The Psychological Background of the First Education in Plato’s Laws

The Psychological Background of the First Educationin Plato’s Laws

ELIAS GEORGOULAS

PhD, University of Crete, GreeceStrati Andreadi 47,

Vrontados 82200, Chios, [email protected]

Abstract

The first advice offered in the Laws regarding the education of the soul concernscuring infants’ difficulty in sleeping in the context of gymnastic exercises which con-tribute to the overall acquisition of courage. The nurses will need to impose shakingon the internal movement which instills terror in the infants (790b–791c). In rea-lity, they need to efface another version of the disorderly motion which characterizesthe first man (as well as the infant) in the Timaeus, when the mental abilities of hisimmortal soul are lost immediately after its incarnation (43a–44b). The aim of thepresent article is to examine whether Plato, in his reference to the first education ofthe soul, remains faithful to Timaeus’ psychology, and, if this is so, to what extent heconsiders the relevant physiological mechanisms to be active. The resulting conclu-sions inevitably constitute grounds for an attempt to exploit the Timaeus in the con-text of the current interpretative issue concerning the division of the soul in the Laws.

Keywords: division of the soul, education, physiology, Plato’s Laws (790b–792e),Timaeus

In the Timaeus, when the immortal soul joins a mortal body it comes tobe without intelligence (ἄνους γίγνεται) (44 A–B).1 During the period ofinfancy, the infant’s soul undergoes the affections of the soul of the firstman, when, along with sensations, the tide which brings nourishment af-fects the circuits of the soul: the revolution of the Same stops and that ofthe Different is disquieted (43 A–44 A). Nonetheless, gradually, as the cur-rent of nutriment and growth is weakened, the revolutions of the immor-

apeiron, vol. 45, pp. 338–353©Walter de Gruyter 2012 DOI 10.1515/apeiron-2012-0011

1 The translation of passages from the Timaeus is from F.M. Cornford, Plato’s Cosmol-ogy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1937), and follow the text of J. Burnet, Plato-nis Opera, vol. IV (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1902).

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tal soul tend to revert to their normal course. In the course of that stage,the intervention of education is vital, so that man is not to become unin-itiated and without understanding (ἀτελὴς καὶ ἀνόητος) (44 B–C). It is afact that education which begins at a young age and in a good politicalbackground is therapeutical and, coupled with a good physical condition,can also dissuade someone from becoming involuntarily bad (87 A–B).2

In the Laws, the absence of the rational account during the first age isalso taken for granted; yet – and here it differs from the Timaeus – thisdoes not constitute an obstacle for acquiring the first virtue by means ofhabituation (653 A–C). The Athenian’s first advice on the education ofthe infants’ soul concerns the treatment of difficult sleep, which is in-tegrated into the overall context of gymnastic exercises that contributeto the acquirement of courage.3 The nurses and mothers are urged to im-pose shaking (σεισμός)4 on the infants, so as to conquer internal motion,which is responsible for fright, and consequently for sleeplessness(790 B–791 C).5 According to Goodey, the infants’ disorderly motion re-flects a condition which is contrary to the cosmological order, when νοῦςis absent because of the absolute dominance of sense-perception.6 We

2 ‘No one is willingly bad; the bad man becomes so because of some faulty habit ofbody and unenlightened upbringing’ (κακὸς μὲν γὰρ ἑκὼν οὐδείς, διὰ δὲ πονηρὰν ἕξιν τινὰτοῦ σώματος καὶ ἀπαίδευτον τροφὴν ὁ κακὸς γίγνεται κακός, Timaeus 86 D7–E2).

3 Plato’s insistence on providing details regarding the manner in which young peoplemust live is characteristic. For instance, he does not hesitate to propose specific exer-cises for pregnant women. According to J. Annas, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic(Oxford: Clarendon Press 1981), 82, this is exactly where the difference lies betweenthe Laws and the Republic, in which he merely sketches out an outline for education.

4 The translation of passages from the Laws is from R.G. Bury, Plato with an EnglishTranslation, vols. X–XI, Laws (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press; London: W. Heinemann 1926), except where otherwisenoted.

5 The affinity to the frenzied behavior of Bacchus’ worshippers is apparent: ‘Both theseaffections are forms of fright’ (Δειμαίνειν ἐστίν που ταῦτ’ ἀμφότερα τὰ πάθη, 790 E

9–10). According to E.B. England, The Laws of Plato, vol. II (Manchester: Manche-ster University Press 1921), 241, the adjectives φοβεράν (‘of fear’) and μανικήν (‘[of]frenzy’), which are attributed to τὴν ἐντὸς κίνησιν (‘internal motion’) (791 A), corre-late to the sleeplessness of the infants and to the Bacchic frenzy: ‘The children it putsto sleep; the Bacchants, who are awake, it brings into a sound state of mind insteadof a frenzied condition …’ (τοὺς μὲν ὕπνου λαγχάνειν ποιεῖ, τοὺς δ’ ἐγρηγορότας … κατειρ-γάσατο ἀντὶ μανικῶν ἡμῖν διαθέσεων ἕξεις ἔμφρονας ἔχειν, 791 A7–791 B2). It thus seemsthat what differentiates the two psychological disorders is the force of the manifesta-tion of their symptoms. See 790 D–E.

6 C.F. Goodey, ‘Mental Disabilities and Human Values in Plato’s Late Dialogues’, Ar-chiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 74/1 (1992), 37–8. Similarly, E. Moutsopoulos,‘Movements of Sounds, Bodies and Souls (Plato, Laws, book 7, 790e ff.)’, Philosophia,31 (2001), 106–7, draws a parallel between the disorder of the infants’ motion (Laws

The Psychological Background of the First Education in Plato’s Laws 339


could thus argue that the fright experienced by the infants is another man-ifestation, internal this time, of the disorderly motion of the first man(and of the infant) in the Timaeus, when the mental capacities of his im-mortal soul are lost as soon as it is incarnated.7

The aim of the present paper is to examine whether Plato, in his re-ference to the first education of the soul, remains faithful to the psycholo-gical model of the Timaeus, and, if this is so, to what degree he considersthat the relevant physiological mechanisms are operative. The resultingconclusions inevitably constitute grounds for an attempt to exploit theTimaeus in the context of the current interpretative issue concerning thedivision of the soul in the Laws.

I

The motion which disturbs the infants’ soul is manifested by means ofintense activity in the heart area which causes discomfort: ‘and by thusoverpowering it, it [the external motion] brings about a manifest calm inthe soul and a cessation of the grievous palpitation of the heart which hadexisted in each case’ (κρατήσασα δὲ [ἡ τῶν ἔξωθεν κίνησις] γαλήνην ἡσυχίαντε ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φαίνεται ἀπεργασαμένη τῆς περὶ τὰ τῆς καρδίας χαλεπῆς γενομένηςἑκάστων πηδήσεως, Laws 791 A3–6). The fact that the calmness of the soulis so closely dependent on the normalization of the function of the heartbefits the heart’s designation in the Timaeus as the primary bodily organof the spirited part;8 in the latter, the possibility is also acknowledged thatthe heart may be disturbed in cases where fear is taken for granted. (Ineffect, the same term is used for rendering the heart’s malfunction: ‘forthe throbbing of the heart when danger is foreseen’ (τῇ δὲ δὴ πηδήσει τῆςκαρδίας ἐν τῇ τῶν δεινῶν προσδοκίᾳ, 70 C1–2).9 Moreover, when the discus-sion of the specific therapeutical practice is concluded, it becomes evident

653 D–654 A) and the disorder of the universe before the intervention of the De-miurge (Timaeus 30 A), which is comparable to Anaxagoras’ Nous. Cf. T.J. Tracy,Physiological Theory and the Doctrine of the Mean in Plato and Aristotle (Chicago:Loyola University Press 1969), 141, n. 46. In a similar vein, E.R. Dodds, ‘Plato andthe Irrational’, The Journal of Hellenic Studies, 65 (1945), 21, argues that, followingTheaetetus (176 A), disorderly motion is the result of necessity, a symbol of irration-ality which Plato is compelled to admit in man in his later work. Cf. Laws896 E–897 B.

7 See above.8 The heart, as spirit boils at the announcement by reason that some unjust action is

taking place, accelerates through blood the transmission of commands and threatswhich come from the upper part of the soul to all parts of the body in order that theappetitive part may submit to it (70 A–C).

9 The underline is mine.

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that the continual contact of the young soul with situations which insti-gate fear is not to practise courage, but cowardice (δειλίας ἄσκησις, ἀλλ’ οὐκἀνδρίας).10 In the Timaeus, temerity (θάρρος) together with fear (φόβος)constitute the second of four pairs of passions which compose the mortalsoul (69 C–D). Furthermore, it is obvious that fear establishes the back-ground for the disease of cowardice (δειλία) at the antipode of which onefinds rashness (θρασύτης) (86 E–87 A); both are diseases of the soul whichcorrelate to states of deficiency and excess of the spirited part.11 As far ascourage is concerned, which is determined by spirit (θυμός), it guaranteesthe success of the mission of the spirited part as a mediator between theimmortal soul and the appetitive part (70 A); as a result, courage can onlybe thought of as a healthy condition, as a mean,12 since the ideal con-dition for the soul is the proportionate development of its three parts(89 E–90 A), following the principle which equates health with virtue andproportion (87 C–D).13 With the above approach the initial foundationsare laid to support the view that the educational practice proposed forinfants who have difficulty sleeping falls within the framework of preven-tive therapy, which concerns the spirited part.

The Athenian, after his reference to exercising the infants’ courage,calls attention to another educational tactic concerning that particular age,which relates to the proper management of the infants’ desires by thenurses.14 The criterion is the middle state, which prescribes neither com-plete avoidance of pains nor pursuit of pleasures. The desirable result iskindliness, which is the distinguishing habit of anyone who is to becomedivine (θεῖος), of the ἵλεως,15 that is, of a person who is not in any way

10 Laws 791 B. T.L. Pangle, The Laws of Plato (New York: Basic Books 1980), 479,observes that the existence of primary and enduring terror in the soul, which is, forinstance, experienced by infants, is suggestive of an elevation of courage as part ofvirtue, which is in any case also ascertained by the great emphasis placed on it in thecourse of education in the second book of the Laws.

11 Ill-temper (δυσκολία) and despondency (δυσθυμία) are considered diseases of the appe-titive part, while forgetfulness (λήθη) and stupidity (δυσμαθία) are considered diseasesof the rational part. See Tracy, 125 ff. For fear as a distressing condition, see alsoRepublic, 577 E–578 A, 579 D–E.

12 In the Laws, extreme care of the body makes the soul puffed up and proud (χαύνουςτὰς ψυχὰς καὶ θρασείας ποιεῖ), while its neglect has exactly the opposite results(728 D–E). For courage as a mean, see Republic 410 D.

13 Cf. Laws 733 D–734 E, where a healthy life is regarded as a kind of virtuous life.14 Laws 791 C ff.15 Laws 792 C–E. Here, according to J.J. Cleary, ‘Paideia in Plato’s Laws’, in S. Scolni-

cov and L. Brisson (eds.), Plato’s Laws: From Theory into Practice (Proceedings of theVI Symposium Platonicum: Selected Papers; Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag2003), 166–7, what is implied is the old Platonic ideal of homoiosis theou. Cf. Ti-maeus 90 C–D, Laws 716 C–D, 818 B–D.



peevish (δύσκολος).16 For that reason the ill-temper (τὸ δύσκολον) of thesoul,17 a manifest extremity, proves to be the next threat, after cowardice,for the infants’ soul.18 We can, therefore, suppose, following the line fromthe Timaeus concerning health,19 that it is the second disease of the soulwhich needs to be prevented by the educational bodies. For Tracy, ill-tem-per (δυσκολία) is very likely a disease of the appetitive part, as luxury,which points to the satisfaction of lower appetites, such as eating, is thereason for rendering the character of very young people peevish (δύσκολα),choleric (ἀκράχολα) and over-sensitive (σφόδρα ἀπὸ σμικρῶν κινούμενα). Onthe other side, one finds young people who, being educated in an oppositemanner, become dejected (ταπεινοί), mean-spirited (ἀνελεύθεροι), and mis-anthropic (μισάνθρωποι),20 attributes which could be summed up with theterm δυσθυμία, in the sense of melancholy or despondency.21 The two ex-tremities (ill-temper and despondency) comprise the pair of homonymicdiseases of the soul, which is referred to in the Timaeus (86 E–87 A).22

What would create a certain difficulty in following the above interpre-tative line is the definition of εὐψυχία, a state which is caused by the ab-sence of ill-temper in the soul.23 Pangle argues that the term (he translatesit as ‘stoutness of soul’)24 primarily means ‘courage’.25 He interprets thepassage in question in a comparable manner and maintains that the sec-ond advisory proposal for the nurses and mothers again concerns a prac-tice which aims at acquiring courage; for Pangle this is yet another prooffor its eminent position as part of virtue.26 It is therefore obvious that thisparticular position could dissuade us from considering that the secondeducational practice aims at the cultivation of the appetitive part, becausecourage, according to the psychological model of the Timaeus, is character-istic of the healthy spirited part.27 It is indeed the case that during theideal martial education the person who earns the name εὔψυχος is he whocan cope with situations which are capable of causing real fear.28 Nonethe-less, in the passage in question a person who is characterized as cheerful

16 Laws 792 A–B.17 I follow the translation of Tracy. See below.18 Laws 791 C.19 See above.20 Laws 791 D.21 Cf. Laws 666 B.22 Tracy, 125–7.23 Laws 791 C.24 Pangle, 179. It is similarly translated by Bury, 13.25 Pangle, 530, n. 4.26 Ibid. 479–80.27 See above.28 Laws 830 E. Cf. Timaeus 25 B.

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(εὔθυμος) and kindly (ἵλεως)29 is he who is educated to taste at the rightamount not only fear but any other kind of pain,30 and that person is noother but the one who is εὔψυχος.31 It follows from the above that εὐψυχίαdoes not promise only the proper confrontation of danger. Moreover, thesecond and last time the term is used in the Laws it conveys the overallgood condition of the soul, at which music should aim (while gymnasticsis responsible for the body) (795 D); in our case it should also be taken inthe same sense. Furthermore, that easily arises from the way the Athe-nian’s speech proceeds from one advisory line to the next (791 B–C): ifcourage, the first educational aim, is defined as part of virtue and the sec-ond, the absence of ill-temper, as part of εὐψυχία, it is more reasonable toconsider the latter as part of the same whole.32 We are thus encouraged totake εὐψυχία in its etymological sense and consider it as another version ofvirtue.33 If that objection to Pangle is valid, then we can securely followTracy’s position and argue that the second proposed educational practiceis a preventive therapy, which concerns the soul’s appetitive part.

II

The compatibility of the soul of the infants who are undergoing treatmentin the Laws with the mortal soul in the Timaeus, which was demonstratedabove, impels us to search in the cosmogony dialogue with increased cer-tainty for physiology data adequate to support the educational practice forthe upper part of the mortal soul. In the Laws, the curative process forthose infants who have difficulty sleeping is integrated into the wider con-text of their upbringing, for which a most decisive role is played by con-tinual motion, which in its finest version would be similar to the swayingmotion of a boat (789 C ff.). At this point it is important to emphasize

29 My translation.30 Laws 792 B–E. The proper management of fear, which obviously points to the prac-

tice of the spirited part, would not be incompatible with an educational tactic whichconcerns the appetitive part, since, according to the Timaeus, all ingredients of themortal soul are related to each other: pleasure and pain, temerity and fear, anger andhope are in their entirety related to sense and desire (69 C–D).

31 As has already been argued, the peevish, who does not participate in εὐψυχία (Laws791 C), is not in any way kindly (Laws 792 A).

32 In another passage it is argued that a peevish (δύσκολος) (my translation) and savagesoul tends to injustice (649 E), not to cowardice; this is yet another reason for arguingthat in the case under discussion εὐψυχία has a much wider meaning.

33 Cf. the relevant objections by England, 242, in Liddell and Scott and Jowett, and byP. Shorey, review of Bury, Classical Philology, 23 (1928), 404, in Bury. See also thecorresponding interpretation by L. Strauss, The Argument and the Action of Plato’sLaws (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press 1975), 100–1.



that although continual motion is typically proposed for the education ofthe souls,34 it is also included in the education of the bodies. In the rele-vant passage it is stated that any kind of shaking (σεισμός)35 or motionwhich takes place unweariedly (ἄκοπα),36 whether it originates in the indi-vidual himself or some means of transportation, including the boat, is ben-eficial to the body (789 C–D). That concerns an almost exact applicationof what is proposed for the care of the body in the relevant passage in theTimaeus, in which the ordering of beneficial motions takes place. In thatpassage, gymnastics is ranked first, since it demands motions which origi-nate in the body itself, thus being akin to the movement of thought andof the universe. Behind gymnastics, and thus second in ranking, is theswaying motion, which is effected by means of floatation or any kind ofcarriage that causes no weariness, thus a motion which originates in asource extrinsic to the body (89 A). Regarding the motion which is last inranking, that is, medical purgation, no particular reference is made in therelevant passage in the Laws, although it is not done unjustifiably. In thecontext of advice concerning the training of bodies for their developmentin the course of the most critical age (788 D–789 B), reference to a medi-cal practice, which is not advisable because of its often dangerous effects,37is rather superfluous. Concerning the first two kinds of therapeutic mo-tion, those have been characterized as modes of purification and bracingof the body.38 By means of the former, unwholesome and superfluous con-stituents are liquefied and removed, while the latter join together constitu-ents which ought to be united.39 Those processes can only be consideredas the outcome of a harmonious motion which originates in perpetualshaking and, in order to achieve health, also brings into orderly arrange-ment those kindred affections and particles that wander about the body.40The nourishment of the body through blood (which is produced from thecombination of the processes of respiration and digestion of food anddrink)41 is also based on the attraction of like to like: substances whichexist in the blood are broken up into the four elements. Each particle of

34 The Athenian clearly changes the subject of discussion from the education of bodiesto the education of souls (790 B–C).

35 The same term was also used in the context of the therapeutic practice applied toinfants who have difficulty sleeping. See above.

36 My translation.37 Timaeus 89 A–D.38 Timaeus 89 A.39 A.E. Taylor, A Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1928),

626.40 Timaeus 88 D–89 A. For the relation of this process to the mechanical causation of

Necessity, see V. Kalfas, Plato, Timaeus, (Athens: Polis 1995) 492, n. 574.41 Timaeus 78 E–79 A. See also Timaeus 80 D–81 A.

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fire, earth, air and water, comparatively to the movement of the universe(since the human body is structured similarly to the universe), pursues itskindred, thus replenishing the vacancy created by moving a similar particleaway. If the expelled particles are less than the added ones, then the bodydevelops.42 Plato seems, therefore, to remain faithful to the laws of phy-siology which he set out in the Timaeus, when he recognizes the digestionof food and drink as an outcome of those motions which can guarantee,aside from anything else, the health of the developing bodies: ‘and thatthis is the reason why bodies can deal successfully with their supplies ofmeat and drink and provide us with health and beauty, and strength aswell’ (καὶ διὰ ταῦτα τὰς τῶν σίτων τροφὰς καὶ ποτῶν κατακρατοῦντα, ὑγίειανκαὶ κάλλος καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ῥώμην ἡμῖν δυνατά ἐστι παραδιδόναι, Laws 789 D

5–7).43If the above claim concerns the training of the infants’ bodies, then it

is quite possible that it also applies to their souls, because, as was demon-strated above, the same therapeutical practice is proposed for the latter; inthat case, there is nothing but, based on the same physiological basis, toattempt to explain how the normalized function of the heart of infantswho have difficulty sleeping is achieved. Besides, the terms which describethe main part of the therapy in question44 point directly to the principleson which advice for care of the body is based in the Timaeus,45 which

42 Timaeus 81 A–B.43 According to England, 238, the term κατακρατοῦντα (‘assimilate’ or ‘absorb’) is medi-

cal. Cf. Aristotle, Problems 930 B 31.44 ‘the treatment they apply is to give them, not quiet, but motion, for they rock them

constantly in their arms’ (οὐχ ἡσυχίαν αὐτοῖς προσφέρουσιν ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον κίνησιν, ἐνταῖς ἀγκάλαις ἀεὶ σείουσαι, Laws 790 D 8–10) and ‘So whenever one applies an exter-nal shaking to affections of this kind, the external motion thus applied overpowersthe internal motion of fear and frenzy’ (ὅταν οὖν ἔξωθέν τις προσφέρῃ τοῖς τοιούτοιςπάθεσι σεισμόν, ἡ τῶν ἔξωθεν κρατεῖ κίνησις προσφερομένη τὴν ἐντὸς φοβερὰν οὖσαν καὶμανικὴν κίνησιν, Laws 790 E 11–791 A3).

45 ‘But if he will imitate what we have called the foster-mother and nurse of the uni-verse and never, if possible, allow the body to rest in torpor; if he will keep it inmotion and, by perpetually giving it a shake, constantly hold in check the internaland external motions in a natural balance’ (ἐὰν δὲ ἥν τε τροφὸν καὶ τιθήνην τοῦ παντὸςπροσείπομεν μιμῆταί τις, καὶ τὸ σῶμα μάλιστα μὲν μηδέποτε ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν ἐᾷ, κινῇ δὲ καὶ-σεισμοὺς ἀεί τινας ἐμποιῶν αὐτῷ διὰ παντὸς τὰς ἐντὸς καὶ ἐκτὸς ἀμύνηται κατὰ φύσινκινήσεις, 88 D6–E1). Cf. ‘Let us take this, then, as a fundamental assumption in bothcases, – that for both body and soul of the very young a process of nursing and mov-ing, that is as continuous as possible both by day and by night, is in all cases salutary,and especially in the case of the youngest’ (Λάβωμεν τοίνυν τοῦτο οἷον στοιχεῖον ἐπ’ἀμφότερα,σώματός τε καὶ ψυχῆς τῶν πάνυ νέων τὴν τιθήνησιν καὶ κίνησιν γιγνομένην ὅτιμάλιστα διὰ πάσης νυκτός τε καὶ ἡμέρας, ὡς ἔστι ξύμφορος ἅπασι μέν, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ τοῖς ὅτινεωτάτοισι, Laws 790 C5–9).



reveals that the nurse and Receptacle of the universe becomes for the firsttime in practice the object of imitation by the nurse of man.46

Concerning the heart which becomes overheated in the face of immi-nent danger, that is, when fear is present, what is estimated in the Ti-maeus is a cooling system through the lungs (70 C–D). It is, therefore,reasonable to assume that the therapy in question for infants who havedifficulty sleeping, because they experience a form of fright, is related torespiration.47 According to the principle of circular thrust (περίωσις),whereby respiration occurs, everything which moves out of the body iscooled, while everything which moves into the body is heated (79 A–E).Based on that, the temperature of the air which moves into the lungs,even before it is heated, so as to be directed to its exit, is such that itallows the lungs to cool the heart, when it becomes overheated. If theheart does not cool down, this means that the incoming air warms upfaster than needed, which, I suppose, is because of its amount being inade-quate for the particular circumstances. The faster the incoming air warmsup, the faster the exhalation, which is succeeded by an equivalent inhala-tion, etc.48 Thus, the motion mothers need to impose on the infants seemsto restore the circular thrust to a normal level by causing the flow of anadequate amount of air into the lungs.

For the new regulation of inhalation and exhalation it is not only con-tinual motion which is necessary but also melody: ‘the treatment they ap-ply is to give them, not quiet, but motion, for they rock them constantlyin their arms; and instead of silence, they use a kind of crooning noise’(οὐχ ἡσυχίαν αὐτοῖς προσφέρουσιν ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον κίνησιν, ἐν ταῖς ἀγκάλαις ἀεὶσείουσαι, καὶ οὐ σιγὴν ἀλλά τινα μελῳδίαν, Laws 790 D8–E1). It is thereforereasonable to inquire about the role of the latter in this process. TheAthenian, when referring to the beneficial effects of that particular prac-tice, mentions only the effect of externally-imposed shaking49 and drawsthe following inference: ‘Let us say, then, that this factor – namely, theexercise of quite young children by the various motions – contributesgreatly towards developing one part of the soul’s virtue’ (ν δὴ καὶ τοῦτοεἰς ψυχῆς μόριον ἀρετῆς, τὴν τῶν παντελῶς παίδων γυμναστικὴν ἐν ταῖς κινή-σεσιν, μέγα ἡμῖν φῶμεν ξυμβάλλεσθαι, Laws 791 C5–7).50 While the aboveprove the secondary importance of melody, they do not invalidate its con-tribution to the infants’ ‘spell’, which is revealed by its parallelism to the

46 Cf. Taylor, 625.47 For the role of the lungs in the respiratory process, see Timaeus 79 C.48 This is apparent, as during inhalation the air enters the place whence during exhala-

tion the breath came out. See Timaeus 79 B–C.49 Laws 790 E–791 A.50 The underline is mine.

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therapy of Bacchus’ worshippers: ‘and thus they literally cast a spell uponthe children (like the victims of Bacchic frenzy) by employing the com-bined movements of dance and song as a remedy’ (καὶ ἀτεχνῶς οἷον κατα-υλοῦσι τῶν παιδίων, καθαπερεὶ τῶν ἐκφρόνων Βακχείων, ἰάσει ταύτῃ τῇ τῆςκινήσεως ἅμα χορείᾳ καὶ μούσῃ χρώμεναι, Laws 790 E1–4).51, 52 If the newcycle of respiration primarily demands an intense motion, which will im-pose the flow of a larger amount of air in the lungs, the rhythm appliedto that motion to accompany the melody53 seems to guarantee its steadycontinuation, so as to set a new tempo to the breath. Undoubtedly, de-spite the close relation between melody and rhythm, the therapeutic effectof the former should be more directly attributed to harmony, which is themain characteristic of as well as the most crucial factor for its quality.54The definition of harmony as the blending of a high and a low sound55points to the Timaeus, in which the consonance of sounds, which is de-fined in exactly the same manner, falls within the context of applicationof the principle of circular thrust (79 E–80 B).56 It is, thus, revealed thatthe harmony of a melody and the mechanism of respiration, which is lar-

51 The underline is mine.52 For T.J. Saunders, ‘Notes on the Laws of Plato’, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical

Studies, supplementary papers, 28 (1972), 50–1, the mothers’ song constitutes thevicarious imitation of the pipe’s music, which is employed in the Bacchic cure.

53 Rhythm has been defined as the order of motion and harmony as the order of voice(Laws 664 E–665 A). Cf. also the use of the terms εὔρυθμον (‘rhythmical’) and εὐάρ-μοστον (‘harmonious’) for the characterization of σχῆμα (‘posture’) and μέλος (‘tune’)(Laws 655 A). Cf. Laws 670 B–C. To give one name, i.e. χορεία (‘choristry’), for thecombination of ἁρμονία (‘harmony’) and ῥυθμός (‘rhythm’), reveals their perfect com-patibility (Laws 664 E–665 A). Cf. ‘Choir-training, as a whole, embraces of courseboth dancing and song’ (Χορεία γε μὴν ὄρχησίς τε καὶ ᾠδὴ τὸ ξύνολόν ἐστιν, Laws 654 B

4–5). Cf. Saunders (1972), 50–1.54 See n. 53. Cf. the precedence of harmony over rhythm in the Timaeus, when refer-

ence is made to their usefulness as gifts from the Muses against the inward discordthat has come into revolution of the soul (ἐπὶ τὴν γεγονυῖαν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀνάρμοστον ψυχῆςπερίοδον) (47 D–E). The echo of this view is characteristic in the Laws, in which thegods give men the gift of pleasurable perception of rhythm and harmony (ἔνρυθμόν τεκαὶ ἐναρμόνιον αἴσθησιν μεθ’ ἡδονῆς) (653 E–654 A). Based on the above, it is difficultto understand how melody could be the cause of a temporary terror, which couldhave a therapeutic value for the soul, as is argued by S. Benardete, Plato’s Laws, TheDiscovery of Being (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press 2000), 192–3.

55 Laws, 665 A.56 The text does not offer us enough information to ascertain exactly how the mechan-

ism of circular thrust contributes to the consonance of sounds. For possible hypo-theses and hermeneutical difficulties ensuing from those, see Cornford, 320–6;E. Moutsopoulos, La Musique dans l’Œuvre de Platon (Paris: Presses Universitairesde France 1959), 36–42; Kalfas, 484, n. 520.



gely responsible for the normalization of heartbeat,57 have a common phy-siological background. Besides, the motion of sound from the ears and thebrain to blood and the liver shows that the sense of hearing has its seat inthe mortal and not the immortal soul;58 that encourages us to supposethat melody stops at the bodily seat of the spirited part, the knot of veinsand the fountain of blood (70 A–B), in this case the perturbed heart ofthe infants. Our suspicions are reinforced if we take into considerationthat the mechanism for the production of a harmonic sound consists inthe imposition of a slow on a quick sound:59 ‘In so doing, the slowersounds cause no disturbance when they intrude a fresh motion; rather byjoining on the beginning of a slower motion in correspondence with thequicker which is now drawing to an end, they produce a single combinedeffect in which high and low are blended’ (καταλαμβάνοντες δὲ [οἱ βραδύτε-ροι φθόγγοι] οὐκ ἄλλην ἐπεμβάλλοντες ἀνετάραξαν κίνησιν, ἀλλ’ ἀρχὴν βραδυτέ-ρας φορᾶς κατὰ τὴν τῆς θάττονος, ἀποληγούσης δέ, ὁμοιότητα προσάψαντες, μίανἐξ ὀξείας καὶ βαρείας συνεκεράσαντο πάθην, 80 B2–5); and that seems com-patible with the attainment of calmness in the heart, the deceleration ofheartbeat in the course of the therapy in question.60 The text does notoffer the required details for illustrating the direct effect of harmony onthe seat of the spirited part (it would be interesting to know, for instance,that the speed of sound influences, or at least is related to, the speed ofblood). Yet, we could argue that the blending of a quick and a slow soundto produce a harmonic one cannot be achieved either at the beginning (inthe brain) or at the end of the journey (in the liver), but somewhere inthe middle, and that, because it would evidently presuppose a temporaland, therefore, spatial interval before it is accomplished. Accordingly, ifthe brain is the seat of the immortal soul (73 C–D)61 and the liver the seatof divination (71 A–B), which dwell together with the spirited part, thereis no other meeting point for the sounds which will produce the harmonicone, but the area around the heart, the seat of the spirited part.

57 See above.58 ‘Sound we may define in general terms as the stroke inflicted by air on the brain and

blood through the ears and passed on to the soul’ (ὅλως μὲν οὖν φωνὴν θῶμεν τὴν δι’ὤτων ὑπ’ ἀέρος ἐγκεφάλου τε καὶ αἵματος μέχρι ψυχῆς πληγὴν διαδιδομένην, 67 B 2–4). Cf.Tracy, 109. For the mortal soul as the seat of all senses, see Kalfas, 466, n. 436. Fortraditional theories concerning hearing, which influenced Plato, see Moutsopoulos(1959), 31–3.

59 In other words, of the low on the high sound. See ‘sounds, which present themselvesas high or low in pitch according as they are swift or slow’ (ὅσοι φθόγγοι ταχεῖς τε καὶβραδεῖς ὀξεῖς τε καὶ βαρεῖς φαίνονται, Timaeus 80 A 3–4). Cf. Timaeus 67 B.

60 Laws 791 A.61 Cf. Timaeus 44 D and 69 C.

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We must point out that reference to the particular practice which isexercised by the nurses (and those who cure Corybantes’ disease) con-cludes with the assertion that gymnastic motions in the course of infancygenerally contribute to the acquirement of courage.62 If the regulation ofrespiration by means of a bodily motion which is assisted by melody re-sults in the normalization of the heartbeat of infants who have difficultysleeping, it is important to identify exactly what constitutes its value as aneducational means with a wider scope. Since in the Timaeus respiration isnecessary for nourishment (78 E–79 A),63 which constitutes a healthy state,it is reasonable to suppose that deregulation of respiration is a precondi-tion for diseases; and this is because diseases originate from a reverse routeto that for nourishment, namely that which leads to the decomposition offlesh, the main products of which are bile and phlegm.64 However, bothacid and salt phlegms as well as bitter and bilious humors constitute causesfor diseases of the soul, in which cowardice is included (86 E–87 A).65Thus, we ascertain that the regulation of respiration can to a great extentguarantee the health of both body and soul.

III

The dialogue concerning the division of the soul in the Laws consists inthe following main points: on the one side, without excluding the triparti-tion of the soul, Rees maintains that the way in which the four virtues(wisdom, courage, temperance and justice) are acquired – providing it isnecessary that it is based on a division of the soul (since that is also dis-puted) – is more appropriately explained by means of the bipartition ofthe soul into a rational and an irrational part.66 Bobonich moves evenfurther when he argues that not only is Partition Theory67 not employedto explain akratic action, but it is for the most part abandoned in the

62 Laws 791 B–C.63 See also Timaeus 80 D–81 A.64 This concerns second-class bodily diseases. See Timaeus 82 E–83 E.65 According to Tracy, 130–2, despondency, cowardice, and stupidity, which are dis-

eases of deficiency, are caused by phlegm, while ill-temper, rashness and forgetfulness,which are diseases of excess, are the result of bile. For their correspondence to theseats of the soul, see Part I.

66 D.A. Rees, ‘Bipartition of the Soul in the Early Academy’, Journal of Hellenistic Stu-dies, 77 (1957), 115–6.

67 In other words, the theory of the parts of the soul found in the Republic. See C. Bo-bonich, ‘Akrasia and Agency in Plato’s Laws and Republic’, Archiv für Geschichte derPhilosophie, 76 (1994), 4–5.



moral psychology of the Laws.68 The common aspect for maintaining bothof the above positions is their comparative treatment of the relevant Pla-tonic views in the Laws and the Republic. What ensues from this approachas a difference of primary importance is the absence of explicit referencesin the Laws which signify the division of the soul. Moreover, both forRees and for Bobonich the division of the soul in the Timaeus does notseem to constitute a serious obstacle to their positions. On the one handthe former, following Owen’s view, according to which the Timaeus doesnot belong to Plato’s later writing period,69 recognizes the absence of thedivided soul as a common feature of the later Platonic works (in whichthe Laws are of course included).70 On the other hand, the latter claimsthat in the Laws no reference is made to parts of the soul (mortal, i.e.Spirited part – Desiring part,71 and immortal) and their characteristics inthe same way as those are understood in the Timaeus (69 C–73 A). As wewill see later in the discussion, this point is rather critical, as in the cos-mogony dialogue the parts of the soul could, according to the commenta-tor, be treated to a certain degree as agent-like, a feature which has beenascribed to them in the Republic.72 At the end of his article, Bobonichasserts that agent-like lower parts of the soul are not to be found in theLaws, that is, parts to which some sort of persuasive action needs to beapplied;73 the only definitive protection against akratic action is the indivi-dual’s power of self-control.74 On the other side, Saunders criticizes Rees’interpretation mainly by highlighting those points which concern the divi-

68 Ibid. 23–8.69 G.E.L. Owen, ‘The Place of the Timaeus in Plato’s Dialogues’, Classical Quarterly, 47

(1953), 79–95. However, this position has received adverse criticism, which con-firmed the Timaeus’ classification into Plato’s later writing period. See Η. Cherniss,‘The Relation of the Timaeus to Plato’s Later Dialogues’, American Journal of Philol-ogy, 78 (1957), 225–66. Cf. H. Thesleff, Studies in Platonic Chronology (Helsinki:Societas Scientiarum Fennica 1982); G.R. Ledger, Recounting Plato (Oxford: Claren-don Press 1989); L. Brandwood, The Chronology of Plato’s Dialogues (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press 1990); Kalfas, 28ff.

70 Rees, 113.71 I maintain Bobonich’s terminology.72 More specifically, each of the three parts is the subject of psychic states, activities and

capacities that are normally attributed to the whole person. See Bobonich (1994), 4.Cf. J. Moline, ‘Plato on the Complexity of the Psyche’, Archiv für Geschichte derPhilosophie, 60 (1978), 1–26; repr. in J. Moline, Plato’s Theory of Understanding(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 1981); Annas, 109–53; T. Irwin, Plato’sEthics (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995), 203–42.

73 One of the characteristics which render a part of the soul agent-like. See Bobonich(1994), 4.

74 Ibid. 32.

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sion into spirited and appetitive parts.75 He, thus, reaches the conclusionthat the soul in the Laws can be analyzed into three parts – and on severaloccasions it is indeed analyzed so – as is done in the Republic.76 Gersonacknowledges greater difficulties in this issue; for instance, he argues thatfor Plato the recognition of spirit as a distinct part of the soul in the Laws863 B2–3 is unimportant.77 Yet, he puts forward serious objections to Bo-bonich’s arguments by claiming that it is impossible to explain ἀκρασίαwithout the division of the soul.78 Although they rarely refer to the Ti-maeus, both Saunders and Gerson acknowledge its convergence with theLaws. The former maintains that the traditional chronology of the Ti-maeus corroborates the argument in favor of the tripartition of the soul inthe Laws (because the Timaeus, in which the tripartition of the soul issupported, belongs to the same writing period as the Laws).79 On theother hand, the latter observes that the distinction between immortal andmortal parts of the soul in the Timaeus is entirely compatible with thatimplied in the Laws 863 B–E, and therefore does not oblige us to rejectthe tripartition of the soul.80

It is obvious that the issue of the division of the soul in the Laws hasnot come to an end. The problematic described above, which focused on acomparable treatment between the psychological model in Plato’s last dia-logue and that found in the Republic, leaves the Timaeus aside, which is adialogue from the last writing period, and in which Plato dissects the souland the body paying due respect to physiology. In the Laws, when he dis-cusses the education of man in the course of the first three years of hislife, the philosopher seems to consider seriously all his instructions con-cerning the soul in the cosmogony dialogue. We have seen above that one

75 See e.g. Laws 863 A-864 B. Cf. Rees, 115.76 T.J. Saunders, ‘The Structure of the Soul and the State in Plato’s Laws’, Eranos, 60

(1962), 37–41.77 L.P. Gerson, ‘Akrasia and the Divided Soul in Plato’s Laws’, in S. Scolnicov and

L. Brisson (eds.), Plato’s Laws: From Theory into Practice (Proceedings of the VI Sym-posium Platonicum: Selected Papers; Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 2003), 153.Cf. Rees, 115; Saunders (1962), 38–9.

78 Gerson, 149ff. See indicatively his interpretation of the Laws 689 A5–B7. A similarview is proposed by R.F. Stalley, ‘Persuasion and the Tripartite Soul in Plato’s Repub-lic’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 32 (2007), 87–88, in the context of hismain objection to the arguments of C. Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast: His LaterEthics and Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2002), which were specified in Bobo-nich (1994). According to Stalley, the view of the parts of the soul as agent-like doesnot occupy a central position in the Republic’s moral psychology; therefore, any at-tempt to explain developments in later Platonic thought by keeping in the back-ground the philosopher’s intention to reject that view are to no purpose.

79 Saunders (1962), 38. This concerns his objection to Rees, 113.80 Gerson, 153.



aspect of virtue, that is, courage, could be acquired in a way which is con-siderably different from that which assigns to man another part of εὐψυχία,thus rendering him kindly,81 and this in the absence of reason (accordingto the definition of education in 653 A–C). That educational practice in-evitably presupposes the division of the soul, as it is described in the Ti-maeus, because, in effect, it constitutes a system of preventive therapy fortwo diseases, namely, those of cowardice and ill-temper, which in the samedialogue affect the upper and lower parts of the mortal soul respectively;moreover, the mortal soul, as ensues from the position of its bodily seats(69D ff), is clearly distinguished from the immortal soul, the carrier of rea-son (70 A). Additionally – and this is what obliges us even more to followthe psychological model in the Timaeus – it is ascertained that not onlydoes the overall educational practice, which is proposed for the acquire-ment of courage, follow but it also exploits the principles of physiologywhich are developed in the Timaeus, thus taking the issue of the educationof the soul one step further: motion as a means of care for the body inthe Timaeus becomes also a means of care for the soul in the Laws. Onthe one hand, the motion which the nurses need to impose on the infantscontributes to the nourishment of the body, a fact which undoubtedlyconfirms the convergence of the two dialogues, but, on the other, and thisis what is innovative, it also eradicates fear by normalizing the function ofthe heart, that is, by having an effect on the seat of the spirited part,according to the Timeaus. In essence, the motion in question functions asa regulatory factor in respiration in order to cure the soul, because in theTimaeus respiration, which is directly involved in the process of nourish-ment, is also related to the function of the heart. For the same purpose,that is, to regulate respiration, melody is also called upon, because har-mony, its main characteristic, is explained by means of the same principle,which supports the function of respiration, namely, the principle of circu-lar thrust.

If Plato proposes that particular treatment for infants, while keepingclear in his mind, as becomes obvious, the picture of the spirited part inthe Timaeus, then we are very close to arguing that the part of the soulwhich is educated in the Laws could have the characteristics of an agent-like part, since the spirited part in the Timaeus listens to the immortalsoul and cooperates with it, so that the appetitive part conforms to it,whenever it fails to comply with its will (70 A–C).82 If the above is valid,

81 Cf. the same characteristic which is attributed to the appetitive part in the Timaeus71 D.

82 Bobonich (1994), 25–26, as well as his opponent Stalley, 65, n. 5, do not believe thatthe appetitive part can, at least on some occasions, become convinced by reason. Platoclearly emphasizes the complete incompetence of the appetitive part in understanding

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then, each time we search for Platonic explanations for akratic action inthe Laws, we are compelled to consider seriously the possibility of theabsence of a courageous soul capable of cooperating with reason so as tocombat desire. In reality, despite courage, which emerges out of a victoryagainst cowardice, that is, against inner fears and pains, another form ofcourage is necessary, so that one is not partly but fully virtuous: couragewhich emerges out of a victory against pleasures and lusts that lure ustoward shamelessness and injustice (647 C–D).83 Education for the formerbegins, as was shown above, during the first years of one’s life, while forthe latter during subsequent years84 in alliance with reason (which is man-ifested by speech), which makes a difference by opening up the road totemperance.85

it (71 A). What is more, the former commentator argues that this observation byPlato is indicative of his tendency to abandon the psychological model of the agent-like parts, because the appetitive part does not meet those requirements that are char-acteristic of an agent-like part. Yet, that position is quite precarious, considering theentrusted role of the spirited part as an obedient intermediary, so that the appetitivepart comes into contact with the commands and threats of reason and submits to it.In other words, the spirited part communicates with the other parts and participatesin a persuasion process, both of which are, according to Bobonich (1994), 4, charac-teristic attributes of an agent-like part in the Republic.

83 Cf. E.B. England, The Laws of Plato, vol. I (Manchester: Manchester University Press1921), 263.

84 ‘alike in play and at work’ (ἔν τε παιδιαῖς καὶ ἐν σπουδαῖς, 647 D 7–8). Games (παιδιαί)are employed as educational means after the first three years. See Laws 794 A.

85 ‘in the case of temperance, on the other hand, a man may attain perfection without astubborn fight against hordes of pleasures and lusts which entice towards shameless-ness and wrong-doing, and without conquering them by the aid of speech and actand skill’ (σώφρων δὲ ἄρα τελέως ἔσται μὴ πολλαῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις προτρεπούσαιςἀναισχυντεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖν διαμεμαχημένος καὶ νενικηκὼς μετὰ λόγου καὶ ἔργου καὶ τέχνης,647 D 4–7).



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The Psychological Background of the First Education in Plato’s Laws

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