The Rise and Fall of Russian Treaty Activism in the Post-Soviet Space

Ross St Clair Gower

Series editor: Thomas Kruesmann ISBN 978-3-9503853-0-4

14 March 2014 Public Policy Research Paper no. 2

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SUMMARY

Russia has initiated more treaties than any other country and the majority of these treaties

exist between Russia and the different nations that comprise the post-Soviet space. Russia’s

treaty activism has post-Soviet integration with Russian domination as its ultimate object.

This paper examines the most important Russian-led treaty-based integration projects affect-

ing the post-Soviet space, and analyzes the nature of the challenges that affect them. I exam-

ine how these projects, especially Moscow’s goal of a Russian-led Eurasian Union, conflict

with the European Union’s Eastern Partnership initiative. I outline how Russia’s aggressive

behavior and history of failing to honor its international obligations ultimately inhibits its

ability to secure regional cooperation. Putin seeks modernization and global influence

through the creation of a Eurasian Union. His forceful tactics, however, fail to take into ac-

count the complicated new political world, one in which modernization requires the recogni-

tion and respect of ‘Western’ values.

Key words: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Collective Security Treaty Organisa-

tion (CSTO), Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), As-

sociation of Georgia Ukraine Azerbaijan Moldova (GUAM), Russia, treaty activism, regional

integration, collective security

1. Introduction

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has invested a tremendous amount of effort into

initiating treaty-based integration projects in the post-Soviet space. Russia has employed the

use of treaty activism for the purpose of achieving dominance in the post-Soviet region, and

global influence as an independent power.1 This paper examines the most important Rus-

sian-led treaty-based integration projects affecting the post-Soviet space, and outlines their

challenges. The most effective projects have encouraged inter-state integration based on

1 Andrei P. Tsygankov, “Russia and the CIS in 2011: Uncertain Economic Recovery” (2012) 52:1 Asian Survey 42

[Tsygankov] at 48. Tsygankov uses the term ‘diplomatic activism,’

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Russia’s regional security interests, its wide diplomatic relations, and through its efforts to

unite the Eurasian economy. The ultimate goal is what Putin sees as his political legacy: a

Russian-led Eurasian Union. I examine how these projects conflict with European interests,

specifically, the European Union’s Eastern Partnership initiative. I argue that Russia’s history

of failing to honour international obligations, and the aggressive methods it employs to se-

cure international ‘cooperation’, ultimately conflict with its promotion of regional integra-

tion and the goal of establishing a Eurasian Union. Putin’s approach for achieving a Eurasian

Union fails to take into consideration the complicated new political world, one in which

modernization requires the recognition and respect of ‘Western’ values.

2. Russia’s Treaty Activism Amongst Post-Soviet States

“No state has initiated as many bilateral and multilateral treaties as has Russia, and this has

occurred across a diversity of policy areas, ranging from infrastructural and economic con-

cerns, to energy and security.”2 A wide array of these multilateral and bilateral treaties has

enabled Russia to maintain a vast network of influence and association amongst a majority

of post-Soviet countries. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was the first such

association. It was formed by the execution of the Belavezha Accords,3 which, at the same

time, dissolved the Soviet Union.4 Within the CIS, Russia has been extremely successful at

establishing bi-lateral treaties with other members of the multilateral treaty-based group.

This tactic has acted as an effective way of creating closer ties and cementing political, eco-

nomic and military relationships with post-Soviet states. Soon followed other major treaty-

based integration projects, such as the Collective Treaty Security Organization, the Shanghai

Cooperation Organization, and most importantly, the Eurasian Economic Community (involv-

ing both the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia (Customs Union), and the

Single or Common Economic Space).

2 Willerton, Slobodchikoff and Goertz, “Treaty networks, nesting, and interstate cooperation: Russia, the FSU,

and the CIS” 2012 15:19 International Area Studies Review 59 [Willerton], at 61. 3 “The Belavezha Accords Signed” (1991) Yeltsin Presidential Library, online: <http://www.prlib.ru/en-

us/history/pages/item.aspx?itemid=749>. 4 Ibid.

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Russia’s ‘treaty activism’5 is not merely a post-Soviet phenomenon; it has been a historical

practice. It is estimated that during the period of 1917-1957, the Soviet Union signed over

2000 treaties with 85 countries.6 “[D]ivorced from most of the mainstream global intergov-

ernmental arrangements, the USSR relied upon a diversity of other institutional and treaty

means ‘network’ itself to its bloc members; those means entailing unrelenting Soviet Russian

pressure and allied states’ required accommodation.”7 The collapse of the Soviet Union nulli-

fied a wide variety of existing arrangements between states, and “domestic interests, com-

bined with regional and global geo-strategic realities, necessitated post-Soviet Russia’s and

former allied states’ immediate reengagement of one another.”8 The Soviet states were

aware of this, which is why the ‘reengagement’ was instantaneous, by simultaneously abol-

ishing the Soviet Union and creating the CIS. The means for repairing the severed ties were

treaties. During this period Russia established many bilateral agreements with CIS member-

states. By “the end of 2005 Russia had initialed over 1300 treaties [with CIS member-states],

with more than 400 of these treaties in the security area.” Moreover, “these totals do not

include treaties for the Russian–Belarusian bilateral relationship, which was said at the time

to be evolving toward a single union state; for the period 1991–2005, a total of 599 Russian–

Belarusian treaties were signed.”9 As a basis for comparison, it took approximately 200 years

for the United States to sign 1,500 international treaties.10 Russia signed more treaties in 14

years with post-Soviet states alone.

Given that Russia favours treaty activism as its method of international networking, it is nec-

essary to consider the legal weight given to these agreements, from both theoretical and

practical perspectives. Theoretically, international law supersedes Russian domestic law.

This is surprising, considering that Russia is not known for submitting its political will to oth-

er legal entities. Willerton, Slobodchikoff and Goertz explain that the 1993 Russian Constitu-

tion reinforces the importance of both treaties and international law. Article 15 of the Rus-

sian Constitution states:

5 I borrow this useful term from Willerton at 60.

6 Ibid at 65.

7 Ibid at 65.

8 Ibid at 65.

9 Willerton at 65.

10 “The Senate’s Role in Treaties” (2009) United States Senate, online:

<http://www.senate.gove/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Treaties.htm>.

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“The commonly recognized principles and norms of the international law and the in-ternational treaties of the Russian Federation shall be a component part of its legal system. If an international treaty of the Russian Federation stipulates other rules than those stipulated by the law, the rules of the international treaty shall apply.”11

Gennady Danilenko asserts that this constitutional adoption of the supremacy of interna-

tional law is the case with many CIS states.12 In 1998 Danilenko noted, “it is still too early to

draw definite conclusions on whether courts of a particular country would be willing to base

their decisions on international law.”13 Ten years later, Shawn Boyne, reviewing a paper by

William Butler, stated: “In retrospect, when viewed against the backdrop the increasingly

autocratic course set by the Kremlin, the initial optimism regarding the role that internation-

al law would play in shaping governmental behaviour seems to have been premature.”14

Butler cites Ginsburgs as highlighting that Russia’s record of compliance with international

law has been erratic, and he goes on to assert that Russia’s reception of international law

appears to have differed historically based on the nature of the political interests con-

cerned.15

The Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member Sates of the

Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee) published a report on September 14, 2012, con-

cerning the Russian Federation’s adherence to obligations and commitments to the Council

of Europe from 1995-2012. Although the Monitoring Committee recognized and welcomed

some positive steps taken over the years, the report overwhelmingly dealt with concerns

about Russia’s failure to fulfill its international legal obligations. The report’s conclusion be-

gins with the following statement:

“The overall state of democracy in Russia raises concern and progress in the fulfil-ment of the country’s obligations and commitments is slow. In this report, we have pointed to numerous problems in all areas of our interest, namely pluralist democra-cy, the rule of law and human rights, both at the level of legislation and its imple-

11

Constitution of the Russian Federation, 1993, art 15, online: <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/constitution-russia.html>. 12

Gennady Danilenko, “Implementation of International Law in Russia and Other CIS States” (1998) [Danilenko] at 49 – online: <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/96-98/danilenk.pdf>. 13

Ibid at 50. 14 Shawn Boyne, Review of International Law and the Russian Legal System by Boris Leonidovich Zimnenko (Utrecht: Eleven Publications, 2007), online: <http://www.gvpt.umd.edu/lpbr/subpages/reviews/zimnenko0108.htm>. 15

Ibid.

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mentation. Russia should increase its efforts and advance more quickly on the way to democratization.”16

Russian nationalists find controversy with the existence of Article 15 of Russia’s 1993 Consti-

tution, even though there is no evidence that suggests Russia actively adheres it, or that it

would enforce international law over and against domestic law in the event of a legal chal-

lenge. Some of those who wish to resurrect Russia’s ‘superpower’ status regard Article 15 as

incompatible with this goal,17 because it conflicts with the independence of political will. In

2013, President Vladimir Putin stated that priority should be given to national law,18 certain-

ly because he holds that same view. In 2008, after winning the bid the host the 2014 Winter

Olympic games, Putin proclaimed to the world, “at last Russia has returned to the world

arena as a strong state—a country that others heed and that can stand up for itself.”19 This is

a fine example of institutional visibility. Russia is continually both professing and asserting

the independence of its political will on the international stage, which effectively nullifies the

practical weight of Article 15.

It is clear that the theoretical legal weight of international law in Russia differs from its prac-

tical legal weight. Russia continually fails to commit to certain broader international obliga-

tions, especially with respect to Western principles of democracy and human rights. Yet,

despite its poor reputation in respecting international law, Russia continues its long tradition

of treaty activism, especially amongst CIS states. The question remains as to whether its fail-

ure to honour international obligations, and the methods it utilizes to secure the coopera-

tion of other states, will ultimately hinder its attempts at promoting regional integration.

16

“The honouring of obligations and commitments by the Russian Federation” Council of Europe Doc. 13018, 14 September 2012, at para 532, online: <http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/XRef/X2H-DW-XSL.asp?fileid=18998&lang=EN>. 17

Lyuba Lulko, “Should international law prevail over Russia Constitution?” Pravda.Ru 12 December 2013, English edition, online: <http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/12-12-2013/126368-international_law_russian_constitution-0/>. 18

Ibid. 19

“The Triumph of Vladimir Putin” The Economist 1 February 2014, online: <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21595451-successes-abroad-and-winter-olympics-make-russia-look-strong-where-it-matters-it?spc=scode&spv=xm&ah=9d7f7ab945510a56fa6d37c30b6f1709>.

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3. The Commonwealth of Independent States – A Post-Soviet

Enterprise

On December 8, 1991, the Heads of State of the Russian Federation, the Republic of Ukraine,

and the Republic of Belarus signed the Belavehza Accords, marking the demise of the Soviet

Union and simultaneously establishing the CIS.20 On December 21, 1991, the Heads of State

of eleven post-Soviet states signed the Alma-Ata Declaration, confirming their membership

in the CIS; these were: The Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of

Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, the Republic of Moldova,

the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, the Republic of Turkmenistan, the Repub-

lic of Ukraine and the Republic of Uzbekistan.21 The declaration lacked signatures from rep-

resentatives of four republics: Georgia and the three Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and

Estonia. These countries refused to join the Alma-Ata Accord; Georgia joined the CIS in 1993,

but began its legal withdrawal from the CIS after its conflict with Russia in 2008.22 In 2005,

Turkmenistan reduced its status to that of an associate member,23 meaning that it did not

ratify the CIS Charter. Since the mid-1990s, Ukraine has only been a participating state; it

insisted that it was not interested in being present for all sessions and has not ratified the

CIS Charter. In 2008, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Volodymyr Ohryzko described Ukraine’s

association with the CIS in the following manner:

“Ukraine does not recognize the legal personality of this organization, we are not members of the CIS Economic Court, we did not ratify the CIS Statute, thus, we can-not be considered a member of this organization from international legal point of view. Ukraine is a country-participant, but not a member country.”24

Today, only nine of the eleven states that signed the Alma-Ata Declaration remain full, char-

ter-ratified CIS members.

20

“The Belavezha Accords Signed” (1991) Yeltsin Presidential Library, online: <http://www.prlib.ru/en-us/history/pages/item.aspx?itemid=749>. 21

Alma-Ata Declaration 12 December 1991, online: <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/belarus/by_appnc.html>. 22

Breffni O’Rourke, “Georgia Finalizes Withdrawal From CIS” RFE/RL 18 August 2009 [O’Rourke], online: <http://www.rferl.org/content/Georgia_Finalizes_Withdrawal_From_CIS/1802284.html> 23

Valentinas Mite, “CIS: Turkmenistan Reduces Ties to ‘Associate Member’” RFE/RL 29 August 2005, online: <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1061002.html>. 24

“Ukraine to analyze expediency of taking part in CIS projects” Unian 19 August 2008, online: <http://www.unian.info/society/138812-ukraine-to-analyze-expediency-of-taking-part-in-cis-projects.html>.

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The conditions of the CIS’s instantiation and its membership already tell us pertinent infor-

mation about what it is and what it does. First of all, as Alexander Nikitin points out, the le-

gal entity of the CIS was and is not an “effective substitute for the notion of a post-Soviet

space.”25 This is true from its beginning, due to the lack of involvement of the Baltic states,

and furthermore, the eventual refusal of Ukraine and Turkmenistan to ratify the CIS charter.

Even in its early years very few CIS decisions were co-signed by all its members.26 The CIS

was, and remains, structurally weak. Willerton, Slobodchikoff and Goertz explain:

“The level of involvement of member-states in the CIS varied significantly. The design of the CIS allowed members to ‘cherry pick’ where and when they wanted to engage in multilateral cooperation. CIS operational rules included an ‘exit option’ that per-mitted members to ignore or depart from any individual CIS agreement. No agree-ments, even the most fundamental, were binding on all CIS members, just as no agreement required the approval of all members to become binding.”27

As a result of the loose structure of the CIS, most agreements occurred on different bilateral

and multilateral bases between CIS member states or participating states.28 Willerton, Slo-

bodchikoff and Goertz describe these agreements as constituting a balance required to

manage the security and conflict dilemmas necessitated by the Soviet collapse.29 “Russia

took the lead in championing all of these multilateral organizational and policy initiatives,”30

and as a result, it was the most influential country in the CIS. Russia capitalized on high oil

prices, improved relations with regional “political elites and strengthened its presence in

post-Soviet economies.”31 The Russia Federation was able to develop bilateral agreements

concretely tying itself to all the CIS members.32 Russia benefited and continues to benefit

from its treaty activism. This activism led to the development of “Treaty networks… [that]

represent a foundation that undergirds not only policy solutions for smaller FSU [Former

Soviet Union] states, but also an enhanced Eurasian leadership position for the Russian Fed-

eration.33

25

Alexander Nikitin, “Russian Foreign Policy in the Fragmented Post-Soviet Space” (2008) 25:2 International Journal on World Peace 7 [Nikitin], at page 12. 26

Ibid at 12. 27

Willerton at 66. 28

Nikitin at 12. 29

Willerton at 64. 30

Ibid at 71. 31

Tsygankov at 50. 32

Willerton at 67. 33

Ibid at 61.

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Russia is still struggling to maintain its influence amongst CIS states. However, the CIS as a

legal entity has little value as a tool for Russia today. As Paul Kubicek explains, “there was

insufficient political will to give a solid shape or identity to the CIS. It could, at best, serve

only a limited functional role and did not have enough political, ideological, or cultural glue

to keep its twelve members together in a cohesive organisation, let alone create a ‘spiritual

unity’ among its peoples, as stated in its Charter.”34 Over the years, the CIS has been a con-

troversial organization. On the one hand, it was regarded as a tool for Russia to maintain

influence over the former Soviet states.35 On the other hand, the CIS member-states, which

were concerned about Russia’s possible interference in their internal affairs, used the CIS as

a forum to address these concerns. As Willerton, Slobodchikoff and Goertz note, “[k]eeping

these states engaged in CIS multilateral arrangements constituted a restraining device on

Russia’s possible ‘imperial advances.’”36 There is a strong movement away from this post-

Soviet organization. For years, many have questioned the group’s relevance.37 In 2008 Geor-

gian President Mikheil Saakashvili remarked, "The CIS totally failed as an international organ-

ization. It is some kind of post-Soviet kind of thing that basically could not do anything to

prevent this tragedy [the Russia-Georgia War] from happening. And, you know, by leaving

the CIS, we are giving final [goodbyes] to the Soviet Union."38 There is a real sense some

post-Soviet countries desire to shed the ‘post-Soviet’ moniker; a symbolic step is abandoning

membership in the CIS. Kubicek notes that, as the CIS has receded in importance, “two types

of states now find themselves members of different regional groupings (for example GUAM

[Georgia Ukraine Azerbaijan Moldova] and CDC [Community of Democratic Choice] for the

former, SCO [Shanghai Cooperation Agreement], CSTO [Collective Security Treaty Organiza-

tion], and EAEC [Eurasian Economic Community] for the latter).39 I will now discuss these

two groupings in the following sections.

34

Paul Kubicek “The Commonwealth of Independent States: an example of failed regionalism?” (2009) 35 Re-view of International Studies 237 [Kubicek], at 256. 35

O’Rourke. 36

Willerton at 79. 37

O’Rourke. 38

Ibid. 39

Kubicek at 256.

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4. Overcoming the Past: GUAM and the Community of

Democratic Choice

4.1. Georgia Ukraine Azerbaijan Moldova (GUAM)

The CIS became less effective partly because certain post-Soviet states began to react

against residual Sovietism by shifting their interests westward. Two major treaty-based inte-

gration projects were established that reflect this shift. On the 7th of June 2001, the Associa-

tion of Georgia Ukraine Azerbaijan Moldova (GUAM) was established (GUAM was known as

GUUAM when Uzbekistan was a participant of the Association from 1999-2005).40 This asso-

ciation sought to engage

“social and economic, transport, energy, scientific and technical, humanitarian, legis-lative and law-enforcement capacities of the Member States, this vision coincides with establishing in the Black Sea – Caspian region a space of civilized partnership based on European standards, criteria and practice, including the principles of four freedoms of movement of goods, services, capital, and labor and persons.”41

GUAM was explicit about its shift toward European standards and “at various times criticized

or condemned CIS projects as Moscow-Minsk centered.”42 Officially, GUAM was not directed

against Russia, it professed to “reflect an objective trend towards the development of inter-

national regional cooperation as one of the modern forms of the globalization and interna-

tionalization of the world.”43 In 2006, the organization's members voted to change the name

to the “Organization for Democracy and Economic Development – GUAM.” The group itself

achieved little, however, the spirit of the Western shift continues to dominate current issues

in post-Soviet space. GUAM is still active today, but Nikitin argues that the rest of the world

interpreted GUAM as falling within a logic of post-Soviet competition, as opposed to a new

serious attempt at integration.44 This position is agreed upon by other experts, who maintain

that GUAM became insignificant after the United States lost interest in the group.45

40

“History and Concept of GUAM” Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Mol-dova [History of GUAM], online: <http://www.mfa.gov.md/about-guam-en/history-concept-guam>. 41

Ibid. 42

Nikitin at 12. 43

History of GUAM. 44

Nikitin at 12. 45

Jean-Christoph Peuch, “East: Leaders Meet In Ukraine To Create New Regional Alliance” RFE/RL1 December 2005, online: <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1063423.html>.

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4.2. Community of Democratic Choice

Georgia and Ukraine’s ‘Colour Revolutions’, which occurred in 2003 and 2004 respectively,

failed to breathe much new life into GUAM.46 “Instead, at the peak of revolutionary enthusi-

asm, Kiev and Tbilisi initiated the creation of the CDC – Community of Democratic Choice.”47

According to Nikitin, the CDC was “an attempt to re-start GUAM in a broader configura-

tion.”48 The Community of Democratic Choice was established on December 2, 2005 in Kiev

by nine states: Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia,

and Ukraine.49 Representatives from Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and

Poland also attended the forum, as well as observers from the United States, the EU and the

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).50 The CDC stated three main

objectives: “the promotion of democratic values, regional stability, and economic prosperi-

ty.”51 Viktor Yushchenko stated that the CDC’s “purpose was not “to befriend anyone against

someone else” but that it must be seen as a “dialogue between friends, adherents of ideas

for promoting democracy and the supremacy of law.””52 The presidential administration

head of Georgia, however, “said that the community would in essence be “an axis of demo-

cratic countries that do not wish to remain in Russia’s orbit.”” Although the CDC has not re-

sulted in great changes to the region, it at the very least represents another important mo-

ment in the development of the counter-CIS, anti-Moscow movement. Crucially, the GUAM

and CDC states engaged with states beyond the CIS region, further cementing the shift in

focus from post-Sovietism. Nikitin explains that the “erosion of the post-Soviet space is man-

ifested not only in the weakening of its former interdependences, but also in the higher

presence and influence of out-of-region actors, and in the spill-over of integrative efforts

beyond the former Soviet borders, to extend interaction between former-Soviet and never-

Soviet countries and societies.”53 Although GUAM and the CDC have had limited successes,

the ideological shift that these groups reflect has helped set the stage for the EU-driven

Eastern Partnership initiative.

46

Nikitin at 19. 47

Nikitin at 19. 48

Nikitin at 29, footnote 5. 49

Jean-Christoph Peuch, “Ukraine: Regional Leaders Set Up Community Of Democratic Choice” RFE/RL 2 December 2005, online: <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1063461.html>. 50

Ibid. 51

Ibid. 52

Ibid. 53

Nikitin at 15.

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5. The Future of Russia: CSTO, SCO & EurAsEC

5.1. Security Integration - Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)

Although the CIS failed in many ways to fulfill its goals, it is only one of many Russian-led

integration projects. Russia has succeeded in maintaining considerable influence and has

achieved some of the unfulfilled goals of the CIS through the establishment of other treaty-

bodies amongst some post-Soviet states. Kubicek explains that “just because the CIS no

longer holds considerable influence in the region, does not mean that “regionalism per se is

doomed in the post-Soviet space. Russian hegemony over certain states, combined with po-

litical incentives for local political leaders, may give life to organisations such as the CSTO or

EAEC [EurAsEC], and China seems to be intent to develop the SCO into a political, economic,

and security bloc.”54 The CSTO or, Collective Security Treaty Organization, evolved out of an

early CIS security treaty (the Collective Security Treaty) and was initiated in its current form

on May 14, 2002.55 It inherited and upgraded the Rapid Deployment Forces for Central Asia

from the CIS.56 Ultimately, “military and security integration of the participating NIS [newly

independent states, i.e. post-Soviet states] was removed from the CIS framework and CSTO

became a self-supporting mechanism of integration.”57 Its members currently include Russia,

Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. If is often described as a Russia-led

rival to NATO.58

The objective of the CSTO is “to continue and strengthen close and comprehensive relations

in the foreign policy, military, military-technical spheres, coordination and joint efforts in

combating international terrorism and other security threats.”59 Russia has been able to ac-

complish a substantial amount through the CSTO. For example, the CSTO created a seven-

54

Kubicek at page 256. 55

Patrick Goodenough, “Russian-Led Alliance to Spend $1 Billion on Weapons in 2014” CNS News 27 December 2013 [Goodenough], online: <http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/patrick-goodenough/russian-led-alliance-spend-1-billion-weapons-2014>. 56

Nikitin at 22. 57

Nikitin at 20. 58

Goodenough. 59

“Collective Security Treaty Organization” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, online: <http://mfa.gov.by/en/organizations/membership/list/cddd96a3f70190b1.html>.

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state alliance of Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense, a goal left unfinished by the CIS.60 Moreover,

it created an Air Defense system and system of collective protection of strategic rail-roads

and communications.61 When considered as a means to inter-state integration, the CSTO has

formed very strong ties. Not only are member-states committed to defending each other (if

attacked) under its Charter, but they are also forbidden from joining other military alliances,

such as NATO.62 This could pose a problem for the EU’s Eastern Partnership Initiative. NATO

and the EU share a strong strategic partnership and have 21 member-states in common.63

The EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative includes two states that belong to the CSTO: Armenia

and Belarus.64 The EU would not likely offer membership to a CSTO member-state.

The CSTO continues to be formidable power. A senior official for the alliance recently re-

vealed that the group plans to spend $1 billion on weapons on upgrading its forces.65 More-

over, Kyrgyzstan will no longer allow the United States access to its base in Manas; a Russian

air base close by will become the CSTO air base.66 Although the group possesses a rotating

presidency, Russia maintains a strong influence; the “CSTO Military staff in Moscow is well

connected to the General Staff of the Russian armed forces.”67 Nikitin notes that “NATO ig-

nores and underestimates CSTO, but may well be making a political mistake.”68 He insists

that the “opening of a formal cooperation and coordination dialogue between NATO and

CSTO, aimed at mutual predictability, transparency, functional interoperability and poten-

tially joint crises response, may help prevent new hostilities and unnecessary rivalries.”69 It

was revealed in a recently approved military doctrine that “Russia views the expansion of

NATO as a primary threat to its security, as well as part of a tendency to give NATO global

security functions.”70 The relationship between NATO and Russia is not good. The NATO-

Russia Council, founded in 2002, and severed after the Russia-Georgia war of 2008, did not

60

Nikitin at 22. 61

Nikitin at 22. 62

Goodenough. 63

“NATO-EU: a strategic partnership” North Atlantic Treaty Organization 29 October 2012, online: <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm>. 64

http://www.easternpartnership.org/publication/2011-07-07/eastern-partnership-two-years-success-or-failure-diversified-enp 65

Goodenough. 66

Ibid. 67

Nikitin at 22. 68

Nikitin at 26. 69

Nikitin at 26. 70

“Russia’s new military doctrine approved” RT 17 April 2010, online: <http://rt.com/usa/russia-military-doctrine-approved/>.

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meet again until September 22, 2010.71 At that meeting the US ambassador to NATO hinted

that NATO membership is open to Russia, so long as it met the NATO’s requirements.72 But

NATO membership would be the end of the CSTO. When asked about the potential for Rus-

sia to join NATO, CSTO Chief Nikolai Bordyuzha stated, “I believe it [Russia’s membership in

NATO] is absurd…What is the sense of NATO membership if Russia has created its own secu-

rity framework with its allies and this system of collective security functions well?”73 Bordyu-

zha is right. Russia has no interest in becoming a member of NATO and “the Kremlin re-

ceived no support from NATO officials or the U.S. for its initiative to negotiate a new security

treaty with European nations.” 74 The CSTO, then, remains an entity with which NATO must

respect and cordially engage, rather than attempt to absorb. This becomes all the more

pressing since it may acquire more members. In 2013, Afghanistan and Serbia were granted

observer status,75 and Bordyuzha even mentioned that “Iran could also join the bloc”76 alt-

hough no steps toward this have been taken.

5.2. Heedful Diplomatic Integration - The Shanghai Cooperation Agreement

The Shanghai Cooperation Agreement (SCO) is essentially used by Russia as a means of

maintaining its influence in Central Asia in the face of China’s growing power and influence

in the region. It is an international organization created on June 15, 2001, in Shanghai, China.

Its members include Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, while

India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan have observer status.77

Its official goals are:

71

Michael Bohm, “5 Reasons Why Russia Will Never Join NATO” The Moscow Times 19 November 2010 [Bohm], online: <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/5-reasons-why-russia-will-never-join-nato/423840.html>. 72

Bohm. 73

Bohm. 74

Tsygankov at 49. 75

“Afghan and Serbian parliaments acquire observer status at CSTO PA” Belarusian Telegraph Agency 11 April 2013, online: <http://news.belta.by/en/news/society?id=712387>. 76

“US attack on Iran will ‘shake everyone’ – CSTO chief” RT 21 February 2012, online: <http://rt.com/politics/us-attack-iran-csto-835/>. 77

“Shanghai Cooperation Agreement” Glossary – Website of the President of Russia, online: <http://eng.kremlin.ru/terms/S>.

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“strengthening mutual confidence and good-neighbourly relations among the mem-ber countries; promoting effective cooperation in politics, trade, economy, science, technology, and culture; making joint efforts to maintain and ensure peace, security and stability in the region, moving towards the establishment of a new, democratic, just and rational political and economic international order.”78

But does it actually achieve these lofty goals? According to Isabelle Facon, at “the official

level, it is almost taboo to criticize the SCO’s efficiency (just as it is almost impossible to dis-

cuss openly the weaknesses of the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership). But Russian ex-

perts do underscore the SCO’s deficiencies as a security player and as a platform for multi-

lateral cooperation.”79 Russia’s membership in the SCO places it in a somewhat unfamiliar

position. In the SCO “another player, China, is claiming great power status, and may be in a

more favorable position than Russia to obtain it.”80 Russia, then, faces two major challenges

in the group: “the first is to treat all the smaller countries like equals despite differences in

the size of their economies and their political influence, and the second is connected

with Russia’s identity: by involving countries like China and South Korea in the integration

process, Russia could lose its status as the leader of the process.”81According to Tsygankov,

“more signs appeared in 2011 that Russia was increasingly viewing its neighbor’s [China’s]

rise as a threat.”82 It is for this reason that Russia does not prioritize its activities in the SCO.

However, membership does have its benefits. It allows for the opportunity for Russia to dis-

play to the world its diplomatic reach. Moreover, membership in the SCO “has allowed Rus-

sia to implement ‘‘a double containment strategy: on the one side, regarding U.S. involve-

ment in the area, and on the other side, regarding China’s growing influence.”83 However, as

Facon notes, “the SCO is only one instrument among others in Russia’s ensemble advancing

its strategic and security interests, and it is not the major instrument.”84

78

Ibid. 79

Isabelle Facon, “Moscow’s Global Foreign and Security Strategy: Does the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-tion Meet Russian Interests?” (2013) 53:3 Asian Survey 461 [Facon], at 482. 80

Facon at 481. 81

“Valdai Launches Eurasian Integration Research Project” Valdai International Discussion Club 19 November 2013, online: <http://valdaiclub.com/event/64744.html>. 82

Tsygankov at 50. 83

Facon at 480. 84

Ibid at 481.

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5.3. Economic Integration: The Eurasian Economic Community

With respect to economic integration, the strongest Russian-led treaty-based integration

project is the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), and its related initiatives. In 2000,

EurAsEC was established by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (with Uz-

bekistan joining in 2006).85 EurAsEC’s aims are “developing economic cooperation and trade,

to effectively further the process for forming the Customs Union and Common Economic

Space, and to coordinate the actions of Community states during integration into the world

economy and international trading system.”86 In 2003, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and

Ukraine decided that they would institute Common or Single Economic Space (SES).”87

Ukraine eventually pulled out of the project. Both Ukraine and Moldova have had “the sta-

tus of EurAsEC observer since May 2002, and Armenia since January 2003.”88 In October

2007, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia signed the Treaty on the Establishment of the Com-

mon Customs Territory and Formation of the Customs Union.89 In 2009 Belarus, Kazakhstan

and Russia decided upon integration stages and developed a timeline for creating the single

custom area.90 They also “declared that development of the Customs Union and the Single

Economic Space should in the future lead to the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union.”

On November 18, 2011 several important events took place. The “presidents of Belarus, Ka-

zakhstan and Russia signed a Declaration on Eurasian Economic Integration, predicated on

recognition of the success of the Customs Union… [and] International agreements setting

out the legal framework of the Single Economic Space, now came into effect” (the SES be-

came operational on January 1, 2012).91 Also on November 18, 2011, “the presidents of Bel-

arus, Kazakhstan and Russia worked out an agreement on the Eurasian Economic Commis-

sion. Based on this agreement on February 2, 2012 the Eurasian Economic Commission be-

gan work as the permanent supranational regulatory body of the Customs Union and the

85

“Eurasian Economic Integration: Facts and Figures” Eurasian Economic Commission 2013 [Eurasian Integra-tion], online: <http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/Documents/broshura26Body_ENGL_final2013_2.pdf>, at 7. 86

“EurAsEC Today” Eurasian Economic Community 2011 [EurAsEC Today], online: <http://www.evrazes.com/i/other/EurAsEC-today_eng.pdf>, at page 3. 87

Eurasian Integration at 7. 88

EurAsEC Today at 2. 89

Eurasian Integration at 7. 90

Ibid at 7. 91

Eurasian Integration at 7.

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Single Economic Space.”92 A deadline of January 1, 2015 has been set for agreements consti-

tuting the framework of the Customs Union and SES, upon which the Eurasian Economic

Union will be founded.93

This deadline, however, is fast approaching. Andrei Zagorksi maintains that there is “little

empirical evidence…which supports the expectation that Eurasian integration will increase in

the years to come. Over the past twenty years Russia has launched many similar initiatives…

None of these previous projects achieved their declared goals. What is more, current eco-

nomic and political indicators are not favourable.”94 President Putin, however, had remained

optimistic until recent events. In recent years Putin has been tremendously successful. For

example, he vetoed military intervention in Syria at the UN, “instead brokering a deal on

chemical weapons and sponsoring a Syrian peace conference,” and his ally, Bashar Assad, is

still in power.95 “Putin has taken some comfort that NATO’s campaign in Afghanistan has

been as difficult and frustrating as the one the Soviet Union endured 30 years ago—and a lot

longer.”96 In August 2012, Putin’s Russia was officially welcomed into the World Trade Or-

ganization.97 In that same year, Putin pledged to spend $770 billion dollars to ‘modernize’

Russian security by upgrading its military over the next decade.98 To add to Putin’s recent

achievements, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia have developed concrete plans to join the Customs

Union in 2014.99 Armenia, like Ukraine, is a member of the Eastern Partnership; this means

that out of the six Eastern Partnership countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia,

Moldova and Ukraine) two have reoriented towards Eurasian integration. This is a serious

92

Ibid at 7. 93

Ibid at 7. 94

Andrei Zagorksi, “Russia’s neighbourhood policy” European Union Institute For Security Studies 14 February 2012 [Zagorski], online: <http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/russias-neighbourhood-policy/>. 95

“The Triumph of Vladimir Putin” The Economist 1 February 2014, online: <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21595451-successes-abroad-and-winter-olympics-make-russia-look-strong-where-it-matters-it?spc=scode&spv=xm&ah=9d7f7ab945510a56fa6d37c30b6f1709>. 96

Ibid. 97

“Russian Federation” World Trade Organization, online: <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_russie_e.htm>. 98

Alexei Druzhinin “Putin: Russian military to get $770B upgrade” CBS News 20 February 2012, online: <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/putin-russian-military-to-get-770b-upgrade/>. 99

“Armenian, Kyrgyz Customs Union Plans Outlined” RFE/RL 27 December 2013, online: <http://www.rferl.org/content/armenia-kyrgyzstan-customs-union/25214286.html>.

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blow to the EU, since in 2012 and 2013 alone the EU granted a total 40 million Euros to Ar-

menia through the Eastern Partnership Integration and Cooperation Programme.100

5.4. The EurAsEC and the Crisis in Ukraine

In December 2013, the Russian President “left European diplomats looking flat-footed by

deploying a mix of money and threats to persuade Ukraine’s president, Viktor Yanukovych,

to walk away from a trade deal he was preparing to sign with the European Union.”101 Putin

has a history of using Ukraine’s reliance on Russian gas to “strong-arm his western neigh-

bour [Ukraine], cutting off supplies twice since 2006 over payment disputes.”102 On Decem-

ber 17, 2013, Yanukovych accepted Putin’s offer of a steep discount on Russian gas, and his

promise to purchase $15 million in Ukrainian bonds.103 This deepened the East-West political

divide in Kiev and caused massive protests against the move, which many saw as pro-Russian

Yanukovych selling Ukraine “to its former Soviet master.”104 Despite the protests, Putin ini-

tially regarded the outcome of his forceful tactics as a major success in his integration pro-

ject, and was confident that Ukraine would return to the process of Eurasian integration.105

On February 18, 2014, however, the rise of Putin’s achievements toward establishing a Eura-

sian Union began to fall. Deadly violence erupted in Kiev as Yanukovych ordered government

police forces to expel anti-government protestors from Independence Square by the use of

force. The bidding war between the EU and Russia over Ukraine’s allegiance inadvertently

led to what resembled a small-scale war zone in Kiev, with finger-pointing over which coun-

try was to blame for the violence. Russia was quick to accuse the West of meddling in

100

“Eastern Partnership Integration and Cooperation (EaPIC) programme” Development and Cooperation - Europeaid 19 December 2013, online: <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/regional-cooperation/enpi-east/eapic_en.htm>. 101

Ibid. 102

Elena Mazneva and Stephen Bierman, “Russia Gas Threat Show Putin Using Pipes to Press Ukraine” Bloomberg News 3 March 2014, online: <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-02/russia-gas-threat-shows-putin-using-pipelines-to-press-ukraine.html>. 103

Darina Marchak and Katya Gorchinskaya, “Russia gives Ukraine cheap gas, $15 billion in loans” Kyiv Post 17 December 2013, online: <http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/russia-gives-ukraine-cheap-gas-15-billion-in-loans-333852.html>. 104

Darya Korsunskaya and Timothy Heritage, “Russian bailout wins Ukraine economic respite but depends political rift” Reuters 17 December 2013, online: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/17/us-ukraine-idUSBRE9BF11U20131217>. 105

“Kremlin Anticipates Ukrainian Integration With Eurasian Union” The Moscow Times 14 February 2014, online: <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/kremlin-anticipates-ukrainian-integration-with-eurasian-union/494541.html>.

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Ukraine’s affairs. Putin and Yanukovych’s regime also blamed extremists for the violence,

and called on the West to condemn the extremists instead of blaming Ukrainian authori-

ties.106 Recently recovered government documents indicate that Yanukovych planned to use

thousands of troops to crush the protests.107 As a result of the violence, which resulted in a

total of eighty-eight fatalities,108 the EU and US imposed sanctions against the Ukrainian offi-

cials that they held responsible.109 On February 22, the Ukrainian Parliament officially ousted

Yanukovych, who had already fled Kiev, and set new presidential elections for May 25,

2014.110 Prior to Parliament’s vote, many of Yanukovych’s presidential staff and other politi-

cal allies, including the billionaire oligarchs who helped shape his career, either distanced

themselves from him or fled Ukraine altogether.111

The effect of this crisis on Russian interests in the region is severe. Putin lost his power base

in Kiev, which was secured by his ally, Yanukovych, as President, and further supported by

wealthy oligarchs who are no longer loyal to the former Ukrainian President. This power-

base cannot simply be rebuilt. Even Putin recognizes that Yanukovych has no political fu-

ture.112 For Putin, a victory for anti-Russian groups in Kiev signaled the probability that

Ukraine would become realigned with the Europe, threatening his future plans for a Eura-

sian Union. The existence of the Eurasian Union, which Putin sees as his own “personal polit-

ical legacy,”113 now hangs in a fragile balance. Gleb Pavlovksiy, a former KGB member and

political advisor to Putin, stated that "[w]ithout Ukraine, Putin's project [of a Eurasian Union]

106

“Putin urges West to condemn extremists in Kiev, stop blaming authorities” ITAR-TASS News Agency 19 February 2014 [Extremists], online: <http://en.itar-tass.com/russia/719977>. 107

“Viktor Yanukovych was ready to ‘use troops to crush Ukraine protests’” The Guardian 25 February 2014, online: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/25/viktor-yanukovych-troops-to-crush-protests>. 108

Ibid. 109

“President Yanukovych, Opposition Leaders Agree 'Truce,' Talks” RFE/RL 19 February 2014, online: <http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-army-chief-fired-sanctions/25270054.html>. 110

James Marson, Alan Cullison, and Alexander Kolyandr, “Parliament Ousts Ukraine President” The Wall Street Journal 22 February 2014, online: <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304914204579398561953855036?mod=e2tw>. 111

Simon Shuster, “Ukrainian President’s Allies Start to Abandon Him” TIME 20 February 2014, online: <http://world.time.com/2014/02/20/ukrainian-presidents-allies-start-to-abandon-him/>. 112

Christopher Brennan, “Putin Sees No Political Future For Yanukovych” The Moscow Times 5 March 2014, online: <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/putin-sees-no-political-future-for-yanukovych/495564.html>. 113

Timothy Heritage, “Ukraine holds key to Putin’s dream of a new union” Reuters 29 November 2013, online: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/29/us-ukraine-eu-putin-idUSBRE9AS0F320131129>.

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is impossible."114 Of all the post-Soviet states, “none is more important to Putin than

Ukraine, a huge market and the cradle of Russian civilization.”115

The drastic measures taken by Putin to secure the Crimean peninsula after his power-base in

Kiev was dissolved is hardly surprising, especially considering how important he views

Ukraine’s role in his political legacy. Also, Crimea is a strategic location, home to the Russian

Black Sea Fleet, with a population that is sixty percent Russian.116 For these reasons Putin

and his government declared that “Russia had the right to invade Ukraine to protect Russian

citizens, and his [Putin’s] parliament has voted to change the law to make it easier to annex

territory inhabited by Russian speakers.”117 Volodymyr Fesenko, a political analyst at the

Kiev-based Penta think-tank, stated that the “revolution has been won in Kiev, in part of

Ukraine, but not in the whole of Ukraine. We still have many risks.”118 Since the ousting of

Yanukovych, several leaders in mainly Russian-speaking regions of east Ukraine asserted that

they were taking control of their territories.119 Putin knows that parts of Ukraine remain po-

tentially within his grasp, and will likely continue to violate international law if it secures

Russian interests. The White House properly noted that Russia’s actions in Crimea constitute

a “clear violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity, which is a breach of in-

ternational law, including Russia’s obligations under the UN Charter, and of its 1997 military

basing agreement with Ukraine, and which is inconsistent with the 1994 Budapest Memo-

randum and the Helsinki Final Act.”120 Although international law supersedes Russian law,

Putin nevertheless maintains Russian interests over and against that international law. As a

nation that has built up more treaty-based relationships than any other, Russia has, by these

actions, destroyed any of its little credibility and reliability as an international power; the

114

Ibid. 115

Ibid. 116

Henry Kissinger, “How the Ukraine crisis ends” The Washington Post 5 March 2014 [Kissinger], online: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html>. 117

“Ukraine Crisis: Merkel, U.S. warn Putin of Crimea annexation” CBC News 9 March 2014 [Ukraine Crisis], online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ukraine-crisis-merkel-u-s-warn-putin-of-crimea-annexation-1.2565729>. 118

Timothy Heritage, “Leaders in east Ukraine vote to take control of their areas” Reuters 22 February 2014, online: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/22/us-ukraine-crisis-regions-idUSBREA1L0KH20140222>. 119

Ibid. 120

“Readout of President Obama’s Call with President Putin” The White House – Office of the Press Secretary 1 March 2014, online: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/01/readout-president-obama-s-call-president-putin>.

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markets indicated this when the ruble fell to an all time low on March 3, 2014.121 Putin is

quickly destroying the possibility of achieving the success that he so desperately desires for

Russia.

Not only are Russia’s actions in Crimea in violation of international law, but so is the Mos-

cow-backed referendum on whether Crimea should rejoin the regional hegemon. There are

currently 11,000 pro-Russian troops maintaining control over the peninsula, awaiting the

referendum scheduled for March 16, 2014.122 “A referendum had previously been scheduled

in Crimea for March 30, but the question to be put to voters was whether their region

should enjoy “state autonomy” within Ukraine.”123 German Chancellor Angela Merkel in-

formed Putin that the “referendum on whether Crimea should join Russia was illegal and

violated Ukraine's constitution.”124 While the US, and other Western governments, will re-

fuse to recognize the result of the vote,125 Putin shows no signs of concern. Europe will not

risk military intervention and is not likely to impose crippling sanctions on Russia because of

its dependence on Russian oil and gas.126 Putin knows that he currently has no influence

from within Kiev, but his ability to cut off natural gas shipments give him a strong bargaining

tool to retain influence by threats and intimidation.127 The Ukrainian Prime Minister refuses

to “budge a single centimetre from Ukrainian land,”128 but Putin has not given up on Ukrain-

ian regions containing high numbers of ethnic Russians. Barring certain events such as the

collapse of the ruble or military action against Russian troops in Ukraine, it is reasonable to

121

“Russian rouble hits new low against the dollar and euro” BBC News 3 March 2014, online: <http://www.bbc.com/news/business-26414285>. 122

“Crimea to vote to split from Ukraine, join Russia” The Washington Post 6 March 2014, online: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/crimea-11000-pro-russian-troops-in-control/2014/03/06/ac13ed60-a4fe-11e3-b865-38b254d92063_story.html>. 123

Ibid. 124

Ukraine Crisis. 125

“U.S. won’t recognize Crimea annexation: security official” Reuters 9 March 2014, online: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/09/us-ukraine-crisis-usa-idUSBREA280GK20140309>. 126

“Ukraine crisis highlights Europe’s dependence on Russian energy” CBS News 4 March 2014, online: <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/does-russian-oil-trump-possible-european-sanctions/>. 127

Paul Sonne, Andrey Ostroukh, and Carol E. Lee “Moscow Tightens Squeeze on Ukraine Over Energy” The Wall Street Journal 8 March 2014, online: <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303369904579424540787917088?mg=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB10001424052702303369904579424540787917088.html>. 128

John-Thor Dahlburg, “Ukraine PM vows not to give up ‘a single centimetre’ of territory” The Toronto Star 9 March 2014, online: <http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2014/03/09/ukraine_pm_vows_not_to_give_up_a_single_centimetre_of_its_territory.html>.

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expect that Russia will continue to exert similar forms of pressure on pro-Russian territories

and encourage referendums in other parts of eastern Ukraine.

5.5. The Bidding War: Incentives, Compromises and the Future

The bidding war over Ukraine was originally fuelled by the idea that Eastern Partnership

states must make a decision between either increasing ties with the EU or increasing ties

with Russia via the Customs Union and the SES. It follows then, that an important question

to address is whether membership in the Customs Union and SES would conflict with signing

an Association Agreement and/or Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the

EU.

In December 2012, the EU stated that Armenia could not sign a far-reaching Association

Agreement with the European Union if it joins the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Ka-

zakhstan, because the two systems are incompatible.129 This is because “a customs union

has a common external trade policy and an individual member country no longer has sover-

eign control over its external trade policies.”130 However, in early 2013, the EU Commission-

er for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy, Stefan Fuele, stated that the “Euro-

pean Union wants good relations between Kyiv and Moscow and believes that Ukraine may

make partial commitments with the Customs Union that do not conflict with its obligations

under the Association Agreement.”131 Therefore, it appears that fully joining and integrating

into the Customs Union and SES would conflict with Association Agreements and other trade

agreements with the EU, but theoretically the EU sees room for partial commitments under

the Customs Union. The EU has also considered new tactics to offer integration incentives

for other Eastern Partnership countries. On February 10, 2014, EU Foreign Ministers dis-

cussed short-term incentive packages to accompany the Association Agreements, which

could “focus on mobility and visas, student exchanges, more twinning projects, and in-

129

“EU Warns Armenia About Russia Customs Union” Asbarez Armenian News 21 December 2012, online: <http://asbarez.com/107280/eu-warns-armenia-about-russia-customs-union/>. 130

Ibid. 131

“Fuele: EU not against Ukraine's cooperation with Customs Union unless it conflicts with Association Agreement” Kyiv Post 5 February 2013, online: <https://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/fule-eu-not-against-ukraines-cooperation-with-customs-union-unless-it-conflicts-with-association-agreement-319892.html>.

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creased participation in EU community programs and agencies.”132 On February 17, 2014 the

Kyiv Post reported the claim of a German political scientist, that “Germany is revising its for-

eign policies inside Europe and will try to persuade the Poles and other Eastern-European

neighbors to change their opinion on "a common European house," mainly initiating refor-

matting of the Eastern Partnership, proposing to include Russian and Asia into it.”133

Offering Russia membership in the Eastern Partnership would certainly fail as a solution to

the recent short-comings of the initiative, and after Russia’s occupation of Crimea, this op-

tion will not even be considered by European governments. Russia’s forceful actions in Cri-

mea highlight the heart of the issue, which is that Putin’s Russia and the EU are fundamen-

tally at odds from a moral perspective. The EU and its Eastern Partnership are not solely

about economic interests; they are also value-based. The Eastern Partnership is “under-

pinned by a shared commitment to international law and fundamental values - democracy,

the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms - and to the market

economy, sustainable development and good governance.”134 Putin’s Russia is not at all

committed to these ideals, and if anything, it has proven that it is against them. As long as

Putin remains in power, Russia will not compromise the independence of its political will to

surrender to European value-based standards. Moreover, the EU should not compromise its

own standards by adopting an interest-driven approach alone, in dealing with Russia.135 The

Eastern Partnership “enables [its] partner countries interested in moving towards the EU

and increasing political, economic and cultural links to do so.”136 In a sense, it acts as a prep-

aration for EU membership, but Russia has no interest in this. Putin would never abandon

his project of establishing a Eurasian Union; the Eurasian Union marks the culmination of

over twenty years, and thousands of multi and bilateral treaties, of Russian-led integration

efforts in the post-Soviet space.

132

Rikard Jozwiak, “EU Members Press For 'European Package' For Eastern Partners” RFE/RL 7 February 2014, online: <http://www.rferl.org/content/eu-eastern-partnership-proposal-european-package/25256146.html>. 133

“Experts: Ukraine's participation in Eastern Partnership depends on Germany's position” Kyiv Post 17 February 2014, online: <http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/expert-ukraines-participation-in-eastern-partnership-depends-on-germanys-position-336977.html>. 134

“Eastern Partnership” European Union External Action, online: <http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/index_en.htm>. 135

Hannes Adomeit, “Putin’s ‘Eurasian Union: Russia’s Integration Project and Policies on Post-Soviet Space” Center For International and European Studies 4 July 2012 [Adomeit], online: <http://www.academia.edu/2485281/Putins_Eurasian_Union_Russias_Integration_Project_and_Policies_on_Post-Soviet_Space>, at page 9. 136

“Eastern Partnership” European Union External Action, online: <http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/index_en.htm>.

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If the EU offers competitive short-term incentives (such as visas, student exchanges, and

immediate economic packages) as well as long-term incentives (i.e. definitive timelines to-

wards EU membership), then it will have greater success in reorienting Eastern Partnership

countries to the West. Russia’s recent flagrant violations of international law might even

have the ultimate effect of dissuading other states from establishing ties with Russia, work-

ing in the EU’s favour. With respect to Ukraine, the newly formed government in Kiev has

expressed its desire to sign the political part of the Association Agreement within a matter of

weeks,137 and “European Council President Herman Van Rompuy has said that the EU is

ready to sign the political part of the Association Agreement with Ukraine by May 25.”138 In

light of the deepening crisis in Ukraine, the EU has also presented Ukraine with an economic

aid package totaling $15 billion dollars over the next few years, hinging on Ukraine signing a

deal with the International Monetary Fund.139 This means that the EU may sign the Associa-

tion Agreement with Ukraine before elections are held, which Russia will undoubtedly criti-

cize, and not without merit. The EU should not forget its responsibility in this crisis to ensure

that Ukraine acts democratically and independently.

With respect to the crisis in Crimea, it is difficult to predict how the situation will unfold.

Putin will take whatever he can get from eastern Ukraine. Western powers will likely only

get involved militarily in the event of a Russian military engagement with Ukrainian troops.

Neither side, however, wants this. Crimea will probably vote in favour of joining Russia, but

this will remain unrecognized by the international community. Crimea may become a de

facto Russian territory, regarded by the international community as disputed, while the rest

of Ukraine will likely deepen its ties with the EU. Ukraine may also join NATO to dissuade

Russian military advancements in the future. However, any NATO membership will likely be

contingent upon the Crimean situation being resolved, since Ukraine’s full membership in

137

Olga Rudenko, “Yatseniuk: Ukraine to sign deal with EU within weeks” Kyiv Post 7 March 2014, online: <http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/yatseniuk-ukraine-to-sign-deal-with-eu-within-weeks-338707.html>. 138

“Van Rompuy: EU to sign political part of Association Agreement with Ukraine by May 25” Kyiv Post 6 March 2014, online: <http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/van-rompuy-eu-to-sign-political-part-of-association-agreement-with-ukraine-by-may-25-338650.html>. 139

“EU Presents Ukraine Package, Freezes ‘Misappropriated Assets’” RFE/RL 5 March 2014, online: <http://www.rferl.org/content/us-russia-to-hold-talks-amid-crimea-tension/25285892.html>.

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the group would require NATO’s military intervention in Crimea. The Russians know that as

long as they hold Crimea, Ukraine will not become a member of NATO.140

Regardless of the outcome of the Crimean crisis, this crisis itself proves that Russian treaty

activism has failed. It failed because Putin misunderstands the West and he misunderstands

the modernization that he desperately seeks for his country. Hannes Adomeit states that the

Russian “government’s major concern at present is ‘modernization’ but it is highly doubtful

that the creation of a Eurasian Union with the preferences of Russia ruling supreme in such a

construct (and ‘integration’ meaning essentially subordination) will in any way expedite the

realization of that interest.”141 Suspiciously, Putin has yet to divulge details regarding the

extent and shape of the political integration he envisions in the Eurasian Union, but I agree

that Russian integration projects have a history of subordinating other states. Putin does not

appear to understand that the world will not stand for his Soviet tactics of intimidation and

subordination. The current crisis in Ukraine serves as an example to him of how determined

certain populations are to free themselves from Russian influence. Pavlovskiy, Putin’s former

political advisor, remarked that he thinks Putin “has run out of his stock of Soviet imagery,

which he had, and which has served him so brilliantly in the past decade. And here comes

another world, more complex, and here he already feels like a black sheep, he does not un-

derstand what it is, what these people want.”142 Putin’s confusion about this ‘complex’

world is reflected in his conception of modernization as essentially money-driven. His initial

$15 billion offer to Ukraine perfectly reflects this. Nur Omarov, the head of the Kyrgyz asso-

ciation of political scientists, properly asserts that, if Russia is to succeed, it ‘‘must become

attractive as a state, as an economic, technological, humanitarian, intellectual partner. It is

not the case now, which compels young [Central Asian] states to look for more interesting,

in all dimensions, friends.”143 Putin has failed Russia by sacrificing whatever decent reputa-

tion it might have had on the world stage for the sake of establishing his own political legacy.

140

“Russian deputy foreign minister believes Ukraine’s NATO membership is impossible” Kyiv Post 6 March 2014, online: <http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/russian-deputy-foreign-minister-believes-ukraines-nato-membership-is-impossible-338555.html>. 141

Adomeit at 9. 142

Egor Zubarev, “Gleb Pavlovskiy: “What Putin is most afraid of is to be left out”” European Association of Independent Journalists 5 December 2012, online: <http://eu-press.org/blog/gleb-pavlovskiy-what-putin-is-most-afraid-of-is-to-be-left-out/#sthash.KeWv9Oqr.dpuf>. 143

Facon at 482.

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But Ukraine cannot simply turn its back on Russia. The real task will be figuring out how

Ukraine, as Henry Kissinger puts it, can “act as a bridge between” Russia and Europe.144

6. CONCLUSION

Russian treaty activism, which once cemented strong international relationships in the post-

Soviet space, has resulted in a legal entanglement, rather than an effective treaty network.

The limited progress made by Moscow in the modernization of Russia and its reintegration

with post-Soviet states focused too much on economics and security, with no unifying moral

element. Moreover, Putin secured Russia’s interests by means of threats and intimidation,

and violations of international law. Russia’s bilateral cooperation treaties essentially resulted

in subordination treaties. Putin ignores that proper international cooperation involving val-

ue-based integration facilitates stable and predictable markets. He fails to see that Russian

modernization can only be achieved by “a value-based approach that calls for democratic

processes and institutions, a law-based state, a free market economy with fair competition

and a civil society.”145 Putin will not institute drastic reforms in Russia order to adhere to EU

values, but if he wants Russia to develop a favourable reputation in the new post-Soviet

world, he needs to purge it of its own post-Soviet identity. This purge would require that

Putin himself step aside to allow a new, democratically elected modernized personality to

spearhead the integration process. There is no political future for Putin in a modernized Rus-

sia, and there is no future for modernizing Russia as long as Putin remains in power. Ulti-

mately, Putin’s own personal political legacy demands his removal.

144

Kissinger. 145

Adomeit at 9.

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