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Title:TheVedantaSutraswiththeCommentarybyRamanuja
SacredBooksoftheEast,Volume48
Author:Trans.GeorgeThibaut
ReleaseDate:January,2005[EBook#7297]
[Yes,wearemorethanoneyearaheadofschedule]
[ThisfilewasfirstpostedonApril9,2003]
Edition:10
Language:English
Charactersetencoding:ASCII
***STARTOFTHEPROJECTGUTENBERGEBOOKTHEVEDANTASUTRAS***
THE
VEDANTASUTRAS
WITHTHECOMMENTARYBY
RAMANUJA
TRANSLATEDBY
GEORGETHIBAUT
PARTIII
SacredBooksoftheEast,Volume48
[1904]
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OCRedandproofedatDistributedProofingbyothervolunteers;Juliet
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CONTENTS.
VEDANTASUTRASWITHTHECOMMENTARYOFRAMANUJA.
INTRODUCTION
ADHYAYAI
PadaI
PadaII
PadaIII
PadaIV
ADHYAYAII
PadaI
PadaII
PadaIII
PadaIV
ADHYAYAIII
PadaI
PadaII
PadaIII
PadaIV
ADHYAYAIV
PadaI
PadaII
PadaIII
PadaIV
INDEXESBYDR.M.WINTERNITZ:
IndexofQuotations
IndexofSanskritWords
IndexofNamesandSubjects
Corrigenda
TransliterationofOrientalAlphabetsadoptedfortheTranslationsofthe
SacredBooksoftheEast
INTRODUCTION.
IntheIntroductiontothefirstvolumeofthetranslationofthe
'VedantaSutraswithSankara'sCommentary'(vol.xxxivofthisSeries)I
havedweltatsomelengthontheinterestwhichRamanuja'sCommentary
mayclaimasbeing,ontheonehand,thefullestexpositionofwhatmay
becalledtheTheisticVedanta,andassupplyingus,ontheother,with
meansofpenetratingtothetruemeaningofBadarayana'sAphorisms.Ido
notwishtoenterhereintoafullerdiscussionofRamanuja'sworkin
eitheroftheseaspects;anadequatetreatmentofthemwould,moreover,
requireconsiderablymorespacethanisatmydisposal.Someveryuseful
materialfortherightunderstandingofRamanuju'sworkistobefound
inthe'AnalyticalOutlineofContents'whichMessrs.M.Rangakaryaand
M.B.VaradarajaAiyangarhaveprefixedtothefirstvolumeoftheir
scholarlytranslationoftheSribhashya(Madras,1899).
ThequestionastowhattheSturasreallyteachisacritical,nota
philosophicalone.Thisdistinctionseemstohavebeenimperfectly
realisedbyseveralofthosecritics,writinginIndia,whohave
examinedtheviewsexpressedinmyIntroductiontothetranslationof
Sankara'sCommentary.Awritershouldnotbetaxedwith'philosophic
incompetency,''hopelesstheisticbiasduetoearlytraining,'andthe
like,simplybecausehe,onthebasisofapurelycriticalinvestigation,
considershimselfentitledtomaintainthatacertainancientdocument
setsforthonephilosophicalviewratherthananother.Ihavenowhere
expressedanopinionastothecomparativephilosophicalvalueofthe
systemsofSankaraandRamanuja;notbecauseIhavenodefiniteopinions
onthispoint,butbecausetointroducethemintoacriticalenquiry
wouldbepurposelessifnotobjectionable.
ThequestionastothetruemeaningoftheSutrasisnodoubtofsome
interest;althoughtheinterestofproblemsofthiskindmayeasilybe
overestimated.Amongtheremarksofcriticsonmytreatmentofthis
problemIhavefoundlittleofsolidvalue.ThemainargumentswhichI
havesetforth,notsomuchinfavouroftheadequacyofRamanuja's
interpretation,asagainstthevalidityofSankarakarya'sunderstanding
oftheSutras,appeartomenottohavebeentouched.Idonotbyany
meansconsidertheproblemahopelessone;butitssolutionwillnotbe
advanced,inanydirection,butbythosewhowillbeatthetroubleof
submittingtheentirebodyoftheSutrastoanewanddetailed
investigation,availingthemselvestothefullofthehelpthatistobe
derivedfromthestudyofalltheexistingCommentaries.
ThepresenttranslationoftheSribhashyaclaimstobefaithfulonthe
whole,althoughImustacknowledgethatIhaveaimedratheratmakingit
intelligibleand,inacertainsense,readablethanscrupulously
accurate.IfIhadtorewriteit,Ishouldfeelinclinedtogoeven
furtherinthesamedirection.IndianPhilosophywould,inmyopinion,
bemorereadilyandwidelyappreciatedthanitisatpresent,ifthe
translatorsofphilosophicalworkshadbeensomewhatmoreconcernedto
throwtheirversionsintoaformlessstrangeandrepellenttothe
westernreaderthanliteralrenderingsfromtechnicalSanskritmust
needsbeinmanypassages.Iamnotunawareofthepeculiardangersof
theplannowadvocatedamongwhichthemostobviousisthetemptation
itofferstothetranslatorofdeviatingfromthetextmorewidelythan
regardforclearnesswouldabsolutelyrequire.AndIamconsciousof
havingfailedinthisrespectinmorethanoneinstance.Inothercases
Ihavenodoubtgoneastraythroughanimperfectunderstandingofthe
author'smeaning.Thefactis,thatasyetthetimehashardlycomefor
fullyadequatetranslationsofcomprehensiveworksofthetypeofthe
Sribhashya,theauthorsofwhichwrotewithreferenceinmanycases
tacittoanimmenseandhighlytechnicalphilosophicalliteraturewhich
isonlyjustbeginningtobestudied,andcomprehendedinpart,by
Europeanscholars.
ItgivesmegreatpleasuretoacknowledgethehelpwhichIhavereceived
fromvariousquartersinpreparingthistranslation.PanditGangadhara
Sastrin,C.I.E.,oftheBenaresSanskritCollege,has,withunwearying
kindnessandpatience,suppliedmethroughoutwithcommentsofhisown
ondifficultsectionsofthetext.PanditSvaminRamaMisraSastrinhas
renderedmefrequentassistanceintheearlierportionofmytask.And
toMr.A.Venis,thelearnedPrincipaloftheBenaresSanskritCollege,
Iamindebtedformostinstructivenotesonsomepassagesofa
peculiarlytechnicalandabstrusecharacter.NorcanIconcludewithout
expressingmysenseofobligationtoColonelG.A.Jacob,whose
invaluable'ConcordancetothePrincipalUpanishads'lightenstoan
incalculabledegreethetaskofanyscholarwhoisengagedinwork
bearingontheVedanta.
VEDANTASUTRAS
WITH
RAMANUJA'SSRIBHASHYA
FIRSTADHYAYA.
FIRSTPADA.
MAYmymindbefilledwithdevotiontowardsthehighestBrahman,the
abodeofLakshmiwhoisluminouslyrevealedintheUpanishads;whoin
sportproduces,sustains,andreabsorbstheentireUniverse;whoseonly
aimistofosterthemanifoldclassesofbeingsthathumblyworshiphim.
ThenectaroftheteachingofParasara'sson(Vyasa),whichwasbrought
upfromthemiddleofthemilkoceanoftheUpanishadswhichrestores
tolifethesoulswhosevitalstrengthhaddepartedowingtotheheatof
thefireoftransmigratoryexistencewhichwaswellguardedbythe
teachersofoldwhichwasobscuredbythemutualconflictofmanifold
opinions,mayintelligentmendailyenjoythatasitisnowpresented
totheminmywords.
Thelengthyexplanation(vritti)oftheBrahmasutraswhichwascomposed
bytheReverendBodhayanahasbeenabridgedbyformerteachers;
accordingtotheirviewsthewordsoftheSutraswillbeexplainedin
thispresentwork.
1.ThenthereforetheenquiryintoBrahman.
InthisSutratheword'then'expressesimmediatesequence;theword
'therefore'intimatesthatwhathastakenplace(viz.thestudyofthe
karmakandaoftheVeda)constitutesthereason(oftheenquiryinto
Brahman).Forthefactisthattheenquiryinto(lit.'thedesireto
know')Brahmanthefruitofwhichenquiryisinfiniteinnatureand
permanentfollowsimmediatelyinthecaseofhimwho,havingreadthe
Vedatogetherwithitsauxiliarydisciplines,hasreachedtheknowledge
thatthefruitofmereworksislimitedandnonpermanent,andhencehas
conceivedthedesireoffinalrelease.
Thecompound'brahmajijnasa'istobeexplainedas'theenquiryof
Brahman,'thegenitivecase'ofBrahman'beingunderstoodtodenotethe
object;inagreementwiththespecialruleastothemeaningofthe
genitivecase,PaniniII,3,65.Itmightbesaidthatevenifwe
acceptedthegeneralmeaningofthegenitivecasewhichisthatof
connexioningeneralBrahman'sposition(intheabovecompound)asan
objectwouldbeestablishedbythecircumstancethatthe'enquiry'
demandsanobject;butinagreementwiththeprinciplethatthedirect
denotationofawordistobepreferredtoameaninginferredwetake
thegenitivecase'ofBrahman'asdenotingtheobject.
Theword'Brahman'denotesthehightestPerson(purushottama),whois
essentiallyfreefromallimperfectionsandpossessesnumberlessclasses
ofauspiciousqualitiesofunsurpassableexcellence.Theterm'Brahman'
isappliedtoanythingswhichpossessthequalityofgreatness
(brihattva,fromtheroot'brih');butprimarilydenotesthatwhich
possessesgreatness,ofessentialnatureaswellasofqualities,in
unlimitedfulness;andsuchisonlytheLordofall.Hencetheword
'Brahman'primarilydenoteshimalone,andinasecondaryderivative
senseonlythosethingswhichpossesssomesmallpartoftheLord's
qualities;foritwouldbeimpropertoassumeseveralmeaningsforthe
word(sothatitwoulddenoteprimarilyordirectlymorethanonething).
Thecaseisanalogoustothatoftheterm'bhagavat[FOOTNOTE4:1].'The
Lordonlyisenquiredinto,forthesakeofimmortality,byallthose
whoareafflictedwiththetriadofpain.HencetheLordofallisthat
Brahmanwhich,accordingtotheSutra,constitutestheobjectofenquiry.
Theword'jijnasa'isadesiderativeformationmeaning'desiretoknow.'
Andasinthecaseofanydesirethedesiredobjectisthechiefthing,
theSutrameanstoenjoinknowledgewhichistheobjectofthedesire
ofknowledge.ThepurportoftheentireSutrathenisasfollows:'Since
thefruitofworksknownthroughtheearlierpartoftheMimamsais
limitedandnonpermanent,andsincethefruitoftheknowledgeof
Brahmanwhichknowledgeistobereachedthroughthelatterpartofthe
Mimamsaisunlimitedandpermanent;forthisreasonBrahmanistobe
known,aftertheknowledgeofworkshaspreviouslytakenplace.'The
samemeaningisexpressedbytheVrittikarawhensaying'afterthe
comprehensionofworkshastakenplacetherefollowstheenquiryinto
Brahman.'AndthattheenquiryintoworksandthatintoBrahman
constituteonebodyofdoctrine,he(theVrittikara)willdeclarelater
on'thisSarirakadoctrineisconnectedwithJaimini'sdoctrineas
containedinsixteenadhyayas;thisprovesthetwotoconstituteone
bodyofdoctrine.'HencetheearlierandthelaterMimamsaareseparate
onlyinsofarasthereisadifferenceofmattertobetaughtbyeach;
inthesamewayasthetwohalvesofthePurvaMimamsasutras,
consistingofsixadhyayaseach,areseparate[FOOTNOTE5:1];andaseach
adhyayaisseparate.TheentireMimamsasatrawhichbeginswiththe
Sutra'Nowthereforetheenquiryintoreligiousduty'andconcludeswith
theSutra'(Fromthereis)noreturnonaccountofscripturalstatement'
has,owingtothespecialcharacterofthecontents,adefiniteorderof
internalsuccession.Thisisasfollows.Atfirsttheprecept'oneisto
learnone'sowntext(svadhyaya)'enjoinstheapprehensionofthat
aggregateofsyllableswhichiscalled'Veda,'andisherereferredto
as'svadhyaya.'Nexttherearisesthedesiretoknowofwhatnaturethe
'Learning'enjoinedistobe,andhowitistobedone.Heretherecome
incertaininjunctionssuchas'LetaBrahnmanabeinitiatedinhis
eighthyear'and'TheteacheristomakehimrecitetheVeda';and
certainrulesaboutspecialobservancesandrestrictionssuchas
'havingperformedtheupakarmanonthefullmoonofSravanaor
Praushthapadaaccordingtoprescription,heistostudythesacred
versesforfourmonthsandahalfwhichenjoinalltherequireddetails.
Fromalltheseitisunderstoodthatthestudyenjoinedhasforits
resulttheapprehensionoftheaggregateofsyllablescalledVeda,on
thepartofapupilwhohasbeeninitiatedbyateachersprungfroma
goodfamily,leadingavirtuouslife,andpossessingpurityofsoul;who
practisescertainspecialobservancesandrestrictions;andwholearns
byrepeatingwhatisrecitedbytheteacher.
AndthisstudyoftheVedaisofthenatureofasamskaraofthetext,
sincetheformoftheinjunction'theVedaistobestudied'showsthat
theVedaistheobject(oftheactionofstudying).Byasamskarais
understoodanactionwherebysomethingisfittedtoproducesomeother
effect;andthattheVedashouldbetheobjectofsuchasamskaarais
quiteappropriate,sinceitgivesrisetotheknowledgeofthefour
chiefendsofhumanactionviz.religiousduty,wealth,pleasure,and
finalreleaseandofthemeanstoeffectthem;andsinceithelpsto
effectthoseendsbyitselfalso,viz.bymeremechanicalrepetition
(apartfromanyknowledgetowhichitmaygiverise).
TheinjunctionastothestudyoftheVedathusaimsonlyatthe
apprehensionoftheaggregateofsyllables(constitutingtheVeda)
accordingtocertainrules;itisinthiswayanalogoustotherecital
ofmantras.
ItisfurtherobservedthattheVedathusapprehendedthroughreading
spontaneouslygivesrisetotheideasofcertainthingssubserving
certainpurposes.Aperson,therefore,whohasformednotionsofthose
thingsimmediately,i.e.onthemereapprehensionofthetextofthe
Vedathroughreading,thereuponnaturallyapplieshimselftothestudy
oftheMimamsa,whichconsistsinamethodicaldiscussionofthe
sentencesconstitutingthetextoftheVeda,andhasforitsresultthe
accuratedeterminationofthenatureofthosethingsandtheirdifferent
modes.Throughthisstudythestudentascertainsthecharacterofthe
injunctionsofworkwhichformpartoftheVeda,andobservesthatall
workleadsonlytononpermanentresults;andas,ontheotherhand,he
immediatelybecomesawarethattheUpanishadsectionswhichformpart
oftheVedawhichhehasapprehendedthroughreadingrefertoan
infiniteandpermanentresult,viz.immortality,heapplieshimselfto
thestudyoftheSarirakaMimamsa,whichconsistsinasystematic
discussionoftheVedantatexts,andhasforitsresulttheaccurate
determinationoftheirsense.Thatthefruitofmereworksistransitory,
whiletheresultoftheknowledgeofBrahmanissomethingpermanent,the
Vedantatextsdeclareinmanyplaces'Andasheretheworldacquiredby
workperishes,sotheretheworldacquiredbymeritperishes'(Ch.Up.
VIII,1,6);'Thatworkofhishasanend'(Bri.Up.III,8,10);'By
nonpermanentworksthePermanentisnotobtained'(Ka.Up.I,2,10);
'Frailindeedarethoseboats,thesacrifices'(Mu.Up.I,2,7);'Leta
Brahmana,afterhehasexaminedalltheseworldsthataregainedby
works,acquirefreedomfromalldesires.Whatisnotmadecannotbe
gainedbywhatismade.Tounderstandthis,letthepupil,withfuelin
hishand,gotoateacherwhoislearnedanddwellsentirelyinBrahman.
Tothatpupilwhohasapproachedhimrespectfully,whosemindis
altogethercalm,thewiseteachertrulytoldthatknowledgeofBrahman
throughwhichheknowstheimperishabletruePerson'(Mu.Up.I,2,12,
13).'Told'heremeans'heistotell.'Ontheotherhand,'Hewho
knowsBrahmanattainstheHighest'(Taitt.Up.II,1,1);'Hewhosees
thisdoesnotseedeath'(Ch.Up.VII,26,2);'Hebecomesaselfruler'
(Ch.Up.VII,25,2);'Knowinghimhebecomesimmortalhere'(Taitt.Ar.
III,12,7);'Havingknownhimhepassesoverdeath;thereisnoother
pathtogo'(Svet.Up.VI,15);'HavingknownasseparatehisSelfand
theMover,pleasedtherebyhegoestoimmortality'(Svet.Up.I,6).
ButanobjectionhereisraisedthemerelearningoftheVedawithits
auxiliarydisciplinesgivesrisetotheknowledgethattheheavenly
worldandthelikearetheresultsofworks,andthatallsuchresults
aretransitory,whileimmortalityisthefruitofmeditationonBrahman.
Possessingsuchknowledge,apersondesirousoffinalreleasemayat
onceproceedtotheenquiryintoBrahman;andwhatneedisthereofa
systematicconsiderationofreligiousduty(i.e.ofthestudyofthe
PurvaMimamsa)?Ifthisreasoningwerevalid,wereply,theperson
desirousofreleaseneednotevenapplyhimselftothestudyofthe
SarirakaMimamsa,sinceBrahmanisknownfromthemerereadingofthe
Vedawithitsauxiliarydisciplines.True.Suchknowledgearisesindeed
immediately(withoutdeeperenquiry).Butamatterapprehendedinthis
immediatewayisnotraisedabovedoubtandmistake.Henceasystematic
discussionoftheVedantatextsmustheundertakeninorderthattheir
sensemaybefullyascertainedWeagree.Butyouwillhavetoadmit
thatfortheverysamereasonwemustundertakeasystematicenquiry
intoreligiousduty!
[FOOTNOTE4:1.'Bhagavat'denotesprimarilytheLord,thedivinity;
secondarilyanyholyperson.]
[FOOTNOTE5:1.ThefirstsixbooksofthePurvaMimamsasutrasgive
rulesforthefundamentalformsofthesacrifice;whilethelastsix
booksteachhowtheserulesaretobeappliedtothesocalledmodified
forms.]
THESMALLPURVAPAKSHA.
Butafurtherobjectionisurgedasthatwhichhastoprecedethe
systematicenquiryintoBrahmanweshouldassignsomethingwhichthat
enquirynecessarilypresupposes.Theenquiryintothenatureofduty,
however,doesnotformsuchaprerequisite,sinceaconsiderationofthe
Vedantatextsmaybeundertakenbyanyonewhohasreadthosetexts,
evenifheisnotacquaintedwithworks.ButintheVedantatextsthere
areenjoinedmeditationsontheUdgithaandthelikewhicharematters
auxiliarytoworks;andsuchmeditationsarenotpossibleforhimwhois
notacquaintedwiththoseworks!Youwhoraisethisobjectionclearly
areignorantofwhatkindofknowledgetheSarirakaMimamsaisconcerned
with!Whatthatsastraaimsatistodestroycompletelythatwrong
knowledgewhichistherootofallpain,forman,liabletobirth,old
age,anddeath,andallthenumberlessotherevilsconnectedwith
transmigratoryexistenceevilsthatspringfromtheview,dueto
beginninglessNescience,thatthereispluralityofexistence;andto
thatendthesastraendeavourstoestablishtheknowledgeoftheunity
oftheSelf.Nowtothisknowledge,theknowledgeofworkswhichis
basedontheassumptionofpluralityofexistenceisnotonlyuseless
butevenopposed.TheconsiderationoftheUdgithaandthelike,which
issupplementarytoworksonly,findsaplaceintheVedantatexts,only
becauselikethemitisofthenatureofknowledge;butithasnodirect
connexionwiththetruetopicofthosetexts.Hencesomeprerequisite
mustbeindicatedwhichhasreferencetotheprincipaltopicofthe
sastra.Quiteso;andthisprerequisiteisjusttheknowledgeofworks;
forscripturedeclaresthatfinalreleaseresultsfromknowledgewith
worksadded.TheSutrawriterhimselfsaysfurtheron'Andthereisneed
ofallworks,onaccountofthescripturalstatementofsacrificesand
thelike'(Ve.Su.III,4,26).Andiftherequiredworkswerenotknown,
onecouldnotdeterminewhichworkshavetobecombinedwithknowledge
andwhichnot.Hencetheknowledgeofworksisjustthenecessary
prerequisite.Notso,wereply.ThatwhichputsanendtoNescienceis
exclusivelytheknowledgeofBrahman,whichispureintelligenceand
antagonistictoallplurality.Forfinalreleaseconsistsjustinthe
cessationofNescience;howthencanworkstowhichthereattach
endlessdifferencesconnectedwithcaste,asrama,objecttobe
accomplished,meansandmodeofaccomplishment,&c.eversupplyameans
forthecessationofignorance,whichisessentiallythecessationof
theviewthatdifferenceexists?Thatworks,theresultsofwhichare
transitory,arecontrarytofinalrelease,andthatsuchreleasecanbe
effectedthroughknowledgeonly,scripturedeclaresinmanyplaces;
compareallthepassagesquotedabove(p.7).
Astotheassertionthatknowledgerequiressacrificesandotherworks,
weremarkthatasfollowsfromtheessentialcontrarietyofknowledge
andworks,andasfurtherappearsfromanaccurateconsiderationofthe
wordsofscripturepiousworkscancontributeonlytowardstheriseof
thedesireofknowledge,insofarnamelyastheycleartheinternal
organ(ofknowledge),butcanhavenoinfluenceontheproductionofthe
fruit,i.e.knowledgeitself.Forthescripturalpassageconcernedruns
asfollowsBrahmanasdesiretoknowhimbythestudyoftheVeda,by
sacrifice,bygifts,'&c.(Bri.Up.IV,4,22).
Accordingtothispassage,thedesireonlyofknowledgespringsup
throughworks;whileanothertextteachesthatcalmness,selfrestraint,
andsoon,arethedirectmeansfortheoriginationofknowledgeitself.
(Havingbecometranquil,calm,subdued,satisfied,patient,and
collected,heistoseetheSelfwithintheSelf(Bri.Up.IV,4,23).)
Theprocessthusisasfollows.Afterthemindofamanhasbeencleaned
ofallimpuritiesthroughworksperformedinmanyprecedingstatesof
existence,withoutaviewtospecialformsofreward,therearisesin
himthedesireofknowledge,andthereuponthroughknowledgeitself
originatedbycertainscripturaltexts'Beingonly,thiswasinthe
beginning,oneonlywithoutasecond'(Ch.Up.VI,I,2);'Truth,
Knowledge,theInfinite,isBrahman'(Taitt.Up.II,1);'Withoutparts,
withoutactions,calm,withoutfault,withouttaint'(Svet.Up.VI,19);
'ThisSelfisBrahman'(Bri.Up.II,5,19);'Thouartthat'(Ch.Up.VI,
9,7),Nesciencecomestoanend.Now,'Hearing,''reflection,'and
'meditation,'arehelpfultowardscognisingthesenseoftheseVedic
texts.'Hearing'(sravana)meanstheapprehensionofthesenseof
scripture,togetherwithcollateralarguments,fromateacherwho
possessesthetrueinsight,viz.thattheVedantatextsestablishthe
doctrineoftheunityoftheSelf.'Reflection'(mananam)meansthe
confirmationwithinoneselfofthesensetaughtbytheteacher,bymeans
ofargumentsshowingitalonetobesuitable.'Meditation'
(nididhyasanam)finallymeanstheconstantholdingofthaisensebefore
one'smind,soastodispeltherebytheantagonisticbeginningless
imaginationofplurality.Inthecaseofhimwhothrough'hearing,'
'reflection,'andmeditation,'hasdisdispelledtheentireimagination
ofplurality,theknowledgeofthesenseofVedantatextsputsanendto
Nescience;andwhatwethereforerequireisastatementofthe
indispensableprerequisitesofsuch'hearing,''reflection,'andsoon.
Nowofsuchprerequisitestherearefour,viz.discriminationofwhatis
permanentandwhatisnonpermanent;thefullpossessionofcalmnessof
mind,selfrestraintandsimilarmeans;therenunciationofall
enjoymentoffruitsherebelowaswellasinthenextworld;andthe
desireoffinalrelease.
Withoutthesethedesireofknowledgecannotarise;andtheyare
thereforeknown,fromtheverynatureofthematter,tobenecessary
prerequisites.Tosumup:Therootofbondageistheunrealviewof
pluralitywhichitselfhasitsrootinNesciencethatconcealsthetrue
beingofBrahman.Bondageitselfthusisunreal,andisonthataccount
cutshort,togetherwithitsroot,bymereknowledge.Suchknowledgeis
originatedbytextssuchas'Thatartthou';andworkisofnohelp
eithertowardsitsnature,oritsorigination,oritsfruit(i.e.
release).Itisontheotherhandhelpfultowardsthedesireof
knowledge,whicharisesowingtoanincreaseoftheelementofgoodness
(sattva)inthesoul,duetothedestructionoftheelementsofpassion
(rajas)anddarkness(tamas)whicharetherootofallmoralevil.This
useisreferredtointhetextquotedabove,'Brahmanaswishtoknowhim,'
&c.As,therefore,theknowledgeofworksisofnousetowardsthe
knowledgeofBrahman,wemustacknowledgeastheprerequisiteofthe
latterknowledgethefourmeansmentionedabove.
THESMALLSIDDHANTA.
Tothisargumentationwemakethefollowingreply.Weadmitthatrelease
consistsonlyinthecessationofNescience,andthatthiscessation
resultsentirelyfromtheknowledgeofBrahman.Butadistinctionhas
heretobemaderegardingthenatureofthisknowledgewhichthe
Vedantatextsaimatenjoiningforthepurposeofputtinganendto
Nescience.Isitmerelytheknowledgeofthesenseofsentenceswhich
originatesfromthesentences?orisitknowledgeintheformof
meditation(upasana)whichhastheknowledgejustreferredtoasits
antecedent?Itcannotbeknowledgeoftheformerkind:forsuch
knowledgespringsfromthemereapprehensionofthesentence,apartfrom
anyspecialinjunction,andmoreoverwedonotobservethatthe
cessationofNescienceiseffectedbysuchknowledgemerely.Our
adversarywillperhapsattempttoexplainthingsinthefollowingway.
TheVedantatextsdonot,hewillsay,producethatknowledgewhich
makesanendofNescience,solongastheimaginationofpluralityis
notdispelled.Andthefactthatsuchknowledge,evenwhenproduced,
doesnotatonceandforeveryoneputastoptotheviewofplurality
bynomeanssubvertsmyopinion;for,tomentionananalogousinstance,
thedoubleappearanceofthemoonpresentingitselftoaperson
affectedwithacertainweaknessofvisiondoesnotcometoanendas
soonastheonenessofthemoonhasbeenapprehendedbyreason.
Moreover,evenwithouthavingcometoanend,theviewofpluralityis
powerlesstoeffectfurtherbondage,assoonastheroot,i.e.
Nescience,hasoncebeencutButthisdefenceweareunabletoadmit.It
isimpossiblethatknowledgeshouldnotarisewhenitsmeans,i.e.the
textsconveyingknowledge,areoncepresent.Andweobservethateven
whenthereexistsanantagonisticimagination(interferingwiththerise
ofknowledge),informationgivenbycompetentpersons,thepresenceof
characteristicmarks(onwhichacorrectinferencemaybebased),and
thelikegiverisetoknowledgewhichsublatestheerroneous
imagination.Norcanweadmitthatevenafterthesenseoftextshas
beenapprehended,theviewofpluralitymaycontinueowingtosomesmall
remainderofbeginninglessimagination.Forasthisimaginationwhich
constitutesthemeansfortheviewofpluralityisitselffalse,itis
necessarilyputanendtobytheriseoftrueknowledge.Ifthisdidnot
takeplace,thatimaginationwouldnevercometoanend,sincethereis
noothermeansbutknowledgetoeffectitscessation.Tosaythatthe
viewofplurality,whichistheeffectofthatimagination,continues
evenafteritsroothasbeencut,ismerenonsense.Theinstanceofsome
oneseeingthemoondoubleisnotanalogous.Forinhiscasethe
noncessationofwrongknowledgeexplainsitselffromthecircumstance
thatthecauseofwrongknowledge,viz.therealdefectoftheeyewhich
doesnotadmitofbeingsublatedbyknowledge,isnotremoved,although
thatwhichwouldsublatewrongknowledgeisnear.Ontheotherhand,
effects,suchasfearandthelike,maycometoanendbecausetheycan
besublatedbymeansofknowledgeofsuperiorforce.Moreover,ifit
weretruethatknowledgearisesthroughthedispellingofthe
imaginationofplurality,theriseofknowledgewouldreallyneverbe
broughtabout.Fortheimaginationofpluralityhasthroughgradual
growthinthecourseofbeginninglesstimeacquiredaninfinite
strength,anddoesnotthereforeadmitofbeingdispelledbythe
comparativelyweakconceptionofnonduality.Henceweconcludethatthe
knowledgewhichtheVedantatextsaimatinculcatingisaknowledge
otherthanthemereknowledgeofthesenseofsentences,anddenotedby
'dhyana,''upasana'(i.e.meditation),andsimilarterms.
Withthisagreescripturaltextssuchas'Havingknownit,lethim
practisemeditation'(Bri.Up.IV,4,21);'Hewho,havingsearchedout
theSelf,knowsit'(Ch.Up.VIII,7,1);'MeditateontheSelfasOm'
(Mu.Up.II,2,6);'Havingknownthat,heisfreedfromthejawsof
death'(Ka.Up.I,3,15);'LetamanmeditateontheSelfonlyashis
world'(Bri.Up.I,4,15);'TheSelfistobeseen,tobeheard,toher
reflectedon,tobemeditatedon'(Bri.Up.IV,5,6);'Thatwemust
searchout,thatwemusttrytounderstand'(Ch.Up.VIII,7,1).
(Accordingtotheprincipleoftheonenessofpurportofthedifferent
sakhas)allthesetextsmustbeviewedasagreeinginmeaningwiththe
injunctionofmeditationcontainedinthepassagequotedfromtheBri.
Up.;andwhattheyenjoinisthereforemeditation.Inthefirstand
secondpassagesquoted,thewords'havingknown'and'havingsearched
out'(vijnaya;anuvidya)containamerereferenceto(notinjunctionof)
theapprehensionofthemeaningoftexts,suchapprehensionsubserving
meditation;whiletheinjunctionofmeditation(whichisthetrue
purportofthepassages)isconveyedbytheclauses'lethimpractise
meditation'(prajnamkurvita)and'heknowsit.'Inthesamewaythe
clause'theSelfistobeheard'isamereanuvada,i.e.amere
referencetowhatisalreadyestablishedbyothermeans;foraperson
whohasreadtheVedaobservesthatitcontainsinstructionabout
mattersconnectedwithcertaindefinitepurposes,andthenonhisown
accountapplieshimselftomethodical'hearing,'inorderdefinitelyto
ascertainthesematters;'hearing'thusisestablishedalready.Inthe
samewaytheclause'theSelfistobereflectedupon'isamereanuvada
ofreflectionwhichisknownasameansofconfirmingwhatonehas
'heard.'Itisthereforemeditationonlywhichallthosetextsenjoin.
InagreementwiththisalaterSutraalsosays,'Repetitionmorethan
once,onaccountofinstruction'(Ve.Su.IV,I,I).Thattheknowledge
intendedtobeenjoinedasthemeansoffinalreleaseisofthenature
ofmeditation,weconcludefromthecircumstancethattheterms
'knowing'and'meditating'areseentobeusedinplaceofeachotherin
theearlierandlaterpartsofVedictexts.Comparethefollowing
passages:'LetamanmeditateonmindasBrahman,'and'hewhoknows
thisshinesandwarmsthroughhiscelebrity,fame,andgloryof
countenance'(Ch.Up.III,18,1;6).And'Hedoesnotknowhim,forhe
isnotcomplete,'and'LetmenmeditateonhimastheSelf(Bri.Up.I,
4,7).And'Hewhoknowswhatheknows,'and'Teachmethedeityon
whichyoumeditate'(Ch.Up.IV,1,6;2,2).
'Meditation'meanssteadyremembrance,i.e.acontinuityofsteady
remembrance,uninterruptedliketheflowofoil;inagreementwiththe
scripturalpassagewhichdeclaressteadyremembrancetobethemeansof
release,'ontheattainmentofremembranceallthetiesareloosened'
(Ch.Up.VII,26,2).Suchremembranceisofthesamecharacter(form)
asseeing(intuition);forthepassagequotedhasthesamepurportas
thefollowingone,'Thefetteroftheheartisbroken,alldoubtsare
solved,andalltheworksofthatmanperishwhenhehasbeenseenwho
ishighandlow'(Mu.Up.II,2,8).Andthisbeingso,weconcludethat
thepassage'theSelfistobeseen'teachesthat'Meditation'hasthe
characterof'seeing'or'intuition.'Andthatremembrancehasthe
characterof'seeing'isduetotheelementofimagination
(representation)whichprevailsinit.Allthishasbeensetforthat
lengthbytheVakyakara.'Knowledge(vedana)meansmeditation(upasana),
scriptureusingthewordinthatsense';i.e.inallUpanishadsthat
knowledgewhichisenjoinedasthemeansoffinalreleaseisMeditation.
TheVakyakarathenpropoundsapurvapaksha(primafacieview),'Oncehe
istomakethemeditation,thematterenjoinedbyscripturebeing
accomplishedthereby,asinthecaseoftheprayajasandthelike';and
thensumsupagainstthisinthewords'but(meditation)isestablished
onaccountofthetermmeditation';thatmeansknowledgerepeatedmore
thanonce(i.e.meditation)isdeterminedtobethemeansofRelease.
TheVakyakarathengoeson'Meditationissteadyremembrance,onthe
groundofobservationandstatement.'Thatmeansthisknowledge,ofthe
formofmeditation,andrepeatedmorethanonce,isofthenatureof
steadyremembrance.
Suchremembrancehasbeendeclaredtobeofthecharacterof'seeing,'
andthischaracterofseeingconsistsinitspossessingthecharacterof
immediatepresentation(pratyakshata).Withreferencetoremembrance,
whichthusacquiresthecharacterofimmediatepresentationandisthe
meansoffinalrelease,scripturemakesafurtherdetermination,viz.in
thepassageKa.Up.I,2,23,'ThatSelfcannotbegainedbythestudy
oftheVeda("reflection"),norbythought("meditation"),norbymuch
hearing.WhomtheSelfchooses,byhimitmaybegained;tohimtheSelf
revealsitsbeing.'Thistextsaysatfirstthatmerehearing,
reflection,andmeditationdonotsufficetogaintheSelf,andthen
declares,'WhomtheSelfchooses,byhimitmaybegained.'Nowa
'chosen'onemeansamostbelovedperson;therelationbeingthatheby
whomthatSelfisheldmostdearismostdeartotheSelf.ThattheLord
(bhagavan)himselfendeavoursthatthismostbelovedpersonshouldgain
theSelf,hehimselfdeclaresinthefollowingwords,'Tothosewhoare
constantlydevotedandworshipwithloveIgivethatknowledgebywhich
theyreachme'(Bha.Gi.X,10),and'TohimwhohasknowledgeIamdear
aboveallthings,andheisdeartome'(VII,17).Hence,hewho
possessesremembrance,markedbythecharacterofimmediatepresentation
(sakshatkara),andwhichitselfisdearaboveallthingssincethe
objectrememberedissuch;he,wesay,ischosenbythehighestSelf,
andbyhimthehighestSelfisgained.Steadyremembranceofthiskind
isdesignatedbytheword'devotion'(bhakti);forthistermhasthe
samemeaningasupasana(meditation).Forthisreasonscriptureand
smritiagreeinmakingthefollowingdeclarations,'Amanknowinghim
passesoverdeath'(Svet.Up.III,8);'Knowinghimthusheherebecomes
immortal'(Taitt.Ar.III,12,7);'NeitherbytheVedas,norby
austerities,norbygifts,norbysacrificecanIbesoseenasthou
hastseenme.ButbydevotionexclusiveImayinthisformbeknownand
seenintruth,OArjuna,andalsobeenteredinto'(Bha.Gi.XI,53,54);
'ThathighestPerson,OPartha,maybeobtainedbyexclusivedevotion'
(VIII,22).
Thatofsuchsteadyremembrancesacrificesandsoonaremeanswillbe
declaredlateron(Ve.Su.III,4,26).Althoughsacrificesandthelike
areenjoinedwithaviewtotheoriginationofknowledge(inaccordance
withthepassage'Theydesiretoknow,'Bri.Up.IV,4,22),itisonly
knowledgeintheformofmeditationwhichbeingdailypractised,
constantlyimprovedbyrepetition,andcontinueduptodeathisthe
meansofreachingBrahman,andhencealltheworksconnectedwiththe
differentconditionsoflifearetobeperformedthroughoutlifeonly
forthepurposeoforiginatingsuchknowledge.ThistheSutrakara
declaresinVe.Su.IV,1,12;16;III,4,33,andotherplaces.The
Vakyakaraalsodeclaresthatsteadyremembranceresultsonlyfrom
abstention,andsoon;hiswordsbeing'This(viz.steadyremembrance=
meditation)isobtainedthroughabstention(viveka),freenessofmind
(vimoka),repetition(abhyasa),works(kriya),virtuousconduct
(kalyana),freedomfromdejection(anavasada),absenceofexultation
(anuddharsha);accordingtofeasibilityandscripturalstatement.'The
Vakyakaraalsogivesdefinitionsofalltheseterms.Abstention(viveka)
meanskeepingthebodycleanfromallfood,impureeitherowingto
species(suchasthefleshofcertainanimals),orabode(suchasfood
belongingtoaKandalaorthelike),oraccidentalcause(suchasfood
intowhichahairorthelikehasfallen).Thescripturalpassage
authorisingthispointisCh.Up.VII,26,'Thefoodbeingpure,the
mindbecomespure;themindbeingpure,thereresultssteadyremembrance.'
Freenessofmind(vimoka)meansabsenceofattachmenttodesires.The
authoritativepassagehereis'Lethimmeditatewithacalmmind'(Ch.
Up.III,14,1).Repetitionmeanscontinuedpractice.Forthispointthe
BhashyakaraquotesanauthoritativetextfromSmriti,viz.:'Having
constantlybeenabsorbedinthethoughtofthatbeing'(sada
tadbhavabhavitah;Bha.Gi.VIII,6).By'works'(kriya)isunderstood
theperformance,accordingtoone'sability,ofthefivegreat
sacrifices.Theauthoritativepassageshereare'Thispersonwho
performsworksisthebestofthosewhoknowBrahman'(Mu.Up.III,1,
4);and'HimBrahmanasseektoknowbyrecitationoftheVeda,by
sacrifice,bygifts,bypenance,byfasting'(Bri.Up.IV,4,22).By
virtuousconduct(kalyanani)aremeanttruthfulness,honesty,kindness,
liberality,gentleness,absenceofcovetousness.Confirmatorytextsare
'Bytruthheistobeobtained'(Mu.Up.III,1,5)and'tothembelongs
thatpureBrahmanworld'(Pr.Up.I,16).Thatlownessofspiritor
wantofcheerfulnesswhichresultsfromunfavourableconditionsofplace
ortimeandtheremembranceofcausesofsorrow,isdenotedbytheterm
'dejection';thecontraryofthisis'freedomfromdejection.'The
relevantscripturalpassageis'ThisSelfcannotbeobtainedbyone
lackinginstrength'(Mu.Up.III,2,4).'Exultation'isthat
satisfactionofmindwhichspringsfromcircumstancesoppositetothose
justmentioned;thecontraryis'absenceofexultation.'Overgreat
satisfactionalsostandsintheway(ofmeditation).Thescriptural
passageforthisis'Calm,subdued,'&c.(Bri.Up.IV,4,23).Whatthe
Vakyakarameanstosayisthereforethatknowledgeisrealisedonly
throughtheperformanceofthedulyprescribedworks,onthepartofa
personfulfillingalltheenumeratedconditions.
Analogouslyanotherscripturalpassagesays'Hewhoknowsbothknowledge
andnonknowledgetogether,overcomingdeathbynonknowledgereaches
theImmortalthroughknowledge'(Is.Up.II).Heretheterm
'nonknowledge'denotestheworksenjoinedonthedifferentcastesand
asramas;andthemeaningofthetextisthat,havingdiscardedbysuch
worksdeath,i.e.thepreviousworksantagonistictotheoriginationof
knowledge,amanreachestheImmortal,i.e.Brahman,throughknowledge.
Thenonknowledgeofwhichthispassagespeaksasbeingthemeansof
overcomingdeathcanonlymeanthatwhichisotherthanknowledge,viz.
prescribedworks.Thewordhasthesamesenseinthefollowingpassage:
'Firmintraditionalknowledgeheofferedmanysacrifices,leaningon
theknowledgeofBrahman,soastopassbeyonddeathbynonknowledge'
(Vi.Pu.VI,6,12).Antagonistictoknowledge(assaidabove)areall
goodandevilactions,andhenceasequallygivingrisetoan
undesirableresulttheymaybothbedesignatedasevil.Theystandin
thewayoftheoriginationofknowledgeinsofarastheystrengthenthe
elementsofpassionanddarknesswhichareantagonistictotheelement
ofgoodnesswhichisthecauseoftheriseofknowledge.Thatevilworks
standinthewayofsuchorigination,thefollowingscripturaltext
declares:'Hemakeshimwhomhewishestoleaddownfromtheseworldsdo
anevildeed'(Ka.Up.III,8).Thatpassionanddarknessveilthe
knowledgeoftruthwhilegoodnessontheotherhandgivesrisetoit,
theDivineonehasdeclaredhimself,inthepassage'Fromgoodness
springsknowledge'(Bha.Gi.XIV,17).Hence,inorderthatknowledge
mayarise,evilworkshavetobegotridof,andthisiseffectedbythe
performanceofactsofreligiousdutynotaimingatsomeimmediate
result(suchastheheavenlyworldandthelike);accordingtothetext
'byworksofreligiousdutyhediscardsallevil.'Knowledgewhichis
themeansofreachingBrahman,thusrequirestheworksprescribedfor
thedifferentasramas;andhencethesystematicenquiryintoworks(i.
e.thePurvaMimamsa)fromwhichweascertainthenatureoftheworks
requiredandalsothetransitorinessandlimitationofthefruitsof
mereworksformsanecessaryantecedenttothesystematicenquiryinto
Brahman.Moreoverthediscriminationofpermanentandnonpermanent
things,&c.(i.e.thetetradof'means'mentionedabove,p.11)cannot
beaccomplishedwithoutthestudyoftheMimamsa;forunlesswe
ascertainallthedistinctionsoffruitsofworks,means,modesof
procedureandqualification(onthepartoftheagent)wecanhardly
understandthetruenatureofworks,theirfruits,thetransitorinessor
nontransitorinessofthelatter,thepermanenceoftheSelf,and
similarmatters.Thatthoseconditions(viz.nityanityavastuviveka,
sama,dama,&c.)are'means'mustbedeterminedonthebasisofviniyoga
('application'whichdeterminestherelationofprincipaland
subordinatemattersanginandanga);andthisviniyogawhichdependson
directscripturalstatement(sruti),inferentialsigns(linga),andso
on,istreatedofinthethirdbookofthePurvaMimamsasutras.And
furtherwemust,inthisconnexion,consideralsothemeditationsonthe
Udgithaandsimilarthingswhich,althoughaimingatthesuccessof
works,areofthenatureofreflectionsonBrahman(whichisviewedin
themundervariousforms)andassuchhavereferencetoknowledgeof
Brahman.Thoseworksalso(withwhichthesemeditationsareconnected)
aimatnospecialresultsoftheirown,andproduceandhelptoperfect
theknowledgeofBrahman:theyarethereforeparticularlyconnectedwith
theenquiryintoBrahman.Andthatthesemeditationspresupposean
understandingofthenatureofworksisadmittedbyeveryone.
THEGREATPURVAPAKSHA.
THEONLYREALITYISBRAHMAN.
Brahman,whichispureintelligenceandopposedtoalldifference,
constitutestheonlyreality;andeverythingelse,i.e.thepluralityof
manifoldknowingsubjects,objectsofknowledge,andactsofknowledge
dependingonthosetwo,isonlyimaginedon(or'in')thatBrahman,and
isessentiallyfalse.
'Inthebeginning,mydear,therewasthatonlywhichis,oneonly
withoutasecond'(Ch.Up.VI,2,1);'Thehigherknowledgeisthatby
whichtheIndestructibleisapprehended'(Mu.Up.I,1,5);'Thatwhich
cannotbeseennorseized,whichhasnoeyesnorears,nohandsnorfeet,
thepermanent,theallpervading,themostsubtle,theimperishable
whichthewiseregardasthesourceofallbeings'(Mu.Up.I,1,6);
'TheTrue,knowledge,theInfiniteisBrahman'(Taitt.Up.II,1);'He
whoiswithoutparts,withoutactions,tranquil,withoutfault,without
taint'(Svet.Up.VI,19);'Bywhomitisnotthought,byhimitis
thought;hebywhomitisthoughtknowsitnot.Itisnotknownbythose
whoknowit,knownbythosewhodonotknowit'(Ke.Up.II,3);'Thou
mayestnotseetheseerofsight;thoumayestnotthinkthethinkerof
thought'(Bri.Up.III,4,2);'BlissisBrahman'(Taitt.Up.III,6,1);
'AllthisisthatSelf'(Bri.Up.IV,5,7);'Thereisherenodiversity
whatever'(Bri.Up.IV,4,19);'Fromdeathtodeathgoeshewhosees
anydifferencehere'(Ka.Up.II,4,10);'Forwherethereisdualityas
itwere,thereoneseestheother';'butwheretheSelfhasbecomeall
ofhim,bywhatmeans,andwhom,shouldhesee?bywhatmeans,andwhom,
shouldheknow?'(Bri.Up.IV,5,15);'theeffectisanamemerely
whichhasitsorigininspeech;thetruthisthat(thethingmadeof
clay)isclaymerely'(Ch.Up.VI,1,4);'forifhemakesbutthe
smallestdistinctioninitthereisfearforhim'(Taitt.Up.II,7);
thetwofollowingVedantasutras:III,2,11;III,2,3thefollowing
passagesfromtheVishnupurana:'Inwhichalldifferencevanishes,
whichispureBeing,whichisnottheobjectofwords,whichisknownby
theSelfonlythatknowledgeiscalledBrahman'(VI,7,53);'Himwhose
essentialnatureisknowledge,whoisstainlessinreality';'Himwho,
owingtoerroneousview,abidesintheformofthings'(I,2,6);'the
Realitythouartalone,thereisnoother,OLordoftheworld!
whatevermatterisseenbelongstotheewhosebeingisknowledge;but
owingtotheirerroneousopinionthenondevoutlookonitastheform
oftheworld.Thiswholeworldhasknowledgeforitsessentialnature,
buttheUnwiseviewingitasbeingofthenatureofmaterialthingsare
drivenroundontheoceanofdelusion.Thosehoweverwhopossesstrue
knowledgeandpuremindsseethiswholeworldashavingknowledgefor
itsSelf,asthyform,OhighestLord!'(Vi.Pu.I,4,38ff.).'Of
thatSelf,althoughitexistsinone'sownandinotherbodies,the
knowledgeisofonekind,andthatisReality;thosewhomaintain
dualityholdafalseview'(II,14,31);'Ifthereissomeotherone,
differentfromme,thenitcanbesaid,"Iamthisandthatoneis
another"'(II,13,86);'Asowingtothedifferenceoftheholesofthe
flutetheairequallypassingthroughthemalliscalledbythenamesof
thedifferentnotesofthemusicalscale;soitiswiththeuniversal
Self'(II,14,32);'HeisI;heisthou;heisall:thisUniverseis
hisform.Abandontheerrorofdifference.Thekingbeingthus
instructed,abandonedtheviewofdifference,havinggainedanintuition
ofReality'(II,16,24).'Whenthatviewwhichgivesrisetodifference
isabsolutelydestroyed,whothenwillmaketheuntruedistinction
betweentheindividualSelfandBrahman?'(VI,7,94).Thefollowing
passagesfromtheBhagavadGita:'IamtheSelfdwellingwithinall
beings'(X,20);'Knowmetobethesoulwithinallbodies'(XIII,2);
'Beingthereisnone,movableorimmovable,whichiswithoutme'(X,39).
Alltheseandothertexts,thepurportofwhichclearlyisinstruction
astotheessentialnatureofthings,declarethatBrahmanonly,i.e.
nondifferencedpureintelligenceisreal,whileeverythingelseis
false.
Theappearanceofpluralityisduetoavidya.
'Falsehood'(mithyatva)belongstowhatadmitsofbeingterminatedby
thecognitionoftherealthingsuchcognitionbeingprecededby
consciousactivity(notbymereabsenceofconsciousnessorknowledge).
Thesnake,e.g.whichhasforitssubstratearopeorthelikeisfalse;
foritisduetoanimperfection(dosha)thatthesnakeisimaginedin
(or'on')therope.Inthesamewaythisentireworld,withits
distinctionsofgods,men,animals,inanimatematter,andsoon,is,
owingtoanimperfection,wronglyimaginedinthehighestBrahmanwhose
substanceismereintelligence,andthereforeisfalseinsofarasit
maybesublatedbythecognitionofthenatureoftherealBrahman.What
constitutesthatimperfectionisbeginninglessNescience(avidya),which,
hidingthetruthofthings,givesrisetomanifoldillusions,andcannot
bedefinedeitherassomethingthatisorassomethingthatisnot.'By
theUntruetheyarehidden;ofthemwhicharetruetheUntrueisthe
covering'(Ch,Up.VIII,3,1);'KnowMayatobePrakriti,andthegreat
LordhimwhoisassociatedwithMaya'(Svet.Up.IV,10);'Indraappears
manifoldthroughtheMayas'(Bri.Up.II,5,19);'MyMayaishardto
overcome'(Bha.Gi.VII,14);'Whenthesoulslumberinginbeginningless
Mayaawakes'(Gau.Ka.I,16).Theseandsimilartextsteachthatitis
throughbeginninglessMayathattoBrahmanwhichtrulyispure
nondifferencedintelligenceitsownnaturehidesitself,andthatit
seesdiversitywithinitself.Ashasbeensaid,'BecausetheHolyOneis
essentiallyofthenatureofintelligence,theformofall,butnot
material;thereforeknowthatallparticularthingslikerocks,oceans,
hillsandsoon,haveproceededfromintelligence[FOOTNOTE22:1]But
when,onthecessationofallwork,everythingisonlypureintelligence
initsownproperform,withoutanyimperfections;thennodifferences
thefruitofthetreeofwishesanylongerexistbetweenthings.
Thereforenothingwhatever,atanyplaceoranytime,existsapartfrom
intelligence:intelligence,whichisoneonly,isviewedasmanifoldby
thosewhosemindsaredistractedbytheeffectsoftheirownworks.
Intelligencepure,freefromstain,freefromgrief,freefromall
contactwithdesireandotheraffections,everlastinglyoneisthe
highestLordVasudevaapartfromwhomnothingexists.Ihavethus
declaredtoyouthelastingtruthofthingsthatintelligenceonlyis
trueandeverythingelseuntrue.Andthatalsowhichisthecauseof
ordinaryworldlyexistencehasbeendeclaredtoyou'(Vi.Pu.II,12,
39,40,4345).
AvidyaisputanendtobytrueKnowledge.
OthertextsdeclarethatthisNesciencecomestoanendthroughthe
cognitionoftheessentialunityoftheSelfwithBrahmanwhichis
nothingbutnondifferencedintelligence.'Hedoesnotagaingotodeath;'
'Heseesthisasone;''Hewhoseesthisdoesnotseedeath'(Ch.Up.
VI,27);'Whenhefindsfreedomfromfearandrestinthatwhichis
invisible,incorporeal,undefined,unsupported,thenhehasobtainedthe
fearless'(Taitt.Up.II,7);'Thefetteroftheheartisbroken,all
doubtsaresolvedandallhisworksperishwhenhehasbeenbeheldwho
ishighandlow'(Mu.Up.II,2,8);'HeknowsBrahman,hebecomes
Brahmanonly'(Mu.Up.III,2,9);'Knowinghimonlyamanpassesover
death;thereisnootherpathtogo'(Svet.Up.III,8).Intheseand
similarpassages,theterm'death'denotesNescience;analogouslytothe
useoftheterminthefollowingwordsofSanatsujata,'DelusionIcall
death;andfreedomfromdelusionIcallimmortality'(Sanatsuj.II,5).
TheknowledgeagainoftheessentialunityandnondifferenceofBrahman
whichisascertainedfromdecisivetextssuchas'TheTrue,knowledge,
theInfiniteisBrahman'(Taitt.Up.II,1);'Knowledge,blissis
Brahman'(Bri.Up.III,9,28)isconfirmedbyotherpassages,suchas
'Nowifamanmeditatesonanotherdeity,thinkingthedeityisoneand
heanother,hedoesnotknow'(Bri.Up.I,4,10);'Letmenmeditate
uponhimastheSelf(Bri.Up.I,4,7);'Thouartthat'(Ch.Up.VI,8,
7);'AmIthou,Oholydeity?andartthoume,Oholydeity?';'WhatI
amthatishe;whatheisthatamI.'ThistheSutrakarahimselfwill
declare'ButastheSelf(scripturaltexts)acknowledgeandmakeus
apprehend(theLord)'(Ve.Su.IV,1,3).ThustheVakyakaraalso,'It
istheSelfthusoneshouldapprehend(everything),foreverythingis
effectedbythat.'Andtoholdthatbysuchcognitionoftheonenessof
Brahmanessentiallyfalsebondage,togetherwithitscause,comestoan
end,isonlyreasonable.
ScriptureisofgreaterforcethanPerception
But,anobjectionisraisedhowcanknowledge,springingfromthe
sacredtexts,bringaboutacessationoftheviewofdifference,in
manifestoppositiontotheevidenceofPerception?Howthen,werejoin,
cantheknowledgethatthisthingisaropeandnotasnakebringabout,
inoppositiontoactualperception,thecessationofthe(ideaofthe)
snake?Youwillperhapsreplythatinthislattercasethereisa
conflictbetweentwoformsofperception,whileinthecaseunder
discussiontheconflictisbetweendirectperceptionandScripturewhich
isbasedonperception.Butagainstthiswewouldaskthequestionhow,
inthecaseofaconflictbetweentwoequalcognitions,wedecideasto
whichofthetwoisrefuted(sublated)bytheother.Ifasistobe
expectedyoureplythatwhatmakesthedifferencebetweenthetwois
thatoneofthemisduetoadefectivecausewhiletheotherisnot:we
pointoutthatthisdistinctionholdsgoodalsointhecaseofScripture
andperceptionbeinginconflict.Itisnotconsiderationsastothe
equalityofconflictingcognitions,astotheirbeingdependentor
independent,andsoon,thatdeterminewhichofthetwosublatesthe
other;ifthatwerethecase,theperceptionwhichpresentstousthe
flameofthelampasoneonlywouldnotbesublatedbythecognition
arrivedatbyinferencethatthereisasuccessionofdifferentflames.
Whereverthereisaconflictbetweencognitionsbasedontwodifferent
meansofknowledgeweassignthepositionofthe'sublatedone'tothat
whichadmitsofbeingaccountedforinsomeotherway;whilethat
cognitionwhichaffordsnoopeningforbeingheldunauthoritativeand
cannotbeaccountedforinanotherway,isthe'sublatingone[FOOTNOTE
25:1].'Thisistheprincipleonwhichtherelationbetween'what
sublates'and'whatissublated'isdecidedeverywhere.Nowapprehension
ofBrahmanwhichismereintelligence,eternal,pure,free,
selfluminousiseffectedbyScripturewhichrestsonendlessunbroken
tradition,cannotthereforebesuspectedofany,eventheleast,
imperfection,andhencecannotbenonauthoritative;thestateof
bondage,ontheotherhand,withitsmanifolddistinctionsisprovedby
Perception,Inference,andsoon,whicharecapableofimperfectionsand
thereforemaybenonauthoritative.Itisthereforereasonableto
concludethatthestateofbondageisputanendtobytheapprehension
ofBrahman.AndthatimperfectionofwhichPerceptionthroughwhichwe
apprehendaworldofmanifolddistinctionsmaybeassumedtobe
capable,issocalledNescience,whichconsistsinthebeginningless
wrongimaginationofdifference.Wellthenafurtherobjectionis
raisedletusadmitthatScriptureisperfectbecauserestingonan
endlessunbrokentradition;butmustwethennotadmitthattexts
evidentlypresupposingtheviewofduality,ase.g.'Lethimwhodesires
theheavenlyworldoffertheJyotishtomasacrifice'areliableto
refutation?True,wereply.AsinthecaseoftheUdgatriand
Pratihartribreakingthechain(notatthesametime,but)in
succession[FOOTNOTE26:1],soherealsotheearliertexts(whichrefer
todualityandtransitoryrewards)aresublatedbythelatertextswhich
teachfinalrelease,andarenotthemselvessublatedbyanythingelse.
ThetextswhichrepresentBrahmanasdevoidofqualitieshavegreater
force
ThesamereasoningappliestothosepassagesintheVedantatextswhich
inculcatemeditationonthequalifiedBrahman,sincethehighestBrahman
iswithoutanyqualities.Butconsidersuchpassagesas'Hewho
cognisesall,whoknowsall'(Mu.Up.I,1,9);'Hishighpoweris
revealedasmanifold,asessential,actingasforceandknowledge'(Svet.
Up.VI,8);'Hewhosewishesaretrue,whosepurposesaretrue'(Ch.Up.
VIII,1,5);howcanthesepassages,whichclearlyaimatdefiningthe
natureofBrahman,beliabletorefutation?Owingtothegreaterweight,
wereply,ofthosetextswhichsetforthBrahmanasdevoidofqualities.
'Itisnotcoarse,notfine,notshort,notlong'(Bri.Up.III,8,8);
'TheTrue,knowledge,infiniteisBrahman'(Taitt.Up.II,1);'That
whichisfreefromqualities,''thatwhichisfreefromstain'these
andsimilartextsconveythenotionofBrahmanbeingchangeless,eternal
intelligencedevoidofalldifference;whiletheothertextsquoted
beforeteachthequalifiedBrahman.Andtherebeingaconflictbetween
thetwosetsofpassages,weaccordingtotheMimamsaprinciple
referredtoabovedecidethatthetextsreferringtoBrahmanasdevoid
ofqualitiesareofgreaterforce,becausetheyarelaterinorder
[FOOTNOTE27:1]thanthosewhichspeakofBrahmanashavingqualities.
Thuseverythingissettled.ThetextTaitt.Up.II,1referstoBrahman
asdevoidofqualities.
Butanobjectionisraisedeventhepassage'TheTrue,knowledge,
infiniteisBrahman'intimatescertainqualitiesofBrahman,viz.true
being,knowledge,infinity!Notso,wereply.Fromthecircumstance
thatallthetermsofthesentencestandincoordination,itfollows
thattheyconveytheideaofonematter(sense)only.Ifagainstthis
youurgethatthesentencemayconveytheideaofonematteronly,even
ifdirectlyexpressingathingdistinguishedbyseveralqualities;we
mustremarkthatyoudisplayanignoranceofthemeaningoflanguage
whichappearstopointtosomeweakmindednessonyourpart.Asentence
conveystheideaofonematter(sense)onlywhenallitsconstitutive
wordsdenoteoneandthesamething;if,ontheotherhand,itexpresses
athingpossessingseveralattributes,thedifferenceofthese
attributesnecessarilyleadstoadifferenceinmeaningonthepartof
theindividualwords,andthentheonenessofmeaningofthesentenceis
lost.Butfromyourviewofthepassageitwouldfollowthatthe
severalwordsaremeresynonyms!Giveusyourattention,wereply,and
learnthatseveralwordsmayconveyonemeaningwithoutbeingidle
synonyms.Fromthedeterminationoftheunityofpurportofthewhole
sentence[FOOTNOTE27:2]weconcludethattheseveralwords,appliedto
onething,aimatexpressingwhatisoppositeinnaturetowhateveris
contrarytothemeaningsoftheseveralwords,andthatthustheyhave
meaningandunityofmeaningandyetarenotmeresynonyms.Thedetails
areasfollows.Brahmanistobedefinedaswhatiscontraryinnature
toallotherthings.NowwhateverisopposedtoBrahmanisvirtuallyset
asidebythethreewords(constitutingthedefinitionofBrahmaninthe
Taittiriyatext).Theword'true'(or'trulybeing')hasthepurportof
distinguishingBrahmanfromwhateverthingshavenotruth,asbeingthe
abodesofchange;theword'knowledge'distinguishesBrahmanfromall
nonsentientthingswhoselightdependsonsomethingelse(whicharenot
selfluminous);andtheword'infinite'distinguishesitfromwhatever
islimitedintimeorspaceornature.Noristhis'distinction'some
positiveornegativeattributeofBrahman,itratherisjustBrahman
itselfasopposedtoeverythingelse;justasthedistinctionofwhite
colourfromblackandothercoloursisjustthetruenatureofwhite,
notanattributeofit.Thethreewordsconstitutingthetextthus_have_
ameaning,have_one_meaning,andarenonsynonymous,insofarasthey
conveytheessentialdistinctionofonething,viz.Brahmanfrom
everythingelse.ThetextthusdeclarestheoneBrahmanwhichis
selfluminousandfreefromalldifference.Onthisinterpretationof
thetextwediscernitsonenessinpurportwithothertexts,suchas
'Beingonlythiswasinthebeginning,oneonly,withoutasecond.'
Textssuchas'Thatfromwhencethesebeingsareborn'(Taitt.Up.III,
1);'Beingonlythiswasinthebeginning'(Ch.Up.VI,2,1);'Self
alonewasthisinthebeginning'(Bri.Up.I,4,1),&c.,describe
Brahmanasthecauseoftheworld;andofthisBrahmantheTaittiriya
passage'TheTrue,knowledge,infiniteisBrahman'givesthestrict
definition.
Inagreementwiththeprinciplethatallsakhasteachthesamedoctrine
wehavetounderstandthat,inallthetextswhichspeakofBrahmanas
cause,Brahmanmustbetakenasbeing'withoutasecond',i.e.without
anyotherbeingofthesameoradifferentkind;andthetextwhichaims
atdefiningBrahmanhasthentobeinterpretedinaccordancewiththis
characteristicofBrahman,viz.itsbeingwithoutasecond.The
statementoftheChandogyaastoBrahmanbeingwithoutasecondmust
alsobetakentoimplythatBrahmanisnondualasfarasqualitiesare
concerned;otherwiseitwouldconflictwiththosepassageswhichspeak
ofBrahmanasbeingwithoutqualitiesandwithoutstain.Wetherefore
concludethatthedefiningTaittiriyatextteachesBrahmantobean
absolutelyhomogeneoussubstance.
But,theaboveexplanationofthepassagebeingaccepted,itfollows
thatthewords'truebeing,''knowledge,'&c.,havetobeviewedas
abandoningtheirdirectsense,andmerelysuggestingathingdistinctin
naturefromallthatisopposite(towhatthethreewordsdirectly
denote),andthismeansthatweresorttosocalledimplication(implied
meaning,lakshana)!Whatobjectionistheretosuchaproceeding?we
reply.Theforceofthegeneralpurportofasentenceisgreaterthan
thatofthedirectdenotativepowerofthesimpleterms,anditis
generallyadmittedthatthepurportofgrammaticalcoordinationis
oneness(ofthematterdenotedbythetermscoordinated).Butwenever
observethatallwordsofasentencearetobeunderstoodinanimplied
sense!Isitthennotobserved,wereply,that_one_wordistobe
takeninitsimpliedmeaningifotherwiseitwouldcontradictthe
purportofthewholesentence?Andifthepurportofthesentence,which
isnothingbutanaggregateofwordsemployedtogether,hasoncebeen
ascertained,whyshouldwenottaketwoorthreeorallwordsinan
impliedsensejustaswehadtakenoneandthusmakethemfitinwith
thegeneralpurport?Inagreementherewiththosescholarswhoexplainto
usthesenseofimperativesentences,teachthatinimperativesentences
belongingtoordinaryspeechallwordshaveanimpliedmeaningonly(not
theirdirectlydenotativemeaning).For,theymaintain,imperativeforms
havetheirprimarymeaningonlyin(Vedic)sentenceswhichenjoin
somethingnotestablishedbyothermeans;andhenceinordinaryspeech
theeffectoftheactionisconveyedbyimplicationonly.Theother
wordsalso,whichformpartofthoseimperativesentencesanddenote
mattersconnectedwiththeaction,havetheirprimarymeaningonlyif
connectedwithanactionnotestablishedbyothermeans;whileif
connectedwithanordinaryactiontheyhaveasecondary,implied,
meaningonly[FOOTNOTE30:1].Perceptionrevealstousnondifferenced
substanceonly
WehavesofarshownthatinthecaseofaconflictbetweenScripture
andPerceptionandtheotherinstrumentsofknowledge,Scriptureisof
greaterforce.Thefact,however,isthatnosuchconflictisobserved
toexist,sincePerceptionitselfgivesrisetotheapprehensionofa
nondifferencedBrahmanwhosenatureispureBeing.Buthowcanitbe
saidthatPerception,whichhasforitsobjectthingsofvariouskinds
andaccordinglyexpressesitselfinjudgmentssuchas'Hereisajar,'
'Thereisapieceofcloth'causestheapprehensionofmereBeing?If
therewerenoapprehensionofdifference,allcognitionswouldhaveone
andthesameobject,andthereforewouldgiverisetoonejudgmentonly
astakesplacewhenoneunbrokenperceptionalcognitioniscontinuedfor
sometime.True.Wethereforehavetoenquireinwhatway,inthe
judgment'hereisajar,'anassertionismadeaboutbeingaswellas
somespecialformofbeing.Theseimpliedjudgmentscannotbothbe
foundedonperception,fortheyaretheresultsofactsofcognition
occupyingdifferentmomentsoftime,whiletheperceptionalcognition
takesplaceinonemoment(isinstantaneous).Wethereforemustdecide
whetheritistheessentialnatureofthejar,oritsdifferencefrom
otherthings,thatistheobjectofperception.Andwemustadoptthe
formeralternative,becausetheapprehensionofdifferencepresupposes
theapprehensionoftheessentialnatureofthething,and,inaddition,
theremembranceofitscounterentities(i.e.thethingsfromwhichthe
giventhingdiffers).HencedifferenceisnotapprehendedbyPerception;
andalljudgmentsandpropositionsrelativetodifferencearefoundedon
erroronly.
Differencebhedadoesnotadmitoflogicaldefinition
TheLogicians,moreover,areunabletogiveadefinitionofsuchathing
as'difference.'Differencecannotinthefirstplacebetheessential
nature(ofthatwhichdiffers);forfromthatitwouldfollowthaton
theapprehensionoftheessentialnatureofathingtherewouldatonce
arisenotonlythejudgmentastothatessentialnaturebutalso
judgmentsastoitsdifferencefromeverythingelse.But,itmaybe
objectedtothis,evenwhentheessentialnatureofathingis
apprehended,thejudgment'thisthingisdifferentfromotherthings'
dependsontheremembranceofitscounterentities,andaslongasthis
remembrancedoesnottakeplacesolongthejudgmentofdifferenceis
notformed!Suchreasoning,wereply,isinadmissible.Hewhomaintains
that'difference'isnothingbut'essentialnature'hasnorightto
assumeadependenceoncounterentitiessince,accordingtohim,
essentialnatureanddifferencearethesame,i.e.nothingbutessential
nature:thejudgmentofdifferencecan,onhisview,dependon
counterentitiesnomorethanthejudgmentofessentialnaturedoes.His
viewreallyimpliesthatthetwowords'thejar'and'different'(inthe
judgment'thejarisdifferent')aresynonymous,justasthewords
'hasta'and'kara'are(bothofwhichmean'hand').
Nor,inthesecondplace,can'difference'beheldtobeanattribute
(dharma).Forifitwerethat,weshouldhavetoassumethat
'difference'possessesdifference(i.e.isdifferent)fromessential
nature;forotherwiseitwouldbethesameasthelatter.Andthis
latterdifferencewouldhavetobeviewedasanattributeofthefirst
difference,andthiswouldleadusontoathirddifference,andsoin
infinitum.Andtheviewof'difference'beinganattributewouldfurther
implythatdifferenceisapprehendedontheapprehensionofathing
distinguishedbyattributessuchasgenericcharacterandsoon,andat
thesametimethatthethingthusdistinguishedisapprehendedonthe
apprehensionofdifference;andthiswouldconstitutealogicalseesaw.
'Difference'thusshowingitselfincapableoflogicaldefinition,weare
confirmedinourviewthatperceptionrevealsmere'Being'only.
Moreover,itappearsthatinstatesofconsciousnesssuchas'Hereisa
jar,''Thereisapieceofcloth,''Thejarisperceived,''Thepieceof
clothisperceived,'thatwhichconstitutesthethingsisBeing
(existence;satta)andperception(or'consciousness';anubhuti).Andwe
observethatitispureBeingonlywhichpersistsinallstatesof
cognition:thispureBeingalone,therefore,is_real_.Thedifferences,
ontheotherhand,whichdonotpersist,areunreal.Thecaseis
analogoustothatofthesnakerope.Theropewhichpersistsasa
substrateisreal,whilethenoncontinuousthings(whichbywrong
imaginationaresuperimposedontherope)suchasasnake,acleftin
theground,awatercourse,andsoon,areunreal.
Butouradversaryobjectstheinstanceisnottrulyanalogous.Inthe
caseofthesnakeropethenonrealityofthesnakeresultsfromthe
snake'sbeingsublated(badhita)bythecognitionofthetruenatureof
thesubstrate'Thisisarope,notasnake';itdoesnotresultfromthe
noncontinuousnessofthesnake.Inthesamewaytherealityoftherope
doesnotfollowfromitspersistence,butfromthefactofitsbeingnot
sublated(byanothercognition).Butwhat,weask,establishesthe
nonrealityofjarsandpiecesofcloth?Allareagreed,wereply,that
weobserve,injarsandsimilarthings,individualdifference
(vyavritti,literally'separation,''distinction').Thepointtodecide
isofwhatnaturesuchdifferenceis.Doesitnotmeanthatthejudgment
'Thisisajar'impliesthenegationofpiecesofclothandother
things?Butthismeansthatbythisjudgmentpiecesofclothandother
thingsaresublated(badhita).Individualdifference(vyavritti)thus
meansthecessation(orabsence),duetosublation,ofcertainobjects
ofcognition,anditprovesthenonrealityofwhateverhas
noncontinuousexistence;whileontheotherhand,pureBeing,likethe
rope,persistsnonsublated.Henceeverythingthatisadditionaltopure
Beingisnonreal.Thisadmitsofbeingexpressedintechnicalform.
'Being'isrealbecauseitpersists,asprovedbythecaseoftherope
inthesnakerope;jarsandsimilarthingsarenonrealbecausetheyare
noncontinuous,asprovedbythecaseofthesnakethathastheropefor
itssubstrate.
Fromallthisitfollowsthatpersistingconsciousnessonlyhasreal
being;italoneis.
Beingandconsciousnessareone.Consciousnessissvayamprakasa.
But,ouradversaryobjects,asmereBeingistheobjectofconsciousness,
itisdifferenttherefrom(andthusthereexistsafterall'difference'
or'plurality').Notso,wereply.Thatthereisnosuchthingas
'difference,'wehavealreadyshownaboveonthegroundsthatitisnot
theobjectofperception,andmoreoverincapableofdefinition.It
cannotthereforebeprovedthat'Being'istheobjectofconsciousness.
HenceConsciousnessitselfis'Being'thatwhichis.This
consciousnessisselfproved,justbecauseitisconsciousness.Wereit
provedthroughsomethingelse,itwouldfollowthatlikejarsand
similarthingsitisnotconsciousness.Norcantherebeassumed,for
consciousness,theneedofanotheractofconsciousness(throughwhich
itsknowledgewouldbeestablished);foritshinesforth(prakasate)
throughitsownbeing.Whileitexists,consciousnessdifferingtherein
fromjarsandthelikeisneverobservednottoshineforth,andit
cannotthereforebeheldtodepend,initsshiningforth,onsomething
else.You(whoobjecttotheabovereasoning)perhapsholdthe
followingview:evenwhenconsciousnesshasarisen,itistheobject
onlywhichshinesforthafactexpressedinsentencessuchas:thejar
isperceived.Whenapersonformsthejudgment'Thisisajar,'heis
notatthetimeconsciousofaconsciousnesswhichisnotanobjectand
isnotofadefinitecharacter.Hencetheexistenceofconsciousnessis
thereasonwhichbringsaboutthe'shiningforth'ofjarsandother
objects,andthushasasimilarofficeastheapproximationofthe
objecttotheeyeortheotherorgansofsense(whichisanother
conditionofperceptiveconsciousness).Afterthistheexistenceof
consciousnessisinferredonthegroundthattheshiningforthofthe
objectis(notpermanent,but)occasionalonly[FOOTNOTE34:1].And
shouldthisargumentationbeobjectedtoonthegroundofitsimplying
thatconsciousnesswhichisessentiallyofthenatureofintelligence
issomethingnonintelligentlikematerialthings,weaskyoutodefine
thisnegationofnonintelligence(whichyoudeclaretobe
characteristicofconsciousness).Havewe,perhaps,tounderstandbyit
theinvariableconcomitanceofexistenceandshiningforth?Ifso,we
pointoutthatthisinvariableconcomitanceisalsofoundinthecaseof
pleasureandsimilaraffections;forwhenpleasureandsoonexistat
all,theyneverarenonperceived(i.e.theyexistinsofaronlyaswe
areconsciousofthem).Itisthusclearthatwehavenoconsciousness
ofconsciousnessitselfjustasthetipofafinger,althoughtouching
otherthings,isincapableoftouchingitself.
Allthisreasoning,wereply,isentirelyspunoutofyourownfancy,
withoutanydueconsiderationofthepowerofconsciousness.Thefactis,
thatinperceivingcolourandotherqualitiesofthings,wearenot
awareofa'shiningforth'asanattributeofthosethings,andas
somethingdifferentfromconsciousness;norcantheassumptionofan
attributeofthingscalled'light,'or'shiningforth,'beprovedinany
way,sincetheentireempiricalworlditselfcanbeprovedonlythrough
consciousness,theexistenceofwhichwebothadmit.Consciousness,
therefore,isnotsomethingwhichisinferredorprovedthroughsome
otheractofknowledge;butwhileprovingeverythingelseitisproved
byitself.Thismaybeexpressedintechnicalformasfollows
Consciousnessis,withregardtoitsattributesandtotheempirical
judgmentsconcerningit,independentofanyotherthing,becausethrough
itsconnexionwithotherthingsitisthecauseoftheirattributesand
theempiricaljudgmentsconcerningthem.Foritisageneralprinciple
thatoftwothingsthatwhichthroughitsconnexionwiththeotheris
thecauseoftheattributesofandtheempiricaljudgmentsaboutthe
latter,isitselfindependentofthatotherastothosetwopoints.We
seee.g.thatcolour,throughitsconjunctionwithearthandthelike,
producesinthemthequalityofvisibility,butdoesnotitselfdepend
foritsvisibilityonconjunctionwithcolour.Henceconsciousnessis
itselfthecauseofitsown'shiningforth,'aswellasofthe
empiricallyobservedshiningforthofobjectssuchasjarsandthelike.
Consciousnessiseternalandincapableofchange.
Thisselfluminousconsciousness,further,iseternal,foritisnot
capableofanyformofnonexistencewhethersocalledantecedent
nonexistenceoranyotherform.Thisfollowsfromitsbeing
selfestablished.Fortheantecedentnonexistenceofselfestablished
consciousnesscannotbeapprehendedeitherthroughconsciousnessor
anythingelse.Ifconsciousnessitselfgaverisetotheapprehensionof
itsownnonexistence,itcouldnotdosoinsofaras'being,'forthat
wouldcontradictitsbeing;ifitis,i.e.ifitsnonexistenceisnot,
howcanitgiverisetotheideaofitsnonexistence?Norcanitdoso
ifnotbeing;forifconsciousnessitselfisnot,howcanitfurnisha
proofforitsownnonexistence?Norcanthenonexistenceof
consciousnessbeapprehendedthroughanythingelse;forconsciousness
cannotbetheobjectofanythingelse.Anyinstrumentofknowledge
provingthenonexistenceofconsciousness,coulddosoonlybymaking
consciousnessitsobject'thisisconsciousness';butconsciousness,as
beingselfestablished,doesnotadmitofthatobjectivationwhichis
impliedintheword'this,'andhenceitspreviousnonexistencecannot
beprovedbyanythinglyingoutsideitself.
Asconsciousnessthusdoesnotadmitofantecedentnonexistence,it
furthercannotbeheldtooriginate,andhencealsoallthoseother
statesofbeingwhichdependonoriginationcannotbepredicatedofit.
Asconsciousnessisbeginningless,itfurtherdoesnotadmitofany
pluralitywithinitself;forweobserveinthiscasethepresenceof
somethingwhichiscontrarytowhatinvariablyaccompaniesplurality
(thissomethingbeing'beginninglessness'whichiscontrarytothe
qualityofhavingabeginningwhichqualityinvariablyaccompanies
plurality).Forweneverobserveathingcharacterisedbypluralityto
bewithoutabeginning.Andmoreoverdifference,origination,&c.,are
objectsofconsciousness,likecolourandotherqualities,andhence
cannotbeattributesofconsciousness.Therefore,consciousnessbeing
essentiallyconsciousnessonly,nothingelsethatisanobjectof
consciousnesscanbeitsattribute.Theconclusionisthatconsciousness
isfreefromdifferenceofanykind.
TheapparentdifferencebetweenConsciousnessandtheconscioussubject
isduetotheunrealahamkara.
Fromthisitfurtherfollowsthatthereisnosubstrateof
consciousnessdifferentfromconsciousnessitselfsuchaspeople
ordinarilymeanwhenspeakingofa'knower.'Itisselfluminous
consciousnessitselfwhichconstitutesthesocalled'knower.'This
followstherefromalsothatconsciousnessisnotnonintelligent(jada);
fornonintelligenceinvariablyaccompaniesabsenceofSelfhood
(anatmatva);hence,nonintelligencebeingabsentinconsciousness,
consciousnessisnotnonSelf,thatmeans,itistheSelf.
But,ouradversaryagainobjects,theconsciousnesswhichexpresses
itselfinthejudgment'Iknow,'provesthatthequalityofbeinga
'knower'belongstoconsciousness!Bynomeans,wereply.The
attributiontoconsciousnessofthisqualityrestsonerror,noless
thantheattribution,totheshell,ofthequalityofbeingsilver.
Consciousnesscannotstandintherelationofanagenttowarditself:
theattributeofbeingaknowingagentiserroneouslyimputedtoitan
erroranalogoustothatexpressedinthejudgment'Iamaman,'which
identifiestheSelfofapersonwiththeoutwardaggregateofmatter
thatbearstheexternalcharacteristicsofhumanity.Tobea'knower'
meanstobetheagentintheactionofknowing;andthisissomething
essentiallychangefulandnonintelligent(jada),havingitsabodein
theahamkara,whichisitselfathingsubjecttochange.How,onthe
otherhand,couldsuchagencypossiblybelongtothechangeless
'witness'(ofallchange,i.e.consciousness)whosenatureispureBeing?
ThatagencycannotbeanattributeoftheSelffollowstherefromalso
that,likecolourandotherqualities,agencydepends,foritsownproof,
onseeing,i.e.consciousness.
ThattheSelfdoesnotfallwithinthesphere(isnotanobjectof),the
ideaof'I'isprovedtherebyalsothatindeepsleep,swoon,and
similarstates,theideaofthe'I'isabsent,whiletheconsciousness
oftheSelfpersists.Moreover,iftheSelfwereadmittedtobeanagent
andanobjectoftheideaof'I,'itwouldbedifficulttoavoidthe
conclusionthatlikethebodyitisnonintelligent,somethingmerely
outward('beingforothersonly,notforitself')anddestituteof
Selfhood.Thatfromthebody,whichistheobjectoftheideaof'I,'
andknowntobeanagent,thereisdifferentthatSelfwhichenjoysthe
resultsofthebody'sactions,viz.theheavenlyword,andsoon,is
acknowledgedbyallwhoadmitthevalidityoftheinstrumentsof
knowledge;analogously,therefore,wemustadmitthatdifferentfromthe
knowerwhomweunderstandbytheterm'I,'isthe'witnessing'inward
Self.Thenonintelligentahamkarathusmerelyservestomanifestthe
natureofnonchangingconsciousness,anditeffectsthisbybeingits
abode;foritistheproperqualityofmanifestingagentstomanifest
theobjectsmanifested,insofarasthelatterabideinthem.Amirror,
e.g.,orasheetofwater,oracertainmassofmatter,manifestsaface
orthediscofthemoon(reflectedinthemirrororwater)orthe
genericcharacterofacow(impressedonthemassofmatter)insofar
asallthosethingsabideinthem.Inthisway,then,therearisesthe
erroneousviewthatfindsexpressioninthejudgment'Iknow.'Normust
you,inthewayofobjection,raisethequestionhowselfluminous
consciousnessistobemanifestedbythenonintelligentahamkara,which
ratherisitselfmanifestedbyconsciousness;forweobservethatthe
surfaceofthehand,whichitselfismanifestedbytheraysofsunlight
fallingonit,atthesametimemanifeststhoserays.Thisisclearly
seeninthecaseofrayspassingthroughtheintersticesofnetwork;the
lightofthoseraysisintensifiedbythehandonwhichtheyfall,and
whichatthesametimeisitselfmanifestedbytherays.
Itthusappearsthatthe'knowingagent,'whoisdenotedbythe'I,'in
thejudgment'Iknow,'constitutesnorealattributeoftheSelf,the
natureofwhichispureintelligence.Thisisalsothereasonwhythe
consciousnessofEgoitydoesnotpersistinthestatesofdeepsleepand
finalrelease:inthosestatesthisspecialformofconsciousnesspasses
away,andtheSelfappearsinitstruenature,i.e.aspure
consciousness.Henceapersonwhohasrisenfromdeep,dreamlesssleep
reflects,'JustnowIwasunconsciousofmyself.'
Summingupofthepurvapakshaview.
Astheoutcomeofallthis,wesumupourviewasfollows.Eternal,
absolutelynonchangingconsciousness,whosenatureispure
nondifferencedintelligence,freefromalldistinctionwhatever,owing
toerrorillusorilymanifestsitself(vivarttate)asbrokenupinto
manifolddistinctionsknowingsubjects,objectsofknowledge,actsof
knowledge.Andthepurposeforwhichweenterontheconsiderationof
theVedantatextsisutterlytodestroywhatistherootofthaterror,
i.e.Nescience,andthustoobtainafirmknowledgeoftheonenessof
Brahman,whosenatureismereintelligencefree,pure,eternal.
[FOOTNOTE22:1.Inagreementwiththeusemadeofthispassagebythe
Purvapakshin,vijnanamustherebeunderstoodinthesenseofavidya.
Vijnanasabdenavividhamjnayatenenetikaranavyutpattyavidyabhidhiyate.
Sru.Pra.]
[FOOTNOTE25:1.Thedistinctionisillustratedbythedifferentviews
PerceptionandInferencecauseustotakeofthenatureoftheflameof
thelamp.ToPerceptiontheflame,aslongasitburns,seemsoneand
thesame:butonthegroundoftheobservationthatthedifferent
particlesofthewickandtheoilareconsumedinsuccession,weinfer
thattherearemanydistinctflamessucceedingoneanother.Andwe
accepttheInferenceasvalid,andassublatingorrefutingthe
immediateperception,becausetheperceivedonenessoftheflameadmits
ofbeingaccountedfor'otherwise,'viz.onthegroundofthemany
distinctflamesoriginatinginsuchrapidsuccessionthattheeye
mistakesthemforone.Theinferenceontheotherhanddoesnotadmitof
beingexplainedinanotherway.]
[FOOTNOTE26:1.ThereferenceistothepointdiscussedPu.Mi.Su.VI,
5,54(Jaim.Nya.MalaVistara,p.285).]
[FOOTNOTE27:1.ThetextswhichdenyallqualitiesofBrahmanarelater
inorderthanthetextswhichrefertoBrahmanasqualified,because
denialpresupposesthatwhichistobedenied.]
[FOOTNOTE27:2.Theunityofpurportofthesentenceisinferredfrom
itsconstituentwordshavingthesamecaseending.]
[FOOTNOTE30:1.Thetheoryherereferredtoisheldbysomeofthe
Mimamsakas.Theimperativeformsoftheverbhavetheirprimarymeaning,
i.e.thepoweroforiginatingaction,onlyinVedicsentenceswhich
enjointheperformanceofcertainactionsforthebringingaboutof
certainends:noothermeansofknowledgebuttheVedainformingusthat
suchendscanbeaccomplishedbysuchactions.Nobody,e.g.wouldoffer
asomasacrificeinordertoobtaintheheavenlyworld,werehenottold
bytheVedatodoso.Inordinarylife,ontheotherhand,noimperative
possessesthisentirelyuniqueoriginativeforce,sinceanyactionwhich
maybeperformedinconsequenceofacommandmaybepromptedbyother
motivesaswell:itis,intechnicalIndianlanguage,established
already,apartfromthecommand,byothermeansofknowledge.Theman
who,e.g.istoldtomilkacowmighthaveproceededtodoso,apart
fromthecommand,forreasonsofhisown.Imperativesinordinaryspeech
arethereforeheldnottohavetheirprimarymeaning,andthis
conclusionisextended,somewhatunwarrantablyoneshouldsay,toall
thewordsenteringintoanimperativeclause.]
[FOOTNOTE34:1.Beingnotpermanentbutoccasional,itisaneffectonly,
andassuchmusthaveacause.]
THEGREATSIDDHANTA.
Thisentiretheoryrestsonafictitiousfoundationofaltogetherhollow
andviciousarguments,incapableofbeingstatedindefinitelogical
alternatives,anddevisedbymenwhoaredestituteofthoseparticular
qualitieswhichcauseindividualstobechosenbytheSupremePerson
revealedintheUpanishads;whoseintellectsaredarkenedbythe
impressionofbeginninglessevil;andwhothushavenoinsightintothe
natureofwordsandsentences,intotherealpurportconveyedbythem,
andintotheprocedureofsoundargumentation,withallitsmethods
dependingonperceptionandtheotherinstrumentsofrightknowledge.
Thetheorythereforemustneedsberejectedbyallthosewho,through
texts,perceptionandtheothermeansofknowledgeassistedbysound
reasoninghaveaninsightintothetruenatureofthings.
Thereisnoproofofnondifferencedsubstance.
Toenterintodetails.Thosewhomaintainthedoctrineofasubstance
devoidofalldifferencehavenorighttoassertthatthisorthatisa
proofofsuchasubstance;forallmeansofrightknowledgehavefor
theirobjectthingsaffectedwithdifference.Shouldanyonetakinghis
standonthereceivedviewsofhissect,assertthatthetheoryofa
substancefreefromalldifference(doesnotrequireanyfurthermeans
ofproofbut)isimmediatelyestablishedbyone'sownconsciousness;we
replythathealsoisrefutedbythefact,warrantedbythewitnessof
theSelf,thatallconsciousnessimpliesdifference:allstatesof
consciousnesshavefortheirobjectsomethingthatismarkedbysome
difference,asappearsinthecaseofjudgmentslike'Isawthis.'And
shouldastateofconsciousnessalthoughdirectlyapprehendedas
implyingdifferencebedeterminedbysomefallaciousreasoningtobe
devoidofdifference,thisdeterminationcouldbeeffectedonlybymeans
ofsomespecialattributesadditionaltothequalityofmereBeing;and
owingtothesespecialqualitiesonwhichthedeterminationdepends,
thatstateofconsciousnesswouldclearlyagainbecharacterisedby
difference.Themeaningofthementioneddeterminationcouldthusonly
bethatofathingaffectedwithcertaindifferencessomeother
differencesaredenied;butmanifestlythiswouldnotprovethe
existenceofathingfreefromalldifference.Tothoughtthereatany
ratebelongsthequalityofbeingthoughtandselfilluminatedness,for
theknowingprincipleisobservedtohaveforitsessentialnaturethe
illumining(makingtoshineforth)ofobjects.Andthatalsointhe
statesofdeepsleep,swoon,&c.,consciousnessisaffectedwith
differenceweshallprove,initsproperplace,ingreaterdetail.
Moreoveryouyourselfadmitthattoconsciousnessthereactuallybelong
differentattributessuchaspermanency(oneness,selfluminousness,&c.
),andoftheseitcannotbeshownthattheyareonlyBeingingeneral.
Andevenifthelatterpointwereadmitted,weobservethattheretakes
placeadiscussionofdifferentviews,andyouyourselfattempttoprove
yourtheorybymeansofthedifferencesbetweenthoseviewsandyourown.
Itthereforemustbeadmittedthatrealityisaffectedwithdifference
wellestablishedbyvalidmeansofproof.
Sabdaprovesdifference.
Astosound(speech;sabda)itisspeciallyapparentthatitpossesses
thepowerofdenotingonlysuchthingsasareaffectedwithdifference.
Speechoperateswithwordsandsentences.Nowaword(pada)originates
fromthecombinationofaradicalelementandasuffix,andasthesetwo
elementshavedifferentmeaningsitnecessarilyfollowsthattheword
itselfcanconveyonlyasenseaffectedwithdifference.Andfurther,
thepluralityofwordsisbasedonpluralityofmeanings;thesentence
thereforewhichisanaggregateofwordsexpressessomespecial
combinationofthings(meaningsofwords),andhencehasnopowerto
denoteathingdevoidofalldifference.Theconclusionisthatsound
cannotbeameansofknowledgeforathingdevoidofalldifference.
Pratyakshaevenofthenirvikalpakakindprovesdifference.
Perceptioninthenextplacewithitstwosubdivisionsof
nondeterminate(nirvikalpaka)anddeterminate(savikalpaka)
perceptionalsocannotbeameansofknowledgeforthingsdevoidof
difference.Determinateperceptionclearlyhasforitsobjectthings
affectedwithdifference;foritrelatestothatwhichisdistinguished
bygenericdifferenceandsoon.Butalsonondeterminateperceptionhas
foritsobjectonlywhatismarkedwithdifference;foritisonthe
basisofnondeterminateperceptionthattheobjectdistinguishedby
genericcharacterandsoonisrecognisedintheactofdeterminate
perception.Nondeterminateperceptionistheapprehensionoftheobject
insofarasdestituteofsomedifferencesbutnotofalldifference.
Apprehensionofthelatterkindisinthefirstplacenotobservedever
totakeplace,andisinthesecondplaceimpossible:forall
apprehensionbyconsciousnesstakesplacebymeansofsomedistinction
'Thisissuchandsuch.'Nothingcanbeapprehendedapartfromsome
specialfeatureofmakeorstructure,ase.g.thetriangularlyshaped
dewlapinthecaseofcows.Thetruedistinctionbetweennondeterminate
anddeterminateperceptionisthattheformeristheapprehensionofthe
firstindividualamonganumberofthingsbelongingtothesameclass,
whilethelatteristheapprehensionofthesecond,third,andsoon,
individuals.Ontheapprehensionofthefirstindividualcowthe
perceivingpersonisnotconsciousofthefactthatthespecialshape
whichconstitutesthegenericcharacteroftheclass'cows'extendsto
thepresentindividualalso;whilethisspecialconsciousnessarisesin
thecaseoftheperceptionofthesecondandthirdcow.Theperception
ofthesecondindividualthusis'determinate'insofarasitis
determinedbyaspecialattribute,viz.theextension,tothe
perception,ofthegenericcharacterofaclassmanifestedinacertain
outwardshapewhichconnectsthisactofperceptionwiththeearlier
perception(ofthefirstindividual);suchdeterminationbeing
ascertainedonlyontheapprehensionofthesecondindividual.Such
extensionorcontinuanceofacertaingenericcharacteris,ontheother
hand,notapprehendedontheapprehensionofthefirstindividual,and
perceptionofthelatterkindthenceis'nondeterminate.'Thatitis
suchisnotduetononapprehensionofstructure,colour,generic
characterandsoon,foralltheseattributesareequallyobjectsof
sensuousperception(andhenceperceivedasbelongingtothefirst
individualalso).Moreoverthatwhichpossessesstructurecannotbe
perceivedapartfromthestructure,andhenceinthecaseofthe
apprehensionofthefirstindividualthereisalreadyperceptionof
structure,givingrisetothejudgment'Thethingissuchandsuch.'In
thecaseofthesecond,third,&c.,individuals,ontheotherhand,we
apprehend,inadditiontothethingpossessingstructureandtothe
structureitself,thespecialattributeofthepersistenceofthe
genericcharacter,andhencetheperceptionis'determinate.'Fromall
thisitfollowsthatperceptionneverhasforitsobjectthatwhichis
devoidofalldifference.
Thebhedabhedaviewisuntenable.
Thesameargumentstendtorefutetheviewthatthereisdifferenceand
absenceofdifferenceatthesametime(thesocalledbhedabhedaview).
Takethejudgment'Thisissuchandsuch';howcanwerealiseherethe
nondifferenceof'beingthis'and'beingsuchandsuch'?The'suchand
such'denotesapeculiarmakecharacterised,e.g.byadewlap,the
'this'denotesthethingdistinguishedbythatpeculiarmake;the
nondifferenceofthesetwoisthuscontradictedbyimmediate
consciousness.Attheoutsetthethingperceivedisperceivedas
separatefromallotherthings,andthisseparationisfoundedonthe
factthatthethingisdistinguishedbyaspecialconstitution,letus
saythegenericcharacteristicsofacow,expressedbytheterm'such
andsuch.'Ingeneral,whereverwecognisetherelationof
distinguishingattributeandthingdistinguishedthereby,thetwo
clearlypresentthemselvestoourmindasabsolutelydifferent.
Somethingse.g.staffsandbraceletsappearsometimesashavinga
separate,independentexistenceoftheirown;atothertimesthey
presentthemselvesasdistinguishingattributesofotherthingsor
beings(i.e.ofthepersonscarryingstaffsorwearingbracelets).Other
entitiese.g.thegenericcharacterofcowshaveabeingonlyinso
farastheyconstitutetheformofsubstances,andthusalwayspresent
themselvesasdistinguishingattributesofthosesubstances.Inboth
casesthereisthesamerelationofdistinguishingattributeandthing
distinguishedthereby,andthesetwoareapprehendedasabsolutely
different.Thedifferencebetweenthetwoclassesofentitiesisonly
thatstaffs,bracelets,andsimilarthingsarecapableofbeing
apprehendedinseparationfromotherthings,whilethegeneric
characteristicsofaspeciesareabsolutelyincapablethereof.The
assertion,therefore,thatthedifferenceofthingsisrefutedby
immediateconsciousness,isbasedontheplaindenialofacertainform
ofconsciousness,theonenamelyadmittedbyeveryonewhichis
expressedinthejudgment'Thisthingissuchandsuch.'Thissame
pointisclearlyexpoundedbytheSutrakarainII,2,33.
Inferencealsoteachesdifference.
Perceptionthushavingforitsobjectonlywhatismarkedbydifference,
inferencealsoisinthesamecase;foritsobjectisonlywhatis
distinguishedbyconnexionwiththingsknownthroughperceptionand
othermeansofknowledge.Andthus,eveninthecaseofdisagreementas
tothenumberofthedifferentinstrumentsofknowledge,athingdevoid
ofdifferencecouldnotbeestablishedbyanyofthemsincethe
instrumentsofknowledgeacknowledgedbyallhaveonlyoneandthesame
object,viz.whatismarkedbydifference.Andapersonwhomaintains
theexistenceofathingdevoidofdifferenceonthegroundof
differencesaffectingthatverythingsimplycontradictshimselfwithout
knowingwhathedoes;heisinfactnobetterthanamanwhoasserts
thathisownmotherneverhadanychildren.
Perceptiondoesnotrevealmerebeing.
Inreplytotheassertionthatperceptioncausestheapprehensionof
pureBeingonly,andthereforecannothavedifferenceforitsobject;
andthat'difference'cannotbedefinedbecauseitdoesnotadmitof
beingsetforthindefinitealternatives;wepointoutthatthese
chargesarecompletelyrefutedbythefactthattheonlyobjectsof
perceptionarethingsdistinguishedbygenericcharacterandsoon,and
thatgenericcharacterandsoonasbeingrelativethingsgiveatonce
risetothejudgmentastothedistinctionbetweenthemselvesandthe
thingsinwhichtheyinhere.Youyourselfadmitthatinthecaseof
knowledgeandinthatofcolourandotherqualitiesthisrelationholds
good,viz.thatsomethingwhichgivesrisetoajudgmentaboutanother
thingatthesametimegivesrisetoajudgmentaboutitself;thesame
maythereforebeadmittedwithregardtodifference[FOOTNOTE44:1].
Forthisreasonthechargeofaregressusininfinitumandalogical
seesaw(seeabove,p.32)cannotbeupheld.Forevenifperceptive
cognitiontakesplacewithinonemoment,weapprehendwithinthatmoment
thegenericcharacterwhichconstitutesontheonehandthedifference
ofthethingfromothers,andontheotherhandthepeculiarcharacter
ofthethingitself;andthusthereremainsnothingtobeapprehendedin
asecondmoment.
Moreover,ifperceptionmadeusapprehendonlypureBeingjudgments
cle