The road to the Israeli‐Moroccan rapprochement

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The road to theIsraeli‐MoroccanrapprochementJacob Abadi aa Teaches at the United States Air ForceAcademy

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The Road to the Israeli-MoroccanRapprochement

JACOB ABADI

Morocco's relations with Israel are noted for their moderation and cordiality. With theexception of former Tunisia's President Habib Bourguiba, who called upon the Arabstates to come to terms with Israel, King Hassan II was the only Arab head of state thatfavoured negotiations with the Jewish State. But unlike any other leader in the region,he agreed to meet Israeli leaders in an attempt to find a solution to the Arab-Israeliconflict. Observers and commentators on Middle Eastern affairs had often argued thatArab countries, which do not share common borders with Israel, tend to be hostile,because they have little to lose by doing so. As a country situated far from the focusof the Arab-Israeli conflict, Morocco was an exception to this rule. What were thereasons for such a conciliatory attitude on Morocco's part and why did Hassan decideto embark on such a dangerous course of action, which exposed him to intensecriticism from the Arab world, are some of the questions, which this essay attempts toanswer. This essay argues that Morocco's conciliatory attitude was a by-product ofboth domestic and external constraints, which were not dealt with in adequate depth inthe preliminary studies written on this topic, and which profoundly altered Morocco'spolicy toward Israel.

Unlike Libya and Algeria, whose politics were dominated by radicalideologies and whose leaders persisted in their reluctance to deal withIsrael, Morocco remained a moderate country, lacking pan-Arab schemesand revolutionary agenda. In some ways, Morocco's foreign policy wassimilar to Tunisia's, a country whose leader earned a reputation as anappeaser in the eyes of his opponents and a peacemaker in the eyes of hisproponents. Morocco's Middle Eastern policy was largely a product of itsbenign experience with colonialism. Despite its domination by foreign rulethe ferocity, which characterised the Algerian war of independence, waslacking in Morocco. Moreover, the anti-Western rhetoric common to manyradical states in the region was far less intense in Morocco. This was largelydue to the country's special relations with the US, which date back to therevolutionary era, when Morocco extended recognition to the youngrepublic. The relationship has remained cordial ever since, and therebyencouraged Morocco to maintain a benign attitude toward Israel. In

Dr Abadi teaches at the United States Air Force Academy.

The Journal of North African Studies, Vol.5, No.l (Spring 2000) pp.27-54PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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28 THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES

addition, the pluralistic nature of the Moroccan society, its desire to attractforeign investments, and last but not least, the existence of a robust andprosperous Jewish community there, were all conducive to cordial relationswith the Jewish State. Although most of Morocco's Jews had left thecountry, their economic value is still highly appreciated by the government.In fact, Hassan had often appealed to the Jews who immigrated to Israel andother countries, to return to their native land. The immigration of the Jewsto Israel may have had an adverse effect on Morocco's economy, however,it was beneficial to the bilateral relations because some of the Jews who leftMorocco continued to act as mediators between the two countries. Given itsnumerous economic and social problems, Morocco found it necessary topromote any political ties which could enhance its political and economicposition.

Hassan's resort to any source of assistance, financial and otherwise, andhis increasing reliance on the country's civil society had so far provedinadequate in solving the social and economic problems of the country'spopulation of over 27 million. There is little wonder therefore, that Israel'stechnical know-how and the prominence of its engineers, provided Moroccowith a powerful incentive to improve the bilateral relations. There wereadditional compelling reasons for better relations. Hassan was nevercomfortable with an Egyptian-dominated Middle East, which left Moroccoat the margins of a nationalistic Arab world. The Israelis were aware of suchfears' and sought to exploit them to their benefit.

Hassan maintained contacts with Israel since his country's independencein 1956 and sought to act as an honest broker in the Arab-Israeli conflict.He saw no harm in establishing relations with the Jewish State, after somany counties had done so in an overt manner. Hassan's contacts with Israelwere never regarded favourably in the Arab states and he became a targetfor criticism from the radicals among them. Consequently, he wascompelled to maintain a pro-Arab official stand, while his contacts withIsrael continued. Morocco's official reaction to Israel's policy toward theArab states and the Palestinians was critical for the most part. Itsrepresentatives in the United Nations had repeatedly condemned Israel'sreluctance to address the Palestinian refugee problem. Moreover, Israel'spunitive measures against the Palestinians in the occupied territories ofGaza and the West Bank and in southern Lebanon were the subject ofintense criticism by Moroccan government officials, who often spoke infavour of the Palestinian cause. Yet, Hassan's contacts with Israeli officialsdid not cease, and when the peace process gained momentum by the end ofthe 1980s, he decided to deal with them overtly. In the long run, Hassan'sdecision to start a meaningful dialogue with Israel was extremely valuableto the peace process, since it encouraged other moderate Arab states to

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ISRAELI-MOROCCAN RAPPROCHEMENT 29

follow suit.2 Although the road to the Israeli-Moroccan rapprochementremained strewn with obstacles, Hassan's extraordinary ability to upgradethe bilateral relations, without serious recriminations from the Arab world,remains one of the most remarkable features of this episode and is dealt within greater detail in the following pages.

The Early Years

Shortly after the establishment of the State of Israel, Prime Minister DavidBen Gurion began cultivating ties with the states in the periphery of theMiddle East. Accordingly, Israel invested great efforts in enhancing itsrelations with countries such as Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia. If successful,such alliances and defence agreements could have provided Israel withgreater security in the region. This defensive mentality increased the valueof all countries, which did not share common boundaries with Israel, bothin the Middle East and North Africa. Ben Gurion had constantly argued thatIsrael's isolation and the traditional hatred, which the Gentiles harbouredagainst Jews, forced the young state to seek as many allies and friends aspossible. In a speech to the Israeli Army's Supreme Command on 27 March1953, he said, 'The Jewish people is the only one in the entire worldwalking in complete solitude on the historical stage from time immemorialto this day'. He assured his audience that Israel 'will not confine its ties toeither certain areas or certain states'.3 In those days Morocco, like the restof the North African colonies, was still under French colonial rule. Officialsin the Israeli Foreign Ministry were aware of the potential benefits ofestablishing normal relations with the North African countries. It wasprecisely for that reason that Israel refrained from supporting a UN proposalto establish a British trusteeship in Libya.4

Morocco's strategic location on the south-western corner of theMediterranean made it an attractive candidate for diplomatic ties withIsrael. Moreover, Morocco loomed large in the eyes of Israeli ForeignMinistry officials, whose concern for the Jewish community led them topressure the Ministry to pay closer attention to the events there.5 As it turnedout, the Jews of Morocco were to become an important vehicle for thebilateral rapprochement. The Jews of Morocco enjoyed a greater degree offreedom and toleration than their brethren in most Arab countries.

In order to understand the Jewish factor in and its impact on the bilateralrelations, one must trace the origins of the Jewish community and theimportant role which Jews played in Moroccan society throughout thecenturies. Historians contend that Jews lived in Morocco when theKingdom of Israel reached its height around 1,000 BC, under KingSolomon. Jews were reported to have been active as missionaries, whose

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aim was to convert the Berbers of North Africa. Occasional influxes ofrefugees from Spain helped increase the size of the Jewish community inMorocco. Some of the newcomers were distinguished for their scholarshipand soon Fez became known for its famous rabbis who taught in itsyeshivas. When the Almohades occupied Morocco in the twelfth century,Morocco's Jews were forced to convert to Islam and a period of persecutionensued. The fall of the Almohades improved the Jewish condition, but therespite did not last long. By the fifteenth century, the Moroccan authoritiesconfined the Jews to mellahs (ghettos). Some Jews were reported to havebeen murdered in 1465, when the sultan suppressed a popular rebellion.Another serious episode of persecution occurred by the end of theeighteenth century, during the reign of Sultan Yazid. Yet despite occasionalepisodes of persecution, the Jewish community continued to expand and bythe beginning of the nineteenth century the number of Jews in the sultan'sbureaucracy began to increase significantly. However, it was not until thebeginning of the French protectorate in 1913, that their conditions began toimprove. By then the Jews no longer had to pay the annual jizya, but theirlegal status remained inferior. The Cremieux Decree, which grantedcitizenship to Algerian Jews, was not applied to Morocco. However, despitethe fact that the Jews had greater security, opportunities for growthremained limited for them. After the fall of France in the Second World War,the Vichy regime put severe restrictions on the Moroccan Jews. The Statuteof 3 October 1940 defined Jews according to racial criteria. In addition,commercial and economic restrictions were placed on the Jews who couldno longer obtain credit from banks and were not allowed to own businessesin the European neighbourhoods of the main towns.6 Nevertheless, no large-scale immigration to Palestine took place until the end of the Second WorldWar, when the representatives of the Jewish community in Palestine arrivedin Morocco to encourage their brethren to immigrate. Yet despite occasionalepisodes of harassment, mass emigration of Jews did not start until 1954,when the French announced their intention to withdraw from Morocco. By1960 the Moroccan Jewish community of nearly 300,000 lost half of itsmembers who immigrated to Israel. Most of the remaining Jews leftMorocco during the 1960s. The wealthy among them immigrated to Franceand Canada, while the poor came to Israel.

Historians and anthropologists still disagree regarding the condition ofthe Jews in Morocco. While Laurence Rosen argued that many Jews werein dyadic relationships with Muslim patrons, which gave them protectionand allowed them to prosper, Norman Stillman argued that the status of theJews as dhimmis (People of the Book) left them in a position of inferiority.Opposing these two views was that of Moshe Shokeid, who argued that theJewish condition did not follow a specific pattern and that Jewish-Muslim

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interaction can be characterised by 'paradoxical accounts of harmony andconflict'.7 The fact that the Jews resided mainly in the big towns and wereengaged in a wide range of commercial activities, which greatly affectedMorocco's international trade, made them so essential for the economy thatthe sultans chose to protect them.8 The aforementioned dyadic relationshipsand the sultan's protection gave the Jews a certain measure of security.According to Shlomo Deshen, the sultan's protection was an importantmanifestation of his power. Moreover, Jews were far from being secludedand their interaction with their Muslim neighbours was frequent andvaluable. What facilitated that interaction was the fact that Jews did notregard Islam as a hostile religion rivalling Judaism and whose contentjustified serious theological debates.9

Despite the limitations on their freedom of actions, Jews hadopportunities to prosper and to gradually reach positions of power. Some ofthem became quite influential already during the reign of King MuhammadV. For example, Dr Leon Benzaquen was appointed minister inMuhammad's first cabinet. Some Jews became active within the Istiqlalparty, which fought for Morocco's independence. They lobbied for theJewish community, encouraged other Jews to participate in the politicalprocess and made efforts to moderate the party's politicians toward Israel.Jewish contribution to Morocco was even more appreciated during Hassan'sreign when Jews had gradually become influential in other parties as well.10

In 1953, Moshe Dayan who later became one of the key figures activein the dialogue with Hassan, visited Morocco on his way from Europe."After visiting the main concentrations of Jews in Morocco, in December1953, an Israeli official warned his superiors in Jerusalem of the danger thatMorocco's Jews might assimilate with the local Muslim population. Hecalled upon them to encourage the immigration of Jews, by establishing aco-ordinating unit under the purview of the Foreign Ministry. Thisenterprise required closer co-operation with the Moroccan nationalists.Israeli officials believed that since the country was about to gainindependence and join the UN, this was an opportune moment to establishfriendly relations with it. And from practical point of view, cordial relationswith Morocco meant less anti-Israeli votes in the UN.12 What enabled thetwo countries to build solid foundations for a robust relationship was thefact that Morocco's relations with the US were cordial from the verybeginning.13

The US maintained military bases in places like Nouasseur, Benguerirand Sidi Slimane. Ties with the US continued to loom large in the eyes ofMoroccan government officials even after the evacuation of the Americanmilitary personnel in 1963. The Moroccans perceived Israel as havingconsiderable influence on US foreign policy. Consequently, the Moroccan

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government regarded the continuation of normal relations with the US ascontingent upon rapprochement with Israel. From Israel's viewpoint, therewas much to gain from cordial relations with Morocco. However, Israelidiplomacy had to be conducted with great caution in those days. Unwillingto alienate France, which they regarded as their country's potential sourceof arms, the Israelis decided to portray a Francophile image in the Franco-Moroccan conflict, and to maintain a low profile in dealing with Morocco.14

When asked by a French diplomat, what would the attitude of hisgovernment likely to be in affairs pertaining to North Africa, at theupcoming UN General Assembly, an Israeli diplomat replied that heassumed that his government would strive to support the French position asclosely as possible, without endangering Israel's position in the Arab worldand Asia, and without alienating all those countries, which supportedIsrael's independence. He added, that he assumed that the Israeli delegationwould be willing to maintain 'unofficial' co-operation with the Frenchdelegation to the UN on this issue.13 In a letter to Israel's ambassador to theUN Abba Eban, Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett said, 'On North Africa faras possible avoid antagonising France, point out Asians implacable hostilityArab world, try seek and support compromise, differentiate Morocco andTunis latter's favour, but not too far."6 Accordingly, the Israeli delegationdid not support a resolution enabling Morocco to assert its independencefrom France. Israel's position triggered an angry response, not only from theMoroccan nationalists, but also from several delegations such as theGuatemalan, which refused to support it on all issues pertaining toPalestine.17

Although Morocco joined the Arab League in 1958, and tended toformulate its foreign policy in line with the Arab states, it managed tomaintain a large extent of independence. Like its North African neighbours,it had always regarded itself superior to the countries of Arab East.Morocco's unique position, far away from the centre of the Arab-Israeliconflict, allowed it to maintain better relations with Israel and although itsmembership in the Arab League led to some restrictions against the Jews,these were gradually relaxed. There were several episodes of persecution ofJews in Morocco, but these remained sporadic and mild. The MoroccanGovernment did not encourage anti-Israeli propaganda, and hostility towardthe Jewish State never loomed large in its foreign policy orientation.18 LikeTunisia, Morocco attempted to show tolerance toward the Jewish State andbegan acting as an honest broker in the Arab-Israeli conflict." However,unlike Bourguiba, Hassan maintained a low profile and thus managed toavoid antagonising the Arab states. He managed to escape the harshcriticism levelled against Bourguiba during the era of Pan Arabism, whenNasser appeared as an omnipotent leader of the Arab world.

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Seeking to avoid a head on collision with the Egyptian leader, Hassanmaintained a low profile and appeared increasingly sympathetic to the Arabcause. In 1959, Morocco hosted an Arab League meeting. Two years later,Nasser paid a visit to Casablanca, where he was accorded a hero's welcomeand paraded through the streets as a conquering hero, running roughshodover his enemies. Nasser's visit had a radicalising effect on Morocco andtriggered a wave of anti-Jewish persecution. During the following years,Hassan had wisely avoided a conflict with the United Arab Republic andcontinued to show sympathy to the Arab cause. Morocco became a memberof the so-called 'Casablanca group of radical Arab states,' which includedthe United Arab Republic, Mali, Guinea and Ghana. It championed thecause of the Palestinian people and refused to extend recognition to theState of Israel. Yet despite these restrictive measures, Hassan continued thedialogue with Israel and the contacts became more frequent after hiscoronation, in March 1961. Morocco's contacts with the Mossadrepresentative in Casablanca, Alexander Gatmon, resulted in greater co-operation, which facilitated the immigration of many Jews to Israel. TheMuslim nationalists and the proponents of Pan Arabism within Hassan'sadministration who became aware of these contacts expressed theirresentment. Striving to allay Arab fears and to ward off criticism from thePalestinians, the Moroccan government insisted that Jews could immigrateto all other countries except for Israel. But when Hassan allowed the Jewsto leave Morocco via Spain, spokesmen for Arab states and the Palestinianswere infuriated.20 Nevertheless, Hassan did not follow the recalcitrantapproach adopted by the radical Arab states. On the contrary, intelligenceco-operation with Israel continued. The Mossad was reported to havetrained the Moroccan secret services, and to have supplied them withinformation regarding the activities of the opposition leaders outside thecountry. In addition, Israel supplied arms and electronic devices to enhancethe ability of the Moroccan navy to suppress subversive activities at sea.

The stormy events in the Middle East and North Africa during the early1960s helped enhance the Israeli-Moroccan rapprochement. The tension inMorocco's relations with Egypt reached a new crescendo during theAlgerian-Moroccan conflict in the autumn of 1963. Morocco's relations withTunisia improved significantly after Nasser asked Bourguiba's permission touse his country's air space, in order to deliver arms and troops to the Algerianarmy and met with refusal. Consequently, Hassan became an ardent supporterof Bourguiba's proposal to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict throughnegotiations with Israel. Commenting on the impact of Bourguiba's initiativeon Israeli-Moroccan relations, an Israeli journalist argued that Bourguiba'sapproach made it easier for Morocco to adopt a similar attitude.21 Theintelligence co-operation between Israel and Morocco began in earnest at that

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time, when Mossad chief Isser Harel agreed to help train Hassan'sbodyguard. Harel's successor, Meir Amit, visited Morocco shortlyafterwards, and the co-operation between the two countries intensified.Coming at a time of intense conflict with Algeria, the Israeli assistance washighly appreciated in Rabat. The Israeli-Moroccan co-operation was knownboth to the French intelligence and to the CIA and they greatly encouraged it.

The bilateral co-operation expanded to the economic field as well. Israelencouraged both Jewish and non-Jewish businessmen to invest in Morocco.Among those who became involved in commercial dealings with Moroccowere the wealthy British businessmen Baron Edmond de Rothchild, and themajor British retailer, Marks and Spencer. Top Israeli officials were alsoinvolved in these efforts. Former deputy defence minister Zevi Dinstein metHassan to discuss methods of improving the citrus export, and former Israelichief-of-staff Mordechai Makleff travelled to Morocco, to share hisexpertise in the phosphates industry. Israel had also sent specialists to trainthe Moroccans in psychological warfare and to develop water resources.22

The favourable statements made by the Moroccan Government in 1964,regarding Bourguiba's initiative had greatly encouraged the Israelis.Officials in Rabat had openly expressed satisfaction over Bourguiba'srealistic approach. Moreover, the Moroccan press gave prominent display tohis declarations and little space to assaults on him. When Bourguiba'sinitiative was discussed by the Arab League on 28 April 1964, Palestinianrepresentative Ahmed Shukairy lobbied for a motion to condemnBourguiba. Morocco's representative opposed the motion on the groundsthat Shukairy was not a full League member.23 At a summit meeting inCasablanca in September 1965, Hassan told the Arab leaders, 'Let's face it.There are no two solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Either we negotiatea political settlement, which is my preference, or we attack. If we rejectnegotiations, let us not lose time.' Recalling his speech several years later,Hassan said that the Arab leaders did not take him seriously.24

When the Arab states discussed plans to divert the waters of the JordanRiver during the mid 1960s, the Moroccan representative argued that thiswas the affair of the eastern countries directly involved in the conflict withIsrael, and that the Maghreb states should not interfere.25 Hassan did notconceal his conviction that the Arab states were acting in a recalcitrantmanner. Yet all along, he was careful to show concern for the Palestinians.In a statement criticising Arab failure to reach a consensus regarding theappropriate action to be taken in the Palestinian issue he said:

Continuous dissent, conflict, and accusation have divided the Arabsand dispersed the efforts that should have been directed toward theliberation of Palestine. The Arab peoples are aware of this, andwonder if we are really serious when we claim that the 'Arab

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atmosphere had cleared'. We run the risk of losing their confidenceand of deceiving them.26

Hassan's championship of the Palestinian cause did not remain confinedto verbal statements. He supported the Arab League's decision todemonstrate greater solidarity toward the Palestinians and agreed to put theMoroccan press at their service. Yet his support for the Palestinians did notprevent him from maintaining and even expanding his country's ties withIsrael.

The bilateral relations underwent a serious test during the mid 1960s.When West Germany announced its decision to recognise the State of Israel,the Arab states held a meeting in which they agreed to recall the Arabambassadors in Bonn; sever diplomatic ties with West Germany, if itdecided to establish diplomatic relations with Israel; consider effectivemeans for an economic boycott of West Germany and reassess the relationsbetween the Arab countries and any country, which decided to recogniseIsrael. When the participants were asked to vote on the resolution, Moroccojoined Libya and Tunisia in expressing reservations about the first twopoints. Morocco did not sever its ties with Bonn, nor did it recall itsambassador.

The Impact of the Six-Day War

The intense sense of patriotism and solidarity in the Arab world, whichpreceded the Six-Day War, caused unusual tension in the bilateral relations.Like most Arab states, Morocco could not ignore Arab demands formaterial and moral assistance. When the war began, Hassan placed three ofhis best army battalions at Egypt's disposal. However, they arrived too lateto the battlefront. What caused concern in Israel was not this tokenexpression of Moroccan solidarity, but the fact that a new wave of anti-Jewish riots erupted in Morocco, causing the flight of most Jews from thecountry. Most of the remaining 80,000 Jews, living at that time in Morocco,immigrated to Israel as a result of the riots.27 Morocco's solidarity with theArabs manifested itself in several ways. Immediately after the war, itsrepresentative in the Security Council asked the UN to extend immediateassistance to the Palestinian refugees. He called Zionism a 'totalitarianphilosophy' and said that peace would not become a reality, unless Israelwithdrew from all occupied territories. Moreover, he warned that Israel'sfailure to withdraw from Arab land would have a serious impact on theprospects of peace in the region.28 Yet at the same time, Morocco hadentered a period of serious tension in its relations with the Arab states.

Unlike Bourguiba, who criticised the Arabs solely on political grounds,Hassan antagonised both Egypt and Syria, saying that Arab defeat was

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caused by their deviation from Islam. And in a manner reminiscent of theTunisian leader, Hassan said that the Arab states were divided bothideologically and politically. He also criticised their excessive reliance onthe Soviet Union.29 But the tension between Morocco and Egypt emanatedprimarily from Hassan's conciliatory attitude toward Israel. Hassancriticised Nasser for provoking Israel instead of attacking. He even advisedPLO Chairman Yasser Arafat to face reality and negotiate with Israel,arguing that terrorist activities will never lead to Israel's destruction. Thesewords angered Palestinians and Egyptians alike. The tension reached acrescendo in 1969, when Nasser received intelligence reports regardingMorocco's Interior Minister General Mohamed Oufkir's collaboration withthe CIA in an attempt to assassinate Nasser.30 As for the Moroccan monarch,he was dismayed at the fact that many Jews had left his country followingthe Six-Day War. He asked Jean Daniel of Le Nouvel Observateur to quotehim as saying that if the Moroccan Jews residing Israel wish to return, 'theyare welcome here'.31

The Goldman-Hassan Dialogue

In the summer of 1970, reports began to circulate in the Moroccan mediaregarding a secret meeting between Hassan and Nahum Goldman, thePresident of the World Zionist Congress. On 23 June 1970, Goldman wasreceived by prime minister Ahmad al-Iraqi and met Hassan the followingday. According to the Egyptian semi-official daily Al Ahram, the Moroccannewspapers wondered why the Moroccan monarch, who was known to havebeen an ardent supporter of the Palestinian cause, agreed to welcome theZionist leader, whose views were in complete contrast to those of his host.32

In Jerusalem, Eban stated that the meeting came as a total surprise to himand that it was not authorised by the Israeli Government. Likewise, Israel'sprime minister Golda Meir was reported to have been annoyed byGoldman's meeting. Harel opposed Goldman's initiative as well.

Responding to his critics, Goldman confirmed that the meeting came athis own initiative and insisted that he was accountable to the Jewish peopleand not to Golda Meir. What prevented the crisis from causing greaterdamage was the interference of the Israeli interior ministry, whosespokesman argued that Goldman's visit did not did constitute a violation ofthe Israeli law. The spokesman argued that Morocco was not officially atwar with Israel and that individuals holding Israeli passports were notrequired to ask for special permission to visit that country. Hassan wasapproached by the Yugoslav embassy, whose officials suggested holding ameeting with Goldman. Prior to the meeting, Hassan consulted both Arabsand Palestinians diplomats, who advised him not to meet Goldman before

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obtaining a written confirmation from Nasser. According to the Londonbased New Middle East, Nasser gave his blessing to the meeting. By doingso he was responding to pressure by the Soviet government, which at thattime was contemplating mending fences with Israel. Moscow approvedGoldman's meeting with Hassan, as a prelude to another meeting withNasser.33 Undoubtedly, Hassan was aware of the potential risk, which sucha meeting entailed. Daniel who was involved in this episode, wrote severaldays later an article, in which he explained the motivating factors behindHassan's decision. According to Daniel, the meeting came at the initiativeof a group of young and progressive Moroccan officials, who believed thatthe tension between Israel and the Arab states could ease only by fightinganti-Semitism and anti-Jewish prejudice. They argued that Morocco shouldstrive to remove all restrictions against Jews, regardless of their country oforigin. From their viewpoint, inviting Goldman was a way to demonstrateArab open-mindedness. Hassan was aware of the high regard in whichGoldman was viewed in the West, as well as in Arab countries, and theextraordinary influence which he had over the powerful American Jewishcommunity was highly appreciated in Rabat.34

The Bilateral Relations During the Sadat Epoch

The events that led to the Yom Kippur War of October 1973 brought greaterco-operation between Morocco and the Arab states. In preparation for the'year of decision', Sadat appealed to the Arab states to assist Egypt, andshortly prior to the outbreak of hostilities, he solicited support from all,including Morocco. In a speech to a mass rally on the occasion of 1 May,Sadat praised Morocco saying that despite its distance from the centre ofArab-Israeli conflict, it did not stint from joining the Arabs in their effortsto confront Israel.35 And when the illustrious General Saad el Shazlyappealed to Hassan to send Moroccan forces, the latter replied, 'TheMoroccan armed forces are at your disposal... Every person in this countrywill rejoice to see our forces fight for the Arab cause'. Hassan invitedShazly to inspect his troops and reassured his guest saying, 'Brother Shazly... I am delighted that we Arabs are at last going to challenge the enemy,break out of our present humiliation ... We have, as you say sent our tankbrigade to Syria. But to your Egyptian front we will send any one of ourinfantry brigades.'36 In March 1973, Hassan sent a brigade to Syria's borderwith Israel. He even promised to send forces to the Egyptian front, but theMoroccan force arrived too late at the Egyptian front.

Morocco's solidarity with the Arab world appeared unwavering after theYom Kippur War. Impressed by Morocco's show of solidarity, Sadat praisedHassan for his support and for keeping in touch with him during the crisis.37

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When President Richard Nixon visited the Middle East, Morocco joined allArab countries in demanding that Israel withdraw immediately to theborders of 4 June 1967. Moreover, Morocco's foreign minister, Ahmed BenHima, applied considerable pressure on Secretary-of-State Henry Kissingerto force Israel to comply with Arab demands.38

The political and ideological changes, which swept the Arab world atthat time, were so profound that even the Moroccan regime could notremain indifferent. Nevertheless, Morocco had a considerable degree ofsuccess, not only in demonstrating solidarity with the Arab world, but alsoin stemming the fundamentalist tide, which engulfed the region.Consequently, Hassan was in a position to maintain reasonably goodrelations with Israel. It was largely his stature as 'Commander of theFaithful,' which placed him in a convenient position to combatfundamentalism.

Hassan's ability to upgrade his ties with Israel cannot be properlyunderstood without examining the methods by which he managed to controlthe Moroccan fundamentalists. Attempting to assess the extent of the Arabgovernments' control over the fundamentalist movements in their countries,scholars found it useful to rely on models. Sami Nair identified three suchmodels; the Jordanian, the Egyptian and the Moroccan. While in theJordanian model the parliamentary character of the regime keeps thefundamentalists as a minority within both legislatures, the Egyptian modelallows only the moderate fringes to participate in the political process,without providing them access to positions of power. Thus the Egyptiansystem manages to leave the most extreme fundamentalists out. However,its major drawback is that it creates a permanent crisis and a vicious cycle,involving terrorism and repression, as happened during the Nasser era. Inthe Moroccan model, the monarch has the greatest freedom of action byvirtue of his position as 'Commander of the Faithful'. According to Nair,the existence of 'state fundamentalism' in Morocco satisfies the essentialfundamentalist needs of the country, leaving the monarch as the only judgecapable of applying the religious law in the political domain. Consequently,the fundamentalists lose their raison d'etre as defenders of the religiousorder against the secular regime. But even the Moroccan model is fraughtwith danger, in that it leads to conflicts, which tend to intensify at the endof the king's reign.39 What kept the fundamentalists at bay was also the factthat Morocco was so far away from what Arabs regard as the heart ofIslam.40 Morocco's foreign minister, Abdellatif Filali, had once boasted,with good reason, that the fundamentalists were no more than 'fringegroups' in his country.41 As long as King Hassan remained in power, thefundamentalists were likely to remain in the margin, but there is no tellingwhat the future might bring.

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The end of the Yom Kippur War ushered in an era of intense diplomaticactivity on the part of the US.42 However, the cease-fire agreements reachedas a result of mediation by the US were merely temporary adjustments anddid not address the problems at the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Whilemost Arab countries persisted in their refusal to negotiate with Israel,Hassan maintained a moderate posture. When the Arab states decided to usethe oil embargo as a means of forcing the Western countries to reduce theirsupport to Israel, they began compiling lists of companies, on which theyplanned to impose the Arab boycott's regulations. Concerned that suchmeasures might discourage businessmen and companies from Westerncountries, most of which traded with Israel, the Moroccan government didnot follow the Arab states' example. It applied some boycott measures, butrarely enforced them.43 Unlike Bourguiba, who attempted to convince theArabs to change their tactics and to base the solution to the Arab-Israeliconflict on the 1947 UN Partition Plan, Hassan maintained a low profile andpreferred quiet diplomacy.

By mid 1970, the bilateral contacts intensified. Secret meetings betweenthe countries were arranged by Moroccan Jews, both in Israel and outside.And what helped enhance the bilateral relations was Israel's willingness tohelp Hassan in areas which he needed most. Israel offered Hassan aid infighting the Algerian-supported Polisario in Western Sahara. Grateful forIsrael's assistance, Hassan invited the Moroccan Jews, both in Israel andabroad to return to his country. To enforce his appeal, he called upon themto visit the graves of their venerable rabbis. The result was anunprecedented influx of Jews to Morocco.

In the summer of 1975, Defence Minister Moshe Dayan paid his firstofficial visit to Morocco. And in October 1976, prime minister YitzhakRabin travelled to Morocco secretly, in an attempt to establish contact withSadat. Accompanied by Mossad personnel, he was disguised in a wig anddark glasses. Hassan's phone calls to both Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peresof the moderate Labour alignment became more frequent following the visitand soon the two countries began raising the possibility of mutual economicco-operation. After hearing about Sadat's decision to start a dialogue withIsrael, Hassan supported the decision, saying that his people had 'given ourblessing' to his peace initiative.44 All along, Hassan remained cautious butpragmatic. His pragmatism becomes all the more obvious when oneconsiders the fact that like Bourguiba, he understood that Israel's existencecould no longer be doubted. In an interview with a journalist he said:

I believe that our point of departure should be the following. Contraryto what the Arabs believed in 1948, we are today facing a situationwhich cannot be denied, namely, that it is impossible to drive Israelinto the sea. Therefore, a new historical formula should be

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established. An attempt at coexistence must also be made because thepresent state of affairs poses a continuing threat to world peace.45

Sadat's peace initiative in 1977 triggered heavy criticism from the all theArab world. The Maghreb states were divided over that issue. Hassanhimself became involved in the contacts, which lead to peace betweenEgypt and Israel. He set up the crucial meeting between Dayan and Egypt'sdeputy prime minister Hassan Tuhami.46 Both Israel and Morocco deemedit essential to maintain utmost secrecy.47 Realising that by doing so he wastaking a great risk, Hassan expressed his concern to Dayan in their meetingin September 1977.48 Hassan's mediation efforts triggered an avalanche ofcriticism both in Morocco and outside. Articles in a Moroccan newspaperarticle lashed out at Hassan's conciliatory attitude toward Israel. Thefollowing sample of such criticism is lengthy, but pertinent to quote:

The relations between the reactionary regime in Morocco andZionism have been getting closer under the auspices of the head ofstate ... Many news agencies have publicised King Hassan's repeateddeclarations regarding the 'wonderful genius of the Zionists', and hisArab-style receptions for the 'geniuses of Israeli polities'. Europeanand western circles have been startled at the presence of an Arab anda Muslim of the Moroccan ambassador to Paris, Yussuf ben Abbas, atthe International Jewish Conference ... And these matters were notcondemned either by Arab national circles who are stronglycommitted to nationalism or by progressive Arab states andorganisations ... The reactionary regime in Morocco has found theroad paved before it, and the general atmosphere ready for its act oftreason in total disregard for the goals of the Arab nations ... Thisreactionary regime has opened the gates of Morocco to Zionism andits leaders ... For after he accorded an audience to [Nahum] Goldmanand Professor Chouraqi the gate was open to the Zionist journalistMoshe Can'an, who later boasted about his visit to Morocco, thereception accorded him by a government minister and the fact that heoccupied the same seat as Yasir Arafat ... Shortly after the advent ofthe Likud to power in Israel, a top leader of the Zionist Histadrut wasreceived in Morocco and established contact with the Jews still livingthere ... These revelations are only the tip of the iceberg ... Thereactionary regime in Morocco, which is aware of the depth ofnational sentiment among Moroccans, continues to commit these actsof treason and to concoct plots while stating that many of theserelations with the Zionist enemy will remain underground ... As theassassination of Ben Barqa confirms, links have always existedbetween imperialist intelligence and Zionism ... In both the 1967 and

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1973 wars, the American military bases in Morocco played a role inguiding the Israelis, with the approval of the Moroccan authorities ...In the course of the recent trial of the volunteers, part of whom hadfought the Palestinian revolution, the Moroccan people could sensethe convergence of interests between the reactionary Moroccanregime and Zionism ... The expedition of the Moroccan army to bailout the Mobutu government, which is one of Israel's staunchest alliesin Africa, and the encouragement and aid extended to the Phalangists,who are the enemies of the Lebanese and the Palestinian people andthe agents of imperialist and Zionist designs in Lebanon, all point tothe common interests of Morocco and Israel ... How is it possiblethen, that Hassan should call upon the Moroccan Jews who live inIsrael to return to their country, knowing that this would weaken anddamage Zionism? It was all an act of camouflage designed to blur hisalliance with Israel, to strengthen the links with her and turn Moroccointo a nest of Zionist activity ... The Arab nation still recalls Hassan'scall to establish an alliance between Israel and the Arabs, where theArabs would pitch in their economic resources and Israel its creativegenius in order to turn this area into a vast international power ... AllArab national forces should condemn these relations.49

Hassan's contacts with Israel were risky for both external and domesticreasons. Most opposition parties in Morocco, particularly those of the leftwing, were enemies of Zionism and enthusiastic supporters of thePalestinians. Their platforms specifically called for a struggle againstcolonialism, imperialism and Zionism.50 Such pressures compelled Hassanto slow down his mediation efforts and to appear critical toward Israel.

By the end of 1977, Hassan planned to invite Begin and his wife toRabat, on the condition that Begin would express readiness to resolve thePalestinian issue. Begin refused and the visit did not materialise.Consequently, Hassan intensified his verbal campaign against the right wingin Israel. He criticised Begin's decision to embark on Operation Litani insouthern Lebanon in March 1978. Notwithstanding his criticism, Hassandid not allow his relationship with Israel to deteriorate and directed hisefforts to promote Morocco's contacts with the Labour alignment. He wasparticularly interested in capitalising on Israeli influence in Washington, inorder to obtain US support for his armed conflict in Western Sahara.However, he found it wise to criticise the Egyptian peace initiative, whichled to the Camp David agreements. Accordingly, Morocco's foreignminister and the leader of the al-Dustour party Mohammad Boucetta, wasinstructed to express his government's disapproval of the Camp Davidagreements. He told Boutros Boutros-Ghali that Egypt had sacrificedPalestinian rights, because the agreements did not guarantee their right to

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self-determination and statehood and they mentioned the PLO as the solelegitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Moreover, he argued thatthe agreements did mention Arab right to the holy city of Jerusalem. Heconcluded by telling him, 'you are making a separate peace'. Morocco'sreaction to the Camp David accords was quite disappointing to Sadat, whobelieved that Hassan would be the first Arab leader to support hisagreements with Israel."

Not only did Hassan not approve of the Camp David accords, but he alsotook steps to convince Sadat to revoke them. Morocco's ambassador cameto Cairo with a message stating that Hassan would restore diplomaticrelations with Egypt, if Sadat would sever his ties with Israel and renouncethe Camp David accords. According to Sadat, 'The envoy returned to Rabatwith the message that his mission had been rejected and Sadat had refusedto see him.'52 Yet despite his criticism of the agreement, Hassan did not goas far as calling upon the Arabs to boycott Egypt. Moreover, he opposedSyria's demand to reject the agreement and objected to Iraq's proposal thatEgypt should be suspended from the non-aligned movement.53

At the Islamic Congress, which convened in Morocco in May 1979,Hassan called upon the participants to organise a peaceful march towardJerusalem. He assured them that the Israelis would not open fire on themarchers.54 At the same time, he agreed to meet with Peres of the Labouropposition.55 This meeting led to a serious crisis in Israel's domestic politics.Begin promised Peres not to tell anyone about his meeting with Hassan, butfailed to keep his promise. Infuriated at Peres' contact with the Moroccanmonarch, Begin told his party members, 'while I'm in charge, he won't seeso much as the earlobe of Morocco-Shmorocco again. Just as I didn't lethim see Hussein'.56 Begin's conduct during the contacts with Morocco wasneither predictable nor consistent. Defence Minister Ezer Weizman of theLikud party, who later left Begin's government was angered by the latter'sconduct in this affair. He complained that he was not informed aboutDayan's first trip to Morocco on 4 September 1977, and that Begin did notfind it necessary to share with him this information. He writes, 'I wassurprised to hear that Dayan was in Rabat and met with Egypt's deputyprime minister, Hassan Tuhami'.57

According to Peres, the solution to the crisis in the Middle East requiredwhat he called a 'double barrel policy'. On the one hand, he said, there wasa need for a regional defence organisation, which would include Egypt,Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Sudan and possibly the states of North Africa. Peresargued that with the active support of the US, this could constitute aformidable defence organisation. He believed that at the same time, asolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict should be found. As Peres saw it,Morocco could play an important role in both processes.58

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Despite his demonstration of solidarity with the Arab cause during theCamp David episode, Hassan continued his secret meetings with the Israelisand the contacts became gradually more overt. Hassan's determination toimprove relations with Israel increased as a result of the deepening conflictin the Western Sahara. It is possible that his struggle against the PolisarioFront's guerrillas led him to seek the good will and support of the Jewishcommunity. Consequently, his pro-Jewish remarks became more frequent.He called for a fusion of 'Jewish and Arab might', and urged Egypt andSaudi Arabia to seek rapprochement with Israel.59 All along, the US wasinstrumental in trying to convince Hassan to remain in the Camp DavidGroup and was quite successful in doing so. Arafat had once argued in ameeting with Soviet leaders that the US had encouraged the Egyptianregime to supply arms and possibly forces to Hassan, in order to bring himback to the fold of the Camp David Group by 'exploiting the defeats hesuffered in Sahara against the Algerian-supported Polisario'.60

Hassan's desire to improve his relations with the US had a salutary effecton his relations with Israel. By the late 1970s and the early 1980s, US-Moroccan relations had gravely deteriorated, when officials in Washingtoncalled for a reassessment of policy toward Morocco. The main reason forthat was Hassan's conciliatory attitude toward the new regime in Iran, andhis friendly overtures toward Libya's President Mu'amar Qadhafi. Comingat a time when US-Libyan relations were highly strained, Hassan'scourtship of Qadhafi was denounced in Washington. Moreover, Americanofficials were not pleased to see Hassan using US-supplied arms in theSaharan war. Hassan was sensitive to the frequent demands made byofficials in Washington, to slash foreign aid to Middle Eastern countries.Seeking to prevent a reduction in US foreign aid to Morocco, he decided toimprove his image in Washington's eyes by playing an active role in theMiddle East peace process, and improving relations with Israel.61

In May 1984, Morocco hosted a conference of Moroccan Jews in whichprominent Israelis participated. This event put Morocco at the focus ofintense Arab criticism. Syria reacted by withdrawing its ambassador fromMorocco. It cancelled its membership in the Islamic ConferenceOrganisation's Jerusalem Committee chaired by Hassan. This did not deterHassan from promoting the peace process. However, he found it wise to sidewith the Arabs on the issue of Jerusalem. He made it clear to Rabin thatJerusalem cannot remain under Israeli control, and that any settlement ofthis issue must take into account the aspirations of all three monotheisticreligions. When Yitzhak Shamir succeeded Begin as the Likud's primeminister and expressed his willingness to negotiate, Hassan suspected thathis declarations were part of a political manoeuvre aimed at gainingpopularity for him and his Likud coalition among the Moroccan Jews of

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Israel. Hassan said that he would be willing to meet the Israeli primeminister, but only if he agreed to discuss the Palestinian issue. He told oneof his aides to inform Shamir that 'neither of us has time for tourism'.62 Allalong, Hassan remained convinced that Shamir was not serious aboutresolving the Palestinian issue and became keen on supporting the return ofthe Labour coalition to power.

Aware of Hassan's interest in the Labour party's return to power, Perescontinued the contacts through Rafi Edri, a former member of the Israelicabinet and deputy Knesset speaker and was thereby capable of bypassingthe Mossad. By 1986, Peres was at the end of his term as prime minister.According to the agreement reached between the Likud and Labour partiesafter the 1984 elections, Peres was to be replaced by Shamir as the newprime minister. Believing that an agreement on the Palestinian issue wouldbe more likely to be reached under a Labour prime minister, Hassan soughtto accelerate the peace process before the end of Peres' incumbency.Therefore, he rushed to invite him to Ifrane, in July 1986. The meeting atIfrane triggered a heavy criticism from the Arab world, and from Syria inparticular. Forced to demonstrate greater solidarity to the Arab cause,Hassan declared that his peace plan did not deviate from the Fahd Plan andthe Arab consensus regarding the solution to the Palestinian issue. Hassan'ssensitivity to this issue stemmed partially from his fear of offending theMuslim fundamentalists in Algeria.

In the spring of 1986, Hassan suggested that the Arabs gather in asummit meeting and authorise one head of state to begin initial discussionswith high-ranking Israeli authorities. The appointee was to present Israelwith the 1982 Fez peace plan. This, said Hassan would compel the Israelisto start a serious dialogue.63 An additional meeting between Hassan andPeres took place on July 1986. Both leaders announced their acceptance ofthe Fez Plan as the basis for peace negotiations in the Middle East.64 On 28July 1986, Peres told the Knesset that during the meeting at Ifrane, theMoroccan monarch called upon the Arab states to end their boycott onnegotiations with Israel.65 Now that Peres was Israel's prime minister, he nolonger needed Begin's approval for his peace initiatives.

Hassan's proposal triggered criticism from many quarters. Not only washe bold enough to persist in his mediating efforts, he also confronted hiscritics verbally. In one of his tirades against the sceptics and opponents ofhis plan, he said that the states of the Arab East (Mashrek) were defeatistsand had no right to teach his country lessons in patriotism.66 Egypt aloneaccepted his peace proposal. Saudi Arabia and Jordan preferred to delay anyaction, while Syria broke off diplomatic relations with Morocco. Iraq'sreaction was harsh as well. Hassan was heavily criticised by the Iraqi press,and his behaviour was condemned as inappropriate and strange.67

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Meanwhile, The Israelis continued to foster cordial relations withMorocco. Officials in the foreign ministry and in the intelligence communitycalled upon the government to take full advantage of Hassan's difficulties inthe Western Sahara in order to cement the bilateral relations. Although thereis no hard evidence that Israel sent military assistance to Morocco, in orderto help it gain the upper hand in its struggle against Algeria for supremacyover Moroccan Sahara, there is a good reason to assume that this was thecase.68 In addition, Israel expanded its intelligence co operation withMorocco. Former director of the Moroccan intelligence, General AhmedDlimi was reported to have visited Israel several times during the 1970s.According to foreign media reports, three Israeli army officers hadparticipated as observers in the joint manoeuvres conducted by the UN andMorocco in the Sahara, in November 1986. The Polisario Front's 'foreignminister', Ali Baiba, claimed that between June 1986 and June 1987, Israeliarmy officers had visited the battle zones in Western Sahara three times. Hetold reporters that Israel suggested building a security fence to prevent theinfiltration of Polisario guerrilla warriors into Moroccan territory.69

Toward a Meaningful Rapprochement

When Peres announced his departure to Ifrane,™ his initiative was criticisedby both right and left wings in Israel. Following Peres' announcement in theKnesset that he informed Hassan about Israel's willingness to embark on ameaningful dialogue with the Palestinians, Shamir sought to dissociatehimself from this initiative, arguing that Peres did not have a mandate fromthe government to make any substantive agreement with Hassan.Commenting on Shamir's attitude, Arye Naor, a former member of theHerat right-wing party, who became disillusioned with the policy of theLikud and Shamir's tactics writes, 'Today the Likud interprets Peres'announcement to the Knesset and the parliamentary approval which itobtained, as a stratagem on the part of the Labour Alignment and not as aproper policy making procedure'." Herzog wrote in a similar vein saying,'This was most unfair, but rather typical of Shamir. He had known about thistrip well in advance and had said nothing. His statement was an attempt tomaintain a "hands-off relationship with Peres'. Spokesmen for the leftwing were no less critical of Peres. They argued that Peres was ignoring themore pressing Palestinian issue. Although Peres rejected Hassan'ssuggestions that the negotiations be based on the Fez Plan, the talkscontinued, causing Syria to react by breaking off diplomatic relations withMorocco. On his return from the trip, Peres told Herzog that there weredifficulties in working with the Arab states and that Hassan asked him howlong Israel could continue ruling over two million Arabs. Hassan wanted to

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know how Israel could continue the state of belligerence without movingtoward a compromise.72

Aware of the complications which diplomatic relations with Israelentailed, Hassan did not rush to open a dialogue with Israel. He continuedto show concern for the Arab cause. Accordingly, Israel's operations inLebanon triggered a critical response from Rabat. A foreign ministryspokesman in Rabat called upon Israel to withdraw its troops from southLebanon.73 But the bilateral contacts did not cease even when the Israelis didnot comply. Both Rabin and Peres visited Morocco after their return fromWashington on 14 September 1993. The visit was arranged with greatsecrecy and co-ordinated by the Edri. This initiative was fully supported bythe US Government and President Bill Clinton praised the Moroccanmonarch for his courage.74 But unlike previous times, this visit receivedwide coverage in the media. And what was more remarkable was that thereaction from the Arab world was mild. Reacting to the autonomyagreement with the Palestinians, the Moroccan Foreign Minister said thatthe accord is a good start, but that it had to be followed by additional stepsleading to the liberation of all Arab lands occupied by Israel. Meanwhile,however, discussions regarding the opening of 'mutual bureaux of interests'in Rabat and Tel Aviv were already underway.

In early June 1994, Peres approached Hassan with a proposal toestablish diplomatic relations with Israel. Hassan said that he was willing toco-operate with Israel in many fields, but insisted that the time was not ripefor formal relations. He explained that diplomatic relations with Israel couldjeopardise his unique status in the Arab League. He agreed to meet Edri andto act on behalf of the Israeli government in the effort to find thewhereabouts of an Israeli soldier missing in action in a battle withPalestinian extremists.75 On 1 September 1994, the Moroccan governmentannounced that the opening of a Moroccan liaison office in Tel Aviv wasimminent. The Israelis hoped that this would open the door to fulldiplomatic relations. Rabin said, 'I would very much like diplomaticrelations, but one must acknowledge that sometimes patience pays andbetter results are achieved by taking things step by step'. Commenting onthe same issue Peres said, 'It's the first step, an opening of a door, and Iimagine there will be continuation'.76 According to the agreement, bothmissions were to be staffed by diplomats and deal with all aspects ofeconomic, trade, tourism, cultural and diplomatic activities. Even withoutthis diplomatic breakthrough, the bilateral trade was estimated at $100million in 1993.77 Peres stated that, 'Thanks to King Hassan, Morocco isalready enjoying agricultural co-operation through research anddevelopment institutes in the United States and Israel'.78

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Indeed, Morocco had good reasons to be satisfied with the relationship.The benefits were obvious to Hassan and his advisors. Israel had embarkedon ambitious development projects in Morocco. Israeli engineers set up amodel farm in Morocco and Israeli companies had invested in flower andvegetable industries. More than 400 Moroccan enterprises obtained Israeliequipment. Research institutes in Ben Gurion and San Diego University hadjointly invested $500,000 in an experimental farm near El Jadida.79

An important factor contributing to better understanding between thetwo countries was the mediative role which the Jewish members of theIstiqlal continued to play in the bilateral relations. The Moroccan JewishCongress, which was established following the dissolution of the AllMoroccan Jewish Council in 1962, continued to play an important role inencouraging the Moroccan regime to negotiate with Israeli officials.80 Alsoactive were the members of the Moroccan-Jewish Association in Canada,whose members were instrumental in facilitating meetings betweenMoroccan and Israel officials. And the fact that the remaining Jews ofMorocco continued to enjoy complete freedom and normal relations withthe country's Arabs contributed to the rapprochement process.81

In order to ease the economic and diplomatic contacts, Israel decided toopen a similar diplomatic office in Rabat. This was the first formal step inthe bilateral relations. Hassan's desire to portray an image of an honestbroker led him to open a liaison office in Gaza as well.82 Media reportsargued that Hassan's move was a result of his desire to play a role indetermining the future of the Muslim holy places in Jerusalem. His claimthat he was a descendent of the Prophet Muhammad provided legitimacy tohis position as the head of Islamic Conference Organisation's Committee onJerusalem.83 However, despite all these steps, Hassan refused to moveforward toward full diplomatic relations with Israel. Seeking to ward offcriticism from the Arab world, Hassan declared in January 1994, that he willnot rush to open an Israeli embassy in his country because 'this matter is notonly in Morocco's hands. The Arab League was the one to decide to severthe relations. Therefore, it is its duty to allow each country to normalisethese relations ... I think that if there is progress in the dialogue betweenSyria and Israel and between Israel and the PLO, this would bring thenormalisation moment closer ... How many years went by withoutrelations? It is possible to wait a year, or a few months, because politics islike agriculture. Everything has to be done in the appropriate moment.'84

Another important step taken by Morocco to accelerate the dialoguebetween the Arabs and Israel was Hassan's hosting of an economicconference in October 1994. At the opening speech, he declared, 'Peace isin our hand ... Our conference is precisely aimed at consolidating it andgiving it the means to make it more durable'. Hassan's declaration created

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much euphoria in Israel. Rabin was quick to attribute this success to hisLabour party's foreign policy agenda saying, 'These events are the result ofthe government's change of policy toward the peace process'. And Peresdeclared, 'King Hassan and I regard this conference as a beginning of a newchapter in the history of the Middle East - shifting matters from the militaryside to the economic'.85

Hassan anticipated criticism from Arab radical states as well asindividuals.86 Syria was highly critical toward the accelerated pace of thepeace process. An editorial in the leading government organ, Tishrin statedthat some governments have opened 'their arms to official Israelidelegations, ignoring the suffering of millions of Arabs languishing underZionist occupation and brutal Israeli aggressions in south Lebanon'.87 TheLibyan daily Jamahiriyah criticised what it called the 'scramble' torecognise Israel and lamented the fact that the Arab Boycott against Israel,hitherto an effective means to pressure Israel, could no longer be used.88

Such comments did not prevent Hassan from continuing to portray theimage of a dispassionate broker in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Aware of thecentrality of the Palestinian issue, the Moroccan monarch had consistentlystressed that no peace could be achieved without addressing the problem. Inhis speech concluding the conference he said, 'The Palestinian issue was thecore of the Arab-Israeli conflict. An attempt to cast the Palestinian nationaside is tantamount to allowing the fire to keep on burning under thesurface'.89 Both political and religious groups in Morocco expressed theiropposition to Hassan's decision to establish ties with Israel. The most vocalamong these were the Moroccan clerics, who argued that relations withIsrael constituted a violation of Islamic law. Marxists and left-wing groupsreacted in a similar manner.90

Hassan's desire to play a greater role in the negotiations regarding thefuture of Jerusalem may have influenced his decision to normalise relationswith Israel. As a chairman of the Arab League's committee on Jerusalem,he became concerned about Israel's announcement in July 1994, that itrecognised the role of Jordan's King Hussein as the guardian of the Muslimholy places.91 This was also the reason why Hassan felt the need to criticisethe US decision to transfer its embassy to Jerusalem, saying that anysolution to this issue must take into account the interests of the threemonotheistic religions.92

In an interview with Le Monde, Hassan said that given a 'green light'from the Arab League, most countries would eliminate the Arab boycott. Healso called upon Israel to overcome its fear and sign the Non ProliferationTreaty.93 A short period of tension in the bilateral relations ensued in May1995, when Israel confiscated Arab land in Jerusalem, but the crisis came toan end as soon as the Israeli government reversed that decision. In January

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1996, Foreign Minister Ehud Barak met Hassan and raised the possibility ofestablishing diplomatic relations between the two countries. Again, Hassansaid that the time was not ripe for such relations. All along, Hassan did notwelcome visits from the politicians of the Likud Party and when Netanyahuexpressed his desire to stop in Rabat on 13 February, Hassan turned downthe offer. Nevertheless, the rapprochement process continued to moveforward. Hassan's efforts to improve relations with the Moroccan-born Jewswho left the country and the fact that the remaining Jews in his country nolonger complained about ill treatment was greatly appreciated in Israel.Indeed, the Jews of Morocco were highly appreciative of Hassan's efforts.When asked to comment about the condition of the Jews in Morocco,Armand Guigui, one of the leading figures of the small remaining Jewishcommunity in Fez told the author, 'King Hassan does not only tolerate theremaining Jews, but would also like those who left to return'.94

Jews played an important role in enhancing peace process andcementing the bilateral relations. According to Uri Savir, the Israeli officialwho was heavily involved in the peace process, Andre Azulay, a prominentJew and Hassan's most trusted advisor played an essential part in thenegotiations.95 Also important were Serge Berdugo and Robert Assaraf, bothof whom were influential in the Jewish community and had connectionswith the Moroccan royal family and big business in that country. By the endof the 1990s, the normalisation process seemed irreversible despite the slowdown of the Middle East peace process.96

Conclusion

A unique combination of factors enabled Morocco to move forward towardrapprochement with Israel. Morocco's geographical distance from theMiddle East and its openness to French culture placed it in a unique positionto act as a mediator and an arbiter in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The existenceof a pro-Western monarchy, which exercised power uninterruptedly sinceindependence, increased Morocco's ability to maintain such a position.Moreover, Hassan was remarkably successful in suppressing the Islamicfundamentalists, who otherwise might have steered his foreign policy in ananti-Israeli direction. Undoubtedly, Hassan has proven to be a master oftightrope walking. All along, he had demonstrated an uncanny ability tomediate, without seriously antagonising either side of the Arab-Israeliconflict. While imploring the Arabs to moderate their stand toward Israel,he continued to insist on the rights of the Palestinians to return to theirhomeland. It was clear that what led Hassan to upgrade his relations withIsrael was the dialogue with the Palestinians. His decision to establish closerties with Israel was not made before the Israeli-Palestinian accord was

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concluded. On 20 October 1994, the Israeli diplomat, Gad Yaacobi,delivered a speech at a UN conference on trade and development, in whichhe made a clear connection between the Israel-Palestinians relations on theone hand and Israel-Moroccan relations on the other. He wrote, 'I believethat the mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestinians pave the wayfor the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan ... Similarly, without theinitial agreement with Jordan in July, there would be no agreement withMorocco'.97 Undoubtedly, Hassan was largely motivated by pragmaticconsiderations when he decided to mediate between Israel and the Arabstates, but he also regarded himself as an honest broker and one can hardlydoubt the sincerity of his repeated arguments that he was motivated by agenuine interest in peace. It remains to be seen if his successor, KingMohammed VI, will follow the same policy.

As to the future of the bilateral relations, it is safe to assume that theprocess of rapprochement is likely to continue despite the unexpectedupheavals of the Middle East peace process. Morocco's need to prolong itsspecial relationship with the US will undoubtedly prevent a seriousdeterioration in these ties and unless the Middle East peace process shouldcome to a screeching halt, there is little reason to be concerned about thefuture of the bilateral relations. The defeat of the Likud party in 1999 andPrime Minister Ehud Barak's resolve to move the peace process forwardcould have had a salutary effect on the future of the bilateral relations. It issafe to assume that King Hassan would have decided to establish fulldiplomatic relations with Israel if Barak's declaration regarding his newgovernment's determination to revive the Israeli-Syrian dialogue hadresulted in the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Golan Heights. And ifthe talks with the Palestinians ever regain momentum, the final obstacle onthe way to normalisation is likely to be removed as far as King Hassan's sonand successor is concerned.

NOTES

1. In a letter to Foreign Minister Golda Meir, an Israeli official had written from Moscow,'From Ghana to Tunis to Ethiopia there is fear of Egyptian expansion.' A. Harel to G.Meir (Moscow, 23 March 1960), No. 283, in Yehoshua Freundlich and YemimaRosenthal (eds.), Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel (Jerusalem: Israel StateArchives 1992) 14 (1960) p.451.

2. Al-Siyassah (Kuwait) 27 Sept. 1994.3. David Ben Gurion, Army and Security [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Ma'arakhot 1955) pp.350,

358.4. Abba Eban, An Autobiography (New York: Random House 1977) pp. 146-7.5. In an answer to critics, who blamed her for paying more attention to the Jews of Eastern

Europe, Golda Meir who was then Israel's ambassador to Moscow and later became thecountry's foreign minister, argued that 'despite the importance and urgency of

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facilitating the emigration of the Jews of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, we would notbe able to build our state with these immigrants alone'. Meron Medzini, The ProudJewess: Golda Meir and the Vision of Israel: A Political Biography [Hebrew](Jerusalem: Edanim 1990) p.190.

6. Norman A. Stillman, The Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times (Philadelphia: TheJewish Publication Society 1991) p.125.

7. Moshe Shokeid, 'Jewish Existence in a Berber Environment' in Shlomo Deshen andWalter P. Zenner (eds.), Jews Among Muslims: Communities in the Precolonial MiddleEast (New York: New York University Press 1996) pp.118-19.

8. Allan R. Meyers, 'Patronage and Protection: The Status of Jews in Pre-colonialMorocco', ibid., pp.84-5, 90.

9. Shlomo Deshen, 'Community Life in Nineteenth-Century Moroccan Jewry', ibid.,pp.99, 101, 105.

10. In 1984, Joseph Ohana was active in the Constitutional Union party, which emergedrapidly and won more seats than any other party in the 1983 elections. Ohana was thefirst Jew to become a parliament member.

11. Moshe Dayan, Shall the Sword Devour Forever? [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Edanim 1981)p.39.

12. David Ben Gurion, 'Israel Among the Nation', State of Israel, Government Year Book(Jerusalem: 1952/53) pp.14-15.

13. Morocco was the first country to recognise the US in 1777 and President Franklin D.Roosevelt had openly championed Morocco's independence from France.

14. In 1952, the French colonial authorities allowed 5,000 Moroccan Jews to immigrate toIsrael. However, after the anti-French riots of December 1952, the French beganrestricting immigration, apparently under pressure from the sultan of Morocco andperhaps because they assumed that the Jewish minority might be able to counteract theindependence struggle of the Arabs in Morocco. Meeting: M. Fischer and L. Marchal,26 Feb. 1953, Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel 8/106 (1953) p.105.

15. Sh. Divon (Paris) to the Western Europe Division, 28 Aug. 1953, ibid., No.359 p.300.16. Ibid. 7/399 (1952) p.582.17. G. Rafael to M. Sharett, 27 Jan. 1952, ibid. No.31 p.29.18. Michael M. Laskier, North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century: The Jews of

Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria (New York: New York University Press 1994) p.193. Astudy made to assess the political attitude of the Moroccan youth has concluded that theoverwhelming majority of them cited Algeria, not Israel, as the enemy and pariah state.See Michael W. Suleiman, 'Morocco in the Arab and Muslim World: Attitudes ofMoroccan Youth', The Maghreb Review 14/1-2 (1989) p.21.

19. In his secret meeting with Rabin in October 1976, Hassan revealed that in an Arabsummit meeting in Lebanon in 1958, he had suggested that they recognise Israel andencourage it to join the Arab League. When asked what was the response, Hassan saidthat the Arab leaders almost fell of their chairs. Yediot Aharonot (Tel Aviv) 14 Feb.1992.

20. Al Muharrir (Beirut) 25 Jan. 1966.21. Ha'aretz (Tel Aviv) 23 May 1965.22. Samuel Segev, Crossing the Jordan: Israel's Hard Road to Peace (New York: St.

Martin's Press 1998) p.233.23. Samuel Merlin, The Search for Peace in the Middle East: The Story of President

Bourguiba's Campaign for a Negotiated Peace Between Israel and the Arab States(New York: Thomas Yoseloff 1968) pp. 127-8, 139.

24. Segev (Note 22) p.234.25. Merlin (Note 23) p.169.26. Ibid, p.167.27. Mark Tessler, 'Moroccan-Israeli Relations and the Reasons for Moroccan Receptivity

to Contact with Israel', The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 10/2 (June1992) p. 100.

28. Complaint of the representative of the United Arab Republic in a letter to the President

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of the Security Council dated 27 May 1967 entitled: 'Israel's aggressive policy, itsrepeated aggression threatening peace and security in the Middle East and endangeringinternational peace and security'. (S/7907), United Nations Security Council OfficialRecords, 1358th Meeting: 13 June 1967 pp.24, 25, 26, 27.

29. Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1984) p.63. Hassan's comments almostechoed those of Bourguiba. But whereas Hassan made occasional references to the Arabstates' deviation from Islam, Bourguiba's comments centred entirely around secularrealpolitik arguments. See Egypt and Nasser Vol.3, 1967-72 (New York: Facts on File1973) p.65.

30. Mohamed Heikal, Autumn of Fury: The Assassination of Sadat (New York: RandomHouse 1983) pp.33-4.

31. Le Nouvel Observateur (Paris) 6 July 1970.32. AlAhram (Cairo) 1 July 1970.33. Record of the Arab World (June 1970) p.4073; (Aug. 1970) pp.5276-7.34. Le Nouvel Observateur (Paris) 6 July 1970.35. Raphael Israeli, The Public Diary of President Sadat: Parti- The Road to War (Leiden:

E.J. Brill 1978) p.359.36. Lt. General Saad el Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez (San Francisco: American Mideast

Research 1980) pp.133, 205.37. Raphael Israeli, The Public Diary of President Sadat: Part II - The Road to Diplomacy

(Leiden: E.J. Brill 1979) p.469.38. Mahmoud Riad, The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East (London: Quartet Books

1981) p.249; Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (New York: Quadrangle 1975)pp.232, 251.

39. Le Monde (Paris) 13 Oct. 1994.40. Nasser had once admitted that he would have liked to be as successful as his North

African neighbours in suppressing the fundamentalists. Referring to Bourguiba'ssuccess in Tunisia he said, 'I would like to do what Bourguiba has done. But do notforget that the obstacles, which he had to overcome in Tunisia, were much less solidthan those which I have to confront here, in the heart of Islam, at the very gate of Al-Azhar.' Cited in Jean Lacouture, Nasser: A Biography (New York: Knopf 1973) p.387.

41. Le Monde (Paris) 14 Oct. 1994.42. US representatives were in touch with Moroccan leaders shortly prior to the Six-Day

War, in an attempt to discuss peace options between Israel and the Arab states andEgypt in particular. See memorandum entitled 'United States Policy and Diplomacy inthe Middle East Crisis, 15 May-10 June 1967', The Lyndon Johnson Library andMuseum, Austin, Texas.

43. Walter Henry Nelson and Terence C.F. Prittie, The Economic War Against the Jews(New York: Random House 1977) p.45.

44. Al Anba' (Rabat) 14 Nov. 197745. 'Press interview statements by King Hassan of Morocco calling for peace with Israel

and emphasising that recognition of the PLO will discourage extremism in the East,(excerpts), Rabat, mid-November, 1977', International Documents on Palestine, 1977(Beirut: Institute of Palestine Studies 1979) No.286, p.410. See similar remarks inBourguiba's interview with Le Figaro (Paris) 14 Jan. 1969.

46. Gideon Rafael, Three Decades of Israeli Foreign Policy: A Personal Memoir (NewYork: Stein and Day 1981) p.81; Aaron S. Klieman, Israel and the World After 40 Years(New York: Pergamon-Brassey's 1990) p. 169.

47. EzerWeizman, The Battle for Peace (NewYork: Bantam 1981) p.63; Mohamed IbrahimKamel, The Camp David Accords: A Testimony (London: KPI 1986) p.34.

48. Moshe Dayan, Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel PeaceNegotiations (New York: Knopf 1981) p.40.

49. These newspaper excerpts are cited in Raphael Israeli, Peace in the Eye of the Beholder(Berlin: Mouton 1985) p. 165.

50. Pierre Bernard (ed.), Le Maroc Politique: De L'independance a 1973 (Paris: Sindbad

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1974) pp.356, 427-8, 430.51. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Egypt's Road to Jerusalem: A Diplomat's Story of the Struggle

for Peace in the Middle East (New York: Random House 1977) pp. 154-5.52. Anwar el-Sadat, Those I Have Known (New York: Continuum 1984) p. 110.53. Boutros-Ghali (Note 51) p.262.54. William Youssef Kosman, Sadat's Realistic Peace Initiative (New York: Vantage Press

1981) p.37.55. The idea of a meeting between Shimon Peres and King Hassan was broached by

Senegal's President Leopold Senghor. It took place at King Hassan's palace in Rabat on17/18 July 1978. Matti Golan, Shimon Peres: A Biography (New York: St. Martin'sPress 1992) p.222.

56. An eyewitness to the event said that Begin used the Russian word khoi, (equivalent tothe Yiddish word schmuck). Golan (Note 55) p.223.

57. Ezer Weizman, The Battle for Jerusalem [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Edanim 1981) p.8958. Golan (Note 55) p.252.59. The Battle for Peace (Note 47) p.82.60. 'PLO Talks with Kremlin Leaders', PLO in Lebanon: Selected Documents, ed. Raphael

Israeli (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1983) No.7 p.42.61. The current annual rate of US aid to Morocco is about $130 million. During the early

1980s, there was a decline in US aid and this was a source of concern to Rabat. Tessler(Note 27) p.86.

62. Cited in Segev (Note 22) p.246.63. Arab Times (Riyadh) 24 March 1986.64. 'Moroccan-Israeli Joint Declaration, Following Prime Minister Shimon Peres' visit to

Morocco, Rabat and Jerusalem, 24 July, 1986 in Yehuda Luckas (ed.), The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Documentary Record (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press1992) p.24.

65. Knesset Proceedings, 28 July 1986.66. Al-Mithak al Watani (Rabat) 25 July 1986.67. Al-Jumhuriyya (Cairo) 23 July 1986; Al Thawra (Damascus) 23 July 1986.68. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, 'Israel and Morocco: A Special Relationship', Maghreb

Review 21/1-2 (1996) p.40. Aaron Kleiman lists Morocco as one of those countries thatreceived arms from Israel. Aaron Klieman, Israel and the World After 40 Years(Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's 1990) p.166.

69. Segev (Note 22) p.323.70. Peres admitted to have visited Morocco in 1978 and in 1981. Ha'aretz (Tel Aviv) 29

July 1981.71. Arye Naor, Writing on the Wall [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Edanim 1988) p.164.72. Chaim Herzog, Living History: A Memoir (New York: Pantheon 1996) pp.302-3. Rabat

RTM Television Network in Arabic 27 July 1993. FBIS-NES-93-143, 28 July 1993.73. Rabat RTM Television Network in Arabic 27 July 1993. FBIS-NES-93-143, 28 July

1993.74. Segev (Note 22) p.229.75. MAP News Agency, Rabat, in Arabic 5 May 1994. SWB (Summary of world

Broadcasts) BBC Monitoring, ME/1990 MED/14, 6 May 1994. Voice of Israel,Jerusalem, in Hebrew 3 June 1994. SWB ME/2014 MED/12, 4 June 1994.

76. Cited in MEED (Middle East Business Weekly) 38/37 (16 Sept. 1994) p.26.77. Ibid.78. Shimon Peres and Arye Naor, The New Middle East (New York: Henry Holt and Co.

1993) p.120.79. Voice of Israel External Service, Jerusalem, in English, 22 Jan. 1994. SWB. MEW/0318

WME/13, 1 Feb. 1994. Ha'aretz (Tel Aviv) 2 May 1993.80. In 1984, the Congress helped the bilateral relations by inviting an Israeli delegation,

including Knesset members to participate in the event along with Jews from othercountries. Ever since, the congress became an important event helping to promotecontacts with Israel. Daniel J. Elazar, The Other Jews: The Separdim Today (New York:

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Basic Books 1989) p.110.81. John Battersby, 'Morocco's Jews could be Pivotal in Reconciling Israelis and Arabs:

Casablanca Back Streets May Hold a Solution to Arab-Jewish Friction', ChristianScience Monitor (22 Nov. 1994) p.l.

82. Al Majala (London) No.766 (16-22 Oct. 1994) p.18; No.768 (30 Oct.-5 Nov. 1994)p.16.

83. Jerusalem Post International Edition, 10 Sept. 1994; New York Times, 2 Sept. 1994.84. Hamodia (Tel Aviv) 14 Jan. 1994.85. Gainesville Sun, 2 Sept., 31 Oct. 1994; Ha'aretz (Tel Aviv) 30 Oct. 1994.86. King Hassan had already warned of the danger coming from the Islamic

fundamentalists of his country. Islamic fundamentalism began to be vocal in 1974,when Abdessalem Yassine sent a letter to Hassan criticising the drift from Islamicvalues. Since then, the Moroccan government adopted harsh measures against thefundamentalists. Alfred Hermida, 'The State and Islam', Africa Report 39/5 (Sept.-Oct.1994) p.58. Fear of fundamentalism was not unique to Morocco. During the CasablancaSummit in autumn 1991, all leaders of the Maghreb declared their intention to combatthe fundamentalists. Al Watan Al Arabi (London) 20 Sept. 1991.

87. Cited in Kayhan International (Teheran) 30 Aug. 1994.88. Tripoli, JANA Radio Broadcast in English, 9 Nov. 1994. FBIS-NES-94-218 10 Nov.

1994.89. Ha'aretz (Tel Aviv) 2 Nov. 1994.90. Al Quds Al-Arabi (London) 16 Nov. 1994; Cherif Ouazani, 'Normalisation, vous avez

dit normalisation?', Jeune Afrique No.1833 (21-27 Feb. 1996) pp.37-8.91. New York Times, 2 Sept. 1994.92. Al Sharq al-Awsat (London) 16 March 1995.93. Al Hamishmar (Tel Aviv) 3 March 1995.94. Personal interview with Armand Guigui, Fez 18 July 1998.95. Uri Savir, The Process: 1,100 Days That Changed the Middle East (New York: Random

House 1998) p. 106.96. In fact, Morocco's diplomatic relations with Israel were frozen, in accordance with an

Arab League Summit decision, in October 2000.97. Gad Yaacobi, Breakthrough: Israel in a Changing World (New York: Cornwall 1996)

p.101.

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