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SCUOLA ORIENT
H
.
v
w
.
u
I
‘ a
5 .
L
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‘THE
SANKHYA
KARIKA,
MEMORIAL VERSES ON
THE
SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY,
BY
ISWARA
KRISHNA;
TRANSLATEDFROMTHESANSCRIT
BY
HENRY
THOMAS
COLEBROOKE,ESQ.
ALSO
THE BHASHYA OR COMMENTARY OF
GAURAPADA;
TRANSLATED, AND ILLUSTRATED BY AN ORIGINAL COMMENT,
BY
HORACE HAYMAN WILSON,
M.A.
F.R.S.
MEMBER OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY, AND OF
THE
ASIATIC socIETIEs 0F PARIS
AND CALCUTTA, S z c .
&c.;
AND EODEN
PROFESSOR
OF SANSCRIT IN THE UNIVERSITY OF oxFoED.
OXFORD,
PRINTED
FOR
THE
ORIENTAL TRANSLATION FUND OF
GREAT BRITAIN
AND
IRELAND,
BY
S- COLLINGWOOD,
PRINTERTOTHEUNIVERSITY.
PUBLISHED AND SOLD BY A . J - VALPY, A . M., LONDON.
1837.
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TO
SIR
GRAVES
CHAMNEY
HAUGHTON, M.A.
F.R.S.
AS
TO ONE
WHOWAS THE FRIEND AND ADMIRER
OF THE LATE
HENRY THOMAS COLEBROOKE;
WHO
IS QUALIFIED,
BY
HIS
CONVERSANCY
WITH
THE
SANSCRIT
LANGUAGE.
AND METAPHYSICAL INQUIRIES,
TOAPPRECIATE THE CORRECTNESS WITH WHICH
THE PHILOSOPHY
OF
THE HINDUS
IS REPRESENTED IN THE FOLLOWING PAGES;
AN D
WHO
HAS FOR MANY
YEARS
BEEN
UNITED
WITH THEIRAUTHOR
IN STUDIES, SENTIMENTS, AND FRIENDSHIP;
THE
PRESENTWORKIS INSCRIBED,
AS A PUBLIC TESTIMONY OF
ESTEEM
AND REGARD,
BY
HORACE
HAYMAN WILSON.
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PREFACE.
ONEof the works e a r l i e s t announced
for publication b y the Oriental
Translation
Fund Committee wa s the Sa'nkhya K a ' r z ' k a ' , a text b o o k
of that system of Hindu philosophy to which the
term
Szinkhya i s
applied, and which had been translated
from
Sanscrit into English
by that emi n en t
Sanscrit
scholar the l a t e Henry Thomas Colebrooke.
The
accession of the lingering
i l l n e s s which
finally
terminated
in
hi s
decease
prevented
M r. Colebrooke from conducting hi s work through
the p r e s s , and f ro m a dd in g to the translation those explanations and
i l l u s t r a t i o n s
which the
text
required,
and wh ich h e
was most compe
tent to supply. Upon my return to England from India, therefore,
in the beginning o f 1833, I
f o un d that
no
progress
had
been
made
in
the publication, and that t he T ra nsl at io n o f
the text
a l on e
was in
the possession of the Committee.
Being
desirous
of
redeeming
the
pledge
which
they
had
publicly
given,
and of accomplishing
the purpose which they
had anno unce d ,
the Committee
thought i t desirable that
the
Translation,
in
i t s then
existing form, should b e printed
; and
conceived t h a t , as i t s extent was
insuflicient
to
constitute a separate work, i t would be
advisable to
i t in
the
Transactions
of the
Royal Asiatic Society. With t h i s
view
the manuscript was
placed in
my hands, that I sh ou ld re nd e r such
assistance a s I
might
be able
to
afford in the correction of the p r e s s .
Conceiving
that the appearance of t he Tra nsl a ti o n i n the pages
of
the
Transactions
would
be
equally incompatible
with
the views of
the Translator and the original intention of
the Committee, I
ven
tured
to
recommend
that their
purpose
should
be
adhered t o , and
b
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v i PREFACE.
that t he Tra nsl a ti on should be printed, as at first designed, as a
separate
work;
offering
at
the same time
to supply
such annotations
as
the text m igh t se em t o require, to be rendered sufficiently
i n t e l l i
gible
and
e x p l i c i t .
The
Committee
approved
of
the
suggestion,
and
M r.
Colebrooke’s
concurrence
wa s readily
obtained.
In the meantime, in the interval that had elapsed since the work
was announced, other translations of the
Sa'nkhya
K a i r i k a ' had a p
peared. The Sanscrit t e x t , and a version of i t in Latin by Professor
Lassen, had been printed at Bonn“; and
the
text
in
Roman ch a
r a c t e r s , with
a
French
translation,
had been
published
at
Paris by
M o n s . Pauthierf.
Many
of
the verses
of the translation had
been
also embodied i n M r. Colebrooke’s general
view
of the Sankhya phi-
losophy; and i t appeared to me expedient, therefore, to make some
such addition to
the
work as should give i t at l e a s t more novelty
than i t was otherwise likely to p o s s e s s . I t seemed also
to
be a
favourable occasion fo r offering to Sanscrit
students
a n e xe mp li fica
tion of the mode
in
which philosophical works are illustrated b y
native
commentators;
and I
accordingly
procured the
consent
of the
Translation Committee to
p r i n t , not
only
the
text and translation
of
the
Szinkhya
K a ' r i k a ' , but the
text and
a translation of
the
o l d e s t ,
and perhaps the b e s t , commentary upon
the
K a ' r i k a ' , the
Bha'shya
of
GAURAPADA. In
order
likewise to fulfil
the
object of attempting to
render the doctrines of
both
text
and comment
as
clear and
e x p l i c i t
as i t
was
in
my power
to
represent them, I further added to the
translation of the Bha'shya a
comment
of my
own,
deriving my
el u
cidations
however, to
a very
great extent,
from the works of native
s c h o l i a s t s ,
and
giving the
original passages at
the foot of the
page.
The scholia which have been
used for t h i s
purpose
are
the
* Gymnosophista: s i v e I n d i c i i e
Philosophiaa
documenta. Vol. I .
Iswara
Crishnae
San'
khya-Caricam
t e n e n s . Bo nn aa a d
Rhenum,
1882.
T E s s a i s s ur l a Philosophie des
Hindous, t r a d u i t s
de l ’ A n g l a i s ,
e t
augmentés de t e x t e s
S a n s k r i t s , &c.; p ar G. P a u t h i e r . P a r i s , 1833.
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PREFACE. v i i
Sa'nkhya Tatwa Kaumudz' of VAcHEsrATI
MISRA,
a n d
the
Sa'nkhya
C h a n d r z ' k a ' of NARAYANA TiRTHA. The Sa'nkhya Kaumua'z' of RAMA
KRISHNA ha s been also consulted,
but
i t i s almost word for
word
the
same
as
the
S .
Chandrika',
and
i s
therefore
in
most
instances
super
fluous. I have occasionally referred
to
the
Sa'nkhya
S a ' r a , a separate
tract o n the doctrines of t h i s school by VIJNANA BHIKSHU; but a n
o ther
work by
the same scholiast, the
Sa'nkhya
Pravachana Bha'shya,
a commentary
on
the S z i t r a s or aphorisms of KAI’ILA, the first teacher
of the Sankhya, according
t o t r a d i t i o n ,
has
been
of
particular
s e r v i c e ,
and w i l l
b e
f o u n d often
c i t ' e d .
Copies of these
different
commenta
r i e s ,
as well as
of
the
text,
exist in the
library of the
East India
Company,
and the
Sa'nkhya
Pravachana Bhzishya
was printed at
Serampore
in
1821.
I have,
however,
f ol lowed a
manuscript
copy,
a s I d id not obtain a copy of
the
printed work until my translation
was finished.
There was l i t t l e ne e d of the labour of c o l l a t i o n , a f t e r the very
accurate
text
of
Professor
Lassen.
I
have
n ot
failed,
however, to
compare
the reading of the different c o p i e s ,
and
have noticed a
few
of
the
variations: n o n e
of
them
are of
a n y
great importance.
Where
collation
was
most
wanted, i t was
unfortunately
not practicable,
there
being b ut
a single
copy
of the
Bha'shya
of
GAURAPADA in
my
possession. The manuscript
was luckily
tolerably
c o r r e c t ,
b ut i t
was doubtful i n
some
p l a c e s , and clearly faulty i n
others;
and I may
not have always succeeded i n rightly correcting, or i n accurately
interpreting i t . With regard to typographical errors i n t he p rese nt
edition of text and comment, I trust they w i l l not be fou n d very
inexcusable, especially when i t i s known that
the
work was f o r the
greater
part necessarily carried on a t a distance from me,
during
my
absence
in
London,
and that i t i s the first publication in
Sanscrit
printed
at
the Press of the
University of
Oxford.
Not
having made
the
Sénkhya philosophy a
subject
of study i n
India, I have executed my task without the advantage o f p revi o us
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v i i i PREFACE.
preparation. Thesubject indeed
i s
b u t l i t t l e cultivated b y the Pan
d i t s , and during the whole of my intercourse with learned natives
I met with but on e Brahman who professed to be a cq u ai n te d wi t h
the
writings
of
t h i s
school.
Opportunity
was
wanting
to
benefit
b y
his instructions, and I cannot therefore venture
to
claim exemption
from those l i a b i l i t i e s t o error
to
which the unassisted study of Sa n
s c r i t
l iterature i n Europe i s
exposed, especially when
directed
to
topics s u f f i c i e n t l y obscure a n d
difiicult in themselves,
and
rendered
s t i l l
more so b y the
sententious and
e l l i p t i c a l
s t y l e in
which they
are treated. . I t i s the fashion with some of the
most
distinguished
Sanscrit scholars on the co nti nen t
to
speak
slightingly
of native
scholiasts
and
Pandits, but t h i s i s the consequence of measuring
their
merits
by
a
wrong
s c a l e ,
and
censuring
them
f o r
venial
inac
curacies which often proceed
from
too entire a familiarity with their
subject. In
a l l
studies
which
native scholars professedly
pursue, they
have the advantage of traditional tuition, of a
course
of
instruction,
coming d o wn , t hro u gh successive generations, from the founder of a
syst em, o r the author
of
a b ook, to the individual who explains the
one or illustrates the other, and from whose interpretation
we
may
therefore reasonably expect
t o
learn
what i t
was originally meant to
teach.
There are a l s o in a l l
philosophical works, e s p e c i a l l y , brief
hints
and conventional allusions, which without such
aid i t i s n o t
possible
to decipher, and f o r the
proper
understanding of
which
a
native explanation i s
indispensable.
Without therefore in the l e a s t
degree undervaluing European industry and a b i l i t y , I cannot consent
to
hold in l e s s esteem the attainments of my former
masters
and
friends, the
Sanscrit l ea rn i ng o f learned
Brahmans.
The translations
to
which I
have
above referred are highly
credit
able to
the t r a n s l a t o r s .
That
of Professor
Lassen i n particular i s
of
great
merit
and
accuracy,
a n d i s
illustrated
by
annotations,
i n
which
he has successfully cleared
up
many of
the
obscurities of the original
t e x t . I have
taken the plan of
h i s notes as in
some degree the
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PREFACE. ix
model of
my comment; and although I d o not
always
concur i n h i s
interpretations
or
explanations, I have fou n d them always entitled
to attention and respect. In on e
or
two instances,
and
especially in
regard to the first stanza, where I have most widely
differed
from
him, I have sought rather t o vindicate the accuracy of
Mr. Cole
brooke,
than
to impugn
that
of
Professor
Lassen.
Variety
of inter
pretation in
such a case
as that of a d i f f i c u l t Work,
o n
a n abstruse
subject, i s no more than may be expected from different interpreters;
and occasional misapprehension implies n o want of either
compe
tency or care.
In t he co urse of my attempts to elucidate the t e x t , I have in a
few instances pointed out what seemed to me to o f f e r remarkable
coincidences
with the
doctrines of
c l a s s i c a l philosophers.
That a n
intimate connection
e x i s t s between the
metaphysical systems of the
Hindus
and
those
of the Greeks
i s generally
admitted, although
i t s
extent
h as n ot yet
been
fully made o u t . We are
scarcely
yet
indeed
in
possession of
the means
of instituting
a n
accurate comparison,
as
the
text books of the Hindus
have
not been
printed
or
translated,
and
general
d i s s e r t a t i o n s , however comprehensive or profound, are
insuf
ficient
f o r
the purpose. The present
publication w i l l go some
way,
perhaps,
t owards su p p lyi n g
the deficiency,
and
may
a f f o r d ,
a s
f a r
as
i t
extends,
authentic materials f o r
the use of
those
better qualified
c l a s s i c a l scholars
who may
be curious
to ascertain in
what
degree the
speculations of Plato and Aristotle correspond with those of Kapila
a n d Ga u ta ma , or
how
f a r the teachers of on e school may h ave b een
indebted
to
tho se o f another. That
the
Hindus derived
a n y
of their
philosophical
ideas
from
the
Greeks seems
very
improbable; and i f
there i s
a n y
borrowing in
the
c a s e , the l a t t e r were most probably
indebted to
the
former. I t has been objected to t h i s conjecture,
that
the
t o t a l
want
of
chronology
i n
Hindu
writings
renders
i t
i m
possible
to
pronounce
upon
their date, and that
i t i s
probable that
many works
regarded a s ancient are
really very modern,
a s
they may
0
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x
PREFACE.
have been
composed
long
a f t e r the
a e r a of
Christianity;
the
notions
which they
inculcate
being
in
f a c t
acquired
from the Greeks of
Alexandria, through
the
intercourse between India and Egypt. That
t h i s
intercourse
may
have
e xe rci se d a
mut ual
influence
upon
some
parts of
the
philosophy of both countries in the first ages of Chris
tianity—that resemblances, respectively interchanged, may be d e
tected in
the
notions of the new Platonists or Platonic Christians
and
of the
more
modern Védantis, or in the
e c l e c t i c
pantheism 0f
the Pauraniks—is not
impossible;
but the
Greek
philosophy of that
period
ca n scarcely
have su gge st ed t he
severer
abstractions of the
Sankhya,
and we
must go
back to a remoter age
f o r
the origin
of
the
dogmas
of
KAPILA. In truth, the more
remote
the
period,
the closer
the a f f i n i t y that seems
to
prevail; and
as
f a r
as
we are acquainted
with the tenets o f the
Ionic and
Italic schools,
i t i s with
them that
Hindu philosophy,
unalloyed
with pantheism,
seems to
claim ki n
d r e d ,
rather than
with
the
mysticism of Plato,
or the subtleties
of
A r i s t o t l e . The
metempsychosis
i t s e l f i s a n important feature i n t h i s
similitude: f o r t h i s belief i s not to be looked upon a s a mere popular
superstition;
i t i s
the main principle of a l l Hindu metaphysics;
i t
i s
the
foundation
of a l l Hindu philosophy. The great object of their
philosophical
research
in
every
system,
Brahmanical
or
Buddhist,
i s
the
discovery
of the means of p utti ng a stop
t o
further
transmigra
tion; t he d isco n ti n ua nce of
corporeal
being;
the
liberation of
soul
from body. That such was the l ea di ng principle of
the
philosophy
of Pythagoras we
learn from
ancient
testimony,
and
i t
essentially
influences the speculations of Plato.
Concurrence in
t h i s principle
involves
agreement
i n
a l l the most important
deductions
from i t , and
e s t a b l i s h e s , i f not
a mutual interchange, at
l e a s t
a
common o r i g i n ,
for much of the oldest
philosophy
of the
Greeks
and the Hindus.
This
i s
a
s u b j e c t ,
however,
to
which
I
ca n
here
but
thus
briefly
allude, and to which I would rather invite the a tt en ti on o f some of
the emi n en t scholars of whom the
University
of
Oxford has
reason
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PREFACE. xi
to
b e proud,
than impair
i t s interest by my own l e s s competent
attempts at i t s elucidation.
The
whole
scope
and
leading
tenets of the Sankhya philosophy
ha ve b een
most
accurately
described by
the
l a t e
M r.
Colebrooke,
in
the
Transactions
of the Royal Asiatic Society, from various original
authorities, i ncl u d i ng that now published, the Ka'riku', or ra ther
K a ' r i k a ' s , of the Sankhya system; the term d esignating a collection
of
memorial
v e r s e s , of apothegmatical stanzas, i n which the chief
tenets of t he scho ol are textually and dogmatically s t a t e d . The
Sankhya philosophy
i s
so
termed, as
M r.
Colebrooke has
mentioned,
because
i t
observes precision of reckoning in the
enumeration
of
i t s
p r i n c i p l e s ,
Sa'nkhya
being understood
to signify
‘ numeral,’ agreeably
t o the usual acceptation of Sankkyri, ‘number ; ’ “and hence i t s
analogy
to
the Pythagorean philosophy has
been
presumed.” The
term i s also explained, however, as Mr. Colebrooke
proceeds
to
men
t i o n , to
denote
the result of deliberation
or
judgment, such
being
on e se nse o f the word Sankhyci, from which Sainkhya
i s
derived.
Agreeably to the
purport
of the word K a ' r z ' k a ' ,
‘
a t ech nica l o r
memorial v e r s e , ’ the following work consists of a s e r i e s of stanzas
systematically arranged, though n ot a lwa ys obviously connected; and
asserting
p r i n c i p l e s ,
rather
than
discussing
arguments.
The
tract
opens with a n explanation of the object of t h i s and of a l l philosophy,
ascertainment of the means by
which
the pain of corporeal existence
may be
finally and absolutely remedied, and the
soul
freed for ever
f ro m b od y:
t h i s
i s declared
alone
to be philosophy,
or the knowledge
of the real
nature
of a l l that i s ,
agreeably to
the
Sa'nkhya
enumera
tion of things. These things,
in
number twenty-five,
are
briefly
indicated
with reference
to
their
r e l a t i v e
character,
as
producing or
produced; and the work then
pauses to
explain the
means
b y wh ich
they
may
be
known,
or
perception,
inference,
and
authority.
Re
verting
then to such of the
twenty-five
things or principles as are
imperceptible, e s p e c i a l l y
t o
the fi r s t material c a u s e , a n d
t o
s o u l ,
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x i i
PREFACE.
logical proofs of their
actual
existence
are adduced,
and the points
in which
they agree
or d i f f e r
with other
things, and
with
each
other,
are described. We
have then
a n explanation
of the
three
essential
qualities
of
things;
purity
or
goodness;
imperfection,
foulness,
or
passion;
and
i n di fference, stu p i di ty, or darkness.
The
existence
of
a general, imperceptible,
unseparated,
universal
cause, the
substance
of which
a l l i s
made, the
eternal
matter of the
Greek
cosmogonies,
i s
then a rgu ed ; and, as a consequence
of
i t s existence, that
a l s o
of
a
s p i r i t u a l
n at ure, o r s o u l ,
i s
asserted.
The properties
of sou l a re then
detailed. We
have
next the twenty-five Tatwas, ‘categories or
prin
c i p l e s , ’ of the Sankhya philosophy severally
described.
These a l l
resolve
themselves, as
may be
inferred
from what has
preceded, into
but two,
matter
and s p i r i t ,
nature
and
soul;
the rest
are a l l the
progeny or products of nature,
evolved
spontaneously through the
necessity of
nature’s providing
f o r the
two
purposes of s o u l , fruition
and l i b e r a t i o n . These products a r e , intelligence; egotism or indivi
duality;
eleven senses,
ten
external
and one internal, or mind; five
rudimental elements, or
elements
of elements; and
five
gross or per
ceptible elements, ether,
a i r ,
water, fire
or
l i g h t , and earth. The
descripti on of these different categories, of their mode and objects of
acting,
of
their
modifications,
and
of
their
e f f e c t s ,
occupies a
con
siderable number of K a ' r i k a ' s . We have then a general account of
bo
dily
condition of two
kinds,
subtile and
gross;
the l a t t e r perishing at
death,
the former accompanying
and
investing soul through
a l l
the
migrations
t o
which
the
various conditions of the intellectual f a c u l t y ,
or virtue and
v i c e ,
subject
i t . Those
conditions
are
then
detailed at
length, and in a l l their modifications, constituting what i s
called
intellectual creation,
or
l i f e ,
consequent
upon
conduct,
originating
with
the
intellect.
But, to give
effect
to these modifications,
form,
a s
well
a s
l i f e ,
i s
said to
be
necessary;
and
hence
results
personal
or
bodily creation
of
various descriptions. Bodily existence, however,
i s
described
a s confinement and
pain,
from which
soul
i s anxious
to
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PREFACE. x i i i
b e e xe mp te d . Nature i s said to labour also fo r s o u l ’ s l i b e r a t i o n , and
to supply the means, in the display which
i t
makes of i t s products,
until
s o u l ,
fully
possessed of their r e a l
character and
tendency, i s
represented
as casting away
a l l
notions-of
individuality
and
s e l f ,
and
i s
n o
more condemned to bodily incarceration. The work c l o s e s
with
stating
that
these truths were taught
originally
by KAPILA
to
Asum, and by him
to PANCHASIKHA,
from
whom
i t
descended,
through repeated
generations
of d i s c i p l e s ,
to
IswAEA KRISHNA,
the
author of
the
Kdrika's. The d a te o f this writer
i s n ot known,
but
Mr. Colebrooke considers
GAURAPADA,
the scholiast on the K a ' r z ' k a ' ,
to
be
the
same a s the
preceptor
of the
celebrated
teacher SANKARA
ACHARYA,
whom
there
i s
reason
to
place
i n
the eighth
century.
How
l o n g anterior to
this
the Ka'rikds existed in their present
form,
we have no means of knowing,
b ut
they we re a vo we d ly subsequent
to other standard compositions of the school, and evidently repre
sent doctrines of high antiquity, doctrines exhibiting profound r e
flection and subtle reasoning; although, l i k e a l l the e f f o r t s of human
i n t e l l e c t
to penetrate unai d e d
the mysteries
of
existence, wholly
unavailing, and too
often ending, a s Cicero complains, i n
d o u b t
and
impiety: “Cogimur
dissensione
sapientum Dominum nostrum
ignorare.”
Some excuse i s perhaps necessary f o r
having
delayed to publish
the present work
so long a f t e r
the Committee of
the
Oriental
Trans
lation
Fund
had
sanctioned i t s
publication.
The work, a s i t i s now
offere d to the public, was ready for press
in the
co urse o f the year
following that
in
which i t was undertaken. Being
desirous,
however,
of printing i t
at
Oxford, where the University had l i b e r a l l y resolved
to provide i t s Press with two new f ou nts o f
Devanagari l e t t e r s ,
I was
u n d e r
the necessity of a wa it in g t he
completion
of the
t y p e s . As
soon
as
one
fount
wa s
supplied,
the
text
was
printed.
I t
was my
wish to have
employed
the other and smaller fount f o r
the
citations
which accompany my Comment; but that fount being not yet c a s t ,
( 1
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xiv PREFACE.
I h av e t ho u gh t i t preferable to
incur
n o
further delay.
I t i s
scarcely
doing justice to
types
of the s i z e here employed to place
them
in
juxtaposition with characters
so much
smaller
as
t ho se o f the English
alphabet;
b ut
looking
a t
them
b y
themselves,
i n
the
pages
of
the
t e x t , I think they w i l l be
fou n d
to wear a more genuinely Oriental
aspect than a n y that have yet been fabricated in Europe.
OXFORD,
J u l y 1 ,
1 8 3 7 .
sANxHYA KARIKA
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SANKHYA
KARIKA.
I .
THEinquiry
i s into the
means
of
precluding the three s o r t s of
pain;
f o r
pain
i s embarrassment: nor i s
the
inquiry superfluous
because
o bvio us means
of alleviation
e x i s t ,
for
absolute
and
fin a l
r e l i e f i s not thereby accomplished.
BHASHYA.
Salutation
to that KAPILA
by whom the Sankhya
philosophy was com
passionately imparted,
to
serve as
a
boat f o r the purpose of crossing the
ocean of ignorance in which the world
was
immersed.
I will
declare compendiously the doctrine, fo r
the
benefit o f s tu d e n ts;
a
short e a sy w ork,
resting on
authority,
and
establishing certain
r e s u l t s .
Three s o r t s o f pain. -The explanation of this Arya
stanza
i s as
follows:
The d ivine
KAPILA,
the son o f
BRAHMAindeed: as i t i s said, “ SANAKA,
SANANDANA, and SANATANA
the
third; AsuRI, KAPILA, BORHU, and PAN
CHASIKHA: these seven sons of Brahma were termed
great
sages.” To -
gether with
KAPILA
were born Virtue, Knowledge, Dispassion, and
Power:
for he
b e i ng born, and observing the world
p l u nge d in
profou n d
darkness
by
the
succeeding
series
of worldly revolutions, was filled with
compassion; and to
his kinsman, the
Brahman
Asulu,
he
communicated
a
knowledge o f th e TWENTY-FIVE
PRINCIPLES;
from which knowledge
the
destruction of pain proceeds. As i t i s
said;
“ He
who
knows the twenty
“ five principles, whatever order
of
l i f e he may
have
entered, and whether
“
he
wear
braided
hair,
a
top-knot
only,
or
be
shaven,
he
i s
liberated
“
(from
existence): of
this
there i s no doubt.”
The
inquiry
i s
in consequence of the embarrassment of the
three
s o r t s
‘
B
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2
of
pain. In
this place
the three sorts
o f p ai n
a r e ,
1 . (édhyétmika) natural
and
inseparable;
2 .
(éd h i bh a ut ika ) n a tura l
and extrinsic; and 3 . (MM
d a i v z ' k a )
non-natural or superhuman. The
first
i s of two kinds, corporeal
and
mental:
corporeal
i s
flux,
fever,
or
the
like,
arising
from
d i so rd e r o f
t he wi nd , b i l e , or
phlegm:
mental i s privation of what i s
liked,
approxi
matio n of what i s disliked. Extrinsic
b u t natural
pain i s fourfold, ac
cording
to the
aggregation of elementary
matter
whence i t originates ;
that
i s , i t
i s
produced
by any created beings,
whether viviparous, oviparous,
generated by heat and moisture, or springing from
the
s o i l ; or in short,
by men, beasts, tame or wild birds, reptiles,
gnats,
musqu i toes,
l i c e ,
bugs,
fish,
alligators, sharks,
trees,
stones, &c. The third
kind
of pain
may
be called superhuman, daivika meaning either
divine
or atmospheric:
i n
the
latter
case
i t
means
pain
which
proceeds
from
col d, heat,
wind,
rain, thunderbolts,
and
the like.
Where
then,
or
into
what, i s
inquiry,
in
consequence of
the
embar
rassment
of the
three
kinds of
pain, to
be made?
Into th e means o f
precluding them. This i s the inquiry. Nor i s the inquiry superjfluous.
That i s ;
i f
this
inquiry be (regarded
a s ) superfluous, the
means of
pre
cluding the
three
s o r t s
of
pain
b e i ng
obvious (seen);
as f o r example;
the internal means of alleviating
the
two
inseparable
kinds of pain are
obvious, through the application of medical science, as by pungent, b i t t e r ,
and astringent decoctions, or through the removal o f th ose o bj ects t ha t
are
disliked, and
accession
of
those
tha t a re
liked;
so
the
obvious
ob
struction of pain from natural causes i s protection and the like; and
these
means being obvious, any (farther)
inquiry
i s superfluous: i f you
think
in
this
manner, i t i s n o t
so ; for
absolute, certain,
final,
permanent,
obstruction (of pain)
i s
not ( t o
be
effected) by obvious means. Therefore
inquiry i s
to
be made by
the
wise elsewhere, or into
means
of prevention
which
are
absolute
and final.
COMMENT.
The
first
verse
of the
Kériké
proposes
the
subject
of
the
work,
and
not o nly
of
t h a t , b u t
of
the
system
to
which
i t belongs, and
of
every
philosophical system studied
by
the Hin d us; the common en d of
which
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3
i s , ascertainment of
the
means by
which
perpetual e xem p ti on
from the
metempsychosis,
or
from
the
necessity
of repeated
b i r t h s ,
may
be at
tained: for l i f e i s
uniformly
regarded by
the Hindus
as
a
condition of
pain and
suffering, as a
state
of
bondage
and
evil; escape
from which
finally and f o r ever i s
a
consummation devoutly to be
wished.
The liberation thus proposed as the object
of
rational existence cannot
be a tt ai ne d a s long as
man
i s subject to the
ordinary
infirmities
of his
nature,
and t he a cci d en ts of hi s condition:
and
the primary
object
of
philosophical inquiry
therefore i s ,
the means by which the imperfections
flesh i s heir to may be obviated or removed.
As
preparatory
then
to
their
right determination, i t
is
first shewn i n the text what means are not
conducive to this end;
such, namely, as obvious but
temporary expe
dients,
whether
physical
or
moral.
Of this introductory stanza Professor Lassen, in the first ‘number of
hi s
Gymnosophistu,
containing
the translation
of
the
K éri ké , h as given
a
version differing in some
respects from
Mr. Colebrooke’s.
He t hu s re n
ders
i t :
“
E
tergeminorum dolorum impetu oritur desiderium cogno
scendaa rationis, qua i i depellantur. Quod cognoscendi desiderium licet
in visibilibus
rebus
infructuose versetur, non
est (infructuosum)
propter
absentiam absoluti, et omni
aevo
superstitis remedii.”
In the first
member
of t h i s sentence, the translation of abhigha'ta by
‘ impetus’ i s irreconcilable with the context. The sense required by the
doctrine
laid
down
i s
‘ i m p ed i m e n t, em ba rr ass me n t,
the
p re ve nt io n o f
liberation by worldly cares and s u fi ' e r i n g s . ’ So the same word abhz'gha'taka
i s immed iately used to mean ‘ preventing, removing,’ ‘ depellens.’ Pro
fessor Lassen’s text, i t i s true, rea ds apagha'taka, but this i s n o t the reading
followed by Mr.
Colebrooke, nor
that
of
the citation
of the text given
in
the
S.
Bhésllya
or S.
Kaumudi;
i t i s that of the S. Tatwa Kaumudi
and
S. Chandrika',
and
although in i t s e l f unobjectionable, ye t i s not a neces
sary
n or
preferable variation. At
any rate
there
can be
no question that
the word abhigha'ta may
be used
in the sen se
of ‘ depellere,’ and
that
sense
therefore
equally
attaches
to
i t
in
the
prior
member
of the
hemi
s t i c h . So
in
the
Bha'shya of
GAURAPADA we
have ridhibhautikasya raksha'
dina
abhigha'tah; ‘ The
prevention of
extrinsic pain
i s
by
protection
and
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4
the l i k e . ’ It
would
not be possible
here
to render abhigha'ta
by ‘impetus.’
By
VAcm-zsmTr the term
abhigha'ta
i s
defined
‘the
confinement
of
the
sentient
faculty
(explained to mean
here
‘ l i f e ’ ) , through the impediment
o pposed
by threefold
distress
abi d ing
in s p i r i t * . ’
NARAYANA
interprets i t
more
concisely asahya sambandha T , ‘intolerable r e s t r a i n t . ’
‘
Embarrass
ment’ therefore sufficiently well expresses the purport of these d efi ni
t i o n s , or
the obstructions offered by
worldly
sufferings to
the
s p i r i t anx io us
to
be
f r e e .
This variation, however, i s of no great
consequence:
the more
im
portant difference i s in the second portion
of
t he st a nz a; and as Professor
Lassen has
deviated
advisedly
from
Mr.
Colebrooke,
i t i s necessary t o
examine the passage
more in d e t a i l . The f ol l owi ng are hi s reasons f o r
the
version
he
has
made:
“ Ha ac posterioris versus ( d rz ' s h fé e t c . ) interpretatio, s i c u t i scholiastarum
suffragiis probatur, a grammatica postulatur. Quod ideo moneo, ne l e v i
ter rationem,
a
Colebrookio, V. summo,
i n hoc versu
enarrando
initam
deseruisse
censear.
Is
enim: ‘ nor i s
the
inquiry superfluous,
because
obvious means of
alleviation exist:
f o r absolute
and
final r e l i e f i s not
thereby accomplished.’
Sed vereor,
ne
vi r summus
constructionem par
t i c u l s e chét
sententiam claudentis et a negatione
exceptaa male
intellex
e r i t .
De qua re d ix i
ad Hitop. protein.
d . 28. Ex interpret.
Colebrook.
construendum esset: drishfé
s c .
s a t i ( i . e . yadyapi
drishfam
vidya t é ) s a '
( j g ' j m i s a ' )
a p a ' r t h a '
n a
e'ka'nt—abha'mit
I .
Sed
ut
omittam,
particulse
chét
nullum omnino relinqui locum i n sententi a, n a inopportuno versus
loco
collocatum e s s e , non potes q u i n concedas. Male omnino se habet tota
s e n t e n t i a e t c l a u d i c a t . E q ui d e m c o n s t r u o : d r i s h f e '
s a '
( j g ' j n a ' s a ' ) a p a ' r t h a '
(bhavati)
c h e ' t ( t a t h a ' p i ) m
a p a ' r t h a ' bhavati)
e ' k a ' n t a — a b h a ' v a ' t l l . Prorsus
similiter dicitur n a ' b h a ' v a ' t
i n f r .
v . 8 . Ablativum igitur eka'ntyatyantoh
? i
.z
a a a a
F
. m5‘
‘mmTWHsitrfirhwfqséfiawmfilm)
mam—ml
"sfimfislsrrsnsmviflufimfi
(ms-Fa)
= 1 (W131 Hafir)mar-mi
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5
a b h a ' v z i t , non
ad d r z ' s h t ' é
refero cum
Colebrookio, se d
ad
negationem,
quae
cum supplementis suis
apodosin
c o n s t i t u i t . Nam quaa post chénna se
q u u n t ur
verba,
ad
apodosin
pertinere
semper
observavi.
Quam
gram
matica postulate videtur, patitur prseterea l o c i tenor enarrationem, imo
melior
evadit
sententia.
Ad
drishlé enim r e l a t i s i s t i s
verbis,
id
tantum
d i c i t u r , rerum visibilium cognitione non attingi posse philosophies finem,
liberationem absolutam e t perpetuam a doloribus; mea posita enarra
tione non id tantum docetur, sed a d d i t u r
etiam
hoc: finem istum posse
a t t i n g i , l i c e t a l i o cognitionis
genere.
Tres omnino positiones altero he
mistichii versu co nti n en t ur: philosophies ( i d
enim
valet g i g n a ' s a ' , i . e .
cognitionis desiderium) finem esse emancipationem a doloribus certam
et omne tempus transgredientem; d e i n d e ad eum non perveniri
ea vi a
quae primum
i n i t u r ,
q ui a obvia
quasi
s i t ,
i .
e .
remediorum
a
s e n s i b i l i
bus rebus
petitorum
op e; d en iq ue
ea remed ia
cognoscendi
desiderium
posse expleri. Sed a l i t e ' r
atque
Colebrookius
hasce sententias
in ter se
conjungit n oster, et p er co nd i ti on em e f f e r t , quod i l l e per n ega ti on em
enuntiat.”
In this view of the meaning of the verse, there i s a refinement that
does n ot belong to i t , and which i s not Indian: arguments are often
e l l i p t i c a l l y and obscurely stated in Sanscrit d i a l e c t i c s , bu t on e position
at
a
time
i s
usually sufficient
for even Brahmanical subtlety. The only
position
here advanced i s , that the cure of worldly e v i l i s not to be effected
by such remedies as are o f o bvi o us and ordinary application, as they can
only
afford
temporary r e l i e f .
Death
i t s e l f i s
no exemption
from calamity,
i f i t
involves the obligation
of b ei ng b orn again.
The version proposed by Professor Lassen rests upon hi s notion of the
grammatical force o f the e xp re ssi on che'nna or c h e ' t , ‘ i f , ’ na, ‘ no t : ’ the
former he
would refer
to the prior member of the sentence, the l a t t e r to
the subsequent expressions.
But
this
division of
the
compound i s not
that
which
i s
most usual
in argumentative writings.
The
phrase i s an
e l l i p t i c a l n ega ti on of a preceding assertion, c h e ' t referring to what has
been
s a i d ,
implying,
‘ i f
you
assert
or b el ieve
this ; ’ and
n a
meeting
i t
with a
negatur,
‘it is not so : ’ then follows the reason or
argument
of
the denial. Thus in the Mukta'vali: ‘
But
why
sho ul d n ot
Darkness
be
c
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6
called
a tenth
thing,
f o r
i t
i s
apprehended
by
perception?
If t h i s be s a i d ,
i t i s
not
so ( i l l
c h e ' n - n a )
; for i t i s
the
consequence o f th e
non-existence
of
absolute
l i g h t , and i t would be i l l o g i c a l to enumerate i t
amongst
things*.’
So
in the Nya'ya Su'tra V r z ' t t i : ‘ If by
a
disturbance in the assembly
there
be no subsequent speech,
and
through the
want
of
a reply
there be
defeat;
i f
t h i s be urged, i t i s not so
( i t z '
c h e ' n - n a ) , because there has
been
no
opportunity
for
an answer
T . ’
Again in the
Sa'nkhya
Pravachana
Bha'shya.
S(1tra:-‘ If i t
be
sa id t ha t Prakriti i s
the
cause
of
bondage, i t
i s not s o , from i t s dependent s t a t e l . ’ Comment : — - ‘ But bondage may be
occasioned by Prakriti. If
t h i s be asserted,
i t i s not s o .
Why? Because
in
the
relation
of
b on d age, Prakriti i s dependent upon conjunction, as
w i l l
be explained
in the
following
precept
l l . ’
Also in the Veda'nta Sa'ra
Vivriti:
‘If
in
consequence
of
such
texts
of the
Védas
as “let
sacrifice
be
performed as long as l i f e
endures”
their performance i s
indispensable,
and constant and occasional
r i t e s must be celebi'ated by those engaged in
the
attainment of
true knowledge; and i f , o n the
other ha n d, the attain
ment
of
true knowledge
i s
distinct from
the observance of ceremonies;
then
a d ou b l e
d u ty
i s
incumbent on those wishing to
eschew
the world.
If
this be asserted, i t
i s
not so ( i t z ' c h e ' n - n a ) , from the
compatibility of
severalty
with union,
as
in
the
case
of a r t i c l e s of
khayar or
other wood§:’
that i s ,
where
t he re a re several
obligations, that which i s
most
essential
*argzwarrsirmzgrfifisfiwfsnwiimqmrfirfi'aw
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fs'qsia'
W
rfis-rlrifitnquaiiufizl
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7
may b e
selected
from the r e s t . In the same
work
we have a n
analogous
form
used
affirmatively; a s ,
‘
But
how
by the efficacy of knowledge, after
the
dissipation
of ignorance,
in
regard
to
the
object
(of
philosophy),
ca n
the true nature of the essentially happy (being) be attained? for as he i s
eternally
existent,
knowledge i s not
necessary
to establish
hi s
existence.
If
this
be asserted, i t i s true ( i t i c h e ' t ;
satyam).
Brahme, o n e essentially
with felicity, i s admitted to
be
eternal, but i n a
state
of ignorance
he is
not obtained; like a piece of gold which i s forgotten (a nd so ugh t f o r ) ,
whilst i t i s hanging round the neck‘.’ Here i t would be impossible to
refer
satyam
to the
succeeding
member
of
the sentence,
as the apodosis
b e i ng separated from i t , not only by the sense, b u t by the particle a p i .
Passages of this description might be indefinitely multiplied, b u t these
are
s u f f i c i e n t to
shew
that
the construction
in
the sense
a d o pted
by
Mr.
Colebrooke i s
common
and correct.
Accordingly hi s version i s
uniformly
supported scholiastarum sufl‘ra
giis. Thus
in
the
S . Bh a' sh ya , a s we have
seen, the passage
i s
e xp l a i n e d,
d r i s h f e '
s a ' a p a ' r t h a '
c h e ' t e'vam
manyase' n a
e ' k a ' n t a ,
&c.; ‘
If by reason of
there
b e i ng obvious remedies, you think i n dee d the inquiry superfluous,
no i t i s not s o ) , from their not b e i ng absolute
and
permanent.’
So
in the
S. Tatwa Kaumudi, after stating the objection at length, the commentator
adds,
n i r a ' k a r o t i , n a i t i ; ‘ (the author)
refutes
i t (by
saying),
no , not so : ’
kutah, ‘why
? ’
e'ka'ntatyantatoh a b l u z ' v a ' t 1 ' .
The
S. Cb a n drika' i s to
the
same e f f e c t , or
s t i l l
more
explicit: ‘ There b e i ng obvious means,
the
inquiry i s superfluous,
the conclusion being otherwise
attained:
i f
( t h i s
b e . urged) such i s the meaning (of the t e x t ) , (the
author)
contradicts i t ;
no, i t i s not so I . This commentator g iv in g t he very reading, d r i s h t ' e ' s a t i ,
which Professor
Lassen
argues Mr. Colebrooke’s version
would errone
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8
ously require. The remaining scholiast, RAMA KRISHNA, adopts the com
ment o f t he Chandrika' word f o r word, and consequently the commentators
are
unanimous
in
support
of
the
translation
of
Mr.
Colebrooke.
With
respect
to the
passages referred
t o by Professor Lassen as esta
blishing the connex io n
of
the
negative
with the l a t t e r member
of
the
sentence,
instead
o f i t s being
absolute,
i t will be
seen
at once
that they
are
not
at a l l
analogous
to the passage in our t e x t . They
are
declaratory,
not argumentative; and the
terms
following
the n egative particle are
the
pa rts or circumstances of the
negative,
not the
reasons
on which i t i s
grounded. Thus in the Hitopadesa: ‘
What
w i l l not be, will not b e;
i f
i t
will be,
i t
will n ot be otherwise * . ’ So
in
v. 8 . of the Ka'rika' : ‘ The
non
apprehension of
nature
i s
from i t s
subtlety, not from
i t s
nonentity
T . ’ In
neither
of
these
i s
there
any
reference
to
a
foregone
position
which must
be admitted or denied, nor i s t he n ega ti ve followed
by
the reasons
f o r
denial, as i s the
case
in our text.
These considerations are more than
sufficient
to vindicate,
what
i t was
scarcely perhaps necessary
to
have
asserted,
M r.
Colebrooke’s
accuracy;
and they
are now also somewhat superfluous, as
I
have been
given to
understand that Professor Lassen acknowledges the correctness of hi s
interpretation. The commentary
of
GAURAPADA
distinctly
shews that
nothing more
i s intended
by
the t e x t , than the unprofitableness
of
recourse
to
visible
or
world ly e x ped ie nts
for
the
r e l i e f
or
removal
of
worldly
pain.
In subjoining
therefore the gloss of VACHESPATI MISRA, with
a
translation,
i t i s intended rather to illustrate the d oct ri ne s o f t he text, and the mode
of their d evel opmen t by native scholiasts, than further to vindicate the
correctness of the translation.
‘ IBut verily the object o f t he science may not need inquiry, 1 . i f there
b e no pain in the world; 2 . i f there be no desire to avoid i t ; 3 . i f there
be no means of extirpating i t . The
impossibility
of extirpating i t i s
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9
twofold; either
from
the
eternity
of p ai n, or
from ignorance
of
the means
of alleviation : o r , though i t be possible to extirpate pain, ye t that know
ledge
which
philosophy
treats
of
may
not
be
the
means
of
i t s
removal;
o r aga in,
there
may
be some other and
more
ready
means.
In the
t e x t ,
however, i t
is
not said that
pain
does not exist, nor
that there is no
wish
to avoid i t . From the embarrassment of the three kinds of palm—A
triad
of
pain,
three
kin ds: they
are the
a'dhya'tmika,
‘ natural
; ’ a'dhibhau
t i k a , ‘extrinsic ; ’ and a'dhidaivika, ‘superhuman.’ The
first
i s of 'two
kinds, bodily and mental: bodily i s caused by disorder of the humours,
wind, bile,
and phlegm; mental i s
occasioned
by
desire, wra t h , co ve t o u s
ness, fear, envy, grief, and want of discrimination. These various kinds
of pain are called inseparable, from their admitting of internal remedies.
The
pain
that requires
external
remedies
i s also twofold, a ' d h i b a u t z ' k a and
a'dhidaivika. The first has fo r i t s cause, man, b e asts, d eer, birds, reptiles,
and inanimate t hi ngs; t he second arises from the e v i l infl uence of the
planets, or
possession
by impure
s p i r i t s (Yakshas, Ra'kshasas,
Vina'yakas,
&c.).
These kinds of pain, depending upon the vicissitudes
arising
from the
quality
of foulness, are to be experienced by every indivi
dual,
and
cannot be
prevented.
Through the obstruction occasioned
by the
three
kinds of p ai n a bi di ng in s p i r i t , arises
embarrassment,
or
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10
confinement of
the sentient
faculty. The capability of
knowing
the
impediment
occasioned
by such pain,
i s
considered the cause
of
the
desire
to
avoid
i t ;
for
though
p a i n
may
not
be
prevente d, yet
i t
i s
p os
sible t o overcome i t , as will be subsequently explained. Pain then b e i ng
generated, inquiry i s to be
made
into the means
of i t s
removal.
Tad
apagha'take': tad refers here to t he t hre e kinds of pain, tad having the
relation dependent upon i t s b e i ng used as a subordinate ( r e l a t i v e ) term.
The means ( h e t u ) of removing—These
are
t o be derived
from
philosophy,
not from any other source: this i s the position (of the t e x t ) .
To
t h i s a
d o u b t i s
objected;
As there
are
obvious means,
the inquiry
i s superfluous;
4 ' f s o — - . The
sense i s
this:
Be i t admitted that th ere a re th re e kinds o f ‘
pain; that the rational b e i ng wishes to escape from them; that
escape
i s
practicable;
and
that
means
attainable
t h ro u gh p h il o so p hy
are
a d eq uate
to their extirpation; s t i l l any investigation by those who look into the
subject i s
need less;
for there
do
exist o b v i o u s (visible) means o f extirpa
t i o n ,
which
are easily
attainable,
whilst
the knowledge
of
philosophical
principles
i s
d i f f i c u l t
of
attainment, and to
be
a cq ui re d o nl y
by long
study,
and
traditional tuition through many generations. Therefore,
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11
according to the p op u l ar
saying,
“Why
should a
man who may
find
honey in
the
arkka flower, go for i t to the mountain?” so what wise
man
w i l l
give
himself
unnecessary
trouble,
when
he
has
attained
the
object
of
hi s
wishes. Hundreds of remedies for bodily affections are indicated by
eminent
physicians.
The p le asu re s o f sense,
women,
wine, luxuries,
unguents, dress, ornaments, are the easy means of obviating mental
d i s t r e s s . So in regard to extrinsic pain, easy means of obviating i t exist
in the s k i l l acquired by acquaintance with moral and p o l i t i c a l
science,
and by residing in safe and
healthy
places, and the like; whilst the
employment of gems
and
charms readily counteracts the e v i l s in d uced
by superhuman agency. This i s the objection. (The author) refutes
i t ; i t i s not s o . Why?
From
these means
not
being absolute or
final.
Eka'nta
means
the
certainty
of
the
cessation
of
pain;
atyanta,
the
non
recurrence of pain that has ceased. (In obvious means of r e l i e f there
i s )
the non-existence of both these properties; the affix t a s z ' , which may be
substituted
f o r a l l inflexions, being here p u t f o r the sixth case
dual
;—as
i t i s said; “From not observing the (invariable) cessation of
pain
of
vario us ki n d s, in consequence
of
the
employment of
ceremonies,
drugs,
women, moral
and political studies,
charms,
and
the
like,
their want of
certain operation ( i s predicated); so i s their temporary influence, from
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12
observing the recurrence‘of pain
that
had been ’suppressed. Although
available, therefore, the obvious means o f p utti ng a stop to p a i n are
neither
absolute nor final, and consequently this inquiry (into other
means) i s not superfluous. This i s the purport (of the t e x t ) . ’
The
Sa'nkhya Chandrih'a' and S. Kaumudi
are both
to
the same e f f e c t ,
and i t
i s
unnecessary to
c i t e them. The
original Sutras
of
KAPILA,
as collected
in the S. Pravachana, and
commented
on
by
VIJGNYANA
BnIKsnu,
confirm
the
view taken
by
the scholiasts.
S(1tra:—‘
The final
cessation
of
the three kinds
of
pain
i s
the fin a l
object of soul*.‘
Comment :—‘ The fin a l cessation
of these
three kin ds
of pain, the
t o t a l cessation
of universal
pain,
whether
gross
o r su bt le
(present
or
to
come),
i s
the
final,
supreme
object
of
soul
1 - . ’
Sfrtra :—‘ The accomplishment of that cessation i s not from obvious
means, from the
evident
recurrence (of pain) after suppression 1 . ’
Comment :—‘ The
accomplishment of
the
final
cessation
of pain i s not
( t o be effected) by
worldly means,
as
wealth,
and
the like.
Whence i s
this?
Because
that
pain
of which
the cessation
i s procured by
wealth
and the
like
i s seen to occur again, when that wealth and the r e s t are
exhausted
l l . ’
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13
I I .
THE
revealed mode
i s
like
the
temporal
one,
ineffectual,
for
i t
i s
impure; and
i t i s defective
in
some
r e s p e c t s ,
as
well
a s
excessive
i n
others. A
method
different
from
both
i s preferable,
consisting in a
discriminative
knowle dg e
of perceptible principles, and of the imper
ceptible
one, and of the thinking s o u l .
BHASHYA.
Although the
inquiry i s
to
be directed
to
other
than to
obvious remedies,
ye t
i t
i s
n ot to
be directed
to such as
a re d eri va bl e from revelation,
as
means of removing t he t hre e kinds of pain. Anusravati, ‘ what man su c
cessively hears ; ’ a'nusravika, ‘th a t which i s
thence
produced, revealed
mode
; ’ that i s ,
established
by the Védas: as i t i s said; “ We drank the
juice
of
the acid
asclepias;
we became
immortal;
we attained
effulgence;
we
know divine things. What
harm
can
a
foe inflict
on
us? How ca n
decay
affect an immortal 1 ”
(This
text
of the
Véda
refers
t o ) a
discussion
amongst Indra
and
other gods, as to how they became immortal. In
explanation i t was s a i d , “We were d ri nke rs o f soma juice, and thence
became immorta
, ” that
i s ,
gods:
f urt he r, “Weascended to , or a t t a i n e d ,
efiulgence,
or
heaven;
we knew
divine,
celestial,
things.
Hence then,
assuredly,
what
can
an enemy
do
to
us? What decay can affect an im
mortal?”
dhurtti meaning
‘
decay’ or
‘injury : ’ ‘What can
i t do
to an
immortal being?’
It
i s
also said
in
the
Védas,
that
final recompense i s obtained
by
animal sacrifice:
“ He
who offers the
aswame'dha conquers a l l worlds,
overcomes
d eath,
and ex piates
a l l sin,
even the murder
o f
a
Brahman.”
As, therefore,
final
and
absolute consequence
i s
prescribed
in
the
Védas,
inquiry (elsewhere) should be superfluous; b u t this i s not the case.
The t e x t s a y s , t h e r e v e a l e d mode i s l i h e t h e t e m p o r a l o n e — d r i s h t ' a v a t ;
‘ l i k e , same as the temporal,’ d r i s h f e ' n a t u l y a . What i s that revealed
mode,
and
whence i s
i t
(ineffectual)? It i s impure,
defective i n some
E
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14
r e s p e c t s ,
and
excessive in
o t h e r s .
It
i s
impure
from (enjoining) animal
sacrifices; as, “according to the ritual of the aswame'dha,
si x
hundred
horses, minus three,
are
offered at
midday.”
For
though that
i s virtue
which
i s
enjoined
by
the
Védas
and
laws,
y e t ,
from
i t s
miscellaneous
character, i t may be affected by impurity.
It
i s also said ;
“Many
thou
sands of Indras and other
gods
have passed away in successive
ages,
overcome
by
time; f o r time i s hard to overcome.”
Hence
therefore, as
even
Indra
and
the go ds perish,
t he re ve al ed mode involves
defective
cessation
of pain.
Excess
i s also on e of
i t s properties, and
pain
i s
pro
duced by
observing the
superior
advantages
of others.
Here,
therefore,
by excess,
a t i s ' a y a , i s understood
the u n e q u a l
distribution of temporal
rewards, as the
consequence of
sacrifice;
the
object of the
ritual of
the
Védas b e i ng in
fact
in
a l l cases temporal good. Therefore
t he re ve al ed
mode
i s like the temporal one. What then i s
the
preferable
mode?
If
this
be asked, i t i s replied, One dilfirent from both. Amode different from
both the
temporal
and revealed i s preferable, b e i ng
free
from
impurity,
e xce ss, o r
deficiency.
How i s
this?
I t i s e x plaine d ( i n the text: It
consists in a
discriminative knowle dge,
&c.
Here, by perceptible princi
ples,
a re intended
Mahat
and the r e s t , or Intellect,
Egotism, the
five
subtile rudiments, the
eleven
organs (of perception
and action),
and the
five gross
elements. The imperceptible
one
i s Pradlia'na
(the
chief or
great one). The thinhing s o u l , Purusha
(the
incorporeal). These twenty
five
principles
are
intended
by
the
(three)
terms
vyakta, avyakta,
and
jna.
In discriminative
knowledge o f t he se
consists the preferable mode;
and he who
knows
them knows the twenty-five
principles
(he has perfect
knowledge).
The difference between the perceptible, and imperceptible, and think
ing principles, i s n e xt explained.
COMMENT.
Having taught that worldly means of overcoming worldly
evil are
ineffectual, i t i s next a sse rt ed t ha t d evotio nal remedies, such as the rites
enjoined by the Védas, are e q ua l ly u n ava i li n g; and knowledge of the
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15
t hre e p art s or
divisions o f e xi st en ce ma te ri al
and s p i r i t u a l ,
i s
the only
mode
by which
exemption
from
the infirmities
of
corporeal
being can be
attained.
The
Védas
are
i n e f l i c i e n t ,
from
their
i n h um a n i ty
in
prescribing the
shed d ing of blood: the
rewards
which
they propose
are
also b u t
tempo
rary,
as
the gods themselves are
finite beings,
perishing in
each
periodical
revolution. The immortality spoken of in the Védas i s merely a long
duration,
or until a dissolution of the existent forms o f thin gs * . The
Védas
also
cause, instead of curing, pain, as the blessings t h ey p ro m is e
to on e man
over
another are sources
of
envy and
misery
to those who d o
not possess them. Such i s t he se nse
given by
GAURAPADA to atisaya, and
the S. Tatwa Kaumudi understands i t
also
to imply the u ne qu al a pp or
tionment of
rewards
by the Védas themselves: ‘The jyotishtoma and
other
r i t e s
secure
simply
heaven; the v a f j a p e ' y a and others co nf er th e
'sovereignty of heaven: this i s b e i ng p osse sse d o f t he property o f e x ce ss
(inequality) T . ’
In like manner, the original aphorism
of
KAPILA
affirms
of these
two
modes,
the
temporal and re ve a le d , t h at
there
‘is no difference
between
themi,’ and
that ‘ escape from
pain i s
not
the consequence of the l a t t e r
l l , ’
because ‘ recurrence i s nevertheless
the
result of
that
immunity which i s
attainable by acts
(o f
devotion) § , ’ as
‘ t h e consequences
o f acts
are
n ot
eternal
“3 Here however a
dilemma
occurs, for the Véda also says, ‘
There
i s
no
return
(regeneration)
of
o n e
who
has
attained
the
sphere
of Brahma
by acts (of
devotion)
T T . ’
This
i s explained away by
a
Sfitra of Ka pi la ,
which declares that
the Véda limits
the n o n -regenerati o n of on e who
has
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16
attained
t he re gi on of Brahma to him who, when there, acquires
discri
minative wisdom * ‘ .
This
discriminative wisdom i s
th e a ccu ra te
discrimination of
those
principles
into
which
a l l
that
exists
i s
distributed by
the
Sa'nkhya
philo
sophy.
Vyakta,
‘that which i s
perceived, sensible,
discrete ; ’
Avyakta,
‘ that which i s
unperceived,
indiscrete ; ’ and
Jna,
‘ that which knows, or
discriminates
: ’ the first i s matter in i t s perceptible modifications; the
second i s crude, unmodified matter; and the
third
i s soul. The object o f
the
S. Ka'rika' i s
to define
and
e x p l a i n
t he se t hre e things,
the
correct
knowledge o f which i s of itself release from worldly bondage, and ex
emption from exposure to human
i l l s ,
by the final separation of soul
from
body.
I I I .
NATURE, the root (of a ll ) , i s n o production. Seven principles, the
Great or intellectual one, &c., are pro d uctio ns and p rod uctive. Si x
teen
are
productions (unproductive). Soul
i s
neither a production
nor productive. I
BHASHYA.
Z l l z f l a
(the
r o o t )
prakriti (nature) i s pradha'na
( c h i e f ) ,
from i t s being the
root
of
the
seven
principles
which
are
productions
and
productive;
such
nature i s
the r o o t .
No production.—It i s not produced from another:
on
that
account nature
(prakriti)
i s
no
product of any other
thing.
Seven
pr inciples.- M ahat and
the
rest;
from i t s being
the
great (mahat) element;
this i s Intellect (Buddhi). I n t e l l e c t and the rest.-The
seven
principles
are, l . Intellect; 2 .
Egotism; 3-7.
The
five
subtile rudiments.
These
seven
are productions
and
productive: in t h i s manner:
Intellect
i s produced
from
the
chief on e (nature). That again
produces
Egotism, whence i t i s
productive (prakriti). Egotism, as derived from I n t e l l e c t , i s a prod uc
*rrau'rwfifiwmqfirrgfim
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tion; but as i t gives origin
to the
five subtile rudiments, i t i s productive.
The subtile ru dimen t of sound i s derived from Egotism,
and
i s
therefore
a
production;
b u t
as causing
the
production of
ether,
i t i s productive.
The subtile
rud iment
of t ou ch , a s
generated
from Egotism, i s a prod uc
tion; as
giving origin
to a i r , i t i s productive. The subtile
rud iment
of
smell
i s
derived
from Egotism,
and
i s therefore
a
production;
i t gives
origin to
earth,
and
i s t he re f ore p ro d u ct i ve . The subtile rudiment of
form i s
a
production from Egotism; as
generating
l i g h t , i t
i s
productive.
The subti le rudiment
of
flavour, as derived from Egotism, is a production;
i t i s p ro du ct ive , a s giving origin to water. In this manner the Great
principle
and
the rest are productions
and
productive. Sixteen are pro
d uctio ns; that
i s ,
the
five organs
of perception, the five organs of action,
with
mind,
making
the
eleventh,
and
the
five
elements:
these
form
a
class of sixteen which are productions, the term vika'ra b e i ng the same as
v i h r i t i . Soul i s neither a
production nor
productive.
These
(principles)
- being thus
classed,
i t i s next to be considered by what and how many
kin ds of proof, and
by
what proof severally
applied,
the demonstration of
these three (classes o f ) principles, the perceptible, the imperceptible, and
the thinking s o u l ,
can
be
effected.
For in this wo rl d a
probable
thing
i s
established
by
p ro of, i n the same mode as (a quantity of ) grain by a
prastha (a certain measure), and the l i k e , or sandal and o th er t hi n gs by
weight.
On this
account what
proof
i s ,
i s nex t
to be d efin e d.
COMMENT.
In t h i s sta nza the
three principal categories
of the
Sankhya system
are
briefly
d efi ned,
chiefly with
regard
to
their relative
characters.
Existent things, according to o n e classification, are
said to
be fourfold:
l . prahriti; 2 . v i / r r i t i ; 3 . p r a h r i t i - v i i h r i t i ; and anubhaya r i ' i p a , neither pra
I m ' t i nor v i h r i t i . Prabriti, according to i t s ordinary
use,
and i t s etymo
logical sense, mcans that
which i s primary,
that
which
precedes what
i s
made; from
pm, pm’, and bri,
‘ to make.’ This, however, i s
further
dis
tinguished
in
the
text
into
the
rmila
prahriti; the
p r a / t r i t i
which
i s
the
root
and substance
of
a l l things except s o u l , matter or nature; and
secondary,
special,
or relative
prahriti,
or every
production
that in i t s
F
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turn
becomes
primary
t o some other
derived from i t . By prahriti
may
therefore be
understood
the
matter
of which every substance primarily or
secondarily i s composed, and from which i t proceeds, the primary, o r , a s
Mr. Colebrooke
renders
i t , ‘
productive’
principle of
some s eco n d a ry s ub
stance
or
production.
This
subsequent
product i s termed v i h r z ' t i ,
from the
same r o o t , h r i , ‘ to make,’with v i , implying
‘ v a r i a t i o n , ’
prefixed. V z ' h r i t i does
not mean a product, or thing brought primarily into existence, b ut merely
a
mo d ificatio n of
a
state of
being,
a new d evel opmen t or
form
of some
thing previously extant.
We
might
therefore
consider i t
a s b est
rendered
by the term ‘ development,’
b u t there
i s no objection to
the
equivalent in
the t e x t , or ‘ product.’ In this way, then, the different substa nces o f
the
universe are respectively nature, or matter, and form. Crude or radical
matter
i s
without
form.
Intellect
i s i t s
first
form,
and
Intellect
i s
the
matter o f Egotism. Egotism i s a form o f Intellect, and the matter of
which the senses and the ru d i me n ta l e l em en t s are formed: th e se nses
are
forms
o f
Egotism.
The gross elements a re forms of
the
rudimental _
elements. We are not to ex ten d the materiality of the grosser
elements
to the forms of
visible things,
for visible things are compounds, not simple
d evelo pments
of a
simple base. Soul comes
under
the
fourth
class; i t i s
neither
ma tter n or
form, production nor productive.
More particular
d e fin i ti o ns o f each category
subsequently
occur.
IV.
PERCEPTION, inference,
and
right
affirmation, are admitted to
be
threefold proof; for they ( a r e by a l l acknowledged, an d) comprise
every mode of
demonstration.
I t i s from proof that belief of that
which i s to b e proven r e s u l t s .
BHASHYA.
Perception
,'-as,
the
ear,
the
skin,
the
eye, the
to ngue,
the nose, are the
five organs of sense; and their five o bj ect s a re respectively, sou n d, f e e l ,
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form,
flavour, and odour: the ear a p p re h en d s so u n d ; the skin,
feel;
the
eye,
form;
the to ngue, taste; the nose, smell.
This
proof i s
called, (that
which
i s )
seen (or perception).
That
object which i s not
ascertainable
either
by
i t s b e i ng present,
or by inference,
i s to
be apprehended from
right
aflirmation; such a s , INDRA, the king of the gods;
the
northern
Kurus;
the
nymphs
of
heaven; and
the
like. That
which
i s
n ot ascer
tainable by
perception or
inference,
i s derived from
apt
( o r s u f f i c i e n t )
authority. It i s also said; “ They c a l l scripture,
right
affirmation; r i g h t ,
as free from e r r o r . Let not o n e
exempt
from fault affirm a falsehood
without a de q u a te reason. He who in his appointed o f f i c e i s
free
from
partiality or enmity, and i s ever respecte d by persons of the same cha
r a c t e r ,
such
a
man
i s
to
be regarded as apt (fit or worthy).”
In these
three
are
comprised
a l l
kinds
of
proof.
JAIMINI
describes
six
sorts
of
proof. Which of those
then
are n ot p ro of s? They a r e , presumption
( a r t h a ' p a t t i ) , proportion (sambhava),
privation ( a b h a ' v a ) , comprehension
( p r a t i b h a ' ) , oral communication ( a i t i h y a ) ,
and
comparison (upama'na).
Thus: “Presumption” i s twofold, ‘ seen’
and
‘heard.’ ‘ Seen’ i s where in
on e case t he e x ist ence of s p i r i t i s admitted, and i t i s presumed that i t
exists in'another. ‘ Heard ; ’ DEVADATTA does not eat by day, and yet
grows f a t : i t i s presumed then that he eats by night. “ Proportion ; ” By
the t erm o ne prastha, four huravas are equally designated. “ Privation” i s
fourfold; prior,
mutual,
constant,
and
total. ‘
Prior ; ’
as, DEVADATTA
in
child ho o d,
youth,
&c.
‘Mutual
; ’
as,
Water j ar in
cloth. ‘ Constant
; ’
as,
The horns of an ass; the son
of
a barren woman; the flowers of the
sky. ‘
Total’ privat ion,
or
destruction;
as when cloth i s b urnt, o r as from
contemplating
withered grain, want
of
rain
i s
ascertained. In this manner
privation
i s manifold.
“
Comprehension ; ”
a s , The part of the country
that
l i e s
between the Vindhya
mou n ta i ns
on the north and Sahya moun
t a i n s on the south, extending
to
the
sea,
is
pleasant;
By this sentence
i t
i s intended to express that
t here are many
agreeable circumstances
com
prehended in that co un try, t he name of the
s i t e
indicating i t s several
products.
“Oral
communication
; ”
a s ,
When
peopl