The Problem of Nihilism a Sociological

8/9/2019 The Problem of Nihilism a Sociological

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that the unifying theme of the choice ofirical matters. While this istrue, wehaven characteristic is that each in one way orcl e by Meerten 1er Borg, we find first the

ofscholarlyparlance, after once having II be questioned by readers wh o note the;Closing of theAmerican Mind, whichsations againstpopularculture and higher

of such books as he reinterpretsheling theory. Using primarily examples

that the primary use of the concept ofor group that has threatened thehilism is explored is that of the process of

Michael Aloisi's Pirsonian analysisCritics have suggested that Parsons

be used on this subject, and the reader isma y offer an interesting perspectiveas hev e toward a theory of ideological change

theories of economics and Collins"nice remind us of the necessity of havingHaving found some surprisingly detailedp in the American colonies of 1776, theyjr-granted assumptions about the peoplee, as they say in a footnote, that "eveniey fail to look up statistics."dd into the mix the article by Doyle Paule analysis as he attempts to put togetherilian Jay nes concept of the transition ofode of thought to modern consciousness,>roven theory.ffrey Levin and Kyriakos Markides bringto well-being, this time among Mexican-editor, and soon to be editorof the journali f history for a fascinating combination ofdo.

Barbara Hargrove

The Problem of Nihilism: A SociologicalApproach1Meerten B. ter BorgIMvmuy of Laden

T h e critique of nihilism, defined as nothingness, caused by th e complut lack of authenticvalues an d t rue end s , h as almost completely d isappeared from th e Western intellectualdiscourse. In M s article m e author tries to f ind the reason fo r this.

Examining the concept of nihilism, one discovers that there is no common propertythat causes persons or society as a whole to be called nihilistic. Therefore, nihilism isstudied, not as an easting thing, but as a label. Since the concept ofnihilism was first usedin the cornea of theprocess of modernization in the time of the French revolution, som emajor figures from the French sociological tradition wh o have an articulate opinion onitfor or againstare selected for a case study: pre-revolutionary writers, Montesquieu,Voltaire an d Rousseau; and post-revolutionary writers, Maistre, Tbcqueville, Comte, an dDurkheim.

They all are ound to label as "nihilistic "people who an, in one wayor another, theiradversaries on the issue of modernization. They feel threatened by the labelled, inWittgenstein's terminology, in their form of life. Therefore, the use of the concept ofnihilism is a case of what Berger and Ludanam call "nihilation, "the conceptual elimina-tion of a competing form of life.

Typical of the label of nihilism is an understanding of the world in metaphysical, no tin theological term s, as wa s the case in earlier times of great upheaval, when heresy andwitchcraft were the appropriate labels. There is a continuity between these labels, no wextensively studied, and the use of "nihilism. "

INTRODUCT ION: THE DISAPPEARANCE O F A CONCEPT

In the past, modem Western society has been criticized in many ways. The most influen-tial critique, crystallized indie word "capitalism," states that all vices of modern society canbe traced back, in one way or another, to that big constellation of wealth and misery. Anothercritique, often heard in the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, was dut of "nihil ism."The modem world was said to lack values and ends, and therefore life seemed meaningless.There were many intellectual circles inwhich this critique was the more influential of the two.I . This a r t ic le is both a summary and a further elaboration of some paints 1 worked out in my bookNihilisme en de franse sociologische traduit (ter Borg, 1982).


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2 SOCIOLOGICALANALYSISToday this severe critique seems to have disappeared almost completely from the inte l lec-

tual discourse. What has happened? Has the problem it denoted eclipsed? Is there no longernihilism in Western society? Have we overcome nihilism, as Alfred Weber hoped?1 We do notknow. Wehave some idea of what happened with that other critique: capitalismhas changed,and there are several theories that try to describe its development in the post-war years, or toexplain the coming of the welfare state in those terms. The Marxist tradition may be a littleoutmoded at the moment, but it is still there, either as a firm tradition, or as an element ofother sociological theories. The reverse seems true for the critique of nihilism. We do notknow whether we are nihilistic or not; or whether the problem has disappeared. The onlything we can say about the problem of nihilism is that nobody seems to be interested in itanymore. The intellectual tradition in which this critique had a central place has vanished. Ithas just faded away, leaving hardly any traces in contemporary thought. Granted, we some-times bear the word mentioned, but this has hardly any consequence. It is not a part of asophisticated theory. Nihilism as a theme in the critique of society or as the nucleus of aninternationally significant theoretical tradition has disappeared. So wemight say that the storyof nihilism just petered out. People no longer care.

Why is this? The reasons may be either intellectual or social. It s disappearance may bedue to the concept itself, or to the philosophical context in which it played a role. This mayhave been untenable. Or it may have disappeared because of the role itplayed in the life ofpeople and in society. To find the ans.wer we must go back to the critique as it was in its heyday.What was nihilism supposed to mean? Who used the concept and for what reason? Perhapsafter considering such issues we will be able to come to a deeper understanding of thedisappearance of the critique of nihilism, or of nihilism itself.

T H E C O N C E P T OF NIHILISM AND fT S PRO BL E M S

In its broadest connotation, to saythat one is nihilistic is to saythat one has no authenticvalues, no real ends, thatone's whole existence is pure nothingness. If one denies this, then itis easy to unmask the values and ends one claims as untrue, unreal, and worthless. Thiscritique can bedirectedat persons, but itcan beextended easily togroups or even to society asa whole. People can see others as nihilistic, but also themselves.

This is the standard definition I have in mind when 1 speak of nihilism, or when I sayothers use the concept, perhaps even without actually using the term. The term nihilism wasintroduced in several places in Europe in the period of the French Revolution (Goudsblom,1977:3ff). It started as a term of abuse against modern trends, especially the destruction ofChristianity and tradition in general. It was the German philosopher Jacobi who initiated aseriousdiscussion of nihilism (Foggier, 1974: 307ff.), calling Kantianand Fichtean idealismnihilistic because itabstracted from traditional, Christian contents. It wasHegel whorepliedthat two kinds of nihilism could be discerned. What Jacobi named so, he would rather call"false nihilism"; he himself would propagate "true nihilism" (ibid.). Here, in a highlysophisticated metaphysical discussion, we can see the beginnings of the enormous confusionthat grew up around the concept. The Russian nihilists contributed not a little to this. IvanTurgeniev, well acquainted with German culture, introduced it in 1862 in Russian literature(in Rahersand Sons). It was picked up with enthusiasm by a groupof youngsterswho wanted

2. The conquest of nihil ism was for a long time an important issue in German sociology an d philosophy(cf. Alfred Weber, 1947: L. Langrebe. 1946; D. Arendt, 1974).

THE PRO!to change Russian society radicallyto the broad definition I just gavedemolishing tradition they wanted tEnlightenment (Bannour , 1974). Tdefinition. It was Dostoevsky whonovels1 that destroying the t radi t ioieverything; opposing tradition imptoevsky wrote highly impressed Nienotes on nihilism, in what was to tconcept was back in Germany aga

Nietzsche is still the most impwill build on some of his insights,quest for truth that is Platonic auncompromising probing that resulttruth itself was undermined. Also,beautiful. In the end, then, wehaveand senseless. Life has become poito "resentment," and thus to the \

Isn't the irony of Socrates anDoesn't he, asone of the opprbegetting his ownbackon the

This unending quest leads, in itsequality. This reinforces nihilism

the disappearance of the higbein manalive . . . (op. c i t . , V

In myanalysis I will keep in mindthe sociology of knowledge. Twowhat follows. First, there is NietzsIt is perhaps not so much a questi

One interpretation was destroyseems meaningless, all seemsSecondly, there is Nietzsche's awanothing is worthwhile, there is no

. . . acting, suffering, willingpathos of the 'for nothing,' ai

3. This is a mam theme m Dostoevskyfirst part of the Noies from ihr Un dforerunners of the Russian nihilists.4. Nietzsche was Dot a theorist, but aConsequently, every description of hi!


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THE PROBLEM OF NIHILISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACHalmost completely from the intellec-denoted eclipsed? Is there no longer. as Alfred Weber hoped?1 We do noler critique: capitalism has changed,lopment in the post-war years, or torhe Marxist tradition may be a littlea firm tradition, or as an elementofthe critique of nihilism. We do notproblem has disappeared. The onlynobody seems to be interested in it

had a central place has vanished. Itiporary thought. Granted, we some-y consequence. It is not a part of aie of society or as the nucleus of anleared. So wemight say that the storyor social. Its disappearance may bein which it playeda role. This ma y

the role it played in the life ofthe critique as it was in its heyday.

>ncept and for what reason? Perhapse to a deeper understanding of theitself.

that one has noauthenticIf one denies this, then it

unreal, and worthless. Thiseasily to groups or even to society asI speak of nihilism, or when I say

the term. The term nihilismwase French Revolution (Goudsblom,t rends, especially the destruction ofphilosopher Jacob! who initiated aKantian and Fichiean idealismcontents. It was Hegel who replied

named so, he would rather call(ibid.). Here, in a highlyof the enormous confusion

little to this. Ivanit in 1862 in Russian literature

a groupof youngsterswh o wanted

German sociology andphilosophy

to change Russian society radically and decided to call themselves "nihilists." But accordingto the broad definition I just gave, they were not nihilists at all. On the contrary, afterdemolishing tradition they wanted to form a new society according to the ideas of the FrenchEnlightenment (Bannour, 1974). This use of the term was very far away from the standarddefinition. It was Dostocvsky who brought this back. He tried to point out in some of hisnovels' that destroying the tradition of Russian Christianity was the beginning of destroyingeverything; opposing tradition implied in the end nihilism as defined above. The way Dos-loevsky wrote highly impressed Nietzsche. It inspired him inthe writing of most of his famousnotes on nihilism, in what was to be published posthumously as The Will to Power.' So theconcept was back in Germany again.

Nietzsche is still the most important theorist on nihilism and, like everyoneafter him, Iwill build on some of his insights. For Nietzsche, the origin of nihilism is the unquenchablequest for truth that is Platonic as well as Christian. No established truth can stand theuncompromising probing that results from thi s thirst for truth. Soeventually, eventhe belief intruth itself was undermined. Also, in the Platonic tradition, truth implies the good and thebeautiful. In the end, then, wehave lost all standards, and everything seems to be meaninglessand senseless. Life has become pointless. Nietzsche traces this unending quest for truth backto "resentment," and thus to the will to power. We see this in Socrates's dialectics:

Isn't the irony of Socrates an expression of revolt? Of the resentment of the populace?Doesn'the, as one of the oppressed, enjoy the fierceness of his stabbing syllogism? Isn'the getting hi s ow n back on the aristocrats who are feiscinated by him? (1973, Vol. 2:954).

This iinmrfipg quest leads, in its utmost consequence, to nihilinn, hut also to a completeequality. This reinforces nihilism for it leads to

the disappearance ofthe higher race, whose inexhaustible fertility and power keeps faithin manalive ... (op. cit.. Vol.3:553).

In myanalysis I will keep inmind Nietzsche's perspective, which makes him a forerunner ofthe sociology of knowledge. Two other points of Nietzsche's analysis are also important inwhat follows. First, there isNietzsche's open eye for the relativity of the problernofnihilism.It is perhaps not so much a question of absolute values, as of familiar ones:

One interpretation was destroyed: but because it passed for the interpretation, existenceseems meaningless, all seems futile (op. cit., Vol 3:853).Secondly, there is Nietzsche's awareness of the problematic logical status of the concept. Ifnothing is worthwhile, there is no point in getting excited:

. . . acting, suffering, willing, feeling have no meaning; the pathos of the nihilist is thepathos of the 'for nothing,' and as such it is an inconsistency (op. cit., Vol.3:549).

3. This is a main theme in Dostoievsky's great novels. The first tune it appears in a concise way is in thefirst part of the Nuits pom the Underground (1864), where he attacks Chemyshevsky, one of theforerunners of the Russian nihilists.4. Nietzsche was not a theorist, but a writer of aphorisms, which are not always mutually consistent.Consequent ly, every description of hit "theories" is an interpretation.


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4 SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSISAnd therefore:

.. . this is the most crippling thought, especially when one realizes that one is fooled,and is not able to do without being fooled (op. cit., Vol. 3:853).So much for a very sketchy description of the ups and downs of the term nihilism and

some of its connotations. Due to its history and meaning, we can say that nihilism has toomany connotations to be a consistent concept. This problematic status was for Nietzsche, themain theorist on nihilism, no reason to denounce the concept. Rather, he saw it as anexpression of the enormous confusion that was caused by the complete breakdown of thetraditional values and ends.

Philosophers may think that the problematic logical status of the concept will make itunattractive. As a social scientist I am inclined to think the opposite.1. After Nietzsche hadmade the concept prestigious, its perplexity gave all thinkers the opportunity to project into ittheir own frustrations about modern society. This wa s an opportunity many took. "Nihilism"received ethical, metaphysical, social, political, and theological connotations. We alreadyhave come across "true" and "false" nihilism, but there is also "positive" and "negative,""active" and "passive," "manifest" and "latent" nihilism. Very different things and personswere called nihilistic. Heidegger saw Western thought in its totality as nihilistic (1961 :Vol.2). As opposed to this, the American philosopher Stanley Rosen claimed that everything isnihilistic which is not rational (1969). In the thirties, Hermann Rauschning called Hitlerandnazism nihilistic (1975). But Tolstoy was called nihilistic aswell.'And these are only a few outof marry examples.

What needs to be explained is why so many eminent thinkers used the concept. Why didthey not choose a less problematic concept? Both the brilliance and the fragmentary characterof Nietzsche's analysis had made the concept not only prestigious, but also inspiring andimaginative. Thanks to Nietzsche, "nihilism" had become a powerful concept, apt to impresspeople. This helps to explain why they used it, but not wh y they used it for such divergentthings and persons. What have they in common that the concept ofnihilism should be used forthem? Nothing, I am afraid. It seems to me that it is not a common property that makes themvictim of this tte, but a common relationship to the subject that is eager to call them so.Therefore, in studying nihilism we may be dealing not with properties of an object, but withthecharacteristics of relations between a subject and anobject. This means thata sociologicaltheory of nihilism should not be about some actual feature in a so-called nihilistic society, butabout the habit of persons labeling people or even society itself as nihilistic. What I amarguing isthat it is not fruitful tostudy nihilism as a property. Weshould study "nihilism" as alabel.To make this plausible I will turn to the French sociological tradition. It is not well knownthat the concept of nihilism was also important in this tradition because the word, "nihilism"isonly used occasionally. But the broad meaning, as given in the standard definition above, isoften referred to. How and why this isdone in 18th and 19th century France is the subjectofthis article as acase study that will enable us to learn something moreof the waythe concept ofnihilism was used.5. Here I jump from a logical to a sociological level of analysis. I can do so without f a l I ing into the trap ofrelativism, that everlasting danger of the sociology of knowledge, because 1 started with a logical analysisof the concept of nihilism. Finding this concept problematic. I turn to social science to understand itssuccess. The f a l l a c y of relativism is committed only when the social function of a concept is taken as areason for denying its validity.6. By Gorki, Thomas Mann, and Isaiah Berlin, cittd in Goudsblom, 1977:18.

THEPROBLNIHILISM IN THE FRENCH SOC

For investigating the use of th.tradition has many advantages. Totxof their predecessors. Secondly, it iton society, without hiding behind olike the Germans. This makes theirthe concept ofnihilism has somethiius to a third advantage. As oppoincorporated into traditional societFrance were more abrupt, making 11are two parties, one in favor of modthat the authors belonging to the dithem were ambivalent; their personcal opinions they advocated. I see tlin a clear-cut situation often have toclear for their public and their alii

French classical sociology wasThis debate lasted for at least two ccviolence. During the 18th centuryBoth Voltaire and Diderot actuallyalways lived near the border of the ias an estranged paranoid. And fncounter-revolutions.

During the 17th and 18th eencentralization at the cost of the pow>wa s run mainly by well-trained boithe higher nobility and the high'nobility, partly impoverished in theof Versailles, was prestigious but pwith its lack of prestige as its wealtlives of many people: bourgeois bidentifying with the bourgeois val

This shift in social positions v >debate that the argument of nihilv

In the beginning the debatewaists stood against the so-called Geoldest: those of the king as heir of1the old German invaders. As seireplaced by modern, mechanistic466f.,Gohring, 1946). We see thisBarrire. 1946; Shackleton, 1961;the nobility, the "thse nobiliare,"forces and counterforces. In hisnecessary to counterbalance royalmonarchy, changingit into meredzation, means a weakening of the :by Montesquieu in his L 'Esprit d,


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realizes that one is fooled,\bl. 3:853).d downs of the term nihilism and, we can say that nihilism has too

status was for Nietzsche, theconcept. Rather, he saw it as an

by the complete breakdown of thestatus of the concept will make it

opposite.3. After Nietzsche hadthe opportunity toproject into it

marry took. "Nihilism"Wealready

isalso "positive" and "negative,"Very different things an d persons

its totality as nihilistic (1961: Vol.Rosen claimed that everything isRauschning called Hitler and

well.'And mete areonly a few outthinkers used the concept. W hy did

and the fragmentary characterprestigious, but also inspiring anda powerful concept, apt to impress

they used it for such divergentof nihilism should be used for

common property that makes themcall them so.

properties of an object, but withmeans that a sociological

in a so-called nihilistic society, butitself as nihilistic. What I am

We should study "nihilism" as atradition. It is not well knownbecause the word, "nihilism"

in the standard definition above, iscentury France is the subject of

moreof the way the conceptof

can do so without ailing into the trap ofwith a logical analysisturn to social science to understand itsfunction of a concept is taken as a

1977:18.

THE PROBLEM OF NIHILISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACHNIHILISM IN TH E FRENCH SOCIOLOGICAL TRADITION

For investigating the use of the concept of nihilism as a label, the French sociologicaltraditionhas many advantages.To begin with, itis a real tradition: authors buildon the resultsof their predecessors. Secondly, it is a truly sociological tradition. The French reflect directlyon society, without hiding behind or slipping away completely into all kinds of metaphysics,like the Germans. This makes their critique ofsociety straightforward. As we saw, the use ofthe concept ofnihilism has something to do with the arrivalofmodern society, and this bringsus to a third advantage. As opposed to the English case, where modernity was slowlyincorporated into traditional society through a long process of adaptation, the changes inFrance were more abrupt, nuking the situation relatively clear, and thuseasier to grasp. Thereare two parties, one in favor of modernization, and one against it. This clarity does not implythat the authors belonging to the different sides themselves had clear-cut positions. Many ofthem were ambivalent; their personal ambitions were sometimes inconsistent with the politi-ca l opinions they advocated. I see this also as an advantage of France, for ambiguous authorsin a clear-cut situationoften have toexpress their position with extra force, not only tomake itclear for their public and their allies, but also for themselves.

French classical sociology was born in the context of the political debate onmodernity.This debate lasted for at least two centuries. It wa s continuously linkedtothe threat ofphysicalviolence. During the 18th century the protagonists of modernity could easily be captured.Both Voltaire and Diderot actually were. Voltaire could not live, but only die in Fans. Healways lived near the bonier of the country. Rousseau wason the runfor a long time and endedas an estranged paranoid. And from 1789 on, France was the country of revolutions andcounter-revolutions.

During die 17thand 18th centuries, modernization in France meant, in the first place,centralization at the cost of the power of the traditional feudal nobility. The centralgovernmentwas run mainly by well-trained bourgeois professionals, most of them lawyers. Both groups,the higher nobility and the higher bourgeoisie, suffered from status inconsistency. Thenobility, partly impoverished in die country, partly subjected to a bizarre etiquette at the courtof Versailles, wasprestigious but powerless, while the bourgeoisie became more discontentedwith its lack of prestige as its wealth and power grew. This caused ambiguities in the personallives of many people: bourgeois buying noble tides in order to gain prestige, and noblemenidentifying with the bourgeois values in order to get more real influence.

This shift in social positions was accompanied by a debate onmodernity.And it is in thisdebate that the argumentof nihilism appears embryonically but very clearly.

In the beginning thedebate was fought with traditional arguments: the so-calledRoman-ists stood against the so-called Germanists, disputing the question of whose rights were theoldest: those of the king asheir of the Roman stadtholder, or thoseof the nobility as theheirofthe old German invaders. As science advanced, these traditional arguments were partlyreplaced by modern, mechanistic ones, taken from Newton and Locke (Gay, 1973, V ol 2:466f.,Ghring, 1946). W fe see this in the work of Montesquieu (1689-1755) (Althusser, 1959;Barrire, 1946; Shackleton, 1961; Starobinsky, 1953). As the main protagonist of die case ofthe nobility, the "thse nobiliare,"he defended tradition with modern arguments, a theory offorces and counterforces. In his vision, intermediate powers, such as the nobility, werenecessary to counterbalance royal power. The disappearance ofnobility would unbalance themonarchy, changing it into mere despotism. And since centralization, so typical ofmoderni-zation, means a weakeningof the nobility, italso bears in it the seed ofdespotism, describedby Montesquieu in his L'Esprit des Lois as follows:


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l.6 SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

. . . There is no law but the will of the prince (1748, Vol. 5:16).but in a despotic government, where there isneither honournorvirtue. . . (op. cit.,\fel. 5:17).men are all equal, . . . because they are nothing (op. cit., Vol. 6:2).

Obviously, these utterances are not true. They stand in a violent contrast to the scientificsophistication that characterizes the book as a whole, which is amonument ofEnlightenment.We see a fierce statement ofconservatism, according towhich theconsequences of centraliza-tion lead to nothingness. Here, wehave, in the middle of the 18th century, a prelude of whatwill be a full-fledged debate in the next: the critique of nihilism And here we see quiteclearly the political bias and the emotional weightofthe statement. It is hardly an analysis, itis a derogatory label.

What made Montesquieu, the cool analyst, lose himself in this way? One reason could bethe ambiguity of bis social position. On the one hand he was one of the most famousintellectuals of France, on the other he was a member of the feudal-landed nobility, and assuch hated centralization and everything else Louis XIVachieved.

Another aspect of the concept of nihilism, the one we saw in the work of Dostoevsky, isforeshadowed by Vbtaire (1694-1778) (Bestermann, 1969; Gay, 1969; Alderidge, 1975;Pomeau. 1955), the most outspoken advocate of centralization in the same debate on moder-nity. Following Descartes, Voltaire thought that a condition for progressive reform of societywasto make tabula rusa of traditional institutions and beliefs, to be brought about by a strongcentra] government:

Do you want good laws? Bum the old and make new (cited in Pomeau, 1955:78).But the implications of this were dangerous. Radical skepticism about the social order

meant the end of the outdated feudal system, the corrupted and narrow-minded clergy("crasez l ' infme!"), and the haled court-elite; but, \bltaire realized, h might in the enddestroy any order, even the one to which heowed his social position. Therefore, his skepticismhad tobe restricted.

It (i.e., traditional belief)must be destroyed among respectable people but maintained forthe canaille large and small for whom it was made (Gay, 1973, \bl.2:521).

ForI want myattorney, my tailor, my servants, even my wife to believe in God; and I thinkthat I shall then be robbed and cuckolded less often (cited in Gay, 1959:265).

Radical skepticism will cause what we might call normlessness or even nihilism. God is theremedy:

If God did not exist, one would have to invent bim (ibid.).Voltaire 's well-known disdain for the people led to a severe stigmatization: society would benormless asa consequence of democratized skepticism. In fact, Voltaire drew for his time, inwhich skepticism advanced, the consequences of an older argument, used for instance byGrolius, that belief in Godcreates obedienceof the people and thus order in the society. Apart

THE PRfrom this, his fear is not limite

An atheist king is more daThe solution of Volta ire 's p

enlightened, central meritocrat'slowly from Christianity to a si

The changes Voltaire wanteambiguity of his social positionhe hated for the humiliations hambitions come true. He had tperson, and the climbingof the )personal climbing heused all thel i nn , writingplays an d poems, bseriously. Toallow utephilosopkhe faced the problem with whiclcoming decades. His own posititradition he was so skeptical atwhich he himself was sitting.

We will deal shortly withprogress. Jean-Jacques RousseaiHendel. 1974; May, 1961; Starothe Lisbon earthquake.Rousseainot the earthquake itself. Ha d iinjured nor killed.

I for one see (he disasten vbrings us. But however cl einstitutions, we have till lotgeneral has become a burdt1959, Vol. 4:1062).

But it is not civilization as suchpomp like that of the elites in Fibourgeois to gel to know the tru

Who did you consult on thapleasures, and obliviousof tto lose it? Or the learned w relse, who think more and artalk with the honest citizenambitions; a good craftsmancourse, where farmers are allcountry, from Geneva for inTo appreciate fully the passie

consider his ambiguity. He was olhighly appreciated by the elites ofat the same time, he was embar ispell off, an d often he did this h


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\fol. 5:16).honour nor virtue. . . (op. cit.,

(op. cit., Vol. 6:2).a violent contrast to the scientificis a monument of Enlightenment,

the consequences of central iza-18th century, a prelude of what

And here we see quitehardly an analysis, it

in this way? One reason could bewas one of the most famouse feudal-landed nobility, and asork of Dostoevsky, is

Alderidge, 1975;same debate on moder-

for progressive reform of society. to be brought about by a strong

in Pbmeau, 1955:78).about the social order

realized, it might in the endTherefore, his skepticism

people but maintained for1973, Vol. 2:521).

e to believe in God; and I thinkin Gay, 1959:265).or even nihilism. God is the

society would befor his time, in

argument, used for instance bythus order in the society. Apart

THE PROBLEM OF NIHILISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH 7from this, his fear is not limited to the common people: it applies to the elite as well:

An atheist king is more dangerous than a fanatical Ravaillac (Gay, 1973, Vol. 2:527).The solution of Voltaire's problem is then simple: the country should be governed by an

enlightened, central meritocracy: Plato's philosopher-king. The people should be led veryslowly from Christianity to a simple version of deism (Bestermann, 1969:469).

The changes Voltaire wanted were very radical, and yet very restricted. This reflects theambiguity of his social position. Voltaire was a parvenu in 18th century court-society, whichhe hated for the humiliations he had to suffer. But he needed court and king to make hisambitions come true. He had two kinds of ambitions: the social climbing of himself as aperson, and the climbing of the groupof Frenchphilosophes of whichhe was a leader. For hispersonal climbing heused all the means available, exhausting his talents for brilliant conversa-tion, writing plays and poems, buying noble titles, only to discover that he wasstill not takenseriously. To allow Ute philosophes as a group to climb, he proposed that new society. But herehe faced the problem with which the "haute bourgeoisie" would become familiar during thecoming decade. His own position, however unsatisfying, was nevertheless coupled with thetradition he was so skeptical aboul. Too radical a skepticism meant sawing the branch onwhich he himself was sitting.

We will deal shortly with another aspect of modernity: civilization and the belief inprogress. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) (Deralbe, 1970; Green, 1955; Grimsley, 1973;Hendel, 1974; May.1961; Slarobinsky, 1971) attacked this in his famous letter to \toltairc onthe Lisbon earthquake. Rousseau held that it wascivilization,city-life, that caused the horror,not the earthquake itself. Had the people lived near nature, they would have been neitherinjured nor killed.

1 for one see the disasters wrought by man to be far more cruel than those that naturebrings us. But however clever we may be at increasing our wretchedness through ourinstitutions, we have till today not succeeded in perfecting ourselves so far that life ingeneral has become a burden for us and we chose nothingness above being (Rousseau,1959, V f o l . 4:1062).

But it is not civilization as such that leads to nothingness, but the civilization of luxury andpomp like that of the elites in French society. Rousseau advises Voltaire to consult the pettybourgeois to get to know the true life:

Who did you consult on that, sir? The rich perhaps, glutted as they are with their evilpleasures, and obliviousof their real needs, always bored with life and constantly afraidto lose it? Or the learned who sit on a chair more and are therefore sicker than anybodyelse, who think more and are therefore less happy than other men. . . . Whydon't youtalk with the honest citizen, who has led a quiet anonymous life, without plan andambitions; a good craftsman, living out of his craft, or a farmer even, not from France ofcourse, where farmers are allowed to starve in order to let us live, but a farmer from a freecountry, from Geneva for instance (op. cit., 1063).To appreciate fully the passion with which Rousseau attacks high society, again we must

consider his ambiguity. He was of modest descent, but due to his intellectual capacities he washighly appreciated by the elites of his time, and he was charmed by this admiration. However,at the same time, he was embarrassed by his popularity. Time and again he had to cast thisspell off, and often he did this by ravaging his friends.


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g SOCIOLOGICALANALYSISCultivating his estrangement, he abhorred high society, be it noble or high-bourgeois. But

it was only in the high-bourgeois salons that he could pul forth his talents. He wanted to usethese talents for the sake of the humble people, but just these were not taken seriously in thesalons. So, we see that in fact status-inconsistency was a major part of his problem.

Now Montesquieu warned of the nihilism of the absolute monarch; Voltaire, advocatingcentralization, wasafraid of the nihilism of the "canaille,"and Rousseau, taking the perspec-tive of what Voltaire would call "canaille," accused the haute bourgeoisie of nihilism.

Did these three writers, who all died before the French revolution, have at their disposal afull-fledged concept of nihilism? No, but together they did use arguments, such as skeptic ismand nothingness, that will in later times cluster around the concept of nihilism. Thesearguments seem to be the prototype of what is coming. As such we might learn from thesethree pre-revolutionary authors something about the use of this type of concept. It is remark-able that the arguments are used as a derogatory label against their social and politicaladversaries. They are stigmatized as being or bringing about nothingness, whatever theirposition is. The fierceness of the attack may be ascribed to the writer's ambivalence resultingfrom his status-inconsistency. What we see in all three cases is mainly a prognosis, awarningof what could happen if the author's side were to lose. This obviously changes after thestruggle has taken place.

The revolution changed the debate on modernity. The themes were often the same:centralization and freedom, the valueoftradition, and the effect ofskepticism; but the mood inwhich the discussion took place was different. After the big confrontation, there were winnersand losers, and the price paid, especially by the losers, had been high. This made thediscussion more fierce.To get a balanced vision on the use of the concept of nihilism after the revolution, we willstudy both losers and winners. "Losers" are those who felt that the revolution meant adramaticdeteriorationofthesocial perspectivesofthemselvesor their class. We will first turnto two losers, both of them noblemen: Joseph de Maistre and Alexis de Tbcqueville.

Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821) was the main spokesman of the reactionary party (Barth,1958; Cioran, 1952; Cignoux, 1963; Le Brun, 1965; Triomphe, 1968.)In his analysis, we seethe same rhetoric against his adversaries as we saw earlier, only fiercer:

Learned barbarism, systematic cruelty, calculating decadence and especially irreligionhave never achieved anything; the strength of youth leads to maturity; decay leads tonothing (Maistre, 1952:198).This vehemence, due no longer toambivalence alone, but also to the bloodshed, is not the

only difference. What in the work of the 18th century writers was only an incidental progno-sis, has nowbecome a full-fledged diagnosis. Nihilism is seen as a reality. As such itneeds atheory that both explains its causes and snows a way out. Such a theory is to be found in theworks of Maistre. Nihilism, the revolution, that is to say the most radical overthrow oftradition, is nothing else than the utmost consequence of the reformation' (Maistre, 1966:355).What the "rienismeprotestant"1 did on the level ofreligion has nowcome about in all sectorsof society. We have now learned that skepticism of tradition knows no end, bringing terribleconsequences. Actually, this theory is the prototype of the theory on the origin of nihilismwhich we find in the work of Nietzsche. The horror of Robespierre's "terreur" and theNapoleonic wars were for Maistre lessons from God, toprepare us for the acceptance of whatis indispensable for an orderly society: the absolute authority of pope and king (Maistre,1952:184).7. Sic. cited by Barth, op. cit. 1S3. Luther and Calvin are called "hommes de nant," 1966, 354.

THE PI feel more misplaced eveI die with Europe (cited 1The work of Alexis de Toi

1897; Lively, 1962; Mayer, 19like that of Maistre, can be irmtheoretical point of departureCatholic reactionary, but a co:tionai society does not exist,elements of it, if necessary in ;had been for Montesquieu: pois the main reason for his famomodem and decentralized.

This difference in temper:least two things: Tocqueville lithe Revolution, and he had asecond generation. His EitherIno family tradition, he did notnot even know which side toagainst everything untradit ionhonorable noble family, with ;sticking to one's post as longseparation of public behavioremotional abuse. So we will nworks he himself published. Vquences will be of what he, lil

It is in vain to summon apower to choose from tinexercise of their free choigradually losing the feculgradually falling below thiIf we want to know how h e

writings: his "Souvenirs"andwhen, as a boy, he came into

Until then my life had unrsoul. At that moment, it denormous forcenot a qusomething like an earthqu;blackest melancholy, by aimpressions from my childagain see the world of themovement that upsets all ththem upside down (cited bShortly before his death, de

of Napoleon m, he wrote to h


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be it noble or high-bourgeois. Butforth his talents. He wantedto use

were not taken seriously in themajor part of his problem.

monarch; Voltaire , advocatingandRousseau, taking the perspec-haute bourgeoisie of nihilism,h revolution, have at their disposal ause arguments, such as skepticism

the concept of nihilism. Thesesuch we might learn from these

this type of concept. It is remark-against their social and political

about nothingness, whatever theirthe writer's ambivalence resulting

ismainly a prognosis, awarningThis obviously changes after the

The themes were often the same:of skepticism; but the mood inconfrontation, there were winners

had been high. This made theafter the revolution, wewill

or their class. We will first rumTocqueville.

he reactionary party (Earth,1968.)In his analysis, we see

only fiercer:and especially irreligion

leads to maturity; decay leads to

but also to the bloodshed, is not theprogno-

seen as a reality. As such it needs aSuch a theory is to be found in theay the most radical overthrow ofreformation (Maistre, 1966:355).has now come about in all sectors

knows no end, bringing terriblee theory on the origin of nihilismRobespierre's "terreur" and the

us for the acceptance ofwhatof pope and king (Maistre,

-hommes de nant." 1966, 354.

THE PROBLEM OF NIHILISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH 9I feel more misplaced every day (cited by Triomphe, op. cit., 3S2).I die with Europe (cited byCioran, op. cit., 33).The work of Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859) (Birnbaum, 1970; Bulks, 1979; Eichtal,

1897; Lively, 1962; Mayer, 1939; Pierson, 1938; Poggi, 1972; Redier, 1925; \bssler, 1973),like that of Maistre, can be interpreted asan attempt to undo the revolution. But his social andtheoretical point of departure is completely different, and so is his mentality. He is not aCatholic reactionary, but a conservative humanist. He realizes that the way back to a tradi-tional society does not exist, and that the most be can do is to try to save some essentialelements of h, if necessary in a modern shape. For him, the essentials were exactly what theyhad been for Montesquieu: power should not be concentrated in acentralized state. This ideais the main reason for his famous journey toAmerica, where he found a system that wasbothmodem and decentralized.

This difference in temperament between Maistre and Tocqueville can be ascribed to atleast two things: Ibcqueville lived ina relatively calmer era and could look from a distance atthe Revolution, and he had a different family history. Maistre was a nobleman only of thesecond generation. His father bought the title. This caused him some uneasiness. There wasno family tradition, hedid not know how to behave. In the beginning of the revolution he didnot even know which side to choose. This may have been a factor in his fierce utterancesagainst everything untraditknal. Ibcqueville, on the other hand, came from an old andhonorable noble family, with a strong tradition of Aonntet-a. This honnttete-a implied asticking to one' post as long as possible, and trying to make the best of it, and strictseparation of public behavior and private feelings. This mentality is not compatible withemotional abuse. So we will not find him fiercely "* i""Ehisopponents very often in theworks he himself published. When he does, it is in a prophesy of what the ultimate conse-quences will be of what he, like Montesquieu, seeks to fightcentralization of government:

It is in vain to summon a people who have been rendered so dependent on the centralpower to choose from time to time the representatives of mat power; this rare and briefexercise of their free choice, however important it may be, will not prevent them fromgradually losing the faculties of thinking, feeling, and acting for themselves, and thusgradually ailing below the level of humanity (Ibcqueville, 1945, Vol. 2:339).If we want to know how he really felt about modern times, we should turn to his private

writings: his "Souvenirs"and his correspondence. There he describes what happenedto himwhen, as a boy, he came into contact with modern ideas in the library of his father:

Until then my life had unrolled in a full belief that never allowed doubt to penetrate mysoul. At that moment, it did so, or rather, the doubt thrust itself into my mind with anenormous forcenot a question of this or that, but a universal unbelief. I experiencedsomething like an earthquake, ... the whole of nature in disarray. I was seized by theblackest melancholy, by a loathing for life that was new to me ... now and then theimpressions from my childhood (I was sixteen at the time) take hold of me again. Then Iagain see the world of the mind revolving, and I feel lost and alarmed in this universalmovement that upsets all the truths onwhich I have built my faith and my deeds and turnsthem upside down (cited by Redier, 287f).Shortly before his death, despairing of the realization of his ideals, due to the coups d'tat

of Napoleon I II , he wrote to his friends words not unlike those of Joseph de Maistre:


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l10 SOCIOLOGICALANALYSIS

We belong to a moral and intellectual family that is dying out. In the past people hadideals, now they only have interests. There used to be bonds between people that havedisappeared. It is sad, sir, to outlive one's Fatherland (cited by Vossler. 1973:177).The feeling that the turn from tradition tomodernity causes in the losers can be put into a

short formula: since my world is destroyed, au world is destroyed.' Everything seemsuseless, meaningless, nothingness. The stigmatizing of the adversary is here combined with adeep melancholy. The adversary is no longer a well-defined category of people. It is the wholeworld. Therefore, existence has lost its value.

What both Maistre and Tocqueville are talking about fits quite well into my standarddefinition ofnihilism. In Maistre there is an elaborate theory of its history and in Ibcquevillewe see the existential side ofnihilism. Both authors are evaluating as nihilistic a change thathas indeed come about in society. It is perceived as an unbearable but unescapable truth.

How do the winners evaluate this change? A winner is here defined as a person whoidentifies with the class that gained power after the revolution.

One such winner is Auguste Comte (1798-1857) (Gouhier, 1933, 1965; Lacroix, 1973;Levy-Brhl, 1910), not because he was very successful in life, but because he consequentlybelieved in the coming of an industrialized paradise in which he and his theories would play amajor pan. Disillusionment did not cause bitterness, but at most religious mania. Analyzingthe condition ofhis time, the first half of the 19th century, hespoke of "spiritual anarchy."Butunlike Maistre or Tocqueville, he sees it as a necessary but temporary stage that can easily beovercome when properly understood. True, people had no values, no ideals that could givetheir lives meaning and adirection. This was reinforced by young poets who spoke of the "maldu sciecle," the "evil of the century."They stuck tothis idea, according to Comte, becausethey did not understand what was going on. To explain mis. Comte combined the theories ofMaistre and Condorcet, the 18th century prophet ofprogress. Towhat the first had attributedan absolute significance, the second completely despisedtradition. Because of this totalopposition of tradition and progress, neither could understand the development of society, inwhich progress comes forth out of tradition. To fill this gap. Comte developed his rathersophisticatedtheory of the three stages, according towhich society developed from a theologi-cal, via a metaphysical, into a scientific, positive era. V ie might say that Comte provides uswith a sociological theory of the genesis of nihilism, that is superior to mat of Nietzsche in hiselaborateness and precision. In the first half of the 19th century, everything traditional hascome toanend, orcompletely lost itscredibility. Butnobodycan see yet what positive contentis about to take its place. That is to say, nobody but Auguste Comte. He is the prophet,literally, of the new, positive era. He will lead society out of the present spiritual anarchy byformulating a new faith:

Faith, that is the inclination to believe spontaneously, without preceding proof, in dogmasthat are proclaimedby a capableauthority. This is indeed the indispensable condition forestablishing and maintaining a true intellectual and moral community (1978:319).

What the lack of such a community means is deeply analyzed in his early works:The decline of theological philosophy and the associated spiritual power has robbedsociety of every moral discipline (288-293).

8. Elilde says:"...in the view of archaic societies, everything that is not 'our world' in not yet aworld." (1959:32). Here the reverse is going on: whit is no longer our world is no longer a world.

THEPRCThis has severe consequences:

The intelligence of the pe/uBirnbaum, Pierre. 1970. SociologieBorg. M. B. ter.. 1982. Nihilisme etBuiks. P. E. J. 1979. Alexis de T b c cCioran. E. M. 1952. "Prftce." inComte. Auguste. 1978. Du tbuvoirDraihc. Roben. 1970(2). Jean-JaiDurkheim. Emile. 1967(8) De la l1970. Suicide. London: R.Eichu. Eugene d'.. 1897.Alexis dGay. Peler. 1959. tollaire 's Mines1973. ne Enlightenment.Giddens. Anthony. 1971. CapitalisiPress.Gignoux, C. J. 1963. Joseph de UEditions Latines.Ghring. Martin. 1946. mg und SiGoudsblom, J. 1977(3). Nihilisme ,Gouhier. Henri. 1933 and after. LaParis: Vrin.

1965(2). La Vie d'AugusteGreen. P.C. 1955. Jean-Jaiaues tCambridge University Press.Grimsley. Ronald. 1973.Th e Phih.Heidegger, Martin. 1961. "Der euPnillingen: Neske:31-256.


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TH E P R OBLEM OF N I H I LI SM : A SOCIOLOGICAL AP P R OAC H 15than ISO years, it is as easy totell

modernization. At the time, theseon, and to choose with which

a favorable turn. Moreover, there isfrom an objective and from athemselves personally with

difficult to choose as it was to seeyears. The loser in one epoch saw

clear in principle, was veryany author I described, was consid-in such a situation is not only to

he rival as nothingness, but also tolabeling.

opponents' form of life, but alsowhole world, including themselves,d Tocqueville showed, is boundto acany things through. And after all,be comforting. It is good to see thatand success are part of the general

in intellectualcircles. Itways, on many levels, in an

in society leads tounderstand-the crisis of the coming of modem

early and smoothly andthe concept of nihilism never played

involved intense turmoil, itnihilism. One dominant form of lite

was all. Slowly, people becameexist, but that relative values may dot the same as chaos, as long as there

of tolerance. In fact,Of course there are still disputesissues within the boundaries offrom time to time. It has become

role in the work of many thinkerswill not disappear completely.concerning our forms of life.

describing an d understanding theire their arguments by using it. Itsthe concept is used, it will

century,from the fortunes of

a concept that is out of date? Yes, we can. First, we have seen how philosophical andsociological reflection on social reality, on values and norms, can be influenced by its socialcontext. This could make us a little suspicious of cultural criticismingeneral. When we speakin our own time of the cultureof narcissism, for instance, or secularism, we should beawareof this. When we speak disdainfully about others, or about culture, there might be somethingwrong nol with them, but with our relation with them. Weshould always be prepared that ourmost sophisticated and elaborate concepts might, in the end. turn out to be nihilating labels.

And so we come to the second point. We are familiar with theories about the functionsthat tales of sorcery and witchcraft may have in timesof social upheaval. But do we also realizethai in modem times the same thing may occur, not in a religious, but in a philosophical oreven a scientific shape? This is what happened with the concept of nihilism. There is acontinuity between the use of this concept and the much studied European "witchcraze." It isdifficult to recognize this continuity, for the concept of nihilism is still very familiar to us.Although out of use, it is part of the conceptual tradition that is ours.

REFERENCESAlthusser. Louis. 1959. Montesquieu. La Politique a l'Histoire. Paris: PUF.Arendt. Dieler. 1974. ' D i e Ueberwindung d es Nihilismus." in Dieler Arendt, ed.. Der Nihilismus alsPhnomen der Geistesgeschidae in der uissenschafilichen Diskussion unseres Jahrhunderts, ff.350-355.ed . 1974. D er Nihilismus als Phnomen der Oeistetgeschichle in der uissenschqftliehen Diskus-sion unseres Jahrhunderts. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschali.Aim. R. 1967. Us Etappes de la Pense Sociologique. Paru: Gallinuid.Binnour. VAnda. 1974.Les Nihilistes Susses. Paris: Aubier-Montaigne.Barrire. Pierre. 1946. Un Grand ftwcna!: Charles-Louis de Second. Baron de la Brde et deMontesquieu. Bordeaux: Editions Delanos.Banh, Hans. 1958. Dir Idee der Ordnung. Erlenbach. Zrich und Stulgart: Eugen RentschBestermann. Theodore. 1969. Iblraire. London and Harlowe: Longmans.Birnbaum. Pierre. 1970. Sociologie de Tocqueiille. Paris: PUF.Borg, M. B. 1er.. 1982. Nihilisme en de Franse sociologische traditie. Deventer: V an Loghum SlalerasBuiks. P. E. J. 1979. Alexis de Jcque\ille en de democratische remlutie. Assen: van Gorcum.Cioran. E. M. 1952. "Preface." in Joseph de Maistre Oeurres Choisis. Monaco: Editions dur Rocher.Comte. Auguste. 1978.Du /butoir Spirituel. P. Arnaud, d. Paris: Livre du Riche.Drath. Robert. 1970(2). Jean-Jacques Rousseau et la Science Politique de son Temps. Paru: Vrin.Durkheim. Emile. 1967(8). De la Krision du Tramil Social. Paris: PUF.

1970. Suicide. London: RouUedge and Kegan Paul.Eichtal. Eugne d ' . . 1897. Alexis de Tocqun-ille et la Democratie Librale. Paris: Calmann Levy.Gay. Peler. 1959. Voltaire'i Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.1973. 77i* Enlightenment. A n Interpretation. II. London: Wildwood House.Giddens. Anthony. 1971 Capitalism and Modem Social Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.Gignoux. C. I. 1963. Joseph de Maiare: Prophte de Pass. Historien de l'Atrnir. Paris: NouvellesEditions Latines.Ghring. Martin. 1946. W r g und Sieg der modernen Staatsidee in Frankreich. Tbingen: Mohr.Goudsblom. J. 1977(3). Nihilisme en Cultuur. Amsterdam: Alhenaeum-PoUk en van Gennep.Gouhicr. Henri. 1933 and after La Jeunesse d'Auguste Comte et la rvrmalion du Positiiisme. 3 vois.Paris: Vrin.1965(2). La Vie d'Auguste Comte. Paris: Vrin.Green, F.C. 1955. Jean-Jacques Rousseau. A Critical Study of His L i f e and Writings. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.Grimsley. Ronald. 1973. 77* Philosoph* o f Rousseau. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Heidegger. Martin. 1961. "Der europaische Nihilismus." (1940). in Martin Heidegger Niet-,-he. II.Prullingen: Neske:3l-256.

-p


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16 SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSISHendel, Charles W. 1934. Jean-Jacque Sousseau, Moralin. Indianapolis: Bobbs Merill.Knig, Ren 1978. Durtheim air Diskussion. Mnchen: HanserLacroix, Jean. 1973. la Sociologie d'Auguste Cornu. Pans: PUF.Landgrebe, L. 1974. "Zur Ueberwindung des Europischen Nihilismus," in Dieter Arendt (ed.) DerNihilismus als Phnomen der Geistesgeschichu in der wissenschaftlichen Disbasion unseresJahrhimderu, pp. 19-38.Lebrun, Richard Allen. 1965. Thront and Altar: The Political and Religious nought of Joseph deMaisire. Ottawa: Ottawa University Press.Levy-Briihl, Luden. 1910. La Philosophie d'Auguste Cornu. Para: Felix Alcan.Lively, Jack. 1962. The Social and Political Thuught a f Alexis de Tocqueville. Oxford: Clarendon Press.\i\\tn, Steven. 1973. Emile DurUieim. Harmondsworth: Penguin.M aisirc, Joseph de. 1 9 5 2 . Oeuvres Choisis. E . M. Cioran (ed.). M onaco: Ed. du Kocher.1966. Du Pape. Genve: Dim.May, Georges. 1961. Rousseau. Paris: Seuil.Mayer, J.P. 1939. Prophet of me Mass Age. A Study o f Alexis de Tocqueville. London: Dent.Montesquieu. 1748. L'Esprit des Lois.Nietzche, Friedrich. 1973. Werke, in drie Bnde, ed. Karl Schlecht*. Mnchen: Hanser.Nisbet, Robert A. 1975 The Sociology of Emile DurUieim. London: HeinemannOwen AMridge, A. 197S. \bltaire and me Century of Light. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Pienon, G. W. 1938. TbcquevMe and Beaumont in America. New York: Oxford University Press.Foggier, Otto. 1974. "H egel und die Anfinge des Nihilismus." in Dieler Ar endt, ed.. Der Nihilismus ahPhnomen der Geistesgeschichu in der wienxhajUichen Disbasion unseres Jahrhunderts, pp .307-349.Poggi, Gianfranco. 1972. Images of Society, Essays on the Sociological Theories ofTocqueviUe, Honeand Durkheim. London: Oxford University Press.Pomeau, Rene. 1955. Maure. Paris: Seuil.Rauschning, Hermann 1974. "Masken und Metamorphosen des Nihiimus," in Dieler Arendt, ed. De rNihilismus als Phnomen der Gtistesgeschichle in der wissenschaftlichen Dishasion unseresJahrhunderts, pp. 99-125.Reider, Antoine. 1925. Comme disait Honneur de TcqueviUe. Paris: Penin & de.Rosen, Stanley. 1969. Nihilism: A Philosophical Essay. New Haven and London: Yale University PressRousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1959. Oeuvra Complta. Paria: Pliade.Shacklelon, Robert. 1961. Montesquieu. A Critical Biography. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Starobinsky, Jean. 1953. Montesquieu pa r lui-mme. Paris: Seuil.\n\. Jean-Jacques Rousseau: la Transparence et l'Obstacle. Paris: Gallimard.Tiryakian, E. A 1978. "Emile Diutheim," inBoOomore, Ibm and Robert A. Nisbet, eds. A History ofSociological Analysis, pp. 187-236. London: Heinemann.IbcquevUle, Alexis de. 1945. Democracy in America, ed. by Phillips Bradley. New York: Vintage.Triomphe, Robert. 1968. Joseph de Maatre. Geneve: Droz.Vbssler, Otto 1973. Alexis de Tcqumtle, Freiheit und Gleiche. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.Weber, Alfred. 1947. farewell to European History or the Conquest of Nihilism. London: Kegan Paul.

Vatican II, EciAnalysis of CfM ichael F . Alois!Bound Brook, N J

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