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P age | 1 [email protected] The Public Pension Black Hole Sucked into the vortex of an undiscovered universe August 18 th , 2016 Mike Newman Beauty of pension accounting CalPERS has $412bn unfunded liability or 3x state tax revenue or 20% of GDP Using 20yr yields as appropriate market rate “It’s not what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It’s what you know for sure that just ain’t so!” Mark Twain The beauty of pension accounting is that slight tweaks can make a large unfunded liability seemingly disappear or at the very least shrink it to “she’ll be alright mate” level s. However if a pension fund plays the game of understating its risks for long enough then eventually it catches up, especially if performance is consistently poor. This is what we are starting to see in vivid colour among state and local (S&L) governments in America. Reality is biting. Let’s jump right in. California Dreaming To put this in perspective the California Public Employee Retirement System (CalPERS) lost around 2% of its funds in 2015/16. The fund assumes an aggressive 7.5% return. Dr. Joe Nation of Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research thinks unfunded liabilities have surged to $150bn from $93bn in the last two years. Furthermore suggesting the use of a more realistic 4% rate of return. CalPERS has an unfunded liability of $412bn (or the equivalent of 3 years’ worth of state revenue). California collects $138bn in taxes annually in a $2.3 trillion economy (around the size of Italy). With over- inflated asset markets and increasingly negative returns on highly rated paper, the growth in unfunded liabilities is even more concerning as any market correction (likely to be severe given such blatant manipulation to date). If the correction is huge it will push the unfunded portion to even more dizzying levels. US Pension Tracker (USPT) defines its methodology to assess the true mark-to-market value of unfunded liabilities versus actuarial assumptions. [We] reflect market pension debt using a discount rate equal to 20-year Treasury yields rounded to the nearest one-quarter percentage point. The yield in 2014 was 3.00%. The use of this discount rate here is intended, as most financial economists agree, to more closely represent market realities and system liabilities.”
Transcript

P a g e | 1 [email protected]

The Public Pension Black Hole

Sucked into the vortex of an undiscovered universe August 18th, 2016

Mike Newman

Beauty of pension

accounting

CalPERS has $412bn

unfunded liability or 3x

state tax revenue or

20% of GDP

Using 20yr yields as

appropriate market rate

“It’s not what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It’s what you know for sure that just ain’t so!” – Mark Twain The beauty of pension accounting is that slight tweaks can make a large unfunded liability seemingly

disappear or at the very least shrink it to “she’ll be alright mate” levels. However if a pension fund

plays the game of understating its risks for long enough then eventually it catches up, especially if

performance is consistently poor. This is what we are starting to see in vivid colour among state and

local (S&L) governments in America. Reality is biting. Let’s jump right in.

California Dreaming

To put this in perspective the California Public Employee Retirement System (CalPERS) lost around

2% of its funds in 2015/16. The fund assumes an aggressive 7.5% return. Dr. Joe Nation of Stanford

Institute for Economic Policy Research thinks unfunded liabilities have surged to $150bn from $93bn

in the last two years. Furthermore suggesting the use of a more realistic 4% rate of return. CalPERS

has an unfunded liability of $412bn (or the equivalent of 3 years’ worth of state revenue). California

collects $138bn in taxes annually in a $2.3 trillion economy (around the size of Italy). With over-

inflated asset markets and increasingly negative returns on highly rated paper, the growth in

unfunded liabilities is even more concerning as any market correction (likely to be severe given such

blatant manipulation to date). If the correction is huge it will push the unfunded portion to even more

dizzying levels.

US Pension Tracker (USPT) defines its methodology to assess the true mark-to-market value of

unfunded liabilities versus actuarial assumptions.

“[We] reflect market pension debt using a discount rate equal to 20-year Treasury yields rounded to

the nearest one-quarter percentage point. The yield in 2014 was 3.00%. The use of this discount

rate here is intended, as most financial economists agree, to more closely represent market realities

and system liabilities.”

P a g e | 2 [email protected]

20yr yields were 3% in

2014 now 1.7%

California unfunded

pension impact could

be as high as 18% of GDP

USPT assumes that public pension funds have a market based unfunded pension deficit of $4.833

trillion. The actuarial base (using a discount rate of 7.5%) of the pension deficit is approximately

$1.041 trillion. This assumes an unfunded portion of $3.8 trillion. Using the 2016 20-year US

Treasury bond yield of 1.71% the market based pension deficit explodes to over $8.8 trillion or a

$7.5 trillion unfunded portion equating to around $74,000 per American household. For California

alone this would push the pension debt per person above $135,000.

Source: Custom Products Research

The US Federal Reserve (Fed) reported in 2013 that the State of California had an official unfunded

pension liability status equivalent to 43% of state revenue. However, if marked-to-market with

realistic discount rates we estimate that it is equivalent to 300% of state revenue or 7x greater.

Going back to 2000, California had an unfunded liability less than 11% of tax collections. As a

percent of GDP it has grown from 2% to 9.7% based on official figures. If our estimate is correct,

the mark-to market reality is that California's unfunded state pension (i.e. for public servants only)

is around 18% of state GDP!

Source: US Pension Tracker

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Fig.1: US 20 Year Treasury - Yield (%)

Now 1.71%

-30%

124%

297%

-50%

0%

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Fig.2: 2008 vs 2014 Market Pension Debt/State Total General Tax Revenue growth rate (%)

P a g e | 3 [email protected]

Impacts by state

The impact can be seen in Figs. 3-5. Gross pension debt marked-to-market at a 3% discount rate

works out at 9.6x California’s tax take and its impact on households has grown from $36,000 to

almost $78,000 between 2008 and 2014.

Source: US Pension Tracker

0.42

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ada

Fig.3: 2014 Total Market Pension Debt/State Total General Tax Revenues (x)

$58,253

$36,159

($11,608)

($20,000)

($10,000)

$0

$10,000

$20,000

$30,000

$40,000

$50,000

$60,000

$70,000

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Fig.4: 2008 Market Pension Debt/Household (US$) by state

$113,137

$77,700

$10,822

$0

$20,000

$40,000

$60,000

$80,000

$100,000

$120,000

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Fig.5: 2014 Market Pension Debt/Household (US$) by state

P a g e | 4 [email protected]

Risks for S&L

governments

Rewind to 2008

Bloated public

salaries

Crash hits

Vallejo missed its

obligations

Actuarial balance

Pressure mounts

It wasn’t just Vallejo

The risk of S&L governments going bust could become a reality yet no one is really thinking deeply

about the path out of it. It is a nightmare for Main Street who will likely have to wear it through higher

taxes and lower payouts.

Summary of a piece from the Pacific Research Institute, ‘Going broke one city at a time’

Rewind to 2008. The municipality of Vallejo, California filed for bankruptcy. It wasn't just the evil

bankers that caused financial markets to collapse resulting in tax revenues shrivelling. Sadly, the

city of Vallejo was living high on the hog. Bloated pensions and fat cat salaries for public servants

ruled by stubborn unions created a scenario where it could not bail water fast enough when the

crash hit.

The police captain was paid over US$300,000 while his lieutenants were on c.US$250,000. The

average fire fighter took home US$170,000. The police and firefighters pay and conditions sucked

up three-quarters of the budget much more than the 55-60% of most municipalities. That $80mn

budget suddenly faced a $17mn black hole.

The city was forced to fire 40% of its 260 police officers and told its residents to be judicious with

calling 911. Crime rates soared above the state average.

Vallejo did not sort its pension obligations to CalPERS during its bankruptcy negotiations which

ended up becoming its largest budget hole by a considerable margin. Even in 2011 when the city

came out of bankruptcy the pension time bomb ticked away. Moreover, the declaration of bankruptcy

prevented access to bond financing making budget gap filling even more complicated.

Fast forward to 2016, the anaemic (and slowing) economic growth around the world is putting stress

on pension funds ability to payout retirees and fund future pensions. Pension funds set "return

targets" which actuaries calculate to ensure the fund stays solvent. However, pension funds need

to be diversified with a mixture of cash, bonds and equities. With equities reaching more outlandish

valuations and bonds moving further into negative yield territory (capital appreciating at least)

pension fund returns are undershooting. When pension funds undershoot then the unfunded

liabilities keep growing. As more baby boomers retire the more outflows are putting more pressure

on the unfunded portions.

Vallejo was small fry but the risk of more cities declaring bankruptcy in coming years is something

that isn't even on investor, national government or central bank radar screens. We are fed more of

the same tripe that all is ok and they're in control.

San Bernardino, California also filed for bankruptcy after GFC carrying $140mn in unfunded pension

liabilities including $50mn in debt it had to raise to fill the pension hole. Yes! It was borrowing money

to plug a pension hole. Sort of like buying groceries on the credit card you can't pay off.

San Jose spends 20% of its $1bn budget on healthcare and pensions given the generous offer

following 30 years’ service in police or firefighting. They net 90% of final salary every year to see

P a g e | 5 [email protected]

San Bernardino

San Jose

Detroit pension & healthcare obligations 4x revenue

out their retirement. Those sweet deals are now being contested in court giving people the option

of the same deal with much higher contributions or accept a higher retirement age with a lower

payment.

Take Detroit, Michigan. It declared bankruptcy around this time three years ago. Its pension and

healthcare obligations total north of US$10bn or 4x its annual budget. Accumulated deficits are 7x

larger than collections. Dr. Wayne Winegarden of George Mason University wrote that in 2011 half

of those occupying the city's 305,000 properties didn't pay tax. Almost 80,000 were unoccupied

meaning no revenue in the door. Over the three years post the GFC Detroit's population plunged

from 1.8mn to 700,000 putting even more pressure on the shrinking tax base.

The Federal Reserve has documented the current status (latest data is 2013) on unfunded public

pension liabilities at the state and local levels versus state GDP and annual tax revenues.

Source: US Federal Reserve

(60.00)

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Fig. 6: Public Pension shortfall status as % of state revenue - 2000

Shortfall

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Fig 7: Public Pension shortfall status as % of state revenue - 2013

Only West Virginia & Oregon saw an improvement vs 2000

Shortfall

P a g e | 6 [email protected]

Hard action

needed

Figs. 6-7 show the extent of the growing pension shortfalls. In order for states and local

municipalities to overcome such gaps, they must reorganise the terms. It could be a simple task of

telling retiree John Smith that his $75,000 annuity promised decades ago is now $25,000 as the

alternative could be even worse if the terms are not accepted. I doubt many Americans will accept

that hands down, leading to class actions and even more turmoil.

Source: US Federal Reserve

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Fig.8: Unfunded public pension status as a % of state GDP (2000)

Shortfall

(30.00)

(25.00)

(20.00)

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th C

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201

3

Nev

ada

201

3

Co

lora

do

201

3

Mis

sou

ri 2

013

Mic

hig

an 2

013

Cal

ifo

rnia

201

3

Ari

zon

a 2

013

Ver

mo

nt

201

3

Geo

rgia

201

3

Sou

th D

ako

ta 2

013

Mar

ylan

d 2

013

Un

ited

Sta

tes

2013

Mo

nta

na

201

3

Ala

bam

a 20

13

New

Ham

psh

ire

201

3

Min

nes

ota

201

3

Kan

sas

201

3

Wes

t V

irgi

nia

201

3

Okl

aho

ma

2013

New

Yo

rk 2

013

Mai

ne

201

3

Vir

gin

ia 2

013

Wyo

min

g 20

13

Ark

ansa

s 20

13

Ore

gon

20

13

No

rth

Dak

ota

201

3

Neb

rask

a 2

013

Flo

rid

a 2

013

Uta

h 2

013

Was

hin

gto

n 2

013

Idah

o 2

013

Ind

ian

a 20

13

No

rth

Car

olin

a 2

013

Iow

a 20

13

Ten

nes

see

201

3

Del

awar

e 2

013

Texa

s 20

13

Dis

tric

t o

f C

olu

mb

ia 2

013

Wis

con

sin

201

3

Fig.9: Unfunded public pension status as % of state GDP (2013)

Shortfall

P a g e | 7 [email protected]

State of Illinois the

worst

Fed figures

Unfunded Liabilities are 100% of tax

collection

Count on yourself

The State of Illinois is the worst in the Fed study, Fig.9. The unfunded pension liability is around

24% of state GDP. In 2000 the unfunded gap to state revenue was 30% and in 2013 was 124% in

2013, Figs 6-7. Alaska is at 20% of GDP up from 0.27%.

On a gross country level, the US Fed reports that aggregated S&L unfunded pension amount of

$1.35 trillion in 2013 from $94.8bn in 2000. As a percentage of GDP it has climbed from 0.9% of

GDP to 8.19% over that same period. If the FT is right in assuming a $3.4tn (we think $3.8tn by their

reckoning) pension funding gap today then the impact should be 2.5x higher or 20% of US GDP.

Putting unfunded liabilities as a percentage of state tax collections under that scenario and we would

effectively see 100% of state budgets across America be required to close the gap. Of course the

entire gap doesn't require immediate action (because all retirees aren't happening at once) to get it

to zero. However getting it to a point where it could safely cover future liabilities on realistic returns

over the long run would still require significant injections. Such injections would crimp S&L services

causing retrenchment of staff, public services and so on.

Source: US Pension Tracker

Perhaps more alarming is that with asset prices so artificially inflated we must question the mark-

to-market pension assumptions should equity and bond markets collapse, leaving even larger

unfunded liabilities with the ensuing economic impacts crushing tax collection creating an even more

vicious circle. As Caroline Burnham said on American Beauty, "You cannot count on anyone but

yourself!"

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

Sou

th D

ako

ta

Dis

tric

t o

f C

olu

mb

ia

Ten

nes

see

Uta

h

Wis

con

sin

New

Yo

rk

No

rth

Car

olin

a

Del

awar

e

Neb

rask

a

Idah

o

Was

hin

gto

n

Min

nes

ota

No

rth

Dak

ota

Iow

a

Ark

ansa

s

Mai

ne

Texa

s

Flo

rid

a

Ind

ian

a

Wes

t V

irgi

nia

Geo

rgia

Ver

mo

nt

Mas

sach

use

tts

Okl

aho

ma

Ore

gon

Oh

io

Mis

sou

ri

Haw

aii

Rh

od

e Is

lan

d

Wyo

min

g

New

Mex

ico

Mo

nta

na

Mar

ylan

d

Vir

gin

ia

Ala

ska

Kan

sas

New

Ham

psh

ire

New

Jer

sey

Ala

bam

a

Co

nn

ecti

cut

Ari

zon

a

Cal

ifo

rnia

Lou

isia

na

Mis

siss

ipp

i

Pe

nn

sylv

ania

Ken

tuck

y

Sou

th C

aro

lina

Co

lora

do

Nev

ada

Illin

ois

Mic

hig

an

Fig. 10: Actuarial (assumes 7.5% return) Pension Debt/State Total General Tax Revenues 2014 vs 2008 (x)

2008 Actuarial Pension Debt/State Total General Fund Revenues 2014 Actuarial Pension Debt/State Total General Fund Revenues

P a g e | 8 [email protected]

Bring in the B-52s.

Helicopters

too small

This going to hurt

Summary

This study is a mere snapshot of the state of public pensions in the US. Once again we have a

festering problem that is turning gangrenous yet not enough attention is being focused on solutions.

The over reliance on authorities to get us out of this economic mess is concerning. Perhaps there

is a wish that helicopter money (as B-52 might be more appropriate) will somehow kick off inflation

and cut back into these unfunded liabilities. However, we should be careful what we wish for. The

risk of duration on the negative yielding debt would wipe out large portions of pension assets making

the journey highly challenging not to mention any hyper-inflation risks would reduce the purchasing

power of any retirees who got paid their promised distributions. Quite simply there is no easy way

out of this and whatever solution is found will involve pain. For all the kicking and screaming in the

world, the problem has festered over the past decade and many administrators have chosen not to

do anything serious about it. Brace yourselves.

.

P a g e | 9 [email protected]

Tokyo 14/F Win Aoyama 942 2-2-15 Minamiaoyama Minato-ku, Tokyo Japan 107-0062

Office Locations

Tokyo Michael Newman

+81-80-4446-8200 [email protected]

Contacts

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