T H E S E C O N D B A T T L E O F YPRES/ST. J U L I E N (April - May 1915)

After several months of training on Salisbury Plain in England, enduring some ot the coldest and wettest winter weather in living memory, the Canadian First Division was sent to France. It arrived at St. Noisier on 16 February 1915 and moved immediately to Flanders. Here the troops settled into the routine of trench life, ill-equipped for the dismal winter weather that greeted them.

In Apri l 1915 the Canadian First Division was occupying a sector of the Allied front line close to the city of Ypres. On the Canadian right were British divisions; to the left a French (Algerian) division. On Apri l 22 after a heavy bombardment, the Germans released 5,730 cylinders of chlorine gas in an attempt to effect a breakthrough. Allied commanders had dismissed reports that gas was about to be used, so the men were totally unprotected against the deadly, choking gas clouds rolling over the front line. The Algerians fled in panic, leaving a great hole four miles wide in the Allied defences and the flank exposed. The Canadians, many of them with their Ross rifles jammed, held on and fought to close the gap. In a series of counter-attacks the Canadians suffered heavy casualties, but their efforts gave the Allies time to save the situation.

Two days later on Apri l 24, the Germans

again attacked, this time releasing gas

against the Canadians, who had only cotton

bandoliers with which to cover their mouths

for protection. German shell fire rained

down on the Canadian positions. Somehow

they held on, except for those at St. Julien,

who were overrun, those not killed being

captured. They were to remain as prisoners

of war until the Armistice in 1918.

The fighting continued for another three weeks, in the course of which the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry distin­guished itself, losing 400 of its 550 men in a successful attempt to hold off an enemy attack. The Canadians in their first engagement had proved themselves worthy, four of them earning the Victoria Cross, but one in three had become casu­alties. In 48 hours 6,035 had been lost (only a few dying from the effects of gas). In all there were more than 59,000 casual­ties for the sake of positions that had little strategic value. It was an ominous portent of what was to occur many times during the next four years, as troops went for­ward to attack powerful enemy defences time after time and casualty Figures rose ever higher in a wasteful war of attrition.

It was after this battle that Lieutenant-Colonel John McCrae composed his immortal poem In Flanders Fields and Sir John French, the British Commander-in-Chief, said of the Canadians: "These splendid troops averted a disaster."

ST. E L O I C R A T E R S (April 1916)

From September 1915 through the early months of 1916 the Canadians were involved in the constant patrolling and raiding in No Man's Land that was a feature of this period of the war. In the process the Canadians gained a solid reputation, but sustained heavy losses (5,452 casualties; 1,234 fatal.) Tunnellers from both the Allied and German sides dug their tunnels ever deeper under the front line positions of their opponents in attempts to blow up enemy trenches.

On March 27, 1916 the British exploded

six huge mines beneath the German

positions at St. Eloi, burying many of

the German defenders. As the British

attacked, German survivors manned

machine guns and prevented the capture

of three of the craters formed by the

explosions. German artillery poured a hail

of shells onto the area, and on the night

of A p r i l 3-4 when the Canadian Second

Division troops relieved them there were

few survivors of the original attacking

force. The Canadians were wearing the

newly introduced steel helmets.

By now the craters had become small lakes and the Canadians huddled in mud-filled shell holes as they fought off German attacks. On Apri l 6 the enemy regained every crater except one. For 13 days a bitter battle raged and finally, on Apr i l 19, a crushing bombardment buried the sur­viving defenders of one of the two craters still in Canadian hands. Those who re­mained alive surrendered. This action cost another 1,373 men. It also cost Alderson his command, for he was relieved by Sir Douglas Haig and replaced by Lieutenant-General the Honourable Sir Julian Byng (later Governor General of Canada) as commander of the Canadian Corps.

It had become obvious by now that the war would not soon be over.

M O U N T S O R R E L and S A N C T U A R Y W O O D (June 1916)

The Canadian Third Division moved in to the front line to occupy a hill in the Ypres salient known as Mount Sorrel, almost the only high ground retained by the Allies f rom the previous year. Because of its strategic importance it was a key target for the Germans. On the morning of June 2, 1916 a furious bombardment was unleashed against the Canadian positions, and simultaneously four huge mines were exploded under Mount Sorrel.

Trenches and their defenders vanished,

and those who survived offered virtually

no resistance to the German infantry as

they attacked. Of 702 men in the 4th

Canadian Mounted Rifles, only 76 survived

unwounded; the Princess Patricia's

Canadian Light Infantry lost 400 men

in Sanctuary Wood. Inexplicably, the

German attack halted at nightfall, w i th

the capture of Ypres within their grasp.

The next morning the Canadians counter-attacked to try to recapture Mount Sorrel and Hills 61 and 62. W i t h little artillery support and in the face of heavy machine gun fire, the Canadians were beaten back. On June 6 the Germans exploded four more mines under the Canadian positions at Hooge.

The British could spare no troops, but I laig was able to provide artillery for a second attempt to recapture the high ground. Byng gave the task of launching this second counter-attack to Arthur Currie, a general whose ability had already become apparent. Currie carefully prepared his troops, rehearsing them prior to the attack and familiarising them with the ground over which they would be attacking. He also devised a somewhat different artillery plan, designed to catch the German defenders off guard. Four times the bombardment built to a crescendo and stopped. Four times the Germans manned their defences, only to sustain heavy casualties as the guns opened up again. Finally, at 1:30 a.m. on June 13, after an intense bombardment the previous evening, the Canadians attacked and regained all the positions lost on June 4. The cost was heavy, with some 8,430 casualties.

Many valuable lessons had been learned, which were to be put to good use in the attack on Vimy Ridge in April 1917. Canadians had won a victory, but ahead of them was the Battle of the Somme.

T H E SOMME (July - November 1916)

In 1916 the Allies planned offensives

on three fronts: the Western, Eastern

and Italian. These were to be massive,

frontal attacks of the type which had

already cost so many thousands of lives.

On the Western Front, the plan was for

a joint British-French assault on the

Somme in mid-1916.

This scheme was upset when the Germans launched an all-out attack on the French fortress of Verdun, which they knew the French would fight to the last man to hold on to. The attack began on February 21, 1916 and lasted until December, by which time more than 800,000 men had died. Verdun made it very difficult tor the French to participate in the Somme offen­sive. The British build-up went ahead, massing guns and men for what Haig termed "the Big Push." The Germans, long aware of the impending attack, waited in their well-prepared defensive positions.

As had happened many times before, the intense bombardment of the enemy positions prior to the attack switched to targets further back behind the enemy lines at the moment of their assault. The Germans came up from their deep dug-outs and were waiting as the 100,000 British troops climbed out of their trenches and advanced against the German trenches in full daylight. It was July 1, 1916.

On that July day, almost 58,000 men

were killed, wounded or went missing.

It was the biggest disaster in British

military history.

Taking part in the attack was the First Newfoundland Regiment, which had come to France from the Gallipoli campaign. Newfoundland was not, of course, part of Canada at that time. The 801 men of the Regiment who went into battle that morning at B E A U M O N T - H A M E L , advanced over 250 yards of open ground before they even reached their own front line. They did not waver as they advanced through a hail of fire, men falling at every

step, "instinctively (tucking) their chins into an advanced shoulder as they had so often done when fighting their way home against a blizzard in some little outport in far-off Newfoundland." Only 68 un-wounded men remained by the end of the day: 14 officers and 219 other ranks were killed or died of wounds; 12 officers and 374 other ranks were wounded; 91 other ranks were missing.

July 1 remains a day of mourning in

Newfoundland.

At the entrance to Newfoundland Park at Beaumont-Hamel is inscribed an epitaph written by John Oxenham:

"Tread softly here! Go reverently and slow!

Yea, let your soul go down upon its knees,

And with bowed head, and hearts abased,

strive hard

To grasp the future gain in this sore loss!

For not one foot of this danl^ sod but drank^

Its surfeit of the blood of gallant men,

Who, for their faith, their hope -for Life

and Liberty -

Here made the sacrifice, here gave their lives

And gave right willingly, for you and me...

General Haig persisted in his strategy of attrition, throwing forward massed for­mations of troops in the months which followed. Casualty figures mounted, often as many as 4,000 in 24 hours. Into this bloodbath came the Canadians in September 1916, relieving the Australians and New Zealanders who had struggled unsuccessfully to take Pozieres Ridge, a long low-lying hill that overlooked the British lines.

On September 15, supported by seven

tanks and a rolling barrage (artillery

f iring shells just ahead of the advancing

infantry so that the German defenders

had no time to man their defences and

weapons before the attack hit home), the

Canadian Second Division attacked at C O U R C E L E T T E . The advance quickly moved forward two miles and the town was entered. Desperate counter-attacks by the Germans were fought off by Canadians f r o m New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Quebec (the 22e Battallion would be the Royal 22nd Regiment). Meanwhile, the Canadian First Division drove the enemy o f f Pozieres Ridge. Casualties were heavy.

O n the British left, the Canadian Thi rd Division attacked the strongly held Fabeck Trench, driving out the enemy

after two days of heavy fighting.

The Canadian First Division fought through two German defensive lines but could not break through the Regina Trench line, secure behind huge barbed wire entanglements and bristling with machine guns. Torrential rain turned the battlefield and trenches into a quagmire. Burdened with their heavy equipment (weighing 65 pounds or more), some soldiers drowned in the mud. The conditions have been described as "a nightmare of the foulest sort." Over the next two months, attack after attack was made upon the Regina Trench, but the failure of artillery to cut the barbed wire in front of German positions, the scarcity of grenades, and poorly trained reinforcements added to the difficulties facing the Canadians. Nevertheless, the Canadian Fourth Division captured Regina Trench on November 11, 1916, and a week later made further advances against German defences. It was the last Canadian action on the Somme, and the Fourth Division left to join the Canadian Corps on the Vimy front.

Between July 1 and November, the front line had advanced some six miles. The Allies had suffered 623,907 dead and wounded; the Germans 465,525 at least.

C A N A D A A N U T H E G R E A T # A R i » i 4 - i ^ i s A N A T I O N BORN

On the British side, "Kitchener's Army"

of volunteers largely formed in 1914-1915

after the declaration of war was all but

destroyed, and the flower of the old

German army was also no more. The

Canadians had sustained 24,029 casualties,

but had earned for themselves a reputation

as hard-hitting attack troops.

By the end of 1916, more than 400,000 men had gone overseas from Canada. No community remained unaffected by the conflict as casualty figures grew.

VIMY R I D G E (April 1917)

In the late autumn of 1916, the Canadian Corps was in the line just north of Arras on the edge of the Douai plain facing Vimy Ridge — a strong point of the German defences in northern Europe. Reaching 110 metres at its highest point, and eight kilometres long, the great Ridge held such strategic importance for the Germans that they had carefully fortified it over the three years of the war. In fact, it was con­sidered impregnable behind three huge defensive lines bristling with machine guns and barbed wire. Along it were four extra-strong fortifications: H i l l 135, H i l l 145, La Folie Farm and the "Pimple." Beneath the Ridge, large underground chambers (complete with electric lights) and deep dug-outs protected the defen­ders from the most intense shelling. Between 1914 and 1916 the French and British had launched three massive attacks against the German position and had lost more than 150,000 men. The Ridge dominated this area of the Western Front, allowing the Germans unrestricted view of the Allied positions. Behind the Ridge were captured French mines and factories that the Germans used for their war effort. O f equal importance was the fact that the Ridge covered the junction of the Hindenburg Line (the strong new

23

C A N A D A ^ T H E GREAT //\\K A N A T I O N B O R N f » M • i •> i »

defences behind which the (iermans had withdrawn in early 1917) and the German defence systems which ran north to the Channel coast.

For the Canadians, an attack on this posi­tion posed an incredible challenge. It was also their assigned task in the massive offensive planned by the Allies in early 1917, in conjunction with the British who were to attack on either side of the Canadians. I f they were to have any hope of success in attacking across open ground in the face of the German defences and artillery, that hope lay in careful planning and preparation.

The Canadian Corps Commander, Licutenant-General Sir Julian Byng, had four divisions who had spent five months in the Vimy sector before the assault began. They were probably among the best trained and equipped troops on the Western Front, and their experiences to that time had welded them into a remarkably cohesive national force. Byng planned an assault by all four divisions in line abreast, to be carried out in four stages according to the German defensive positions. The German stronghold at the northern end of the Ridge (the "Pimple") was to be attacked within the 24-hour period following the start of the main assault.

In January 1917 Byng had sent Major-General Arthur Currie as the Canadian Corps representative to a conference at Verdun, where recently the French Commander Nivelle had enjoyed some success as a result of the introduction of new tactics. Currie returned to Byng with a number of proposals that were then incorporated into the Canadian training in preparation tor the Vimy assault. Throughout the British Expeditionary Forces, change was being forced on commanders after the blood-

baths of earlier years. At last lessons

learned were to be applied, and the

Canadians were in the vanguard.

The preparations: •PI /V IC30ISJ TT*\»C 1 ICL>S

Earlier battles during the war had shown that in the heat of action it was very d i f f i ­cult for officers to effectively command more than a platoon (consisting of anywhere from 35 to 60 men and organized in four rifle sections). Moreover, the launching of wave after wave of closely packed soldiers against heavily defended enemy positions had resulted in casualty rates which were unacceptably high, even by 1914-1918 standards. A further problem had been that the separation of riflemen from spe­cialist soldiers, such as bombers and machine gunners, in an attack had made it impossible tor proper support to be given to the attackers.

In preparing for Vimy, the Canadian Corps reorganized so that each platoon had rifle, rifle-grenade, bombing and Lewis gun (light machine gun) sections. These platoons were trained to move forward in loose formations, giving each other covering fire, rather than in massed ranks as before. This made it easier for the officers to command, and provided greater flexibility in responding to changing situations as the battle developed.

M A C H I N E G U N S

By 1917 each Canadian Corps division had 64 Vickers medium machine guns. These were extremely effective weapons (and in fact remained in service with the British Army until 1968), capable of firing 450 rounds per minute for hours at a time at ranges of more than 5000 yards (almost 5500 metres). Up until now these weapons had been used mainly in a defensive role and against direct targets.

24

T A N A D A a n i > T H F f i R F A T 'iP^A R 19 14 - n i l A N A T I O N BORN

Lieutenant-Colonel Raymond Brutinel, a Frenchman serving with the Canadian Corps, developed new tactical uses for the Vackers machine guns, supplementing the artillery. Day and night these weapons were used for indirect fire, and poured a rain of bullets, as done with artillery, onto German positions, supply and com­munication lines and artillery batteries. By firing on predetermined fixed lines in the dark, the Canadians were able to prevent the enemy from making repairs to the barbed wire defences in front of their positions. During the attack itself they — along with the artillery shelling -effectively forced the Germans to keep their heads down and stay below ground unti l the Canadian infantry were into their defences.

A R T I L L E R Y

The artillery preparations and build-up for the attack were massive: 45,760 artillery personnel and 848 guns were assembled (some 250 heavy guns and howitzers and about 600 field guns and light howitzers). New tramways (light railways) were constructed, existing track was repaired and miles of plank road were built to enable the bringing up of the huge amounts of ammunition required to feed the guns (as well as other supplies and the evacuation of casualties). When the bombardment of the enemy positions began on March 20, 1917, 2,500 tons of ammunition were expended each day. In the three weeks prior to the attack on Apri l 9, one million shells were fired at the Ridge. When the barrage intensified on Apri l 2, there began for the Germans what they termed "the week of suffering." A further 42,000 tons of ammunition was stockpiled behind the lines for the attack itself.

was responsible, as Counter-Battery Staff Officer to the Canadian Corps, for co­ordinating parts of the artillery fire plan, in ptirticulctr for loc^tio^ the Grcrm^n batteries' positions so that they could be shelled and destroyed. It was only possible to see the German rear areas, where reserves and heavy artillery were located, by using observation balloons and recon­naissance aircraft. In spite of casualties, the Royal Flying Corps was able to give McNaughton accurate information, which — combined with geometric calcula-tions based on ground observations — enabled the Canadians to pinpoint the position of more than 180 of the 212 German artillery batteries behind the Vimy front. Counter-battery fire took out 80 percent of these positions before they could he used against Canadian troops, and prevented many of the remainder from being used.

At the time of the attack, infantry and field artillery were to work closely together, the infantry advancing behind a wall of exploding shells just ahead of them (a "rolling barrage") at a rate of 100 yards every three minutes — a manoeuvre which was to be carefully rehearsed a number of times before the actual attack. This was to ensure that the defenders remained in their deep underground bunkers until the Canadians were within yards of the German positions: in previous attacks, the artillery fire had ceased even before the infantry climbed out of their trenches into No Man's Land leaving the soldiers to face the deadly fire of enemy machine guns. At the same time, other artillery would concen­trate on German batteries, ammunition dumps and communications centres.

A further important innovation was the

introduction of the instantaneous 106 fuse,

which meant that instead of exploding in

27

C A N A D A - " T H E GREAT ^ A R A \ A 1 K i \ I U > R \ i 0 1 4 i «> I s

tin- air or in the ground, the shells would

explode in the barbed wire in front of the

enemy trenches, clearing paths through

which the infantry could advance. It was,

of course, also necessary to have attackers

cut wire, and men were specially detailed

for this purpose.

RAIDING AND REHEARSING

In the period before the assault on the Ridge, the Canadians carried out an inten­sive campaign of raids against the enemy positions. These raids were designed to hurt morale, but more importantly to learn as much as possible about the enemy defences and the ground over which the Canadians would have to attack.

Not all of these raids were successful: one raid in early March against Hi l l 145 was not preceded by the usual artillery bom­bardment or wire cutting, and 700 Canadians were lost.

Rut the information gained during the raids was invaluable. Far behind the lines, the infantry were rehearsed for their part in the upcoming attack, practising over ground laid out to resemble as closely as possible the German defences on the Ridge. They carried the equipment which they would take into battle on April 9. Mounted officers rode ahead of them carrying flags at the same pace as the artillery barrage which would precede them as they attacked - the range l if t ing 100 yards every three minutes.

At the Canadian Corps Headquarters a

relief map of the Vimy sector was con­

structed of plaster. Officers, sergeants

and even section leaders were brought

in to study the map so that they and their

men would know exactly what their

objectives were. Every man knew his task,

what lay ahead of him, and what was

expected of him.

O THER PREPARATIONS

Canadian and British engineers and miners

dug deep tunnels and subways through

which troops could move up to their start­

ing line protected from enemy shelling.

These tunnels were fitted with water

supplies, electricity and telephones.

Mines were dug under German lines.

Careful preparations were made to treat and evacuate rapidly t hose who became casualties, to move the dead and to remove prisoners, (dose to the front line there was even an underground hospital.

More than 300 kilometres of telephone cables were buried two metres deep along the Corps front to ensure continuity of communication.

Portable bridges were constructed to allow easy passage over the trenches when the artillery was brought forward as the attack progressed.

Finally, to pull the trams and carry supplies, more than 50,000 horses and mules were brought into the area. To ensure a water supply for them, reservoirs and pumping stations had to be built, along with more than 70 kilometres of piping. Little was left to chance. Still, the German positions were extremely strong and would only be taken with great sacrifice on the part of the Canadians.

T H E A T T A C K (April 9 - 12,1917)

On the night of Apri l 8, 1917 (Easter Sunday) the strength of the Canadian Corps, including attached British troops, was 170,000 men.

At 5:28 a.m. on Easter Monday, April 9,

machine guns opened up against the

enemy lines, mines were exploded under

C A N A D A A M » T H K ( ; i<EAT / / \ K i <> 1 4 i •< i s \ \.vi l' >\ iv >u\

enemy positions and an enormous barrage

began, fired by the 850 guns assembled lor

the purpose and supplemented by another

280 guns of I British Corps on the left of

the Canadians. A keen northwest wind

drove snow and sleet into the faces of the

attackers. Behind the rolling barrage, the

infantry advanced.

Just before the attack went in, gas shells

were fired into the German rear areas,

kill ing hundreds of horses and disrupting

the Germans' ability to bring up ammuni­

tion and move their artillery.

The leading companies were in the first

line of enemy trenches before defenders

could emerge from their deep dug-outs.

Many prisoners were taken, 3,500 in the

first rush. Moving forward according to

their timetable, Canadian troops ran into

intense machine gun fire from the second

line of German defences, sustaining heavy

losses. In spite of this, the Canadians

took one objective after another until

by midday the First, Second and Third

Divisions were astride the Ridge on

schedule. The "Pimple" and Hi l l 145,

however, remained in German hands.

The Fourth Division had as its objective

the heavily fortified H i l l 145, the highest

and most important point on the Ridge.

The German defences here were particu­

larly strong and the Canadians were held

up in their advance, coming under heavy

fire from the "Pimple." Further attacks

had to be put in without artillery support,

and it was not until the morning of Apri l

10 that H i l l 145 was taken. That afternoon

a final assault cleared out the remaining

pockets of resistance and the Ridge was in

Canadian hands, the German defenders

pulling back to new defensive positions on

the Douai plain beyond Lens.

At 5 a.m. on April 12 the Fourth Division

launched an attack on the "Pimple,"

which had been rein forced with fresh

troops on the previous day. As on April 9

a heavy artillery bombardment supported

them, but this time it was not so easy to

move just behind the rolling barrage due

to the dif ficult terrain. The weather was

again cold, with driving snow and sleet,

and heavy enemy fire took its toll on

the attackers. But by mid-afternoon, the

storm had abated and the Canadians

were in control of the "Pimple."

In all, the Canadians had sustained just

over 10,500 casualties. Of these 3,598 were

fatal. They had also captured Vimy

Ridge, taken more than 4,000 prisoners

and many guns, and achieved one of the

greatest victories of the war up to that

time. It is said that Vimy was where

Canada was born as an independent

nation. In the attack, four Victoria

Crosses had been won: by Captain Thain

Wendell MacDowell; Private William

Johnstone Milne; Lance-Sergeant Ellis

Well wood Sifton; and Private John

George Pattison. Major-General Arthur

Currie was knighted on the battlefield by

King George V Later that summer, Currie

was promoted to Lie u ten a n t-( jeneral and

assumed command of the Canadian Corps

- its first Canadian commander.

Around the world the international press

hailed the Canadian victory. The New

York Tribune carried an editorial entitled

"Well Done Canada" and stated "no

praise of the Canadian achievement can

be excessive." Banner headlines in Britain

proclaimed " C A N A D I A N S SWEEP

V I M Y RIDGE."

Yet the victory at Vimy was not decisive.

The Allies were unable to exploit their

success and the Germans were able to

build a new, strong defensive line. How

29

C A N A D A - " T H E GREAT J/'N& A N.Vi'H )N H( ) K N i <m 4

different it might have been had the Allies been able to bring their artillery forward immediately to continue the bombardment of the enemy. The British were exhausted, however, and unable to exploit the success. When the French put in their attack on April 16 to the south between Soissons and Reims it was a complete and costly failure, and a further 25,000 men were lost in the space of five days. Nivelle was removed, and there were widespread mutinies in the French Army. The Vimy offensive had not led to the major break­through always hoped for, but Canadians could be justifiably proud of their achieve­ment. The memorial which stands today atop the Ridge is witness to that achieve­ment and an eloquent testimony to the sacrifice made at Easter 1917.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL THE HONOURABLE SIR JULIAN BYNG

Sir Julian Byng assumed command of the Canadian Corps on May 28, 1916. Prior to coming to France he had personally commanded the British evacuation at Gallipoli, the only bright spot in a wasteful and unsuccessful campaign. He had achieved the evacuation without loss of life.

From the beginning, this careful, level­headed and experienced soldier made it clear that his priority was training and careful staff work, which would save lives. Surprisingly, this British aristocrat and cavalry officer endeared himself to the Canadians. He had little time for the pomp and ceremony upon which so many high-ranking British officers insisted. One officer who served with him observed that Byng would return salutes "as well as he could without taking his hands out of his pockets." Such an approach went down well with Canadian soldiers. He was also a cool and effective commander

in the field, as his handling ot the Vimy

attack proved.

After Vimy, Byng and Currie had a number

of differences over the issue ot trench raids,

Currie insisting that he would not sacrifice

lives unnecessarily.

On June 6, 1917 Byng left the (Canadian Corps, his competence proven beyond doubt, to take command ot the British Third Army with the rank of General. After the war, honoured by being made Viscount Byng of Vimy, he was to serve as Canada's Governor-General from 1921 to 1926. He was caught up in a constitutional crisis in June 1926, refusing Prime Minister King's request to dissolve Parliament. As always he acted honestly, and, as he felt, correctly. Most constitutional experts today agree that he was correct, but he left Canada under a shadow. His achievements during the war remain undiminished.

G E N E R A L SIR A R T H U R C U R R I E

Arthur Currie, a real estate dealer from Victoria, British Columbia, began the war with no military experience other than that gained in the Militia, where he had served as commander of the 50th Highlanders. On September 29, 1914 he was appointed commander of the Second Canadian Infantry Brigade and was to go on to serve in all the major actions of the Canadian forces during the war.

On September 13, 1915 Currie took over

command of the First Canadian Division:

he succeeded Byng as Commander of the

Canadian Corps on June 9, 1917. In that

same month, he was knighted in the field

by King George V — and also faced the

surfacing of a personal financial scandal

from his pre-war days which, fortunately,

he was able to survive.

30

c) The Ross rifle scandal During the South African War of 1899-1902, the Canadian government had expe­rienced serious problems in obtaining weapons from Britain, on whom it relied lor its supplies. In particular the .303 Lee-Enfield rifle was unavailable, and efforts to persuade Birmingham Small Arms Company to set up a branch factory in Canada to manufacture the rifle were unsuccessful. Sir Wi l f r i d Laurier, then the Prime Minister, was persuaded by his Militia Minister, Sir Frederick Borden, that Canada would have to make its own rifle. A new rifle, developed by Sir Charles Ross, had recently appeared on the market. It was a fine target and sporting weapon. Ross came to Ottawa and met with a committee set up to evaluate his rifle. One of the committee members was Sam Hughes, who immediately liked the weapon. It was put through a series of tests, including comparison tests with the Lee-Enfield. In spite of the fact that the Ross jammed and often misfired, the committee recommended its adoption and manufacture in Canada. What "small problems" there were, Sir Charles Ross assured them, could be eliminated with the appropriate modifications. Sam Hughes steadfastly defended the Ross rifle in the House of Commons and was opposed to replacing it. Events were to show that he was tragically wrong.

In trench conditions, surrounded by mud and fi l th, and when it was essential to have a reliable weapon, the Ross was definitely out of place. It had a long barrel and was difficult to use in the trench's confined spaces, and it frequently jammed. It was indeed a fine weapon - on a firing range under controlled conditions.

But the First Division's stand at Ypres in

the face of a gas attack, Canadian soldiers

threw away their Ross rifles in despair

and frustration, and picked up Lee-

Enfields f rom dead British soldiers on

the battlefield.

In spite of this, the Second Division went to France with Ross rifles and again the results were much the same, with soldiers throwing away jammed weapons. By July 1916 Sir Douglas Haig, the new Commander-in-Chief, had ordered the replacement of all Ross rifles by the Lee-Enfield, then becoming widely available. To the end, Hughes refused to accept that there were problems with the Ross, and it took the intervention of many influential people to persuade him otherwise.

In November 1916, Hughes resigned, after Sir Robert Borden's decision to appoint a Minister of Overseas Forces. He died in 1921 at the age of 69.

Weapons of War - ? V.\r:i. - ".•

C ^ n s j d g r e g j ^ d ^

poison gas was necessitated by the requirement of wart ime armies to f ind

First Use by the French

Although it is populariy believed that the German army was the f irst to use

J.t was, jn. f a ct j n it i a 11 y deployed by the French. In the first month of the

Germans. Nevertheless the German army was the first to give serious

stjyhdy_toJ^^

iaiae.-Scaje^

Initial German Experiments

lD_the_c^rjtur^^

cQDi3jneaLa_.c^

fxont

Ei i jer l iDJ iguMiorm contained in 15 cm howitzer shells against the Russians at Bolimov, the new

ej<atrMenL^ temperatures prevalent at Bolimov.

the French in March 1915.

Introduction of Poison Gas

The debut of the first poison gas however - In this instance, chlorine

- came on 22 April 1915, at the start of the Second Battle of Ypres.

At this stage of the war the famed Ypres Salient, held by the Brit ish,

Canadians and French, ran for some 10 miles and bulged into

German occupied terr i tory for five miles. A combination of French

terr i torials and Algerian troops held the line to the left, with the

British and Canadians tending the centre and line to their r ight.

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line fell silent as the afternoon grew. Towards evening, at around 5 pm, the bombardment began

afresh - except that sentries posted among the French and Algerian troops noticed a curious yellow-

green cloud dri f t ing slowly towards their line.

B u z z i e r j ^ y t ^ u s ^ ^

and ordered their men to 'stand to' - that is, to mount the trench fire step in re a d inc ss rot:. P. rob a b I e

attack,

The cloud did not mask an infantry attack however; at least, not

yet. I t signalled in fact the f irst use of chlorine gas on the

batt lefield, Ironically its use ought not to have been a surprise to

the Allied troops, for captured German soldiers had revealed the

imminent use of gas on the.Western.Front. Their warnings were not

passed on however.

The effects of chlorine gas were severe. Within seconds of inhaling

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choking attacks. (For a memoir of the first gas attack click here,)

A Missed German Opportunity

Panic-stricken the French and Algerian troops fled in disorder,

prepared for this eventual i ty they could potentially have effected a

decisive breakthrough. However the results of their exper iment

caused as much surprise to the German high command as confusion

G g J O M l T ^ into the gap, but nervously and with hesitance. Outflanking the

succeeded in seizing control of a significant portion of the salient the Allies nevertheless managed

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Condemnation - and Escalation

I l i e j G e ^

dajiiMedj3erm.a..n..relations with the neutral powers, including the U.S. The gas attacks were placed

to rapid propaganda use by the British although they planned to respond in kind.

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djsajir^em,ent,,l,,.oyer its use. The cat was out of the bag; and the use of poison gas continued to

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Allied Retaliation

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British were the f irst to respond.

Raisjn,,q,.,Special Gas Companies in the wake of the Germans' April attack fof approximately 1,400

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to prepare for a gas attack at Loos in September 1915.

Interest ingly the men who comprised the British Special Gas Companies were not allowed to refer

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among their opponents.

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referred to their gas canisters as "accessories"; use of the word

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chlorine gas emplacements were established among the British

f ront line around Loos. The gas was released by turning a cock on each cylinder.

B r i t i sh Setback a t Loos

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gaA-W^s_rejeased intermit tent ly over a period of about 40 minutes before the infantry assault

began.

Hoy±ey^r^.rejeasin,g gas f rom cylinders in this manner meant that the user had to be wary of wind

condit ions. ILwas..desirable that a light wind exist in the direction of the enemy trenches; if the

Wind j ve re_ toJ^

in parts of the British line that morning this is precisely what transpired.

I h e j M l Q L s i ^ ^

the British trenches. I t has been est imated that more British gas casualties

were suffered that morning than German.

Although the numbers are arguable there is little doubt but that the exercise

proved a fai lure: and the resultant infantry attack similarly failed.

The Need for a New Delivery Mechanism

Although it was the British who chiefly suffered on 25 September 1915 all

three chief armies - Britain, France and Germany - suffered similar self-

i n f ] | c t e c l ^

be used a more reliable delivery mechanism was called for.

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provided the additional benefits of increasing the target range as well as the variety of gases

released.

Foilowinq on the heels of chlorine gas came the use of phosgene. Phosgene as a weapon,,,,wa.s.,,,mpre

potent than chlorine in that while the latter was potentially deadly it caused the vict im to violently

cough and choke.

Phosgene caused much less coughing wi th the result that more of it was inhaled; it was

consequently adopted by both German and Allied armies, Phosgene often had a delayed effect;

apparently healthy soldiers were taken down with phosgene gas poisoning up to 48 hours, after

[Qiiaiatiom.

The so-called "white star" mixture of phosgene and chlorine was commonly used.on the Somcne:

the chlorine content supplied the necessary vapour with which to carry the phosgene,.

Mustard Gas

EejI)aj,nj,Qq,,.mn,sj,st,ent^ in terms of gas warfare development, Germany unveiled an enhanced

form of gas weaponry against the Russians at Riga in September 1917: mustard gas (or Yperite)

Mustard gas, an almost odourless chemical, was distinguished by the serious blisters it caused both

internally and external ly, brought on several hours after exposure, Protection

proved more diff icult than against either chlorine or phosgene gas.

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T h ^ j j ^ o f n i u ^

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Ever Increasing Production

A s i w j ^ c h M qas before it, the Allies promptly reciprocated bv copying the

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particularly on the Western Front. I f the war had continued into 1919 both sides had planned on

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Other types of gases produced by the belligerents included bromine and

chloropicrin. The French army occasionally made use of a nerve gas

obtained f rom prussic acid.

:ne and mustard.

I M j G e n ^

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Diminishing Effectiveness of Gas

Although gas claimed a notable number of casualties during its early use, once the crucial element

of surprise had been lost the overall number of casualties quickly diminished. Indeed, deaths f rom

gas after about May 1915 were relatively rare,

I t has been est imated that among British forces the number of gas casualties f rom May 1915

amounted to some 9 per cent of the total - but that of this total only around 3% were fatal. Even

so, qas vict ims often led highly debil i tat ing lives thereafter with many unable to seek employment

once they were discharged from the army.

In large part this was because of the increasing effectiveness of the methods used to protect

often predicted, Innovations in its use were quickly combated and copied by opposing armies in an

ongoing cycle.

Protection Against Gas

The types of protection initially handed out to the troops around

Y e r e s J M ^

primit ive In the extreme, 100,000 wads of cotton pads were

quickly manufactured and made available. These were dipped

in a solution of bicarbonate of soda and held over the face-

Soldiers were also advised that holding a urine drenched cloth

over their face would serve in an emergency to protect against the effects of chlorine.

By_JL91jL^^ .sides were far better prepared to meet the ever-present threat of a gas

Mtadc._rltexxespjrators fusing charcoal or antidote chemicals) were the norm and proved highly

effective, although working in a trench while wearing such respirators generally proved difficult and

br ing ,

.W i t j n ^h^

w a s j n j j d a j ^ ^

Casualties From Gas - The Numbers

Country Total Casualties Deaths

Austria-Hungary

British Empire

100,000

188,706

3,000

8,109

France

Germany

Italy

Russia

USA

190,000

200,000

60,000

419,340

72,807

8,000

9,000

4,627

56,000

1,462

Others 10,000 1,000

Photographs courtesy of Photos of the Great War website