken 2011, p. 530, see also Gerken 2012, p. 381-386 for a more detailed characterisation of “warrant”and “justification”). The problem with the term “warrant” as used by Gerken, however, is that it cannotsubsume all externalist and internalist uses of “justification” or “entitlement”. For Gerken states that “[t]heterm [“warrant”] is non-factive”, (Gerken 2011, p. 530). This seems to be incompatible with at least someversions of externalist views according to which justification is factive, for recent examples, see Sutton(2007) and Littlejohn (2012). In what follows, I will not pursue this consideration further. I will assumefor the sake of argument on Gerken’s sense of “warrant” —a genus term for non-factive justification andentitlement, where to say that a warranted belief is non-factive means that it does not entail the truth of itscontent. Thanks to an anonymous referee for this journal for suggesting to clarify the notion of “warrant”as used by Gerken.
The Problem of Massive Deception for Justification Norms of Action
JBKRP states its object in the following way: “[..] it is rationally permissible forS to treat the proposition that p as a reason for acting if and only if [..]”, whereasWA states “[..]S meets the epistemic conditions on rational use of (her belief that) pas a premise in practical reasoning or of (her belief that) p as a reason for acting (ifand) only if [..]”. And the JK rule states “One has justification to [..] act on P if andonly if [..]”. JBKRP is about treating p as a reason for action, whereas WA is aboutusing p in one’s practical reasoning and about using p as a reason for acting. Andthe JK rule is about acting on P. Furthermore, KRP is also stated in terms of treatingp as a reason for action. In order to clarify this terminological issue, I follow Gerkenand assume that Neta’s use of “treating p as a reason for acting” concerns a kindof practical deliberation that involves higher-order metacognitive capacities, whereasHawthorne and Stanley’s use does not, as neither does Gerken’s.10 I also assume thatto act on P (in the JK rule) is the same as using p as a reason for acting (in the WA).
In the light of these clarifications, I propose then to distinguish the followingcategories:
Rational Action S’s action φ is rational = in her φ-ing, S makes rational use of a(relevant) proposition p as a reason for φ-ing.
For example, to say that Maria’s action of taking an umbrella is rational just meansthat her use of the relevant proposition, say, that it is raining outside, as a reason fortaking the umbrella is rational. In short, an action is rational when it relies on a reasonin a rational way. The necessary and sufficient conditions for such rational relianceon a relevant proposition are fixed by knowledge or justification norms.
Rational Practical Reasoning S’s practical reasoning is rational = S makes rationaluse of a (relevant) proposition p as a premiss in her practical reasoning.
For example, to say that Maria’s practical reasoning is rational just means thatMaria’s use of the relevant proposition, say, that an umbrella is too cumbersome fortaking it with her to the cinema in her practical reasoning is rational.
Rational Treating p as a Reason for Action S’s treating p as a reason for action φ isrational = either (1) in the first-order sense: (a) In her φ-ing ,S makes rational useof a (relevant) proposition p as a reason for φ-ing [rational action], or (b) S makesrational use of a (relevant) proposition p as a premiss in her practical reasoning
10“To assess Neta’s discussion, it is crucial to note that he changes the topic. His account concerns S’s‘treating p as a reason’ in the higher-order sense of S’s conceiving herself as having p as a reason. Incontrast, (WA) as well as Hawthorne and Stanley’s knowledge account are concerned with ‘treating p asa reason’ in the first-order sense of using or relying on (the belief that) p. So, Neta does not address theissue that Hawthorne, Stanley and I are concerned with” (Gerken 2011, p. 535, fn.9 (original italics)).
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[rational practical reasoning]; OR (2) in the higher-order sense: S is rationallyconceiving herself as having p as a reason for action [Neta’s sense].
The last description illustrates that treating p as a reason for action can be usedin multiple senses. It seems then that “treating” is a rather ambiguous term since onecan be said to treat p as a reason for action, when S effectively acts relying on p(think of Maria taking her umbrella while effectively relying on the proposition thatit is raining outside); in other situations, however, S can be characterized as treatingp as a reason for action when S uses p as a premiss in her practical reasoning (whenMaria considers in her practical reasoning the proposition that the umbrella is toocumbersome). And still in other situations, one can also use “S’s treating p as a reasonfor action” while referring to S’s conceiving of herself as having a reason for thataction (when Maria conceives herself as having a reason for going to the hospital,namely, that she has symptoms of an illness, despite that it is raining outside and shedoes not have an umbrella). At least it does not seem obvious that our use of “treatingsomething as a reason for action” is only the higher-order sense.
Furthermore, WA and KRP use the first-order sense of “treating p as a reason foraction” (1), where Neta’s JBKRP refers to the higher-order sense (2).
In order to improve clarity, I propose to reserve the term “practical deliberation”for practical reasoning and “higher order practical deliberation” for the (2) sense of“treating p as a reason for action” (that is the sense in which Neta uses “treating p asa reason for acting”).
My aim in this paper is to show that justification is not an adequate norm forrational action, nor practical deliberation, nor higher-order practical deliberation.
3 Action and Deception
My claim is that the above justification-based norms do not have the resources toresist the conclusion that it is possible for a subject S to be at the same time justi-fied in believing that p (to an adequate degree relative to a deliberative context), orjustified in believing that she knows that p, and at the same time to lack rationalityof action, rationality of practical deliberation or rationality of higher-order practicaldeliberation. To this end, I will present some cases in which a subject is deceived,and hence cannot act, but should be considered by the proponents of the justificationnorms as justified in believing p to a degree that is adequate relative to the deliberativecontext.
The Problem of Deception Consider the following thought experiment. Maria andMaria’s mental duplicate Maria*, a deceived brain in a vat, share the same non-factivemental states and are both careful reasoners. Maria and Maria* differ, however,with respect to the truth value of their beliefs and other non-factive states. WhereMaria happens to have true beliefs, Maria* has no (or almost no) true beliefs. Tra-ditionally, this thought experiment (known also as the New Evil Demon scenario)is largely taken to demonstrate that if we take that Maria’s belief that p is justi-fied, then we should also accept that Maria’s* belief that p is justified since it seems
The Problem of Massive Deception for Justification Norms of Action
counterintuitive to claim the contrary.11 Without entering into a further discussionabout whether this scenario disqualifies certain conceptions of justification, let us justaccept for the sake of argument that Maria and Maria* are both justified in believ-ing a certain proposition p to a degree that is adequate to the deliberative context ofMaria and Maria*.12 Given that the deliberative context is specified on the basis ofnon-factive mental states, and Maria and Maria* are mental duplicates, it follows thatMaria and Maria* share the same deliberative context (in short, the New Evil Demonscenario can be applied also to motivate the equal rationality of presuppositions thatconstitute the deliberative context). Let us also presuppose that the deliberative con-text for Maria in this scenario is appropriate for the sufficiency condition of WA toapply. In other words, the deliberative context DC, for Maria, is such that if Mariais justified in believing that p to a degree that is adequate relative to the delibera-tive context DC, then Maria meets the epistemic conditions on rational use of p as areason for action.
Now, as Maria is justified in believing that p to a degree that is adequate relativeto DC (as presupposed in the example), it follows (from WA) that Maria meets theepistemic conditions on rational use of p as a reason for acting. And crucially, fromour thought experiment, it follows then that Maria* also meets the epistemic condi-tions on rational use of p as a reason for acting in this case since Maria and Maria*are justified in believing p to the same degree, and Maria and Maria* are in identicaldeliberative contexts.
However, as Maria* is a brain in a vat, she cannot perform any actions (or she canperform very few actions). But if an action cannot ever be realized, then it is not thecase that it can be rational. Since rationality (if we speak about epistemic conditionson practical rationality) is a property that only an action can possess or not possess.That is, in the terminology of WA, if an action cannot in principle be realized, then asubject could never meet the epistemic conditions on the rational use of a reason forthat action. Indeed, it seems at least odd to say that an action cannot be realizable butit is still reasonably permitted. Therefore, we can conclude that Maria* does not meetthe epistemic conditions on rational use of p as a reason for acting in our scenario. But
11The New Evil Demon thought experiment was introduced into contemporary epistemology by Lehrerand Cohen (1983) and Cohen (1984). It is widely accepted, by both internalists (as for example, Lehrerand Cohen 1983; Cohen 1984; Wedgwood 2002) and externalists (as Goldman 1986; Burge 2003;Comesana 2002), that the subject and her deceived counterpart are both justified (or warranted). Thethought experiment constitutes a problem for any externalist account of justification (warrant) becauseit appears to demonstrate that it is possible for a subject to have epistemic justification for believingwithout satisfying any externalist criteria for justification (it is supposed, for instance, that a deceivedcounterpart’s belief forming process is not reliable). There have been an impressive number of external-ist attempts to deal with this major problem (for some paradigmatic examples see, Goldman 1986; Bach1985; Mylan Engel 1992; Williamson 2000; Littlejohn 2009a, b; Weatherson 2008; Henderson et al. 2007;Comesana 2002, 2005; Graham 2012). In what follows, we will not, however, enter into that debate.Thanks to an anonymous referee for this journal here.12If one is willing to deny the sameness of justification in the deception case, then my argument does notmanage to establish its conclusion. However, it is also reasonable to assume that those who are willingto endorse justification norms of action are also willing to accept that brains in a vat can have justifiedbeliefs. This seems, for instance, to be the case with Smithies. For he defends an internalist conception ofjustification for believing, see Smithies (2014).
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this is clearly in contradiction with our previous conclusion. This is an unacceptableresult. We can state the argument in a more formal manner:
Argument from deception against the justification norm of action
(1.1) WA norm [Assumption](1.2) S, a brain in a vat, is justified in believing that p to a degree that is adequate
relative to her deliberative context, DC [BIV scenario].(1.3) In the appropriate deliberative context DC, S meets the epistemic condi-
tions on rational use of p as a reason for acting [WA, 1.2].(1.4) However, if a subject cannot realize any action, then the subject does not
meet the epistemic conditions on rational use of p as a reason for acting[rationality of action implies the possibility to perform action].
(1.5) And crucially, in a BIV scenario, subject S cannot realize any action [BIVscenario].
(1.6) Therefore, in the deliberative context DC, S does not meet the epistemicconditions on rational use of p as a reason for acting [1.4, 1.5].
Premisses 1.1—1.5 are mutually inconsistent and lead to absurdity. In order toavoid the contradiction, I suggest we reject the WA principle.13
Some might object to my argument by saying that the constraint on the realizabil-ity of action can be included in the WA principle, as a part of DC or as an additionalcondition for a rational action.
To such an objection, I respond that this might turn out to be either a too strong oran ad hoc constraint. First, including it in the specification of the deliberative contextwould be too strong for it would assimilate the deliberative context to the de factocircumstances in which a subject happens to be, which is contrary to what Gerkenhas claimed (see Gerken 2011, p. 530, fn.2). As we have seen, one’s deliberativecontext is taken to consist of one’s rational presuppositions about what circumstancesone is in. Second, if we include the realizability of an action as another condition(in addition to justified belief) for (epistemic) constraints on rational action in the
13This argument can be easily adapted also to work against the JK rule, which is another justification normof action. Here is one way how it can be adapted against the JK rule:
(1.1’) The JK rule [Assumption](1.2’) S, a brain in a vat, is justified in believing that she is in a position to know p [BIV scenario].(1.3’) S has justification to act on P (= S meets epistemic conditions on rational use of p as a reason for
acting [the JK rule, 1.2’].(1.4’) However, if a subject cannot realize any action, then the subject does not meet the epistemic
conditions on rational use of p as a reason for acting (= has no justification to act on p) [rationalityof action implies the possibility to perform action].
(1.5’) And crucially, in a BIV scenario, subject S cannot realize any action [BIV scenario].(1.6’) Therefore, S does not meet the epistemic conditions on rational use of p as a reason for acting
[1.4’, 1.5’].
Premisses 1.1’—1.5’ are mutually inconsistent and lead to absurdity. To avoid the contradiction, I advocatethe rejection of the JK rule.
The Problem of Massive Deception for Justification Norms of Action
WA, we need an independent motivation for that. That is, if one modifies the rightpart of the WA by adding to “S is warranted in believing that p to a degree that isadequate relative to DC” a clause “AND S can perform actions”, then one needs toshow that such a clause is not here only in order to avoid BIV cases. A more motivatedexplanation would need to be given. In absence of such a motivation, it seems to methat such a move should be classified as ad hoc.
Notice also that contrary to WA, a knowledge norm of action does not imply suchunacceptable results. By the sole fact that knowledge is factive and incompatible withdeception scenarios (brains in a vat do not have knowledge), any cases where actionis not possible is excluded.
A similar argument can be made against the justification norm of practicaldeliberation.
Argument from deception against the justification norm of practicaldeliberation
(2.1) WA norm [Assumption](2.2) S, a brain in a vat, is justified in believing that p to a degree that is adequate
relative to her deliberative context, DC [BIV scenario].(2.3) In the appropriate deliberative context DC, S meets the epistemic con-
ditions on rational use of p as a premiss in practical reasoning [WA,2.2].
(2.4) However, if a subject cannot realize any action, then the subject does notmeet the epistemic conditions on rational use of p as a premiss in practicalreasoning [practical deliberation implies realizability of action]
(2.5) And crucially, in a BIV scenario, subject S cannot realize any action [BIVscenario].
(2.6) Therefore, in the deliberative context DC, S does not meet the epistemicconditions on rational use of p as a premiss in practical reasoning [2.4, 2.5].
Premisses 2.1—2.5 are mutually inconsistent and lead to absurdity. I suggest wereject WA.
It can be argued against my second argument that it is not true that practical delib-eration implies the realizability of action. Even in BIV cases, it is clear that subjectsdo reason. Hence, it seem too strong to claim that all practical reasoning end in action.
To this I reply that, it is true that even in BIV cases, subjects do reason. Butto reason is not exactly the same thing as practical reasoning. If subjects in BIVcases reason, their reasoning remains theoretical. If their reasoning never ends inaction, then I do not see how it differs from theoretical reasoning. The differencebetween theoretical and practical reasoning, as I see it, is not just a difference inthe content of the premisses that we use in them. Theoretical reasoning has asits constitutive end a state of belief or conviction, whereas practical reasoning hasas its constitutive end an action or at least intention to act. And that is how weordinarily proceed: our theoretical reasoning normally ends in states of believing,whereas our practical reasoning normally ends in action or at least intention to act.
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Similar suggestions come from a recent work on practical deliberation in practicalphilosophy:
“Determining what to think or what to do is thus a constitutive end of delibera-tion, in the same way that persuasion is a constitutive end of arguing, or gettingcoffee is a constitutive end of going for coffee. Deliberation can fail to achieveits end, but it is an activity that aims to achieve that end (perhaps among others)”(Arpaly and Schroeder 2012, p. 211).
And finally, a similar argument can be made also against higher-order practicaldeliberation:
Argument from deception against the justification norm of higher-orderpractical deliberation
(3.1) JBKRP norm [Assumption](3.2) In a situation where S’s choice is p dependent, S, a brain in a vat, is justified
in believing that she knows that p [BIV scenario].(3.3) It is rationally permissible for S to treat the proposition p as a reason for acting
[JBKRP, 3.2].(3.4) However, if a subject cannot realize any action, then it cannot be rationally
permissible for a subject to treat the proposition p as a reason for acting[higher-order practical deliberation implies the realizability of action].
(3.5) And crucially, in a BIV scenario, subject S cannot realize any action [BIVscenario].
(3.6) Therefore, it is not rationally permissible for S to treat the proposition p as areason for acting [3.4, 3.5].
Premises 3.1—3.5 are mutually inconsistent and lead to absurdity. I suggest thatwe reject JBKRP.
Here, the matters might appear a little bit more controversial. If in the two preced-ing arguments it might have seen more plausible to consider that realizability impliesaction, or practical deliberation, then it might seemed less plausible in the case ofconceiving oneself as having a reason for acting.
However, the reason why I maintain the idea that even higher-order practical delib-eration implies the realizability of action is the following. It seems implausible thatin a case where a subject can never act for a reason (a BIV scenario), she can never-theless conceive herself as having a reason for action in the sense that is of interestin the present discussion. I take it that conceiving oneself as having a reason for act-ing is not just a second-order belief about justifiably believing a proposition. It isstill a state that typically ends in an action or in an intention. The difference withfirst-order practical deliberation is that here a subject is aware of the reason that shehas for her action, what is not necessary for the deliberation in the first-order sense(see also Arpaly and Schroeder 2012). Therefore, I conclude that higher-order prac-tical deliberation implies the realizability of action, just as for first-order practicaldeliberation.
The Problem of Massive Deception for Justification Norms of Action
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued against justification norms of action, practical deliberationand higher-order practical deliberation. My claim is that there is nothing in justifiedbelief in any proposition p (to a degree adequate relative to given deliberative context)that may ensure the rational use of p as a reason for action, or use of p as a premisein one’s practical reasoning, or conceiving oneself as having p as a reason for action.
An additional upshot of my paper is that it might be possible to develop a similarargument against a justification norm of assertion (as the norm proposed by Smithies(2012) or Gerken’s recent proposal in Gerken (2014), for instance).14 Smithies’ normof justification is an epistemic norm of both practical deliberation and assertion.Gerken has recently endorsed a view according to which his WA norm of action isstructurally similar to the norm of assertion (Gerken 2014). Moreover, there has beenrecently an increasing amount of interest among epistemologists in the question ofwhether the norm of action (and practical deliberation) and assertion is the same(see for instance Brown 2012; Montminy 2013; McKinnon 2012; McKenna 2013).Anyone who thinks that these norms are the same and justification based for bothaction (practical deliberation) and assertion will meet the same kind of problem thatI have developed here against justification norms of action, practical deliberation andhigher-order practical deliberation. For assertion, like action and practical delibera-tion, cannot be performed in deception scenarios. It seems reasonable to suppose thatbrains in vats do not assert anything. Some of the (typical) preconditions for assert-ing cannot ever be met in BIV scenarios. BIVs cannot physically assert (BIVs cannotspeak because they do not have mouths and they cannot use a sign language becausethey do not have hands), and more importantly, there is no audience in a BIV sce-nario. It seems reasonable to suppose that without audience, there is no assertion(except some special cases).15 However, BIVs do have justified beliefs (at least ifone is internalist, one should be sensible to the possibility of justified false beliefs).Therefore, we can generate the same type of argument from deception cases againstjustification based norms of assertion, as we have done against justification norms ofaction, practical deliberation and practical higher-order deliberation.
I conclude then that given the failure of justification norms in certain possible sce-narios, there seem to be only two possible further options: either it is impossible toprovide a specific epistemic norm of action, deliberation and higher-order delibera-tion (and assertion), or a kind of knowledge norm of these is true. I hope that the stateof the matter is not so pessimistic as to oblige us to adopt the first one.
Acknowledgments Thanks to Santiago Echeverri, Robin McKenna and an anonymous referee for thisjournal for useful comments and discussion. The research work that lead to this article was supportedby the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) grant number 100015 131794 (project “Knowledge,Evidence, and Practice”).
14Thanks to an anonymous referee for this journal and to Robin McKenna here15Gerken seems to endorse the idea that there should be an audience for an act to be an act of asser-tion: “Assertions are, at least typically, uttered in conversations (broadly construed) and they do, at leasttypically, have an audience (broadly construed)” (Gerken 2012, p. 378).
A. Logins
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