This article was downloaded by: [DTU Library] On: 05 May 2014, At: 10:29 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Contemporary Buddhism: An Interdisciplinary Journal Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcbh20 ‘The relationship between the two truths’: a comparative analysis of two Tibetan accounts Sonam Thakchoe a a University of Tasmania, Australia Published online: 04 Jun 2010. To cite this article: Sonam Thakchoe (2003) ‘The relationship between the two truths’: a comparative analysis of two Tibetan accounts, Contemporary Buddhism: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 4:2, 111-127, DOI: 10.1080/1463994032000162947 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1463994032000162947 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub- licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly
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This article was downloaded by: [DTU Library]On: 05 May 2014, At: 10:29Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH,UK
Contemporary Buddhism: AnInterdisciplinary JournalPublication details, including instructions for authorsand subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcbh20
‘The relationship between thetwo truths’: a comparativeanalysis of two Tibetan accountsSonam Thakchoe aa University of Tasmania, AustraliaPublished online: 04 Jun 2010.
To cite this article: Sonam Thakchoe (2003) ‘The relationship between the twotruths’: a comparative analysis of two Tibetan accounts, Contemporary Buddhism: AnInterdisciplinary Journal, 4:2, 111-127, DOI: 10.1080/1463994032000162947
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1463994032000162947
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all theinformation (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform.However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, orsuitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressedin this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not theviews of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content shouldnot be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions,claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilitieswhatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connectionwith, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes.Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly
‘The Relationship between thetwo truths’: a comparativeanalysis of two TibetanAccountsSonam ThakchoeUniversity of Tasmania, Australia
Introduction
Nagarjuna, the most well-known Buddhist thinker after the Buddha himself,points out in his famous Mulamadhyamakakarika that ‘The Buddha’s teachingsof the Dharma is based on the two truths: a truth of worldly conventions andan ultimate truth’ (XXIV:8). This doctrine of the two truths does indeed lie atthe very heart of Buddhism. More particularly, the phenomenological andsoteriological discourses in the Madhyamika tradition revolve around ideasconcerning the two truths. Central to the doctrine is the concept that allphenomena possess dual characteristics—conventional and ultimate. The for-mer, defined as the mode of phenomenal appearance, is the conventional truth;while the latter, defined as the ultimate mode of being, is the ultimate truth. Thispaper examines the ways in which these two truths are related from the TibetanPrasangika Madhyamika perspective, and argues that there are two radicallydistinct Tibetan ways of reading and interpreting the issues surrounding them.It does so by comparing the ccounts of Tsong khapa Blo bzang Grags pa(hereafter Tsong khapa, 1357–1423 A.D.) and Go rampa bSod nams Senge’s(hereafter Go rampa 1429–1489 A.D.), and focuses on the way in which the twotruths are related. It will be argued that, for Tsong khapa, the two truthsconstitute a ‘single ontological identity’ (ngo bo gcig) with ‘different conceptualidentities’ (ldog pa tha dad), whereas for Go rampa, the truths are separate ina way that is ‘incompatible with their unity’ (gcig pa bkag pa’i tha dad) oridentity.
Before we move on, there are two important background issues that we mustremember. In formulating an account of the relationship between the two truths,Tsong khapa places great emphasis on the relationship between ‘the twonatures’ of a single entity. He argues that ‘the ultimate reality of the shoot isits [ultimate] characteristic (rang bzhin), thus it is called shoot’s nature. Theshoot’s colour, shape, and so on, are also its features, therefore they too areconstitutive of its nature’ (Tsong khapa 1992, 406).1 Given the fact that eachphenomenon is considered to have two natures—wherein its conventionalnature corresponds to conventional truth and its ultimate nature to ultimatetruth—Tsong khapa is implicitly suggesting that the two truths constitute oneand the same phenomenon (or entity or thing)—they do not, in any way,
ISSN 1463-9947 print; 1476-7953 online/03/020111-17 2003 Taylor & Francis LtdDOI: 10.1080/1463994032000162947
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represent two ontologically distinct identities. As a consequence, in the accountof the relationship between the two truths, Tsong khapa’s primary aim is toestablish the mutually compatible relationship between two modes of cognitionthat relate to the two natures of a single phenomenon or entity. In other words,for Tsong khapa, the two modes of cognition and the two natures correspondingto the two truths are underlain by one phenomenon. In contrast, however, Gorampa views the relationship between the two truths as one between two distinctand incompatible modes of cognition that do not refer to a single entity withtwo natures, but rather constitute two modes of cognition, only one of whichrefers us to a real phenomenon.
The two truths are ontologically identical but conceptually distinct
First we turn to Tsong khapa: here two rather technical phrases provide thecontext for our examination of Tsong khapa’s account of the relationshipbetween the two truths. The Tibetan phrase ngo bo gcig used in Tsong khapa’sphilosophy, particularly in the context of the relationship between the twotruths, is usually translated in English as ‘one entity’ (Newland 1992, 59–75;Hopkins 1996, 413–7). Although ‘entity’ has some connotations of ‘being’, itusually refers to a ‘thing’. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, for example,points out “‘thing”, in its most general sense, is interchangeable with “entity”or “being” and is applicable to any item whose existence is acknowledged bya system of ontology, whether that item be particular, universal, abstract, orconcrete’ (Honderich 1995, 871). In Tsong khapa’s sense, in spite of the factthat there is an underlying assumption that the two truths constitute ‘one entity’or ‘one thing’ or ‘one phenomenon’, the ngo bo, it does not as such directlyrefer to a ‘thing’. Even in ordinary Tibetan discourse, ngo bo does not have anyexplicit reference to things. There is, however, an implicit reference to thingssince ngo bo always refers to the identity, nature or the property of that thing.The Great Tibetan–Chinese Dictionary (Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo), forexample, defines ngo bo as rang bzhin, meaning ‘nature’, or gnas lugs, meaning‘mode of being’ (Tang Yi Sun 1993, 633). It also explains ngo bo gcig pa asrang bzhin tha mi thad pa, meaning ‘that which has no distinct nature like forinstance being a jar and being impermanent’ (ibid.).2 Making it even clearer, thedictionary enumerates the rang bzhin gcig pa, meaning ‘single nature’, andbdag nyid gcig pa, meaning ‘identical character’, as the synonyms of ngo bogcig pa, meaning ‘single ontological identity’ (ibid.).3 Considering these issues,instead of ‘entity’, I choose to translate ngo bo as ‘ontological identity’, andthus ngo bo gcig as ‘single ontological identity’, or as ‘single-nature’ inter-changeably, depending on the context, although Cabezon (1992, 364) prefersthe latter. As we shall see, the analysis of the relationship between the twotruths for Tsong khapa amounts to analysing the relationship between the twonatures.
The second Tibetan phrase is ldog pa tha dad. This phrase is usuallytranslated in English as ‘isolates’ (Newland 1992, 59; Hopkins 1996, 413), orless frequently as ‘opposites’ (Cabezon 1992, 364), ‘distinguisher’ (Dreyfus
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1997, 165–70), or even ‘under description’.4 However, ldog pa is explained inThe Great–Chinese Dictionary (Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo) as ‘a phenom-enon that appears to conceptual mind as being different categories … or it isthat which appears not being different. For instance, the ldog pa of a jar is theaspect which is merely not being of the non-jar like the form that appears toconceptual mind’ (Tang Yi Sun 1993, 1458).5 While translating ldog pa as‘distinguisher’, Dreyfus also points out that the ldog pa of a phenomenon ‘is itsconceptual identity. It is the property of a phenomenon being not what it is not.For example, a jar is distinct from everything (that is not jar). This is explainedby the Collected Topics to be as its distinguisher. Since such a distinguisher isa distinction made by thought, it is conceptual’ (1997, 166). Similarly, Dreyfusexplains ‘when we think that the Vedic language is impermanent, we apply thedistinguisher, that is, the concept of impermanence, to the Vedic language’(1997, 165).
As these explanations of the phrase reveal, ldog pa is a term more to do withconceptual identification than the thing itself. In order to be closer to themeaning at issue here, and although the translation is less literal, I shalltentatively use the English term ‘conceptual identity’ in place of the Tibetanphrase ldog pa. Ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad is therefore tentatively renderedas ‘single ontological identity with different conceptual identities’. These twoTibetan phrases are thus conjunctively explained in The Great Tibetan–ChineseDictionary as follows: ‘in spite of not having distinct natures, exists as separateconceptual identities. For example, [it is like the conceptual relationshipbetween] a jar and object of knowledge, being impermanent and things,mankind and their causal condition, the five aggregates and the like’ (Tang YiSun 1993, 663).6
This principle of ‘single ontological identity’ (ngo bo gcig) with ‘distinctconceptual identities’ (ldog pa tha dad), pointed out earlier, is founded on theconcept of the two natures. The two natures not only serve as the basicreference point for Tsong khapa in his exposition of the basis of the divisionof the two truths, of their meanings and definitions, but they also serve as thebasic ontological reference for his account of the relationship between the twotruths.
Tsong khapa traces the notion of the two natures back to Candrakırti. ‘[TheBuddha] said that all things have two natures—those found by perceivers ofreality and of falsities’, says Candrakırti in the Madhyamakavatara [VI:23](Candrakırti 1996b, 155; also cited in 1994, 98).7 While glossing a statement inthe Madhyamakavatarabha•ya, Candrakırti also writes: ‘All phenomena—in-terior and exterior—such as conditioned phenomena and the shoot, have twonatures’ (1994, 98; also cited in Tsong khapa 1992, 406).8 In mKhas grub rJe’swords, the point can be rephrased in this way: ‘as both the root texts of the[Madhyamakavatara] and its commentary [Madhyamakavatarabha•ya] main-tain … all conventional and ultimate phenomena possess natures, and if theirnatures exist they must be either one or different. For if [two natures] exist theymust be either the same or different’ (n.d., 429f; trans. Cabezon 1992, 363).9
Since the dual natures are ontologically locked together within the framework
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of each phenomenon, it is obvious that the two truths constitute the samephenomenon. So, the question concerning the relationship between the twotruths is the same question as that which concerns the relationship between thetwo natures. To find out the relationship between the two truths is thusequivalent to examining the precise relationship between the two natures.
So, how are the two natures related? Are they identical or distinct? Accordingto the view held by Tsong khapa, the short answer is that the two natures areneither identical nor distinct in any unqualified sense. The two natures arerelated in terms of a single ontological identity with distinct conceptualidentities—thus they are both the same and different. Since the two natures arethe basis of the relationship between the two truths, so the relationship betweenthe two truths will reflect the relationship between the two natures. Ultimatetruth and conventional truth thus possess the same ontological status. As the twonatures are two natures of the same ontological structure, so the two truths aretruths that relate to the same ontological structure also.
Tsong khapa likens the relationship between the two truths, and the twonatures, to the relationship between ‘being conditioned’ (byas pa) and ‘beingimpermanent’ (mi rtag pa)’ (1984, 176).10 He borrows this point fromNagarjuna’s Bodhicittavivaran�a (byang chub sems ‘grel), wherein the latterstates: ‘Reality (de nyid, tathat) is not perceived as separate from conventional-ity (kun rdzob, sa·v�ti) [67]. The conventionality is explained to be empty.Empty alone is the conventionality’, and therefore for Nagarjuna, ‘if one ofthem does not exist neither will the other, like being conditioned and beingimpermanent’ [68] (Namdol 1991, 45–6; cited in Tsong khapa 1984, 176; alsosee Cabezon 1992, 364; Newland 1992, 61).11 Commenting on this passagefrom Bodhicittavivaran�a, Tsong khapa writes:
The first four lines show that things as they really are are not ontologi-cally distinct from that of the conventionality. The latter two linesestablish their relationship such that if one did not exist neither could theother (med na mi ‘bung ba’i ‘brel ba). This, in fact, is equivalent to theirbeing constituted by a single-property relationship (bdag cig pa’i ‘brelba). Therefore, like the case of being conditioned and being impermanent,[the relation between the two truths] is demonstrated as one of a singleontological identity (ngo bo gcig pa). (1984, 176–7)12
The way in which the two truths are related is thus analogous to the way inwhich being conditioned and being impermanent are related. So far as thecharacter of being conditioned and being impermanent is concerned, they areontologically identical and mutually entailing. Whatever is impermanent is alsoconditioned; likewise, whatever is conditioned is also impermanent. If imperma-nence did not exist, conditioned phenomena would not exist; similarly, ifconditioned phenomenon did not exist, impermanence would not exist.
The ontological identity between being conditioned and being impermanentdoes not imply identity in all and every respect. So far as their mode ofappearance is concerned, conditioned and impermanent phenomena are distinctand contrasting. Impermanence always presents itself to the cognising mind as
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impermanent, but not as conditioned. Similarly, being conditioned alwayspresents itself to its cognising mind as conditioned, but not as impermanent.Similarly, it does not necessarily follow that the two truths are identical in everyrespect just because they share a common ontological identity. So far as themodes of appearance are concerned, ultimate nature and conventional nature aredistinct. The mode of appearance of ultimate nature is non-deceptive andconsistent with its mode of existence, while the mode of appearance ofconventional nature is deceptive and inconsistent with its mode of existence.
Conventional nature is, according to this view, uncritically verified byempirically valid cognition, whereas ultimate nature is critically verified byultimately valid cognition. Hence, just as ultimate nature is inaccessible to theempirically valid cognition on account of its uncritical mode of engagement, sotoo is conventional nature inaccessible to ultimately valid cognition on accountof its critical mode of engagement. This is how, in Tsong khapa’s view, thetruths differ epistemologically in spite of sharing a common ontologicalidentity.
In summarising Tsong khapa’s points, mKhas grub rJe writes: ‘the two truthsare therefore of the same nature, but different conceptual identities (ngo bo gcigla ldog pa tha dad). They have a single-nature relationship such that if one didnot exist neither could the other (med na mi ‘byung ba’i bdag gcig ‘brel) justlike being conditioned and impermanent’ (n.d., 429f; cf. Cabezon 1992, 364).13
In commenting on dGe lugs pa thought, Newland also echoes the same point:
That the two truths are ‘different isolates’ [ldog pa that dad] means, forexample, that a table and its emptiness can be distinguished in terms ofhow they are understood by a conceptual consciousness. To say that twothings are different isolates is to make only the most minimal distinctionbetween them. Since conceptual consciousnesses often operate underthe sway of language, things are different isolates as soon as they aregiven different names—even if those names refer to the same object.(1992, 60)
Since the meaning of ‘distinct conceptual identities’ (ldog pa tha dad), in Tsongkhapa’s view, is rooted in the two natures, the conceptual distinction betweenthe two truths must not be understood as a pure epistemological distinction. Thedistinction between the two truths, according to Tsong khapa, is not reducibleto two different perspectives, or even to two different linguistic practices. Sinceboth the truths have their own objective references, namely the two natures,they are not reducible to subjective viewpoints nor are they reducible to merelya difference of language. Jose Ignacio Cabezon is one commentator who doesemphasise the distinction between the two truths as entirely linguistic and writesthat the two truths ‘although having the same referent … have different names,different designations, being the opposites of different entities qua names’(1992, 516–1128n). Both Newland and Cabezon are correct in pointing out that‘distinct conceptual identities’ (ldog pa tha dad) in Tsong khapa’s sense aredistinctions drawn by the conceptual consciousness, and so clearly have alinguistic component. They are also correct in pointing out, as I have earlier,
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that the two truths have only ‘one entity’ or ‘one phenomenon’ as their referent.Yet to say, as a consequence, that the differences between the two truths arepurely linguistic in nature, is to ignore Tsong khapa’s own emphasis on the roleof the two natures to which the two truths correspond.
Although the two truths presuppose, according to Tsong khapa, a singlephenomenon or entity as their common referent, this does not mean that theyshare exactly the same objective referent. Given the fact that the two naturescorrespond to the two truths, ultimate truth has the ultimate nature of thephenomenon as its referent, while conventional truth has the conventionalnature of the same phenomenon as its referent. Thus, while engaging with thesame phenomenon, both verifying consciousnesses have their own distinctivereferents according to the manner in which they operate—one critically, theother uncritically. This latter point is one of Tsong khapa’s central theses. Itallows him to ground both the identity and difference that stems from therelationship between the two truths on the single ontological identity anddifferent conceptual nature of the one phenomenon. In doing this, he effectivelydismisses the idea of treating the difference between the truths as merely oneof contradictory perspectives or different linguistic practices. Thus he allowsequal significance to both the epistemological and ontological issues involvedin the relationship between the two truths. To say that they share a singleontological identity with different conceptual identities does not mean, there-fore, that the distinctions at issue are purely epistemological. This is consistentwith his position that the two truths stand on an equal footing and do notconstitute an ontological or epistemological hierarchy.
The two truths are distinct and incompatible
Let us now examine how Go rampa formulates the relationship between the twotruths. From Go rampa’s point of view, the position advanced by Tsong khapais utterly unacceptable. To say that the two truths are ontologically identical issimilar to equating ignorance with wisdom.
The main point of reference in Go rampa’s exposition of the basis of the twotruths is what he calls ‘mere mind’ (blo tsam) since this is what underpins theclaim that the distinction between the two truths is purely subjective. Moreover,because Go rampa denies that there is any ontological unity that underlies thedistinction between the two truths—that distinction is one of ‘mere mind’ suchthat the two truths cannot both have an objective referent—the two truths mustconstitute conflicting and incompatible perspectives. As a consequence, therelationship between the two truths is, according to this view, equivalent to therelationship between the two conflicting perspectives—namely, ignorance andwisdom. The question now at issue is: How is ignorance related to wisdom? Orhow does wisdom relate to ignorance? In answer, Go rampa suggests fourpossible sets of relationships between the two truths. He borrows them from Saskya pun�d� ita Kun dga’ rGyal tshan (also known as Sa pa):
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Generally the twofold division is analysed in order to determine (1)whether its members are substantially distinct (rdzas tha dad) like amattress and a jar. (2) Or [to determine whether they are] single identitywith distinct conceptual identities (ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad) likebeing conditioned (byas pa) and impermanent (mi rtag pa), (3) orcoreferential but different in meaning (rnams grangs pa’i tha dad) like‘moon’ and ‘that which has a cooling effect (bsil zer byed pa)’, (4) or‘distinct’ in the sense that is incompatible with oneness (gcig pa gdag pa’itha dad) like entity (dngos po) and entitilessness (dngos med). This[relationship] between the two truths also has to be analysed in this way.(Go rampa 1969b, 375d; cf. Sa pa 1968b, 31d)14
Among these four sets of relations, Go rampa ignores the first—substantiallydistinct (rdzas tha dad)—and the third—co-referential, but different in meaning(rnams grangs pa’i tha dad). Because his adversary, Tsong khapa, advocatesthe second type of relationship—’single ontological identity with distinctconceptual identities’ (ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad), Go rampa expresslyrejects it. He formulates his own account based on the fourth type of relation—that the two truths are ‘distinct in the sense they are incompatible with unity’(gcig pa dgag pa’i tha dad) like entity (dngos po) and entitilessness (dngosmed).
For Go rampa, the relationship between the two truths is a straightforwardone. In the ultimate sense, he argues that the two truths transcend identity anddifference (1969b, 376d).15 ‘The transcendence of identity and difference fromthe ultimate standpoint is synonymous with the transcendence of identity anddifference from the purview of the arya’s meditative equipoise’ (Go rampa1969b, 377a).16 However, from the empirical standpoint (tha snyad du), heclaims that the two truths are ‘distinct in the sense that they are incompatiblewith their unity’ (gcig pa bkag pa’i tha dad). Go rampa likens this relation withthat between ‘entity’ (dngos po) and ‘entitilessness’ (dngo med) (ibid., 377a).17
In claiming that the two truths are distinct and incompatible, Go rampaasserts that the two truths are both ontologically and epistemologically distinct.Since what is divided into the two truths is ‘mere mind’ (blo tsam), it is obviousthat there is no single phenomenon that could serve as the objective referent forboth. This also means that the two truths must be construed as correspondingto distinct spheres belonging to distinct modes of consciousness: conventionaltruth corresponds to ignorance and ultimate truth to wisdom. It is thusinappropriate to describe the relationship between the two truths, and theircorresponding modes of consciousness, in terms of two ways of looking at thesame entity. Although the two truths can be thought of as two ways of looking,one of ignorance and the other of wisdom, there is no same entity at which bothlook. There is nothing common between the two truths and if they are bothways of looking then they do not look at the same thing.
Go rampa’s formulation of the distinct and incompatible relationship betweenthe two truths is also reinforced by his objections launched against the notion
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that the two truths share a common ontological identity. One of these objections(for a detailed objection, see 1969b, 376d; 1969a, 604–5ff) states that:
If two truths were identical in their natures, then metaphorically speaking,the hairs seen through blurred vision and the nonexistence of hairs seenthrough a correct vision would absurdly become identical. This wouldfollow from the two truths being identical in their natures. (Go rampa1969b, 376d).18
According to this view, the relationship between conventional truth and ultimatetruth is comparable with the relationship between the ‘hairs seen throughcataracts’ and the ‘absence of falling hair seen through correct vision’. Althoughthis is a metaphor, it has a direct application to the matter of how the two truthsare related. Conventional truth is analogous to the seeing of falling hairs as aresult of cataracts: both conventional truth and such false seeing are illusory, inthe ontological sense that there is nothing to which each corresponds, and in theepistemological sense that there is no true knowledge in either case. On thisbasis, ultimate truth is therefore analogous, ontologically and epistemologically,to the true seeing unaffected by cataracts in which there are no falling hairs. Justas cataracts give rise to illusory appearances, so ignorance, according to Gorampa, gives rise to all conventional truths—wisdom, on the contrary, gives riseto ultimate truth. As each is the result of a different state, so there is no link,either in terms of some common ontological identity or some common episte-mological or conceptual identity, to which both the conventional and theultimate are related.
For Go rampa, the idea that the two truths refer to one ontological identitywith different conceptual identities is highly problematic. He takes it asequivalent to claiming that there is an ontological identity between the fallinghairs seen as a result of cataracts and the absence of falling hairs seen in theabsence of such cataracts. Likewise, to say that the two truths share anepistemological link is equivalent to claiming that there is an epistemologicalconnection between the seeing of falling hairs by someone with cataracts andthe seeing from which falling hairs are absent experienced by someone withhealthy vision.
Go rampa rejects the identity of the two truths by relying on theSa·dhinirmocana sutra. This sutra, according to him, exposes four absurditiesin claiming that the two truths are ontologically identical (1969b, 375d).19 If thetwo truths were identical, then:
[1] Just as the childish (byis pa) directly perceive conventional thingssuch as form and sound, they would absurdly directly perceive ultimatetruth. [2] Just as conventional [truth] comprises many divisions ofcategories (spros pa’i dbye ba) such as form and sound, even so, ultimate[truth] would absurdly comprise many divisions (bye ba du ma). [3] Justas the conventional [truth] by definition (mtshan nyid) has nature of (rangbzhin) deluded ignorance (kun nas nyon mongs pa), ultimate truth would[absurdly] be the same. [4] Just as conventional meaning is not sought
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apart from what is seen by the childish, ultimate truth would absurdly bethe same. (1969b, 375d–6a).20
By reading the Sa·dhinirmocana sutra as presenting the relationship betweenthe two truths as distinct and incompatible, Go rampa does not mean to suggestthat the two truths constitute two distinct entities (dngos po). Nor does he meanto suggest that the two truths are one entity seen under two conflicting aspects.First, the basis of the divisions of the two truths is ‘mere mind’ (blo tsam), andit is not coherent to reduce mind into two distinct entities. Second, all entities(dngos po) are classified as belonging to conventional truth, while ultimate truthconsists purely of ‘entitilessness’ (dngos med).
If the two truths are really two distinct entities, then, Go rampa argues, theygive rise to a second set of absurdities, also four in number, as set out in theSa·dhinirmocana sutra as follows:
… if two truths were distinct [entities], then [1] aryas, while directlyrealising ultimate [truth] absurdly would remain unreleased (mi grol ba)from the conventional bondage (kun rdzob kyi ‘ching ba). [2] Reality(chos nyid) simultaneously, despite their distinctness, that is, the ultimate[truth] absurdly would not be universal (spyi tshan nyid, samanya-lakwa6�a) of conventionalities. [3] Either conditioned phenomena (‘dubyed), i.e., conventionalities would remain unestablished or selflessnesswould absurdly not be ultimate truth. [4] A continuum of each personwould absurdly accommodate both, afflictive characteristics (nyon mongsgyi mtshan nyid) and liberating qualities (rnam byang gyi mtshan nyid)(1969b, 376a).21
This second quartet of absurd consequences show, according to Go rampa, thatthe two truths are not utterly distinct entities even though they are distinct andincompatible perspectives—perspectives that are in no way convergent. Tsongkhapa, however, totally disagrees with Go rampa’s interpretation of the passagein the Sa·dhinirmocana sutra. As far as Tsong khapa is concerned, the first fourabsurdities to which the Sa·dhinirmocana sutra direct attention are intended tooperate against the position that treats the two truths as equivalent—as identicalin every respect. These absurdities, as Tsong khapa understands them, exposethe problems inherent in any such identification of the two truths. Tsong khapahimself does not explicitly cite the Sa·dhinirmocana sutra, nor does he exactlyspell out these faults; however, many later dGe lugs pa scholars do use the samecitation and, just as Go rampa did, they point to the four absurdities as settlingthe issue concerning the claim that the two truths are equivalent. Consider oneexample. In mKhen zur Pad ma rGyal tshan’s words, we read:
If the two truths [not only have single ontological identity but] a singleconceptual identity (ldog pa gcig yin na), then [1] common beings (soskye, prthajana) would directly realise the ultimate reality (chos nyid,dharmat); [2] the awareness of that reality would generate delusionssuch as attachment; [3] that [reality] would be comprised of colours,shapes and so forth and [4] yogi’s effort to meditate on reality would
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absurdly be pointless. This would follow because a jar and its ultimatereality (chos nyid, dharmat) would fall under a single conceptual identity.(1984, 323)22
For Tsong khapa, if the two truths were distinct, then, by definition, they wouldhave distinct ontological identities, since the definitions are founded on thoseidentities (1984, 177). As mKhas grub rJe points out, ‘if the two truths areontologically distinct they must be distinct unrelated things because ontologi-cally distinct things cannot have a “single-character relationship” (bdag gcig‘brel)’ (n.d., 429f; trans. Cabezon 1992, 363).23 But such a ‘single-character’relationship is essential for the unity of the two truths. To reinforce thisposition, the later dGe lugs pa scholars also use the Sa�dhinirmocana sutra(Thub stan Chos grags 1990, 707–702; see also Newland 1992, 63–6 on ‘Jamdbyangs bZhad pa and Nga dbang dPal ldan’s works). For example, mKhen zurPad ma rGyal tshan borrows from the Sa�dhinirmocana sutra the idea that fourabsurdities would follow were the two truths entirely distinct:
[1] A jar’s emptiness of true existence would not be the jar’s mode ofexistence; [2] the realisation of a jar’s emptiness of true existence wouldnot eradicate the reification through the conception of true existence; [3]it would make no sense to say that a jar is the basis of the repudiation ofthe true existence of the jar and so forth; and [4] the fact that aryabuddhas’ continuum does not simultaneously accommodate both—thewisdom realising the emptiness and the grasping to true existence of ajar—would become absurd. This would follow if the jar and the jar’semptiness of true existence are distinct. (1984, 322–3)24
Although these four absurdities are here employed to argue against the viewthat takes the two truths to be utterly distinct, the argument in which they playa part is quite different from that found in Go rampa. Go rampa is not interestedin demonstrating the unity between the two truths. His goal is to prove that theyconstitute two distinct perspectives. On the contrary, Tsong khapa and the otherdGe lugs pa scholars, by drawing attention to these absurdities in the way thatthey do, aim implicitly at establishing the mutual interdependence of the twotruths.
Other Tibetan scholars, kLong chen rab ‘Byams (1983, 192–3ff),25 Rong stonSakya rgyal tshan (n.d., 21–2ff),26 ‘Ju Mipham ‘Jam dbyangs rNam rgyal rGyamtsho (1977, 84f)27 and dGe ‘dun Chos ‘phel agree with Go rampa, however,in asserting that the two truths are distinct. They all argue that the two truthsare essentially incompatible with their unity (gcig pa bkag pa’i tha dad). Incriticising Tsong khapa28 for holding that there is a non-contradictory relation-ship between the two truths, dGe ‘dun Chos ‘phel, for example, writes:
The so-called mutually compatible relationship between the two truthsmight be possible if there was ever a time whereby the arya’s wisdom andthe conception of ordinary beings become mutually compatible withoutcontradiction. Otherwise, such a [relationship] is utterly impossible …There is indeed no opportunity to attain the liberation for those who hold
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that conventional and ultimate [truths] as non-contradictory. [This alsoholds true] in terms of the modes of analysis of both the truths. (1990,215)29
Also he states:
… This implies the acceptance of the mutually compatible and thenon-contradictory relationship between the mental states of the naıveordinary beings—the lowest extent of foolishness—and the enlightenedknowledge—the highest extent of erudition. If by accepting this, it did[justice to the enlightened wisdom], then there should be no problem evenin accepting the mutually compatible relationship between the objects ofignorance and reasoning consciousness (i.e., arya’s wisdom), [wouldthere?]… In short, the view that holds the two truths as non-contradictoryis a philosophical system that accepts all categories of mental states frombuddhas down to sentient beings as non-contradictory. (dGe ‘dun Chos‘phel 1990, 220–2)30
Still others such as Sa pa (1968a, 32a),31 Red mda ba gZhon nu bLo gros (1995,121–121),32 Sakya mChog ldan (1975, 30–3ff),33 and Mi skyod rDo rje (n.d.287–8ff)34 argue that the relationship between the two truths is essentially‘inexpressible’. They claim that ‘ultimately the two truths transcend the notionof identity and difference’ (gcig dang tha dad spros pa dang bral ba) and‘conventionally, their relationship is neither expressed as identical nor asdistinct’ (de nyid dang gzhan du brjod du med).
Conclusion
In short, the two accounts we have been considering here differ markedly intheir views regarding the relationship between the two truths. Tsong khapainsists that the two truths constitute a single ontological structure and that theyshare a common ontological identity. Yet he emphatically denies that the twotruths are identical in every respect. They are different so far as their mode ofappearance and their mode of existence is concerned. The appearance ofconventional truth does not cohere with the mode of existence of conventionaltruth (so conventional truth is contingent and yet gives the appearance ofnon-contingency), whereas the appearance of ultimate truth is coherent with themode of existence of ultimate truth (it appears to be non-contingent and is so).Conventional and ultimate truth differ, then, in terms of the two natures uponwhich they are founded and therefore to the respective cognising conscious-nesses to which they relate.
The identity and difference of the two truths must, according to Tsong khapa,be both ontologically and epistemologically grounded in the two natures. Thisrenders the reduction of the two truths to a mere subjective distinctionimpossible, since the two natures do not constitute a merely subjective distinc-tion. In contrast, Go rampa’s account of the relationship between the two truthstakes them to be reducible to two conflicting perspectives. The cognitive
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experiences of ordinary beings (so skye, prthajana) and the cognitive experi-ences of buddhas are distinct in every sense of the word. There is nothing incommon between these two conflicting perspectives and neither is there anycommon ontological identity nor epistemological link between these twoperspectives.
Notes
1 Myu gu’i chos nyid ni de’i rang bzhin yin pas de’i ngo bo zhes bya la myu gu’i khadog dang dbyibs la sogs pa yang myu gu’i bdag nyid yin pas de’i ngo bo’o⁄⁄)
2 Ngo bo gcig pa/rang bzhin tha mi dad pa/dper na bum pa dang mi rtag pa lta bu’o/3 Ming gi rnam grangs la rang bzhin gcig pa dang/bdag nyid gcig pa’o⁄⁄4 Suggested to me by Jay Garfield on my draft material.5 rTog pa rigs mi mthun pa’am tha dad pa las log par snang ba’i chos/dper na/bum
pa ma yin pa las log tsam gyi cha ni bum pa’i ldog pa yin pa ste rtog pa la snangba’i gzugs lta bu’o⁄⁄
6 Ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad pa/rang bzhin so so ba ma yin zhing rang gi ldogpa tha dad du gnas pa ste/bum pa dang shes bya gnyis dang/mi rtag pa dang dngospo/mi dang mi’i nyer len gyi bum po’o⁄⁄
7 dNgos kun yang dag brdzun pa mthong ba yis/dngos rnyed ngo bo gyis ni ‘dzin par‘gyur/VI:23/
8 Du byed dang myu gu la sogs pa nang dang phyi ro gyi dngos po thams cad kyi ranggyi ngo bo rnam pa gnyis nye bar bstan ste⁄⁄
9 Jug pa las/dngos rnyed ngo bo gnyis ni ‘dzin par ‘gyur/zhes sogs rtsa ‘grel ggisgsung pa ltar kun rdzob dang don dam gyi chos thams cad la ngo bo yod la/ngo boyod na ngo bo gcid dang tha dad gang rung yin dgos ste yod na gcig dang tha dadgang rung yin dgos pa’i phyir ro⁄⁄
10 Byas pa dang mi rtag pa lta bu ste⁄⁄11 Kun rdzob las ni tha dad par⁄⁄ de nyid dmigs pa ma yin te/67/kun rdzob stong pa nyid
du bshad⁄⁄ stong pa kho na kun rdzob yin⁄⁄med na mi ‘byung nges pa’i phir⁄⁄byas dangmi rtag je bzhin no/68/
12 rKang pa dang po bzhi’i don ni kun rdzob las ngo bo that dad par de kho na nyidyod pa min te/kun rdzob pa rnams bden pas stong pa yin pa’i phir dang/bden stongnyid kyang gzhi kun rdzob la ‘jog pa’i phir zhes pa ‘o⁄⁄ de nas gnyis kyis ni de ltaryin dang med na mi ‘byung ba’i ‘brel ba nges la/de yang bdag gcig pa’i ‘brel payin pas byas mi rtag bzhin du ngo bo gcig par bstan no⁄⁄
13 De’i phyir bden gnyis ni ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad cing med na mi ‘byung babdag gcig ‘brel grub pa byas mi rtag lta bu yin te …⁄⁄
14 sPyir gnyis su dbye ba thams cad la bum snam ltar rdzas tha dad dam/byas mi rtagltar ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad dam/zla ba dang bsil zer byed pa ltar rnamgrangs pa’i tha dad dam/dngos po dang ngos med ltar gcig pa bkag pa’i tha dad yinzhes bya ba ‘de dpyad dgos pas bden pa gnyis la’ang de dpyad par bya’o⁄⁄
15 mDo las gcig dang tha dad la skyon brjod pa ni don dam gyi dbang du byas pa yinpas don dam par gcig dang gnyis las grol la⁄⁄; also he writes (1969b: 376a): ‘o naci ltar gnas zhe na gcig dang tha dad las grol bar gnas te/
16 Don dam par gcig dang tha dad las grol ba dang/‘phags pa’i mnyam gzhag gi ngorgcig dang tha dad las grol ba don gcig pa’i phir …//
17 Tha snyad du dngos po dang dngos med ltar gcig pa bkag pa’i tha dad yin cesgsungs pa ‘de nyid rigs pas ‘thad par mngon te⁄⁄
18 bDen pa gnyis ngo bo gcig yin na dpe’i sgo nas rab rib can gyis mthong ba’i skrashad dang/mthong ba dag pas skra shad med par mthong ba gnyis ngo bo gcig tuthal te/bden pa gnyis ngo bo gcig yin pa’i phir⁄⁄
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19 mDo sde dgongs ‘grel las/bden gnyis gcig pa dang tha dad pa’i phyogs la skyon bzhibzhi gsungs te⁄⁄
20 Dang po ni bden pa gnyis gcig yin na/1/byis pas kun rdzob gzugs dang sgra la sogspa mngon sum du mthong ba de bzhin du don dam pa’i bden ba’ang mngon summthong bar thal ba dang/2/kun rdzob las gzugs sgra la sogs pa spros ba’i dbye badu ma yod pa de bzhin don dam pa la yang dbye ba du ma yod par thal badang/3/kun rdzob kun nas nyon mongs pa’i rang bzhin nam mtshan nyid yin ba ltardon dam yang de ltar ‘gyur ba dang/4/kun rdzob byis pas mthong ba la sogs pa’idon logs su btsan du med pa de bzhin du don dam pa’i bden pa’ang de ltar thalba’o⁄⁄
21 gNyis pa ni bden pa gnyis tha dad yin na … /1/‘phags pa rnams kyis don dam mngonsum du rtogs kyang kun rdzob kyi ‘ching ba las mi grol bar thal ba dang/2/chos nyiddon dam de kun rdzob kyi spyi’i mtshan nyid ma yin par thal ba dang/3/‘du byed kunrdzob rab tu ma grub pa’am/bdag med de don dam a ma yin par thal ba dang/4/gangzag gcig gi rgyud la kun nas nyon mongs kyi mtshan yid dang/rnam byang gi mtshannyid gnyis dus gcig tu so sor grub par thal ba’o⁄⁄
22 lDog pa gcig yin na yang [1] bum pa’i chos nyid mngon sum du rtogs pa’i so skyeyod pa dang/2/chos nyid de la dmigs nas chags sogs nyon mongs skye ba dang/3/dela kha dog dang dbyibs sogs grub par ‘gyur zhing/4/rnal ‘byor pas chos nyid sgompa’i ‘bad pa don med du thal/bum pa dang bum pa’i chos nyid ldog pa gcig yin pa’iphir⁄⁄
23 Ngo bo tha dad yin na ‘brel med don gzhan du ‘gyur dgos te/ngo bo tha dad la bdaggcig ‘brel mi srid pa’i phyir dang/chos nyid ‘dus ma byas yin pas de dang de ‘byungdu ‘brel ba mi srid pa’i phyir ro⁄⁄
24 /1/bum pa bden ston bum pa’i gnas lug min pa dang/2/bum pa bden stong rtogs pasbum ba bden ‘dzin gyi sgro ‘dogs mi gcod ba dang/3/bum pa bum pa bden grub kyidgag gzhi yin pa sogs mi ‘thad cing/4/sangs ‘phags kyi rgyud la bum pa bden stongrtogs pa’i yeshes dang bum pa bden ‘dzin gnyis lhan cig tu med pa sogs mi thad parthal/bum pa dang bum pa bden stong ngo bo tha dad yin pa’i phir⁄⁄
25 Des na don dam pa’i bden pa spros pa thams cad dang dral ba de kun rdzob kyibden pa las dngos po gzhan dang de nyid du’ang brjod du med pa/gcig pa bkag tsamgyi tha dad yin no⁄⁄ See ff. 191–2 for his criticisms on other views.
26 Tha snyad du gcig pa bkag pa’i tha dad de/skra shad dang skra shad kyis dben pa’tha dad bzhin no⁄⁄ As he simplistically states it, ‘it is like the difference between the[perception of] arrows of hairs and [the perception of] without hair’.
27 rNam grangs min pa kho na don dam dang/tha snyad shes brjod ‘jug gsum gyi yulgyur thams cad kun rdzob byas na bden gnyis gcig pa bkag ba’i tha dad yin namsnyam⁄⁄ In this passage Mi pham agrees with kLong chen, his predecessor, for thelatter argues that ‘from the standpoint of provisional ultimate (rnam grangs kyi dondam) or from the conventional standpoint, the two truths are distinct and incompat-ible (gcig pa dkag pa’i tha dad)’. However, Mi pham does not maintain this positionconsistently. Elsewhere he argues that two truths have a single ontological identitybut different conceptual identities (ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad) from thestandpoint of the non-provisional ultimate (rnam grangs min pa’i don dam). See1977, 81f: bden pa gnyis ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad pa’i ngo bo gcig pade/snang stong dbyer med ngo bo gcig yin la/de ni bden gnyis dpyod pa’i tshad masgrub ste gang snang ‘de stong/stong pa de snang ba las tha dad du yod na/chos de’ingo bo mi stong bar ‘gyur bas de gnyis tha dad du med do⁄⁄ ngo bo dbyer med pargrub pa’i ngo bo ni rnam grangs min pa’i don dam ste/de la gang du’ang brjod mishes te so sor rang rig gi yul lo⁄⁄ Also, for his criticism against the notion that thetwo truths are distinct or identical, see ‘Ju Mipham ‘Jam dbyangs rNam rgyal rGyamtsho (1993, 4). Note, however, the sentence structure. He argues that ‘if two truthsare ultimately distinct (don dam par tha dad) and conventionally identical (kun rdzobtu gcig)’, then there would be four fallacies each. Although Mi pham’s dialecticsseem very compatible with Tsong khapa’s, the underlying assumptions are totally
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different. From Mi pham’s definitions of the two truths, it is clear that two truthsmust not have equal status. If this is a little too unconvincing, see 1977, 159f: mtharni ‘phi don med de bag chags kyi snang ba tsam yin par dngos stobs kyis grub ste/
28 The criticisms dGe ‘dun Chos ‘phel advances against Tsong khapa’s view areconsidered here primarily as means to indicate the former’s rejection of the view thatholds the mutual compatibility between the two truths. These criticisms are quitelegitimate from the point of view held by Go rampa and dGe ‘dun Chos ‘phel.According them, the two truths are reducible to ignorance and wisdom. Whereas forTsong khapa, the two truths must not be reducible to ignorance and wisdom sinceboth have their ontological references. Therefore, the legitimacy of these criticismsshould be understood properly by having proper perspectives of both these twodifferent systems before applying them directly against Tsong khapa’s view straight-away.
29 bDen gnyis zung ‘jug bya ba ‘de ‘phags pa’i yeshes dang ‘jig rten phal pa’i rnamrtog gnyis ‘gal med zung du ‘jug pa’i dus gcig srid na de dus ‘ong bar nges kyigzhan du nam yang srid pa’i skabs med do⁄⁄ Also (dGe ‘dun Chos ‘phel 1990, 217):kun rdzob dang don dam mi ‘gal bya ba ‘de bden gnyis gang gi dpyod lungs byedna yang thar pa’i go skabs ga la yod⁄⁄
30 Don la blun po’i mthar thug pa’i ‘jig rten phal ba’i bsam mno dang/mkhas pa’imthar thug pa’i sangs rgyas kyi mkhyen lugs gnyis ‘gal med zung ‘jug te khas blangpa yin la/de ‘dra byed tshe ma rigs pa dang rigs shes gnyis kyi yul yang ‘gal medzung ‘jug tu mkhas blang na ci la mi chog/ … mdor na bden gnyis ‘gal med du ‘dodpa ‘de sangs rgyas nas sems can gyi bar bsam mno thams cad ‘gal med du ‘dod pa’ilugs yin no⁄⁄
31 Don dam dang tha snyad pa’i rnam bzhag gnyis las/dang po ni gcig dang tha dadkyi spros pa dang bral ba yin te … gnyis pa tha snyad pa’i rnam gzhag ni/gzhan selgyi ngor ngo bo byed med ldog pa tha dad ces bya ba’am de nyid dang gzhan dubrjod du med pa zhes bya ba gsungs pa de kho na khas blang ngo⁄⁄ Sa pan� expresslyrejects the notion of ‘distinct that is incompatible with their unity’ (gcig pa bkag pa’itha dad). See Sa pan� 1968b, 73a: gcig pa bkag pa’i tha dad kyang ma yin te/gangrung dgnos por thal ba’i phir/des na de nyid dang gzhan du brjord ba med de⁄⁄ Gorampa, on other hand, candidly ascribes this view to Sa pan� . See Go rampa 1969b,376d: gsum pa ni dpal ldan Sa skya Pu6�ita’i bshad pa …
32 bDen pa gnyis po ‘de dag gcig gam tha dad ce na/gcig pa’am ma yin/tha dad pa’amma yin te/‘de dag phan tshun ltos nas rnam par ‘jog pa’i phir ro/gang zhig gang laltos pa de ni de dang gcig ma yin te/rang nyid rang la ltos pa la dgos pa med pa’iphir ro⁄⁄gzhan nyid kyang ma yin te/ltos pa po ma grub na ltos sa las gzhan nyidkyang ma yin la⁄⁄grub na gzhan las ltos me dgos pa’i phir ro⁄⁄ The two truth canneither be expressed as identical nor different, they are relative as opposed toontologically interdependent. If the relationship between the two truths is notunderstood in terms of subjective relativity, Red mda’ ba would contradict thedefinitions of the two truths he provided earlier based on two conflicting perspec-tives.
33 He maintains that the two truths are ‘inexpressible’ (brjod par bya ba ma yin pa) interms of how they relate each other. They can neither be expressed as identical nordistinct in terms of their nature. This inexpressibility, he says, applies both in termsof the conventional stance and in terms of the ultimate stance. See 1975, 33f: myugu dang de’i chos nyid stong pa nyid ni ngo bo gcig dang tha dad gang du yangbrjod par bya ba ma yin te/kun rdzob tu yang der brjod par bya ba ma yin don damdu yang der brjod par bya ba ma yin pa’i phir⁄⁄ See his objections to the notion ofidentity or difference based on the Sa·dhinirmocana sutra (Sakya mChog ldan 1975,33–5ff); and his objections to Tsong khapa’s position, which maintains that the twotruths have a single ontological identity with different conceptual identities (ibid.,30–2ff). His criticisms for Tsong khapa, however, rest on many factors. One notablefactor is his absolute denial of the very coherence of the so-called ‘ontological
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identity’ or ‘single-nature’ relationship in the Madhyamika system. He writes (ibid.,31–2ff): chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med pa zhes bya ba ‘de dbu ma’i lugs yin pa’iphir/de yang dbu ma par rang lugs ‘chad pa na kun rdzob kyi rang gi ngo bo nirnam pa thams cad du ‘gog pa kho nar nges la/don dam pa’i ngo bo ni gnas skabsgcig tu khas blangs kyang/de ngo bo mtshan nyid pa ma yin la/de yang mthar ‘gogpa’i phir/byang chub sems ‘grel las/med na mi ‘byung nges pa’i phir⁄⁄zhes ‘byung bade yang/kun rdzob kyi ngo bo med pa’i shes byed yin te/gzhung der kun rdzob kyingo bo med pa nyid don dam par bshad pa’i phir⁄⁄
34 Kho bo cag dbu ma pa la ni rnam par dpyad pa na bden gnyis gzhi grub pa dangma grub pa gang du’ang smra bsam brjod pa dang dral pa’i phir/bden gnyis ngo bogcig dang tha dad gang du’ang rtog par ga la byed ces shes par bya’o⁄⁄ Also see hisobjections to Dol po pa’s notion of distinct nature of the two truths (n.d., 281–5ff);and the objections to Tsong khapa’s notion of identical ontological characters of thetwo truths (n.d., 285–7ff).
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Correspondence address: Dr Sonam Thakchoe, Lecturer in Buddhist Philosophy, Ethicsand Nonviolence, School of Philosophy, The University of Tasmania, Private Bag 41,Hobart, Tasmania 7001, Australia. E-mail: [email protected]
