The Social Cohesion of Liberal DemocracyAuthor(s): Michael MannReviewed work(s):Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Jun., 1970), pp. 423-439Published by: American Sociological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2092986 .Accessed: 11/10/2012 11:03

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SOCIOLOGICAL

JUNE, 19 70 VOLUME 3 5, No. 3

THE SOCIAL COHESION OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

WIICHAEL MANN

University of Cambridge

This paper analyzes the empiricat utility of cossensual and conNictual theories in explaining the social cohesion of the liberal democracies of Britasn and the United States. After clari- fying conceptual problems of value consensus tSleory and Marxist theory, it examines the forms and extent of value-commitment in these countries. The conclusion is that both theories grossly overstate the amount of both value consensus betweee individuals and value con- sistency within individuals that actually exists. Cohesion in liberal democracy depends rather on the lack of consistent commitment to general values of atry sort and on the "pragmatic ac- ceptance" by subordinate classes of their limited roles in society. Suggestive evidence is also found for the existence of some "false consciousness" among sgbordanate classes.

IT iS llOW some years since Dahrendorf and others made their attacks on consensus theory and their pleas for a "mixed the-

ory" of social cohesion. But, despite all the complexities of individual sociologists' argu- ments, there is still agreement between al- most aII theorists that some minimal degree of value consensus exists ill liberal demo- cratic societies, permitting them to handle conflict and remain stable. What is especially surprising is that this belief is at its strongest among latter-day conflict theorists, who ad- mit that value consensus exists but deny its "validity" by their use of "false conscious- ness." In this paper I will attempt empirical testing of the theories of both "consensus" and "false consciousness" sociologists.

The theoretical orthodoxy of those I loosely term "consensus theorists" is to be found in this quotatioll from an editorial in- troduction to an American symposium on po- litical socialization:

"Political socialization refers to the learning process by which the political norms and be- haviors acceptable to an ongoing political system are transmitted from generation to generation . . . A well-functioning citizen is one who accepts (internalizes) society's po- litical norms . . . NVithout a body politic so in harmcny with the ongoing political values, a political system would have trouble func-

tioning smoothly . . ." (Sigel, 1965:1; for a similar statement see Rose, 1965:29).

Using such an approach, several well-known studies have argued that the stability and "success" of democratic societies depend on the sharing of general political and prepoliti- cal values. In these studies, Great Britain and the United States are taken as examples of successful liberal democracies and often con- trasted explicitly or implicitly with "less suc- cessful" democracies (e.g. AlmondandVerba, 1963; Lipset, 1964; Easton and Dennis, 1967 ) . Thus, Dahl ( 1967: 329-330), review- ing previous studies, concludes that "Ameri- cans ordinarily agree on a great many ques- tions that in some countries have polarized the citizenry into antagonistic camps. One consequence of this massive convergence of attitudes is that political contests do not usu- ally involve serious threats to the way of life of significant strata in the community," while Rose has stated ". . . enduring con- sensus is one of the most distinctive features of politics in England" (1969:3; see also his 1965 work).

We now might ask "what is this consensus about?" And here different writers would produce different answers. F;rstly, there are those who stress the commitment of social

423

AMERICAN REVI EW

424 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

members to ultimate vaZues, of which ex- amples might be generalized beliefs in equal- ity and achievement (Lipset, 1964). Others, however, stress commitment to social norms, of which well-known examples are an adher- ence to the "rules of the democratic game' and opposition to those who introduce strong conflictual elements (such as class ideology) into politics (Dahl, 1967; McKenzie and Silver, 1968 ) . Finally, there are writers who stress commitment to beliefs about how so- ciety is actually organized, of which there are two main varieties. The first stresses the harmonistic structure of society and political elites (against, say, a belief in class conflict), while the second stresses the essential benev- olence of other individuals within the society, for example, the trustworthiness of others (see respectively Easton and Dennis, 1967, and Almond and Verba, 1963). According to these writers, widespread commitment to any or all of these values, norms and beliefs con- fers legitimacy and stability on present social strllcture. The "false consciousness" writers agree that this widespread commitment ex- ists, but deny that it thus confers legitimacy on society. Before turning to their arguments, however, let us examine the conceptual prob- lems arising from the asserted link between consensus and social cohesion. There are in fact four main objections to the statement that shared values integrate and legitimate social structures.

( 1 ) Most general values, norms and social beliefs usually mentioned as integrating so- cieties are extremely vague, and can be used to legitimate any social structure, existing or not. As Parsons (1951:293) notes, conserva- tives and revolutionaries alike appeal to com- mon values of "social justice," "democracy," and "peace." Even the most monolithic of societies is vulnerable to radical appeals to its core values. For example, medieval rebels were often clerics appealing to common Christian values, as did John Ball in the 138 1 Peasants' Revolt in England:

"When Adam delved and Eve span, Who was then a gentleman?"

But at the same time respectable, established clerics unwittingly primed their congrega- tions by emphasizing these "leveling" as- pects of Christianity in their sermons (Owst, 1961: Chaps. 5 and 6). Most "consensus

theorists" accept the force of this argument. Dahl, for example, though concluding that the stability of American democracy rests on consensus about fundamentals, admits that these are often vague and of doubtful influ- ence on actual behaviour (see also Rose, 1965:30).

(2) Even if a value is stated precisely, it may lead to conflict, not cohesion. For while some values unite men, others necessarily divide them. An extreme example of this fact is the consensus among the Dobu people on the values of suspiciousness and treachery (quoted by van der Berghe, 1963 ) . The more consensus there is about such values, the greater the ensuing conflict. Clearly it is only some values which lead to integration, and we had better stick to safe statements like "the more widely interpersonal trust is valued, the greater the social integration" (cf. Almond and Verba, 1963). In short, we have to specify the content of a value if we are to predict its consequences.

(3) The standards embodied in values are absolute ones, and it is difficult for such absolutes to co-exist without conflict. For example, the modern Western values of "achievement" and "equality"mphasized by Lipset-each limit the scope of the other. Turner ( 1953-54) has noted that such value- conflict is ubiquitous in societies, which de- velop ways of "insulating" values from each other. Cohesion is therefore affected by the relative success of society's insulation proc- esses as well as by the nature of the values themselves.

(4) The final objection is related to the third: where insulation processes operate, co- hesion results precisely because there is no common commitment to core values. For ex- ample, in a society which values achievement, a lower class is more likely to acquiesce in its inequality if it places less stress on achievement aspirations than on other val- ues. Moreover, the cohesion of any function- ally differentiated society must partly de- pend on the learning of role-specific values. In a business firm, for example, though all managers may need some degree of commit- ment to common organizational goals, they also need differential commitment to role values the engineer to product quality, the accountant to cost, the personnel manager to industrial peace for the survival and effi-

LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 425

ones in the mind of the worker; and thirdly, in both cases we still have to be able to rank the rival sets of values in order of their "au- thenticity" to the worker if we are to decide which is more "true." This is a formidable task, barely begun by Marxists. On the first point they are in conflict with the many re- search findings which show that it is com- paratively difficult for the mass media and other indoctrination agencies to change exist- ing values (to which they might justifiably reply that as ruling-class values are in es- sence traditional, they do not have to be taught afresh). The second point they have obscured by general denunciations of total indoctrination. The third problem of "au- thenticity" has always been faced by Marx- ists, but has been too often solved by asser- tion rather than by evidence.

We are now in a position to derive testable propositions from each of the broad theoreti- cal positions described above. The crucial questions are empirical: to what extent do tke various classes in society internaZize norms, values and beliefs which legitimate the social order? And, do such norms, values and beZiefs constitute true or false conscious- ness, as defined above? Present sociological writings offer no coherent answer to these questions. One distinguished group of writers has argued that a "minimum" legitimating consensus does exist in certain liberal democ- racies, thereby contributing to the stability of their regimes (e.g. Almond and Verba, 1963; Dahl, 1967; Easton and Dennis, 1967). But other empirical investigations of the extent of political value consensus in one of those liberal democracies, the United States, provide opposite conclusions and, moreover, provide hints that the individual's own internal belief system may not be con- sistent (Agger et al., 1961; McClosky, 1964, Prothro and Grigg, 1960, Converse, 1964). An impasse has been reached. As Easton has remarked ( 1965: 191): " . . . the actual spe- cification of the degree of consensus . . . is an empirical rather than a theoretical matter and is one that has never been fully faced up to, much less resolved through testing whole systems." Such is the intention of the main part of this paper.

The Data The data consist of a variety of findings

from other writers' empirical investigations

ciency of the firm. Thus either role- or class- specific values may contribute more to social cohesion than general core values.

As I have indicated, these problems have been perceived by consensus theorists. Their modifications of a naive, traditional view of consensus (such as Kingsley Davis, 1948, posited) have been paralleled by recent mod- ifications to "conflict theory" which in the modere context means Marxist theory.

Just as no consensus theorist would posit the existence of complete harmony, no Marx- ist would claim that complete disharmony characterized society. He would admit, firstly, that some form of social cooperation is necessary in the pursuit of scarcity, and, secondly, that subordinate classes within so- ciety always appear to "accept" their posi- tion at least to some extent (Giddens, 1968: 269). Yet the precise meaning of this word "accept" has greatly troubled Marxists. We must distinguish two types of acceptance: pragmatic acceptance, where the individual complies because he perceives no realistic alternative, and normative acceptance, where the individual internalizes the moral expecta- tions of the ruling class and views his own inferior position as legitimate. Though prag- matic acceptance is easy to accommodate to Marxism, normative acceptance is not, and the unfortunate popularity of the latter con- cept has contributed to the inadequacies of much modern Marxist theory.

Writers like Marcuse (1964) and Hacker ( 195 7 ) have agreed with the consensus the- orists that value consensus does exist, and that normative acceptance characterizes the working class in present-day liberal democ- raciesj Such a position can be only reconciled with a Marxist approach by utilizing the con- cept of "false consciousness" and asserting that normative acceptance is "false" in the sense that it leads workers to ignore their true interests. Yet false consciousness is a dangerous concept, for if we define interests totally independently of the orientations of those concerned, "religious mania alone speaks here" (Geiger, quoted by Dahrendorf, 1959: 175). Nevertheless, the concept of false consciousness is tenable if we can demon- strate two of three things: that an indoctri- nation process has occurred, palpably changing working-class values, or that the in- doctrination process is incomplete} leaving in- doctrinated values in conflict with "deviant"

426 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

sensus." ()ne further classification has been made: where class differences emerge, in that upper classes endorse dominant values sig- nificantly more, and deviant values signifi- cantly less, than lower classes, this is labeled "Dissensus between Classes." 2

One important reservation must be made before we turn to the actual results: this type of secondary analysis of published material suffers from important methodological disad- vantages. One major problem is that the questions actually used in different studies are rarely identical, and as all sociologists well know very slight changes of cue in a question can produce markedly differing re- sults. This difficulty will not be shirked- for example, the effect on respondents of the single word "class" will be discussed but as we are looking for consistency between find- ings from different surveys, questioIl bias will usually be randomized. The same should also apply to the difficulties of comparing re- sponses of samples of differing compositions at different points of time and place. How- ever, it must be emphasized that conclusions drawn from such secondary analysis can be only tentative until cotlfirmed by primary research.

Results

In this section we analyze respondents' views on the legitimacy of social structure and particularly class structure, in Britain and the United States. As the principal func- tion of a social stratification system is to regulate the distribution of scarce resources, we will start by observi:ng how much people, particularly working-class people, want those scarce resources. Sociological studies of "achievement mo- tivation" are our first pieces of evidence. Several have shown that almost all persons, of whatever class, will agree with statements like "It is important to get ahead" (Scanzoni, 1967:456; Mizruchi, 1964:95; Veness, 1962: 153), and some useful pointers to what re- spondents mean by this are now emerging.

2 The reverse trend does not in fact occur. Note that no tests of statistical significance are used here the populations sampled by the studies are too diverse and ill-reported for this. "Significant" differences indicates merely "clear" differences in this paper.

into value-commitment in Britain and the United States. The values, norms, and beliefs analyzed here are all ones supporting, or de- structive of, the present social structure of those countries. Most concentrate on issues regarding the legitimacy of the social stratifi- cation system. Following Parkin (1967), I have labeled supporting values dominant, and destructive values deviant. Dominant values are generally promulgated by ruling groups to legitimate their rule; deviant val- ues, by groups contesting that legitimacy.

Nearly all the results used here consist of responses to agree-disagree questions. They are presented in Tables 1 to 4. The first col- umn of these tables contains the investigator's name and reference, together with references to other studies which produced similar find- ings. The second column gives brief details of the sample used, and the third column gives the gist of the question asked. The fourth column gives details of subsamples where available. This paper gives only the subsamples corresponding to the broad occu- pational stratification hierarchy in liberal democracies, with the groups presented in descending order.1 The term "class" will be loosely used in the text to describe the main groups, though the authors of the studies themselves use a variety of terms. The fifth column shows the percentage agreement among the sample to the question. The final column presents a classification system de- signed to show briefly which, if any, theory the finding tends to support. If 7572 or more of respondents agree with a dominant value, the final column contains "Dominant Con- sensus." If 75go agree with a deviant value, this is labeled "Deviant Consensus." Obvi- ously, 75So is an arbitrary cutoff point be- tween consensus and dissensus, but its gen- eral level seems not unreasonable. Where a clear majority of a sample endorses a value, this may still be a significant finding, and thus any agreement of between 60So and 75SO has been labeled either "Dominant" or "Deviant Dissensus," according to the direc- tion of the majority. Where there is almost complete, i e. between 409 and 60%, disa- greement, this has been labeled simply "Dis-

1 There is no analysis in this paper of racial as- pects of stratification, though these are obviously extremely important in the United States, and in- creasingly so in Britain.

LIBERAL DEMOURACY 427

"ability" and "hard work" while much smaller numbers endorse "luck," "pull" and "too hard for a man." Yet there are slight in- dications here that these beliefs might not be of great significance for the respondents. Thus the Blauner and the Mercer and Weir studies show that respondents are more likely to be cynical about the opportunity structure that confronts them in their actual working lives. This kind of interpretation is strength- ened by the Veness (1962) findings. These are based on schoolchildren's essays describ- ing imaginary "successes" in future life. Very large class differences emerge in the essays. In the essays of the grammar and technical school boys (destined for the most part for occupational success), success and status are seen as comi;ng from steady achievements in the occupational sphere. In those of the sec- ondary modern boys (the future manual workers), however, the idea of cumulative status is usually absent, and, instead, success comes from either a quiet, happy life or sud- den fame in sport and entertainment. From this, it seems probable that, though lower class children may endorse general platitudes about the importance of ambition, these have little actual relevance for their own life- projects. Turner ( 1964), in his study of American high-school seniors, also comes to this conclusion, stressing that we can only assess the importance of values in society by considering their relevance to peoples' lives.

For further tests of our theories we can turn to respondents' images of the entire so- cial structure to see whether they hold to the- ories of harmony or conflict. Table 2 presents the relevant findings.

This mass of conflicting results permits no easy generalizations. It is true that significant class differences in the direction predicted by Marxist theory emerge in several parts of this table. But not even the statement "Big business has too much power" evokes deviant consensus among the workirlg class of both countries. In only two other cases is there even a clear majority for a deviant value among the working class: for "The rich get all the profits" and (probably) for "The laws favour the rich." 3 And when we

3 Taking note of McClosky's statement that more of the lower occupational groups in his sample have significantly deviant beliefs than higher groups ( 1964:3 71 ) . He does not, however, present these differences statistically.

Most important, working-class people are more likely than middle-class people to think of success as achieved solely in the occupa- tional sphere, and are more likely to conceive of it as materialistic, economic success (Miz- ruchi, 1964: 77-90). The crucial question then is "Can their economic aspirations be met, given the constraints of the stratified occupational system?" There is evidence that the answer to this is "No." In a comparative analysis of British and American schoolboys, Stephenson demonstrated that the lower the social class of the boy, the more his occupa- tional aspirations outran his occupational ex- pectations. Thus, later on it is the working class pupils ". . . who lower most their aspi- rations when it comes to considering plans or expectations" in the occupational sphere (Stephenson 1958:49; for supporting evi- dence see Caro and Pihlblad, 1965). This process seems to continue in the world of work itself. It has been a frequent research finding in industrial sociology that, in identi- cal jobs, older workers are more satisfied than younger ones. The most probable ex- planation of this is Kornhauser's, applied to his own findings: ". . . men in the routine types of work come over the years to accept and make the most of their situation" ( 1967: 77). From a very early age the lower class person begins to realize that he is at the bottom of a stratification hierarchy (Bettel- heim and Sylvester, 1950; Himmelweit et al.,

1952). Probably starting with universalistic achievement values, he gradually redefines his aspirations in a more and more role- specific way, so that his lot can become acceptable.

The nature of this "acceptance" is, of course, crucial as I argued earlier. Does this redefinition of goals lead to normative or to pragmatic acceptance? One test of this is the extent to which lower classes regard as legi- timate the opportunity structure which has disadvantaged them. In this respect, domi- nant values are clear: success comes to those whose energies and abilities deserve it, fail- ures have only themselves to blame. Is this argument accepted by lower class persons? Table 1 provides an answer.

We can see that, by and large, the samples hold dominant beliefs about the opportunity structure. Though these results show clearly the biasing effects of leading questions, aI- most all respondents endorse the key cues of

TABLE 1. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE

Author Sample Statement Subsample % Agreement Classification

Mizruchi (1964:82) (cf. US. small town adults Ability determines a) Social Classes I-III 97 Dominant

oo

t \ - - -

Berelson et al., 1954:58; Lenski, 1963: 165)

.e

who gets ahead b) Social Classes IV, V g2 Consensus

Veness (1962: 144)

Kornhauser ( 1965: 210)

a) English boys and girls aged 13-17, representative national sample

b) Boys only

U S. male workers

Hard work (and not luck or influence) is how to get on

a)

b3 c)

a) b) c)

Grammar School Technical School Modern School

Grammar School Technical School Modern School

8 93 88

79 63 30

13 26

36

32 50

Dominant Consensus

Dissensus between classes

Dissensus bet^7veen classes

Dominant con- sensus in mid- dle class

37

-

Q

V) o

_

o

o C)

g

C

Ct C;

Status achieved by effort in children's essays

Luck and "pull" determines who gets ahead

a) White collar b) Nonfactory workers c) All factory workers

(including d and e) d) Small town factory

workers e) Routine production

workers

U.S. factory workers national sample

"cynical" factors determine promotion in own organization

Blauner ( 1964: 206)

39 Dominant Dissensus

* )

Mercer & Weir (1969:122) English male clerical and technical workers large town

Ditto

28 Dominant Dissensus

* i

McKenzie & Silver ( 1968: 140)

English urban working class. Labour and Conservative voters only

Too hard for a man with ambition to get ahad 51 Dissensus

LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 429

examine these most favoured statements we see that none mentions "class" and all are couched in what might be termed simplistic "common man" language. By contrast in Ta- ble 2, all the more abstract and sophisticated models of society evoke less support, whether they be basically dominant or deviant in con- tent. We may 1lote, for example, in the studies of Form and Rytina (1969) and of Manis and Meltzer (1954) that dissensus results from presenting alternative abstract theories of society to working class respondents. Moreover, the single word "class" produces dissensus among them whenever it occurs, except significantly when in the Lewis study it is decisively rejected in favour of nation- ality. This, then, is another problem to be faced later: why is the working class able and willing to produce deviant simplistic views of society but not deviant abstract ones?

Another type of study which enables us to perceive men's images of ongoing social structure is analyzing "political efficacy," that is a man's estimate of his own ability to affect the poltical government. A belief in high efficacy is certainly consonant with what we have termed dominant values, though a belief in low efficacy is not necessarily devi- ant to the extent of supporting the redistri- bution of political power. The relevant re- search findings are set out in Table 3.

All but one of the questions produce dis- sensus among respondents Again, however, significant class differences appear, with at least half the working-class respondents choosing the mildly deviant alternative. Clearly then we must consider the possibil- ity, argued by Thompson and Horton ( 1960), that there is considerable political alienation among the working class. And at the very least, the numerous inconsistencies in politi- cal beliefs emerging in the McClosky study indicate that a person's attitudes to political authority may have little significance for him. Again, we have to consider not only a person's stated attitude but also its impor- tance for him.

From the confused images of society re- vealed in Tables 2 and 3, we might predict that confusion would also be evident in working-class norms regarditlg political ac- tion, and this is indeed revealed in Table 4 (see p. 434).

Here, the two statements supporting class action (Leggett a and Nordlinger b) produce dissensus. The statement "Workers should have more control in industry" produces no consistent majority. Very few of oneworking- class sample want wealth equally divided, only about half of another mixed-class sam- ple think that large inequalities are wrong, but in a third, working class, sample there is consensus in favour of reducing class differ- entials (one possible explanation of the last finding is that "class" is such an unpopular term that almost everyone is in favour of re- ducing it). Clearly, if most social groups had consistent and meaningful normative sys- tems, the results would be less affected by the exact wording of questio;ns, the composi- tion of samples, etc.

A further trend emerges from Table 4 which we also noticed in Table 1: that devi- ant values are more likely to be endorsed if they are presented as relevant to respond- ents' everyday lives. Thus 607fo of Korn- hauser's (1965) samples say that in disputes they always side with the union and only 5So with the company, while all of Sykes' (1965) manual workers, in marked contrast to his clerks, support collective rather than individual bargining. Note also that in Table 2, 557fs of Goldthorpe et als (1968a) manual sample saw work study engineers as opposed to worker interests, though 672to had in gen- eral seen worker-management relations in harmonistic terms. Again there seems to be a disjunction between general abstract values and concrete experience.

Such a disjunction is the main theme of Free and Cantril's (1967) study of American political attitudes, and their evidence can advance our argument considerably. They asked respondents two series of questions to test their liberalism/conservatism, the first Oll specific issues of government intervention in favour of redistribution (which they term the "operational" spectrum), the second on general issues of individualist versus inter- ventionist philosophies (the "ideological" spectrum). Typical examples are, in the first spectrum, "Do you approve of Medicare?" and in the second "We should rely more on individual initiative . . . and not so much governmental welfare programs." Table 5 presents their main results.

As the authors comment, the results are

TABLE 2. HARMONISTIC AND CONFLICTUAL IMAGES OF SOCIETY

Author Sample Statement Subsample So Agreement Classification

cs o

Form & Rytina ( 1969:23 ) U.S. adults, medium town (the "analytic sample")

Holding pluralist models of society rather than class or power elite models

a)

b) C)

Rich Middle Poor

65 59 57

Borderline Dissensus Class differences

not significant

:>

Q

n

o Q o

o

Q

Lewis (1964-65 :176)

Manis & Meltzer (1954: 33-35)

U.S. white males, medium town

U.S. male textile workers, medium town with history of labour disputes

Rating U.S. citizenship more important than class membership

a) Social classes are in- evitable and desirable

b) Social classes are either enemies or in conflict, or partners or in paternalistic relationship

"Almost"; 90

56

Dominent Consensus

Dissensus

*

J

* J

337

46J Dissensus

Leggett t 1964: 230) The rich get the profits a) Employed b) Unemployed

Deviant Dissensus

U.S. male manual workers, metropolis

62 76

McClosky ( 1964 :370) U.S. national ("general electorate") sample

a) The laws are rich man's aws

b) Poor man doesn't have a chance in the law courts

33 Dominant Dissensus

Dissensus

Kornhauser ( 1965: 220) cf. Haer, 1956-57:140; Lipsitz, 1964 :957)

U.S. male workers Big business has too much power

a) White collar workers b) All factory workers

43 54 79

Dissensus between classes

Deviant consensus within lower class

TABLE 2 .-(continued)

Author Sample Statement Subsample %Agreement Classification

'As only one-third of manual workers vote Conservative, the Conservative bias of this sample has been removed by weighting double the % of Labour voters in all cases.

Nordlinger (1967:1783 English male urban manual workers 1

English urban workers. Labour and Conservative voters only

Class conflict is impor- tant in EngIand

5 Dissensus

Dissensus

McKenzie & Silver ( 1968: 135 ) (cf. Cannon, 1967:168)

Upper class has always tried to exploit work- ing class

51

51 3>

o

5U

Goldthorpe et al. (1968b:26) English affluent workers medium town

The laws favour the rich a) White collar b) Manual workers

9

72 Virtual deviant Dissensus

English male clerical and technical workers, large town

Mercer & Weir (1969:121) Management and workers are a team, and not on opposite sides

54

Dissensus

Goldthorpe et al. (1968a:73, Asabove 85) a) Ditto a) White collar

b) Manual workers

Manual workers only

76 67

55

Dominant Dissensus

Dissensus b) Work study engineers are antiworker

Goldthorpe et al. ( 1968b: 26) As above (cf. Cannon, 1967:168; McKenzie & Silver, 1968: 127)

a) Big business has too much power

b) Trade unions have too much power

a) White collar b) Manual workers a) White collar b) Manual workers

63 60 72 43

Deviant Dissensus Dissensus between

classes

432 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEMi

positively schizophrenic, with a large propor- tion of the electorate operationally liberal but ideologically conservative. Significantly, white manual workers are among the most schizoid groups ( though Negroes are con- sistently liberal). Similar findings have also been reported by Selznick and Steinberg ( 1969: 220) . Such findings have obvious bearing on the problem of false consciousness discussed earlier in this paper: it is interest- ing that writers as obviously non-Marxist as Free and Cantril ( 1967) should conclude their study by remarking that present Ameri- can ideology is out of touch with American realities (i.e. false) and should therefore be reformulated.

Finally, we can examine the suggestion that political and social stability is in part a function of consensus on pre-political values. Many writers have argued this, asserting in particular that liberal democracy "works" because its members trust each other. The most satisfactory evidence for this comes from Almond and Verba's ( 1963 ) influential study, but even their findings seem rather suspect on closer examination. It is indispu- table that their results show a greater degree of consensus on values such as interpersonal trust among British and American respon- dents than among respondents in the "less successful" democracies of Italy, Mexico, and West Germany. However, there are equally significant differences in value-commitment according to the only (and indirect) measure of social class used, the formal education of the respondent. The least educated groups are consistently the least politically confident and trusting. Moreover, when Almond and Verba produce their results on the extent of commitment to the norm of interpersonal trust, they tend to obscure one very signifi- cant finding, which is difficult to fit into their general theoretical position. It is that the degree of value commitment, even in Britain and the United States, is still minimal. In Table 4 (on page 267) Almond and Verba demonstrate that more respondents in Bri- tain and the States than in the other coun- tries agree with five similar statements whose tenor is that "people can be trusted." But additionally, on two of the five items in the U.S. and on three of them in Britain, only a minority of respondents show themselves as "trustful." Also, in Table 5 (on page 269),

a majority of those with only primary educa- tion in these countries agree with the deviant statement "No one is going to care much what happens to you, when you get rlght down to it," which statement AImond and Verba think "reflects the most extreme feel- ing of distrust and alienation" (p. 268). Un- fortunately, the authors do not present the results of the other questions according to educational level, but it would not be unrea- sonable to assume that the majority of Iower class respondents would emerge as distrustful on the less extreme questions. Clearly, A1- mond and Verba's analysis of the stability of liberal democracy is at best partial, neglect- ing as it does the lack of value consenslls between classes.

From all these findings four trends, which are in need of explanation, clearly emerge:

1. value consensus does not exist to any sig- nificant extent;

2.there is a greater degree of consensus among the middle class than among the working class;

3. the working class is more likely to support deviant values if those values relate either to concrete everyday life or to vague popu- list concepts than if they relate to an ab- stract political philosophy;

4.working class individuals also exhibit less internal consistency in their values than middle-class people.

We can now return to our general theories with these trends in mind.

Discussion

If there is not value consensus, what re- mains of value consensus theory? Obviously the more extreme and generally stated ver- sions of the theory are untenable, but many others have been rather more cautious, as- serting merely that some "minimum" level of consensus about certain 'scritical" value is necessary to social cohesion. As this level is never precisely specified, we cannot very easily come to grips with the argument. Let us approach the problem by asking why some measure of consensus is considered nec- essary for social cohesion. The answer lies in one of sociology's most sacred tenets: that values are by definition beliefs governing action. As action itself must be considered nonrandom, and as men do actually cooper- ate with one another, then it would seem to follow that there is some degree of congru-

TABLE 3. IMAGES OF POLITICAL EFFICACY

Author Sample Statement Subsample % Agreement Classification l Thompson & Horton U.S. adults, small town Neither esercising nor a) Managers and Officials 33

(1960:1914) (cf. for white collar, Haer, 1956-7: 140)

believing in possibility of esercising political control ("politically alienated")

b) Professionals c) White collar d) Labour

Dissensus between Classes 38

47 68

McClosky (1964:371)

Nordlinger (1967:97) (cf. McKenzie & Silver, 1968: 124)

Agger et al. (1961:479) (for b cf. Berelson et al. 1954: 58; Kornhauser et al., 1956:190)

U.S. national "general elec- torate" sample

English male urban manual workers

U.S. adults in metropolitan area

a) Nothing I do has any effect on. politics

b) No use being inter- ested in politics

People like me have no ability to influence government

a) People are very fre- quently manipulated by politicians

b) Politicians usually represent the general interest

Deviant Dissensus Dominant Consensus

62

1

5e 37

o Q

Dissensus

*

>

43

60 Deviant Dissensus * >

58 Dissensus

Nordlinger (1967:105, 109) As above Selfish minority groups control government

Which groups ? a) big bllsiness, rich,

upper classes b) trade uxiions

Deviant Dissensus

N.B. Total= cllOS

Deviant Dissensus

63

651

17

TABLE 4. NORMS RELATING TO CLASS ACTION AND EQUALITY

Author Sample Statement Subsample gO Agreement Classification

Kornhauser (1965:213-220) U.S. male workers a) Workers should have a) White collar 37 Dissensusbetween

1 This figure was arrived at by averaging the percentages among Labour and Conservative voters, who are equally represented in the country as a whole but not

more control of in- dustry

b) Always side with union against company

a) Supporting working-class action in rent protest

b) Wanting wealth equally divided

a) In favour of reducing class differentials

a) Large inequalities are wrong

b) Workers should have more control in industry

b) Working class should stick together to get ahead

Preferring to bargain with employer collectively

a) Government should give work to unemployed

b) Government should give everyone good standard of living

Government should do more for housing, unemploy-

ment, education, etc.

Ditto

b) All factory workers

All factory workers

60

60

31 46

9

16

79

48

47

41

classes

Deviant dissensus

Leggett (1964:230)

Nordlinger ( 1967: 178)

Benney et al. ( 1956: 140-141 ) (for b cf. Goldthorpe et al. 1968a:109)

Nordlinger (1967: 181)

U.S. male manual workers, metropolis

English male urban manual workers

English adults, medium town

As above

a)

b) a) b)

Employed Unemployed Employed Unemployed

Dissensus Dominant Consensus

Deviant Consensus 3>

H Q

CX

o Q _

o

o C)

g 7d

C

Dissensus

Dissensus

Dissensus

Sykes (1965 :303)

McClosky ( 1964: 369)

Lenski (1963 :152) (cf. Kornhauser, 1965 : 218)

Key (1965 :124)

Scottish males, nationalized steelworks

U.S. national "general electorate" sample

U.S. adults, metropolis

a) Clerks b) Workers

4

100

Consensus within, dissensus be-

tween classes

Dissensus

Dissensus

Dissensus

47

55

40 7

a) Middle Class b) Working Class

U.S. national sample a) Nonmanual b) Manual

28 31

Dominant Dissensus

TABLE 5. IDEOLOGICAL AND OPERATIONAL SPECTRUMS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL ATTITUDES (Source: Free and Cantril, 1967:32)

Ideological Spectrum Operational Spectrum

Completely Liberall 4SOl 44go) S 16% k 659

Predominantly Liberal 12 J 21 J

Middle of the Road 34 21

Predominantly Conservative 20l 71 S 50S7 k 14fto

Completely Conservative 30J 7J

lOO6yto 100%

The scoring system is quite complicated and the reader is referred to Free and Cantril, p. 220 221.

LIBERAL DENIOCRACY 435

Clearly it is the former who daily face the problems of power-sharing. Secondly, there are the various class differences demon- strated earlier in this paper, and obviously, the middle class is closer to centers of power than is the working class. Etzioni ( 1964) has argued persuasively that the normative ori- entations of lower participants in "utilitar- ian" organizations like the industrial firm are largely irrelevant to the quality of their role-performance. Might this be also true of the lower classes in liberal democracy? Their compliance might be more convincingly ex- plained by their pragmatic acceptance of specific roles than by any positive normative commitment to society. There is even evi- dence that lower class parents and children are in a similar relationship: Rosen (1967) shows that the working-class parent disci- plines his children by "eliciting specific be- havioral conformitiesX' from them, whereas the middle-class parellt attempts more to persuade his children to internalize norms and to generalize them to a variety of situa- tions. The attachment of the lower classes to the distant state may be expected to be far less normative and more pragmatic than their attachment to the primary familial group.

While rejecting more extreme versions of harmonistic theories, we must also do the same with Marxist ones. There is little truth in the claims of some Marxists that the work- ing class is systematically and successfully indoctrinated with the values of the ruling class. Though there is a fair amount of con- sensus among the rulers, this does not extend very far down the stratification hiearachy. Among the working-class there is almost complete dissensus on most of the general dominant-deviant political issues we have in-

ence between their values. This seems plausi- ble, for if men cooperate they must come to some form of agreement, explicit or implicit, to share power. There is, of course, no such social contract which does not rest on shared normative understandings (Durkheim, 1964: 206-19).

But when we consider whole complex so- cieties, it is not clear that all social members can be considered as patries to the social contract. The ordinary participant's social relations are usually confined to a fairly nar- row segment of society, and his relations with society as a whole are mostly indirect, through a series of overlapping primary and secondary groups. We may characterize his meaningful life as being largely on an every- day level. Thus his normative connections with the vast majority of fellow citizens may be extremely tenuous, and his commitment to general dominant and deviant values may be irrelevant to his compliance with the ex- pectations of others. As long as he conforms to the very specific role behavior expected of him, the political authorities may not trouble themselves with his system of beliefs.

If this is so, we might develop the follow- ing hypothesis: only those actua5Zy sharing in societaG power need develop consistent so- cietal values. There are two available tests of this hypothesis and both support it. Firstly, McClosky (1964) has shown that there is a far greater internal consistency in the politi- cal values of political activists in the United States than in the population at large.4

4See also Converse's (1964) excellent argument on this point: he maintains that it is a tiny minor- ity consisting of highly educated, political activists which has an internally consistent, considered, and stable set of political beliefs.

436 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

paradoxically, they are dealing with upper class children. As Litt puts it, politics is pre- sented as a ". . . formal mechanistic set of government institutions with the emphasis on its harmonious legitimate nature rather than as a vehicle for group struggle and change." ( 1963: 73 ) . Abrams ( 1963 ) comes to a similar conclusion from his review of textbooks used in British schools: he notes that they often try to avoid mentioning non- benevolent occurrences such as economic slumps or industrial conflict, and where they cannot avoid them, the events are presented as "just happening" with no real attempt at explanation. Other studies have shown that schools also attempt to inculcate individual- ism and competitiveness in pupils; e.g., the child is taught that any form of achierrement is gained at the expense of others (e.g. Henry, 1965; Friedenberg, 1963). It is of especial interest that the domirlant values thus taught in schools are precisely the ones we hasre already noted as being present in adult working-class consciousness. Individ- ualism we saw expressed strongly in Table 1, while a strong preference for ties of nation- ality over class, was also evident in Table 2. Furthermore, Litt and Zeigler's observations about teaching on the American political system enable us to trace back the origin of another supposed American core-value, belief in the legitimacy of the Constitution (see Dahl, 1967, for an assertion of the impor- tance of this value to American democracy).5

We must be careful to specify the limits of this indoctrination. It is rarely direct, though the daily oath to the U.S. flag, or the grant- ing of holidays to children in Britain if they will cheer visiting royalty, clearly come into this category. More usually, dominant-devi- ant issues are not presented at all to children. The essential point is the "the realities of the political process?' (to use Litt's phrase) and the populist deviant tradition of the lower class are ignored in the classroom. Presumably the working class child learns the latter from his family and peers; 6 cer-

5Respondents' attitudes on this issue have not been analyzed here, as there is no comparable British issue.

6 Though the evidence here is conflicting. Hess and Torney (1967) state that the families they in- vestigated also transmit nationalism and political benevolence, but Carter (1962) finds that British working class families transmit a cynical populism.

vestigated. We have seen that two types of deviant values are widely endorsed by work- ing class people: firstly, values which are ex- pressed in concrete terms corresponding to everyday reality, and, secondly, vague sim- plistic divisions of the social world into "rich" and "poor." Everyday social conflict is experienced, and to some extent is referred to what Ossowski has described as the eternal struggle between "rich" and "poor," "rulers" and "ruled," "idle drones" and "worker bees" (Ossowski, 1963: 19-30). But the one is con- crete and the other is vague; there is no real political philosophy uniting the two in the working-class consciousness. Instead, at the political level are rather confused values with surprisingly conservative biases. How these political values come to be is of crucial theo- retical importance, for it is their presence which keeps the working-class from non- compliance in the political order. It is not value-consensus which keeps the working- class compliant, but rather a lack of consen- sus in the crucial area where concrete ex- periences and vague populism might be translated into radical politics. Whether a harmonistic or a conflictual theory can best account for their compliance now turns on whether this lack of consensus is "free'2 or "manipulated," on how it is produced. Though we need more studies of the opera- tion of socialization processes, at least one of them, the school system, has been extensively studied.

Studies of the school systems of Britain and the United States have generally con- cluded that the school is a transmitter of political conservatism, particularly to the working-class. Hess and Torney (1967) find that the school is the most important politi- cal socialization agency for the young child, and that its efforts are directed toward the cultivation of nationalism and a benevolent image of established political authority. Greenstein stresses benevolence, too, noting that the child's view of the world is deliber- ately "sugarcoated" by adults: "Books such as Our Friend the Farmer and How the Po- liceman HeUs Us are couched in language which closely resembles some of the pre- adolescent descriptions of the political lead- ers reported in this survey" (1965:46). Both Zeigler (1967) and Litt (1963) stress how teachers strive to keep the conflictual ele- ments of politics out of the classroom unless,

LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 437

tainly he experiences something of the former when he enters the world of work, so his manipulated socialization is only partial. We may aptly describe these socialization proc- esses as the mobilization of bias (the phrase of Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). As the child gets older, he becomes increasingly cynical in his political and social attitudes (Hess and Easton, 1960; Hess, 1963; Greenstein, 1965), but he has difficulty in putting them into abstract terms. What has been ignored in childhood is unlikely to be grasped in adult- hood, given working class difficulties with abstract concepts (ef. Bernstein, 1961; find- ings replicated by Hess and Shipman, 1965). Hence we can see agencies of political radi- calism, like the trade unions and the British Labour Party, struggling against their op- ponents' ability to mobilize the national and feudal symbols to which the population has been taught to respond loyally in schools and in much of the mass media (McKenzie and Silver, 1968:245). Thus the most common form of manipulative socialization by the liberal democratic state does not seek to change values, but rather to perpetuate val- ues that do not aid the working class to inter- pret the reality it actually experiences. These values merely deny the existence of group and class conflict within the nation-state so- ciety and therefore, are demonstrably false.

Thus there are strong suggestions that the necessary mixed model of social cohesion in liberal democracy should be based more on WIarxist conflict theory than sociologists have usually thought. A significant measure of consensus and normative harmony may be necessary among ruling groups, but it is the absence of consensus among lower classes which keeps them compliant. And if we wish to explain this lack of consensus, we must rely to some extent on the Marxist theories of pragmatic rote acceptance and manipula- tive socialization. Of course, the existence of contrary harmonistic processes is feasible. Alongside coercive processes there may exist elements of voluntary deference, nationalism, and other components of normative integra- tion in liberal democracy. It is often difficult to distinguish the two. Yet sociologists can no longer assert that these elements produce value consensus between social members and value consistency within them. Thus what- ever "legitimacy" liberal democracy possess

is not conferred upon it by value consensus, for this does not exist.

However, these results do not contradict all such affirmations of the legitimacy of social structure. Though I have demonstrated the existence of present-day false conscious- ness, this is insufficient as a total explana- tion of pragmatic role acceptance. For the reason why most working-class people do "accept" (in whatever sense) their lot and do not have consistent deviant ideologies, we must look back to the historical incor- poration of working-class political and in- dustrial movements in the 19th and 20th centuries within existing structures. Dahl's historical analysis would lead to the same conclusion as that of Marcuse, that the in- stitutionalization of class conflict has re- sulted in a closing of the "political universe." But, of course, whereas Marcuse stresses that this process was itself dominated by the manipulative practices of the ruling class,7 Dahl has stressed its elements of genuine and voluntary compromise. Clearly, the historical as well as the present-day theory must be a "mixed" one. Yet one ob- stacle to the development of a more precise mixed theory in the past has been the fail- ure of most sociologists to take the Marxist tradition in social theory seriously. In par- ticular, they have dismissed the crucial con- cept of "false consciousness" as being non- scientific. Yet in this paper we have seen fulfilled two of the preconditions for an empirically-grounded theory of false con- sciousness. Firstly, we saw quite clearly a conflict between dominant and deviant values taking place within the individual. Secondly, we found some evidence of the al- ternative precondition, the actual indoctri- nation of dominant values. Thus the third precondition, the ranking of conflicting values by an analysis of "who gains and who loses" can be investigated, and some relevant suggestions have been made here. The central argument of this paper is that the debate be- tween harmonistic theories and Marxist theories must be an empirical one. The way is open to further empirical investigations.

7 For a rather more detailed and better argued statement of this, see R. Miliband, 1961.

438 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIERV

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