The Radical Right in Postsocialist Central and Eastern ...CEE radical right and interwar fascism in...

The Radical Right in Postsocialist Central and Eastern EuropeComparative Observations and InterpretationsMichael Minkenberg

The writer Tom Wolfe is said to have observed that ldquothe specterof fascism is constantly hovering over America but always seemsto land in Europerdquo With the break-up of the Soviet empire andthe world of socialist (and ldquoanti-fascistrdquo) regimes in Eastern Eu-rope there seems to be even more landing ground now But incontrast to the widespread literature on the transformationprocess in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)1 scholarly atten-tion to right-wing radical or ultranationalist parties and move-ments in the region and their impact on democratic consolida-tion is scattered So far only a few essays and contributions toedited volumes have addressed the topic most of the literature isjournalistic rather than academic and country-speci c rather thancomparative2 Often analogies are drawn between the post-1989CEE radical right and interwar fascism in terms of images of aldquoWeimarizationrdquo of Eastern European politics and the return ofthe precommunist ultranationalist or even fascist past3 However

East European Politics and Societies Vol 16 No 2 pages 335ndash362ISSN 0888-3254 online ISSN 1533-8371

copy 2002 by the American Council of Learned Societies All rights reservedSend requests for permission to reprint to Rights and Permissions

University of California Press 2000 Center St Ste 303 Berkeley CA 94704-1223

335

1 ldquoCentral and Eastern Europerdquo and ldquoEastern Europerdquo are used interchangeably through-out

2 See eg Luciano Cheles et al eds The Far Right in Western and Eastern Europe 2nded (LondonNew York Longman 1995) Peter Merkl and Leonard Weinberg edsThe Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties (London Frank Cass 1997) Sab-rina Ramet ed The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe (University ParkPennsylvania State University Press 1999) Paul Hainsworth ed The Politics of theExtreme Right From the Margins to the Mainstream (London Pinter 2000) Amongthe truely comparative pieces are Klaus von Beyme ldquoRechtsextremismus in Osteuropardquoin Juumlrgen Falter et al eds Rechtsextremismus Ergebnisse und Perspektiven derForschung special issue of Politische Vierteljahresschrift 27 (1996) (Opladen West-deutscher Verlag 1996)423ndash43 and Cas Mudde ldquoExtreme-right Parties in Eastern Eu-roperdquo Patterns of Prejudice 341 (2000) 5ndash27

3 See Paul Hockenos Free to Hate The Rise of the Right in Post-communist Eastern Eu-rope (New YorkLondon Routledge 1993) Walter Laqueur Fascism Past Present Future(Oxford Oxford University Press 1996) chap 3

with few but notable exceptions such as Russia or Croatia thesegroups have very little success at the polls Thus another inter-pretation of the phenomenon argues that since Central and East-ern European party systems increasingly resemble their West Eu-ropean counterparts so does the radical right at least where it issuccessful electorally4

Another line of thought explored here however suggests thatthe Central and Eastern European radical right after 1989 is nei-ther a return of the pre-democratic and precommunist past northe equivalent of todayrsquos Western European radical right The dom-inant forces of the radical right in the transformation countries areideologically and structurally different from most western varietiesIdeologically they are more extreme and openly antidemocraticorganizationally they are less a party and more a social movementphenomenon Besides country-speci c histories and opportunitystructures the overall analytical frame for the CEE radical right isa multiple modernization process ie a transformation from au-thoritarian regimes to liberal democracies from state-socialist tocapitalist market economies and from industrialism to postindus-trialism The resulting strains of economic and political insecurityespecially the uncompleted process of democratization and con-solidation of the new regimes provide opportunities for the radi-cal right which present western democracies do not but at the sametime the ldquotransformationrdquo of these movements into solid politi-cal parties and electoral success is limited

The Radical Right in Perspective Some Conceptual Remarks

A workable denition of right-wing radicalism in comparative per-spective seems best tied to the theoretical concepts of social changethat underlie most analyses of the radical right Here moderniza-tion theories provide some conceptually grounded criteria for suchanalyses Generally modernization can be understood as a grow-ing autonomy of the individual (status mobility and role exibil-

336 The Radical Right in Postsocialist Europe

4 Mudde ldquoExtreme-right Parties in Eastern Europerdquo 25

ity) and an ongoing functional differentiation of the society (seg-mentation and growing autonomy of societal subsystems)5 In thislight right-wing radicalism can be dened as the radical effort toundo such social change The counter-concept to social differen-tiation is the nationally dened community the counter-conceptto individualization is the return to traditional roles and status ofthe individual in such a community It is this overemphasis on orradicalization of images of social homogeneity that characterizesradical right-wing thinking The historical origins of right-wing rad-icalism are seen to lie in the interdependence of nation-buildingdemocratization industrialization and the growing importanceof the natural sciences Variants of right-wing radicalism can bedistinguished according to the criteria of ideology and organiza-tional structures (for the application of the following to CEE seetable 4)

Ideology Right-wing radicalism is dened as a political ideol-ogy whose core element is a myth of a homogeneous nation a ro-mantic and populist ultranationalism directed against the conceptof liberal and pluralistic democracy and its underlying principlesof individualism and universalism This denition focuses explic-itly on the idea of the nation that lies somewhere between the polesof demos and ethnos The nationalistic myth is characterized bythe effort to construct an idea of nation and national belongingby radicalizing ethnic religious cultural and political criteria ofexclusion and to condense the idea of nation into an image of ex-treme collective homogeneity Several ideological variants can beidenti ed according to the respective concept of nation and theexclusionary criteria applied authoritarian-fascist classical racist(including colonialist) xenophobic or ethnocentric and religious-fundamentalist versions All four variants have in common astrong quest for internal homogeneity of the nation and a pop-ulist anti-establishment political style but the latter two share thecharacteristic of a culturally (rather than biologically) dened re-jection of ethnic differences In reality some groups (eg Deutsche

East European Politics and Societies 337

5 See Dieter Rucht Modernisierung und neue soziale Bewegungen (FrankfurtNew YorkCampus 1994)

Volksunion (DVU) or skinheads) may spill over into several cat-egories but generally this classi cation can be applied analyticallyto structure the eld of right-wing radical actors6

Structures Starting from the concept of party or movementldquofamiliesrdquo7 it is important to ask when the radical right manifestsitself in the form of a movement rather than a party and how muchother organizational forms of the radical right support or constrainthe particular organizationrsquos mobilization efforts8 The organiza-tional variants are distinguished by their approach to institutionalpolitical power and public resonance Parties and electoral cam-paign organizations participate in elections and try to win publicofce Social movement organizations try to mobilize public sup-port as well but do not run for ofce rather they identify with alarger social movement (a network of networks with a distinct col-lective identity) and offer interpretative frames for particularproblems9 Finally smaller groups and sociocultural milieus op-erate relatively independent of either parties or larger social move-ments and do not exhibit formal organizational structures but canalso be characterized as networks with links to other organiza-tions and a collective identity which tends to be more extreme thanthat of the parties or movement organizations (including higherlevels of violence) They represent a ldquomicromobilization poten-tialrdquo for the radical right10

An explanatory approach of the success of right-wing radical-ism which dwells on the central aspects of nationalism and mod-ernization theory and follows earlier work by Theodore WAdorno and Seymour M Lipset is provided by German sociol-ogists Erwin Scheuch and Hans-Dieter Klingemann11 Their


6 See Michael Minkenberg Die neue radikale Rechte im Vergleich USA FrankreichDeutschland (OpladenWiesbaden Westdeutscher Verlag 1998) chaps 1 7 esp 236ndash45

7 Klaus von Beyme Parteien in westlichen Demokratien (Muumlnchen Piper 1984) RuchtModernisierung

8 See Minkenberg Die neue radikale Rechte chap 89 See Sidney Tarrow Power in Movement (Cambridge Cambridge University Press

1994) 135f Rucht Modernisierung 17710 Werner Bergmann ldquoEin Versuch die extreme Rechte als soziale Bewegung zu

beschreibenrdquo in Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb eds Neonazismus und rechte Sub-kultur (Berlin Metropol 1994) 183ndash207

11 Erwin Scheuch and Hans Dieter Klingemann ldquoTheorie des Rechtsradikalismus in west-lichen Industriegesellschaftenrdquo Hamburger Jahrbuch fuumlr Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaft-spolitik 12 (1967) 11ndash29

model is based on the assumption that the potential for radicalright-wing movements exists in all industrial societies and shouldbe understood as a ldquonormal pathologicalrdquo condition In all fast-growing modernizing countries there are people who cannot copewith rapid economic and cultural developments and who react tothe pressures of readjustment with rigidity and closed-minded-ness These reactions can be mobilized by right-wing movementsor parties offering political philosophies that promise an elimina-tion of pressures and a simpler better society These philosophiesdo not describe any conceivable utopia but usually a romanticizedversion of the nation before the rst large wave of modernizationThat is the two sociologists postulate that the core of the problemconsists of a speci cally asynchronous reading of the past espe-cially a dissent about the evaluation of modernity in the respec-tive societies

The notion that the mobilization of the radical right often oc-curs in times of accelerated social and cultural change provides afruitful starting point for explaining right-wing radical mobiliza-tion in both Western Europe (before and after 1989) and EasternEurope (after 1989) The rebirth of the radical right in the Westcan be understood as a result of a general modernization shift inthe wake of ldquo1968rdquo and speci c mobilization shifts in the con-text of each countryrsquos opportunity structures12 The moderniza-tion shift includes a transition of western industrial societies intoa phase of ldquopostindustrialismrdquo and a new political dynamism thatopened opportunities for new parties on the left and right alonga new value-based cleavage with the latter mobilizing the ldquonor-mal pathologicalrdquo right-wing potential This new radical right isnot simply the extension of conservatism towards the extreme rightbut the product of a restructuring of the political spectrum and aregrouping of the party system Ideologically and sociologicallyit represents the right-wing pole of a new con ict axis which cutsacross the established lines of partisan con ict and societal cleav-ages while politically it establishes a (neo)conservatism and an ex-plicitly antidemocratic latently violent right-wing extremism


12 See Michael Minkenberg ldquoThe Renewal of the Radical Right Between Modernity andAnti-modernityrdquo Government and Opposition 352 (Spring 2000) 170ndash88

The new radical right is distinguished from the old by its soften-ing of antidemocratic rhetoric its playing according to the rulesof the game and its emphasis on ethnocentrism rather than clas-sical biological racism while its electoral base especially the grow-ing number of working-class voters signi es a new place in thechanging structures of party competition and cleavages In termsof its support the new radical right does not simply representldquomodernization losersrdquo since most of their supporters are not ldquolos-ersrdquo in any objective sense As shown elsewhere13 these support-ers constitute an ideologically motivated segment of the public thatreacts to the social and cultural changes outlined above by tryingto slow the effects of these changes and overcoming its own inse-curities by scapegoating immigrants leftists and feminists asthreats to the integrity of the national community As such thesevoters or supporters are modernization opponents or ldquosubjectiverdquomodernization losers

A closer look at the German scenario reveals some distinct East-West differences as a consequence of German uni cation the on-going process of transformation in the East and some legacies ofthe past To these belongs the ofcial ideology of the German Dem-ocratic Republic (GDR) which contained a symbolic frameworkaround the principles of antifascism democracy and socialism Butthe continuous repression of an open discourse about GermanyrsquosNazi past and the constant interpretation of fascism as a conse-quence of capitalism amounted to the dogma of an ldquoantifascismby decreerdquo rather than a truly antifascist education of the GDRrsquospopulation Not surprising by the second half of the 1980s a right-wing extremist youth culture developed in the GDR in consciousdemarcation from the Socialist Unity Party (SED) regime14

In general the situation is characterized by a general fragmen-tation of the spectrum along with higher levels of radicalizationand violence in the new Laumlnder (see table 1) While the total num-ber of adherents of the radical right uctuates at a rather high level


13 See eg Kitschelt The Radical Right in Western Europe (Ann Arbor University ofMichigan Press 1995)

14 See Michael Minkenberg ldquoGerman Unication and the Continuity of Discontinu-ities Cultural Change and the Far Right in East Westrdquo German Politics 3 2 (Aug1994) 169ndash92

Table

1

Dev

elop

men

t of t

he G

erm

an R

adic

al R

ight

Gro

ups (

uppe

r ro

w) a

nd M

embe

rs (l

ower

row

) 199

0ndash19

99 (R

epor

ts o

f the

Fede

ral O

fce

for

the

Prot

ectio

n of

the

Con

stitu

tion)

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

Mili

tant

Rig

ht-w

ing

extr

emis

ts S

kinh

eads

a4

13

53

55

4200

6400

5600

5400

6200

6400

7600

8200

9000

Neo

nazi

s27

3033

2733

4348

4041

4914

0021

0014

0024

5029

4019

8024

2024

0024

0022

00P

olit

ical

Par

ties

84

43

33

355

130

4540

035

900

3350

034

800

3900

037

000

ldquoNat

iona

l-fr

eihe

itlic

herdquo

DV

U3

33

2200

024

000

2600

026

000

2000

015

000

1500

015

000

1800

017

000

ldquoNat

iona

l-de

mok

rati

sche

rdquoN

PD

55

573

0067

0053

0050

0045

0040

0035

0043

0060

0060

00ldquoR

epub

likan

errdquo

2300

020

000

1600

015

000

1550

015

000

1400

0O

ther

s34

3841

4045

5652

6365

7729

0039

0040

0031

2038

3035

6026

6043

0045

0042

00Su

m to

tal b

(min

us

mul

tipl

e m

embe

rshi

ps)

9610

810

911

413

432

200

3980

041

900

6450

056

600

4610

045

300

4840

053

600

5140

0so

urc

es

Mic

hael

Min

kenb

erg

Die

neu

e ra

dika

le R

echt

e im

Ver

glei

ch U

SA F

rank

reic

h D

euts

chla

nd(O

plad

enW

iesb

aden

Wes

tdeu

tsch

er V

erla

g 1

998)

30

1 ta

ble

719

Bun

desm

inis

teri

um d

es I

nner

en V

erfa

ssun

gssc

hutz

beri

cht 1

999

(Bon

n 20

00)

18

no

tes

a Aft

er 1

995

mili

tant

s of

the

extr

eme

righ

t inc

lude

d m

anife

stly

vio

lent

per

sons

and

thos

e w

ith s

uf

cien

t evi

denc

e of

a te

nden

cy to

war

ds v

iole

nce

b Beg

inni

ng w

ith th

e 19

94 R

epor

t (ie

19

93 d

ata)

the

ldquoR

epub

likan

errdquo

wer

e in

clud

ed t

hus

the

dram

atic

incr

ease

of t

otal

mem

bers

hip

compared to pre-1989 West Germany (when total membership wasaround 25000) the membership in radical right-wing partiesmdashwhere East Germans are clearly underrepresented15mdashhas signi -cantly declined from its all-time high in 1993 But in the late 1990ssigni ed by the elections in Saxony-Anhalt in April 1998 whenthe DVU entered the state parliament with 129 percent of the votethere has been an upswing for the radical right among East Ger-man voters In the new Laumlnder the more extreme DVU receivesmore support than Die Republikaner (REP) although both par-ties are West German imports The DVU attempts to appeal tothe GDRrsquos past by combining in its electoral campaigns social andnationalist messages and cultivating the East German distinctnessThis is also accomplished by the much smaller but well organ-ized and more extreme Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutsch-lands (NPD) which behaves more like a political movement thana political party Organizationally there is a big difference betweenthe REP and the DVU since the DVU is largely run by one manits wealthy leader Gerhard Frey and has no identi able intrapartyorganizational structures There are also striking East-West dif-ferences among the supporters and voters of these parties Whileboth the REP and the DVU enjoy a disproportionate supportamong male and working-class voters East German adherents ofthe parties of the radical right are much younger than the REPvoters in the West

In the non-party sector of militant and violent right-wing ex-tremists the number of individuals has increased since unicationreaching a record-level of 9000 at the end of the decade with al-most half of them in the eastern Laumlnder Considering that onlyone- fth of the German population lives in the East this is a re-markable overrepresentation16 From the early nineties on move-ment-type activities and subcultural milieus of the extreme rightourished in the East especially among younger East GermansOne could observe the emergence of cliques and a ldquostructural in-


15 See Richard Stoumlss ldquoRechtsextremismus in einer geteilten politischen Kulturrdquo in OskarNiedermayer and Klaus von Beyme eds Politische Kultur in Ost- und Westdeutsch-land (Opladen Leske and Budrich 1996) 123

16 Richard Stoumlss Rechtsextremismus im vereinten Deutschland (Bonn Friedrich EbertStiftung 1999) 100

tegrationrdquo of the extreme right-wing scene by various neo-Naziorganizations17 This trend was accompanied by a dramatic increasein right-wing violence in the second half of the nineties again withthe center of gravity in the East When measuring ofcial reportsof right-wing violent acts in proportion to population size allve new Laumlnder have consistently topped the list over the pastyears18

Finally recent survey data add to the picture of a higher degreeof radicalization in the East (see table 2) Whereas 13 percent ofall Germans adhere to a right-wing radical agenda this gure issigni cantly higher in the East than in the West But while thereare no East-West differences regarding nationalistic pro-Nazi andanti-Semitic attitudes East Germans tend to be more authoritar-


17 See Bergmann ldquoEin Versuchrdquo 192f18 See Minkenberg Die neue radikale Rechte 306

Table 2 The Right-wing Radical Attitude Potential in Germany (in percent) 1998

Germany West East

In ideological components

Authoritarianism 11 10 16Nationalism 13 13 13Xenophobia 15 14 20Welfare chauvinism 26 23 39Pro-Naziism 6 6 5Anti-Semitism 6 6 5

In occupational groups

Unemployed 14 7 22Workers 19 18 24Employees 8 7 12Civil Servants 2 1 11Self-employed 12 12 15Non-working 15 15 18Total 13 12 17

so ur c e Richard Stoumlss Rechtsextremismus im vereinten Deutschland (Bonn FriedrichEbert Stiftung 1999) 3035

ian xenophobic and ldquowelfare chauvinisticrdquo than West Germansthe latter dened as the refusal to share the nationrsquos wealth withldquoforeignersrdquo This means that we are not dealing with the returnof the Nazi past but a reaction to the radical transformation of EastGerman politics society and economy in terms of the aforemen-tioned rigidity and ldquonormal pathologyrdquo in fast-changing societies

The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe Text

The overview of East-West differences within Germany leads tosome questions regarding the radical right in Central and East-ern Europe as a whole They concern the emergence and strengthof right-wing party formation in comparison to movement-typeor other non-party groups the nature of the radical right as a re-sponse to the process of transformation or the return of old deep-seated traditions the degree of ideological extremism especiallyantidemocratic (anti-system) and racist attitudes and the supportpatterns19

In general the mobilization potential for the radical right inEastern Europe seems rather large but not signi cantly larger thanin western democracies20 Survey data reveal sizable currents ofnationalism anti-Semitism and right-wing self-identi cationamong the public of various Eastern European countries (see table3) Patriotic or nationalist attitudes are only slightly higher in theEast than in the West but not as high as in the United States Anti-Semitism is relatively strong in Poland as are irredentist feelingsregarding ldquolost territoriesrdquo21 In general there is a greater concern


19 Although East Germany is not typical of the rest of Eastern Europe and one must becareful with generalizations it remains a (special) case of postsocialist transformationsee Helmut Wiesenthal ed Einheit als Privileg Vergleichende Perspektiven auf dieTransformation Ostdeutschlands(FrankfurtMain Campus 1996) Patricia Smith edAfter the Wall Eastern Germany since 1989 (Boulder Colo Westview 1998)

20 For the concept and measuring of the radical right-wing mobilization potential whichincludes components of right-wing self-identication nationalism anti-system ori-entations anti Semitism and racism authoritarianism and religious fundamentalismsee Minkenberg Die neue radikale Rechte chaps 5 and 6 For the problem of na-tionalism in Eastern Europe see Rogers Brubaker Nationalism Reframed (CambridgeCambridge University Press 1996)

21 An international comparison of anti-Semitic attitudes in Poland Hungary and theCzech and Slovakia Federation Republic (CSFR) revealed that Poland ranked con-sistently higher than the other two countries across various measures Communica-

among East Europeans over territorial issues especially in Hun-gary Poland and Romania where sizable ethnic minorities livein neighboring countries andor a large part of the former terri-


tion by Werner Bergmann Technische Universitaumlt Berlin Zentrum fuumlr Antisemitis-musforschung (February 1999) See also Wolf Oschlies ldquoAntisemitismus im postkom-munistischen Osteuropa (I)rdquo in Berichte des BIOst 21 (1995)

Table 3 The Radical Right-wing Mobilization Potential in East and West (early 1990rsquos data)

L-R Patriot Right or Irredent Control Author Anti-semit (1) (2) wrong (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

USA ndash 88 55 ndash ndash ndash 6UK ndash 72 56 20 79 ndash 14F ndash 64 37 12 86 ndash ndashE ndash 70 46 48 66 ndash ndashI ndash 69 39 29 84 ndash ndashGR ndash 72 28 39 70 ndash ndashD-W ndash 74 31 43 70 ndash 26D-E ndash 69 16 25 70 ndash ndashCS 31 70 28 39 65 1726 1433H 13 70 30 68 68 27 11PL 20 75 47 60 58 26 34BG 23 75 53 52 38 ndash 9R 9 60 42 22 45 45 22UR ndash 62 36 24 31 46 22LI 26 63 39 46 54 23 10

Sources Klaus von Beyme ldquoRechtsextremismus in Osteuropardquo in Juumlrgen Falter et al eds Rechts-extremismus Ergebnisse und Perspektiven der Forschung special Issue of Politische Vierteljahres-schrift 271996 (Opladen Westdeutscher Verlag 1996) 429 438 Gert Pickel ldquoTendenzen derDemokratisierung und politischen Unterstuumltzung in Osteuropardquo in Gert Pickel et al eds Demo-kratie Entwicklungsformen und Erscheinungsbilder im interkulturellen Vergleich(FrankfurtOder and Bamberg VDF 1997) 115

Questions(1) Right-wing self placement in 19921993 (in EU average 20)(2) ldquoI am very patrioticrdquo ( agree)(3) ldquoWe should ght for our country right or wrongrdquo ( agree)(4) ldquoThere are parts in neighboring countries which belong to usrdquo ( agree)(5) ldquoWe should increase the control of access to our countryrdquo ( agree)(6) Authoritarianism(7) (negative opinions about Jews)

Countries UK United Kingdom F France E Spain I Italy GR Greece D-W West Germany D-EEast Germany CS Czechoslovakia ( Czech RepublicSlovakia) H Hungary PL Poland BGBulgaria R Russia UR Ukraine LI Lithuania

tory was lost after the Second World War On the other hand anti-migration feelings seem rather low compared to western countriesa result of the general direction of migration in Europe from Eastto West while there is widespread resentment of the largest regionalminority the Roma which except for Poland ranges between 5percent (Hungary) and 9 percent (Romania) of the population inCentral and Southeast Europe22 These trends occur in the con-text of a declining trust in democracy and low levels of condencein parliament and political parties For example between 1993 and1996 the proportion of Romanian respondents who would sup-port an authoritarian ldquoiron-hand governmentrdquo rose from 27 per-cent to about 33 percent23 And between 1991 and 1995 the pro-portion of those satis ed with the present working of democracyshrank from 34 percent to 21 percent in Hungary 46 percent to14 percent in Bulgaria 62 percent to 27 percent in Lithuania and18 percent to 7 percent in Russia Only in the Czech Republic andPoland were the trends reversed24 In sum it seems that the atti-tudinal pro le of the Eastern European mobilization potential forthe radical right is shaped in rather classic terms by high levels ofnationalism mixed with anti-Semitism and territorial concerns andfed by sizable anti-system affects This in fact resembles the sit-uation in Weimar Germany But how do these attitudes translateinto political behavior

To begin with radical right-wing parties exist in almost all ofthe transformation countries but their electoral success variesgreatly from less than 1 percent in some countries to more than10 percent in Russia Slovenia Slovakia and most recently in Ro-mania At rst glance most of these parties exhibit clear tenden-cies of authoritarian and antidemocratic orientations justifyingtheir classi cation as ldquofascistrdquo in the sense outlined above and ofracist andor anti-Semitic attitudes with blurred lines between bi-


22 See Zoltan Barany ldquoEthnic mobilization and the State the Roma in Eastern EuroperdquoEthnic and Racial Studies 21 2 (March 1998) 308ndash27

23 Data in Michael Shar ldquoMarginalization or mainstream The extreme right in post-communist Romaniardquo in Hainsworth ed Politics of the Extreme Right 264

24 Gert Pickel ldquoTendenzen der Demokratisierung und politischen Unterstuumltzung in Ost-europardquo in Gert Pickel et al eds Demokratie Entwicklungsformen und Erschein-ungsbilder im interkulturellen Vergleich (FrankfurtOder and Bamberg VDF 1997)121

ological racism and ethnocentrism An overview of these partiesand other groups and movements that do not fall into the cate-gory of political party is presented in table 4 In Russia the Lib-eral Democratic party (LDPR) dominates the right Its leaderVladimir Zhirinowsky entertained relationships with the Frenchintellectuals of the Nouvelle Droite as well as with Jean-Marie LePen and Gerhard Frey25 Other groups such as the Russian Na-tional Unity (RNU) supporting Russian revolutionary ultrana-tionalism the Russian National Assembly (RNA) and the Front


25 Martin L Lee The Beast Reawakens (Boston Mass Little Brown 1997) 318ff 325ffJudith Revlin Slavophiles and Commissars Enemies of Democracy in Modern Russia(New York St Martinrsquos Press 1999) 138ndash56

Table 4 Dominant Actors in the Central and Eastern European Radical Right-wing Family (after 1989) Russia (R) Romania (RO)Poland (PL) Czech Republic (CR) Hungary (H)

partycampaign social movement subcultural organization organization (SMO) milieu

Fascist-authoritarian right PL ROPR LDPR R Pamyat R WerewolvesRO PRM R RNU skinheads

RO MPRRO PDNPL PNR

Racist-ethnocentrist right PL KPN RO Vatra skinheadsH MIEacuteP RomaneascaCR SPR-RSC PL PWN-PSNRO PSM PL Radio MaryjaRO PUNR

Religious-fundamentalist PL ZChN PL Radio Maryjaright PL LPR

not e KPN Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej (Confederation for an Independent Poland) LDPRLiberal-Democratic Party of Russia LPR Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of the Polish Family)MIEacuteP Magyar Igazsaacuteg eacutesEacutelet Paacutertja (Hungarian Justice and Life Party) MPR Miscarea pentruRomania (Movement for Romania) PDN Partidul Dreapta Nationala (Party of the NationalRight) PNR (Polish National Rebirth) PRM Partidul Romania Mare (Party for Greater Roma-nia) PSM Partidul Socialist al Muncii (Socialist Workers Party) PUNR Partidul Unitatii Romane(Party of Romanian Unity) PWN-PSN Polska Wspoacutelnota Narodowa Polskie Stronnictwo Naro-dowe (Polish Nationalist Union) RNU Russian National Unity ROP Ruch Odbudowy Polski(Reconstruction of Poland) SPR-RSCSdruzeniacute pro republikumdashRepublikaacutenskaacute strana Cesko-slovenska (Republicans) Vatra Romaneasca Romanian Cradle ZChN ZjednoczenieChrzeparacijantildeskomdashNarodowe (Christian National Union)

of National Rescue (FNR) an alliance of about 40 parties andmovements failed to attract a signi cant number of votes How-ever they claim to have more members than the LDPR estimatesput the LDPR at some 50000 members while the other groupsrange at around 120000 Whether Gennadii Zyuganovrsquos Com-munist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) by far the mostimportant of todayrsquos Russian parties with its blend of Russian im-perialism and nationalist reinterpretation of Stalinism falls into thecategory of the radical right as some observers argue26 is debat-able After all nationalism and xenophobia are not core elementsof the CPRFrsquos ideology although contacts between Zyuganov andultranationalist and anti-Semitic organizations are documented27

A similar situation exists in Romania where easily identiableright-wing radical parties coexist with the successor party ofCeauordmescursquos Communist party Among the former are the Partyfor Greater Romaina (PRM) and the Party of Romanian Unity(PUNR) The PRM founded in 1991 by Eugen Barbu and Cor-neliu Vadim Tudor and led by Tudor claimed 35000 members inthe mid-nineties and is characterized by an openly anti-Semitic andxenophobic ie particularly anti-Hungarian and anti-Roma ide-ology coupled with an antidemocratic and anti-western doctrinederived from a glori cation of the Partida Nationala a national-ist movement of the 1830s the fascist ideology of the Iron Guardsand the communist past under Ceauordmescu In the 2000 presiden-tial and parliamentary elections Tudor and his party attracted morevotes than ever The party is now the second largest in parliamentand Tudor managed to enter the second round of the presidentialelections where he received one-third of the vote against Iliescu(see table 5) By comparison PUNR founded in 1990 but recentlydissolved seemed slightly less extreme They were also chauvin-ist dirigist and particularly anti-Hungarian but not as openly anti-Semitic and antidemocratic as PRM The Socialist Workers party


26 See Christopher Williams and Stephen Hanson ldquoNational-Socialism Left Patriotismor Superimperialism The lsquoRadical Rightrsquo in Russiardquo in Ramet ed Radical Right257ndash77

27 Mudde ldquoExtreme-right Parties in Eastern Europerdquo 16 see also Williams and HansonldquoNational-Socialism Left Patriotism or Superimperialismrdquo 267 and Revlin Slavo-philes and Commissars 157ndash80

(PSM) which succeeded the Romanian Communist party but faresless well than other postcommunist parties in CEE fuses nation-alist with socialist ideas and openly rejects democracy and west-ern values and culture All three parties were temporary membersof an informal majority coalition from 1992 to 1994 under the lead-ership of the Party of Romanian Social Democracy28

Similarly the Polish situation is characterized by a high degreeof uidity which often leads to a restructuring of the party sys-tem and a reorganization and renaming of individual partiesThere were six radical right-wing parties in Poland in the early1990s but none of them entered parliament in the rst elections29

The most important are the National Front Party of the Father-land (Stronnictwo Narodowe lsquoOjczyznarsquo [SN]) which advocatesan explicit anti-Semitic and anti-German platform and is based onthe nationalist ideas of Roman Dmowski of the interwar period30

and the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KonfederacjaPolski Niepodleglej [KPN]) which is ideologically modeled on theideas of Pilsudski Finally as a Polish peculiarity there is a clerical-nationalist party the Christian National Union (ZjednoczenieChrzeparacijantildesko-Narodowe [ZChN]) which advocates that Catholicdogma should be the basis of Polish politics and which claims toembrace the interests of ethnic Poles in all of Eastern Europe31 Un-like the previous two country cases the Polish radical right par-ties have only a small following owing to the lack of ldquoa persuasive


28 See Shar ldquoMarginalization or mainstreamrdquo and Anneli Ute Gabanyi ldquoPolitischeParteien in Rumaumlnien nach der Wenderdquo Suumldosteuropa 441ndash2 (1995) 1ndash50 idldquoRumaumlnien Parlaments-und Praumlsidentschaftswahlen 1996rdquo Suumldosteuropa 463ndash4(1997) 119ndash45 See also Tom Gallagher Romania after Ceauordmescu The Politics of In-tolerance (Edinburgh Edinburgh University Press 1995) 25ndash47

29 For a detailed but very descriptive overview of all post-1989 national nationalist andright-wing radical parties see Tomasz Kalina ldquoPolskie Partie Narodowerdquo (masterrsquosthesis Institute of Political Science Warsaw University Warsaw 2000) see alsoBogumisup3 Grott ldquoRuch narodowy w Polsce postkommunistyczenjrdquo Arka 5354(1994) 13ndash34 and Anita J Prazmowska ldquoThe New Right in Poland Nationalismanti-Semitism and parliamentarianismrdquo in Cheles et al eds The Far Right 198ndash214

30 See Andrej Walicki ldquoThe Troubling Legacy of Roman Dmowskirdquo in East EuropeanPolitics and Societies 141 (Winter 2000) 12ndash46

31 See Kalina ldquoPolskie Partie Narodowerdquo 78ndash82 114ndash18 see also Thomas Szayna ldquoTheExtreme Right Political Movements in Post-Communist Central Europerdquo in Merkland Weinberg eds The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism 116 David Ost ldquoTheRadical Right of Poland Rationality of the Irrationalrdquo in Ramet ed The RadicalRight 98ff

target against which to mobilize constituentsrdquo32 However with thegrowing importance of accession to the European Union (EU) thePolish radical right like that in the following two country casesmight very well get such a persuasive target This is shown by theresults of the most recent parliamentary election in September 2001which combine the elements of uidity in the party system on theone hand and of stability and even some growth in support forthe far right on the other While older right-wing parties such asthe KPN and ROP virtually disappeared a new partymdashthe fun-damentalist League of the Polish Family LPR (Liga PolskichRodzin)mdashthat is allied to Radio Maryja and oriented to the ideas


32 Ost ldquoThe Radical Right in Polandrdquo 88

Table 5 Electoral Performance of the Central and East EuropeanRadical Right Poland Czech Republic Hungary RomaniaRussia

Country Election Votes (in and date Type CandidateParty bold if seats)a

Poland

1990 Presb Leszek Moczulski (KPN) 261991 Parlc KPN 74

ZChN and allies 871993 Parl KPN 58

ZChN and allies 631997 Parl [AWS]d [338]2001 Parl LPR 79

Czech Rep

1990e Parl mdash1992e Parl SPR-RSC 751992 Parl SPR-RSC 601996 Parl SPR-RSC 801998 Parl SPR-RSC mdash

Hungary

1990 Parl MIEacuteP mdash1994 Parl MIEacuteP 161998 Parl MIEacuteP 55

of Roman Dmowski scored 79 percent of the vote (see table 5)Like the right-wing populist Self-Defense of Andzrej Lepper(Samoobrona) which gained 102 percent in 2001 the LPR mobi-lized their electorate around the issue of opposition to Polandrsquos ac-cession to the EU

In the Czech Republic the most important party on the radicalright is the ldquoRepublicansrdquo (Sdruzeniacute pro republikumdashRepublikaacutenskaacutestrana Ceskoslovenska [SPR-RSC]) founded in 1989 and led byMiroslav Sladek Modeled on the Russian LDPR and the GermanRepublikaner this openly xenophobic party is the only Czech partythat does not accept the secession of Slovakia Its dreams of an ldquoeth-nically purerdquo greater Czechoslovakia (comprising only Slavicpeople) are combined with visions of a paternalistic and corporatist



Russia

1991 Presb V Zhirinowsky (LDPR) 781993 Parl LDPR 2291995 Parl LDPR 1201996 Presb V Zhirinowsky (LDPR) 571999 Parl Zhirinowsky Bloc 602000 Pres V Zhirinowsky 27

Romania

1991 Parl mdash mdash1992 Parlc PUNR PRM PSM 1461996 Parlc PUNR PRM PSM 114f

1996 Presb Gheorghe Funar (PUNR) 32Corneliu Vadim Tudor (PRM) 47

2000 Presb Corneliu Vadim Tudor (PRM) 2832000 Parlc PRM 195

no t esaMost East European electoral systems are based on the principle of proportional repre-

sentation with a threshold of 4 or 5 percent (in Poland electoral alliances such asAWS needed at least 8 percent to enter parliament)

bPresidential election rst round onlycParliamentary elections rst chamber onlydAn alliance of the moderate right (Solidarnosc) and radical right (ROP ZChN Radio

Maryja)eCzech part of the CSFRrsquos national assemblyfNo seats for PSM

ie authoritarian state33 In 1994 the party had about 25000 mem-bers thus making it the third largest party in the Czech Republicand compared with the German Republikaner or DVU an un-usually strong radical right-wing party34 Nonetheless in the 1998parliamentary elections the SPR-RNC lost all their seats

The Hungarian radical right is dominated by Istvan CzurkarsquosHungarian Justice and Life party (Magyar Igazsaacuteg eacutes Eacutelet Paacutertja[MIEacuteP]) which split in 1993 from the conservative HungarianDemocratic Forum (Magyar Demokraacuteta Foacuterum) [MDF]) one ofthe major players in the 1989ndash90 velvet revolution The MIEacuteP es-pouses anti-Semitic and biological-nativist views and advocates arecovery of the old Hungarian territory that now belongs to Ro-mania Ukraine and Slovakia thus refusing to accept the Treatyof Trianon of 1919 which settled the current borders between Hun-gary and its neighbors Although Czurka claims that he is not anti-Semitic he shares with openly anti-Jewish neo-Nazis the goal toexpose what he sees as a worldwide Judeo-liberal-cosmopolitanconspiracy including the World Bank the International MonetaryFund and George Soros35

An overview of the electoral fate of these parties or their can-didates reveals signs of an electoral strength of the Eastern Euro-pean radical right which is comparable to that of the Western Eu-ropean new radical right (see table 5) Obviously these parties arenot temporary protest organizations but can attract a signi antportion of the electorate over several elections When looking atthe social characteristics of this electorate one nds a mix of work-ing-class and rural support in addition to speci c regional varia-tions In Poland as in Hungary the radical right is stronger in theEast than in the West ie in regions that lag in economic devel-opment Data from the Czech Republic show that in 1996working-class voters constituted 35 percent of the Republicansrsquoelectorate more than in any other partyrsquos electorate36 Thus theCzech case resembles strongly the Western European situation


33 See Szayna ldquoThe Extreme Right Political Movementrdquo 12534 Guido Brendgens Demokratische Konsolidierung in der Tschechischen Republik (mas-

terrsquos thesis University of Heidelberg 1998) 6035 See Laszlo Karsai ldquoThe Radical Right in Hungaryrdquo in Ramet ed The Radical Right

14336 Brendgens Demokratische Konsolidierung 60

where by the mid-to-late 1990s the electorates of the new radi-cal right contained a higher proportion of workers than in anyother party The Romanian case deviates from this pattern sinceonly the PSM can count on lower-class support mainly in ruralareas whereas the PRM is supported largely by medium-to-higherstatus strata and has a disproportionately young electorate with90 percent of their voters under 40 years37

In the movement sector the group Pamyat (Remembrance)played an important role in the last days of the Soviet Union Aright-wing social movement organization led by Dimitri Vasiliev(who since 1992 has portrayed himself as a fascist and monarchist)Pamyat was formed in the midndash1980s and began to fragment afterthe dissolution of the Soviet Union But many of the current lead-ers and activists of the Russian radical right went through Pamyatin the late 1980s and early 1990s38 One of the numerous Nazi or-ganizations in Russia the Werewolves ofcially supports the Na-tional Socialist ideology but disintegrated when its leaders werearrested in 1994 In the midndash1990s experts counted some 30 ex-treme right organizations in Russia with the RNU the biggest andbest organized According to one estimate the RNU has at-tracted around 6000 hard core armed members and 30000ndash50000active non-member supporters39 In Romania too there is a vis-ible and active movement sector Most prominent is Vatracent Ro-maneasca the Romanian Cradle made infamous by its violent ac-tivities against ethnic minorites especially the sizable Hungariangroup right after the fall of Ceauordmescursquos regime Vatracent Romaneascahas been considered an extra-parliamentary arm of PUNR40

Other groups include the Movement for Romanina (MPR) therst movement to openly acknowledge its descent from the IronGuard and the Party of the National Right which adopted the IronGuardrsquos statutes and organizational structures (including identi-cal uniforms) and favors an ethnocratic authoritarian state Though


37 Gabanyi ldquoPolitische Parteien in Rumaumlnienrdquo 22ndash2838 See Revlin Slavophiles and Commissars 23ndash30 34ndash6039 Victor Parfenov and Marina Sergeeva ldquoRussia Showing Nationalist Grapes of Wrathrdquo

Transitions 5 ( July 1998) 34 A recent estimate reports more than 40 right-wing rad-ical and ultranationalist groups along with a growing number of skinheads see BerlinerZeitung 18 July 2000 9

40 Gallagher Romania after Ceauordmescu 194ff

neither group is registered as a party both court support especiallyamong Romaniarsquos youth41

The Polish case also reveals a strong and partially violent move-ment sector of groups that act and mobilize support in the pre-institutional arenas One of the larger groups is the neofascist move-ment Polish Nationalist Union (Polska Wspoacutelnota NarodowaPolskie Stronnictwo Narodowe [PWN-PSN]) led by BoreslavTejkovski which numbers about 4000 members and became no-torious internationally with its attacks on Jewish property and theCatholic Church in 1991 and 199242 Another right-wing move-ment organization is the Party of National Rebirth (PNR) the majorfascist organization in Poland under the leadership of 30-year-oldAdam Gmurczyk PNR set up local branches in many cities in-cluding Lodz Krakow and Warsaw43 Finally since the midndash1990sthe ultra-Catholic radio station Radio Maryja has attracted millionsof listeners and followers mainly poor retired workers the unem-ployed and all kinds of ldquotransformation losersrdquo with its mix of re-ligious anti-modernist nationalist xenophobic at times also anti-Semitic messages Although not a political party Radio Maryjanonetheless scored a signicant political success in the late 1990sby nding parliamentary allies in several representatives of the Sol-idarnosc group Akcja Wyborcza Solidarnoparac AWS in the Sejm44

Beyond these organizations a growing right-wing extremist sceneof violent groups and Nazi skinheads is evident across Polandmdashinmany towns meetings of several hundred militants are rather fre-quent events as are anti-Semitic or fascist grafti on buildings45

Also in the Czech Republic there is a visible scene of violence-prone right-wing extremists who by targeting Roma people (seeabove) can count on some sympathy from their fellow citizens Asin Poland and in Hungary the Roma wereare the least-liked eth-nic minority in Czechoslovakia (followed by Arabs blacks AsiansRussians and Jews)46 Between 1990 and 1998 a total of 21 people


41 See Shar ldquoMarginalization or mainstreamrdquo 255ndash5942 Prazmowska ldquoThe new right in Polandrdquo 208f43 Ost ldquoThe Radical Right in Polandrdquo 9644 Letter to the author from Dr Karol Kostrzecircbski Inst of Political Science Warsaw

University 12 June 200045 Die Tageszeitung 13 November 1998 1346 Data from Werner Bergmann ldquoEuro Socialrdquo Meinungsprole Ostmitteleuropa 1991

have died in the Czech Republic in racist attacks which consideringthe countryrsquos population sharply exceeds the level of racist violencein neighboring Germany47

Taken together these sparse gures suggest an active and violentsubcultural milieu of right-wing extremism in Central and East-ern Europe That it unfolds under the conditions of transforma-tion implies a particular dynamism of this development towardsgrowth and expansion rather than a downswing or disappearance

The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe Context

If radical right-wing mobilization is a reaction to intense modern-ization processes and resulting insecurities as argued above thenwe should have expected 10 years after the fall of the Berlin Walland the collapse of state socialism an active and growing scene ofradical right-wing parties and movements in Eastern Europe Butthe data yield mixed results The party sector is not as strong as insome western democracies (especially France Austria Belgium) andthe militancy of the movement sector is less than in others (espe-cially Germany Sweden and the United States) Is Eastern Europeonly ldquocatching uprdquo with the West or is right-wing radicalism in theEast a genuinely different variant Several reasons suggest that thelatter is closer to the truth and they concern the nature of the trans-formation process traditions of nationalism the political cultureand the new cleavage structures and emerging party systems

The transformation process in Eastern Europe is more far-reaching deeper and complex than the current modernizationprocess in the West48 First it includes the collapse not only of po-litical regimes but also of their legitimating ideologies Thus a sim-ple return to left-wing or socialist ideas as a recourse by the ldquolos-ersrdquo of this modernization process is not a viable optionRight-wing groups or those that combine socialist with national-ist ideas can benet from this constellation Second the democ-


47 Stanislav Penc and Jan Urban ldquoCzech Republic Extremist Acts Galvanize Roma Pop-ulationrdquo Transitions 5 ( July 1998) 39

48 Klaus von Beyme Systemwechsel in Osteuropa (FrankfurtMain Suhrkamp 1994)12ndash14

ratization of regimes is accompanied by an economic and socialtransformation that touches all aspects of life (thus making it dif-ferent from earlier waves of democratization or ldquoredemocratiza-tionrdquo as in German and Italy after the Second World War) Thecomplexity of the transformation process produces large ldquotrans-formation costsrdquo which can benet the radical right Third theexchange of entire social systems causes high levels of social dis-orientation and ambivalence towards the new order Again po-litical entrepreneurs who offer simple solutions and appeal to thepeople or nation rather than a particular social class or universal-ist vision of progress have a competitive advantage In sum thesetransformation-induced opportunity structures which lie behindthe institutional settings of liberal democracy as they are put intoplace in most Eastern European countries must be seen as gen-erally favorable to the radical right It is also clear that theseprocesses differ fundamentally from the western transition fromindustrial to postindustrial society one of the key context factorsfor the emergence of a new or postindustrial radical right (seeabove) However the transformation process is still more com-plicated because it is a multiple modernization process ie thetransition to liberal democracy and market capitalism along withelements of change from industrialism to postindustrialism whichoften involves aspects of simultaneous nation- and state-buildingas well Thus the radical right combines postindustrial aspects suchas the use of modern mass media and the decreasing role of mass(party) organizations with the ideologies of a particular past iethe mix of traditional nationalism in the East and the legacy of statesocialism Organizationally they belong to a new type of partythat has emerged in postcommunist Eastern Europe ldquoassociationsof sympathizers run by a political elite and professional party ap-paratus as tertiary sector organizations providing political serv-ices for a loosely constituted electoral clientelerdquo49

Unlike many cases of western nation-building most EasternEuropean nations did not emerge in conjunction with a bourgeoisrevolution a strong liberal movement or the establishment of lib-


49 Paul Lewis Party Structure and Organization in East-Central Europe (Cheltenhamand Brookeld E Elgar 1996)184

eral democracy In general the western type of nation can be char-acterized as a ldquopolitical nationrdquo as opposed to a cultural or evenan ethnicallyracially dened nation As is well known the Ger-man path to national unity and the subsequent national identitydiverges from the western model in its heavy emphasis on the Ger-man Kulturnation that after uni cation in 1871 resulted in themyth of an ethnic community of Germans or Volksnation Its lega-cies today are among other things the outdated citizenship lawsof 1913 the absence of an immigration policy despite the fact ofimmigration and the problem for the new radical right to nd itspolitical space between the moderate right which clings to thevoumllkisch concept of the German nation and the openly racist andantidemocratic extremists50

If the German experience is that of a late nation-building and amix between political and cultural nationalism then the Eastern Eu-ropean model is that of a very late or blocked nation-building andthe prevalence of cultural and ethnic nationalism51 Even as the west-ern process of nation-building entered a phase of consolidation andliberalization (the last third of the nineteenth century) almost allof Eastern Europe was subject to multinational empires ie theHapsburg the Russian and the Ottoman empires Nation-build-ing here was always in the style of the risorgimento52 directed againstthe existing order and dependent upon its collapse The dates of na-tional independence were 1881 for Romania 1882 for Serbia 1908for Bulgaria and 1919 for all the others In sum the dominant pat-tern was (a) the emergence of a national identity without the na-tion-state ie an ethnic nationhood and (b) the establishment ofa nation-state along with democratization after the rst World Warie in the context of the rst wave of democratization53 Except forCzechoslovakia in the interwar period all Eastern European na-


50 See Kitschelt The Radical Right chap 6 and Minkenberg Die neue radikale Rechtechap 9

51 It has been argued that this typology makes little if any sense see Stefan Auer ldquoNa-tionalism in Central EuropemdashA Chance or a Threat for the Emerging Liberal Demo-cratic Orderrdquo in East European Politics and Societies 142 (2000) 213ndash45 Howeverignoring the relevance of particular historical trajectories of nation-building or de-mocratization in certain parts of Europe seems overly ahistorical

52 See for example Peter Alter Nationalism (New York Arnold 1985)53 Samuel P Huntington The Third Wave Democratization in the Late Twentieth Cen-

tury (Norman University of Oklahoma Press 1991)

tions experienced a relapse into authoritarianism And apart fromthe brief democratic intermezzo between 1944 and 1948 this con-stellation was extended after the Second World War with the forcedtransition from a right-wing to a left-wing dictatorship and the ldquodis-solutionrdquo of the nation-state into an international socialist order

Against this background the development of political culturesin Central and Eastern Europe diverges from the West What hasbeen found for the intra-German situation after uni cation54

seems to hold true for Europe in general too Only the Czech Re-public exhibited early signs of a civic culture with relatively highand stable levels of ldquosystem affectrdquo underpinned by pluralistic prin-ciples55 Beyond signi cant intraregional differences the politicalcultures of Central and Eastern Europe shaped by socialization inthe socialist past and by the rigors of the present transition tendto be characterized by a lower acceptance of liberal market princi-ples than in the West (a commitment to somewhat socialist and egal-itarian values) by dissatisfaction with the transformation processand its outcomes and by what Ronald Inglehart calls values of ldquotra-ditional authorityrdquo (as opposed to secular-rational authority) andldquosurvival valuesrdquo (as opposed to values of well-being)56

Because participation cannot be equated with liberalism and tol-erance occasional outbreaks of protest activities in Eastern Eu-rope are not necessarily indicators of a participatory political cul-ture Instead and in sharp contrast to the democratization of (West)Germany after 1945 the anticommunist thrust of the 1989 up-heavals has automatically rehabilitated the nation-state in EasternEurope Thus nationalist rhetoric and the ethnic concept of na-tionhood are widespread among the political class and the publicand are not a fringe phenomenon which explains why despite theenormous pressures and insecurities of the transformation process


54 See Dieter Fuchs ldquoThe Democratic Culture of United Germanyrdquo in Pippa Norrised Critical Citizens Global Support of Democratic Governance (Oxford Oxford Uni-versity Press 1998) also Michael Minkenberg ldquoThe Wall after the Wall On the Con-tinuing Division of Germany and the Remaking of Political Culturerdquo ComparativePolitics 261 (October 1993) 53ndash68

55 von Beyme Systemwechsel 340 f and Pickel ldquoTendenzen der Demokratisierungrdquo 12156 von Beyme Systemwechsel 349ndash54 Ronald Inglehart Modernization and Postmod-

ernization (Princeton NJ Princeton University Press 1997) 93 William MillerStephen White Paul Heywood Values and Political Change in Post-Communist Eu-rope (New York St Martinrsquos Press 1998)

and the potential for radical right-wing mobilization the ultra-nationalist messages receive only limited support from the votersThis also helps explain why the radical right in Central and East-ern Europe in order to distinguish itself from the nationalist butalso nominally democratic parties of the moderate right and therest of the political spectrum advocates clearly antidemocratic andanti-system visions of a new political order Usually theirs is a na-tionalism explicitly derived from the myth of an organic ethni-cally pure nation and from the glori cation of authoritarianregimes of the not so distant national past

Finally the Central and Eastern European cleavage structuresand party system differ markedly from those in western democ-racies In the West the new radical right is situated at the right-wing pole of a New Politics cleavage that cuts across the older class-and religion-based cleavages57 In Central and Eastern Europe allcleavages are new (or renewed) and must be seen in the contextof the transformation process If Lipset and Rokkanrsquos ldquofreezinghypothesisrdquo was already questionable for western party systemsin the 1970s and 1980s then it is even more dif cult to apply toEastern Europe simply because there were hardly any stable partysystems in the 1920s that could have frozen Traditional cleavagesre-emerged only in those countries where the most dominantcon ict that between supporters of the old regime and support-ers of the new order was settled and democratic consolidation hadadvanced58 Accordingly Klaus von Beyme identi es eight cleav-ages in the East but hastens to add that the older presocialist cleav-ages (urban-rural state-church monarchist-republican) have beeneroded by state-socialist modernization policies59 This leaves fourothers center-periphery and workers-owners which von Beymesuggests are irrelevant for the radical right and westerners-indi-genists and internationalists-nationalists which are better seen astwo sides of the same coin than two distinct cleavages60


57 See Kitschelt The Radical Right chaps 1 2 Minkenberg Die neue radikale Rechtechaps 7 8

58 See Timm Beichelt Demokratische Konsolidierung im postsozialistischen Europa(Opladen Leske and Budrich 2001)

59 von Beyme ldquoRechtsextremismus in Osteuropardquo 424 f60 See Richard Stoumlss and Dieter Segert ldquoEntstehung Struktur und Entwicklung von

Parteiensystemen in Osteuropa nach 1989mdasheine Bilanzrdquo in Dieter Segert Richard

Most research on party systems in postsocialist Central andEastern Europe identi es some central cleavages such as the onebetween forces that promote the ideas of market liberalism andthose that favor political redistribution or between modernizersand opponents of modernization61 But there is disagreement aboutthe number and characteristics of other cleavages unrelated to therst one and where to situate parties of the radical right For ex-ample Plasser et al suggest considering two more cross-cuttingcleavages one between transformation losers and transformationwinners and another between orientations of self-reliance and theneed for guidance But ldquoself-reliersrdquo transformation winners andmarket liberals do not appear sufciently distinct as a basis for dif-ferent cleavages On the other hand Glaesner suggests condens-ing all con ict models into one between ldquostructural conservativesrdquo(including ex-communists nationalists social populists etc) andldquomodernizersrdquo (market liberals forum parties etc)62 This ap-proach however oversimpli es the con ict structure and over-looks the variety of cleavages within and across countries Thusthe idea of a dual modernization con ict along a socio-economicaxis and along a sociocultural or value-related axis seems more per-suasive because of the distinct logical and historical differences ofthe two cleavages63 For the case of Central and Eastern EuropeKitschelt and collaborators have adopted his earlier model to thecontext of transformation and rede ned the two main cleavagesas one between market liberals and social protectionists on the onehand and secular libertarians and religious authoritarians on theother64 When applied to the radical right in the ve Central andEastern European countries under discussion here this model sug-gests situating the parties at the authoritarian end of the libertarian-


Stoumlss Oskar Niedermayer eds Parteiensysteme in postkommunistischen Gesellschaft-ten Osteuropas (Opladen Leske and Budrich 1997) 379ndash428 esp 386ndash98

61 Herbert Kitschelt ldquoThe Foundations of Party Systems in East Central Europerdquo Pol-itics and Society 201 (1992) 31 Fritz Plasser et al Politischer Kulturwandel in Ost-Mitteleuropa Theorie und Empirie demokratischer Konsolidierung (Opladen Leskeand Budrich 1997) 134 Stoumlss and Segert ldquoEntstehung Struktur und Entwicklungrdquo398ndash401

62 In Stoumlss and Segert ldquoEntstehung Struktur und Entwicklungrdquo 40063 Ibid 39964 Herbert Kitschelt et al Post-Communist Party Systems Competition Represenation

and Inter-Party Cooperation (Cambridge Cambridge University Press1999)

authoritarian axis and closer to the state end of the market liberaland social protectionist axis So far however the evidence is notconclusive While Kitschelt et al show that in Poland and Hun-gary the parties in question are situated at the far end of the au-thoritarian scale (with the exception of the Czech SPR-RSC) butin the center of the protectionism scale others nd these partiesat the far end of both cleavages65 This in fact is congruent withthe ndings for the new radical right in western democracies butit does not determine the degree of electoral success of these par-ties Alternative models of institutional opportunity structuressuch as electoral systems do not explain much by themselves ei-ther66 Therefore it is important to consider political traditions suchas nationalism the particular ideologies of the Central and East-ern European radical right in comparison to that of other actorsand the degree of radicalization and militancy beyond the partyspectrum as potentially limiting or reinforcing factors

Conclusions

Studying the radical right in transformation countries in Centraland Eastern Europe not only resembles shooting at a moving tar-get but also shooting with clouded vision Because of the regionrsquosdistinct history both before and during the days of state social-ism in particular its lack of democratic experience and practiceand because of the dynamism and openness of the transformationprocess resulting among other things in unstable political alliancesand a uid party system the categories and approaches of ana-lyzing the radical right in western democracies must be appliedwith caution Generally a radical right springing from populistand antidemocratic ultranationalism has emerged in most of thesecountries and the socio-economic and political conditions for itsappearance seem rather favorable But so far these groups have


65 Juumlrgen Dieringer ldquoDie ungarischen Parlamentswahlen 1998rdquo Zeitschrift fuumlr Parla-mentsfragen 29 (Dec 1998) 656 and Brendgens Demokratische Konsolidierung 77

66 In part because they are also the result of the emerging structures of the party systemsee Dieter Nohlen and Mirjana Kasapovic Wahlsysteme und Systemwechsel in Os-teuropa (Opladen Leske and Budrich 1996) and Timm Beichelt ldquoDie Wirkung vonWahlsystemen in Mittel- und Osteuropa Zeitschrift fuumlr Parlamentsfragen 29 (Dec1998) 605ndash23

had only limited electoral success so that at the moment the rad-ical right is no serious threat to the transformation and democra-tization process in Eastern Europe

It could be shown that the dominant forces of the radical rightin these countries are ideologically and structurally different frommost western varieties Organizationally the Central and East-ern European radical right is less developed than its western coun-terpart a fate it shares with most other political parties in the re-gion Thus an analysis of the phenomenon must take into accountboth its party-type and its movement-type characteristics Sucha combined look reveals that the party sectormdashmeasured in bothelectoral and organizational strengthmdashis not as strong as in mostWestern European democracies in particular Austria Belgiumor France On the other hand the militancy of the movement sec-tor is hard to assess but does not seem as high as in GermanySweden or the United States Moreover given that the most ro-bust right-wing radical parties in terms of membership and voteshave emerged in Romania Hungary andmdashuntil 1998mdashin theCzech Republic suggests there is no direct relationship betweenthe degree of democratic consolidation and the strength of theseparties Ideologically the radical right in Central and Eastern Eu-rope is more reverse oriented than its western counterpart iemore antidemocratic and more militant In most countries wheredemocracy is not yet ldquothe only game in townrdquo (Linz) opportu-nities exist for the radical right that are preempted in the WestBut at the same time the political space for radical right-wing par-ties is rather limited because nationalism informs the ideology ofmost dominant actors and because historical fascism is largely dis-credited Therefore the behavior of elites and the political classseems more crucial for the further development of the radical rightthan such institutional arrangements as electoral hurdles or lawsagainst racism


with few but notable exceptions such as Russia or Croatia thesegroups have very little success at the polls Thus another inter-pretation of the phenomenon argues that since Central and East-ern European party systems increasingly resemble their West Eu-ropean counterparts so does the radical right at least where it issuccessful electorally4

Another line of thought explored here however suggests thatthe Central and Eastern European radical right after 1989 is nei-ther a return of the pre-democratic and precommunist past northe equivalent of todayrsquos Western European radical right The dom-inant forces of the radical right in the transformation countries areideologically and structurally different from most western varietiesIdeologically they are more extreme and openly antidemocraticorganizationally they are less a party and more a social movementphenomenon Besides country-speci c histories and opportunitystructures the overall analytical frame for the CEE radical right isa multiple modernization process ie a transformation from au-thoritarian regimes to liberal democracies from state-socialist tocapitalist market economies and from industrialism to postindus-trialism The resulting strains of economic and political insecurityespecially the uncompleted process of democratization and con-solidation of the new regimes provide opportunities for the radi-cal right which present western democracies do not but at the sametime the ldquotransformationrdquo of these movements into solid politi-cal parties and electoral success is limited

The Radical Right in Perspective Some Conceptual Remarks

A workable denition of right-wing radicalism in comparative per-spective seems best tied to the theoretical concepts of social changethat underlie most analyses of the radical right Here moderniza-tion theories provide some conceptually grounded criteria for suchanalyses Generally modernization can be understood as a grow-ing autonomy of the individual (status mobility and role exibil-


4 Mudde ldquoExtreme-right Parties in Eastern Europerdquo 25

























Table

1

Dev

elop

men

t of t

he G

erm

an R

adic

al R

ight

Gro

ups (

uppe

r ro

w) a

nd M

embe

rs (l

ower

row

) 199

0ndash19

99 (R

epor

ts o

f the

Fede

ral O

fce

for

the

Prot

ectio

n of

the

Con

stitu

tion)

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

Mili

tant

Rig

ht-w

ing

extr

emis

ts S

kinh

eads

a4

13

53

55

4200

6400

5600

5400

6200

6400

7600

8200

9000

Neo

nazi

s27

3033

2733

4348

4041

4914

0021

0014

0024

5029

4019

8024

2024

0024

0022

00P

olit

ical

Par

ties

84

43

33

355

130

4540

035

900

3350

034

800

3900

037

000

ldquoNat

iona

l-fr

eihe

itlic

herdquo

DV

U3

33

2200

024

000

2600

026

000

2000

015

000

1500

015

000

1800

017

000

ldquoNat

iona

l-de

mok

rati

sche

rdquoN

PD

55

573

0067

0053

0050

0045

0040

0035

0043

0060

0060

00ldquoR

epub

likan

errdquo

2300

020

000

1600

015

000

1550

015

000

1400

0O

ther

s34

3841

4045

5652

6365

7729

0039

0040

0031

2038

3035

6026

6043

0045

0042

00Su

m to

tal b

(min

us

mul

tipl

e m

embe

rshi

ps)

9610

810

911

413

432

200

3980

041

900

6450

056

600

4610

045

300

4840

053

600

5140

0so

urc

es

Mic

hael

Min

kenb

erg

Die

neu

e ra

dika

le R

echt

e im

Ver

glei

ch U

SA F

rank

reic

h D

euts

chla

nd(O

plad

enW

iesb

aden

Wes

tdeu

tsch

er V

erla

g 1

998)

30

1 ta

ble

719

Bun

desm

inis

teri

um d

es I

nner

en V

erfa

ssun

gssc

hutz

beri

cht 1

999

(Bon

n 20

00)

18

no

tes

a Aft

er 1

995

mili

tant

s of

the

extr

eme

righ

t inc

lude

d m

anife

stly

vio

lent

per

sons

and

thos

e w

ith s

uf

cien

t evi

denc

e of

a te

nden

cy to

war

ds v

iole

nce

b Beg

inni

ng w

ith th

e 19

94 R

epor

t (ie

19

93 d

ata)

the

ldquoR

epub

likan

errdquo

wer

e in

clud

ed t

hus

the

dram

atic

incr

ease

of t

otal

mem

bers

hip











Germany West East



































RO MPRRO PDNPL PNR























Poland




Czech Rep


Hungary






Russia


Romania






































































Conclusions
































Table

1

Dev

elop

men

t of t

he G

erm

an R

adic

al R

ight

Gro

ups (

uppe

r ro

w) a

nd M

embe

rs (l

ower

row

) 199

0ndash19

99 (R

epor

ts o

f the

Fede

ral O

fce

for

the

Prot

ectio

n of

the

Con

stitu

tion)

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

Mili

tant

Rig

ht-w

ing

extr

emis

ts S

kinh

eads

a4

13

53

55

4200

6400

5600

5400

6200

6400

7600

8200

9000

Neo

nazi

s27

3033

2733

4348

4041

4914

0021

0014

0024

5029

4019

8024

2024

0024

0022

00P

olit

ical

Par

ties

84

43

33

355

130

4540

035

900

3350

034

800

3900

037

000

ldquoNat

iona

l-fr

eihe

itlic

herdquo

DV

U3

33

2200

024

000

2600

026

000

2000

015

000

1500

015

000

1800

017

000

ldquoNat

iona

l-de

mok

rati

sche

rdquoN

PD

55

573

0067

0053

0050

0045

0040

0035

0043

0060

0060

00ldquoR

epub

likan

errdquo

2300

020

000

1600

015

000

1550

015

000

1400

0O

ther

s34

3841

4045

5652

6365

7729

0039

0040

0031

2038

3035

6026

6043

0045

0042

00Su

m to

tal b

(min

us

mul

tipl

e m

embe

rshi

ps)

9610

810

911

413

432

200

3980

041

900

6450

056

600

4610

045

300

4840

053

600

5140

0so

urc

es

Mic

hael

Min

kenb

erg

Die

neu

e ra

dika

le R

echt

e im

Ver

glei

ch U

SA F

rank

reic

h D

euts

chla

nd(O

plad

enW

iesb

aden

Wes

tdeu

tsch

er V

erla

g 1

998)

30

1 ta

ble

719

Bun

desm

inis

teri

um d

es I

nner

en V

erfa

ssun

gssc

hutz

beri

cht 1

999

(Bon

n 20

00)

18

no

tes

a Aft

er 1

995

mili

tant

s of

the

extr

eme

righ

t inc

lude

d m

anife

stly

vio

lent

per

sons

and

thos

e w

ith s

uf

cien

t evi

denc

e of

a te

nden

cy to

war

ds v

iole

nce

b Beg

inni

ng w

ith th

e 19

94 R

epor

t (ie

19

93 d

ata)

the

ldquoR

epub

likan

errdquo

wer

e in

clud

ed t

hus

the

dram

atic

incr

ease

of t

otal

mem

bers

hip











Germany West East



































RO MPRRO PDNPL PNR























Poland




Czech Rep


Hungary






Russia


Romania






































































Conclusions




























Table

1

Dev

elop

men

t of t

he G

erm

an R

adic

al R

ight

Gro

ups (

uppe

r ro

w) a

nd M

embe

rs (l

ower

row

) 199

0ndash19

99 (R

epor

ts o

f the

Fede

ral O

fce

for

the

Prot

ectio

n of

the

Con

stitu

tion)

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

Mili

tant

Rig

ht-w

ing

extr

emis

ts S

kinh

eads

a4

13

53

55

4200

6400

5600

5400

6200

6400

7600

8200

9000

Neo

nazi

s27

3033

2733

4348

4041

4914

0021

0014

0024

5029

4019

8024

2024

0024

0022

00P

olit

ical

Par

ties

84

43

33

355

130

4540

035

900

3350

034

800

3900

037

000

ldquoNat

iona

l-fr

eihe

itlic

herdquo

DV

U3

33

2200

024

000

2600

026

000

2000

015

000

1500

015

000

1800

017

000

ldquoNat

iona

l-de

mok

rati

sche

rdquoN

PD

55

573

0067

0053

0050

0045

0040

0035

0043

0060

0060

00ldquoR

epub

likan

errdquo

2300

020

000

1600

015

000

1550

015

000

1400

0O

ther

s34

3841

4045

5652

6365

7729

0039

0040

0031

2038

3035

6026

6043

0045

0042

00Su

m to

tal b

(min

us

mul

tipl

e m

embe

rshi

ps)

9610

810

911

413

432

200

3980

041

900

6450

056

600

4610

045

300

4840

053

600

5140

0so

urc

es

Mic

hael

Min

kenb

erg

Die

neu

e ra

dika

le R

echt

e im

Ver

glei

ch U

SA F

rank

reic

h D

euts

chla

nd(O

plad

enW

iesb

aden

Wes

tdeu

tsch

er V

erla

g 1

998)

30

1 ta

ble

719

Bun

desm

inis

teri

um d

es I

nner

en V

erfa

ssun

gssc

hutz

beri

cht 1

999

(Bon

n 20

00)

18

no

tes

a Aft

er 1

995

mili

tant

s of

the

extr

eme

righ

t inc

lude

d m

anife

stly

vio

lent

per

sons

and

thos

e w

ith s

uf

cien

t evi

denc

e of

a te

nden

cy to

war

ds v

iole

nce

b Beg

inni

ng w

ith th

e 19

94 R

epor

t (ie

19

93 d

ata)

the

ldquoR

epub

likan

errdquo

wer

e in

clud

ed t

hus

the

dram

atic

incr

ease

of t

otal

mem

bers

hip











Germany West East



































RO MPRRO PDNPL PNR























Poland




Czech Rep


Hungary






Russia


Romania






































































Conclusions


















Table

1

Dev

elop

men

t of t

he G

erm

an R

adic

al R

ight

Gro

ups (

uppe

r ro

w) a

nd M

embe

rs (l

ower

row

) 199

0ndash19

99 (R

epor

ts o

f the

Fede

ral O

fce

for

the

Prot

ectio

n of

the

Con

stitu

tion)

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

Mili

tant

Rig

ht-w

ing

extr

emis

ts S

kinh

eads

a4

13

53

55

4200

6400

5600

5400

6200

6400

7600

8200

9000

Neo

nazi

s27

3033

2733

4348

4041

4914

0021

0014

0024

5029

4019

8024

2024

0024

0022

00P

olit

ical

Par

ties

84

43

33

355

130

4540

035

900

3350

034

800

3900

037

000

ldquoNat

iona

l-fr

eihe

itlic

herdquo

DV

U3

33

2200

024

000

2600

026

000

2000

015

000

1500

015

000

1800

017

000

ldquoNat

iona

l-de

mok

rati

sche

rdquoN

PD

55

573

0067

0053

0050

0045

0040

0035

0043

0060

0060

00ldquoR

epub

likan

errdquo

2300

020

000

1600

015

000

1550

015

000

1400

0O

ther

s34

3841

4045

5652

6365

7729

0039

0040

0031

2038

3035

6026

6043

0045

0042

00Su

m to

tal b

(min

us

mul

tipl

e m

embe

rshi

ps)

9610

810

911

413

432

200

3980

041

900

6450

056

600

4610

045

300

4840

053

600

5140

0so

urc

es

Mic

hael

Min

kenb

erg

Die

neu

e ra

dika

le R

echt

e im

Ver

glei

ch U

SA F

rank

reic

h D

euts

chla

nd(O

plad

enW

iesb

aden

Wes

tdeu

tsch

er V

erla

g 1

998)

30

1 ta

ble

719

Bun

desm

inis

teri

um d

es I

nner

en V

erfa

ssun

gssc

hutz

beri

cht 1

999

(Bon

n 20

00)

18

no

tes

a Aft

er 1

995

mili

tant

s of

the

extr

eme

righ

t inc

lude

d m

anife

stly

vio

lent

per

sons

and

thos

e w

ith s

uf

cien

t evi

denc

e of

a te

nden

cy to

war

ds v

iole

nce

b Beg

inni

ng w

ith th

e 19

94 R

epor

t (ie

19

93 d

ata)

the

ldquoR

epub

likan

errdquo

wer

e in

clud

ed t

hus

the

dram

atic

incr

ease

of t

otal

mem

bers

hip











Germany West East



































RO MPRRO PDNPL PNR























Poland




Czech Rep


Hungary






Russia


Romania






































































Conclusions














Table

1

Dev

elop

men

t of t

he G

erm

an R

adic

al R

ight

Gro

ups (

uppe

r ro

w) a

nd M

embe

rs (l

ower

row

) 199

0ndash19

99 (R

epor

ts o

f the

Fede

ral O

fce

for

the

Prot

ectio

n of

the

Con

stitu

tion)

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

Mili

tant

Rig

ht-w

ing

extr

emis

ts S

kinh

eads

a4

13

53

55

4200

6400

5600

5400

6200

6400

7600

8200

9000

Neo

nazi

s27

3033

2733

4348

4041

4914

0021

0014

0024

5029

4019

8024

2024

0024

0022

00P

olit

ical

Par

ties

84

43

33

355

130

4540

035

900

3350

034

800

3900

037

000

ldquoNat

iona

l-fr

eihe

itlic

herdquo

DV

U3

33

2200

024

000

2600

026

000

2000

015

000

1500

015

000

1800

017

000

ldquoNat

iona

l-de

mok

rati

sche

rdquoN

PD

55

573

0067

0053

0050

0045

0040

0035

0043

0060

0060

00ldquoR

epub

likan

errdquo

2300

020

000

1600

015

000

1550

015

000

1400

0O

ther

s34

3841

4045

5652

6365

7729

0039

0040

0031

2038

3035

6026

6043

0045

0042

00Su

m to

tal b

(min

us

mul

tipl

e m

embe

rshi

ps)

9610

810

911

413

432

200

3980

041

900

6450

056

600

4610

045

300

4840

053

600

5140

0so

urc

es

Mic

hael

Min

kenb

erg

Die

neu

e ra

dika

le R

echt

e im

Ver

glei

ch U

SA F

rank

reic

h D

euts

chla

nd(O

plad

enW

iesb

aden

Wes

tdeu

tsch

er V

erla

g 1

998)

30

1 ta

ble

719

Bun

desm

inis

teri

um d

es I

nner

en V

erfa

ssun

gssc

hutz

beri

cht 1

999

(Bon

n 20

00)

18

no

tes

a Aft

er 1

995

mili

tant

s of

the

extr

eme

righ

t inc

lude

d m

anife

stly

vio

lent

per

sons

and

thos

e w

ith s

uf

cien

t evi

denc

e of

a te

nden

cy to

war

ds v

iole

nce

b Beg

inni

ng w

ith th

e 19

94 R

epor

t (ie

19

93 d

ata)

the

ldquoR

epub

likan

errdquo

wer

e in

clud

ed t

hus

the

dram

atic

incr

ease

of t

otal

mem

bers

hip











Germany West East



































RO MPRRO PDNPL PNR























Poland




Czech Rep


Hungary






Russia


Romania






































































Conclusions








Table

1

Dev

elop

men

t of t

he G

erm

an R

adic

al R

ight

Gro

ups (

uppe

r ro

w) a

nd M

embe

rs (l

ower

row

) 199

0ndash19

99 (R

epor

ts o

f the

Fede

ral O

fce

for

the

Prot

ectio

n of

the

Con

stitu

tion)

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

Mili

tant

Rig

ht-w

ing

extr

emis

ts S

kinh

eads

a4

13

53

55

4200

6400

5600

5400

6200

6400

7600

8200

9000

Neo

nazi

s27

3033

2733

4348

4041

4914

0021

0014

0024

5029

4019

8024

2024

0024

0022

00P

olit

ical

Par

ties

84

43

33

355

130

4540

035

900

3350

034

800

3900

037

000

ldquoNat

iona

l-fr

eihe

itlic

herdquo

DV

U3

33

2200

024

000

2600

026

000

2000

015

000

1500

015

000

1800

017

000

ldquoNat

iona

l-de

mok

rati

sche

rdquoN

PD

55

573

0067

0053

0050

0045

0040

0035

0043

0060

0060

00ldquoR

epub

likan

errdquo

2300

020

000

1600

015

000

1550

015

000

1400

0O

ther

s34

3841

4045

5652

6365

7729

0039

0040

0031

2038

3035

6026

6043

0045

0042

00Su

m to

tal b

(min

us

mul

tipl

e m

embe

rshi

ps)

9610

810

911

413

432

200

3980

041

900

6450

056

600

4610

045

300

4840

053

600

5140

0so

urc

es

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Germany West East



































RO MPRRO PDNPL PNR























Poland




Czech Rep


Hungary






Russia


Romania






































































Conclusions


















Germany West East



































RO MPRRO PDNPL PNR























Poland




Czech Rep


Hungary






Russia


Romania






































































Conclusions













Germany West East



































RO MPRRO PDNPL PNR























Poland




Czech Rep


Hungary






Russia


Romania






































































Conclusions





































RO MPRRO PDNPL PNR























Poland




Czech Rep


Hungary






Russia


Romania






































































Conclusions





























RO MPRRO PDNPL PNR























Poland




Czech Rep


Hungary






Russia


Romania






































































Conclusions




















RO MPRRO PDNPL PNR























Poland




Czech Rep


Hungary






Russia


Romania






































































Conclusions














RO MPRRO PDNPL PNR























Poland




Czech Rep


Hungary






Russia


Romania






































































Conclusions



























Poland




Czech Rep


Hungary






Russia


Romania






































































Conclusions






















Poland




Czech Rep


Hungary






Russia


Romania






































































Conclusions













Poland




Czech Rep


Hungary






Russia


Romania






































































Conclusions












Russia


Romania






































































Conclusions






































































Conclusions































































Conclusions
























































Conclusions

















































Conclusions









































Conclusions





































Conclusions






























Conclusions






















Conclusions















Conclusions









Conclusions











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