The Sociology of War and the Military

ANRV381-SO35-12 ARI 5 June 2009 9:27

The Sociology of Warand the MilitaryMeyer KestnbaumDepartment of Sociology, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742;email: [email protected]

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2009. 35:235–54

First published online as a Review in Advance onApril 6, 2009

The Annual Review of Sociology is online atsoc.annualreviews.org

This article’s doi:10.1146/annurev-soc-070308-120004

Copyright c© 2009 by Annual Reviews.All rights reserved

0360-0572/09/0811-0235$20.00

Key Words

mobilization, enemy, signification, state, self-armed, civilian

AbstractRecent work on war and the military has addressed two broad questions:Why do states and societies wage war as they do? And what differencedoes it make that war is, or has been, waged in that manner? Building onthe Clausewitzian focus on relations among the state, the armed forces,and society, responses to these questions emphasize the need for theanalyst to recognize that the state may not possess a monopoly of force,interstate and civil wars may intertwine, and meaning and valence mayfigure prominently in war and its consequences. Scholarship in this areatends to focus on three broad domains: mobilization into war, treatmentof the enemy, and signification. Each has its own distinctive analyticsand historical pattern of transformation and development. How thesethree domains intersect holds real promise for future work.

235

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 20

09.3

5:23

5-25

4. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by U

nive

rsid

ade

de B

rasi

lia o

n 04

/29/

14. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV381-SO35-12 ARI 5 June 2009 9:27

This article departs from a simple pair of propo-sitions: (a) that to understand the military, itis useful (if not necessary) to situate it withinthe context of the armed conflict—actual orpotential—that military was formed to wage orperhaps prevent; and (b) that to understand war,it is equally important to attend to the struc-ture of armed force or the organization of coer-cion. Support for these claims comes from suchnoted military sociologists as Segal (1989) andBurk (1998, 2007), as well as scholars of warwithin sociology (Martin 2005, Kiser & Gleave2008) and without (Chorley 1973, Paret 1992,Bartov 1996). The analytic interdependence ofwar and the military circumscribes the domainin which we can identify a powerful set of schol-arly threads, highlighting the core relationshipson which all focus and offering the rationalefor this line of inquiry. Such work draws atten-tion away from familiar lines of consideration—most notably, explanations for the origins andconclusions of wars—that are more typical ofwork in political science and the history of in-ternational relations (see Elman & Elman 2001)and toward questions about how states and so-cieties wage war and about what difference itmakes that war is, or has been, waged in onemanner or another (Kestnbaum 2005, p. 252).

Although attempts to answer such questionscome in many forms, nearly all share elementsworth highlighting because of what they conveyabout the logic of this work. Each departs fromWeber’s seminal formulation that the modernstate acquires its distinctive quality only whenit additionally claims a monopoly over the le-gitimate use of force (Weber 1978, 1:50–56;2:901–4). However, it is the way von Clausewitz(1976 [1832])—more than half a century be-fore Weber—formulated this very relationshipbetween the state and the military that is criti-cal for our purposes. Clausewitz proposes thatwar among any set of belligerents is a prod-uct of the tripartite relations among the state(the political determinants of armed force), thearmed forces (the instrument of coercion), andsociety (the people governed by those decid-ing on the use of force and subject to if notprotected by the coercive means) (see Paret

1992). These elements and the bonds betweenthem form a powerful trinity in war making,war preparation, and recovery from conflictand have critical implications for the under-standing of the phenomenon of war and ofits social organization.1 From von Clausewitzthrough Weber to Turney-High (1971), per-haps the foremost anthropologist of organizedviolence (see Simons 1999), armed conflict isconsidered warfare only when it involves a clashamong organized means of coercion, with atleast one belligerent being characterized byboth an organizationally distinct armed forceand state apparatus. Recent scholarship in thisvein is therefore implicitly, if not explicitly,historical, precisely because it recognizes thatways of making war and war’s effects on thoseit touches are no less historically particularthan are relations among states, militaries, andsocieties.

MOVING BEYOND MONOPOLY,MONOFOCAL, ANDMATERIALIST BIASESIN RESEARCH

Recognizing the broad scope of the Clause-witzian trinity has three powerful implicationsfor work on war and the military that highlightthe distinctive contributions of recent scholar-ship: Research on war and the military mustmove beyond the analytic biases (a) that statesnecessarily possess monopolies over coercion,(b) that interstate and civil war can be fullygrasped in isolation from one another, and(c) that the social consequences of war lie pri-marily if not exclusively in the material realm.I address each of these in turn.

Most research focusing on warfare and themilitary reflects a bias toward monopoly. Thiscan be seen where Weber’s formulation of thestate’s monopoly over coercion is transformed

1The classics of military sociology—Janowitz’s (1960) TheProfessional Soldier and Huntington’s (1957) The Soldier andthe State—further underscore the centrality of these three el-ements by focusing, respectively, on relations between societyand the military and the state and the military.

236 Kestnbaum

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 20

09.3

5:23

5-25

4. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by U

nive

rsid

ade

de B

rasi

lia o

n 04

/29/

14. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV381-SO35-12 ARI 5 June 2009 9:27

from a claim about the significance of the rela-tionship between political authority and con-trol over coercive means into a de facto as-sumption about the actual organization of forcegoverning the entire domain of war making.As a consequence, nonstate forms of orga-nized coercion—what might be called milita-rized forms of self-help—tend to figure onlywhen they actively oppose conventional state-organized forces. Furthermore, nonstate asso-ciations and ordinary people who are unarmedor who do not supply the specific resourcesor materiel required by the military tend tobe marginalized or treated separately in analy-sis. Both tendencies are pernicious. The first isproblematic because it treats as practically irrel-evant a host of irregular military forces formedalong local political, ethnic, religious, or othersectarian lines that are neither exclusively op-positional nor duly constituted and authorizedby the central state. Such forces may remainapart from conflict or seek to enter it or evenstay it. They may act in ways orthogonal tothe state or perhaps become aligned with state-raised conventional forces. These irregular mil-itary forces might remain completely indepen-dent; they might ultimately be recognized oreven sanctioned by the state. In some instances,they might even be sponsored by the state anddeployed openly. For example, this might oc-cur when state power is seized through revo-lution (Skocpol 1979), when a collapsing state,to ward off dissolution, calls for the country-side to rise up in a “people’s war” (Paret 1992,Geyer 2002), or when paramilitary bodies con-tribute to state efforts at military and policingcontrol without official reliance on the armedforces (Ahram 2008). In dynamic relationshipwith other forms of militarized self-help andwith conventional armed forces, these form theconstellation of organized coercion, provoca-tively characterized by Tilly (2003) as the arrayof “specialists in violence.” Only by examiningthe complete range of specialists in violence canwe move beyond the monopoly bias, allowingthe analyst to trace how each violence specialistshapes the use of coercion by other parties to aconflict, who is organized into war and precisely

how, and to what effect (see Davis & Pereira2003, Holden 2004).

The second expression of the monopoly biasis somewhat more elusive but no less important.At least since the twentieth century, popularsupport, personal sacrifice, and the devastationwrought by mass war have appeared worthy ofregard, yet there has still been a tendency tocharacterize wars in terms of the official stateapparatus of war making and its central eco-nomic dependencies. The effect has been si-multaneous acknowledgment of the dramaticeffects war has on individuals and segregationof the analysis of war broadly from these effectsas well as from consideration of the ways state-led war depends on unarmed people and non-state organizations. A countercurrent of workhas clarified the problems with this sort of seg-regation by taking into account not only thestate and the military but also the place of or-dinary people in armed conflict, examining therange of ways their involvement (and the state’sor military’s reliance on them) shifts in distinc-tive settings and the consequences of their par-ticular location in struggle (e.g., Paret 1992).Elsewhere, I have argued that elevating ordi-nary people to a central place in analysis ofthe state and military in armed conflict definesthe core of an emerging historical sociology ofwar (Kestnbaum 2005). This move is doublycentral, then, because it constitutes the secondline of challenge to the monopoly bias, allow-ing the analyst to arrive at a richer and morecomplete understanding of how war comes tobe organized, how it is understood, and whomit touches.

The second analytic bias in existing schol-arship appears when we turn our attentionto opponents faced in war making and theway this defines the kind of war being waged.For the purposes of presentation, I call thisthe monofocal bias. Comparative work on thestate proposes, at least in principle, that statesare uniquely situated in that they look outat others with which they compete and in attheir own societies, which they govern andfrom which they extract resources, and so on.Following Skocpol’s (1979) apt phrase, the state

www.annualreviews.org • Sociology of War 237

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 20

09.3

5:23

5-25

4. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by U

nive

rsid

ade

de B

rasi

lia o

n 04

/29/

14. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV381-SO35-12 ARI 5 June 2009 9:27

is Janus-like, simultaneously facing both inwardand outward. Yet when the same insight is ap-plied to scholarship on war, Janus typically facesonly one way at a time, and his vision is re-duced from dynamically multifocal to singularin attention—either inward or outward, towardcivil war or interstate war. This professional di-vision of labor undercuts any effort to assesswhat is distinctive or shared about war makingand the organization of coercive force across thetwo types of conflict. Just as importantly, it un-dermines any sustained examination of how thetwo may be intertwined, shaping one another.Recent work has sought explicitly to bridge thisdivide, comprehending the two in single analy-ses, championed perhaps most prominently byWimmer & Minn (2006).

The third bias, for lack of a better term, Icall broadly materialist. It is perhaps most clearwhen scholars reduce the defining character orsocial effects of warfare to casualty counts, andthe significance of loss or the search for con-solation, for example, are pushed to the mar-gin. But this tendency also appears when un-dermined or rebuilt institutions are examinedprimarily, if not exclusively, in terms of servicesinterrupted, life chances affected, or even bun-dles of rights lost or enjoyed. What is marginal-ized here is the host of ideational processes—cognitive, evaluative, and even emotional—thatget at how individuals make sense of themselvesand of the world in which they live and the va-riety of ways these efforts at sense making mayshape and be shaped by warfare. But some re-cent work on armed conflict has sought to in-corporate precisely this, focusing on how warreflects and serves to remake collective under-standings and the complex meanings they entail(see Kestnbaum 2005, Wagner-Pacifici 2005;on the broad significance of this move in his-torical research, see Adams et al. 2005, and withrespect to the state, Steinmetz 1999).

The growth of scholarship revealing andrejecting biases toward coercive monopoly,monofocal vision, and materialist preoccupa-tions has produced a substantive reorientationof the field around two clusters of questions.The first focuses on why states and other

actors wage war as they do. It distinguishesbetween how war makers organize and mobi-lize coercive force and how organized coercionis directed at and applied to a designated en-emy. The second investigates some of the po-litical, institutional, and cultural consequencesof different patterns of war making. This lineof investigation explores how war reflects andremakes the way events, experiences, and so-cial groups are understood and signified, and ithighlights the reworking of salient categories ofsocial differentiation and the valences they aregiven. These three broad thematic domains—mobilization into war, treatment of the enemy,and signification—form the substantive core ofthe new thrust in scholarship on war and themilitary, and it is to each of these domains thatI now turn.

MOBILIZATION INTO WAR

The point of departure for the bulk of sociolog-ical scholarship on mobilization lies in Parker’s(1976, 1988) and McNeill’s (1982, 1989)formulations of “the military revolution” (oc-curring between 1530 and 1710) and “thegunpowder revolution” (running roughly from1450 to 1800), respectively. Both contend that,in the early modern Europe of the sixteenth andseventeenth centuries, a break occurred thataltered the military and political organizationof war making. Although somewhat differentin detail, each author focuses on the histori-cal development of professional standing armiesequipped with gunpowder weapons, employingdrill and discipline, and supported from statetreasuries. In both formulations, the militarypower of professional standing armies main-tained by the state was stark, driving other poli-ties to reform the way they made war or to per-ish, and fundamentally remaking warfare intoan enterprise of engagements among state-ledstanding forces. Historically, this can be under-stood as a twofold process, achieved to greateror lesser extent in particular cases, in whichthe means of making war were concentratedin a coherent set of organizations—the stand-ing armed forces—over which the central state

238 Kestnbaum

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 20

09.3

5:23

5-25

4. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by U

nive

rsid

ade

de B

rasi

lia o

n 04

/29/

14. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV381-SO35-12 ARI 5 June 2009 9:27

gained control (see Elias 1978/1982; Tilly 1985,1992; Mann 1986, 1993; Bates 2001; Kiser &Baer 2005; on the elimination of contractedarmies, see especially Redlich 1964/1965). Inthis sense, the military and gunpowder revo-lutions formed the initial decisive move in thestate’s consolidation of a more or less imperfectmonopoly over violence, giving rise to the cen-trality of the Clausewitzian trinity in warfare.

Incorporating the Masses

The emphasis on this early modern break, how-ever, frequently lets another moment of change,with no less important consequences for schol-arship on war, go unnoticed. This subsequentrupture is what historian Paret (1992, pp. 3–4)has called “the revolution in war at the end ofthe eighteenth century” (see also pp. 16–17, 26–27, 32–38, 77–80, 136, 151; Paret 1986). ForParet, the core of this late-eighteenth-centuryrevolution lay in newly emerging methods oforganizing and raising armed forces, methodsthat amounted to nothing less than the state’smobilization of the masses of ordinary peo-ple into war (see Howard 1976; Black 1991,1994; Posen 1992; Bartov 1996; Avant 2000; seealso von Clausewitz 1976 [1832], pp. 591–94).The sociological significance of this revolutioncan be seen most clearly in its historical con-text and linked explicitly to the use of coerciveforce (Kestnbaum 2005). With the creation ofstanding military forces in the fifteenth cen-tury, state-building princes and monarchs be-gan to usher ordinary people out of inter-state war, neither soliciting their involvementin armed conflict (Howard 1976; Rothenberg1978; Best 1982; Duffy 1987; Parker 1988;Black 1994, 2001) nor making them its pri-mary target (Walzer 1977; Best 1980, 1994;Howard et al. 1994). At the end of the eigh-teenth century, however, ordinary people werebrought back to the center of war. The stateturned to the broad expanse of those it ruled tofind persons to take up arms, to provide the re-sources necessary for armed conflict, to supportwar efforts, and ultimately to endure dislocationand devastation and to become casualties and

victims (Rothenberg 1978, 1994; Best 1980;Black 1991, 1994, 2001; Paret 1992). In vonClausewitz’s (1976 [1832], p. 592) memorablephrase, “war again became the business of thepeople.” Ordinary people became inextricablybound up with state-organized coercion, andwars themselves took on popular meaning andsignificance that could barely have been imag-ined even a few decades before.

Explanations for the late-eighteenth-century shift toward state-led mass militarymobilization from von Clausewitz (1976[1832]) to Chorley (1973) to Skocpol (1994)de-emphasize technological and geopoliti-cal considerations and instead focus on theeruption of popular politics and its fit withmilitary institutions. Building on these insights,Kestnbaum (2000, 2002, 2005) argues thatmass-mobilizing warfare and the revolutionin war that it initiated are explained by citizenconscription. Conscription was an especiallyappropriate military and political response tothe conjunction of popular political mobi-lization and armed threat precisely because itincorporated the wide swath of ordinary men ascitizens into the military workings of the state.In turn, this binding of politics to war was thekey to conscription’s profound impact. It pro-vided the institutional framework within whichstates built massed citizen armies and mobilizedtheir citizenries behind those forces. By high-lighting the obligations of citizens, conscriptionprovided the politically resonant idiom andhighly flexible rationale for all manner ofpopular involvement in warfare (Paret 1992;Avant 2000; Kestnbaum 2002, 2005; Moran& Waldron 2002). What is more, conscriptionhelped produce a distinctive nationalizationof warfare—both among and within states—inwhich not only political authorities but alsoordinary people increasingly understood warsand their parts in them in national terms (seeBrubaker 1992, Bartov 1994, Scarry 1996). Thisvery nationalization under the regime of con-scription, however, was achieved through an ex-traordinary reliance on nonstate organizationsto mobilize both soldiers and civilians, frompoliticized militias or revolutionary committees


Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 20

09.3

5:23

5-25

4. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by U

nive

rsid

ade

de B

rasi

lia o

n 04

/29/

14. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV381-SO35-12 ARI 5 June 2009 9:27

to voluntary associations, ultimately includingbusiness and labor organizations (Horne 1997,Skocpol et al. 2002, Kestnbaum 2005).

Popular Incorporationand Militarized Self-Help

From the end of the eighteenth century to thepresent, the revolution in war that incorpo-rated the masses into armed conflict has playedout against the more familiar background ofstate efforts to consolidate control over stand-ing forces, sensitizing the analyst to the variedways ordinary people are drawn into conflictor are, instead, marginalized. One componentof this process is especially suggestive: Warswaged during moments of state reconstitutionhave left a durable imprint on how states or-ganize and mobilize for armed conflict. Forexample, Centeno (2002) contends that statesin Latin America, whose central control overstanding military forces was consolidated un-der colonial rule, won their independence with-out large-scale war and thus had no impe-tus to reform the structure of their militariesor to incorporate the masses into war mak-ing. Achieving independence in this way rein-forced the insulation of civilian society fromthe armed forces and from the state’s prose-cution of war and did little to help build anadministrative core that might allow the stateto enforce a monopoly over coercion. Withoutsubsequent pressure to wage mass-mobilizingwar (and without the administrative capacity todo so), these arrangements persisted, even inthe face of political and institutional challenges.Skocpol (1994) and Kestnbaum (2002, 2005)make the converse case: States that underwentsocial revolution, staved off collapse under se-vere military pressure by bringing the massesinto both politics and war, or won their inde-pendence through force of arms relying on pop-ular political mobilization incorporated ordi-nary people into war making in thoroughgoingfashion.

Recent work on post–World War II decolo-nization (Ahram 2008) and on the American andFrench Revolutions (Kestnbaum 2000, 2002,

2005; cf. Skocpol 1979, 1994), however, notesthat such states were at an important crossroads:Popular mobilizing wars of independence andrevolution tend to produce a range of mili-tarized forms of self-help, most especially lo-cal self-defense and militia forces, which newly(re)formed states attempt to co-opt for the pur-poses of war making and local order-keeping.Under strong military pressure, especially sus-tained mass-mobilizing warfare, some of theseforms of militarized self-help become moreor less regularized such that the state autho-rizes their formation and operation and mayeven bind them organizationally to conven-tional standing forces (see Kestnbaum 1997).In the absence of such pressure, however, manyof these forms of militarized self-help remainlargely independent of the state, leaving con-trol over substantial forms of coercion stronglydecentralized.

New War?

Arguments about the state’s incorporation ofthe masses into war and its relation to the emer-gence of militarized forms of self-help offer aclear bridge to an emerging line of scholarshipon the so-called “new wars” (Snow 1996; Gray1997; Kaldor 1999; Bauman 2001, 2002; Jung2003; Mueller 2004; Munkler 2005; Shaw 2005;but cf. Kalyvas 2001, Duyvesteyn & Angstrom2005, Newman 2004). Distinguished from oldwars waged by regular military forces con-trolled by central states, united under a singleflag and the idioms of national service and se-curity, and fighting against similarly organizedfoes, new wars, as Kaldor (1999) and others ar-gue, involve nonstate actors, such as militias,guerrillas, and warlords running private mili-taries (see Snow 1996, Bauman 2001), moti-vated less by national ideology than by greed(Enzensberger 1994, Bauman 2001, Munkler2005), frequently if not generally behavingcriminally, and entering conflicts that can beseen as insurgencies or civil wars and that in-clude campaigns of terrorism (Enzensberger1994, Kaplan 1994, Snow 1996, Mueller 2004,Munkler 2005).

240 Kestnbaum

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 20

09.3

5:23

5-25

4. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by U

nive

rsid

ade

de B

rasi

lia o

n 04

/29/

14. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV381-SO35-12 ARI 5 June 2009 9:27

This work has precipitated significant criti-cism along several lines. Most contentious, per-haps, is the claim regarding criminality, whosebearing, apart from specific methods used (suchas targeting of civilians, which I treat in the nextsection), can be understood largely in terms ofwhich side in a civil war has earned the polit-ical sympathies of the analyst (Kalyvas 2001).More important for our considerations is theoverstated claim that wars involving irregularor self-armed elements and motivated by forcesother than overarching citizenship or nation-hood narratives are somehow new (Newman2004, Chojnacki 2006). The last point is sig-nificant because it calls for careful specificationof the range of irregular military forms enter-ing civil and interstate wars dating back to therevolution in war at the end of the eighteenthcentury and the emergence of the modern termguerrilla. It also calls for careful examination ofhow state control over military force, efforts tomobilize in the national idiom, and even statecollapse (see Derluguian 2005) may be linkedto countermobilizations of irregulars that drawexplicitly on ethnic, religious, or other politi-cally salient group memberships.

The new-war debate, however, has been re-markably productive along perhaps unexpectedlines. In descriptive terms, this work has high-lighted a shift in the structure of conflict sinceWorld War II, in which a growing propor-tion of all wars involve nonstate actors. Civilwars in particular have become longer andmore common than in the prior half-century(Wallensteen & Sollenberg 2001, Sarkees et al.2003, Lacina & Gleditsch 2005), and such con-flicts have shifted to the territory of relativelyweaker states (Malesevic 2008).

Perhaps even more importantly, the new-war debate has produced analytic dividendsalong several lines, framed usefully by the workof sociologists Roxborough (2006a,b, 2007) andHironaka (2005). First, it has raised the ques-tion of the relationship between civil and inter-state war. As Hironaka (2005) argues, the pri-mary attention given to interstate war wagedby strong central states and its Darwinianeffects has blinded scholars to how much

transnational institutions, relations, and con-sensus have helped support comparatively weakstates, for which civil wars must be seen as partof normal politics. Roxborough (2006a,b, 2007)contends that not merely academic analysts butthe armed forces themselves may suffer froma similar blind spot: The demands and ori-entations of interstate war have made the pe-culiarities of coping with insurgency difficultto recognize and respond to effectively. Sec-ond, the new-war debate highlights the iden-tification of state weakness with the loss of thestate’s monopoly on violence and forces us torecognize that how the state experiences thisloss shapes our understanding of ensuing armedconflict. Holden (2004), Bates (2008), andAhram (2008) argue along with Roxborough(2006a, 2007) that we must examine the state’sand the military’s acceptance or even sponsor-ship of local militias and paramilitaries along-side the state’s inability or reluctance to putdown or disarm insurgents, guerrillas, opposi-tional militias, and private militaries as sourcesof the erosion of its control. Thus, the state (andthe armed forces) must be seen as a potentiallyactive participant in dismantling its own puta-tive monopoly on force.2 Each of these routestoward the erosion of coercive monopoly af-fects the analysis of why civil war has become anormal state of affairs, as well as how such warsmight be brought to a close.

The third line of analysis in some sensedraws the prior two together, highlighting theinterstate dimensions of the involvement of ir-regulars in warfare waged within states in whichthe monopoly over force is challenged in signif-icant ways. There, financial, organizational, andpolitical support for oppositional militias and

2Furthermore, among characteristically stronger states en-tering these conflicts from outside the region, we observe aparallel process in which the state actively undermines its ownmonopoly over coercion. Having consolidated forms of mil-itary mass mobilization and subsequently reformed the mili-tary into a professional standing force (Segal 1989, 1993; seeSnider & Watkins 2002), foreign powers such as the UnitedStates have begun again to hire armed military contractors toaugment regular forces they send abroad (Singer 2003, Avant2005, Kelty 2008).


Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 20

09.3

5:23

5-25

4. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by U

nive

rsid

ade

de B

rasi

lia o

n 04

/29/

14. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV381-SO35-12 ARI 5 June 2009 9:27

insurgents, as well as trained personnel, maycome from across borders and enter civil wars(Kaldor 1999); irregulars involved in a civil warat home may cross state lines to fight in a civil orinterstate war abroad; and wars may be foughtprimarily among nonstate groups within one setof state borders or even across borders, creatingnew conflict dynamics that defy characteriza-tion as either civil or interstate war (Chojnacki2006).

TREATMENT OF THE ENEMY

If questions of mobilization have dominatedscholarly attention, no less significant are is-sues of how coercive force is directed and ap-plied, against whom, and on what basis. Thisis the domain of the treatment of the enemy,where “the enemy” may be defined as the per-sons against whom the state deems it may le-gitimately use organized coercion (see Schmitt1976 [1927]). Making anyone the target of at-tack, then, amounts to treating those persons aspart of the enemy. Seen in this fashion, the no-tion of the enemy frames analysis in two ways:(a) It specifies a terribly plastic and politicallyand militarily charged category of persons intowhich different social groups may be seen toenter or exit, varying historically and by bel-ligerents in a conflict; and (b) it focuses atten-tion squarely upon those whom the state deemsit is appropriate to attack as a matter of design.

Jus in Bello and NoncombatantImmunity

Who may be targeted and attacked is capturedin the prevailing laws of war and, more accu-rately, in the jus in bello—those rules and con-ventions governing the actual conduct of war.This is not primarily an issue of formal agree-ments or treaties, although the jus in bello maybe codified at various moments in precisely suchways. Rather, it is an issue of the conventionallyand customarily accepted understandings thatregulate military operations on the ground andare expressed in actual war-making practice (seeWalzer 1977, Best 1980).

Central to the jus in bello is the notion ofnoncombatant immunity, specifying that the in-tentional and systematic use of state-organizedcoercion be reserved only for those armedby another state or its military commanders(Walzer 1977, Best 1994). This principle crys-tallized historically in parallel with the forma-tion of standing armies in Europe, as the orga-nizational distinction between those who borearms for the state and those who did not be-came increasingly clear. Since at least the firstpart of the seventeenth century, noncombatantimmunity has constituted a clear standard ofconduct, explicitly engaged by belligerents asthey respected its requirements, sought legit-imate exceptions, or justified disregard for itsdemands (Best 1980, 1994). In analytic terms,noncombatant immunity does much the samework that the state’s monopoly over force per-forms in the domain of mobilization: Histori-cally challenged at many junctures, it binds theorganization of coercion to the actual practiceof war making, in this instance highlighting theextent to which the distinction between soldiersand civilians is salient in a belligerent’s determi-nation of whom it attacks or how and drawingattention to how understandings of who may betreated as the enemy are subject to revision.

Dehumanization and IntentionalAttack on Civilians

Much sociological work on mobilization de-parts from the early modern moment; in thedomain of the enemy, explaining how attacks oncivilians became routine in World War II galva-nizes attention, from targeting civilian concen-trations for their political and military effects, tothe use of massively destructive weapons whoseeffects failed to distinguish among combatantsand noncombatants, to large-scale internmentand even genocide associated with war. Here,pathbreaking work by historians Bartov (1996,2000) on the Eastern Front and Dower (1986)on the Pacific Theater highlights a central pro-cess: Belligerents came to see one another indehumanized or (in Dower’s usage) demonizedterms—rendered utterly alien and an object of

242 Kestnbaum

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 20

09.3

5:23

5-25

4. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by U

nive

rsid

ade

de B

rasi

lia o

n 04

/29/

14. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV381-SO35-12 ARI 5 June 2009 9:27

fear and dread. Under these conditions, notonly were the rules of conduct in war reservedfor ordinary persons set aside, but also whatmight otherwise be understood as brutality oreven atrocity was transformed into routine ac-tion deemed both necessary and justifiable (seeKassimeris 2006). This is a special variant of aclass of social distance arguments that seek toexplain the use of coercion in terms of the waythe often deadly consequences of action may beobscured or rendered insensible to those per-forming the acts as well as to third parties (seeCollins 2007, 2008). In this case, rather thantechnological, organizational, or linguistic fac-tors serving to separate persons from the con-sequences of their actions, people are redefinedcategorically so that, regardless of their role inwar, they neither demand nor deserve conven-tional protections but instead require the mostsevere treatment. Dehumanization and demo-nization acquired their particular power fromthe way the nationalist idiom in which they wereexpressed further racialized adversaries, render-ing social differences among belligerents funda-mental. And they were driven in large part bya politics that remade armed conflict betweensuch foes in ideological terms, as a struggle be-tween worldviews, itself partly the product ofthe experience of prior war, especially the ef-fects of mass killing. In this way, Bartov (1996,2000) and Dower (1986) set the terms for dis-cussion. Central to the erasure of distinctionsbetween combatants and noncombatants wasa radical shift in which the enemy came to beseen as both alien and terrifying. This shift re-flected the experience of mobilizing for and en-during the devastation of mass war, which inturn shaped how the state characterized whatwas at stake and how it needed to mobilize towage such war.

Total War and Civilian Protections

Responding to the extraordinary and even un-precedented ways civilians were drawn intoWorld War II, much of the sociologically richwork on treatment of the enemy has been partof a self-conscious effort to rehabilitate the

notion of total war. This work is identifiedperhaps most explicitly with the multivolumeproject sponsored by the German HistoricalInstitute and focusing on the three-quartersof a century leading up to World War II(Forster & Nagler 1997; Boemeke et al. 1999;Chickering & Forster 2000, 2003; Chickeringet al. 2004). Its analytic utility lies in its recog-nition that any understanding of total war musttake account equally of mobilization and treat-ment of the enemy and must ultimately exam-ine the complex relationships between the two,as suggested by Bartov and Dower. This worklooked back beyond the extremities of WorldWar II to a period of restraint in interstate war,when noncombatant immunity became botha principle and practice at the level of state-authorized conduct.

Here, the work of Geoffrey Parker andGunther Rothenberg is pivotal. Parker (1994)established the extent to which war was gener-ally regulated by conventions and rules regard-ing appropriate conduct, going back at least tothe sixteenth century. He examined how suchrules might be suspended in times of ideolog-ically infused confessional conflict among na-tional states (similar to, if less extreme than,the racialized dehumanization of World WarII), and how the backlash against extraordi-nary wartime violence against civilians inspireda new set of explicit limits on war. That back-lash was articulated in theory and codified inemergent international law, directed at narrow-ing the scope of the enemy to those armed byan opponent and prescribing how that enemywas to be treated. In that connection, Parkerhighlights a critical link between newly crystal-lized conventions regulating military practiceand political calculus: The state’s consolidationof effective control over the armed forces com-bined with its recognition of the extraordinarycosts of armed reprisals from adversaries for ac-tions the adversaries deemed inappropriate ledto the state’s self-enforcement of rules regard-ing attack on noncombatants. The aim was tokeep war something states could afford to wage(cf. Kiser & Gleave 2008). To this discussion,Rothenberg (1994) adds the analytic claim,


Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 20

09.3

5:23

5-25

4. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by U

nive

rsid

ade

de B

rasi

lia o

n 04

/29/

14. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV381-SO35-12 ARI 5 June 2009 9:27

supported by careful historical documentation,that the jus in bello organized around noncom-batant immunity was a sufficiently strong reg-ulator of military conduct in practice that, evenwith the emergence of massed citizen armiesand the channeling of the energies of a mobi-lized nation into armed conflict around 1800,there was no commensurate dropping of pro-tections for civilians in interstate war.

Undermining Civilian Protectionsand Militarized Self-Help

Two distinct threads of scholarship build onthis foundation. Both examine how state-authorized attacks on civilians became routinepractice in contexts less encompassing than theworld wars of the twentieth century and high-light the mobilization of self-armed men intowar. Both also illuminate the complex relation-ships between interstate and civil conflict. Thefirst takes the long historical perspective, turn-ing attention away from the outright suspensionof the rules of war toward how conventionalrestraints regarding treatment of civilians dur-ing wartime were relaxed. McPherson (1997),examining the U.S. Civil War, and Horne(2002a,b), examining the Franco-Prussian War,identify a central dynamic: The entry of guer-rillas and partisans into war led to a blurring ofdistinctions between combatants and noncom-batants precisely because anyone at anytimemight take up arms. The appearance of suchmen in invaded or occupied territory fightingalongside state-raised, conventional massed cit-izen forces implicated the unarmed citizenry atlarge, destabilizing prevailing norms regulatingtreatment of civilians. Ultimately, this led state-organized forces to engage in large-scale cam-paigns destroying civilian property, livelihoods,and habitations and even shelling cities to denyvaluable resources to their opponent, certainly,but also to undermine popular morale and po-litical support on which guerrilla involvementas well as conventional mass war depended.The last point is especially important becauseit emphasizes the destabilizing effects of irregu-lars in wars between conventional armed forces

and underscores that, when considering attackon civilians, it is not merely lethal force thatmatters. Rather, it echoes the claim of Tilly(2003) regarding violence more generally: Theuse of organized coercion against civilians todo many things short of killing—from limit-ing the ability to feed a family or earn a livingto detention and inflicting beatings and moregrievous bodily harm—must all be consideredif we are to identify and understand how thecombatant-noncombatant distinction was ren-dered less salient in armed conflict.

Bell’s (2007) recent examination of theFrench Revolution as a total war adds an im-portant dimension to analyses of the impact ofself-armed fighters on civilian attack by focus-ing on the different kinds of war that guerril-las might wage. When Revolutionary France’sarmed forces encountered foreign militaries—even those allied with emergent guerrilla forces,as in Northern Spain—they reserved state-authorized organized coercion for armed com-batants (including irregulars). Although attackson civilians certainly occurred, they stoppedshort of systematic campaigns targeting non-combatants. Such was not the case, however,when the French Revolutionary state facedarmed opposition internally, which the militaryput down, sometimes brutally, and in which at-tacks on civilians were frequent, if not the norm.Bell suggests that this was partly a product ofthe intolerability of internal opposition by self-armed men and partly the pressure of waginga concurrent mass-mobilizing war against for-eign powers.

Taken together, McPherson, Horne, andBell make a suggestive argument: The rules ofwar regulating appropriate or tolerable con-duct and guiding state response to guerril-las in strictly internal conflicts, as opposed towars among conventional military forces, werequite distinct around the end of the eighteenthcentury. In both domains, however, when self-armed men posed a powerful affront to theestablished order and became not merely a mil-itary concern but challenged the state’s con-trol over coercive force, their appearance servedto spur and legitimize intentional targeting of

244 Kestnbaum

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 20

09.3

5:23

5-25

4. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by U

nive

rsid

ade

de B

rasi

lia o

n 04

/29/

14. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV381-SO35-12 ARI 5 June 2009 9:27

civilians, transforming attack on noncombat-ants into a distasteful necessity.

The second line of scholarship followingfrom the emergence of restraint on war tends totreat noncombatant immunity as given and tofocus instead on how attacks on civilians emergein war despite strong normative and interna-tional legal prohibitions. This work is distin-guished by a focus on self-armed men both ascause and potential agent of attack on noncom-batants, highlights civilian attacks in the ab-sence of engaging conventional forces, and de-velops the useful analytic distinction betweenselective and indiscriminate attack on civilians.The bulk of such work focuses on war-makingenvironments characterized by states that lack amonopoly over coercion and that have limitedterritorial control, as well as on how the posi-tion of irregulars vis-a-vis the state and ideo-logical factors shape the political calculus asso-ciated with intentional attack on civilians. Forthe purposes of discussion, this scholarship canbe divided into research emphasizing the coun-terstate (or oppositional) side and research em-phasizing the state and state-supported side ofconflict.

In research on the counterstate side ofconflict, work on new wars (discussed above,e.g., Enzensberger 1994; Kaldor 1999; Munkler2005; Roxborough 2006, 2007) and on ter-rorism (Goodwin 2006, Goodwin et al. 2008)stands out. On this account, oppositional self-armed actors—militants, insurgents, revolu-tionaries, warlords, or terrorists—attack civil-ians (including putative supporters of rivalmilitias or warlords) within the states in whichthey are operating. They do so from some com-bination of a desire to capture resource streamsto enrich themselves and sustain their oppo-sition and a desire to secure a zone of opera-tions free from central state and local civilianinterference. They may also have broader goalsof securing local political control, which typ-ically involves offering protection to locals inlieu of the state (Goodwin & Skocpol 1994,Goodwin 2001). In this context, the opposi-tional actors’ civilian attacks may involve se-rious bodily harm or death and are directed

selectively at apparently disloyal or unsupport-ive elements (see Kalyvas 2006, Goodwin et al.2008). Where opposition has a widespread eth-nic, religious, or other sectarian base, it may in-clude claims for regional autonomy or self-rule,and civilian attacks are frequently intended atleast in part to gain both recognition and bar-gaining power with respect to the state, sendingthe message to locals and political authoritiesalike that the state is unable to suppress vio-lent opposition or protect those who might beits victims. Such attacks are more likely to takethe form of deadly indiscriminate assaults onrandom members of politically salient groups,characteristic of terrorism per se, formingpart of an ongoing insurgency or revolution-ary struggle (Goodwin 2006). Such terroristicforms of violence may be further bolstered byreligious or other ideological justifications formilitant opposition against broadly defined en-emies, and may spill over into—or be organizedprimarily as—terror undertaken in foreignlands. But as Derluguian (2005) emphasizes inthe context of violent struggle over the futureof governance, willingness to resort to civil-ian attacks is not evenly distributed amongall oppositional elements in a conflict, evenwhen it might be effective or when rivalsshow precisely this willingness. Even in suchcases, some oppositional forces may maintain aprincipled and more conventional aversion toemploying such means.

From the state or state-supported side,Kalyvas (2004, 2006) argues that, in civil war,attack on civilians (by state forces or paramili-taries) is a more or less effective strategy to sup-press armed opposition, making its costs worthbearing. But such attacks vary in form. Vio-lence generally is more selective when the state-supported side has dominant but not completeterritorial control, but it is more likely to takean indiscriminate form when insurgents areweak and unable to offer civilians protection.Downes (2006, 2007a,b, 2008) and Valentinoet al. (2004, 2006; see also Valentino 2004)take issue with this analysis, noting that in-surgents rarely can offer civilians protection.Instead, these scholars characterize civilian


Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 20

09.3

5:23

5-25

4. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by U

nive

rsid

ade

de B

rasi

lia o

n 04

/29/

14. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV381-SO35-12 ARI 5 June 2009 9:27

attacks launched by states as acts of despera-tion, given the relative ineffectiveness and highpolitical costs of such tactics—including hard-ening domestic opposition, bringing about for-eign condemnation, and potentially elicitingreprisals both internally and externally. Thisnotion of desperation may be understood as anon-normative reconstruction of the just warprinciple of necessity (Walzer 1977), which ele-vates the stakes of the conflict, in the focal state’sjudgment, to the center of the political calculus.In this sense, it is the potential consequences ofan unresolved guerrilla-based civil war or pro-tracted war of attrition, for example, that elicitattacks on civilians as a last resort.

The debate between Kalyvas, Downes, andValentino and his collaborators in terms ofwhether civilian attacks are worth their costshinges on one central consideration: the extentto which specifying the stakes and the costs ina struggle is the product of complex and highlycharged evaluations of the threat faced. Andhere we are squarely back to the considera-tion raised by McPherson, Horne, and Bell thatthreat linked to civilian attack potentially in-volves elements both of how the opponent chal-lenges the state’s control over coercive force andof the extent to which that opponent’s actionsrepresent a violation of strongly held normsof conduct. We are also back to the accountoffered by Dower and Bartov that categoricalidentifications of the enemy rendering themalien and objects of fear or dread may demandand justify civilian attacks.

Mann (2005) picks up these lines of ar-gument, in some sense completing the anal-ysis of the state side. Mann focuses on masskilling per se, exploring what he calls mur-derous ethnic cleansing. Such ethnic cleans-ing relies on a destabilized or weakened state,the product of foreign war or internal crises,but one that can and does offer its politicaland military support—and even coordination—to efforts to forcibly relocate or kill largenumbers of ethnically identified persons. Suchcampaigns depend on a historical conflationof popular rule with rule by and for a single

people defined in ethnic terms. They frequentlyrely for their execution on state-tolerated if notstate-sponsored paramilitary or militia forcesin addition to the military. Ethnic cleansing, inturn, may be racialized, as in the case of NaziGermany and more generally where racism hasanimated and served to justify mass killing inthe name of imperial expansion (Mann 2007).In this connection, we can see the import ofBartov and Dower, McPherson, Horne, andBell, projected into the colonial world. To-gether with Mann, they suggest how extraor-dinary and sometimes exemplary state use offorce against civilians in colonial civil wars maybe seen as overdetermined—a product of thepolitical challenge posed, the normative viola-tion entailed in taking up arms against one’sown state as well as refusing to fight in conven-tional ways, and facilitated, if not demanded,by perceptions of fundamental differences be-tween colonial rulers and their subjects.

SIGNIFICATION: WHAT IS THEMEANING OF IT ALL?

It would be difficult to imagine questions ofmobilization or treatment of the enemy en-tirely apart from processes of signification—both those that designate, distinguish, and linkin categorical terms and those that assign sig-nificance or valence. Indeed, in the preced-ing presentation, such processes figure promi-nently, offering the interpretive frame withinwhich coercive force is organized and directedat particular ends. With respect to mobilization,this is clearest in the substance of appeals andcounterappeals to join a war effort: the claimagainst persons embedded in the appeal, theidiom in which this is expressed, its particularresonance, the social and cultural resources onwhich such an appeal draws, and the people itactivates. These set the very terms of war mak-ing, energized by and energizing clusters of in-stitutions and inflecting a range of relationshipsbound up in those institutions. The notion ofcitizen obligation and the way it has been vari-ously reworked in different national traditions

246 Kestnbaum

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 20

09.3

5:23

5-25

4. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by U

nive

rsid

ade

de B

rasi

lia o

n 04

/29/

14. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV381-SO35-12 ARI 5 June 2009 9:27

of the armed nation offer a compelling example(e.g., Kestnbaum 2002, Avant 2000, Moran &Waldron 2002). Treatment of the enemy, inturn, is inextricably tied to questions of sig-nification in that the domain itself is definedaccording to how different social groups areformed into an enemy to be attacked. Suchenemy formation in turn involves varying pro-cesses through which the salience of the distinc-tion between combatants and noncombatants isdiminished and replaced by a foe defined in un-differentiated terms. This appears most clearly,perhaps, in the work of Bartov and Mann, inwhich state elites (and others), advancing starkethnic or racialized distinctions among peoplesand believing that state power is to be employedin the service of one such group, played a centralrole in constructing the enemy in homogeneousterms, creating a strategic and normative con-text that both demanded and justified the use ofcoercion directly against civilians.

Recent work on signification in war buildson and echoes these two strands of scholarshipbut shifts attention to the ways processes of warmaking leave a durable imprint on states, soci-eties, and arms bearers of all varieties, well be-yond wartime itself. Such work can be dividedinto two broad approaches, the first highlight-ing the role of memory, the second such insti-tutions as citizenship. Both focus on how warmaking shapes the politically salient social cat-egories through which daily life is organized,the patterns of relations among persons seen tooccupy these categories, and the central meansof understanding employed by such personsto navigate their daily lives. This set of rela-tionships gives war making its eventful quality,in Sewell’s terms (2005; see Kestnbaum 2005,pp. 266–69), revealing the promise of suchresearch.

Memory

The point of departure for work on memorylies in an earlier line of scholarship that focusesmore tightly on the actual experience of war.Keegan (1976) offers perhaps the definitive

treatment of soldiers in combat. But workon memory couples to such research theexamination of the experience of war from theperspective of ordinary people—from thoseproducing the material requirements of armedconflict, to the families and friends of soldiers,to war’s many casualties—and highlights thevariety of ways armed conflict touches people’slives (e.g., Winter & Roberts 1997, 2007; seeForster & Nagler 1997). Such attention to therange of lived experience has the peculiar qual-ity of uniting the analytic focus on mobilizationand treatment of the enemy, explicitly examin-ing how both work together to constitute theexperience of war for particular populations.This experience, in turn, is translated byprocesses of collective recollection into a setof understandings not only of the particularexperiences lived through but of the variedparticipants in war and of warfare itself.

Mosse’s (1990) examination of memory fromthe French Revolution through World WarII and Winter’s (1995) focus on mourning inWorld War I (see also Winter 2006) define thisapproach. For Mosse, what is central to mem-ory is the fashioning of a more or less coherentmyth of the war experience from the conflictswaged by the first massed citizen armies, a mythidentifying how war was transformed into anextraordinary experience and test of manlinessthat remade both the soldier and the nation onwhose behalf he fought in glorious terms. Theexperience of mass death in World War I, inturn, reshaped the particular contours of themyth, extolling the virtues of those who gavetheir lives, and greatly expanded the role of thestate in myth making. The differential nationalexperiences of World War II meant the destruc-tion of the myth for Germany but its recharg-ing in victorious countries such as the UnitedStates. The myth’s importance lay precisely inthe way it gave meaning to loss and sacrifice,framing how differently situated persons mightmake sense of war and their place in it. Winter(1995) also focuses specifically on loss andthe scale of devastation and death endured inthe Great War. However, he highlights how


Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 20

09.3

5:23

5-25

4. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by U

nive

rsid

ade

de B

rasi

lia o

n 04

/29/

14. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV381-SO35-12 ARI 5 June 2009 9:27

communal processes of grieving gave meaningto the conflict and shaped how persons orientedto and made sense of that war, and the ways inwhich these processes formed a repertoire of re-sponses employed and elaborated in subsequentconflicts.

Both authors underscore the role of com-memoration in memory making: the active roleof the state as opposed to enthusiastic (if onlyvicarious) volunteers or local communities infashioning collective recollections at differentjunctures and the different roles such represen-tations of war played for civilians, soldiers, vet-erans, and the state in that particular conflictas well as in subsequent mobilizations. Suchwork shares much with Bartov’s (1996, 2000)considerations of how the World War I expe-rience translated into the doctrine and organi-zation of industrialized killing implemented bythe Nazi state in World War II. This line ofscholarship extends to the examination of howdifferently situated groups may fight over com-memoration of conflict or the contours of mem-ory (Wagner-Pacifici & Schwartz 1991; Olick2005, 2007), including a more narrow focus onwar crimes (Bartov et al. 2002) or reparations(Torpey 2006), and the way particular symbolsare reworked to different effect across conflicts,as can be seen in the invocation of the per-son and presidency of Abraham Lincoln duringthe wars of the twentieth century in the UnitedStates (Schwartz 2000). While highlighting in-teractional dynamics and even contestation aswell as change over time, all these scholars fo-cus on ways of conceiving of war’s significanceexplicitly in terms of how people are drawn intoarmed conflict.

Citizenship

The second main strategy turns this focuson war-defined social locations on its head.Implicitly engaging an earlier thread of re-search by Marwick (1974, 1988; Marwick et al.2001) on how war incorporates different so-cial groups, this recent scholarship focuses onsocial categories that exist beyond war mak-ing per se—class, race, ethnicity, or gender, for

example—to explore how such distinctionsshape the way war is waged and how war mak-ing remakes these lines of social differentia-tion in meaningful terms. Rather than focuson how processes of memory translate experi-ence into collective understandings, this workhighlights how the institutions of war mak-ing themselves—drawing on state authority andrendered socially consequential because of howthey are used in war making—recreate classesof persons and their relations to others.

Given this strategy’s range of possibilities, Ifocus here on work on gender for its clarity andrich illustrative quality. Of course, categoricaldistinctions along other lines, such as class andrace, are no less important. Indeed, for theo-retical reasons, it may be especially powerful toattend to intersections of race, class, and gen-der (Crenshaw 1989, Collins 1990). Notwith-standing the limits of research focusing on gen-der alone, work by Kestnbaum & Mann (2004)and Geva (2006, 2009) can be taken to de-fine the contours of the citizenship approach.Both focus on conscription, not only becauseconscription is implicated in the revolution inwar at the end of the eighteenth century, butalso because the national form of citizenshiparound which conscription is built specificallycuts across other lines of social differentiationsuch as class, race, and gender. For Kestnbaum& Mann, conscription had the effect of clari-fying and hardening lines of gender differen-tiation and projecting those hardened distinc-tions directly into the apparatus of war makingby identifying bearing arms for the state exclu-sively with those men who might be called onas citizens to fight. In doing so, it transformedthe masculine ideal in distinctly martial terms,elevating duty, sacrifice, honor, courage, and ca-maraderie as defining features of manliness. ForGeva, exemptions and deferments from com-pulsory service for family status meant that theparts played by men in mass war would be fun-damentally shaped by their roles as fathers andbreadwinners. In so doing, conscription estab-lished that a man’s obligations to serve the statewere no more powerful or decisive than his obli-gations to his family.

248 Kestnbaum

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 20

09.3

5:23

5-25

4. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by U

nive

rsid

ade

de B

rasi

lia o

n 04

/29/

14. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV381-SO35-12 ARI 5 June 2009 9:27

Manufacturing Difference andProcesses of Homogenization

Taken together, the memory and citizenship ap-proaches illustrate an important and provoca-tive tension in this domain. Both highlight howwar produces significations expressed as newdistinctions among social categories or newlysalient social categories, conceived in internallyundifferentiated terms. However, such homog-enization has a very different place in thesetwo lines of analysis. Work on memory empha-sizes the formation of singular, coherent col-lective recollections that animate subsequentconflicts and the way people understand andorient to their place in war. Neither the newlysalient categories of person or event nor thevalances attached to them—for example, thosewho gave their lives in war as a glorious un-dertaking for the fatherland—necessarily re-flect lived experience, however. And this is crit-ical, for as Mosse (1990) contends, apart fromwho invokes them and how, the power of suchcollective recollections resides in their coher-ence and the extent to which they allow broadclasses of persons to reconcile to their expe-rience and to locate themselves meaningfullywith regard to war. Work on citizenship, alter-natively, draws attention to how war-producedhomogenization—for example, “all citizens willserve”—involves a reinscription of categoricaldifference. This reinscription of difference maybe tacit, especially when it is associated witharticulation of the comprehensiveness of so-cial categories and their uniformity, and fre-quently serves to marginalize or exclude thosedifferentiated (see Mann & Kestnbaum 2007).Kestnbaum & Mann (2004) see this in the waynational citizenship and military service wereboth expanded broadly in social class terms atthe turn of the eighteenth century, but howtheir mutual identification refashioned each in

gender-exclusive terms. For Geva (2006, 2007),state implementation of family-based exemp-tions produced a classification scheme of all po-tential conscripts, placing the burden of oblig-atory service on those least able to substantiatea claim that a family depended on them.

The possibility that homogenization may becentral for the clarity and uniformity it pro-vides or for the differentiation it partially oc-cludes is absolutely vital. That homogenizationmay both provide clarity and obscure differencesuggests the complex and multilayered qualityof signification and expressly opens the doorto examination of the interrelationships amongthese processes.

CONCLUSIONS

Work on signification thus draws attentionto the two other broad domains of in-quiry: those elements of mobilization intowar and treatment of the enemy that involve(re)differentiation—expressed in and perhapsconstituted by sectarian, ethnic, and indepen-dence or secessionist nationalist clashes. Theseelements exist alongside and may be spurred bynational, religious, ethnic, or other processes ofhomogenization, raising questions of the con-nections among them (see Derluguian 2005).This, in turn, has broad implications for schol-arship on war and the military because it under-scores the many potential intersections amongthe domains of mobilization into war, treatmentof the enemy, and signification and suggestshow fruitful their exploration might be. Thisstands as both a challenge and an exhortationto seek out such points of interconnection andto clarify the ways these three domains may bebound to one another, in the hopes of sheddinglight on each of the analytic domains involved,as well as the broader field.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The author is not aware of any biases that might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of thisreview.


Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 20

09.3

5:23

5-25

4. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by U

nive

rsid

ade

de B

rasi

lia o

n 04

/29/

14. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV381-SO35-12 ARI 5 June 2009 9:27

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I thank Cynthia R. Cook, Carolina Martin, Emily S. Mann, Molly Clever, and James Murphy fortheir assistance in conceptualizing as well as preparing this review. Thanks also to my colleagues atthe University of Maryland, as well as to my students, on whom I have tried out many of these ideasover the years. I would also like to acknowledge support received from the U.S. Army ResearchInstitute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences under contract W74V8H05K0007. The viewsexpressed in this piece are the author’s own and not those of the U.S. Army Research Institute,the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.

LITERATURE CITED

Adams J, Clemens ES, Orloff AS, eds. 2005. Remaking Modernity: Politics, History, and Sociology. Durham, NC:Duke Univ. Press. 612 pp.

Ahram A. 2008. Devolution from above: the origins and persistence of state-sponsored militia in the international system.PhD thesis. Washington, DC: George Washington Univ.

Avant DD. 2000. From mercenaries to citizen armies: explaining change in the practice of war. Int. Organ.54:41–72

Avant DD. 2005. The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security. New York: Cambridge Univ.Press. 310 pp.

Bartov O. 1994. “The nation in arms”: Germany and France, 1789–1939. History Today 44:27–33Bartov O. 1996. Murder in Our Midst: The Holocaust, Industrial Killing, and Representation. New York: Oxford

Univ. PressBartov O. 2000. Mirrors of Destruction: War, Genocide, and Modern Identity. New York: Oxford Univ. PressBartov O, Grossmann A, Nolan M, eds. 2002. Crimes of War: Guilt and Denial in the Twentieth Century.

New York: New PressBates RH. 2001. Prosperity and Violence: The Political Economy of Development. New York: Norton. 144 pp.Bates RH. 2008. When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge

Univ. PressBauman Z. 2001. Wars of the globalisation era. Eur. J. Soc. Theory 4:11–28Bauman Z. 2002. Reconnaissance wars of the planetary frontierland. Theory Cult. Soc. 19:81–90Bell DA. 2007. The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It. Boston: Houghton

Mifflin. 420 pp.Best G. 1980. Humanity in Warfare. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. 400 pp.Best G. 1982. War and Society in Revolutionary Europe, 1770–1870. New York: St. Martin’s. 336 pp.Best G. 1994. War and Law Since 1945. Oxford/New York: Clarendon of Oxford Univ. PressBlack J. 1991. A Military Revolution?: Military Change and European Society, 1550–1800. Atlantic Highlands,

NJ: HumanitiesBlack J. 1994. European Warfare, 1660–1815. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. PressBlack J. 2001. Western Warfare, 1775–1882. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press. 210 pp.Boemeke MF, Chickering R, Forster S. 1999. Anticipating Total War: The German and American Experiences,

1871–1914. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press. 496 pp.Brubaker R. 1992. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press.

270 pp.Burk J. 1998. The Adaptive Military: Armed Forces in a Turbulent World. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.

227 pp.Burk J. 2007. Obedience, professional competence, and a right to do wrong. Presented at Bienn. Meet. Inter-Univ.

Semin. Armed Forces Soc., Chicago, Oct. 26Centeno MA. 2002. Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America. University Park: Pa. State Univ.

PressChickering R, Forster S. 2000. Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914–1918.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press. 531 pp.

250 Kestnbaum

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 20

09.3

5:23

5-25

4. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by U

nive

rsid

ade

de B

rasi

lia o

n 04

/29/

14. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV381-SO35-12 ARI 5 June 2009 9:27

Chickering R, Forster S. 2003. The Shadows of Total War: Europe, East Asia, and the United States, 1919–1939.Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press. 364 pp.

Chickering R, Forster S, Greiner B. 2004. A World at Total War: Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction,1937–1945. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press. 404 pp.

Chojnacki S. 2006. Anything new or more of the same? Wars and military interventions in the internationalsystem, 1946–2003. Global Soc. 20:25–46

Chorley K. 1973. Armies and the Art of Revolution. Boston: BeaconCollins PH. 1990. Black Feminist Thought. New York: RoutledgeCollins R. 2007. Techniques of violent confrontation: micro sociological cues to mass killing. Contexts 6:31–3Collins R. 2008. Violence: A Micro-Sociological Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. PressCrenshaw K. 1989. Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex. Univ. Chicago Legal Forum 1989:139–67Davis DE, Pereira AW, eds. 2003. Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and State Formation.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. PressDerluguian GM. 2005. Bourdieu’s Secret Admirer in the Caucasus: A World-System Biography. Chicago: Univ.

Chicago Press. 406 pp.Dower JW. 1986. War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War. New York: Pantheon BooksDownes AB. 2006. Desperate times, desperate measures: the causes of civilian victimization in war. Int. Security

30:152–95Downes AB. 2007a. Draining the sea by filling the graves: investigating the effectiveness of indiscriminate

violence as a counterinsurgency strategy. Civil Wars 9:420–44Downes AB. 2007b. Introduction: modern insurgency and counterinsurgency in comparative perspective.

Civil Wars 9:313–23Downes AB. 2008. Targeting Civilians in War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. PressDuffy C. 1987. The Military Experience in the Age of Reason. London: RoutledgeDuyvesteyn I, Angstrom J. 2005. Rethinking the Nature of War. London/New York: Frank Cass. 247 pp.Elias N. 1978/1982. The Civilizing Process. New York: Pantheon BooksElman C, Elman MF, eds. 2001. Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International

Relations. Cambridge, MA: MIT PressEnzensberger HM. 1994. Civil Wars: From L.A. to Bosnia. New York: New PressForster S, Nagler J. 1997. On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification,

1861–1871. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press. 705 pp.Geva D. 2006. To father or to fight? Mass conscription and the politics of masculine citizenship, France 1913–1940,

and the United States, 1917–1944. PhD thesis. New York: New York Univ.Geva D. 2007. The draft comes to America: military service, fatherhood, and the politics of obligation. Presented at

Annu. Meet. Am. Sociol. Assoc., New York, Aug. 11Geva D. 2009. Men’s breadwinning, dependency, and the gendered origins of conscription in First World War

United States. Contemporanea: Rivista di storia dell’ 800 e del ‘900. In pressGeyer M. 2002. People’s war: the German debate about a levee en masse in October 1918. In The People

in Arms: Military Myth and National Mobilization Since the French Revolution, ed. D Moran, A Waldron,pp. 124–58. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press

Goodwin J. 2001. No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991.Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press

Goodwin J. 2006. A theory of categorical terrorism. Soc. Forces 84:2027–46Goodwin J, McCarthy MA, Yukich G. 2008. Explaining the rise and fall of terrorism: the case of the Irish Republican

Army. Paper presented at Annu. Meet. Am. Sociol. Assoc, Boston, Aug.Goodwin J, Skocpol T. 1994. Explaining revolutions in the contemporary Third World. In Social Revolutions

in the Modern World, ed. T Skocpol, pp. 259–78. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. PressGray CH. 1997. Post-Modern War: The New Politics of Conflicts. London: RoutledgeHironaka A. 2005. Neverending Wars: Weak States, the International Community, and the Perpetuation of Civil

War. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. PressHolden RH. 2004. Armies without Nations: Public Violence and State Formation in Central America, 1821–1960.

New York: Oxford Univ. Press


Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 20

09.3

5:23

5-25

4. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by U

nive

rsid

ade

de B

rasi

lia o

n 04

/29/

14. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV381-SO35-12 ARI 5 June 2009 9:27

Horne J. 1997. State, Society and Mobilization in Europe during the First World War. Cambridge, UK/New York:Cambridge Univ. Press

Horne J. 2002a. Civilian populations and wartime violence: towards an historical analysis. Int. Soc. Sci. J.54:483–90

Horne J. 2002b. Defining the enemy: war, law and the levee en masse from 1870 to 1945. In The Peoplein Arms: Military Myth and National Mobilization Since the French Revolution, ed. D Moran, A Waldron,pp. 100–23. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press

Howard M. 1976. War in European History. New York: Cambridge Univ. PressHoward ME, Andreopoulos GJ, Shulman MR, eds. 1994. The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western

World. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press. 303 pp.Huntington SP. 1957. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.

Cambridge/London: Belknap Press Harvard Univ. PressJanowitz M. 1960. The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. New York: Free PressJung D. 2003. Shadow Globalization, Ethnic Conflicts and New War: A Political Economy of Intra-State War. London:

Routledge. 196 pp.Kaldor M. 1999. New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press.

192 pp.Kalyvas SN. 2001. “New” and “old” civil wars: a valid distinction? World Polit. 54:99–118Kalyvas SN. 2004. The paradox of terrorism in civil war. J. Ethics 8:97–138Kalyvas SN. 2006. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. PressKaplan RD. 1994. Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History. New York: VintageKassimeris G, ed. 2006. The Barbarization of Warfare. New York: New York Univ. PressKeegan J. 1976. The Face of Battle. London: HarmondsworthKelty R. 2008. The U.S. Navy’s maiden voyage: effects of integrating sailors and civilian mariners on deploy-

ment. Armed Forces Soc. 34:536–64Kestnbaum M. 1997. Partisans and patriots: national conscription and the reconstruction of the modern state in France,

Germany and the United States. PhD thesis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ.Kestnbaum M. 2000. Citizenship and compulsory military service: the revolutionary origins of conscription

in the United States. Armed Forces Soc. 27:7–36Kestnbaum M. 2002. Citizen-soldiers, national service and the mass army: the birth of conscription in revo-

lutionary Europe and North America. Comp. Soc. Res. 20:117–44Kestnbaum M. 2005. Mars revealed: the entry of ordinary people into war among states. See Adams et al.

2005, pp. 249–85Kestnbaum M, Mann ES. 2004. Arms and the man: war and hegemonic masculinity at the turn of the eighteenth

century. Presented at Annu. Meet. Am. Sociol. Assoc., San Francisco, Aug. 14Kiser E, Baer J. 2005. The bureaucratization of states: towards an analytical Weberianism. See Adams et al.

2005, pp. 225–45Kiser E, Gleave E. 2008. Norms of war: an institutionalist account. Presented at Annu. Meet. Am. Sociol. Assoc.,

Boston, Aug.Lacina B, Gleditsch NP. 2005. Monitoring trends in global combat: a new dataset of battle deaths. Eur. J.

Popul. 21:145–66Maleevic S. 2008. The sociology of new wars? Assessing the causes and objectives of contemporary violent

conflicts. Int. Polit. Sociol. 2:97–112Mann ES, Kestnbaum M. 2007. Republican universalism? Intersections of gender and race in the making of French

citizenship at the turn of the eighteenth century. Presented at Annu. Meet. Am. Sociol. Assoc, New York,Aug. 11

Mann M. 1986. The Sources of Social Power. Vol. 1: A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760. Cambridge,MA: Cambridge Univ. Press

Mann M. 1993. The Sources of Social Power. Vol. 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760–1914. Cambridge,MA: Cambridge Univ. Press

Mann M. 2005. The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.580 pp.

252 Kestnbaum

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 20

09.3

5:23

5-25

4. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by U

nive

rsid

ade

de B

rasi

lia o

n 04

/29/

14. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV381-SO35-12 ARI 5 June 2009 9:27

Mann M. 2007. Global trends in civilian mass killing. Contexts 6:28–34Martin JL. 2005. The objective and subjective rationalization of war. Theory Soc. 34:229–75Marwick A. 1974. War and Social Change in the Twentieth Century: A Comparative Study of Britain, France,

Germany, Russia and the United States. London: MacMillanMarwick A, ed. 1988. Total War and Social Change. London: MacMillanMarwick A, Simpson W, Emsley C, eds. 2001. Total War and Historical Change: Europe, 1914–1955. Buckingham,

PA: Open Univ. PressMcNeill WH. 1982. The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000. Chicago: Univ.

Chicago PressMcNeill WH. 1989. Age of Gunpowder Empires, 1450–1800. Washington, DC: Am. Hist. Assoc.McPherson JM. 1997. From limited war to total war in America. In On the Road to Total War: The American Civil

War and the German Wars of Unification, 1861–1871, ed. S Forster, J Nagler, pp. 295–309. Cambridge,UK: Cambridge Univ. Press

Moran D, Waldron A, eds. 2002. The People in Arms: Military Myth and National Mobilization Since the FrenchRevolution. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press

Mosse GL. 1990. Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.264 pp.

Mueller J. 2004. The Remnants of War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. PressMunkler H. 2005. The New Wars. Cambridge, UK: Polity. 180 pp.Newman E. 2004. The “new wars” debate: a historical perspective is needed. Secur. Dialogue 35:173–89Olick J. 2005. In the House of the Hangman: The Agonies of German Defeat, 1943–1949. Chicago: Univ. Chicago

PressOlick J. 2007. The Politics of Regret: On Collective Memory and Historical Responsibility. London: RoutledgeParker G. 1976. The “military revolution,” 1560–1660—a myth? J. Mod. Hist. 48:195–24Parker G. 1988. The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800. Cambridge,

UK: Cambridge Univ. PressParker G. 1994. Early modern Europe. See Howard et al. 1994, pp. 40–58Paret P. 1986. Napoleon and the revolution in war. In The Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the

Nuclear Age, ed. P Paret, pp. 123–42. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. PressParet P. 1992. Understanding War: Essays on Clausewitz and the History of Military Power. Princeton, NJ: Princeton

Univ. PressPosen BR. 1992. Nationalism, the mass army and military power. Int. Secur. 18:80–124Redlich F. 1964/1965. The German Military Enterpriser and His Workforce: A Study in Economic History.

Wiesbaden: Franz SteinerRothenberg GE. 1978. The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. PressRothenberg GE. 1994. The age of Napoleon. See Howard et al. 1994, pp. 86–97Roxborough I. 2006a. Learning and diffusing the lessons of counterinsurgency: the U.S. military from Vietnam

to Iraq. Sociol. Focus 30:319–46Roxborough I. 2006b. The new American warriors. Theoria 53:49–78Roxborough I. 2007. Counterinsurgency. Contexts 6:15–21Sarkees MR, Wayman FW, Singer JD. 2003. Inter-state, intrastate, and extrastate wars: a comprehensive look

at their distribution over time, 1816–1997. Int. Stud. Q. 47:49–70Scarry E. 1996. The difficulty in imagining other people. In For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism,

ed. J Cohen, pp. 98–110. Boston: BeaconSchmitt C. 1976 (1927). The Concept of the Political. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Univ. PressSchwartz B. 2000. Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press. 367 pp.Segal DR. 1989. Recruiting for Uncle Sam: Citizenship and Military Manpower Policy. Lawrence: Univ. Press

Kans.Segal DR. 1993. Organizational Designs for the Future Army. Alexandria, VA: US Army Res. Inst. Behav. Soc.

Sci.Sewell WH. 2005. Three temporalities: toward an eventful sociology. In Logics of History: Social Theory and

Social Transformation, pp. 81–123. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press


Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 20

09.3

5:23

5-25

4. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by U

nive

rsid

ade

de B

rasi

lia o

n 04

/29/

14. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV381-SO35-12 ARI 5 June 2009 9:27

Shaw M. 2005. The New Western Way of War: Risk-Transfer War and its Crisis in Iraq. Cambridge, UK: Polity.183 pp.

Simons A. 1999. War: back to the future. Annu. Rev. Anthropol. 28:73–108Singer PW. 2003. Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ.

PressSkocpol T. 1979. States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China. Cambridge,

UK: Cambridge Univ. PressSkocpol T. 1994. Social revolutions and mass military mobilization. In Social Revolutions in the Modern World,

pp. 279–98. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. PressSkocpol T, Munson Z, Karch A, Camp B. 2002. Patriotic partnerships: why great wars nourished American civic

voluntarism. In Shaped by War and Trade: International Influence in American Development, ed. I Katznelson,M Shefter, pp. 134–80. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press

Snider D, Watkins G, eds. 2002. The Future of the Army Profession. New York: McGraw-HillSnow DM. 1996. Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts. Boulder, CO: Lynne RiennerSteinmetz G. 1999. State/Culture: State-Formation after the Cultural Turn. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press.

433 pp.Tilly C. 1985. War-making and state-making as organized crime. In Bringing the State Back In, ed. P Evans,

D Rueschemeyer, T Skocpol, pp. 169–91. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge Univ. PressTilly C. 1992. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992. Cambridge, UK: BlackwellTilly C. 2003. The Politics of Collective Violence. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press. 276 pp.Torpey JC. 2006. Making Whole What Has Been Smashed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. PressTurney-High HH. 1971. Primitive War, Its Practice and Concepts. Columbia: Univ. S. C. PressValentino B, Huth P, Balch-Lindsay D. 2004. “Draining the sea”: mass killing and guerrilla warfare. Int. Organ.

58:375–407Valentino B, Huth P, Croco S. 2006. Covenants without the sword: international law and the protection of

civilians in times of war. World Polit. 58:339–77Valentino BA. 2004. Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century. Ithaca, NY: Cornell

Univ. Press. 317 pp.von Clausewitz C. 1976 (1832). On War, ed. transl. M Howard, P Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. PressWagner-Pacifici R, Schwartz B. 1991. The Vietnam Veterans Memorial: commemorating a difficult past. Am.

J. Sociol. 97:376–420Wagner-Pacifici RE. 2005. The Art of Surrender: Decomposing Sovereignty at Conflict’s End. Chicago: Univ.

Chicago PressWallensteen P, Sollenberg M. 2001. Armed conflict, 1989–2000. J. Peace Res. 38:629–44Walzer M. 1977. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. New York: Basic BooksWeber M. 1978. Economy and Society, ed. transl. G Roth, C Wittich. Berkeley/Los Angeles: Univ. Calif. PressWimmer A, Minn B. 2006. From empire to nation-state: explaining wars in the modern world, 1816–2001.

Am. Sociol. Rev. 71:867–97Winter J. 1995. Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History. Cambridge,

UK: Cambridge Univ. PressWinter J. 2006. Remembering War: The Great War between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century. New

Haven, CT: Yale Univ. PressWinter J, Robert JL, eds. 1997. Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin 1914–1919. Cambridge, UK:

Cambridge Univ. PressWinter J, Robert JL, eds. 2007. Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin 1914–1919. Vol. 2: A Cultural History.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press

254 Kestnbaum

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 20

09.3

5:23

5-25

4. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by U

nive

rsid

ade

de B

rasi

lia o

n 04

/29/

14. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

AR348-FM ARI 2 June 2009 9:48

Annual Reviewof Sociology

Volume 35, 2009Contents

FrontispieceHerbert J. Gans � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � xiv

Prefatory Chapters

Working in Six Research Areas: A Multi-Field Sociological CareerHerbert J. Gans � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1

Theory and Methods

Ethnicity, Race, and NationalismRogers Brubaker � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �21

Interdisciplinarity: A Critical AssessmentJerry A. Jacobs and Scott Frickel � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �43

Nonparametric Methods for Modeling Nonlinearityin Regression AnalysisRobert Andersen � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �67

Gender Ideology: Components, Predictors, and ConsequencesShannon N. Davis and Theodore N. Greenstein � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �87

Genetics and Social InquiryJeremy Freese and Sara Shostak � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 107

Social Processes

Race Mixture: Boundary Crossing in Comparative PerspectiveEdward E. Telles and Christina A. Sue � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 129

The Sociology of Emotional LaborAmy S. Wharton � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 147

Societal Responses toTerrorist AttacksSeymour Spilerman and Guy Stecklov � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 167

Intergenerational Family Relations in Adulthood: Patterns, Variations,and Implications in the Contemporary United StatesTeresa Toguchi Swartz � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 191

v

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 20

09.3

5:23

5-25

4. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by U

nive

rsid

ade

de B

rasi

lia o

n 04

/29/

14. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

AR348-FM ARI 2 June 2009 9:48

Institutions and Culture

Sociology of Sex WorkRonald Weitzer � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 213

The Sociology of War and the MilitaryMeyer Kestnbaum � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 235

Socioeconomic Attainments of Asian AmericansArthur Sakamoto, Kimberly A. Goyette, and ChangHwan Kim � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 255

Men, Masculinity, and Manhood ActsDouglas Schrock and Michael Schwalbe � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 277

Formal Organizations

American Trade Unions and Data Limitations: A New Agendafor Labor StudiesCaleb Southworth and Judith Stepan-Norris � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 297

Outsourcing and the Changing Nature of WorkAlison Davis-Blake and Joseph P. Broschak � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 321

Taming Prometheus: Talk About Safety and CultureSusan S. Silbey � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 341

Political and Economic Sociology

Paradoxes of China’s Economic BoomMartin King Whyte � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 371

Political Sociology and Social MovementsAndrew G. Walder � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 393

Differentiation and Stratification

New Directions in Life Course ResearchKarl Ulrich Mayer � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 413

Is America Fragmenting?Claude S. Fischer and Greggor Mattson � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 435

Switching Social Contexts: The Effects of Housing Mobility andSchool Choice Programs on Youth OutcomesStefanie DeLuca and Elizabeth Dayton � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 457

Income Inequality and Social DysfunctionRichard G. Wilkinson and Kate E. Pickett � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 493

Educational Assortative Marriage in Comparative PerspectiveHans-Peter Blossfeld � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 513

vi Contents

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 20

09.3

5:23

5-25

4. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by U

nive

rsid

ade

de B

rasi

lia o

n 04

/29/

14. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

AR348-FM ARI 2 June 2009 9:48

Individual and Society

Nonhumans in Social InteractionKaren A. Cerulo � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 531

Demography

Social Class Differentials in Health and Mortality: Patterns andExplanations in Comparative PerspectiveIrma T. Elo � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 553

Policy

The Impacts of Wal-Mart: The Rise and Consequences of the World’sDominant RetailerGary Gereffi and Michelle Christian � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 573

Indexes

Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 26–35 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 593

Cumulative Index of Chapter Titles, Volumes 26–35 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 597

Errata

An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Sociology articles may be found athttp://soc.annualreviews.org/errata.shtml

Contents vii

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 20

09.3

5:23

5-25

4. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by U

nive

rsid

ade

de B

rasi

lia o

n 04

/29/

14. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

AnnuAl Reviewsit’s about time. Your time. it’s time well spent.

AnnuAl Reviews | Connect with Our expertsTel: 800.523.8635 (us/can) | Tel: 650.493.4400 | Fax: 650.424.0910 | Email: [email protected]

New From Annual Reviews:Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational BehaviorVolume 1 • March 2014 • Online & In Print • http://orgpsych.annualreviews.org

Editor: Frederick P. Morgeson, The Eli Broad College of Business, Michigan State UniversityThe Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior is devoted to publishing reviews of the industrial and organizational psychology, human resource management, and organizational behavior literature. Topics for review include motivation, selection, teams, training and development, leadership, job performance, strategic HR, cross-cultural issues, work attitudes, entrepreneurship, affect and emotion, organizational change and development, gender and diversity, statistics and research methodologies, and other emerging topics.

Complimentary online access to the first volume will be available until March 2015.TAble oF CoNTeNTs:•An Ounce of Prevention Is Worth a Pound of Cure: Improving

Research Quality Before Data Collection, Herman Aguinis, Robert J. Vandenberg

•Burnout and Work Engagement: The JD-R Approach, Arnold B. Bakker, Evangelia Demerouti, Ana Isabel Sanz-Vergel

•Compassion at Work, Jane E. Dutton, Kristina M. Workman, Ashley E. Hardin

•ConstructivelyManagingConflictinOrganizations, Dean Tjosvold, Alfred S.H. Wong, Nancy Yi Feng Chen

•Coworkers Behaving Badly: The Impact of Coworker Deviant Behavior upon Individual Employees, Sandra L. Robinson, Wei Wang, Christian Kiewitz

•Delineating and Reviewing the Role of Newcomer Capital in Organizational Socialization, Talya N. Bauer, Berrin Erdogan

•Emotional Intelligence in Organizations, Stéphane Côté•Employee Voice and Silence, Elizabeth W. Morrison• Intercultural Competence, Kwok Leung, Soon Ang,

Mei Ling Tan•Learning in the Twenty-First-Century Workplace,

Raymond A. Noe, Alena D.M. Clarke, Howard J. Klein•Pay Dispersion, Jason D. Shaw•Personality and Cognitive Ability as Predictors of Effective

Performance at Work, Neal Schmitt

•Perspectives on Power in Organizations, Cameron Anderson, Sebastien Brion

•Psychological Safety: The History, Renaissance, and Future of an Interpersonal Construct, Amy C. Edmondson, Zhike Lei

•Research on Workplace Creativity: A Review and Redirection, Jing Zhou, Inga J. Hoever

•Talent Management: Conceptual Approaches and Practical Challenges, Peter Cappelli, JR Keller

•The Contemporary Career: A Work–Home Perspective, Jeffrey H. Greenhaus, Ellen Ernst Kossek

•The Fascinating Psychological Microfoundations of Strategy and Competitive Advantage, Robert E. Ployhart, Donald Hale, Jr.

•The Psychology of Entrepreneurship, Michael Frese, Michael M. Gielnik

•The Story of Why We Stay: A Review of Job Embeddedness, Thomas William Lee, Tyler C. Burch, Terence R. Mitchell

•What Was, What Is, and What May Be in OP/OB, Lyman W. Porter, Benjamin Schneider

•Where Global and Virtual Meet: The Value of Examining the Intersection of These Elements in Twenty-First-Century Teams, Cristina B. Gibson, Laura Huang, Bradley L. Kirkman, Debra L. Shapiro

•Work–Family Boundary Dynamics, Tammy D. Allen, Eunae Cho, Laurenz L. Meier

Access this and all other Annual Reviews journals via your institution at www.annualreviews.org.

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 20

09.3

5:23

5-25

4. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by U

nive

rsid

ade

de B

rasi

lia o

n 04

/29/

14. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

AnnuAl Reviewsit’s about time. Your time. it’s time well spent.

AnnuAl Reviews | Connect with Our expertsTel: 800.523.8635 (us/can) | Tel: 650.493.4400 | Fax: 650.424.0910 | Email: [email protected]

New From Annual Reviews:

Annual Review of Statistics and Its ApplicationVolume 1 • Online January 2014 • http://statistics.annualreviews.org

Editor: Stephen E. Fienberg, Carnegie Mellon UniversityAssociate Editors: Nancy Reid, University of Toronto

Stephen M. Stigler, University of ChicagoThe Annual Review of Statistics and Its Application aims to inform statisticians and quantitative methodologists, as well as all scientists and users of statistics about major methodological advances and the computational tools that allow for their implementation. It will include developments in the field of statistics, including theoretical statistical underpinnings of new methodology, as well as developments in specific application domains such as biostatistics and bioinformatics, economics, machine learning, psychology, sociology, and aspects of the physical sciences.

Complimentary online access to the first volume will be available until January 2015. table of contents:•What Is Statistics? Stephen E. Fienberg•A Systematic Statistical Approach to Evaluating Evidence

from Observational Studies, David Madigan, Paul E. Stang, Jesse A. Berlin, Martijn Schuemie, J. Marc Overhage, Marc A. Suchard, Bill Dumouchel, Abraham G. Hartzema, Patrick B. Ryan

•The Role of Statistics in the Discovery of a Higgs Boson, David A. van Dyk

•Brain Imaging Analysis, F. DuBois Bowman•Statistics and Climate, Peter Guttorp•Climate Simulators and Climate Projections,

Jonathan Rougier, Michael Goldstein•Probabilistic Forecasting, Tilmann Gneiting,

Matthias Katzfuss•Bayesian Computational Tools, Christian P. Robert•Bayesian Computation Via Markov Chain Monte Carlo,

Radu V. Craiu, Jeffrey S. Rosenthal•Build, Compute, Critique, Repeat: Data Analysis with Latent

Variable Models, David M. Blei•Structured Regularizers for High-Dimensional Problems:

Statistical and Computational Issues, Martin J. Wainwright

•High-Dimensional Statistics with a View Toward Applications in Biology, Peter Bühlmann, Markus Kalisch, Lukas Meier

•Next-Generation Statistical Genetics: Modeling, Penalization, and Optimization in High-Dimensional Data, Kenneth Lange, Jeanette C. Papp, Janet S. Sinsheimer, Eric M. Sobel

•Breaking Bad: Two Decades of Life-Course Data Analysis in Criminology, Developmental Psychology, and Beyond, Elena A. Erosheva, Ross L. Matsueda, Donatello Telesca

•Event History Analysis, Niels Keiding•StatisticalEvaluationofForensicDNAProfileEvidence,

Christopher D. Steele, David J. Balding•Using League Table Rankings in Public Policy Formation:

Statistical Issues, Harvey Goldstein•Statistical Ecology, Ruth King•Estimating the Number of Species in Microbial Diversity

Studies, John Bunge, Amy Willis, Fiona Walsh•Dynamic Treatment Regimes, Bibhas Chakraborty,

Susan A. Murphy•Statistics and Related Topics in Single-Molecule Biophysics,

Hong Qian, S.C. Kou•Statistics and Quantitative Risk Management for Banking

and Insurance, Paul Embrechts, Marius Hofert

Access this and all other Annual Reviews journals via your institution at www.annualreviews.org.

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 20

09.3

5:23

5-25

4. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by U

nive

rsid

ade

de B

rasi

lia o

n 04

/29/

14. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

Date post:	25-Dec-2016
Category:	Documents
Upload:	meyer
View:	216 times
Download:	2 times

The Sociology of War and the Military

Documents