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The Shift from Slo Mo to High Intensity Warfare

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This briefing will focus on the shift from a primary focus on the land wars to dealing with peer competitors and those in particular shaping what analysts are calling anti- access and area denial strategies. The US and the allies are not just sitting on their hands. They are building out relevant high tempo and high intensity warfare capabilities. 1
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Thisbriefingwillfocusontheshiftfromaprimaryfocusonthelandwarstodealingwithpeercompetitorsandthoseinparticularshapingwhatanalystsarecallinganti-accessandareadenialstrategies.TheUSandthealliesarenotjustsittingontheirhands.Theyarebuildingoutrelevanthightempoandhighintensitywarfarecapabilities.

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WearefocusingontheshiftfromslomotohighintensityoperationsonthecurrentSecondLineofDefenseForum.http://www.sldforum.com

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HowwilltheUSandthealliesmaketheseshifts,andtotaketheforcewehaveandmakeitmorehighintensitycombatreadyandensurethatmodernizationgoingaheadenhancesthecapabilitytoengageinandwinhighintensityconflict?

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AsChinaandRussiabuildoutanti-accessandareadenialcapabilities,thereistheriseofwhatcanbecalledsecondnuclearagepowers.Thereturnofthenuclearchallengeispartoftheevolvingthreatcalculusandonewhichrequiresrethinkinghowbesttobuildhighintensityoperationalcapabilities.PaulBracken’scharacterizationofthenewphaseastheSecondNuclearAgehighlightsthereturnofthenuclearquestion.TheNorthKoreancrisiscertainlyhighlightsthenewrealities.ButattheheartofthedebateaswellisthenatureofwhyacountrylikeNorthKoreahasnuclearweapons.Itisclearlynotaclassicdeterrentdynamic.

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AsDannyLamhasputitwithregardtoNorthKoreannuclearintentions:KimJongUn’sspeechonSeptember22,2017thattheUShavedeclaredwaronDPRKand“willmakethemanholdingtheprerogativeofthesupremecommandintheU.S.paydearlyforhisspeechcallingfortotallydestroyingtheD.P.R.K.”inthiscontextleavesnodoubtthatNorthKoreawillusetheirnuclearcapabilitiesoffensivelyagainsttheUS.DPRKForeignMinisterRi’sspeechpublicallystatedinfrontoftheUNGeneralAssemblythatNorthKoreaintendtohandsomelyprofitfromtheirabilitytoenforcesettlementoftheirallegedgrievancesagainsttheworldwiththermonuclearweapons.Thatmuch,isperfectlyclear:NorthKoreawillbetheworld’sfirstnucleararmedextortionist.http://www.sldforum.com/2017/09/north-korean-nuclear-intentions/

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FromaninterviewweconductedwithAdmiralGortneyin2016whenhewasNORTHCOM/NORADCommander:Wecanlookattheevolvingthreatasateno’clockandatwoo’clockfight,becausetheyoriginatefromthetenandtwo.Andtheteno’clockfightisprimarilyrightnowanaviationfight.They’removingcapabilitythere,butit’snothinglikewhattheyhaveatthetwoo’clockfight.Thetwoo’clockfightismoreofamaritimefight…..BoththeChineseandRussianshavesaidintheiropenmilitaryliterature,thatifconflictcomes,theywanttoescalateconflictinordertode-escalateit.Nowthinkaboutthatfromourside.Andsonowascrisisescalates,howwillRussiaorChinawanttoescalatetodeescalate?They’lldefinitelycomeatusthroughcyber.Andthey’lldeliverconventionalandpotentiallyputnukesonthetable.Wehavetotreatthethreatinaglobalmannerandwehavetobepreparedtobeabletodealwiththesethroughmultipledomains,whichincludecyber,butthat’snotinNORADorNORTHCOMmissionsets.http://www.sldinfo.com/north-american-defense-and-the-evolving-strategic-environment-admiral-gortney-focuses-on-the-need-to-defend-north-america-at-the-ten-and-two-oclock-positions/

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TheworkofTheWilliamsFoundationinAustraliahasdoneagreatjobinhighlightingthepathtoUSandalliedinnovationsandhighlightedthechallengesandopportunities.See,forexample:http://www.sldinfo.com/new-approaches-to-air-sea-integration/http://www.sldinfo.com/designing-the-integrated-force/

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https://breakingdefense.com/2017/11/denmark-eyeing-russia-oks-20-spending-boost-what-it-means/http://www.sldinfo.com/facing-core-threats-in-the-nordic-region-reverse-engineering-the-russian-a2d2-threat-to-denmark/

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TheChallengefortheLiberalDemocracies•  Timelineforearlywarningisshorter;•  Thethresholdfortheuseofforceislower.

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http://www.sldinfo.com/allies-and-21st-century-weapons-systems-the-case-of-the-coming-of-the-f-35-to-europe/http://www.sldinfo.com/allies-and-21st-century-weapons-the-maritime-domain-strike-enterprise/http://www.sldinfo.com/leverage-allied-investments-and-combat-learning-experience-in-modernizing-the-u-s-military/

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ThenewUKcarriersisattheheartofintegratingUKforcestodeliverUKcapabilitieswithintheintegratedbattlespace,bothintermsofanintegratedcarrierstrikeforceaswefightingsystemswhichwillcometogetheronboardtheship.Itishoweverattheheartofshaping21stcenturyinteroperability.ThereistheinteroperabilitybeingworkedwiththeUSNavy,asevidencedintherecentSaxonWarriorexerciseoffofScotland.ThereistheinteroperabilitybeingworkedastheUSMCwilloperateitsF-35Bsoffoftheship.ThiswillrequireanabilityfortheshiptooperateUSweaponsonboardaswellastoaccommodateUSMCmaintainersaswellwiththeirspecificnationalmaintenanceapproaches.TheshipisanF-35carrierandwillworkitsinteroperabilitywithotherF-35saswellintheregion,notablywiththeDutch,theNorwegians,theDanes,theItalians,theIsraelis,theUSandperhapsothersEuropeansaswell.Inotherwords,thecarrierisatthevortexofaturninBritishhistory,andakeyelementofshaping21stcenturyforceintegrationandinteroperability.

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ThisslidecamefromapresentationbyCaptainNickWalker,RoyalNavy,toaWilliamsFoundationseminarinCanberraAustralia.WhatitisgettingatisthatthecoretransformationofUSandalliedmilitarypoweristoreshapehowtheshooter-sensorrelationshipworksinanintegratedforce.Thecorepointisratherstraightforward:ratherthansimplylookingatwhataplatformcarriesorganically,itisabouthowapackageofforcecancrossoperatetodeliveracombateffect.Inmyownwork,Ipioneeredtheconceptofthelongreachofaegis,inwhichtheF-35strikeforceactuallyoperatesasaforwardsensorcapabilityfortheAegisdefensivesystemandintegratedtogethercreatesandoffensive-defensivecapability.http://www.sldinfo.com/captain-nick-walker-provides-an-update-on-the-queen-elizabeth-class-carrier-at-the-williams-foundation-air-sea-seminar/https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-01/long-reach-aegishttp://www.sldinfo.com/the-long-reach-of-aegis/

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C2isbecomeanessentialelementforforcestructuretransformation,ratherthanfocusingexcessivelyontheISR,orcollectionofinformationtoinformdecisions.Theshiftfromthekindsoflandwarsfoughtinthepastdecadeandahalftooperatingacrosstherangeofmilitaryoperationstoinsertforceandtoprevailinamorerapidtempoconflictthanthatwhichcharacterizedcounter-insurgencyoperationscarrieswithitaneedtohaveaverydifferentC2structureandtechnologiestosupportthosestructures.Theshifttohighertempooperationsisbeingaccompaniedbyplatformswhicharecapableofoperatinginanextendedbattlespaceandattheedgeofthebattlespacewherehierarchical,detailedcontrolsimplydoesnotcorrelatewiththerealitiesofeithercombatrequirementsoroftechnologywhichispartofashifttodistributedoperations.DistributedoperationsoveranextendedbattlespacetodealwitharangeofmilitaryoperationsrequiredistributedC2;nothierarchicaldetailedmicromanagement.Ineffect,thefocusisuponshapingthecommander’sintentandallowingthecombatforcestoexecutethatintent,andtoshapeevolvingmissionsintheoperations,withthehigherlevelcommandersworkingtogainanoverviewontheoperations,ratherthanmicro-managementoftheoperations.

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InourbookonRebuildingAmericanMilitaryPowerinthePacific,welaidoutanapproachwhichprovidedforthekindofforcetransformationnecessarytodealwiththenewstrategicenvironment.“Thisbookisacontributiontoshapingbroaderunderstandingofwhatisnecessaryandwhatneedstobedone,ifvisionandwillareaddedtotechnologicalchange.Itisdesignedtodefinethechallengesandsuggestpathstoshapingsolutionsappropriatetothechallenges.”“Itmakesnosensetotake20thcenturythinkingforwardtodealwith21stcenturychallengesandtooperatewithinthementalfurnitureofthepast.“ThePRCpushoutintothePacificandNorthKoreandevelopmentsintersectwithU.S.technologiestoshapeastrategictrajectoryasimportantasthecarrierwastothe20thcenturyinthePacific,namelyshapingadistributedoperationsforcefortheU.S.anditsallies.Thebooklaysoutsomeofthekeywaystoshapesuchaforce.”http://www.sldinfo.com/rebuilding-american-military-power-in-the-pacific-a-21st-century-strategy/

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