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THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

Claim No. CV2019-04625

BETWEEN

KIRISHMA BEHARRY

Claimant

AND

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Defendant

Appearances:

Claimant: Gerald Ramdeen and Umesh D. Maharaj instructed by Dayadai

Harripaul

Defendant: Nadine Nabie and Janique Mitchell instructed by Avaria Niles and

Tiffany Kissoon

Before The Honourable Mr. Justice Devindra Rampersad

Dated: 2 July 2020.

JUDGMENT

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Contents

Introduction and Discussion ........................................................................................................ 3

The Law ................................................................................................................................................ 5

General Principles with respect to Detention ................................................................... 5

Analysis ................................................................................................................................................ 9

Damages ........................................................................................................................................... 12

The Order ......................................................................................................................................... 15

Postscript ......................................................................................................................................... 15

Schedule of Authorities relied upon by the Parties ......................................................... 17

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Introduction and Discussion

1. On 9 November 2019, the claimant and her Venezuelan maid, Eduarda Salazar

Pino, were jointly charged on an information with being in possession of a

dangerous drug, namely Cannabis Sativa I, commonly known as marijuana,

under section 5 (1) of the Dangerous Drugs Act Chapter 11:25. The substance

was allegedly found at the claimant’s home upon the execution of a search

warrant at which time both the claimant and Ms. Pino were arrested and

detained.

2. The crux of this case for this court’s determination is the statement made by

Police Constable Jeremy Dass at paragraph 14 of his affidavit filed in these

proceedings on 17 January 2020 which states:

“14. It is the general practice that where persons are to be jointly

charged with an offence and one information is laid, both individuals

have to be complete (sic) the entire charging process before bail can be

accessed. On 8th November, 2019, the Claimant was formally charged

however Ms. Pino could not have been formally charged on the said

date due to the lack of the availability of an interpreter to explain the

details of the charge to her.”

3. As a result of this “general practice”, instead of being allowed to access bail

after she was charged around 12 PM on 8 November 2019, the claimant said

that she was only allowed to access bail at around 2 PM on 9 November 2019.

She was granted bail by a Justice of the Peace and was out of custody by 2:30

PM. During that time, since 8 November 2019 was a Friday, the claimant said

that she instructed her attorney at law to apply to the High Court for injunctive

relief which was dealt with at around 11:28 AM on the said 9 November by the

Honourable Mdm. Justice Margaret Mohammed. She intimated in her affidavit

that she had a one-year-old baby and was concerned that she would be

detained in the unsanitary conditions that she was placed in for the entirety of

the weekend away from her baby unless an order was made.

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4. There is no information as to if or when that order of the learned judge was

brought to the attention of the police officers at the Point Fortin Police Station

where the claimant was being detained.

5. There is a conflict in respect of the chronology as to when exactly the charge

was laid against Ms. Pino. PC Dass deposed that the interpreter, who was the

reason given for the delay as mentioned above, attended the Police Station at

around 10 AM on 9 November 2019. He said that Ms. Pino was then formally

charged after the interpreter translated the charges for her. He also said that

he left the Police Station by 12:30 PM, which suggests that the process was

completed more than 2 hours before the 2 PM time mentioned by the

claimant.

6. Unfortunately, despite the fact that he had access to the Station Diary in which

a contemporaneous record including the time would have been available for

the court’s consideration1, PC Dass failed to provide a copy of the same to the

court. No copy of his personal diary was produced either. In the circumstances

where a person’s liberty is at stake and the deprivation of her constitutional

rights, including to due process of law, is being challenged, it was incumbent

upon him to have produced cogent and necessary records to substantiate that

which he had a duty to properly record. His failure to do so must redound to

his detriment in that the court is free to infer that the production of the

document would have contradicted his allegation. In the circumstances, the

court expresses its dis-approval and dis-satisfaction of the actions of this

officer of the law in this regard.

7. Further, the nature of this “general practice” was not established. The court

has no idea of the antiquity or general acceptance of this alleged practice nor

is there any basis – whether legal or factual or conventional – upon which PC

Dass relied in relation to the same. The generality of this alleged practice was

1 See Standing Order No. 17 section 6

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not established and no senior police officer gave evidence to establish the

validity or existence of such a “general practice”.

8. Having regard to the circumstances, the fact deposed to on the affidavits, and

the submissions of both sides, the court is of the respectful view that:

8.1. There is no proof before the court of any valid “general practice” as

alleged by PC Dass;

8.2. In any event, if even there was one, no legal basis whatsoever was

established for the same;

8.3. Without any such basis, and in any event, such a practice would be in

violation of the claimant’s constitutional rights and should be struck

down immediately unless reasonably justified. It was not so

established;

8.4. As a result, the employment of such a practice was unlawful and

unconstitutional and the claimant is entitled to her declarations and

damages for her unlawful deprivation of access to bail.

The Law

General Principles with respect to Detention

9. The Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago is the defining document which

provides the foundation for the rights and liberties of the citizens of Trinidad

and Tobago and which shapes the legislative framework in this jurisdiction. The

preamble expressed the desire that the Constitution should enshrine the

principles and beliefs set out in that preamble and make provision for ensuring

the protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms in Trinidad and

Tobago. Those fundamental rights and freedoms protected under the

Constitution were enshrined in section 4 thereof and includes the right of the

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individual to life, liberty, security of the person and enjoyment of property and

the right not to be deprived thereof except by due process of law2. Section 5

goes on to state that Parliament may not authorize or effect the arbitrary

detention, imprisonment or exile of any person3 or deprive a person who has

been arrested or detained of the right to be informed promptly and with

sufficient particularity of the reason for his arrest or detention4, of the right to

retain and instruct without delay as legal advice of his own choice and to hold

communication with him5 and also of the right to be brought promptly before

an appropriate judicial authority6. Section 5 goes on to state that Parliament

may not deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing in accordance with the

principles of fundamental justice for the determination of his rights and

obligations 7 or of the right to such procedural provisions as are necessary for

the purpose of giving effect and protection to his/her rights and freedoms8.

10. In particular, the Constitution provides that a person charged with a criminal

offence cannot be deprived of the right to reasonable bail without just cause9.

11. Clearly, therefore, the underlying principle of the rights and freedoms of an

individual as defined under the Constitution must be properly preserved.

12. Lady Hale, in the UK Supreme Court case of Welsh Ministers v PJ 10 stated11, in

a case in the UK which is not founded on a written constitution as in this

jurisdiction:

“We have to start from the simple proposition that to deprive a person

of his liberty is to interfere with a fundamental right – the right to liberty

of the person. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction

that a power contained in general words is not to be construed so as to

2 Section 4 (a) 3 Section 5 (2)(a) 4 Section 5 (2) (c) 5 Section 5 (2) (c) (ii) 6 Section 5 (2) (c) (iii) 7 Section 5 (2) (e) 8 Section 5 (2)(h) 9 Section 5 (2)(f)(iii) 10 [2019] 2 All ER 766 11 At paragraph 24

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interfere with fundamental rights. The best-known explanation for this

principle is contained in Lord Hoffmann's opinion in R v Secretary of

State for the Home Dept, ex p Simms [1999] 3 All ER 400 at 412, [2000]

2 AC 115 at 131:

'Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or

ambiguous words. This is because there is too great a risk that

the full implications of their unqualified meaning may have

passed unnoticed in the democratic process. In the absence of

express language or necessary implication to the contrary, the

courts therefore presume that even the most general words

were intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual.

In this way the courts of the United Kingdom, though

acknowledging the sovereignty of Parliament, apply principles

of constitutionality little different from those which exist in

countries where the power of the legislature is expressly limited

by a constitutional document.'

This famous passage was quoted by Lord Reed in AXA General

Insurance Ltd v Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46, (2011) 122 BMLR

149, [2012] 1 AC 868, para [151]. Lord Reed went on to explain, at para

[152]:

'The principle of legality means not only that Parliament cannot

itself override fundamental rights or the rule of law by general

or ambiguous words, but also that it cannot confer on another

body, by general or ambiguous words, the power to do so. As

Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated in [Pierson v Secretary of State

for the Home Dept [1997] 3 All ER 577 at 592, [1998] AC 539 at

575]:

“A power conferred by Parliament in general terms is not to be

taken to authorise the doing of acts by the donee of the power

which adversely affect … the basic principles on which the law

of the United Kingdom is based unless the statute conferring the

power makes it clear that such was the intention of

Parliament.” '

13. Clearly, therefore, clear and unambiguous words are required by a statute in

order to deprive a person of his/her constitutional rights and freedoms if

reasonably justified. In this case, an alleged unestablished and uncorroborated

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“general practice” is a far cry from any clear and unambiguous words by which

a person’s right under the Constitution can be curtailed.

14. Brooke LJ in D v Home Office12 cited the words of Lord Atkin and Lord Griffiths

in paragraph 69:-

“No member of the executive can interfere with the liberty or property

of a British subject except on the condition that he can support the

legality of his action before a court of justice. And it is the tradition of

British justice that judges should not shrink from deciding such issues in

the face of the executive” (Eshugbayi Eleko v Office Administering the

Government of Nigeria [1931] AC 662, 670, per Lord Atkin.)

“in English law every imprisonment is prima facie unlawful and

... it is for a person directing imprisonment to justify his act. The

only exception is in respect of imprisonment ordered by a judge,

who from the nature of his office cannot be sued, and the

validity of whose judicial decisions cannot in such proceedings

as the present be questioned. (Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC

206, 245-246, per Lord Atkin.)

15. Lord Griffiths in Murray v Ministry of Defence13 opined that the law attaches

supreme importance to the liberty of the individual and if he suffers a wrongful

interference with that liberty it should remain actionable even without proof

of special damage.

16. According to Lord Bingham of Cornhill:

“Freedom from executive detention is arguably the most fundamental

and probably the oldest, the most hard won and the most universally

recognised of human rights …”14

12 [2006] 1 WLR 13 [1988] 1 WLR 692, 703 14 Lord Bingham 'Personal Freedom and the Dilemma of Democracies' (2003) 52 ICLQ 841–858

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Analysis

17. Bearing in mind the Constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent

until otherwise proven according to law15, along with the right to bail as

mentioned above, any unnecessary and prolonged deprivation of liberty by

unlawful and undue delay in granting access to bail without just cause is one

which may not stand up to Constitutional scrutiny.

18. There has been no justification whatsoever for this alleged unsubstantiated

“general practice”. Consequently, the court is of the respectful view that the

same unlawfully trespassed onto the claimant’s constitutional rights by

deliberately curtailing her access to bail having regard to the constitutional

right mentioned above to be brought promptly before an appropriate judicial

authority. There has been no attempt to justify the same and, in the

circumstances, it is not only unjustified but it is also unjustifiable.

19. Any unnecessary delay in providing the claimant with access to bail was, in the

circumstances which prevailed in this case, an unnecessary deprivation of her

liberty, once she was in a position to secure her release by the granting of bail

in a timely manner. No doubt, from the evidence, not only was the Justice of

the Peace present on both occasions, but it is also obvious that there was no

issue involved with respect to the granting of bail. The facts speak for

themselves in that within half hour on 9 November, the claimant access and

was granted bail and was released from custody. That process could have been

carried out on 8 November, aforesaid with certainly the same outcome.

20. The court says that the outcome would have been the same because it is

obvious that there was no different circumstances which prevailed on the

preceding day. No objection to bail was put forward nor even considered

15 Section 5 (2) (f) (i) of the Constitution

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relevant to the claimant’s circumstances. All in all, the failure to allow the

claimant access to bail was clearly unlawful.

21. The court notes further that the defendant made no attempt whatsoever to

establish that the alleged general practice was reasonably justifiable under

section 13 of the Constitution.

22. In the defendant’s submissions, the defendant suggested that there was no

actual failure to grant bail. Instead, there was the failure to allow access to bail.

It was therefore submitted that the alleged failure to be brought before the

proper official to make an application for the grant of bail and the denial of bail

is not equivalent in fact or law.

23. That distinction is, to my mind, inconsequential in light of the claim before the

court and the stated grounds on the claim.

24. There is no doubt that the issue for determination is the denial of the

claimant’s rights to access bail until her jointly accused Ms. Pino was actually

charged. As a result, bearing in mind the overriding objective which includes

the resolution of the issue between the parties, the court is quite entitled to

deal definitively with the same.

25. Notwithstanding the charge, the Constitution preserves the principle of the

presumption of innocence along with the right of due process and the right to

bail. All of these rights are intermingled to generate the basic tenet that the

deprivation of one’s liberty may only be done in a constitutionally sanctioned

manner by the appropriate body.

26. The court is of the respectful view that until the charge is preferred, the police

is the decision maker in relation to the detention of the accused. Once the

charge has been preferred, that control shifts to the judicial decision making

process. Any decision-making in relation to the latter, and in this case that

decision-making included the decision whether to promptly present the

claimant to the appropriate judicial authority after being charged or delay the

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same to allow the co-accused to be charged, amounts to an impingement of

the separation of powers.

27. One is innocent unless proven guilty and until such time as that proof has been

established, one is entitled to bail16. To my mind, one’s entitlement to be

granted bail is a direct result of being allowed access to it by being brought

before the appropriate judicial authority in an expeditious manner in light of

the constitutional provision. The police has the duty to abide by that right

preserved under the Constitution and failure to grant that access broadly

affects the constitutionally protected right to bail. The laying of the charge

commences the constitutional train of events. That process is in fact founded

on a distinct separation of powers principle – it is not for the executive to

decide the fact of, or even one’s accessibility to, the right. The right is judicially

considered, unfettered by the executive’s control or decision-making. In that

regard, and bearing in mind the underlying threat to the liberty of the person

and due process, access to the right cannot be deliberately delayed by an

arbitrary, unsanctioned, and in this case unestablished, “general practice”. To

do so would be to engage a decision making process by the executive,

represented by the police officer, which directly conflicts with the procedural

safeguards set out in section 5 of the Constitution that protects the section 4

rights.

28. The position would have been different if the reason for the access to the right

lay with the judicial process e.g. the unavailability of a judicial decision maker

such as a Justice of the Peace, or a magistrate, etc. In those circumstances, the

learning from the cases relied upon by the defendant’s attorney-at-law such

as Rishi Gunness v The AG would definitely have been apposite. In this case,

however, it is the police who made the deliberate decision to delay the access

to the right. The preponderance of unchallenged evidence before the court is

16 Save in certain statutorily established exceptions – see section 5 of the Bail Act Chapter 4:60 of the laws of Trinidad and Tobago

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that the judicial process was in place i.e. the Justice of the Peace was available

and present17 on 8 November but was refused by the police officer. To my

mind, that refusal and decision was plainly wrong and was based on an

unconstitutional rationale which ought not to be propagated. It must

immediately be struck down and cast aside going forward. The

implementation of such an arbitrary practice, if it in fact exists, is fraught with

danger. For example, delay in charging a co-accused due to he/she having

absconded, etc. would create an unacceptable unconstitutional breach to the

continued detention of any others being charged and held in custody.

29. Further, it matters not, except perhaps in relation to the issue of damages, that

the length of time between the charging of the co-accused was relatively short.

That is a difficult proposition to accept once one’s constitutional right has been

breached. It would be difficult to rationalize that to any person whose liberty

has been deprived for one minute or hour longer than is legitimately

necessary, especially where that person has an infant child and where the

person has to remain detained in unsanitary conditions.

30. The court will therefore grant the declarations sought by the claimant.

Damages

31. The court requested further assistance from the parties on this aspect of the

case and they, admirably in very short time, presented notes which were of

tremendous assistance to the court.

32. The court has considered the authorities relied upon by the parties and has

also looked at the further authorities of:

32.1. Ricardo Jack v The AG CV2014-02841 & 02842; and

32.2. Indra Samuel v PC Ali & Anor CV2014-00608.

17 See the affidavit of Umesh Maharaj

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33. Looking at the case in the round, as prescribed by de la Bastide CJ in Millette v

McNicolls [2000] 60 WIR 362, the court is of the respectful view that, apart

from the fact of the detention for 26 hours18 it should also consider the factor

highlighted by the claimant in her affidavit which was stated as follows:

“5. …. The most difficult part of being arrested and taken away by the

police officers was the fear that I had to leave my baby with my family. I was

worried and distraught because I did not know what was going to happen to

me and I did not know when I would see my baby again. I did not know how

he would be taken care off and throughout this entire ordeal I was worried

about my child and his well-being.

…

9. I felt so relieved when I saw that I was about to be allowed to access

bail. All my fear died down for a while as I couldn’t with to get out of the

station and be with my family and my child. I had been so worried that I would

have had to spend the weekend at the station.

10. I am informed by my Attorney-at-Law, Mr. Umesh Maharaj, and

verily believe the same to be true that when they sought to access my bail, my

attorneys and Mr. Singh were told by Constable Dass that I could not be

granted bail because I would be jointly charged …

11. All the fear that I had previously went away returned even more

severely than before because when I was told this I did not know when I would

be released. I felt as though my freedom was snatched from me at the last

moment, in the most wicked of ways. My eyes immediately filled with tears,

my thoughts going straight to my baby boy who I had not seen since the

morning, and who had went through this traumatic experience and would need

me to be there for him. Being a very young adult of only 22 years, I was so

afraid of spending the weekend in the police station. I had never had any

experience with the law before, it was all so new to me. A crippling fear came

over me as I had no idea how long I would be kept there.”

34. It is difficult to quantify or even express the hurt and distress which would have

been generated by the separation of a mother and her infant child. No doubt,

the process of arrest and detention had to be complied with having regard to

18 From 12 PM on 8 November to 2 PM on 9 November when she was allowed access to the Justice of the Peace

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the allegation made by PC Dass and the follow-up charge which, to his credit,

was laid fairly expeditiously. However, the unnecessary distress of the further

separation when the horizon of her release seemed in sight would have added

an element beyond the norm of a regular person being disappointed and

detained in these circumstances. That pain, that distress, would to my mind

have been unquantifiable and the court would not be surprised that the

claimant would have been filled with deep anguish. Her anxiety was palpable

from her affidavit.

35. The court acknowledges the submission made by attorney-at-law for the

defendant that there was no expressed mala fides in PC Dass’ decision. To my

mind, in the absence of any cogent proof of the “general practice”, his

deliberate decision comes into question. The court accepts that he may not

have had any mala fides but, in relying on the practice, he engaged in conduct

which was unconstitutional – regardless of intention or his state of mind. The

fact of the constitutional breach, therefore, does not depend upon

intentionality in the circumstances of this case. An officer acting under a

provision of law which is subsequently struck down as being unconstitutional

may not have any negative or malicious intention in implementing the former

valid law yet a claimant would still be entitled to relief arising out of its

unconstitutionality. Therefore, mala fides is not relevant except where it exists

to add a further aggravating factor.

36. Having regard to the circumstances and the authorities, the court will award

the sum of $75,000 to the claimant for her detention for that period of 26

hours when she was so detained without access to bail by reason of the

deliberate decision referred to above. This includes an uplift for the

aggravating factor referred to in the preceding paragraphs.

37. In the circumstances, the court is of the respectful view that vindicatory

damages are not warranted.

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The Order

38. In the circumstances, the court accepts the claimant’s attorney-at-law’s

submissions and grants the declarations sought by the claimant i.e.

38.1. The court declares that the decision of Police Constable Jeremy Dass

Regimental No. 19463, being a servant and/or agent of the State of

Trinidad and Tobago, on the 8th November 2019 to deny the Claimant

reasonable bail without just cause is unconstitutional and unlawful and

in breach of the Claimant’s fundamental rights guaranteed under

Section 5(2)(f)(iii) of the Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and

Tobago;

38.2. The court declares that the decision of Police Constable Jeremy Dass

Regimental No. 19463, being a servant and/or agent of the State of

Trinidad and Tobago, on the 8th November 2019 to deny the Claimant

reasonable bail without just cause is unconstitutional and unlawful in

breach of the Claimant’s fundamental rights guaranteed under Section

4(a) and 4(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and

Tobago.

39. The court also grants the claimant compensatory damages in the sum of

$75,000.00 to be paid by the defendant to the claimant.

40. The defendant shall also pay to the claimant the costs of the claim to be

quantified by the Registrar of the Supreme Court in default of agreement.

Postscript

41. The court is of the respectful view that, having regard to the failure to present

any cogent evidence in relation to the alleged “general practice”, the

explanation put forward by the police officer was simply untenable. That fact

ought to have been apparent especially in light of the failure to produce any

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corroborating evidence substantiating its existence and the court is of the

respectful view that the point ought to have been conceded very early on. In

any event, if even it was established, the court is of the respectful view that

the “practice” could not stand up to constitutional scrutiny.

42. In the circumstances, the court will direct that a copy of this judgment in its

final form be forwarded to the Commissioner of Police for his guidance and

consideration in relation to the existence of any such “general practice”.

43. Finally, the court has not taken the time in this judgment to analyze in detail

each of the authorities put forward by the parties, even though the court has

considered them all. This by no means amounts to an indictment of their

efforts and, in deference to their time and industry, the court provides as a

schedule hereto a full listing of the helpful authorities relied upon on both

sides.

/s/ D. Rampersad J.

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Schedule of Authorities relied upon by the Parties

The Claimant

1. R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Cheblak [1991] 1

WLR 890

2. R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103

3. The Attorney General v Pearson [1992] 3 RCS 665

4. State of Mauritius v Khoyratty [2007] 1 AC 80

5. Hinds v The Queen [1977] AC 195

6. Thornhill v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago 6 [1981] AC 61

7. R (On the application of Bancoult) The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 7 [2009] 1 AC 453

8. M v The Home Office [1994] 1 AC 377

9. Wightman and others v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (No 2) [2018] 9 SCIH 62 10

10. Taylor v Scottish Ministers [2019] CSIH 2

11. R (On the Application of Jackson) v The Attorney General [2005] UKHL 456

12. The Cheng Poh v Public Prosecutor [1980] AC 458

13. R (On the application of Miller) v The Prime Minister [2019] UKSC 41

14. Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v Whiteman [1991] 2 AC 240

15. Independent Publishing Limited and others v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago [2005] 1 AC 190

16. Odikagbue v Chief Immigration Officer CV2016-02258

17. R v Hallstrom ex parte W (No. 2) QB 1090

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18. Fuller v The Attorney General of Belize [2011] UKPC 23

19. The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v Ramanoop [2005] 2 WLR 1324

20. Terry Andrews v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago CV2017-03165

21. Alyssa Morgan v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago CV2018-00562

22. Millette v Mc Nicolls [2000] 60 WIR 362

23. Subiah v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago [2009] 4 LRC 253

The Defendant

24. Seetahal, D. “Commonwealth Caribbean Criminal Practice and Procedure”, Routledge, Fourth Edition pages 58 - 63

25. State of Mauritius v. Khoyratty [2007] 1 A.C. 80

26. Rees v. Crane [1994] 2 AC 173

27. The Attorney General v. Dion Samuel Civil Appeal No. P 181 2013 Wenwrick

Theophillus v. The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago CV 2009-01683

28. Thornhill v AG [1981] A.C. 61

Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v Whiteman [1991] 2 A.C. 240

29. Bernard Coard & Ors v The Attorney General Privy Council Appeal No. 10 of 2006

30. Ramnarine Jorsingh v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (1997) 52 WIR 501

31. Jerome Boodhoo v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago Privy Council Appeal No. 8 of 2003:

32. Lezama v The Commissioner of Prisons HCA 2098 of 2002 Page Nos. 176-197

33. Lewis v Attorney General of Jamaica [2001] 2 AC 50

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34. Thomas v Baptiste [2000] 2 A.C. 1

35. Suratt v AG [2008] UKPC 38

36. Gerard Scott v. The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago, CV2016-04122

37. David Lyndon Duprey v. The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago, CV2015-02465

38. Lenville Small v. Police Sergeant Nicholas Thomas and Others, CV2005-00660

39. Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Ramanoop [2005] UK PC 15, [2005] 1A.C. 328

40. Odikogbue v. The Chief Immigration Officer and another CV2016-02258

41. Subiah v. The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago 2008 UKPC 47

42. Indra Samuel v. PC Ali & Another CV2014-00608

43. Emraan Ali v. The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago CV2012-02695

44. Darryl Ramsamooj v. The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago CV2017-01961

45. Ricardo Jack and Peter Griffith v. The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago CV2014-02841/ CV2014-02842

46. Wayne Clement v The Attorney General and W.P. CPL. Charmain William CV2009-02218

47. Maurice Koon Koon v The Attorney General CV2009-01530

48. Seepersad and Panchoo v. AG 2012 UKPC 4

49. Thompson v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1998] QB 498, 516 D-E, [1997] 2 All ER 762, [1997] 3 WLR 403)