The Race-Intelligence Controversy I (Harwood)

5/25/2018 The Race-Intelligence Controversy I (Harwood)

1/27

The Race-Intelligence Controversy: A Sociological Approach I - Professional FactorsAuthor(s): Jonathan HarwoodSource: Social Studies of Science, Vol. 6, No. 3/4, Special Issue: Aspects of the Sociology ofScience: Papers from a Conference, University of York, UK 16-18 September 1975 (Sep., 1976),pp. 369-394Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/284688.Accessed: 02/02/2014 14:21

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Sage Publications, Ltd.is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Social Studies ofScience.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 129.78.72.28 on Sun, 2 Feb 2014 14:21:57 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sageltdhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/284688?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/284688?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sageltd


2/27

Social StudiesofScience,6 (1976), 369-94

The Race-Intelligenceontroversy:A SociologicalApproachI - ProfessionalFactorsJonathanHarwood

To understandwhysciencedevelopsas it does. what onemustunderstand... is themanner nwhich a particular et of sharedvalues nteracts ith theparticularxperiences haredbya communityf specialiststonsure hatmostmembersof the groupwfllultimately indone set of arguments ather hananother ecisiveThe debate about race and intelligencenlybeginsto make sensewhenit isseen as one intemalto academiclife; betweentwogroupsof menwho differin personality, n academicbackground,nd inpolitical ndsocial allegiance.2

For overfiftyyearsscientists,particularlyn the UnitedStates,havedisagreed over the interpretationof a common observation: thatAmerican whites score on average about fifteenpoints higheronstandardizedtestsof intelligence'IQ tests') thando AmericanNegroes.Although many scientists familiarwith the argumentshave notcommittedthemselves n the issue,severalhave perceivedthedata asfavouring itheran 'hereditarian'or an 'environmentalist'xplanationfor this IQ gap.3 Since 1969, ArthurJensen'smonograph How MuchCan We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?'4has provokeda re-emergence f thiscontroversy.In this paper I focus on severalenvironmentalistsnd hereditariansin the current hase of therace-IQ controversynd attempt o explaintheir advocacy in terms of professional circumstances which inclineparticipants in the controversy o maximize their own discipline'sexplanatoryrole. In a companion paper,5 I relatethiscontroversyoAuthor's address: Departmentof Liberal Studies in Science, The University,Manchester,M13 9PL, UK.

369

This content downloaded from 129.78.72.28 on Sun, 2 Feb 2014 14:21:57 PMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/27

370 Social Studies of Sciencethe contrastingworld-viewsof environmentalistsnd hereditarians,manifestboth in the contentof theirpoliticalcommitmentsnd in thestyle n whichtheir cientific ositions re expressed.6Thus, in this study, scientificcontroversy s approached 'sym-metrically': both positions in the debate are seen as requiringexplanation. As the Popper-Kuhn debate has emphasized, it isincreasinglyunclear in what sense(s) theory-choice n accreditedscientific esearch s dictatedsolelyby establishedmethodological ules.This uncertaintytends to underminethe long-standing istinctionbetweentheways inwhich true nd falsebeliefs rise:namely, hrough'rational' and 'irrational'processes,respectively.One responseto thissituation is to declare even science irrational; if one takes the(traditional) view that only irrational beliefs are amenable tosociological explanation, then the symmetrical approach stands.Anotherresponse9 treats ll institutionalizedelief ystems s rational,socially constructed, nd thusrequiring at least in part) a sociologicalaccount. A thirdposition,advocated by mostphilosophers f science,treats the historyof science as a mixture of rationaland irrationaldecisions. 'Rational' decisions are those which accord with theparticularphilosopher'spreferredpistemology nd are seen to requireno special explanation. The 'irrational' emainder s thenallocated tosociologistsand 'externalist'historians.1 Since philosophers fsciencedo not agreeon the best epistemology, owever, he thirdpositiondoesnot provideany consistent uidelinesas to which portionsof scientifichistoryare rational or irrational. Consequently the sociologist onceagainmusttreat ll scientific nowledge dentically.Urbachl1 has recently pplied Lakatos'smodel for themethodologyof scientificresearch programmes1 to the debate over individualand group differences n IQ. Persuasive as his analysis is in showingthe heretofore progressive' character of the hereditarianresearchprogrammeand the 'degenerating'haracterof the environmentalistone, such an analysiscannotbe used to arguethat theenvironmentalistposition is any less 'scientific' or more in need of sociological(psychological, economic, etc.) explanation than the hereditarianposition. For Lakatos's model fails to specifythe conditions n whichretention f a degeneratingesearchprogramme ecomes irrational'.13From another angle, the race-IQ controversy s, in any event,unresolved accordingto the hereditarians nd environmentalistshem-selves. As I have argued elsewhere4, both positions in the debateare based on fundamental ssumptions s to whether r not Americanblack and white populations can legitimatelybe equated for IQ-



4/27

Harwood: The Race-Intelligence ontroversy 371relevant environmental actors.At present,there are no consensualscientific riteriafor decidingwhich of theseassumptions s trueandthus (on the traditional grounds described above) exempt fromsociological explanation. Each side of the debate includescompetentscientists and cannot easily be dismissed as 'hack science'. The taskremains, herefore, o identify he 'sets of sharedvalues' whichdisposehereditarians nd environmentalistso finddifferent ets of argumentsconvincing.

SOURCES OF DISAGREEMENT: SOCIAL FACTORS WITHIN THESCIENTIFIC COMMUNITYOne of the more conspicuous differences etween hereditarians ndenvironmentalistss that the former eem on the whole more apt tobe biologistsor to do research oncernedwithorganicvariables,whileenvironmentalists are more likely to be social scientists or

TABLE 1. Participants n theControversy*'Hereditarians' Discipline MethodologicalOrientationA.R. Jensen* psychology soft-hardH.J.Eysenck** psychology hardR.B. Cattell* psychology hardDwight ngle physiologyRichardHernstein** psychology hard'Environmentalists'A.H. Halsey sociologyJ.McVickerHunt** psychology softMartinDeutsch** psychology softEdmundGordon educationAshleyMontagu anthropology softChristopher ncks sociologyStevenRose neuro-biologyRichardLewontin populationgenetics -WalterBodmer populationgenetics -Jerry irsch** behaviourgenetics*referredo inthispaper * *interviewedy author



5/27

372 Social StudiesofScienceeducationalists.' One physicalanthropologist, aught n thecrossfire,illustrateshisdisciplinaryplit:

At Chapel Hill [site of the University f NorthCarolina], I serveboth theAnatomy Department, where I am considered a liberal, and theAnthropologyDepartmentwhere I am considereda conservative. ome inAnatomy apparentlyview man's behaviourdifferences s racial and thusgenetic;some in Anthropology pparently ee these differencess purelyamatterof cultureand view our biologicalinheritance s essentially niformsince H. erectus. 16

Membersof each group of disciplinestypically tressthe importanceof those variableswhich they study and of the literaturewithwhichthey are most familiar.Thus the race-IQ debate can be seen to someextentas an example of a boundarydispute.' 7 One of thereasonsforsuch disputes s that the scientific rainingwhichtheprotagonists aveundergone s necessarilyhighly elective.Consequently ach side tendsto impugnthe competence (and thus the rightto participate n thedebate) of theiropponents.'8 For example, some of Jensen'scriticshave suggestedthat he is sociologicallynaive,while severalenviron-mentalists' ppositionto thehereditarian ypothesis n therace-IQgaphas been based on the (mistaken) notion that, for example, highheritability stimatesfor IQ mean that education can do nothingtoaffecteitheran individualchild's IQ or the distribution f individualIQ differencesn a population.Similarly,t is usuallyenvironmentalistswith social scientific rainingwho have ruledout even theplausibilityof the hereditarianhypothesis; those environmentalistsrained asgeneticistshave tended to grantthe plausibilityof the hereditarianhypothesiswhile arguing that the likelihood of it being true is low(or at least that presentevidence is inadequate). Thus differencesntraining ould also account for some of the heterogeneity ithintheenvironmentalist camp.A second reasonforboundarydisputesconcernsgroups'perceptionsof their self-interest. Where shifting one's cognitive allegiances isdifficult,membersof a disciplinewill seek to maximize the numberand significance f phenomenathat fall withinthe explanatoryreachof theirdiscipline'stheories.This strategy ids disciplinemembers nsecuring professional recognition and thus occupational security. Thatsuch a strategy inevitably influences the emphasis to be found in ascientist's work is recognized by the scientists themselves.' 9 Abehaviour geneticist writes:



6/27

Harwood: The Race-Intelligence ontroversy 37 3Differencesmong ndividualsan be compared ith he smallpart f theiceberghat hows bove hewater. ehavioureneticistsepend n ndividualdifferencesor their ivelihood. s a result, hey tend to overlook heenormous mount f common eredityshared y all human aces]thatdistinguishesan romogorhorse.20Such selectiveattention o geneticdifferencesmightwellpredisposegeneticists r differentialsychologistsin general)to emphasize argerheritabilitystimates nd to be morereceptive hansocial scientists othe possibilityof genetic differences etweenpopulations.Similarly,Cronbach has suggested hat educationaltechnologieswhichsucceed inreducing he rangeofindividual ifferencesn IQ (whichcompensatoryeducation has attempted) would ultimatelyput the IQ testers ut ofbusiness.2 Since many environmentalistsavebeen committed o thesearchforsuch technologies, nd since several f thehereditarians avebeen professionallyoncernedwith the construction nd validationofobjective tests,professional elf-interestrovidesa partialexplanationfor hereditarians' and environmentalists' isagreement over the

importance of group IQ differences and the alleged failure ofcompensatory ducation.Furthermorethere are many indications that research into thepossible relevance of genetic factors for explaining various socialproblems or group behaviouraldifferences s veryunpopular, t leastamong academic audiences in the United States at present,makingfinancial support for such research a scarce commodity.2 Thiscircumstancewould help to explainwhyhereditarians ave so stronglypromoted a 'no-holds-barred'pproach to research nd attackedwhatthey see as the suppressionof theirviewsby orthodoxand dogmaticenvironmentalism. he more strongly hehereditariansan arguetheircase, themore likelytheywill be able to getgrants orfuture esearchin theirfieldsand - just as crucial - the less grantmoney s apt to beavailableforthestudyofenvironmentalnfluences.Along similar ines, in trying o understand he re-emergence ftherace-IQ controversyn the late 1960s, it may be pertinent o note theinstitutionalization f the new field of 'behaviourgenetics' at aboutthe same time. The firsttextbook in this area appeared in 1960,followedby a numberofpublishedconference roceedings nd reviewsinthe 60s and the ournal,BehaviorGenetics, in 1970. During he 60sthe first of the (American) post-graduatetrainingprogrammes nbehaviourgeneticswere introduced at severaluniversities.23t is notsurprising hat several scientists n this new and growingfield haveassertedbehaviourgenetics' right o be recognizedby the othermore



7/27

374 Social Studies ofScienceestablishedbehavioural ciencesas a legitimate ieldof inquiry nd havetaken pride in what they perceive as the gradually diminishingdisciplinary opposition to the importance of genetic factors inbehaviour.24While behaviourgeneticists re by no means agreed onthe group-differences-in-IQssue, it is reasonable to suppose thatthegrowth of a coherent behaviour-genetic iterature and of anacademically respectable research area encouraged Jensen to re-introducethe apparendystrengthened ereditarianposition n thelate'60s. Consistentwith this view was the publication in 1972 of a'Statement on Behaviour and Heredity'2 which, in effect,gaveacademic support to Jensen,Eysenck, Herrnstein nd otherswhosebehaviour-genetic research had come under widespread attack,especially on Americancampuses,since 1969. Of thefifty ignatorieson the statement,five scientists in addition to Jensen,Eysenck,Herrnstein, attell and Ingle) could be readilyassociatedwiththenewfield of behaviourgenetics.26Conversely, hehostileenvironmentalistresponseto Jensenmay be interpretedn partas professional esistanceamongsome areas of the social sciences to the perceived hreatfromnew sub-discipline lexing ts aliengenetic ndquantitativemusclesandstakingts claimto explaininggroupbehaviouraldifferences.One of the, at the first glance awkward,facts with which the'boundary dispute hypothesis'must contend is that throughoutthehistoryof the nature-nurtureebate, psychologists s a group havehardlydisplayedwhat one could call a 'disciplinary' lignment; heirsupport has been scatteredon both sides of the debate. Such splitallegiance,however, s of considerable nterestn itselfforpsychologyhas, since its beginnings in late 19tX-centuryGermany, been aconglomerationof 'schools' withgreatlydifferingubjectmatters ndmethodological commitments.We must ask: Are hereditarianandenvironmentalist sychologistsassociated with different chools ofpsychology Ifso,why?Before dealingwith the firstof these questions, t is important oconsider what form the fragmentation f contemporary sychologymighttake. Two recentbooks haveportrayed heprevailingpproachesto behaviour n verysimilarways. In The Science of Behavior nd TheImage of Man,2 Chein describestwo sub-culturesn the behaviouralscienceswhich he calls 'clinicalist'and 'neo-behaviourist'. he formeris characterizedby an attempt to understand very nstance n all itsindividuality', uspicion of fixed schemesof classificationnd generallaws, distrustof statistical evidence, reliance on intuition,and aninterest more in modifyingor extending hypotheses than in dis-



8/27

Harwood: TheRace-Intelligence ontroversy 375confirming them. The latter is characteristically ommitted to'scientificmethod', experiment,quantification,reductionism, nd astress on precision and certainty. n The Cult of the Fact,28 LiamHudson locates psychology s a disciplinebetweenthe natural cienceson the one hand and the humanitieson the otherwith most of itspractitionersattracted to one neighbouror the other. The 'soft'tradition in psychology including Freudian and social psychology)is said to stress ntuition nd imagination,s 'concerned ess with law-making than with speculative exploration'2 9 and takes seriouslypersons' thoughts and experiences. The 'hard' tradition (includingexperimental, behavioural and physiological psychology) is 'self-consciously scientific'30 and mechanistic, tresses measurement ndempiricism,nd discounts the importance f individuals' elf-awarenessand thoughtswhile tryingto explain behaviour with simple laws.Hudson writesof havingwatched his 'hard' youngcontemporariesnpsychology align themselveswith the forcesof enlightenment..'3 1Such close correspondence between Chein's and Hudson'scharacterizations ears fruitwhen applied to the first f thequestionsraisedabove. The hereditarian sychologists Jensen,Eysenck,Cattelland Herrnstein can all be readily dentifiedwith the hard'tradition.Hunt and Deutsch - theonlyenvironmentalistsychologists orwhomI have relevant nformation would both, I think,be associatedwiththe 'soft' tradition.32 Significandy erhaps,theenvironmentalisterryHirsch - who is a professorboth of zoology and of psychology iswell-known, inter alia, for a trenchant critique of behaviouristpsychology.3 Why should thiscorrespondence etweenhard/softndhereditarian/environmentalistxistamongst the psychologists tudied?Since these psychologists'membership of the 'soft' and 'hard'subdisciplinesprecedes their involvement n the race-IQ debate, theproblem becomes one of explaininghow such soft/hard rientationsmight predispose a psychologist to take up an environmentalist/hereditarian osition.One might rguethat theprocess of 'professionalsocialization' (e.g., PhD training nd/oractual experiencewithin aresearch tradition) confers upon the actor a set of preferencesconcerningmethodology, xplanatory ariables, nd so on,bywhich heorientshimselfwhen facedwith a choiceof intellectual ositions.Thusbehaviouristswould tend to favourpositionswhich are experimental,quantitative, non-introspective n character, while those of 'soft'persuasion would lean toward positionswhich are non-quantitativeand rely more on the observer's ntuitionfor the interpretation fmeaningful ehaviour. The disadvantageof thisexplanation s thatone



9/27

376 Social Studies ofSciencehas no way of excluding he possibility hat actors'methodological ndtechnical preferences re establishedwell before they undergo pro-fessional socialization and perhaps even account, in part, for theacademic disciplines in which they choose to be trained.34Amoreproductive line of inquiry consists of treatingthe soft and hardtraditions in psychology as 'styles of thought'whose features canbe identifiedn environmentalistnd hereditarian riting.

STYLES OF THOUGHTIn his essay 'Conservative Thought',3 Mannheim introduces theconcept of 'style of thought' in order to analyze the relationshipbetween a group's social situation and its intellectualproductions.He suggeststhat Weltanschauungencan be characterizednot onlyby what is said but by the way in which it is said: 'content' isdistinguishedrom form' or style).

In thisessay Mannheimdiscusseshow, in reactionto theideologicalpressureof the French Revolution,a 'conservative' tyle of thoughtdeveloped in 19th-century ermany, tressing recisely hoseelementsof thoughtwhich were absent in the Bourgeois iberal' or 'natural-law'thoughtof the Enlightenment. hus, for example, the methodologicalcharacteristicsfnatural-lawhought re heldto be:1. rationalismnd a faith nthescientificpproach2. quantitative hinkingnd continuity3. a preference or bstraction nd theory4. an atomistic nd reductionist onceptionofwholes5. an insistence n the universal pplicationofprinciples6. an orientation oward the future and progress) ather han thepastand7. 'static' thinking,n the sense that ethical ustificationsre made onthe groundsof 'the rightreason' rather han in termsof historicalexplanation.

In contrast, onservativehought isplays:1. a stress n intuition nd the limits f rationalist hinking2. a stress n qualitativedifferencesnd discontinuity3. a preference ortheparticular,he concrete nd practice4. the view that the whole is greater han the sum of its parts andthat the individualparts can be understoodonly as parts of thewiderwhole



10/27

Harwood: The Race-Intelligence ontroversy 3775. an antipathy owards xplanation n terms fgeneral aws6. an orientation owardthepastand7. a certain dynamism',seen in the use of concepts like 'dialectic'and the stress on historical and developmental explanation/

justification.It is reasonably clear that thenatural-law tyleofthought esemblesthe hard' traditioneg., infeatures to 5), while the conservativetyleshares severalcharacteristics iththe soft' traditioneg., features1,2,3 and 5). More striking, owever, re themany respects n which thefundamental intellectual differences between hereditarians andenvironmentalistsall into 'natural-law' nd 'conservative'categories.The evidence for such hereditarian nd environmentalist tyles ofthought s presented elow.36

1) Rationalismvs. IntuitionHereditarianwriting bounds with statements tressinghe importanceof rationality, areful cientificmethod, hardfacts', ogical argument,objectivity, nd the like, overagainst heevilsofsuperstitiorlr.unreason,emotion.3 Hereditarians ave taken theview thatmoreresearch ntothe basis of race differencesn IQ is desirable, nd thatwhile currentmethods may not allow a conclusive estof the hereditarian ypothesis,scientific ingenuity - given adequate financial support - can becounted on to sortout the problems;science is seen as a 'good thing'and the more of it the better. Environmentalistsave been far lesssanguine about scientists'ability to resolve this controversyn theforeseeable future, nd have correspondingly ended to oppose theexpansion of research in this area. Furthermore, ereditarianshavetaken environmentalists o task for theirfailure to deduce precise,testable hypotheses from clearly formulated, explicit theory.3Environmentalistsave defended their position on the grounds of itsplausibility. nsistenceon methodological igour s notably absent fromenvironmentalistwriting. This contrast between hereditarian andenvironmentalist pproaches can be seen quite clearly in their dis-agreementover the likelihood that as yet unknown environmentalfactors e.g., racism) could combine to account for the lower averageIQ of Negroes. Environmentalistsend to believe ntuitively39 hat thelong and continuing istory f discriminationgainstAmericanNegroesmust depress theirmental testperformances; ere4itariansre scepticalof this until it can be demonstratedthat having a black skin is of



11/27

378 Social Studies of Scienceitself a cognitivedisadvantage.40 Hereditarians tressthe inadequacyof known, measurable environmental ariables n accounting for therace-IQ gap (much as uniformitarian eologists nsisted on explainingthe earth's history solely in terms of contemporaryvisible forces).Similarly, environmentalistshave played down the significance ofhigh heritability stimatesfor IQ on the groundsthat manipulationofas yet unknown IQ-relevantenvironmentsmightreduce heritabilityestimates markedly. The hereditarians prefer instead to takeheritability stimates seriously because these are seen to express therelative importance of the only measurable environmental ffects.

2) Quantitative-Continuitys.Qualitative-DiscontinuityThis aspect of the two sides' disagreementmay be seen in theirapproaches to matching Negroes and whites for IQ-relevant nviron-mental factors. Hereditarians tend to see Negroes' environmentaldisadvantages relative to whites as merely a matter of degree;matching Negroes and whites for socio-economic status is thereforeregarded as reasonably adequate.41 Socioeconomic statusis perceivedas a single continuumalong which environments ary quantitativelyin their stimulationof IQ. Middle-classNegroes are seen to inhabitabout as good environments s middle-classwhites, and in any casebetter environments han working-classwhites. Environmentalists,nthe other hand, argue that the IQ-relevant nvironments f middle-class Negroes and middle-classwhites may be qualitatively ifferent.42The disagreement ver comparing he IQ averageof Negroeswith thatof other coloured, deprivedAmericanminority roups s exactly ana-logous. fIereditarians ee such comparisons s fairand important incevariouscoloured groupsare evenmore measurablymaterially) eprivedthan AmericanNegroes.Environmentalistsbject that of thesegroupsonly Negroes have a historyof slavery, qualitativedifferencewhichcould accountfortheiruniquely ow IQ average.4 3Clearly, too, the hereditarianapproach relies more heavily onquantitativestatisticalmethodologies those central to psychometricsand population genetics) than does the environmentalist, artlybecause the environmentalist osition has been developed by thosesocial scientistswhose methods tend to be relatively descriptive.Hereditarians' ontemptfor the soft'non-quantitativemethodsof theiropponents, as well as environmentalists'uspicions of hereditarians'abstract tatisticalmanipulations, re often ncountered.44Another tendency in hereditarian houghtis to refer to genetic



12/27

Harwood: TheRace-Intelligence ontroversy 379differencesbetween individuals or groups as genetic 'inequality';that is to say, qualitative differences re thereby translated intoquantitative ones alonga singleevaluativescale.45 This tendencyhasbeen repeatedlycriticizedby severalgeneticistswho have taken issuewithJensen.46

3) A bstract-Theoreticals.Particular-ConcreteCattell hasneatlypin-pointed hisdifferencenoutlook:The difficulties hat psychologistshave had in their complex subject indeveloping unassailable concepts have often resultedin a retreatfromabstraction and general laws to a safe (but dreary) particularism.n theretreat f pure environmentalismromthe scientific ield t is now adoptinga scorched-earth olicy of obscurantism nd even downright onceptualnihlism.4

Hirsch's argumentalso illustratesthis differenceof perspective:4 8Highorlow heritabilityell us absolutelynothing bout how a given ndividualmighthave developed under conditionsdifferent rom those in which heactuallydid develop . . Since the characterizationf genotype-environmentinteraction an only be ad hoc and the number of possible interactions seffectivelynlimited, o wonderthesearchforgeneral aws ofbehaviourhasbeen so unfruitful,nd 'theheritabilityf ntelligence rany other raitmustbe recognizedas stillanother of thosewill-o-the-wispeneral aws. And nomagic words about an interaction omponent n a linearanalysis-of-variancemodel will make disappear the realityof each genotypes unique normofreaction. Interaction s an abstraction f matematics... Norm of reactionis a developmental eality. .4 9

4) Atormism-Reductionism vs. Holism-Stress on GroupsThis dichotomy occurs in the discussion of both scientific nd social-philosophicalmatters.irst,n accountingforNegroes' owerIQ average,the hereditarian xplanation treats the Negrogroupas the sumof itsconstituent individuals: a low population mean results from a relativelylarge numberof individualswithlowernativeendowmentfor IQ. Theenvironmentalist explanation, in contrast, focusses not on individualNegroes but on their membership of a group, the consequence ofthis membership being that Negroes are socially stigmatized asinferior; this stigma is then reflected in poor IQ performance.For an environmentalist, then, the individual can only be understoodin terms of the wider group of which he is a part.5?In addition, several environmentalist writers have objected to what



13/27

380 Social StudiesofSciencethey see as the mechanist-reductionistast of hereditarianhought.5The hereditarian ositionis,of course, reductionist n the sense that t'reduces' average group behavioural differences treating Q as a be-haviouraltrait)togene frequency ifferences etween the groups. nter-estingly,however,even thoughhereditarians cknowledgethe contri-bution of environmentalnfluences o the race-IQ gap, Jensen t leasthas stressed he importance f physiologicalfactors e.g., nutrition)52ratherthanthemorecharacteristicallyuman ones (eg., psychological,social, cultural)commonly nvokedby environmentalists.urthermore,is it sheer coincidence that hereditarians avearguedthat the contribu-tions of heredity nd environment o individualdifferencesn IQ arelargely additive i.e., genotype-environmentnteraction nd covarianceare negligible),whereasenvironmentalists ave stressed heimportanceof non-additive ffects?5It is quite strikinghow differentn general are hereditarians' ndenvironmentalists'ommitments o the individualversus the group.54Thus, all of the major hereditarians re opposed to the use of quotasystems which select individualsfor particularranks on the groundsof ascribedcharacteristicse.g., social class, sex, race). This practicecurrently nstitutionalized n the United States in the form of, forexample, the 'AffirmativeAction' programme is seen as contraryto the genetic facts of individual differences nd antithetical o thenotion of equal opportunity. Far from being viewed as legitimatecompensation for severalhundredyears of discrimination t the handsof a whitemajorityor an attempt imply to equalize opportunities ordisadvantaged groups (as environmentalistsn general perceive thesituation), quotas for Negro students and employees have beenattacked as 'reverse racism'.5 Hereditarians have made theirunease at the phenomenon of group consciousness explicit.56Much the same objection has been voiced by several hereditarianstowards programmesof compensatory ducation,5 and in one casetowards forced'racialdesegregationn theUnited States.5Environmentalists,n contrast, have been untroubled by theintroduction of quota systems or by the possibilitythat past andpresent compensatoryeducational programmesmighthave infringedthe principleof equal opportunity.59A.H. Halsey, forexample, hasinstead declared that now is the time for 'positivediscrimination nfavour of the have-nots n education'.0 Interestingly, alsey is ableto take thispositionwithoutviolating he equal opportunity' rinciplebecause he defines equal educational opportunity'as having beenachievedonlywhen social groupdifferencesn educational attainment



14/27

Harwood: TheRace-Intelligence ontroversy 381no longer exist.61 It is significant, oo, that the Society tor thePsychologicalStudy of Social Issues SPSSI), a branchof theAmericanPsychologicalAssociationwitha relativelyargenumberof prominentenvironmentalistmembers6 2 and a history of opposition tohereditarianism, as been involvedin the developmentof AffirmativeAction programmes.6 3A closely related aspect of the hereditarians' earch for generalcausal laws is their nsistenceon the universal pplicationofprinciples.This insistence is obvious enough in the discussion of quotas,immediately bove. A passage in Eysenck's Race, IntelligenceandEducationmakesthisyetclearer.

However much one may sympathizewithnegrodemandsof thiskind [forfavourablequota systems n educationl, they nfringe hegeneralrule laiddown above and are racist n nature; [admission o universityn purely acialgrounds] sunacceptable n principle.. 64and later:

Racial groundsfor acceptance and rejectionare unacceptableregardless fwhich race is favoured; t is the5principlehich iswrong.Each personmustbe considered n hismerits;. .6Here one notices also the 'static' qualityof hereditarian hought; hecriticism f quota systemss ustified n grounds f theright eason' -in this case, 'equal opportunity'. Natural-lawustificationsn terms f'the rightreason' oftentake the torm of a strong ttack on tradition,dogma and that which is perceived s authoritarian. haracteristically,hereditarians and their supporters have repeatedly criticized theinstitutionalization f 'doctrinaire' or 'dogmatic' environmentalism,especially n the UnitedStates.6Thus hereditarians'and environmentalists' onceptions of socialjustice are diametrically pposed; the hereditarians' onception s theclassic liberal belief in the primacy of the individual, whileenvironmentalistsre committed o re-establishing hat they see asa justbalance betweenmajorsocial groups.

5) Static-A bistorical vs. Dynamic-Historical TendenciesOne of the clearest expressions, not only of the static-dynamicdichotomybut of severalother conservative' s. natural-law' ontrasts,can be found in hereditarians' nd environmentalists'pproaches tothe study of intelligence.Virtually all hereditarianwriting n thiscontroversy as followedthe psychometricradition,whilea substantial



15/27

382 Social Studiesof Sciencenumber of environmentalist ritershave been influencedby theworkof Piaget.67 As Elkind has pointedout68 these perspectives ocus onrather ifferentspectsof intelligence:a) Psychometrics s future-orientedn the sense that its testsaredesignedfor electionpurposes. t is not concernedwithhow individualdifferencesn IQ arose but with their existencehere and now. In thissense it can also be considered a static conception. Piaget uses adevelopmental approach which is concerned with the 'history' ofindividuals' ognitive hanges.b) While nature-nurturetudies in the psychometrictraditionare based on populationsfromwhich one derives quantified tatementof the importance f heredity nd environmentorthe averagemember(an abstraction) of the population studied, Piaget focusses on theconcrete individual organism and investigates the dynamic and'dialectical' relationshipbetween the organismand its environmentduring he various tagesof itsdevelopment.c) Mental growth in psychometricwork is continuous andquantified,while in Piagetianstudies so faremphasishas been placedon thedescription fqualitatively istinct tages.69

DISCUSSIONThe existence of hereditarian nd environmentalist,s well as 'hard'and 'soft', styles of thoughtraisesmany questions. One of them -which cannot be dealt with here - concernsthe social and historicaloriginsof the softand hardtraditionsn psychology.Mannheim'sper-spectivepromptsone to look for the genesisof soft and hardstylesin the social situation of the foundersof the respective chools ofthought.70The centralquestion which I deal with in the companionto this paper concerns the origins of modern hereditarians'andenvironmentalists'tyles of thought. I assume that an individual'sstyle of thought- even in matters cientific tends to reflectthesocial situation of the groups of which he is a member.71 That thehereditarians' and environmentalists' substantive and stylisticdifferencesextend to questions of social philosophy makes thisassumptionplausible.One type of group whose social situationhas contributed o thecontroversyhas already been discussed: the protagonist's cademicreference group. Whilenecessary n order to account for severalfeaturesof the controversywhich were discussedabove, the boundary



16/27

Harwood: TheRace-Intelligence ontroversy 383dispute hypothesis is at best a partial explanation. It cannot, forexample, explain why scientistsof similarprofessionaltraining ndaffiliation ccasionally adopt quite different ositions on the race-IQdebate.72 Nor does it account for the environmentalistendency ofAmerican behaviourist psychology. Some of the most tellingevidence against the sufficiency f the boundarydispute hypothesisis to be found in Herrnstein's nd Jensen'sintellectualbiographies,summarizedbelow. These furtheruggest he inadequacyofexplainingscientific tylesof thought olely in termsof professionalocialization(see also note 34).Herrnstein aswritten hat hewas

slow to identify the [environmentalist] urrent that guided my work,especially incealmosteveryone roundmewas caughtnthe samestream . .Eventually; . .my confidence in the environmentalist octrines brokedown ...when he came to studymental testing nd the importanceof genes.

WhenJensen'sarticlecame out I read it, and I was impressedby it. But Iknew very ittleof the currentdata in thisfield .. I was surprised y [thearticle], that the case could be made so strongforsubstantialheritability.In fact until I read that articleI didn't reallyknow what heritabilitywas.Q: You'd neverhad anygenetics uringyourPhD training?No. I'd had some biologycourses but [theydiscussedelementaryMendelianrather hanpopulationgenetics] I'd neverworkedthrought inanyway . ..[So he began to talkovertheJ nsenarticlewithcolleagues.] I startedtalkingJensenup.' I said 'This is a greatguy.Look whathe's done ' And theysaid'He's a racist.' I was shocked because he didn't come across in theHarvardEducational Review like a racist.And theyreplied He's a shrewdracist.'So I wentback and read all the articles [Jensenhad] reviewed o see if Iwould come to a different onclusion. And the more I read the moreimpressed waswithhisjudiciousness.He is a very xcellent cholar?4

Jensen'spaper provided the stimulusforHerrnsteino decide to writehis widely-read ssay, 'IQ'.75 Thus despite being largelyuntrained nbiology or genetics,and working n a predominantlynvironmentalistresearcharea, Herrnstein esponded favourably to Jensen'swork.76Even more striking,J nsen's professionaltrainingwas stronglyrooted in the environmentalistnd 'soft' traditions.77 Toward theendof his PhD research, he firstencountered Eysenck's critique ofpsychoanalysis,whereupon, according to Jensen, his approach tobehaviour underwenta ratherabrupt 'switch' to the hard tradition.



17/27

384 Social StudiesofScienceHe thenspenttwo yearswithEysenckat the Institute f PsychiatrynLondon, an experiencewhichJensen ees as having nfluenced, irectlyor indirectly, early ll of his Jensen's)subsequentwork.78 As recentyas 1964, however, after a thirdyear at the Instituteof Psychiatry,Jensen recalls that his position on both racial and social classdifferencesn IQ was still environmentalist.79 nly subsequently, ngatheringmaterialfor a book on educational problemsof culturallydisadvantaged hildren, id he - despitebeing largelybut not utterlyignorantof the researchon the geneticsof mental abilities' - beginto questionenvironmentalistheories:

What truckme as most eculiars I workedmywaythroughhevastbulkof literaturen thedisadvantaged as thealmost ompleteack of anymention f the possible oleof genetic actorsn individualifferencesnintelligencendscholasticerformance. . It seemed bvious o me thatbook dealingwiththe culturallyisadvantagedould haveto includechapter hat honestlyttemptso come to grips cientificallyiththeinfluencefgeneticactorsn differencesnmentalbilities.8These and other intellectual historiespresent the problem ofexplaining why Herrnstein nd Jensen, unlike others with similartraining,have abandoned to various extents the beliefsand practiceswhich they acquired throughprofessional ocialization. An adequateexplanationof the race-IQ controversymust consider he protagonists'membershipnot only of scientific eference roupsbut also of groupsoutside their respective research traditions. This aspect of the

controversy s dealt with in a companion paper, to be published inSocial StudiesofScience,Vol. 7, No. 1 (February1977).

NOTES

An earlierversionofthispaperwas presented o theConference n theSociologyof Science held at the Universityf York,UK, on 16-18 September1975. Theresearchforthispaperwas done primarilyt theScienceStudiesUnit,Universityof Edinburgh,whose staff nd studentsprovidedvalued intellectual timulus ndencouragement.Researchcosts were kindlymet by theWoodhull Endowment



18/27

Harwood: TheRace-Intelligence ontroversy 385and theHistorynd Social Studiesof Science programme t Sussex University.I would like to thankBarryBarnes,JohnLaw,PeterHalfpennyndmycolleaguesinManchester orhelpful riticism f thispaper in draftform. am alsogratefulto ProfessorsRaymond B. Cattell,MartinDeutsch, H.J. Eysenck,RichardJ.Herrnstein, erryHirsch,J. McVicker Hunt and ArthurR. Jensenforhavingshownan interest n thisresearch ndgivengenerously f their ime.

1. T.S. Kuhn,The Structure f ScientificRevolutions Chicago: UniversityofChicagoPress,1970), 200.2. L. Hudson, Introduction',n K. Richardson,D. Spearsand M. Richards(eds), Race, Culture and Intelligence (Harmondsworth,Middx.: Penguin,1972), 14.3. By 'hereditarians' meanscientists hobelieve thattherace-IQgap arisesfromboth geneticand environmental auses. 'Environmentalists',n the otherhand, believe the gap to be exclusivelyenvironmentaln origin. Since thepublishedcontributions o thiscontroversy ave comefrom o many ndividuals,I have had to base my analysis on five hereditariansnd perhapsa dozenenvironmentalistssee Table 1). These individualswere chosen forstudybecausethey (1) enjoy reasonablygood reputationswithindisciplinesrelevant o therace-IQ issue, (2) have made severalcontributions o the debate, and (3) havetaken clear-cuttanceon the ssue.Of the hereditarians iscussedhere, RichardHerrnstein oes not accept thehereditarian iew of the race-IQgap, but I have treatedhim neverthelesss anhereditarian rimarily ecause of his outspokenadmiration or Jensen'swork.This assignments, I believe, ustifiable n view of several mportant espects nwhich his social-political views resemble those of the other hereditarians(discussed n thecompanionpaper;see note5).The environmentalistroup poses something f a methodologicalproblem.Their view on heredity-environmentssues run the gamutfromaccepting theinvolvement f genes in individualbut not in social class or racedifferencesnIQ at one end (eg., A.H. Halsey) to acceptingthe involvement f genes inindividual nd social classdifferencesnd accepting heplausibility butnotthelikelihood) of a genetic component n race differencesn IQ at the other.Thelattersub-group ncludesWalterBodmer, RichardLewontinand JerryHirsch.Significantly,ach of these three s a geneticist. hus theenvironmentalistsrea heterogeneous roup in respectof disciplinary rientation, oo (see Table 1).To havefocussedon a morehomogeneous ub-group fenvironmentalistsouldhave removedmany of themethodological roblems, ut itwould also have doneviolenceto thebasicallydiffuse haracter f theenvironmentalistide.Despite their inaccuracy,I have chosen to retain the traditional abels'hereditarian'and 'environmentalist' ecause they continue to be used byparticipants hemselves. uch usage is interestingnsofar as it reflects ctors'beliefthatthe controversys 'really'about the substantivessuesofheredity ndenvironment. he fact that several environmentalists'ome so veryclose toaccepting Jensen'sgenetic hypothesiswhile stronglycriticizinghis work ingeneral,however, ndicatesthatthe controversys not solelyabout substantiveissues. Stricdy speaking,therefore,more appropriate abels for the two sideswould be 'pro-Jensen'nd 'anti-Jensen'.



19/27

386 Social Studiesof Science4. Harvard ducationalReview,Vol. 39 (1969), 1-123.5. 'The Race-IntelligenceControversy:A Sociological Approach; II -ExternalFactors',to appear in Social Studies ofScience, Vol. 7, No. 1 (February1977).6. It is not myintention nor, n my opinion, s itpossible to invalidateeitherposition n this debatemerelyby 'accountingfor t' sociologicallyand/orpsychologically,tc.). Futureresearch ould wellvindicate ither f these tanceson therace-IQ ssue.7. See for example I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave eds), Criticismnd theGrowth f Knowledge London: CambridgeUniversityress,1970).8. P. Feyerabend,Against Method (London: New Left Books, 1974).9. See J.D.Y. Peel, 'Understanding lienBeliefSystems', rit.J. Sociology,Vol. 20 (1969), 69-84; S.B. Barnes, cientificKnowledge nd SociologicalTheory(London: Routledge nd Kegan Paul, 1974), Chapters and 2.10. I. Lakatos, 'Historyof Science and its RationalReconstructions',n R.Buck and R. Cohen (eds), Boston Studies in thePhilosophyof Science, Vol. 8(1971).11. P. Urbach, Progress nd Degeneration n the IQ Debate', Bnit.J. Phil.Sci., Vol. 25 (1974), 99-135 and 235-59.12. I. Lakatos, 'Falsificationand the Methodologyof ScientificResearchProgrammes',nLakatos and Musgrave, p. cit. note7, 91-195.

13. See D.C. Bloor, 'Two Paradigmsfor ScientificKnowledge?', ScienceStudies, Vol. 1 (1971), 105-15.14. M. Bantonand J. Harwood,The Race Concept Newton Abbot,Devon:David andCharles,1975), Chapter .15. (The entries in Table 1 suggestotherwise, ut my 'environmentalist'category contains a disproportionatelyarge number of biologists.) Socialscientists' environmentalistpredilections are, of course, neither a newphenomenonnor are theyrestrictedo therace-IQ controversy.ee M. Bressler,'Sociology, Biology and Ideology', in D.C. Glass (ed.), Genetics (New York:RockefellerUniversity ressand RussellSage Foundation,1968), 178-210; andN. Pastore, The Nature-Nurture ontroversy New York: Kings CrownPress,1949).16. W.S. Pollitzer, article in L. Ehrma0,G. Omenn,and E. Caspari (eds),Genetics, Environmentand Behaviour: Implicationsfor Educational Policy(New York: AcademicPress,1972), 126-27.17. Cf. B. Barber,Resistanceby Scientists o Scientific iscovery', cience,Vol. 134 (1 September1961), 596-602.18. See for example thesparringmatchbetween Rose and Eysenck nNewScientist (1973): 14 June, 704; 28 June,832; 5 July,41; 19 July,164; and26 July, 22.19. The environmentalistociologist Halsey makes essentially hispoint in'Biology and Sociology: A Reconciliation', n D.C. Glass (ed.), Genetics, op.cit. note 15.20. S.G. Vandenberg, The Nature and Nurtureof Intelligence', n Glass(ed.), ibid.,22.21. L.J.Cronbach, The Two Disciplines fScientific sychology',AmericanPsychologist, ol. 12 (1957), 678.22. Several of the signatories f a published Statementon Behaviourand



20/27

Harwood: TheRace-Intelligence ontroversy 387Heredity' (American Psycbologist,Vol. 27 [19721, 660-61) have recountedpersonal experiences tome which suggest hat researchproposals in this areamayhavebeenrejectedforreasonsof social responsibilitynscience, nparticularout of a desire not to worsen race relations. The US National Academy ofScience's reluctance o honourWilliamShockley'srepeatedrequestsfor ponsor-ship nthis rea iswell-known.One mightexpect 'power' to become a potentially mportant actor n thedevelopment of scientific controversy whenever influential audiences -professional nd lay - strongly avour one positionin the controversySee Y.Ezrahi, 'The Political Resources of AmericanScience', Science Studies, Vol.1 [19711, 117-34). Such conditionscurrentlybtain n certain reas ofheredity-environmentesearch n the UnitedStates and are probably nfluencingo someextentthe course of the race-IQ controversy ia such levers s therecruitmentof research students and the availabilityof researchgrants. t is not clear,however, hat power' is of anyuse in explaining heviewsof established andin many cases eminent - scientists uch as those I have studied here; highstatus helps to insulate such scientistsfrom the effectsof public and/orprofessional isapproval.23. See G. Lindzey,J. Loehlin,M. Manosevitz ndD. Thiessen,BehaviouralGenetics',Ann.Rev.Psychology,Vol. 22 (1971), 39-94.24. For example L. Erlenmeyer-Kimling,rticle n Ehrman et al., op. cit.note 16, 200-01:

... behaviourgeneticists,s a group,have oftenkeptbusy just ini theeffort to gain from entrenched environmentalists ome enduringrecognition f the need to reckonwithheredityn behavioural tudies.In a similarvein see L. Heston(ibid., 102) and J. Hirsch,BehaviorGeneticor"Experimental" Analysis: The Challenge of Science versus the Lure ofTechnology',American sychologist,Vol. 22 (1967), 118.25. Op. cit.note 22.

26. That thisstatement epresentedmorethanmeredisciplinaryelf-interest,however,may be inferred romthe absence of the signatures f severalwell-known geneticistswith an interest n the race-IQ issue: Richard Lewontin,JerryHirsch,Theodosius Dobzhansky,WalterBodmer and L.L. Cavalli-Sforza.Each of these bsenteeshasbeen critical fthehereditarianosition.27. I. Chein London: Tavistock,1972), 303-15.28. (London: Cape, 1972), Chapters & 7.29. Ibid.,88.30. Ibid., 105.31. Ibid., 101.32. Hunt's concern with the effectsof early experienceon animal andhuman behaviour grew out of his interestin psychoanalytictheory andconsiderable clinical experience in psychiatry and abnormal psychology(interview, 6.6.74 and Hunt's autiobiographical ssay in T.S. Krawiec (ed.),ThePsychologists, ol. 2 [NewYork: OxfordUniversityress,19741, 135-202):MartinDeutsch also held severalposts in clinicalpsychiatry,nd his researchin the1960s would probablybe classified s 'socialpsychology'.33. 'Behavior Genetics and IndividualityUnderstood',Science, Vol. 142(13 December 1963), 143642.



21/27

388 Social Studies of Science34. It seems plausible that individuals with particular personalitycharacteristicsr abilitieswould be attracted o certain isciplines' pproachesto

human behaviour. Such individual characteristicsmightoriginate n previoussocialization e,g.,under the influence f school and/orhomeenvironments,r ina prior university raining n another discipline).Thus it is hardly accidentalthat Cattell took his first egree n chemistrynd that Eysenckwanted to readtheoretical hysicswhenhe first ame as a studentto theUniversityf London.Cattell writes:It is no accident thatthe psychologists find mostcongeiuial,nd whohave contributedmost to psychology, uch as Hull,Thurstone,GodfreyThomson,Tolman . . . hadbeen physical cientists,earningwhatsciencemeans,before theybecame psychologistsin his autobiographical ssayinT.S. Krawiec ed.), op. cit. note 32, 1041.

Similarly, .L. Krantzhas referred o Skinnerian sychology'smarked endencyin the 1940s and '50s to attract raduate tudents rom henatural ciencesratherthanfrom rtsdisciplines 'Schools and Systems:The Mutual solation of Operantand Non-Operant sychology s a Case Studv'.Jour.Hist.BehaviouralSciences,Vol. 8 [19721, 86-102). Furthermore, ermsteinmay have been attractedtoformalbehaviourist sychology artlybecause mathematics as alwaysbeeneasyfor him (interview,6.6.74). Much the same can be said of Jensen's earlyeducationalpreferences:[In the third nd fourthyears of his undergraduate sychology oursehe began to getdisillusionedwiththefield] . . . too much of it seemedtoo soft-headedto me, so I changed my major and switched tophysiologyand zoology. [Had you always found maths or physicalsciences relatively asy?] Yes, they ust were more appealing to me. Iliked subjectsthat nvolvedmorededuction and so on than thingswhereyou just have to learn a lot of facts. liked things hatweresystematic.[Interview,3.8.741Consistent with this evidence is Hudson's impression that most of thepsychometricianswhom he has met were of 'convergent' emperamentmostsuited to high IQ test performance).On the relationsbetweenpersonalityndintellectual referenceee L. Hudson,Contrary maginationsLondon: Methuen,1966); Frames ofMind (London: Methuen, 968); andespeciallyThe CultoftheFact (London: Cape, 1972), 129 and 132-33.35. Karl Mannheim, Conservative hought',inhis Essays in Sociology andSocial PsychologyLondon: RoudedgeandKegan Paul, 1953).

36. In justifying he use of such a methodology, t may be worthnotingthatit was onlyafter had been studying herace-IQliteratureorabout a yearthat I cameupon Mannheim'sessay and was struckby the stylisticparallels.Ultimately thersfamiliarwith this iteraturewill have to judge whether havefairly ategorizedhereditariannd environmentalistritings.As withall excursions n thesociologyofknowledge, roblems fimputationexist (cf. note 3). It mustbe stressed hatno singlemember feitherhereditarianor environmentalistroupis likely o display ll of thefeatures fthe natural-awor conservative tyles respectively).This is partlydue to group heterogeneity,especially among environmentalists. hasten to add, however, that I use



22/27

Harwood: The Race-Intelligence ontroversy 389Mannheimn'swo stylesmerely s exemplarytools' fortracing eatures fthoughtto social circumstances. ecognizing hehistorically pecificnature of hisstudy,one should not be surprisedo findthathereditariannd environmentalisttyles(as well as the hard and soft traditions)only approximatenatural-law ndconservativenes.While one mightbe able to findsome respect n which hereditarian ritingreveals conservative' lements or environmentalist riting,natural-law' nes),the most profound differencesbetween hereditarianand environmentalistassumptionsare categorizeable n termsof natural-law nd conservativetyles.That this correspondences not an artifactmay be seen in the fact that thecharacteristicsf tneDroader hard' and 'soft'schools ofpsychology romwhichmanyof theprotagonistsre drawn lso beara strong esemblance onatural-lawand conservativetyles.Finally, tylistic nalysis s ustified yitsheuristic alue.Many scientific ontroversies ave hingedupon differencesn viewpointwhichcould be categorized n terms fnatural-lawnd conservativetyles;for xample,holist-reductionist ebates, and the 'Uniformitarian-Catastrophistebate' in19th-century eology. Can such a feature be explained in termsof relevantscientists' xistential ircumstances?37. See for example, 'The Dangers of the New Zealots', Encounter(December 1972), and 'Humanismand the Future', in A.J. Ayer (ed.), TheHumanist Outlook (London: Pemberton Books, 1968). Also R.B. Cattell,article in R. Cancro (ed.), Intelligence:Geneticand Environmentalnfluences(New York: Grune and Stratton,1971); R.B. Cattell, A New MoralityfromScience: Beyondism (Elmsford,N.Y.: Pergamon, 1972); and A.R. Jensen,Educability nd GroupDifferencesLondon: Methuen, 973), 4-5.38. For example, H.J.Eysenck,Race, Intelligencend Education (London:TempleSmith,1971), 128-30;Jensen,bid.,Chapter10.39. I am not suggestinghat the environmentalistosition s irrational orthattheenvironmentalists' ork n general s less rationalor 'scientific'han thehereditarians'. everthelessheenvironmentalists'tanceon thisvery entral ssuein thedebate relieson a speculative ssumptionwhichtheyregard s intuitivelyplausible if not obvious) rather han on replicable xperiments hich rewidelyacknowledgedby environmentalists. he hereditarians' osition on this issue,by contrast,restsquite firmlywithinthe standardpractice of behaviourandpopulationgeneticistscf. Barnes, p. cit.note9, 132-35). In thisrather estrictedsense I think t is justified o contrast hetwopositions s 'rational'vs intuitive'(althoughthe tylistic pproachexplored here s in no way dependentupon theadequacyof thisparticular istinction).40. Thbis haracteristic f the hereditarian osition has been observed byHerrnstein:

[The possibilityof race discriminationccountingfor the IQ gap] issomethingthatJensendoesn't quite tum over in his mind. .. It's anincalculablething nd just because it's incalculableJensentendsto bevery oncrete nd tendstodismiss t . . [Interview,.6.74JAsked about the likelihoodof thispossibility, ensenrepliedthathe thoughtitunlikely ecause:

. .. I would thinkthatone's personality nd thedegreeof neuroticism... would perhaps be [affected] by beingdiscriminatedgainstmore



23/27

390 Social Studies ofSciencethan cognitive bilitieswould be affected .. and thatdoesn't seem tobe the case. . . I don't see whycognitive bilities[suchas IQ] would beso drasticallyaffectedwhereas other demandingtasks like memorytests re notaffected.[Interview,38.741The words I have italicized lso serveto emphasizethatscientists'udgement nthis particular ikelihood is not governedby strictly echnicalconsiderations;consequently ne cannotunderstand scientist's ssessment f sucha likelihoodwithout considering is individualpersonalitynd/orhis social situation nd itsassociatedcomplexof ideas about racediscrimination.he problem s to under-standwhyhereditariansnd environmentalistsiffervertheir ssessment f thislikelihood.41. Forexample,Eysenck, p. cit.note 38, 119 and 107-Q3g.

42. See, for example, T. Gregg nd P. Sanday, Geneticand EnvironmentalComponentsof Differentialntelligence',n C.L. Brace, G.R. Gambleand J.T.Bond (eds), Race and Intelligence,Anthropological tudiesNo. 8 (Washington,D.C.: AmericanAnthropological ssociation,1971).In addition:What is implied [by the hereditarian osition] is that all disadvantageis essentially he sameand existsonly ndifferinguantities.Actually, fcourse, it is impossibleto avoid recognizing hat thereare qualitativedifferences etween environmentsnd that these are probablybighlyrelevant to any discussionof envirownent-behaviourelationships. orexample, in superficiallycomparing Indians and Negroes, Jensencompletely ignoresthe special conditionsof AmericanIndians: theirhistory, heir urrent ocial organization, nd their chooling. Emphasisadded; M. Deutsch, Happenings n theWayBack FromThe Forum', nScience,HeritabilityndlQ, HarvardEducationalReviewReprint eries,No. 4 (1969), 76-77.1

43. A general distaste for the idea of qualitative differencesn mentalcharacteristics etween groups of people also finds expression in Eysenck'swriting,or xample,op. cit.note 38, 79:We must conclude that ust as there s not one physicsfor Aryans, ndanother forJews, so there s not one intelligence or whites,anotherquitedifferentypeforblacks.

See also ibid, 75. The fact that Eysenck here chooses an analogy fromtheGermany f the 1930s, plushisexpressed ntipathy or the group-mind'oncept(Encounter [December 19721, 79), maynot be merecoincidence nd isdiscussedin thecompanionpaper.44. See J. McV. Hunt, Has CompensatoryEducation Failed? Has it beenAttempted?', in Environment, eredity ndIntelligence, Harvard EducationalReviewReprint eries,No. 2 ( 1969), 134; BrianSimon, ntelligence, sychologyand Education (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 971), 23 and 244; Eysenck,TimesEduc. S pe ent (12 December1969); Cattell,Abilities:Their tructure,Growthand Action (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin,971), especially280-87; andCattell,article in Cancro (ed.), op. cit. note 37, 6 and 7. See also Eysenck,TheInequalityofMan (London: TempleSmith,1973), 82 and 83. Cf. note49.45. For example Eysenck,op. cit.note 38, 118, and The InequalityofMan,

passim.



24/27

Harwood: TheRace-Intelligence ontroversy 39146. NotablyT. Dobzhansky, n Glass ed.), Genetics, p. cit.note 15, as wellas in Dobzhansky's Genetic Diversity nd Human Equality (New York: Basic

Books, 1973); also R.C. Lewontin, FurtherRemarks n Race and the Genetics fIntelligence', ulletinofAtomicScientists,Vol. 26, No. 5 (1970), 25.47. In Cancro ed.), op. cit.note 37, 24.48. A similarpoint has been made by Hunt n Intelligencend Experience(New York: RonaldPress,1961), Chapter8.49. Hirscharticle, n Cancro (ed.), op. cit. note 37, 102, emphasisadded.StevenRose has made a rather imilarremark: Theygo on playingwiththeirfigures nd equations to givean aura of science,even thoughthe basic data isgarbage . . Do not confuse a statisticalphenomenonwith a biologicalreality'(cited n 'The TimesDiary',The Times,19 September 974).50. One of the clearer xpressions f thisholistic tress n environmentalistwriting s to be found in Ashley Montagu's Statementon Race (New York:UNESCO, 1972); for xample p. 134):Whatmenwant is to feel relatedto something. . Man does not wantindependence n the sense offunctioningeparately rom he nterestsfhis fellows.That kind of independence eads to lonesomeness nd fear.What man wants is . . . the feeling hat he is a part of a group. It is acommon observationthat the happiest persons are those who moststrongly eela sense of connectionwith thewhole community.

51. For example M. Deutsch and C. Deutsch, New York UniversityEducation QuarterlyWinter1974) referto the . . . inherent umantragedynhereditariansmaking biologically deterministic nd mechanisticassumptionsregardingndividualpotential. ..' (p.7) They declare theiropposition to thisapproach, saying '[Our] values .. are quite divergent from those in thepsychological community who . . . establish in the area of heredity andintelligencewhat are ephemeralreductionist nd simplisticmodels of humanbehaviour nddevelopment.' p. 1)Another critique of certainreductionistpoints of view has been made byStevenRose. See, forexample, Science, Racismand Ideology',SocialistRegister(1973), 235-60; The ConsciousBrain London: Weidenfeld ndNicholson,1973),275-84, and H. Rose and S. Rose, 'Do not Adjust Your Mind;There s a Fault inReality: Ideology in Neurobiology',in R. Whitley ed.), Social Processes inScientific evelopmentLondon: Routledge ndKegan Paul,1974).52. Cf.Jensen, p. cit. note4, 65-74.53. For thehereditarians' ositionsee Jensen, p. cit. note 4, 3841;Jensen,op. cit. note 37, 173-74; and Eysenck, op. cit. note 38, 72-74. For theenvironmentalists'osition see C. Jencks t al., Inequality:A Reassessmentf theEffect of Family and Schooling in Amenica New York: Basic Books, 1972),Appendix A; D. C. Layzer, 'HeritabilityAnalyses of IQ Scores: Science orNumerology?'Science, Vol. 183 (29 March 1974), 1259-66; Hirsch'sarticle nCancro ed.), op. cit. note 37,97-98; and Hunt,op. cit.note 48.54. This feature of thedebate has been observed ndependently yWilliamHavender n 'A Commenton ArthurJensen'sCritics', npublished aper,10 and11. 55. Dwight Ingle, article n M. Meade, T. Dobzhansky, E. Toback and R.Light (eds), The Race Concept (New York: ColumbiaUniversity ress,1968),



25/27

392 Social Studies ofScience113; and Eysenck, p. cit.note 38, 143.56. Forexample,Jensen, p. cit. note 37, 9-10,and:

Most environmentalists've run nto are not really ndividualist.hey'rethe ones usuallywho think n termsof quotas... 'Take care of theindividual nd let the groupsfallwhere theymay' is thephilosophywould advocate. And I thinkthat 'group-thinking's really half theproblem. t's what's creatingmuchof the difficultyn thiswhole thingthinkingn termsof group identities nd grouployalties, chauvinisticattitudes bout your own groupmembershipnd so forth. think t'sveryharmful.. [Interview ithJensen, 3.8.74]Lastly:

I have writtenof possible averagewhite-Negro ifferencesn geneticendowment because this [U.S.A.] and other countriesare torn andthreatenedby some of the coercive effortsto abolish the averageachievement ap between whitesand Negroes.I refer o social actionsbased upon 'racial' identityratherthan individuality. Ingle,Midway(Winter 970), 114]Herrnstein as expressed very imilar iew [Interview,.6.74).57. Herrnstein,Q in the MeritocracyLondon: AllenLane, 1973), 133 and152, as well as in interview 6.6.74). See also Eysenck, 'The Rise of theMediocracy', n C.B. Cox and A.E. Dyson (eds), BlackPaper II - The Crisis nEducation (London: CriticalQuarterly ociety,1970), 37.58. Ingle,articlereprintednJ. Bakerand G. Allen,Hypothesis, redictionand Implication n Biology (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley,968), 107. Ingleargues that Negroes' eligibility for integration into white middle-classneighbourhoods ughtto be based on individual ualifications,merit, ehaviouralstandards,tc.,rather han on simplybeingNegro'.59. One environmentalist,or example, believed minorityquotas to beuncontroversial ecause theyhavehad, as he saw it, essentiallyno effectonstudent dmissions-

As a result there is no strongmove againstit. The existenceof theprogramme alves the consciencesof liberalsbut its relativeneffective-ness does nothingto disturbthe statusquo so that both liberalsandconservativesan moreor less ignore t. It is only those on theextremeright,who, under the guise of principle principlebeingof course thechiefpreoccupationof all people on the right)nsist hattheaffirmativeaction programme s destroyingAmerican education and is unfair owhites.MartinDeutschexpressed comparableview interview,2.6.74).60. A.H. Halsey,TimesHigherEducational Supplement 5 April1974), 3.61. 'Towardsa More Noble Alternative', he Guardian 27 May 1975), 20.This view is of course also the assumptionupon which one environmentalist'swell-known ulture-fairQ testwas constructedsee note77).62. For example, MartinDeutsch,Marie Jahoda and Otto Klineberg allformerhairmen), swell as Jerry irsch, rwinKatz and ThomasPettigrew.63. SPSSI Newsletter, o. 133 (March1973).



26/27

Harwood: TheRace-Intelligence ontroversy 39364. Op. cit. note 38, 143,emphasisadded.65. Ibid. 144,emphasis dded.66. See, for example, Jensen, article in Environment,Heredity andIntelligence, p. cit. note 44, 215, and Ingle (op. cit.note 56) who havedrawnattentionto the official environmentalist)osition of variousUS governmentdepartments nd agencieson thequestionofgroupdifferencesnmental bilities.See also A.G.N. Flew, Reason, Racismand Obscurantism',New Humanist July1973), and Eysenck,TheDangers na NewOrthodoxy', amevolume,82-83.67. One book which has had considerable influenceon contemporaryenvironmentalism as been Hunt's Intelligence nd Experience. In thisbook aselsewhere Tbe Cballengeof Incompetenceand Poverty [Urbana, Ill.: IllinoisUniversity ress,19691, and Hunt and G. Kirk,article n Cancro,op. cit.note

37), Hunt'sadmiration orPiaget s clear.Amongother nvironmentalistritingsinspired y Piagetare thepaperbyJ.Radford ndA. Burton nRace,,CulturendIntelligence,op. cit.note 2, 19-35;Richards,Richardsonnd Spears' concludingessay in the same volume, 179-96; and the articleby G. Voyat inJ. Hellmuth(ed.), The DisadvantagedChild, Vol. 3, Compensatory ducation: a NationalDebate (New York: Brunner/Mazel, 970). See also the articleby EdmundGordon in Cancro (ed.), op. cit.note 37, 245-46, and Deutsch, op. cit.note42,82-83.68. 'Piagetianand Psychometric onceptionsof Intelligence'Harv. Educ.Rev.,Vol. 39 (1969), 33847.69. One mightwant to object at this point that the notion of 'style' issuperfluous in distinguishing ereditarianismrom environmentalismn thegroundsthat the intellectual ubstance of one's positionon therace-IQdebatevirtually etermines he style nwhich it can be expressed:thehereditarianiewis based on genetics and therefore ould not be other than 'hard' in itsformulationconversely or nvironmentalism).here are several easonswhy thisobjectiondoes not holdup.On the one hand it is not difficult o envisagea hereditarian rogrammecouched in the 'soft' style. For example the Piagetian niodel is perfectlycompatiblewithhereditarian otions and has in factrecently eenappropriatedby psychometricians). egroes' intelligencemighthave been conceptualizedasqualitatively ifferent romwhites',rather hanquantitatively o. Furthermore,the hereditarian ositionnecessitatesneither n atomistic onceptionof societynor an attackon compensatoryiscrimination.On the otherhand, an environmentalistrogramme ould easily have beenformulatedlong hard' lines.The Americanbehaviourist sychological raditionthroughmost of thiscentury llustrates hispossibility.Modern nvironmentalistwriting ould havebeen litteredwithacknowledgementso 'scientificmethod'. tcould have been based on a static and abstract psychometricmodel ofintelligence. t could haveattempted o explain theIQ gap, notinhistorical ermsas the complicated nd as yetunquantifiedegacyof racism,but in biochemicalterms, orexample,as theconsequenceofNegroes'brainfunction eing mpairedby varioustoxic substances o whichtheyare differentiallyxposed. This brandof environmentalism ightwell be combinedwithan atomistic ocial philosophyand a critique f compensatoryiscrimination.70. Although I am arguingthe differential ecruitment f hard and softpsychologists o the hereditariannd environmentalistlatforms,espectively,



27/27

394 Social Studies of Sciencedo notwant to suggest that all hard/soft sychologists, ast and present,wouldsharesuch views; Americanbehaviourists,orexample, have traditionallyendedto take an environmentalist osition. Nevertheless here are clearly strongmethodologicalsimilarities etween the early work of Loeb and Watson andhereditarianism.71. This kind of approach has been used by Donald A. MacKenzie and S.BarryBarnes n a recentdiscussionof the Mendelian-Biometricianontroversy,in N. Stehrand R. Konig (eds), WissenscbaftssoziologieKolner ZeitscbrifturSoziologie und Sozialpsycbologie,Vol. 18) (Opladen: WestdeutscherVerlag,1975), 165-96.72. For example, Bodmer and Lewontin have taken an environmentalistpositiondespite theirtraining s populationgeneticists, nd sociologists uch asChristopher encks ndBruceK. Eckland accept that ocial class differencesn IQare partlygenetic and are receptive, t least, to the possibility hat the racialdifferencemighthavea geneticcomponent.73. CommentaryApril 1973), 53.74. Interviewwith Herrnstein,.6.74.75. AtlanticMonthly September1971), 43-64.76. Compare this with the extremely riticalresponseof JerryHirsch abehaviour geneticist- in 'J nsenism: The Bankruptcy of "Science" WithScholarship',Educational Theory,Vol. 25, No. 1(1975), 3-28.

77. Jensen'smasters egreeadviserwas KennethEells,one of whose majorresearchnterestswas thedevelopment f a culture-fairQ testwhichwould showno social class differences n performancecf. K. Eells et. al., Intelligence ndCulturalDifferences [Chicago: University f Chicago Press, 1951] ). Jensen'sPh.D. dissertation t Columbia ('Aggression n Fantasyand Overt Behaviour')involvedhim in the Freudianpsycho-dynamicradition, nd his thesisadviserthere, Percival Symonds, was psychoanalytically-oriented. f. J nsen'sautobiographicalssayinT.S. Krawiec ed.), op. cit.note 32, 203-44.78. PsychologyToday (December 1973), 102.79. Interview,3.8.7480. Jensen,Genetics ndEducation (London: Methuen, 971), 8.81. Ibid.,7 & 8, emphasis dded.

This content downloaded from 129.78.72.28 on Sun, 2 Feb 2014 14:21:57 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Date post:	15-Oct-2015
Category:	Documents
Upload:	samuel-andres-arias
View:	8 times
Download:	0 times

The Race-Intelligence Controversy I (Harwood)

Documents