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The Rise and Fall of Industrialization and Changing
Labor Intensity: The Case of Export-Oriented Silk
Weaving District in Modern Japan*
Tomoko Hashino† and Keijiro Otsuka‡
September 5, 2014
Paper to be presented at the Fourth Asian Historical Economics Conference, Istanbul, Sept. 19-20, 2014
Abstract
The production of simple silk fabric, called habutae or habutai, expanded rapidly from
1890 to the end of the 1910s in Fukui prefecture, and it was exported to Europe and the
U.S. Habutae was initially woven by hand looms in cottage enterprises and, hence, its
production was labor intensive. It gradually became capital intensive with the
introduction of power looms since around 1905 but its production as well as export
declined precipitously since the late 1910s. We attribute such rising and falling production
and export to Japan’s changing comparative advantage of habutae production in
international markets associated with changes in production technology from labor-using
to capital-using direction.
*This is a preliminary draft. Please do not quote. We would like to thank Takeshi Abe for valuable and
insightful comments on the earlier version of this article. We are also grateful to Tetsuji Okazaki, Taro
Hisamatsu, Yukichi Mano, Masaki Nakabayashi, Kentaro Nakajima, Yasuo Takatsuki, and other
participants in seminars in Kobe University and Osaka University for helpful comments. First author
also would like to thank Masami Harada for valuable discussion in the earlier stage of this study. The
financial support from Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C) 25380425 is gratefully acknowledged. † Kobe University; [email protected] ‡ National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies; [email protected]
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1. Introduction
The issue of the Great Divergence between the West and the East has received increasing
attention among economic historians, which has led to a proliferation of studies on Asian
economic history with a view to drawing a fuller picture of global economic history (Van
der Eng 2004; Broadberry and Van der Eng 2010; Broadberry and Hindle 2011; Brandt,
Ma, and Rawski 2014). In spite of this growing body of research, however, the actual
catch-up process of the East and changing comparative advantage in industrializing
process have not been fully explored because of a lack of long-term micro-level data
necessary to investigate how specific industries or regions within Eastern countries
learned new technologies from the West, adapted them, and expanded production.
It is well known that the textile industry has played an important role in the early
process of industrialization in developed countries as well as in contemporary developing
countries. This industry is unique, as it consists of diverse industrial sectors—from the
production of yarns to a variety of fabrics—some of which use traditional or indigenous
technologies, while others use modern technologies. The cotton spinning industry in the
19th century Japan typified a capital-intensive modern industry characterized by large-
scale production with imported mechanized technologies (see, for example, Otsuka et al.
1988), whereas the weaving industry used a mixture of traditional labor-intensive and
modern capital-intensive technologies. According to the literature review conducted by
Hashino and Saito (2004), most Japanese economic historians had generally believed
until recently that the rise of modern sectors contributed to economic growth more than
the modernization of traditional sectors. Nakamura (1983), however, argues that
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traditional sectors employed a larger share of workers and contributed more significantly
to economic growth in Japan from the late 19th through the early 20th century. His
argument strongly suggests that the modernization of traditional industries depended on
the successful introduction of new technologies from the West. In fact, not only local and
central governments but also local entrepreneurs developed various institutions and
organizations to introduce and absorb such technologies (Hashino 2012; Hashino and
Kurosawa 2013). Yet, quantitative studies on the modernizing process of traditional
industries in Japan are scant.
The aim of this study is to explore the development of the silk weaving district
in Fukui prefecture by analyzing production data from Fukui city and seven surrounding
counties from 1890 to 1921. Fukui became the top exporter of habutae, or plain silk fabric,
in the late 19th century in Japan—shortly after the introduction of weaving technologies
from more advanced districts such as Kyoto and Kiryu. In 1904, the export of habutae
accounted for 11.8 percent of total exports of Japan. The striking feature of the
development of the Fukui district was its rapid growth and the geographic expansion of
production from the capital city to surrounding rural areas. In this respect, Fukui’s
development resembles that of the silk fabric industry in Lyons, France, in which
production spread from urban to rural areas in the 18th century (Federico 1993). It is
worth emphasizing that this industry was newly ‘transplanted’ in the late 1880s to Fukui,
suggesting that an established, traditional weaving industry was not necessarily a pre-
requisite for a modernized equivalent.
The case of Fukui’s development also offers a good example of a traditional
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industry which was successful in export-led growth. Saito (2014) argues that Meiji growth
was largely export-led by traditional manufacturing sectors in rural areas with some
interactions with the emerging modern sectors. Initially almost all habutae was produced
by hand looms and exported to the United States and European countries such as France
and the United Kingdom, where the demand for silk products increased due to the
“democratization” of silk, i.e., changes in the silk products from luxury for the rich to
ordinary commodity for mass consumption. Fukui’s development can be regarded as a
typical case of labor-intensive industrialization consistent with the endowment of cheap
labor as Sugihara (2007) examines. However, labor-saving technologies, such as power
looms, were rapidly introduced in response to the rising wage rate in the mid-1900s.
While habutae production initially increased with the diffusion of power looms, it became
stagnant gradually and finally decreased precipitously from the end of the 1910s. We
hypothesize that the silk weaving industry was characterized by high labor intensity until
around the turn of the century, so that being labor abundant economy Japan had
comparative advantage in this industry and that because of the shift from labor-intensive
to capital-intensive production systems, corresponding to change from hand looms to
power looms since the late 19th century, particularly in the U.S., Japan lost comparative
advantage in this industry.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an
overview of the growth of habutae export and the accompanying development of the
Fukui weaving district. In particular, we examine the conditions which facilitated the
geographical expansion of habutae production from Fukui city to surrounding rural areas,
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the introduction of power looms, and the fall of habutae production in the Fukui silk
weaving district. Section 3 examines changes in production, the number of firms, firm
size in terms of the number of workers per firm, and labor productivity. In Section 4, the
two contrasting hypotheses regarding the effects of the introduction of power looms on
habutae production are tested. We conclude this paper by summarizing the main findings
of the paper and drawing implications for future research in the last section.
2. A Brief History of Rise and Fall of Industrial Development in Fukui
2-1. The rise of habutae production in Fukui prefecture
Because of the lack of a major manufacturing sector within Fukui prefecture, the
prefectural government made various attempts to promote new industries, particularly for
the sake of ex-samurais who found themselves without employment after the Meiji
Restoration (1868). For example, the government first tried to stimulate the production
of hosho-tsumugi, traditional plain silk fabrics for the domestic market, using the modern
production techniques. To this end, the prefectural government sent a few people to Kyoto
to learn advanced methods of weaving and dyeing. Hosho-tsumugi had long been
produced mainly in Fukui city; however, it was not such promising industry because
demand was limited. Local people wanted to start producing fabrics which had larger
market and export potential. A small group of ex-samurais established the weaving
workshop, ‘Shokko-gaisha’, which was equipped with ten hand looms with flying shuttles,
to produce silk handkerchiefs and umbrella material for export. This was the first weaving
workshop in Fukui prefecture (Fukui Prefecture Silk Fabric Association 1921, pp. 182-
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189), but its success was by no means guaranteed. The workshop faced a number of
problems regarding management and struggled to stay open. New industries with market
opportunities were continually sought by trials and errors.
It was habutae production which started in Fukui city in 1887 that seemed to
afford the most promise. Local people learned the basic production methods from Naohiro
Koriki, an engineer in the Kiryu silk weaving district located 500 km away, who was
invited by the Fukui prefectural government to conduct a three-week training session in
Fukui city (Harada 2002, pp. 25-26). An estimated 100 people attended.1 Kiryu had been
the first exporter of habutae, beginning around 1877, and several prefectures including
Fukui had directly introduced Kiryu’s habutae production methods. The Kiryu district,
however, decreased habutae production and concentrated on the production of more
sophisticated products, such as kimono, rather than just simple habutae (Hashino and
Otsuka 2013).
After the introduction of the flying shuttle from Kyoto and following the three-
week training program, production of habutae grew rapidly in Fukui city. It is said that in
1892, shortly after foreign merchants from Yokohama opened local branch offices, more
than fifty new hand looms entered into operation every day in Fukui city (Mikami and
Debuchi 1900, p. 7). Although there is no specific evidence to this effect, it might well be
1 Unfortunately, the content of the training and participant demographics are not well reported. It is
known that prefectural officials and workshop owners decided to pay 0.15 yen per person (per hand
loom) to Koriki for his training services, and that he received 15 yen in total. This suggests that
about 100 people received training (Fukui Prefecture Silk Fabric Association 1921, pp. 188-89). It is
interesting to note that the recent development of the garment industry in Bangladesh also started
with a training program (Mottaleb and Sonobe 2011).
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that many foreign merchants identified Fukui as promising new center of habutae
production in Japan. The production of habutae quickly spread from Fukui city to
surrounding rural areas. Export of habutae produced in Fukui prefecture increased
sharply and surpassed Kiryu’s habutae export in mere several years after production had
first commenced
Figure 1 shows the map of the Fukui weaving district, with its center in Fukui
city. Habutae production geographically expanded initially from Fukui city to
neighboring counties: Imadate county started production in 1887, Yoshida county in 1888,
Sakai county in 1889, and Ohno and Nanjo counties in 1890 (Fukuiken Yushutsu
Orimono Kensajo 1911, pp. 5-9).2 As will be shown later, the history of the export-led
growth of the Fukui weaving district accompanied the geographic—and thus net—
expansion of production.3
2-2. Changes in habutae export
Figure 2 shows the growth in real value of Japanese habutae exports, habutae production
in Fukui prefecture and its exports, and exports of habutae to Europe and the U.S. The
real value of habutae exports rose sharply in the 1890s. After stagnant growth in the mid-
1900s, export again took off in the 1910s. The share of habutae as a fraction of total
Japanese exports increased to nearly 12 percent in 1904, which indicates the importance
2 Starting years of production in Asuwa and Nyu counties are unknown, but production probably
began later than in more northern counties. 3 As the weaving industry did not become popular in the southern part of Fukui prefecture, consisting
of Mikata, Oi, Tsuruga, and Onyu counties, we focus only on Fukui city and seven northern counties
in this study.
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of this commodity at the early stage of Japan’s modern economic development. At the
same time, habutae production in Fukui prefecture occupied a significant place in the
Japanese export, especially in the 1890s and 1910s.4
As intermediate goods, habutae fabrics had to be very light, even, and uniform
(Hashino 2010, p. 488). Most of the habutae was shipped in its grey state and then printed
or dyed in European countries and the U.S. to be used for ladies’ dresses, blouses, linings,
trimmings, and various ornamental purposes (Crowe 1909, p. 33). Japanese habutae that
shipped to France to be dyed or printed was supplied not only to the French domestic
market but also beyond it. Japanese habutae became popular throughout Western
countries, where demand had increased for cheap silk fabrics worn by the general public,
thanks to modern production techniques. This was the so-called great “democratization”
of silk (Federico 1997, pp. 43-44). Cheap silk fabrics, in solid colours and piece-dyed
prints, became much more fashionable than expensive figured or pre-dyed fabrics. They
had to be light and thin so as to save material costs (Tamura 2009, p. 191). The production
of such fabrics is highly labor-intensive, and Fukui was suitable for producing them
because cheap labor was available for weaving habutae on hand looms outfitted with
flying shuttles. According to the Silk Association of America (1921, p. 72), in 1913 daily
wage of male weavers ranged from $ 10 to $ 30 in the U.S., and that of female weavers
ranged from $ 0.07 to $ 0.22 in Japan. In addition, thin raw silk for producing light fabric
was available from Yokohama. The raw silk was too thin to be used for power loom
4 Almost all of the habutae produced in Fukui was exported, as is indicated in Figure 2.
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production in those days.
According to survey data from the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce (1911,
pp. 8-9) in 1895, more than 60 percent of Japanese habutae was exported to the U. S., 20
percent to France, and 6 percent to the U.K.5 Habutae export to the U.S., however,
decreased beginning in the mid-1890s due to tariffs protecting their nascent silk weaving
industry. In the U.S., hand looms were replaced by power looms in the 1880s (Silk
Association of America 1920, p. 100). The number of power looms increased from 5,321
in 1880 to 44,257 in 1990 (Sugiyama 1988, p. 102). The use of power looms and the
import of cheap and uniform Japanese raw silk, rather than habutae, enabled American
silk weaving industry to grow rapidly. Thus, the European market became more important
for Japanese habutae in the early 20th century. In 1910, around 30 percent of Japanese
habutae was exported to France, 20 percent to the U.K, and only 13 percent to the U. S.,
where the production of broad silk roughly doubled from 1900 to 1910 (Sugiyama 1988,
p. 101).
The above figures do not necessarily mean that Japanese habutae was always
competitive in the European market. In 1896, a Japanese inspector pointed out that no
product could compete with Japanese habutae except Chinese pongee in the major silk
markets such as Patterson, Manchester, Geneva, Zurich, and Lyons. However, when the
same inspector visited the European market again in 1900, he found a number of worthy
competitors: pongee, mixed goods with silk and cotton produced in Lyons, American light
5 Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce (1911), pp. 8-9. The figures were reported on a value basis.
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silk, Chinese pongee, and English satin with silk and cotton (Tamura 2009, p. 192).
In fact, habutae export as well as its production in Fukui prefecture drastically
declined in the 1920s (see Figure 2). It appears that the silk weaving industry in the U.S.
rapidly developed due to the use of power looms to produce silk fabrics, as well as mixed
fabrics with silk and cotton, which were cheap enough to outcompete Japanese habutae.
Interestingly, when habutae export to the U.S. declined sharply (Figure 2), Japan’s raw
silk export to the U.S. increased dramatically (Figure 3). Such changes indicate the
development and establishment of new silk fabric production system in the U.S. based on
improved power looms. For example, more than 100 power looms were equipped in 9
firms out of 51 newly-established silk fabric producing firms in 1914 (Silk Association
of America 1915, p. 57, p. 60).6 In contrast, only 10 to 20 power looms were used in
factory systems in Fukui. The Silk Association of America (1915, p. 54) reported that
habutae was “originally and still largely made in Japan, and now also in the United States.”
For the U.S., the lighter of thinner habutae imported from Japan was not competitive with
domestic products, however, some of heavier grades were directly competitive with the
domestic products (Matsui 1930, p. 185). Furthermore, Japan imported power looms for
silk fabric production from the U.S (Silk Association of America 1918, pp. 39-40)7. It
may well be that because of the capital-using (or power loom-using) technological change
in the U.S., Japan’s comparative advantage in the production of simple silk fabric was
6 It is also important to consider the significant turn to rayon, which was much cheaper than silk;
rayon fabric production soon outpaced that of habutae in the 1920s in Japan. 7 According to the same article, prominent silk manufactures in the U.S. were keen about export of
power looms from the U.S. to Japan.
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lost.
2-3. Production growth in Fukui prefecture
How did silk fabric production grow in Fukui prefecture, leading it to become the top
exporter of habutae in Japan soon after the industry first developed? Table 1 shows the
real value of habutae production, the number of firms, the average number of workers
per firm, labor productivity, and the number of hand and power looms in 1905, 1910,
1915, and 1920 by location. Several important findings can be made. First, Fukui city was
by far the most important center of production, accounting for nearly 50 percent of the
district’s production in 1905. Its production share, however, decreased significantly over
time, implying that the habutae production subsequently increased in surrounding
counties. Second, total production in Yoshida and Imadate counties was fairly large in
1905. Taking advantage of their geographic proximity to Fukui city (Figure 1), these
counties seem to have begun habutae production relatively early on. Third, some
remaining counties, such as Sakai and Ohno counties, caught up with and even surpassed
the Yoshida and Imadate counties over time. It appears that the production of habutae
was technically easy and unskilled labor-intensive, so that the production area expanded
smoothly to hitherto underdeveloped rural area. In fact, the labor productivity was
comparable among Fukui city, Asuwa, Yoshida, Imadate, and Ohno counties in 1905. In
1910, however, labor productivity became much higher in Fukui city, because the
adoption rate of power looms was higher. Fourth, power looms were not used in 1905
only with a few exceptions, but it dominated over hand looms in 1915 and 1920. Actually
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the number of power looms increased from 1905 to the end of the 1910s (Figure 4)8,
which roughly corresponds to the growth of labor productivity. Fifth, according to Figure
4, the number of workers and the number of looms were roughly the same, indicating that
typically one worker operated one loom, be it hand or power looms. Sixth, the firm size
in terms of the number of workers was relatively small; only 5 to 6 workers per firm
except in Fukui city in 1905, where 15 workers worked per firm. Later on, however, 10
to 20 workers worked per firm in counties where the adoption of power looms was
widespread, such as Yoshida, Sakai, and Ohno counties. It is the purpose of this study to
explore why such unique patterns of development emerged in the Fukui silk weaving
district by using the available county-level data from 1890 to 1921.9 We cover this period
because reliable data are available during this period.10
3. Descriptive Analyses
3-1. An overview of development
In order to identify the major components of growth in industrial production, we
decompose the real value of production (Q) into the number of firms (N), firm size in
terms of the number of workers per firm (L/N), and labor productivity (Q/L) according
to the following:
8 The number of power loom workers shown in Figure 4 was estimated by subtracting the number of
hand looms from the total number of workers, assuming that one hand-loom worker used one hand
loom. 9 Detailed county data are available from 1905 to 1921 in statistical survey by prefectural
government. This survey covers firms which produced habutae for export. 10 The large-scale production of rayon fabrics became common in the 1920s (Hashino 2007, pp. 31-
32), an analysis of which requires a separate approach focusing on how new products’ production
techniques were acquired.
12
Q = N × (L/N) × (Q/L).
Taking the logarithm, the above equation can be rewritten as:
Ln (Q) = Ln (N) + Ln (L/N) + Ln (Q/L).
Using this relationship, changes in logarithms of the indices of Q, N, L/N, and Q/L are
shown in Figure 5.11 It should be noted that indices in this figure are set to be unity in
1890 and pertain to the production of only habutae.
It is interesting to observe that the development patterns of this industrial district
are markedly different in at least three periods. It was primarily an increase in the number
of firms and labor productivity growth that brought about a rapid growth in production
from 1890 to around 1905. Gradually, however, the number of firms stopped growing and
began declining after 1910. On the other hand, labor productivity did not increase
appreciably from 1900 to 1907, when it began increasing sharply. Labor productivity,
however, did not grow or even declined in the later period of the 1910s. The average firm
size in terms of the number of workers increased from 1893 to 1901 but stagnated or
decreased thereafter.
Based on these observations, we may divide the entire study period into three
phases: (1) Phase I (1890-1905), in which the increasing number of firms and labor
productivity growth were major sources of growth; (2) Phase II (1906-15), in which the
number of firms declined but the labor productivity increased; and (3) Phase III (1916-
21), in which labor productivity, average firm size, and the number of firms remained
11 ‘Firms’ include (1) workshops employing more than 10 workers, (2) workshops employing less
than 9 workers, (3) weaving manufactures-cum-contractors, and (4) out-weavers.
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largely unchanged. Why such characteristically different phases of development emerged
is a major question to be addressed.
3-2. Regional expansion of production
Figure 6 shows changing shares of habutae production in Fukui city, neighboring counties,
and the remaining counties.12 It is clear that the production centre shifted from Fukui city
to other areas, particularly to neighboring counties in Phase I. Considering that it was an
increase in the number of firms and labor productivity growth, that were the main sources
of production growth in Phase I, and that the decentralization of the production base took
place rapidly, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that there were no strong Marshallian
agglomeration economies. In fact, if strong agglomeration economies are present,
production expansion would take place in locations where the total size of production was
large from the beginning.13 Similar arguments can be made for the number of weaving
firms. Although we do not have concrete evidence, the most important reason for the
industry’s geographical expansion was the lower wage rate outside Fukui city, which may
correspond to the predictions of product cycle theory (Vernon 1966).
It also seems sensible to conjecture that scale economies at the workshop or
factory level were weak. If they are strong, the firm size tends to increase in areas where
12 In this figure neighboring counties refer to Asuwa and Yoshida counties, whereas remaining
counties refer to Sakai, Ohno, Imadate, Nyu, and Nanjo counties. 13 Usually, industrial districts or clusters are geographically concentrated in small areas. Thus, the
case of the Fukui silk weaving district is exceptional. See Sonobe and Otsuka (2006) and Hashino and
Kurosawa (2013) for a discussion of the expansion of industrial clusters and Marshallian
agglomeration economies in contemporary East Asia and modern Japan, respectively.
14
the firm size was large from the beginning. According to Table 1, however, the firm size
expansion was not pronounced during Phase I. If scale economies were strong in the
Fukui district, the initial capital requirement would have been large, which, in turn, may
have discouraged the entry of new firms into the silk weaving business outside Fukui city.
Actually, hand looms were almost exclusively used until 1909 (see Figure 4) and, roughly
speaking, one worker used one power loom in this period, which indicates that the
habutae production during this period was very labor intensive.
It is also interesting to observe from Figure 6 that production shares of the
remaining counties, located in the far north and east, gradually increased in Phase II and
III. Why this happened is another interesting question. As is shown in Table 1, these
counties were characterized by the higher adoption rate of power looms and larger farm
size. It is reasonable to conjecture that the comparative advantage of hand-loom based
production had been weakened over time.
3-3. Structural transformation of industrial districts
After wage rate began increasing rapidly in the first decade of 20th century, the adoption
of power looms has increased sharply, first in Fukui city, followed by the neighbouring
counties and subsequently by the remaining counties. Figure 7 confirms this tendency:
there was positive correlation between wage rate and adoption rate of power looms in
1910 and 1916. Furthermore, real wage rate deflated by consumers’ price index generally
increased from 1910 to 1916. Although we cannot claim that high wage rate caused the
high adoption of power looms, the evidence shown in Figure 7 is at least consistent with
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capital-labor substitution induced by increasing wage rate.
The differences in the adoption rate of power looms in Phases II and III are
largely consistent with changes over time and differences across regions in terms of the
number of firms and the average firm size, shown in Table 1; the number of firms tended
to be larger in areas where the hand looms were used, while the firm size tended to be
larger in areas where the adoption rate of power loom was higher. In fact, the number of
firms generally decreased from 1910 to 1915, whereas firm size generally increased
during the same period. In Phase II, a structural transformation took place along with the
introduction of power looms—first in Fukui city and followed by the neighboring and
remaining counties—which destroyed a large number of small firms and increased labor
productivity. Even though such changes took place, the number of workers per firm
remained small, ranging from ten to twenty in major habutae producing counties.
Furthermore, the number of power looms operated by one worker was relatively small,
slightly more than one on average (Figure 4). Thus, although the habutae production
became more capital-using over time to the extent that power looms were more expensive
than hand looms,14 highly capital-using, large-scale production organization, as was
observed in the U.S., has never emerged in the Fukui weaving district.
4. Hypotheses and Empirical Methodology
4-1. Hypotheses
14 According to Hashino and Otsuka (2013), the price ratio of hand looms to power looms was in the
vicinity of ten in the early 20th century.
16
We have found that the whole development process of the Fukui silk weaving district can
be divided into three phases: (1) one of geographical expansion (1890-1905); (2) one of
structural transformation (1906-15); and (3) one of production stagnation and contraction
(1916-21). Although it appears reasonable to hypothesize that the growth in the habutae
production accompanied the geographic expansion of the industry in Phase I because
agglomeration economies were weak, scale economies at the workshop level were weak,
and the imitation of existing technology was easy, it is difficult to test this hypothesis
statistically essentially because of the difficulty in quantifying the supposed effects.
Regarding the latter two periods, we would like to postulate and test the following
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The introduction of power looms in Phase II, which would have
been induced by increasing wage rates, brought about a structural transformation in which
the number of small firms decreased, and the real value of production, firm size, and labor
productivity increased in areas where power looms were actively introduced.
Hypothesis 2: Compared with Phase II, the impacts of the use of power looms
on production and the structural transformation became weaker, as the production of silk
fabric became more capital intensive internationally and consequently Japan lost
comparative advantage in the habutae production.
4-2. Empirical methodology
In order to test the validity of the above hypotheses, we estimate the following function
by growth phase using the ordinary squared regression method:
17
Zit = + iPLRit + iDj + tYt +
where Zit refers to the logarithm of the value of production, the number of firms, the firm
size (or the number of workers per firm), and labor productivity; PLR refers to the ratio
of the number of power looms to the total number of looms; Di is a county dummy in
which Fukui city is the basis of comparison; Yt is a year dummy; ssand s are
regression parameters; and is an error term. Although PLR is endogenous, the
endogenuity bias is expected to be lessened by controlling locational fixed effects by
county dummies.15
Hypothesis 1 on the structural transformation can be tested by examining
whether a positive association exists between the adoption of power looms and the value
of production, firm size or labor productivity, and whether a negative relationship exists
between the power loom adoption and the number of weaving firms. Testing Hypothesis
2 is a more subtle exercise, because it asserts weak or even insignificant effects of the
power loom adoption on the dependent variables.
4-3. Regression results
Now let us examine the results of regression analyses shown in Table 2 for Phase II and
in Table 3 for Phase III. It is clear from Table 2 that power loom ratio had significantly
positive effects on the value of habutae production, firm size, and labor productivity, and
significantly negative effect on the number of firms, which are consistent with the
15 The estimation bias will remain because of the selection effect, e.g., location adopting power
looms may have greater potential in the habutae production, as well as possible time-varying
location specific effects.
18
Hypothesis 1. That is, the introduction of power looms boosted the habutae production
by increasing firm size and labor productivity, and by decreasing the number of small
firms. It must be also pointed out that almost all county dummies have negative and
significant coefficients in all the regression functions, implying that Fukui city was still
the center of habutae production with the larger number of larger firms, which achieved
higher labor productivity. Among the seven counties, the value of production, firm size,
and labor productivity are generally higher in Yoshida, Sakai, Ohno, and Imadate counties
than Asuwa, Nyu, and Nanjo counties. The former counties adopted power looms faster
than the latter counties, according to Table 1, which suggests that swift adoption of power
looms promoted the habutae production in this phase. Overall, the estimation results in
Table 2 confirm significant effects of the adoption of power looms on the firm structure
and productivity of habutae production.
In sharp contrast to the regression estimates in Phase II, the power loom ratio
does not have significant effects on the value to production and labor productivity in
Phase III, as is shown in Table 3. It is somewhat surprising to find no significant effect of
power loom adoption on labor productivity, because power looms are labor-saving and,
hence, labor-productivity enhancing technology. The insignificant effect suggests the
sluggish demand for habutae produced by power looms. The power loom ratio, however,
continue to have negative and significant effect on the number of firms and positive and
significant effect on the number of workers per firm. These findings indicate that the
adoption of power looms conferred the advantage of large-scale production, even though
it did not increase the total value of habutae production and labor productivity in the
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region as a whole. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the Fukui silk weaving district
had no longer comparative advantage in the production habutae using power looms,
which supports Hypothesis 2. This is also consistent with the argument of Ma (2005) that
the world silk markets were well integrated across the Pacific in the early 20th century
and even before them.
Similar to the results shown in Table 2, coefficients of counties dummies are
generally negative and significant, indicating the Fukui city was still center of habutae
production in the Fukui silk weaving district, even though its production share decreased
(Figure 6). There are, however, exceptions. The coefficients of Yoshida, Sakai, and Ohno
dummies are positive and the former two are significant in the firm size regression,
indicating that scale advantages had emerged in these counties. Recall that these are
counties where the adoption rate of power looms was high (Table 1). It is also clear from
Figure 6 that the production share of these counties sharply increased in Phase III. Thus,
the use of power looms in relatively large factories seems to have been relatively efficient
within the Fukui silk weaving district. Even if this is the case, however, the use of power
looms failed to prevent the falling production of habutae in Phase III.16
5. Conclusions
This study attempted to explore the rise and fall of the Fukui silk weaving district, which
16 In contrast to the common view of the day that higher tariff in the early 1920s reduced the export
of Japanese habutae (Matsui 1930, pp.162-163), it is interesting to note that our result which shows
the decline of habutae production in the late 1910s in Fukui. Further research is needed to consider
the structural changes in Fukui silk weaving district after the adoption of power looms from various
points of view.
20
became the main exporter of habutae in Japan shortly after it had introduced production
technology from more advanced Japanese weaving districts in the late 1880s. Major
factors underlying the successful development of this district were found to be distinctly
different in three phases: (1) initially the geographical expansion of the industry took
place with an increasing number of firms and a reliance on hand loom technology; (2)
subsequently a structural transformation occurred, marked by a declining number of firms,
but increased firm size and labor productivity through the introduction of power looms;
and (3) finally habutae production decreased without accompanying increases in labor
productivity.
Before habutae was introduced, even though people in Fukui city had attempted
to establish a weaving industry, it was not successful and, hence, skilled workers in the
weaving industry were quite scarce. Thus, the finding that habutae production rapidly
expanded from Fukui city to rural area without reducing labor productivity strongly
indicates that its production was easy and, hence, unskilled-labor intensive. Since
unskilled labor was abundantly available, the Fukui silk weaving district must have had
a comparative advantage in producing habutae.17 Indeed, the Kyoto and Kiryu silk
weaving districts, which had long traditions of producing complicated silk products, such
as kimono, by using skilled workers, did not undertake habutae production on a large
scale. Also, power looms were most rapidly introduced to Fukui among the three silk
weaving districts (Hashino 2007), presumably because machineries could be easily
17 Since there were other areas in which there was not a strong weaving tradition, the question of why
Fukui particularly developed a silk weaving industry is difficult to answer. It must be pointed out that
other districts undertook habutae production without much success.
21
substituted for labor engaged in simple tasks carried out by unskilled workers in the
habutae production process. Thus, following its comparative advantage seems to be the
key to the successful development of this weaving district.
When wage rates increased, however, the comparative advantage of habutae
production using hand looms and unskilled labor must have weakened. It is also true that
the quality of domestically produced power looms improved and their prices declined
significantly (Minami and Makino 1983, p. 3; Suzuki 1996, Chapter 9). As a result, power
looms were rapidly introduced in the Fukui weaving district beginning in the early 1900s.
Such shift in technology—from hand looms to power looms—is consistent with the
argument of both Broadberry and Guputa (2006; 2009) and Allen (2012), which indicates
the significance of factor prices in explaining the large divergence in technology choice
and productivity growth between Europe and Asia.
The dominant use of power looms implies that this silk weaving industry was no
longer unskilled-labor intensive by the 1910s; it became more capital-intensive. This
suggests that Fukui lost its comparative advantage in producing habutae, so far as the
basis for its comparative advantage lay in the availability of cheap unskilled labor. The
sharp decrease in habutae production after the late 1910s may be a manifestation of such
a fundamental change in the comparative advantage.
Moreover, given that the silk weaving industry in the U.S. grew rapidly, Japanese
habutae production had to compete with its American counterpart by using power looms,
some of which were imported form the U.S. Thus, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that
the development of capital-intensive weaving industry in the U.S. further reduced the
22
comparative advantage of habutae production in Fukui silk weaving district. Such
arguments strongly suggest that the development of industries in Asia cannot be analyzed
adequately in isolation from that of corresponding industries in the U.S. and Europe.
23
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28
Table 1: An overview of production and employment in the Fukui silk weaving district by location
Sources: Fukui Prefecture (1905, 1910, 1915, and 1920) Fukuiken tokeisho.
Notes: A value of production is deflated by the habutae price index. For making deflator,
we used price index of habutae in manufactured goods by commodity (1902=100),
Ohkawa et al. (1967) p.199, p. 201.
City or
County
Total
habutae
production
in 1000 yen
Number of
firms
Average
number of
workers
per firm
Labor
producti-
vity in yen
Number of
hand looms
Number of
power
looms
1905
Fukui 6317.8 556 14.70 772.8 7,958 5
Asuwa 939.2 294 4.50 709.4 1,315 0
Yoshida 2317.8 308 7.64 985.5 2,233 0
Sakai 1266.8 401 5.94 531.8 2,387 0
Ohno 900.4 174 5.59 926.4 947 0
Imadate 2463.2 547 4.85 929.1 2,678 0
Nyu 303.9 169 3.67 490.1 620 0
Nanjo 690.8 260 4.77 556.6 1,232 0
1910
Fukui 11404.9 631 8.72 2072.9 4,371 1,474
Asuwa 1204.9 496 3.21 756.4 1,526 61
Yoshida 3249.1 528 4.70 1309.6 2,216 436
Sakai 2104.8 722 3.45 844.6 2,061 637
Ohno 1255.7 116 10.09 1072.3 690 613
Imadate 2562.9 980 2.67 978.2 2,337 420
Nyu 593.2 666 1.99 447.7 1,175 20
Nanjo 902.4 419 3.06 703.4 1,255 46
1915
Fukui 14943.9 165 14.78 6129.6 193 2,926
Asuwa 664.2 94 6.94 1018.8 495 159
Yoshida 3127.0 77 17.74 2289.2 332 1,283
Sakai 6996.9 89 21.45 3665.2 358 2,295
Ohno 3479.0 90 12.52 3087.0 36 1,237
Imadate 5378.8 417 4.22 3054.4 463 1,469
Nyu 277.5 447 1.55 401.6 559 79
Nanjo 1826.1 203 2.82 3186.9 178 243
1920
Fukui 8553.9 182 9.90 4746.9 199 3,342
Asuwa 667.6 101 7.24 913.3 131 630
Yoshida 2860.2 111 14.36 1794.3 126 2,117
Sakai 7001.7 93 20.52 3669.6 15 3,019
Ohno 5763.8 193 10.35 2886.3 8 2,571
Imadate 6379.6 475 5.83 2304.8 115 3,810
Nyu 428.9 460 1.69 552.1 577 256
Nanjo 1321.3 183 3.51 2058.1 141 395
29
Table 2: Estimation results of the effect of power-loom adoption on value of production,
number of firms, firm size, and labor productivity, 1905-15
ln (value of
production)
ln (number of
firms)ln (firm size)
ln (labor
productivity)
power-loom
ratio1.183*** -1.161*** 0.818*** 1.506***
(0.211) (0.279) (0.245) (0.200)
asuwa_d -1.998*** -0.721*** -0.674*** -0.609***
(0.127) (0.168) (0.147) (0.121)
yoshida_d -1.091*** -0.477*** -0.361*** -0.245**
(0.116) (0.153) (0.134) (0.110)
sakai_d -1.155*** -0.156 -0.564*** -0.438***
(0.114) (0.151) (0.133) (0.109)
ohno_d -1.847*** -1.078*** -0.331** -0.424***
(0.116) (0.153) (0.135) (0.110)
imadate_d -1.005*** 0.347** -1.084*** -0.266**
(0.115) (0.153) (0.134) (0.110)
nyu_d -2.742*** -0.515*** -1.301*** -0.914***
(0.133) (0.177) (0.155) (0.127)
nanjo_d -1.831*** -0.682*** -0.763*** -0.374***
(0.128) (0.169) (0.149) (0.122)
d_1906 0.214 0.192 -0.0800 0.125
(0.134) (0.177) (0.155) (0.127)
d_1907 -0.187 0.177 -0.0758 -0.308**
(0.134) (0.177) (0.155) (0.127)
d_1908 0.181 0.265 -0.0929 -0.00199
(0.134) (0.177) (0.155) (0.127)
d_1909 0.264* 0.436** -0.174 0.0112
(0.134) (0.178) (0.156) (0.127)
d_1910 0.171 0.673*** -0.506*** 0.00593
(0.138) (0.183) (0.161) (0.131)
d_1911 0.107 0.588*** -0.541*** 0.0625
(0.147) (0.195) (0.171) (0.140)
d_1912 -0.0514 0.488** -0.650*** 0.124
(0.156) (0.207) (0.181) (0.148)
d_1913 0.0489 0.357 -0.578*** 0.277*
(0.164) (0.218) (0.191) (0.156)
d_1914 -0.281 0.262 -0.556*** 0.00522
(0.176) (0.233) (0.205) (0.167)
d_1915 -0.0874 0.0835 -0.305 0.133
(0.193) (0.255) (0.224) (0.183)
Constant 15.54*** 6.146*** 2.405*** 6.984***
(0.124) (0.164) (0.144) (0.117)
Observations 88 88 88 88
R-squared 0.939 0.766 0.781 0.890
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
30
Table 3: Estimation results of the effect of power-loom adoption on value of production,
number of firms, firm size, and labor productivity, 1916-21
ln (value of
production)
ln (number of
firms)ln (firm size)
ln (labor
productivity)
power-loom
ratio0.379 -0.894** 1.042*** 0.187
(0.443) (0.407) (0.339) (0.492)
asuwa_d -2.652*** -1.267*** 0.116 -1.516***
(0.216) (0.199) (0.165) (0.240)
yoshida_d -1.595*** -0.967*** 0.423*** -1.047***
(0.146) (0.134) (0.112) (0.162)
sakai_d -0.749*** -1.017*** 0.808*** -0.539***
(0.147) (0.135) (0.112) (0.163)
ohno_d -0.707*** -0.350** 0.115 -0.477***
(0.148) (0.136) (0.113) (0.165)
imadate_d -0.309** 0.489*** -0.460*** -0.345**
(0.147) (0.135) (0.112) (0.163)
nyu_d -2.855*** 0.137 -1.168*** -1.854***
(0.340) (0.312) (0.259) (0.377)
nanjo_d -1.636*** -0.503** -0.890*** -0.265
(0.218) (0.200) (0.166) (0.242)
d_1917 0.260** 0.0831 -0.0286 0.174
(0.127) (0.116) (0.0967) (0.141)
d_1918 0.607*** 0.288** -0.167 0.475***
(0.130) (0.119) (0.0993) (0.144)
d_1919 0.311** 0.538*** -0.252** -0.00648
(0.134) (0.123) (0.103) (0.149)
d_1920 0.163 0.396*** -0.329*** 0.0818
(0.146) (0.134) (0.112) (0.162)
d_1921 -0.0659 0.234 -0.185 -0.125
(0.155) (0.142) (0.118) (0.172)
Constant 15.62*** 6.017*** 1.564*** 8.092***
(0.398) (0.366) (0.304) (0.442)
Observations 48 48 48 48
R-squared 0.963 0.920 0.964 0.889
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
31
Source: http://www.freemap.jp/itemDownload/fukui/fukui/1.png
Note: Fukui Prefecture is shown in red.
Figure 1: The map of Fukui Prefecture and Fukui silk weaving district
Fukui silk weaving district
32
Sources: Data: Yokohamashi (1965), p. 313, for Total export, Export to the U.S. & the
Europe (U.K. and France); The Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce (various
years) Noshomu tokeisho for Habutae production in Fukui; Fukuiken
Kinuorimono Dogyo Kumiai (1922), and pp. 196-97 for Habutae export from
Fukui.
Note: For making deflator, we used price index of habutae in manufactured goods by
commodity (1902=100), Ohkawa et al. (1967), p. 199.
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
500001
89
2
189
3
189
4
189
5
189
6
189
7
189
8
189
9
190
0
190
1
190
2
190
3
190
4
190
5
190
6
190
7
190
8
190
9
191
0
191
1
191
2
191
3
191
4
191
5
191
6
191
7
191
8
191
9
192
0
192
1
192
2
192
3
Figure 2: Changes in total habutae export from Japan, export to the
U.S. and the Europe, habutae production in Fukui, and export from
Fukui, 1892-1923 (three-year average, in thousand yen)
Total export Export to the U.S.
Export to the Europe Habutae production in Fukui
Habutae export from Fukui
33
Source: Nakabayashi (2003), pp. 471-72.
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
189
1
189
2
189
3
189
4
189
5
189
6
189
7
189
8
189
9
190
0
190
1
190
2
190
3
190
4
190
5
190
6
190
7
190
8
190
9
191
0
191
1
191
2
191
3
191
4
191
5
191
6
191
7
191
8
191
9
192
0
192
1
192
2
192
3
192
4
192
5
192
6
192
7
192
8
192
9
Figure 3: Changes in export of raw silk from Japan to the U.S. and the
Europe, 1891-1929 (three-year average, in ton)
total U.S. Europe
34
Sources: Fukui Prefecture (1905-1920) Fukuiken tokeisho.
Note: The number of power loom workers was estimated by subtracting the number of
hand looms from the total number of workers, assuming that one hand-loom
worker used one hand loom.
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921
Figure 4: Changes in the number of handloms, powerlooms, total
workers, and estimated power-loom workers, 1905-21
power looms hand looms total workers estimated number of power-loom workers
35
Sources:
(1) Production: Fukui Prefecture (1890-1901) Fukuiken kangyo nenpo for data from 1890
to 1901; Fukui Prefecture (1993) Fukuikenshi shiryohen 17: tokei, for data from 1902
to 1904; Fukui Prefecture (1905-1921) Fukuiken tokeisho for data from 1905 to 1921.
(2) Number of firms and workers: Mikami and Debuchi (1900) for data from 1890 to 1892;
Fukui Prefecture (1893-1900) Fukuiken kangyo nenpo for data from 1893 to1900;
Fukui Prefecture (1901) Fukuiken noshoko nenpo for data in 1901; Fukui Prefecture
(1905-1921) Fukuiken tokeisho for data from 1905 to 1921.
Notes: A value of production is deflated by the habutae price index. See, the note of Table
1 for deflator. Liner interpolation was used for data of number of firms and
workers from 1902 to 1904.
0.1
1
10
1001
89
0
189
1
189
2
189
3
189
4
189
5
189
6
189
7
189
8
189
9
190
0
190
1
190
2
190
3
190
4
190
5
190
6
190
7
190
8
190
9
191
0
191
1
191
2
191
3
191
4
191
5
191
6
191
7
191
8
191
9
192
0
192
1
Figure 5: Indexes of production, the number of firms, firm size, and
labor productivity in Fukui habutae weaving district, 1890-1921
(1890=1)
Production Number of firms Firm size Labor productivity
36
Sources: Fukui Prefecture (1890-1903) Fukuiken noshoko nenpo for data from 1890 to
1903; Fukui Prefecture (1905-1921) Fukuiken tokeisho for data from 1905 to
1921.
Notes: We categorized capital city and seven counties into following three groups. Fukui
city; Fukui; Neighboring counties; Yoshida and Sakai; and Remaining
counties; Sakai, Imadate, Ohno, Nyu, and Nanjo. Liner interpolation was used
for data for 1893 and 1904.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1001
89
0
189
0
189
2
189
3
189
4
189
5
189
6
189
7
189
8
189
9
190
0
190
1
190
2
190
3
190
4
190
5
190
6
190
7
190
8
190
9
191
0
191
1
191
2
191
3
191
4
191
5
191
6
191
7
191
8
191
9
192
0
192
1
Figure 6 : Changes in regional share of value of habutae production,
1890 to1921 (%)
Fukui city Neighboring counties Remaining couties
37
Sources: Fukui Prefecture (1910 and 1916) Fukuiken tokeisho.
Notes: Daily wage rate is deflated by consumers’ price index of all items in Ohkawa et al.
(1967), p. 135. The wage rate of individual firms with more than 10 workers
is available. We calculated weighted wage rate of each counties by dividing
the total wage paid for female workers by the number of total female workers.
A hunred sen is equivalent to one yen.
Fukui
Asuwa
YoshidaSakai
Ohno
Imadate
Nyu
Fukui
Asuwa
Yoshida Sakai
Ohno
Imadate
Nanjo
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
p-l
ra
tio
(%
)
real wage rate of female workers (sen/day)
Figure 7: Relationship between real wage rate and power-loom ratio by
location in 1910 and 1916
1910 1916