The Spectrum A publication by King’s Think Tank Society

London’s First student-led policy centre

August 2011 Edition 01

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A Note from the President In the wake of the student protest movements that rocked the country, students have been left in a political vacuum unable to get through to the policy makers who will decide their futures. In fact, it is quite possible that the protest movements actually alienated the students from the very people they were trying to convince. A small minority that resorted to violence left the majority unable to make their arguments credibly. As a result, students are forced to look for new means by which to have their ideas represented. In many ways, this makes more sense than protesting. Students’ greatest asset is their intelligence yet rarely has it been put to good use in coming up with creative policy recommendations. The combination of a youthful optimism, creative mindset and intellectual curiosity leave students in a powerful position to make changes for the better. Previously, there were no means to put such ideas into practice. Although student journals have existed for decades, there has never been a means for students of all disciplines to unite to brainstorm ideas and solve current policy problems together. As a result, we are now witnessing the advent of a new age of student politics. Defined by bi-partisan problem solving and based on principles of sound research, campuses in the UK, and the world as a whole, are learning of the efficient potency of student-led policy institutes. In the past year, working on the KCL Think Tank Society has proved that there is a healthy appetite among students, and even faculty members, for such societies. In just a few months since our launch, we have two hundred members officially signed down and almost four hundred members on our mailing list. The linking of policy to academia both taps the huge resources available in universities to solve policy problems and furthermore lends vital credibility to universities at a time when they are under increasing pressure. The creation of such a unique and successful society does not come without challenges. As such, I wish to take this opportunity to thank those that made this possible; the Institute for Public Policy Research for providing us with contacts, expertise and work placement opportunities for our members, Warwick think tank society for their invaluable advice from the outset, KCLSU for their support in expediting our ratification and the Department for European Studies and other staff members in the university for their advice and even funding. I must also stress my gratitude for the committee of the society, a team of more than twenty individuals who work tirelessly to ensure that we can achieve the ambitious aims that we laid out at the beginning. Without them the society would have floundered and for their dedication I am supremely grateful. Each and every event, along with this journal, serve as a testament to their hard work. Naturally, a society such as this is only as powerful as its members. As such, those who have contributed to the journal and attended our events deserve ample recognition. Our plans for the next year are detailed and ambitious, splitting the society into five policy centres, Defence/Diplomacy, Energy/Environment, Healthcare, Finance/Economics and a special policy centre for current issues. This will allow us to cover a wider variety of topics, attract more members, offer more opportunities to students and become a pillar of student life at King’s. I look forward to working with you over the coming year and hope that you will be inspired to write a piece for our next edition. Until then, I pray that our journal is of interest to you and thank you for taking the time to be part of a paradigm shift in campus politics. Kind Regards,

Benedict Counsell KCL Think Tank Society Founder and President

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Acknowledgments & EDITOR’s NOTE Before I begin, there are a few acknowledgements to be made without which the success of the year and the journal would not have been possible: The incredibly hard working members of our society, speakers James Forder, Elin Weston, Amani Soliman, Dr Ashraf Mishrif, Antony Barnet, Ben Bradshaw and Natalie Samarasinge, Warwick Think Tank Society, the staff at the Institute for Public Policy Research, our selection committee Nic Groombridge and Anton Howes, and finally the talented students who have dedicated time and energy into submitting pieces for this journal. Our gratitude. Further, we must stress that our Think Tank has no political or ideological affiliation. The views expressed in the following articles are those of the authors alone and have not been altered by the Think Tank or the selection committee. Our aim is not to predispose our peers but instead to operate an open forum where students from any discipline can learn, debate and write about important matters, both internal and abroad. The focus for this year’s journal was Accountability, and this broad theme has been interpreted in a number of ways, leading to the diverse and rich collection of articles presented here. Amongst the overbearing media, academic opinion and the uninformed, lies a very special kind of voice; that is the educated student. My hope for The Spectrum and in fact the future of King’s Think Tank Society is simple: that it inspires continued debate, encourages an avid interest in politics and policy-making and allows for the student voice to be heard. In a time of great economic unrest and uncertainty of what’s to come, it is imperative that this voice is heard. What we have found this year is that King’s students are not only cerebral, but they are inquisitive, informed and above all, interested in the sweeping changes in public policy and the power of politics. Our opening event drew a crowd of over 100 students. This coming year we anticipate a more developed forum paired with even more students coming out to listen and engage with our learned speakers and submit to this exciting and new piece of student activity – the first of its kind in London! Thank you for taking time to read this compilation and I hope you join with us to ensure that this imperative student voice never goes unheard.

Michelle Beck

KCL Think Tank Society

Editor in Chief

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Content International Policy Centre 6 Islamic Norms and Democratic Accountability: Compatible or Contrary? Simon Pratt 9 To what extent should Hosni Mubarak be held accountable for the problems in Egypt during his

reign? Arif Ahmad 12 The Internet: Lessons from the Arab’s quest for accountability and the promise it may hold for

Africa Michel D Nienhuis

Domestic Policy Centre 17 The Welfare State vs. The Welfare of The State Olivia Haddow 20 How to turn short-term thinking into long- term accountability Yori Kamphuis 23 House of Lords or New Senate? Herman Park

Feature 25 Alternative Vote – Author: James Forder

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INTERNATIONAL POLICY CENTRE

The International Policy Centre of the Think Tank discussed many exciting and relevant topics from abroad this year. With continual uprising occurring in many Middle East nations in the spring of 2011 the policy centre began by discussing the uprising in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. As such, the Journal focuses heavily on the events leading up to and resulting from shifts in power in the Middle East. With a large youth population who are engaged in new media the events taking place in the Middle East may be indicative of what’s to come in the Western world. Further, the turmoil there will have a strong and ever-growing link to us in Europe contributing to many issues such as unstable commodities markets, immigration and potential violence and unrest. The Policy Centre also focused on the genocide in Sri Lanka. The violence, which was “largely ignored by the UN” according to one contributor was shocking to a naïve audience. The subject has not received the attention or intervention that is deserved. The Think Tank delves into the difficulties in resolving such an ugly situation. The International Policy Centre will continue to focus on issues from around the world that will soon be affecting Britons. Such distant issues may seem disconnected but as evident from our speakers and submissions, such events hit much closer to home than expected.

Andrew O’Shea

International Policy Centre Editor

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Islamic Norms and Democratic Accountability: Compatible or Contrary? Simon Pratt

As Egypt and Tunisia march into what one hopes is a new era of democracy and public accountability, and people

in other states in the region agitate at great personal risk for their own political freedom, many observers find their excitement tempered by worries about the potential rise of theocracy. No doubt recalling how the Iranian revolution quickly became an ‘Islamic Revolution’ and noting how in countries such as Egypt, political oppression and bureaucratic weakness has impelled Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, many wonder if the future governments of ‘liberated’ Arab countries will quickly become religious analogs of their autocratic predecessors. Yet Islamism has advanced democracy in some cases. Egypt and Iran are both examples of political environments in which groups have enhanced democratic and civil liberties by arguing for expanded rights through Islamic norms and language, and by interpreting their religion in a way that it compliments their individual social and political aspirations. By examining these cases, one can see that while it is certainly reasonable to worry about the potential for Islamist tyranny, the risk of such an eventuality appears low.

Given its recent ‘liberation’ from the venerable Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian case is a natural opening for a discussion on how political Islam can impel democracy. Egypt hosts the oldest and most pervasive Islamist movement in the world today, the largest organisation within which is the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). The Egyptian political environment has historically been highly repressive and still features only limited opportunities for democratic participation. However, following openings in the political environment during the last two decades, Egyptians became able to participate in limited democratic institutions. These openings spawned new “Muslim Democrat” movements, such as Hizb al-Wasat (HB) and the Wasatiyya, which depart from MB’s traditionally conservative stance. The MB itself underwent significant changes in its political goals, from calling for revolution and militancy to advocating political reform and liberal freedoms. Thus, in Egypt, political Islam in its various interpretations has impelled democracy. Egypt’s Islamist movement is fundamentally a social movement. At its height in the 1980s, it encompassed a vast and heterogeneous network of social organisations and activities aimed at generating socio-religious reform towards a more Islamic society, through preaching (Daw‘a) and associational works1. This form of social organisation had furthermore lain mostly outside the regulation of the government2. During this time, the MB had great political influence, almost comprising a “shadow government” through its network of parallel institutions3. This was not to last, though, and the extensive organisational capacity of the MB during this time was demolished in government crackdowns on Islamists during the mid-1990s; while the movement survived due to its core of kinship ties, associational activism, and ability to shift into abeyance, its political clout had been nullified4.

Despite the decline of MB’s political clout, however, the Islamist movement had succeeded in “Islamising” Egyptian society to a considerable degree, at all levels. It succeeded in penetrating into areas of culture, economy (with Islamic banking and investment), student activism, and trade syndicates5. The cosmopolitan youth of Egypt had internalised Islamic norms in a flexible piety that suited their desire for an individualistic lifestyle6. Even parliamentarians spoke in Islamic terms7. In the new millennium, U.S. pressure on Egypt to undergo democratic reform8 allowed for increased activism in a somewhat less repressive environment. The MB once again began to mobilise amidst a constituency that was already socialised into an Islamic identity.

The MB was able to compete in a relatively free 2005 parliamentary election. The platform the MB ran under stated that they sought to establish a “republican system of government that [is] democratic, constitutional, and parliamentary and that conforms with Islamic principles.” 9 This platform emphasised: the need for constraints on state power, a strong and autonomous judiciary, multi-party elections, adoption of laws that strengthen civil and political rights, and for accountability of a government to its constituents. The MB also called for guaranteed rights for women and Coptic Christians, stressing the latter’s important role in the nation. 10

1 Bayat. 137 2 Mandaville 100 3 Bayat 143 4 Ibid 143. 5 Mandaville, 110. 6 Bayat, 161. 7 Ibid 148 8 Ibid 183. 9 Rutherford, 721 10 Ibid, 722-725.

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At least rhetorically, the MB conceptualises their understanding of the role of an Islamist constitutional and legal framework in a way that resembles classical liberalism: it advocates laws that treat ruler and ruled equally, the creation of institutions to regulate state power, and the protection of political and civic rights and freedoms, as well as broad public democratic participation11. This is not to say that the MB no longer has conservative elements to its platform, particularly with regard to its mission to further Islamise society in all dimensions and its understanding of the state as needing to play an active role in this transformation through such tasks as ensuring that people “worship, practice good manners, and act honourably.” 12 Yet despite the MB platform containing invasive elements, it nevertheless includes a great many of the institutions which are so important to liberal democracy.

The MB practiced what it preached when it captured 88 seats in the 2005 election. Its regular attendance at

parliamentary sessions forced a concurrently greater attendance of the ruling NDP party in order for the NDP to still pass legislations, compared to the nearly empty sessions of previous years, and challenged the role of parliament as a rubber-stamp for the regime. 13 The MB’s influence in parliament during the passing of the 2006 annual Government Statement on budgetary and policy priorities saw widespread criticism for the bill, which even some NDP MPs voted against. 14 MB MPs also acted in coalition with other parties and movements (such as Kifaya) to protest the renewal of oppressive “state of emergency” laws that legalised continued repressive and coercive measures by the regime. 15 The MB was willing to take the institution of parliament seriously and transform it into an institution that represents its citizens and requires accountability from the government—two qualities that are vital to a democratic state.

The new and as-yet small Wasatiyya movement and its party HW represent another important trend in Egyptian

Islamism. Like the MB, HW calls for democratic reform, governmental accountability, and participation of non-Muslims, women, and secular activists. In a departure from the MB’s more conservative and strictly Islamist mantra of “Islam is the Solution,” however, HW sees religion as only one part of the solution, in conjunction with national interests, economic factors, and culture16. HW’s mission is not to Islamise society but rather to “embrace the spirit of the shari‘a” and the concepts of social justice contained therein.17 HW calls for pluralistic political dialogue that includes disparate views and sees non-Muslims as equal partners in the search for a just society. HW and the Wasatiyya movement move even closer to the liberal democratic paradigm than the MB, and exhibits fewer illiberal tendencies.

Iran provides another context to illustrate the ways in which Islamic norms can support democracy. Iran is a partially democratic Islamic state, and its laws and political institutions are legitimated in Islamic terms. During the 1990s, a reformist movement has sought to achieve greater personal, civic, and political liberties by engaging with the Islamic regime on its own terms—Islamic terms—and using Islamic norms to justify a liberal shift. The reformist movement owes its intellectual character to three significant groups: youth, women, and Islamic scholars. While the reformists have severely crippled by the regime’s repressive crackdowns, they demonstrated how prevailing Islamic norms can be reinterpreted to enhance democracy in a semi-democratic and semi-authoritarian Islamic state.

Starting at the beginning of the 1990s, the Iranian urban population began to desire greater individual freedom. Tehran began to change. Urban development projects saw the creation of parks, cultural centres, commercial billboards, freeways, department stores, and other public and civic works. These new loci for public interaction permitted the socially acceptable intermingling of the sexes, recreation for women, exposed Iranians to Western culture, and contributed to generally transforming Tehran from a sober revolutionary-Islamic bastion to a modern city like any to be found in the West.18

It is within this context that Iranian youth formed a social movement for change. Struck with anxiety and

depression, they were desperate for a forum to engage in romance, in cultural exploration, in individual expression, and in the leisure that they were denied in the repressive and austere environment of Iranian society. In their search for an outlet, the youth presented their demands through Islamic symbolism and institutions, which granted legitimacy to the demands on religious grounds, and in the process redefined them, such as through re-defining traditional Islamic holidays as opportunities

11 Ibid 726. 12 Ibid 727 13 Shehata and Stacher 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Mandaville 116-118 17 Ibid, 115. 18 Bayat 56-57

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for festivity19. Their massive numbers comprised an entire social class with aspirations for social and political reform, if not a structure for fulfilling those aspirations.

Groups of women, unhappy with their restricted legal status in the Islamic state, campaigned for more civil rights

and attempted to redefine Islamic norms on an intellectual level20. Feminist activists were able to achieve some changes, including restrictions on polygamy and greater equality in the family legal system, a shorter work day and extended maternity leave, and have rescinded the requirement that a male guardian be present at school for women over the age of 28. 21 Feminist activism towards establishing a more liberal interpretation of Islam, and for social and political change according to that interpretation, demonstrate the potential for a movement operating within an Islamic intellectual framework to produce real democratic reform and greater civic freedoms.

A potent structure for social reform was expressed in Islamic language and legitimated by Islamic values by the

religious intellectual establishment of Iran. Comprising moderate clerics, former revolutionaries who evolved their views to a post-revolutionary outlook, and similar individuals with recognised credentials as scholars, these intellectuals criticised the Islamist establishment for attributing all of Iran’s problems to the spectre of Western imperialism, and saw Iran’s history of despotism as the true source for their nation’s woes22. These intellectuals, occupying a “balance between focusing on man and focusing on God,” criticised the repressive authoritarianism of their regime and feared that society was beginning to blame the entire religious establishment or even religion itself for the poor performance of the ruling clerics and the repressive nature of existing Islamic law. 23 Their solution was to blend religion with values of liberal democracy and modernism into a sort of ‘post-Islamist’ republican theology. 24

Islamism has impelled democracy in a variety of contexts. In Egypt, the Islamist movement pushes for greater civil and political rights, The MB unfalteringly attended parliamentary sessions and sought to reform and legitimise the institution, which had a reputation for being nothing more than a rubber-stamp for the regime’s policies. The MB advocated representation for minorities and political pluralism. The Wasatiyya movement took this even further, and the HW runs on a platform of social justice, equality for all, regardless of sex or creed, and liberal democratic politics. In Iran, the Reformist movement works within the existing Islamic framework of the regime and uses Islamic terms and norms to demand greater freedom. Significant components of that movement are religious scholars and intellectuals, who have undeniable faith in Islam and consider themselves to be informed by Islamic values, yet who present arguments for greater individual rights and greater democratic input into the regime.

Both cases share a common theme: the interpretation of Islam in such a way that it supports democracy. Islamic political groups use religious language to legitimise increased political input and greater civic freedom. This language is not merely rhetorical, either. It is the language of Muslims whose conception of their religion allows for plurality and liberal rights, and permits them to lead an individualistic lifestyle where they have the freedom to make their own decisions and leave others to do the same. Islam comprises a vast array of ideologies and understandings, and has no monolithic interpretation. Rather, the social and political climate that Muslims live in and their interaction with other cultures and intellectual trends will determine how they choose to see the relationship between themselves and their religion. Some might choose the repressive authoritarianism of the Taliban, but many others may certainly choose the near opposite. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bayat, Asef. Making Islam Democratic. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007. Mandaville, Peter. Global Political Islam. London: Routledge, 2007. Rutherford, Bruce K. Egypt After Mubarak. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008. Stacher, Joshua and Samer Sehata. “Hear out the Muslim Brotherhood.” The New York Times. 26 March 2007.

Available online at <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/26/opinion/26iht-edstach.1.5028488.html?_r=2&scp=4&sq=joshua%20stacher&st=cse>. Accessed 18 April 2011.

19 Ibid 60-61 20 Ibid 78 21 Ibid 80 22 Ibid 87 23 Ibid 87 24 Ibid 88

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To what extent should Hosni Mubarak be held accountable for the problems in Egypt during his reign?

Arif Ahmed

It is easy to say that Hosni Mubarak was responsible for the lack of economic growth, the ineffectiveness of the political parties and the unjust social structure. Egypt’s revolution started on 25th January 2011 when tens of thousands of marchers occupied the capital’s square ‘Tahrir’ to protest against the government of Muhammad Hosni Sayyid Mubarak. This can convince many people from all over the world that Hosni Mubarak should be held accountable for the dissatisfaction among the Egyptians. I believe that Hosni Mubarak was responsible for the dark Egyptian conditions and deserves to be overthrown by his own people. Nevertheless, I will explore in details to the extent of his accountability especially taking into account of the political, social and economic structure of Egypt. I will also delve into the influence of the West and the accountability of the West for the poor condition in Egypt.

On 14th October 1981, Hosni Mubarak was sworn into power. Since then he had ruled the country as a quasi-

military leader. What had put him into power was his peace treaty with Israel. This tremendously built up his reputation as an international statesman. In a way, the harsh regime could be seen as just by some people because Mubarak aimed to combat Islamist terrorism. But this was never just. For example, the Egyptian State Security Services was seen as symbol of the worst human right abuses of the former regime. "Torture is a widespread, systematic, routine policy in Egypt through the last 30 years. It is everywhere and in every place in Egypt," said Dr Hamed. Perhaps one could argue that Hosni Mubarak should not be held accountable for this but the United States. For example, the U.S. Agency for International Development may have stated on its Web site that "over three decades, the United States has helped to improve the quality of life of all Egyptians through programs supporting economic development and regional stability. USAID assistance has totalled $28.6 billion since 1975."25 Nevertheless, as stated in the Institute of Southern Studies website, ‘The Egyptian government receives about $2 billion a year from the United States, with most of that assistance going to its military.’26 It appears that the United States has focussed more on funding Egypt’s military rather than the economic aid which the Egyptians clearly need more. The United States can be said to put their own interests as top priority, not the Egyptians. Clinton’s words, ‘We are on the side, as we have been for more 30 years, of a democratic Egypt that provides both political and economic rights to its people”27 therefore was clearly false.

Even so, as much as how some may want to put the blame equally to both the United States and Mubarak, I still

think that Mubarak was still the one to be held accountable for the Egyptian unjust political system. The United States might have unavoidable reasons in maintaining the friendly relationship with Egypt during Mubarak’s reign as such that this relationship plays an important role in implementing US policy in the Middle East. Also there is evidence that suggests the United States has been trying to help improve Egyptian political and economic rights. For example, the US had tried to encourage democracy in 2005; which resulted in the inclusion of rival candidates in the electoral system28.This however failed to create a just electoral system. While the US interests in the Middle East can be questioned further, the fact that Mubarak himself was the ruler of Egypt means that he could have made Egypt a better place for the people. Mubarak had made Egypt ‘neither a fully developed democracy nor a fully pledged autocracy’. This was made to his great advantage and self-interests. In the book ‘The Struggle over Democracy In the Middle East’, it has been stated that Mubarak won more than 88.5 percent of the valid votes but in real democratic sense, he only won about 19.6 percent of the 32 million registered voters29. Clearly Mubarak had abused his power by limiting the political rights of the Egyptians, and should have been hold accountable.

One of the other areas needed to be assessed is the social structure of Egypt. We might wonder, why did it take 30

years for Egyptians to revolt against Mubarak’s rule? Is there any way that Mubarak’s ruling can be considered acceptable? I take the philosophical view that people who either tacitly or non-tacitly consents to the rule of an authoritarian means that they are bound to have political obligation towards the authoritarian rule. We should not, however, be deceived that the lack of massive protests in Egypt throughout the Mubarak regime means there were general Egyptian consensus to the regime. In

25 U.S Agency for International Development, last updated 4th February 2011, Egypt URL: http://www.usaid.gov/locations/middle_east/countries/egypt/ (accessed: 17th March 2011) 26 The Institute for Southern Studies, last updated 1st February 2011, U.S. defense contractors with the most at stake in Egypt URL: http://www.southernstudies.org/2011/02/us-defense-contractors-with-the-most-at-stake-in-egypt.html (accessed: 17th March 2011) 27 SOCIALISTWORKER.org, last updated 4th February 2011, End U.S. support for Egypt's dictatorship URL: http://socialistworker.org/2011/02/04/end-us-support-for-mubarak (accessed: 18th March 2011) 28 Emad El-Din Shahin and Nathan J. Brown, Routledge (2009), The Struggle over Democracy in the Middle East, ‘Democratic transformation in Egypt’ p.100 29 Ibid. p.106

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fact, as shown above, the statistics show how unpopular Mubarak was. Further evidences such as the mentioned State Security Services were greatly intimidated by many Egyptians due to their cruelty. This intimidation should not be seen as equal as tacit consent of Mubarak ruling. This actually brings in quite interesting debate as to whether the abusive police were to be held accountable and not Mubarak. The reason for the State Security Services to have power over the Egyptian is the forcedly imposed ‘Emergency Law’. It is therefore necessary to explore the Law. Since the assassination of President Anwar El Sadat in October 1981, the emergency law was renewed and has been extended many times. As stated in the International Federation of Human Rights (fidh) website, the emergency law grants the authority such as ‘Broad power to impose restrictions on the freedoms of assembly, move or residence; the power to arrest and detain suspects or those deemed dangerous, and the power to search individuals and places without the need to follow the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code (by virtue of article 3 of the emergency law)’30. In the other parts of the website, it is seen that the Emergency Law has been ineffective in combating terrorism in Egypt. As such in 2010, there was a series of bloody attacks against religious minorities; ‘religious intolerance and discrimination are embedded very deeply within the legislative and ideological framework of the Egyptian society’31.

Mubarak could have made the emergency law more efficient and acceptable by international standards. In this case,

however, I would say that Mubarak was not to be held accountable entirely for the unstable social structure in Egypt. Terrorists should be held accountable for the attacks and fear of the minorities. Nevertheless, Mubarak also contributed to the fear of the majority of the Egyptians and therefore is held accountable. In fact, I would say his accountability is greater than the terrorists’. He allowed the State Security Services carrying on their injustice ways of handling suspects of terrorists in Egypt. He turned a blind eye to the religious minorities especially the Copts as there was a lack of resolves in addressing the attacks on the Copts. It is not just matters regarding religion as other important issues such as elections have been abused. As stated in the fidh website, ‘The Coalitions’ observers have extensively reported the use of violence and bullying in the constituencies, resulting in the death of six citizens.’32 Mubarak had effectively won the elections by depriving political and social movements. This lack of freedom among the Egyptians also includes the media restrictions; media outlets must avoid politically sensitive issues that could get in the way of Mubarak’s winning the elections.

It is not true to say that the Egyptians are dissatisfied only by the political and social restriction imposed on them.

They are also displeased by the lack of progress in the economy. The Egyptian Revolution in 2011 was inspired by the successful revolution in Tunisia that on 25th January 2011 ‘thousands of people began taking to the streets to protest poverty, rampant unemployment, government corruption and autocratic governance of President Hosni Mubarak’33. Lack of food, for example, is actually due to many factors. It is not just Mubarak’s government ineptitude that has caused shortage of food. The dams in the Nile River have caused water scarcities and make land difficult for farming. As a result, water actually becomes more expensive than soft drink in many parts of Egypt and planting of necessary crops is reduced34. The declining of the arable land contributed to the food shortage in Egypt. Mubarak could be held accountable for not taking positive actions to provide enough food to the people of Egypt. He even restricted the production of staple crops such as rice35. While it could be justified if we take into account the essentiality of saving water, his government nevertheless should be held accountable for Egypt’s declining economic growth. The Egyptian government had launched economic reforms that affected the lower classes. The reforms include restricting rice production and restricting water usage which have caused many agricultural labourers jobless36. Since the central government is located in the north of Egypt, major economic activity is based there37. This actually caused rural-urban migration that aggravated the economic situation in the south. The unemployment rate which plays important role in igniting the protest in January is very high. For example, 700,000 new 30 International Federation of Human Rights, last updated 17th November 2001, The Emergency Law in Egypt, URL: http://www.fidh.org/THE-EMERGENCY-LAW-IN-EGYPT (accessed: 18th March 2011) 31 International Federation of Human Rights, last updated 6th January 2011, FIDH and its member organisations condemn the terrorist attack in Alexandria and call upon the Egyptian authorities to respect human rights in fighting against terrorism URL: http://www.fidh.org/FIDH-and-its-member-organizations-condemn-the (accessed: 17th March 2011 32 International Federation of Human Rights, last updated 9th December 2010, Parliamentary elections: Egyptian comedy against the background of abuses and human rights violations URL: http://www.fidh.org/Parliamentary-elections-Egyptian-comedy-against (accessed: 17th March 2011) 33 Huffington Post, last updated 28th January 2011, What’s Going On In Egypt? URL: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/28/whats-going-on-in-egypt_n_815734.html (accessed: 16th March 2011) 34 LINKS international journal of socialist renewal, last updated 14th February 2011, The food price crisis and the Egyptian revolution, URL: http://links.org.au/node/2170#comment-98563 (accessed: 17th March 2011) 35 The INDEPENDENT UK, last updated 28th November 2010, Rice production withers as Egypt diverts vital water supply URL: http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/rice-production-withers-as-egypt-diverts-vital-water-supply-2146290.html (accessed: 18th March 2011) 36 LINKS international journal of socialist renewal, last updated 14th February 2011, The food price crisis and the Egyptian revolution, URL: http://links.org.au/node/2170#comment-98563 (accessed: 17th March 2011) 37 Encyclopedia of the Nations, Egypt URL: http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Africa/Egypt-POVERTY-AND-WEALTH.html (accessed: 16th March 2011)

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graduates in Egypt each year are chasing about 200,000 jobs that many end up with jobs that are not sought after38. Mubarak government failed to create a justifiable distribution of food and jobs opportunities for youth.

A leader should put his people and their demands as top priority. But as we have seen, he restricted their freedom

politically, socially and economically. None of the reasons for these restrictions could justify Mubarak’s actions. Throughout his reign in Egypt, he had lived a wealthy life, but he never tried his best to distribute wealth evenly. In fact, Hosni Mubarak bequeathed US$30 billion in debt to the Egyptian people while possibly keeping as much as US$70 billion in his family’s bank account39. The Egyptian people are not to be held accountable for paying this debt. Even though Mubarak had left Egypt, he should still be held accountable for this debt. I would also like to extent that the West should make larger effort in helping Egypt. On closer analysis, it is seen that for the duration of Mubarak regime, Egypt had to repay its loans to the United States and Europe at a rate of around US$3 billion dollars40. I agree that this money could have been spent on improving the lives of many Egyptians. Therefore, upon understanding the nature of debts in Egypt and also having little or no opposition to Mubarak’s unjust rule for 3 decades, the Western countries are actually to be held partially accountable in helping Egypt build its economy.

As we have seen, Mubarak was not entirely to be held accountable by all the problems in Egypt. Mubarak was to

be held accountable entirely for the political disorder. The terrorists are to be held accountable for causing fear among the Egyptians but Mubarak was no different. His harsh regime methods such as renewing the emergency law and using the Security State Services are human rights violations. Even though Mubarak had left Egypt, he should be punished for causing misery among a majority of Egyptians and should not receive exile by foreign countries. To a small extent, the West should be held accountable for the disastrous economic condition in Egypt. But it is still Mubarak who should be largely held accountable for not making effective economic reforms that advantage the lower class. Also the West had allowed Mubarak to loan money to fund military operations, which put Egypt more into debt. The money that has been used to repay debts and interest repayments for over the three decades of Mubarak regime could have been spent on the Egypt’s poor not to the West, which benefited from the Egyptian misery. The West now is to an extent, be held accountable in helping removing the Egypt’s debts. The current Egyptians should not be burdened with the national debts which are clearly Mubarak’s and to a smaller extent, the West’s faults.

38 BBC News, last updated 16th February 2005, Young In the Arab World: Egypt URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4226201.stm (accessed: 16th March 2011) 39 Guardian UK, last updated 4th February 2011, Mubarak family fortune could reach $70bn, say experts URL: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/04/hosni-mubarak-family-fortune (accessed: 18th March 2011) 40 Jubilee Debt Campaign, last updated 16th February 2011, Egypt's debt must fall with Mubarak's regime, URL:http://www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk/Egypt%27s%20debt%20must%20fall%20with%20Mubarak%27s%20regime+6761.twl (accessed: 18th March 2011)

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The Internet: Lessons from the Arab’s quest for accountability and the promise it may hold for Africa

Michel D Nienhuis

Introduction The recent uprising in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has come to many as a surprise. I, for one, had not expected the fearlessness and perseverance of the protesters. Especially interesting is the influence of technology on the process – could this have happened, say, two century ago? It is easy to see that a case can be made for globalization as the root determinant of the speed with which the protests spread. Two centuries ago, word of revolution would take a rather long time to spread to neighbouring states, and detailed reporting on the scale, tactics and effects even longer. Globalization, fuelled by technology, has changed all that and provides vivid imagery of the atrocities – possibly instigating more outrage. Even more so, the Internet allows for mobilization and organization on a scale never witnessed before. In this article, I will make the case for more study into Internet penetration as a determining enabler in starting uprisings against autocracies – with the ultimate aim of having accountable leadership. For the sake of argument, the political-philosophical debate on the merits and drawbacks of autocracies is not addressed and it is assumed that non-autocracies are more accountable and sustainable – a prevalent viewpoint in the West. (An interesting counterargument in this respect is California, where a high level of direct democracy may have led to an abysmal financial situation41.) For this analysis, important differences and commonalities between the Arab countries and the rest of the world will be explored. Before starting out, it is important to note three things. First, the countries involved are complex entities with complex and extensive histories, and a short article can never do justice to this – it will have to generalize. Second, correlation does not imply causation, but it can lead us to investigate relationships previously not considered. Third, peer-reviewed academic publications on the recent uprisings have not yet appeared and we must therefore rely on other sources. There has been widespread debate about the origins of the recent uprising. As with many things in this world, it is likely to be a complex interplay of many factors. Frequently mentioned are the following: autocracy, corruption, human rights violations, unemployment, demographic factors (mostly the high percentage of unemployed youth), poverty, economic recession, and rising food prices42,43. Many of these are interrelated. But how do they relate to the rest of the world? What are striking characteristics of the region, especially with regards to the technology factor? Three major sources have been explored to this end: the Human Development Report 2010 from the United Nations Development Programme44, the Democracy Index 2010 from the Economist Intelligence Unit45, and the Internet Usage Statistics 2010 from Internet World Stats46. All three are widely accepted sources of data, albeit not academically peer-reviewed. Aggregate news sources on the current status of the uprising have been retrieved from Wikipedia47. The resulting data selection is shown in Table 1 on the last page. 41 The Economist (2011, April 20). The perils of extreme democracy. California offers a warning to voters all over the world. Retrieved April 21, 2011, from http://www.economist.com/node/18586520 42 Korotayev, A.V. & Zinkina, J.V. (2011). Egyptian Revolution: A Demographic Structural Analysis. Entelequia, 13, pp. 139-166. Retrieved April 18, 2011 from: http://cliodynamics.ru/download/Korotayev_Zinkina_Egyptian_Revolution_Entelequia.pdf 43 Javid, S.A. (2011, Jan 27). Arab dictatorships inundated by food price protests. Tehran Times. Retrieved April 18, 2011, from: http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=234768 44UNDP (2010). The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development. Human Development Report 2010. Retrieved April 18, 2011, from http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Complete_reprint.pdf 45 EIU (2010). Democracy in retreat. Democracy Index 2010. Retrieved April 18, 2011, from http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy_Index_2010_web.pdf 46 Internet Usage Statistics (2010). Retrieved April 18, 2011, from http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm 47 Wikipedia (2011). 2010–2011 Middle East and North Africa protests. Retrieved April 21, 2011 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_uprisings

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Analysis of democracy, human development and Internet penetration First, let us first look at the aspects of democracy and accountability, which are widely claimed to be a major reason, if not the reason, for the uprising. To assess the state of democracy, let us look at the Democracy Index. Reviewing that index, the lack of democracy in the MENA is striking. Out of 167 countries assessed, the average rank of the MENA countries where there has been an uprising (henceforth called “uprisers” for convenience) is 134, with an average Index figure of 3.11 out of 10. All but two of the uprisers are classified as authoritarian regimes, with Iraq on the verge and Lebanon the only significant positive outlier. Compare this average of 3.11/10 with the rest of the world: 8.45 in Western Europe, 6.37 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 5.55 in Eastern Europe, 5.53 in Asia and Australasia, and even 4.23 in Sub-Saharan Africa, with the world average being 5.46. The MENA was and– pending the reforms – still is clearly the least democratic region in the world. Related figures of accountability show a similar pattern. These were retrieved from the UN Human Development Report, which in turn uses other sources. First, the average press freedom index – lower is better – of the uprisers in 2009 was 50.3 (ranging from 15.3 in Kuwait to 104.1 in Iran), while that of the West is on average 4, Eastern Europe 12, Latin America and the Caribbean 20, Asia and Australasia 42 and that of Sub-Saharan Africa 30. Hence, the press freedom of the uprisers is the lowest (that is, with the highest index) in the world, followed by Asia and Australasia and Sub-Saharan Africa respectively. Second, measuring the corruption, the percentage of people that faced a bribe situation in the uprisers was in 2010 on average 23%, with figures ranging from 5% (Jordan) to 41% (Yemen). This figure is on average 6% in the West, 18% in Eastern Europe, 10% in Latin America and the Caribbean, 12% in Asia and Australasia, and 20%, in Sub-Saharan Africa. The uprisers thus also have the highest corruption rate in the world, outpacing even Sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe respectively. Third, the democratic decentralization in the uprisers is relatively poor: most countries have an appointed local executive, while most countries in Western and Eastern Europe have an elected one, just like Latin America and the Caribbean. In that regard, it is relatively comparable to Asia and Australasia, where an appointed executive is also typical, and better than in Sub-Saharan Africa, where most countries have an appointed local legislature on top of an appointed local executive power. So, poor accountability abound in the uprisers, though they are not the worst part of the world in that regard. Hence, we can conclude from the above that this is the most authoritarian ruled region in the world, with the lowest press freedom, the highest corruption, and poor democratic decentralization. But does this mean it is also the least developed region? The answer is no. The average Human Development Index, which is a broad measure of the level of health, education and income, is 0.617 for the uprisers, while the comparable figures are 0.879 for the developed OECD countries, 0.702 for the developing countries in Europe and Central Asia, 0.704 for Latin America and the Caribbean, 0.643 for East Asia and the Pacific (South Asia: 0.516), and a saddening 0.389 for Sub-Saharan Africa. So while it is on the low side, it is faring significantly better than Sub-Saharan Africa in terms of human development. This may be due to the oil revenue, however little of it may trickle down from the autocrats. So why has Africa, with its abysmal human development, third lowest press freedom and second highest corruption rate, as well as second worst democracy index, not risen up? The answer may be found in one of the main organizing devices of the Arab uprising: the internet. It is generally thought that many of the protests were organized through Facebook and Twitter48. The internet penetration, then, may be a critical factor. While ranging widely from 1.1% in Iraq to 88.0% in Bahrain, the average of 24.8% is significantly higher than that of Africa as a whole (including North Africa) with 10.9%, which amounts to about 4-5% without North Africa. Though comparable to Asia (21.5%) and lower than North America (77.4%), Oceania/Australia (61.3%), Europe (58.4%), and Latin America and the Caribbean (34.5%), the difference between 5% and 25% may just be why Africans find it hard – if not impossible – to mobilize and organize widespread protests and Arabs did not – socio-cultural and demographic factors aside.

48 Beaumont, P. (2011, Feb 25). The truth about Twitter, Facebook and the uprisings in the Arab world. The Guardian.Retrieved April 18, 2011, from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/25/twitter-facebook-uprisings-arab-libya

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To strengthen this hypothesis, we can take a look at the MENA countries that have not faced an uprising (yet): Israel, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Israel, the only country without an Arab majority (when we exclude Palestine), has a flawed democracy (Index 7.48), a press freedom index of 23.8, 11% corruption victims and a Human Development Index of 0.872, number 15 in the world. In addition, the inequality correction to the HDI is 12.5% compared to the average of 28.4% in the countries facing an uprising (though data is only available for half of them). So even though internet penetration is 77.4%, the Israelis have comparatively little reason to rise up. More interesting are Qatar and the UAE. Both have authoritarian regimes with Democracy Indexes of 3.09 for Qatar and 2.52 for the UAE, but press freedom is “twice as high” as the average of the uprisers: 24.0 and 21.5 respectively (compared to 50.3), corruption victims are 8% and 20% respectively (compared to 23%), but most importantly the Human Development Indexes are 0.803 and 0.815: top 40 in the world. Internet penetration is 51.8% for Qatar and 75.9% for the UAE, but significant here may again be the high HDI which prevents, for now at least, an uprising. The only comparable countries with an uprising are Bahrain (HDI of 0.801, internet penetration of 88.0%) and Kuwait (HDI of 0.771, internet penetration of 39.4%) and to a lesser extent Iran (HDI of 0.702, internet penetration of 43.2%). This may be explained by several specific factors: Bahrain faces sectarian divide between the minority Sunni ruling elite and the oppressed Shia majority49, Kuwait protests have been instigated by stateless Arabs (bidoon) demanding citizenship50, and Iran’s situation is characterized by an extremely authoritarian regime (158 out of 167 countries) with an extremely low press freedom index (104.1) and internet censorship to prevent an uprising. Final Considerations and Conclusion Already, Asian countries with a mix of relatively low human development and relatively high levels of both autocracy and internet penetration, like China (HDI 0.663, Democracy Index of 3.14 and internet penetration of 31.6%), are cracking down hard on emerging protests51. The question is whether increased human development and economic prosperity, like in Qatar and UAE, can stave off revolution in China, or if they will have to rely solely on internet censorship. China, along with for example Syria and Iran, seem to be very proficient and effective at censorship. And, we must not forget, social media will not magically turn people into activists willing to risk their lives on the streets – plus, the governments can also use social media, ironically, to track down and prosecute dissidents. But if there is indeed, as this analysis of the Arab uprisings suggests, a threshold of internet penetration that facilitates widespread protests that can topple autocratic regimes with low human development, this would hold a great promise for the future – especially for Africa. While broader increased human development in terms of education and infrastructure will automatically lead to increased internet usage, it may be worth studying whether more direct methods of increasing internet penetration and usage in Africa can significantly speed up democratic reform. The latter would significantly increase Africa’s prospects, as it is widely thought that autocratic, corrupt regimes are a significant inhibiting factor in Africa’s development52. This Arab uprising may have more profound positive consequences than many realize.

49 BBC (2011). Bahrain country profile. Retrieved April 19, 2011 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/country_profiles/790690.stm 50 Al Jazeera (2011, Mar 08). Youth groups to protest in Kuwait. Retrieved April 18, 2011 from http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/03/20113810848167726.html 51 Grammaticas, D. (2011, Feb 28). Calls for protests in China met with brutality. BBC News. Retrieved April 18, 2011 from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12593328 52 See e.g. Gyimah-Brempong, K. (2002). Corruption, economic growth, and income inequality in Africa. Economics of Governance, 3, pp. 183-209.

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DOMESTIC POLICY CENTRE

KCL Think Tank Society has had a brave and successful first year and the result of the work of an eager, bright and hard-working group of students can be seen in the first edition of the journal, Spectrum. I am not simply talking about the committee of the think tank, but also the students that came to the events and articulated their opinions into policy proposal papers. The domestic policy centre had two events revolving around change in the UK Parliament: the Alternative Voting System reform for the House of Commons and the yet undecided approach to revolutionizing the House of Lords. With guests such as Ben Bradshaw, former minister in the Labour government, and Anthony Barnett from opendemocracy.net, the events saw controversial matters brought into the Q&A sessions and helped produce three articles which revolve around the accountability of the British system of politics and its different sectors such as the welfare state and the House of Lords. The past year and these articles are only the beginning as the think tank committee hopes to bring more and more students together in the extended format of four policy centres that tackle the environment, healthcare, economy and current affairs. A student-led organization, the KCL think tank aims at being a forum for all the students that want to voice their opinions on politics. I want to thank the writers for their thought –provoking pieces and I hope to see their names and many others’ in the next edition.

Andrada Dobre

Domestic Policy Centre Editor

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The Welfare State vs. The Welfare of The State Olivia Haddow

Astronomical rises in obesity and weight problems. The elderly left in care homes that meet basic care standards, ignored by their families. Children leaving primary school without basic reading and writing skills. Whole towns steeped in unemployment, the residents living off benefits. Extensive NHS waiting lists that show no signs of waning. The damaging effects of the British Welfare State are endless- and beg the question whose welfare is actually secured? The exact time in which the Welfare State was put into motion remains unclear, but it is evident that a certain care for the poor was always considered necessary. Pat Thane roots its foundations in 1870, ‘because it was around that time that important demands began to arise for the state in Britain to take a permanent, as distinct from temporary and residual responsibility for the social and economic conditions experienced by its citizens’53. However, even this assertion blindly skims over the progressive Poor Law that emerged during the mid- nineteenth century. Since then, government intervention has snowballed into every area of the average British citizen’s life: health, education, work, family and old age, with ‘the desire to provide cheap housing for the poor, the best healthcare for all and pensions which made satisfactory provision for a comfortable retirement’54. So, how have the best intentions from society for those in need brought about such negative, unprecedented results? It is worth briefly assessing several areas of the Welfare State and examining their consequences in turn. For this, we can turn to Milton Friedman and his take on social policy from his highly acclaimed ‘Capitalism and Freedom’. One major scheme that forms part of the Welfare system, the State Pensions, has hit British headlines in recent months due to the proposed changes to civil servants’ pensions announced in the 2010 budget55. The cuts, estimated at around £60/month, will accumulate, and the Teacher’s Union NASUWT estimates that a teacher with an annual pension of £10,000 could lose £74,000 over 25 years56. However, this atrocity did not come without a warning- a warning that was voiced in 1893. Alfred Marshall, the famous Cambridge economist, warned the Royal Commission on the Aged Poor to resist universal pensions as they ‘do not contain… the seeds of their own disappearance. I am afraid that, if started, they would tend to become perpetual’57. Freidman also highlights the dangers of state pensions, ‘the “social security” program is one of those things on which the tyranny of the status quo is beginning to work its magic58’. The very fact that State Pensions work on the basis of taking one’s wages as if it ‘were just any other form of tax revenue’59 and the citizen in question relies on the government taxing sufficiently in the future for your own pension leaves plenty of room for error. This, coupled with the necessity for the State to be involved every step of the way, leaves uncertainty for the future as Britain relies totally on the government for its security. And what of the beloved NHS, the ‘jewel in the crown of the British Welfare State’60? The health service that battles on despite its yearly winter crisis, never seems to have quite enough hospital beds, nurses or money- ever!- and is a constant headache for every politician, let alone those dangling on the edge of a waiting list, desperately waiting to be treated. The number of people opting for private health insurance is ever increasing- and the service is not even providing a ‘best healthcare for all’ since ‘it matters very much in which area of the country you are located as to what standard of treatment you get’61.. Moreover, since the financial responsibility for one’s health has been handed over to the government, this could account for the dramatic rise in weight- related diseases and health problems, as well as increased drinking and smoking. Friedman even touches on the minimum wage law, forcing us to see beyond the nation’s good intentions to the harmful effects it has had on our society, ‘insofar as minimum wage laws have any effect at all, their effect is clearly to increase poverty’62. Unemployment is raised as employers see no financial gain in hiring those that they would otherwise kept at a cheap rate, thus leaving them jobless. Those that are left in such a state are those that can least afford to give up whatever little they earn, ‘small as it may appear to the people voting for the minimum wage’63. Business that could have been cultivated at home has been shipped off to underdeveloped countries such as China and India, where labour is cheap. The result for Britain? Countless numbers of people without jobs, living off State benefits- and a nation walking around in clothes made in frightening sweat shops by workers exploited by our own kin.

53Harris, Bernard. The Origins of the Welfare State: Social Welfare in England and Wales 1800-1945 preface xi 54 Stephen Berry, The Rise and Fall of the British Welfare Sate http://www.la-articles.org.uk/ws.htm 55 http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2011/apr/18/civil-servants-challenge-pensions-change 56 Ibid. 57 Cited by Stephen Berry, http://www.la-articles.org.uk/ws.htm 58 Friedman, Milton, Capitalism and Freedom The University of Chicago Press, 2002. p182 59 Berry, http://www.la-articles.org.uk/ws.htm 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 Op Cit., Friedman, p180. 63 Ibid. p181.

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Interestingly, politics of recent years have suggested a regression to home- spun, non- governmental charities taking matters into their own hands. A clear example of this is Cameron’s ‘Big Society’, which is a backlash from former policy making; ‘for years, there was the basic assumption at the heart of government that the way to improve things in society was to micromanage from the centre, from Westminster. But this just doesn’t work.’ 64. So, instead of looking to the government to fill the holes that appear in our lives, we are to help our own communities and ourselves- in a bid to ‘liberate’ ourselves from the constraints of micromanaging. Cameron is looking back to Thatcher and Seldon philosophy: the people’s liberty and the people’s responsibility. Perhaps the future of the Welfare State lies in the government gently slipping out of omniscient control- and handing the responsibility back to the people. With this in mind, we can begin to draw conclusions from this 150-year-old experiment and look to the future. Stephen Berry, along with many others, encourages us to remember that although the intentions of the Welfare State were to remove divisions in society, the reality of the situation has made these divisions more visible. The public see a stark difference between the pensioners that spend their private pensions on spending half the year in their estates on the Iberian coast and the pensioners that rely on State hand-outs to pay their heating bills; just as the public notices the gap between the homeowner and the tenant in public housing65. So, how do we go about recalling the shame that was once inflicted upon those who could not afford to support their families? For it is this inward anguish and embarrassment that forces men and women to take pride in building a better future for the next generation rather than perpetually hindering society through endless benefit sponging. Even the Royal Commission Report from 1834 highlighted this urgent lack on conscience, ‘Parish aid has the tendency to remove all shame’66. Moreover, is it possible to reclaim the charitable and generous hearts of the Victorian era? In 1895 it was reported that the average middle-class family gave 10% of their income to charity (that’s more than they spent on anything else bar food), and even half of working class families had weekly subscriptions to charities, and a quarter gave to a church or chapel67. At the same time as the government was tightening its belt on benefit handouts after the 1834 report that highlighted widespread benefit fraud and employment dodging, the country was pioneering an increasing number of charities in the wake of bitter winters and a slump of 1866. Ultimately, ‘the theory that high unemployment benefits lead to high unemployment is comprehensible in theory and is backed by the evidence’68, and perhaps this is the best place to start. In addition, a ‘friendly societies’ model of insurance, created by Samuel Tuke and Joseph Rowntree in 1831 promotes a work ethic by creating a small community that is inter-dependent and therefore discourages certain members of that community fraudulently claiming benefits from the other members of that community. Thomas Chalmers also promotes a welfare system that focuses on time spent on a certain individual alongside financial aid within a small community so as to encourage an individual who is struggling to find work again swiftly. This system, one that he implemented in the parish of St John in Glasgow, proved successful in diminishing unemployment in an 8,000- strong area to a minute percentage. With all this in mind, we can see that a successful Welfare State is one that takes into account the enormous benefit of time-based aid and local autonomy in deciding how to tackle the problems in their own parish. The ‘friendly society’ model has the necessary elements to aid those involved through financial difficulty without creating a tendency to take advantage of these benefits, as those in need are in close contact with those who are helping them. The future of the Welfare State perhaps lies in a more localized system that stops uselessly throwing money at the problem and starts to spend more time with those in need and working out long term solutions.

64 David Cameron, speaking on Monday 19th July 2010, http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/speeches-and-transcripts/2010/07/big-society-speech-53572 65 http://www.la-articles.org.uk/ws.htm 66 Quoted by James Bartholomew, The Welfare State We’re In p37. Parish aid was the predecessor of the Welfare State benefit system. 67 Ibid. p40. 68 Ibid. p63.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bartholomew, James, The Welfare State We’re In Politico’s Publishing, 2004 Friedman, Milton, Capitalism and Freedom The University of Chicago Press, 2002. Harris, Bernard, The Origins of the Welfare State: Social Welfare in England and Wales, 1800-1945

Palgrave Macmillan 2004 Hills, John, Inequality and the State, Oxford University Press, 2004 Kidd, Alan, State, Society and the poor in Nineteenth- Century England Macmillan Press Ltd 1999

WEB

http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/health http://www.arthurseldon.org/content/obituaries/thetimes.asp http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article1596955.ece http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2011/apr/18/civil-servants-challenge-pensions-change http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/speeches-and-transcripts/2010/07/big-society-speech-

53572 Www.la-articles.org.uk/ws.htm

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How to turn Short-term Thinking into Long-Term Accountability Yori Kamphuis

The long-existing struggle for governing methods Open any book about political philosophy and governing methods, and you will quickly learn that our political and governing system has been susceptible to changes before we arrived where we are now: arguably the most advanced political system employed by so-called First World nation-states. These nation-states almost all have postmodern capitalist societies driven by free-market capitalism (Robinson and Groves, 2003). This free-market capitalism has supposedly allowed financial institutions to take more risks as bonuses were linked to short-term gains rather than a long-term vision. The electoral system of these democracies irrefutably has disadvantages, as no perfect governing system does exist. These disadvantages are outweighed by the advantages: it offers influence to everybody although the influence on the individual level is limited and the electoral system seems better than other alternatives as it is the prevailing alternative. We can choose, and having a choice is better than having no choice. Every individual is unique and all voters have to make a trade-off between options and choose what party they are represented by best. The elected representatives have to rule together if no party holds the majority of seats – something frequently occurring in Europe. One of the consequences of ruling conjointly with other political parties is that parties cannot and will not hold all of their promises – promises that could have moved voters to give their vote. Like financial institutions, politics is currently business sensitive to short-term gains. Although beneficial in the long term, decisions that decrease our wealth in the short-term are likely to be postponed, e.g. due to re-election pressure, even though future policies could be tougher and have more negative consequences. An example is the unwillingness to force pension funds to stop indexing pensions for inflation in the Netherlands in spite of the sharp rise of retiring persons and the lack of funds to sustain the current policies (Bakker and Boelaars, 2011). Instead of parading a long-term vision by taking decisions that are beneficial for the country as a whole in the long run, politicians frequently choose short-term growth and the short-term reward of votes(Krebs, 2011). How the long-term struggle has lead to short-sighted governments Comparison of the major industrial G7-countries seems just, as success often is measured in financial terms. Three G7-nation-states (Germany, Japan and the USA) hold elections once every 4 years. Other G7 members (Canada, France, Italy) hold elections every 5 years, while the UK is currently changing its laws to establish a fixed-term 5 year governing period (Gay and Mae, 2010, BBC News, 1998). All countries hold elections when the Lower Chamber of their bicameralism system dissolves. Elections can have a series of consequences. First, because campaigns require attention, politicians put energy into campaigning rather than governing the country. Second, if elections are approaching, controversial decisions are likely to be postponed until after elections. If new elections are called because the government has been dissolved, this is even more likely. In other words, elections are often held at the expense of effective rule. Short-term thinking is stimulated through the way elections are currently organised. Contentious decisions are unlikely to be taken with elections coming up. This causes the last period of time before elections to be without effective rule. Furthermore, as the success of elections depends on the success of rule, whatever that may be, short-term decisions are likely to be favoured. For example, consider the situation in the UK of the last 2 elections and the subsequent periods the Lower Chamber was in power– it is impossible to include the current government in the comparison as there is not yet enough data to determine a trend in the Acts (enforceable laws (Parliament UK, 2011, p.1)) passed since 2010. See Figure 1.

Figure 1.

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Not surprisingly, the amounts of Acts enacted were the lowest in the years of the elections, namely 2001 and 2005, in which respectively 59% and 66% of the parliament’s average productivity was reached with 25 and 24 Acts while a decline in Acts in the year before the election took place. This supports the idea that elections cause in-power and newly elected politicians spend less time governing as the downfall in production cannot be explained by the duration of the forming of the government as it was quick in both cases. One can argue that things are better when governments pass fewer laws. The observation that most acts are passed soon after the election supports the idea that the new government attempts to form the state according to their vision, even though these acts could be detrimental or could counterbalance the acts of the previous government. A solution I propose a different model for running elections and the composition of the Lower Chamber as a way to encourage more long-term thinking. This is based on the current system, so that adaptation would be as smooth as possible. I have chosen to base this model on the 4-year system, however with some important differentiations. In this model:

Representatives are elected for an 8-year period. Elections are held every 4 years. Only half of the Lower Chamber gets changed every 4 years. Representatives may not stand for re-election immediately after their 8-year term, but can run for the election 4 years later. An oversight committee is added to the Lower Chamber.

The role of the oversight committee is limited to checking whether politicians vote and debate in accordance with their stated promises. It displays the results of the part of the Chamber that is up for election. This is graphically depicted on the left side of the graph. The composition of the oversight committee should be as independent as possible to limit conflict of interest. More realistically, it should include media from the whole political spectrum, political leaders and independent researchers. The difference from media and opposition as such is that the publication of the oversight committee should be free of political colour. The focus and length of this article does not allow costs to be addressed. This deserves future research. Why should we organise our Lower Chamber in such a way? There are several reasons for reorganising the parliament in this way, all closely connected to the advantages the model possess.

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The Advantages First, this system leads to increased stability of the Lower Chamber because only half of the seats are up for election every time, which works as a counterbalance to often volatile swings in voting patterns. Second, because of this increased stability in the Lower Chamber–which also forms the government–there will be fewer changes in the programs launched by the government. This leads to less starting and stopping of government programs. Moreover, this increased stability leads to less wasting of money, labour, time and energy. For the third advantage, it is necessary to look not at the Lower Chamber as a whole, but at the building blocks of the parliament and government: political parties. Political parties are pushed to keep their thinking in a more straightforward manner because of the following. As the ‘oldest guard’ of parliament is up for election, the results on how they kept their promises in voting and positioning in debates are published. It is best for a political party to do as well as possible as this shows their trustworthiness to the public as it could lead to an increase of their power. But this ‘oldest guard’ was only able to do well with the support of its newer equivalent: the part of the party that has been in power for 4 years, which I call the ‘old guard’. The oldest guard was needed to support the old part in order to make their reign a success, and the old guard needs to support the ‘new guard’ in their issues. This leads to the continuation of the same sort of policies from the oldest guard, through the old guard to the new guard. Likewise, the newly elected party members will need to support the old guard to guarantee a continuation of party success, which can only be done with the continuation of the policies of the oldest guard. If the supported policies are bad policies, however, a political party will naturally lose their influence. So it is in the self-interest of political parties to employ long-term thinking. The proposed change would let the self-interest of political parties coincide with the interest of the public. Fourth, it is unlikely that the exact same policies are employed over long periods of time as policies and law are subject to change. However, ideologies of parties can be articulated as types of policies. Formulating goals rather than policies allows changes in addressing issues, and at the same time it improves collaboration between the parties, leading to a more stable Lower Chamber and fewer opportunities for ad hominems. Formulating goals furthermore allows the parties to address urgent issues as well. Parties will thus not be limited in their ability to respond rapidly when the situation asks for it. Another reason for less ad hominems is that politicians assisting in the campaign, but still in power themselves, are likely to be involved in alliances in the parliament and have to defend the policy decisions their alliances have made. It is therefore likely that the amount of mudslinging would decrease. An advantage of the establishment of an oversight committee is the safeguarding of accountability: politicians will be held accountable for what they say and promise during their campaigns through a constant monitoring of their actions. As a result of this improved accountability, politicians would act in a more nuanced manner in their campaigns because vigorous positioning may backfire through the results of the committee. Sixth, the part of the parliament in power would simultaneously be less likely to postpone difficult decisions, as postponing decisions can have a negative impact on the accountability report – it is dubious whether this would be in accordance with the goals they have formulated. Lastly, as half the parliament retains their seats, the nation-state is likely to experience better governing during the time normally lost due to representatives and governments settling themselves into their jobs in the first stage of their term. Election posturing in the last stage of their term will be non-existent because representatives cannot immediately stand for re-election which does not stop them from taking unpopular measures. If one argues that more acts passed implies more productivity, the reduction of Acts passed in the current 4-year model corresponds with losing roughly 4.5 months to the initial period and 2 months to campaigning for re-election which is 13.5% of the time. In the proposed solution, fewer months, let us assume 3, are lost to the initial period and no months for re-election. This is only 3.1% of the time, reducing the waste of time by almost 4.5 times. If one argues that more acts passed in the year after election is a sign of ineffectiveness or counterbalancing the previous government, having a more stable government will reduce the number of changes. Thus, effectiveness will increase. BIBLIOGRAPHY

BAKKER, T. & BOELAARS, I. 2011. Over je pensioen heb je dus helemaal niets in te brengen. NRC Next, 5 April 2011.

BBC NEWS. 1998. What is the G7? BBC News, 9 October 1998. CROWN. 2011. UK Public General Acts [Online]. London: Legislation.Gov.UK. Available:

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga [Accessed 19 April 2011]. GAY, O. & MAE, L. 2010. Fixed-term Parliaments. KREBS, C. 2011. Long-term vision, not short-term growth key to sustainability, UC ecologist [Online]. Canberra,

Australia: University of Canberra Media Centre. [Accessed 14 April 2011]. PARLIAMENT UK. 2011. Acts - UK Parliament [Online]. London. Available:

http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/laws/acts/ [Accessed 19 April 2011]. ROBINSON, D. & GROVES, J. 2003. Political Philosophy - a graphic guide, London, Icon Books Ltd.

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House of Lords or the new Senate? Herman J. Park

Today, the House of Lords is composed of hereditary peers(who have inherited their seats from noble forebears,) bishops of the Church of England, and life peers appointed by the Queen as advised by the Prime Minister or the Appointments Commission. All in all, no peer has been through the democratic process and yet peers exercise lawmaking powers of the second highest degree in the land. How long can this imperfect situation persist when Britain defines herself as a liberal democracy(meaning there should be no such thing as an unelected politician) and we find evidence of people the world over wanting to take charge of their own destinies(as the recent Arab Spring movement shows)? The current state of affairs The lack of democratic credentials has already led to a downsizing of the Lords’ powers. The Salisbury-Addison convention (a non-legal rule that nonetheless has withstood the test of time) requires the Lords to give a second reading to a manifesto bill from the Commons and not make ‘wrecking’ amendments to it. Parliament Acts 1911-49 permit the Commons to pass laws without the Lords (normally, it takes the common assents of the Commons, the Lords, and the monarch.) However, it would be misleading to suggest that the House of Lords has been tamed. In 2002-3 alone, the Lords have defeated government proposals 88 times. In its role, the Lords can insist on its own amendments to legislation which may stall the government’s agenda short of a full-blown impasse. Since the 1999 Act, the upper House has only grown in assertiveness due to the inheritable peerages coming to an end. The status quo and its defenders A number of arguments may be raised to resist the call for democratic reform of the Lords. First, the upper house will lose valuable experience if the current peers are to stop serving and the appointments system is to be eliminated. Life peers are the single biggest grouping within the House of Lords and they have been chosen for their expertise in a particular field. They have been credited for enriching the debates with expertise outside the traditional fields like agriculture, military, or law. This argument is not bullet-proof, however. Electing the upper house does not banish the existing highly qualified and experienced Lords – they can put themselves up for an election. Admittedly, the extra expense involved - airing TV ads or printing flyers or grassroots campaigning costs money, time, and skill – may discourage some from running. However, if they were truly committed to public service, they will not mind. Electing members of the upper house may mean that candidates for office can no longer be screened systemically against their qualifications or relevant industry experience since voters are free to vote for the under-qualified or inexperienced candidate. However, voters are not as uneducated as the popular media sometimes portrays and without some measure of proven success, weak candidates will lack the credibility to clinch the election. It may be argued that reforming the House of Lords will remove the political advantages of the current House of Lords: no single party has an overall majority in the Lords, cross-benchers are not associated with a political party and therefore not subject to taking orders from the whips. The result is a House of Lords where consensual politics is more commonplace and the government, which usually dominates the Commons, is not awarded easy victories (the Lords defeated the government 18 times over the Prevention of Terrorism Bill 2004-5.) An elected upper house will likely contain no cross-benchers lessening the scope for apolitical bargaining. Also, UK’s FPTP (First Past the Post) system delivers strong majorities at elections to the detriment of smaller fringe parties like UKIP or the Greens. This raises the possibility that the main party (Labour or Conservative in all likelihood) dominant in the Commons may be dominant in the elected Lords, too – the upper house will be a helpless clone rather than a correcting chamber keeping government power in check. For the record, even the appointed (and therefore political-hijacking-proof) Lords has failed to make good on its promise – one example is the Lords making zero amendments to the infamous Anti-terrorism, Crime, and Security Bill 2001. The overwhelming circumstances surrounding the events of 9/11 played no small part but this does expose the limits of the appointed (and more politically even) House of Lords in holding back the misguided wisdom or momentary overreaction of the lower House. There are also plausible ways to keep a reasonable distance between the upper and lower houses in the event that the upper house is elected. The Joint Committee on the House of Lords Reform suggests that the members of the upper house should serve long terms (12-15 years) and those terms should be non-renewable. This will mean that the general election for MPs does not coincide with the election for the upper house, denying the winning party from the general election a landslide conquest over the upper house. One party is quite unlikely to win in two differently scheduled elections compared to ones occurring simultaneously. Once elected, the upper house members will not fear for their political careers and feel more at liberty to depart from the party line when voting for or against new bills. In 2007, the Lords voted for a 100% appointed House of Lords and the Commons voted for a 100%- or 80% elected House of Lords. The Lords seem to be unrelenting for no greater reason than self-interest. They may detest the prospect of being asked to vacate their privileged posts – the voters may not favour them or they may decide to forego the open election

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entirely. They may worry that they are losing a part of their family’s or the country’s history – the tradition of passing on their seats from one generation to the next. In this regard, they may perhaps need reminding that things are forever shifting and at ever faster rates. The British society no longer accepts enslavement, husbands who claim to have a right to rape their wives, self-selected elites who rule over the masses. The case for reform An elected upper house will likely be renamed ‘the Senate’ (like the US that has an elected upper house) or another variant to signify the transformation. An elected upper house will be endowed with democratic legitimacy. Its members will have to yield to the will of the people. This should be so because members of the upper house devise laws, regulations, and policies that affect the lives of 62 million people on everything from health and safety to gene therapy. Some are concerned that an elected upper house will be too strong and displace the primacy of the Commons. The Salisbury-Addison convention may be breached (for which no legal sanction will follow because conventions are unenforceable by nature.) The counter-argument is that the primacy of the Commons over the Lords depends on more than just the democratic mandate. It is the Commons as opposed to the Lords that retains the financial privilege, that benefits from the Parliament Act procedure, that has the Prime Minister and senior government ministers sitting on its benches. Another concern is political gridlock and irresolution if each house is dominated by an opposing party. The recent stand-off between Democrats and Republicans in Washington DC over US’ debt ceiling highlights the dangers of political posturing and partisan bickering. It is not hard to imagine the same being repeated in Britain over issues like NHS funding or state pensions with serious consequences. However, as Elliott writes, the Commons has been unchallenged for too long. The majority party forms the government and its party whips control the voting patterns of most MPs in Parliament. So long as the whips do their job, MPs from all the other parties do not have the numbers to overwhelm the government’s party. Someone must stand up and question the government’s policy when appropriate – governments do make mistakes and indulge in ‘groupthink.’ The upper house provides the right forum for this. The noise and the messy dealings attached to political deliberations are not a good reason to deny people the right to vote. They are the price we pay for a democratic way of life. And after the inception of a Coalition government, politicians themselves may begin to surrender their ideological biases. Lastly, an elected upper house will better represent the society at large. New perspectives and ideas can be heard for the first time. Class or station in life will pre-empt far fewer votes in the house. Bishops from the Church of England will be removed to reflect the secularism on the increase and stave off criticisms from the multi-faiths community. And the process of elections may empower and educate the voters. Opening up the upper house to state-schooled or non-religious public servants will buoy people of many backgrounds with hope that they are not alone. Conclusion Reforming the House of Lords will fix a historic anomaly, make the government more answerable, and offer people the chance to participate in political decision-making

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FEATURED GUEST CONTRIBUTOR

The AV Referendum

James Forder is a Fellow of Balliol College Oxford and author of The Case Against Voting Reform, Oneworld Publications, 2011. What a shocking referendum that was. Neither official campaign made any impact on the real issues. One lot offered us the costs of buying counting machines as a decisive argument against the change. Even if it were true that that they were needed, £130m would not be much to pay for a better democracy (if that is what we were getting). Some of the rest of the £250m they were quoting was the cost of the referendum itself – not something to be changed by the way we voted. Meanwhile, the other lot seemed to think that AV would put an end to expenses abuses, without, apparently, having noticed how completely the parties had punished those who broke the rules. And they said it would put an end to tactical voting without – so it seemed – being aware of research over decades showing that no voting system is free of opportunities for that. And they said it would make MPs seek wide support, without, as far as one could tell, wondering what they do in any case. And so it went on. If there were a competition for the worst argument advanced by either side in the campaign, there would be plenty of competition. But at least it was a shocking campaign that led to the right result. There are good arguments for the present system. They flow from seeing effective democracy as matter of choosing leaders, not of choosing policies. Once we see it that way, the important thing becomes having a system that puts the choice of leaders properly in the hands of voters. The trouble with both AV and proportional representation is that they make coalition much more likely, or in some cases, more or less inevitable. What that means is that the decision as to who forms the government falls to the politicians and it is one they take after the election. The great thing about the present system is that – most of the time – when the votes are counted, we know who is in government. That is what puts the crucial question in the hands of the voters, and that is the essence of democracy. Most of the time, but not all of the time. And what an irony it is that this referendum could only occur in circumstances that displayed more disadvantages of coalition. The poor old Liberal Democrats and their troubles over tuition fees offer a study of the whole problem. They clearly promised not to vote for fee increases, but after the election, in a hung Parliament, with coalition all but inevitable, electoral promises have a different colour. In those circumstances, compromise is inevitable. That, of course, is not always thought a bad thing. Indeed, when it is said that politicians 'working together' would be preferable to their 'bickering', it can be made to sound a very good idea. And if what 'working together' means is finding some middle, moderate course, it might even actually be a good idea. But of course that is not what it means. What it means, first of all, is that party promises – as we now know – mean more or less nothing. But more than that, they cannot even be taken as statements of preference, since if coalition is more or less inevitable, the parties are bound to adopt negotiating positions in their manifestoes. And to add to that, those who break their promises even have a ready-made excuse – it is necessary to compromise in coalition, after all. During the referendum, all this was apparent. It has been made apparent by the coalition and the tuition fees issue. It served as an excellent warning of how coalition systems damage democracy. (Whether they damage the quality of government – as distinct from the quality of democracy – or for that matter, whether higher tuition fees are a good idea are other questions). We were having, in one of its aspects, a referendum on whether we wanted a system that would put the Liberal Democrats again and again in the position they were in during 2010 – that is, a position to bargain away what they had promised the electors in exchange for whatever they could get. Understandably, and rightly, that was not a welcome prospect. Against this inconvenient background, the Yes campaign was an unmistakable flop. Their basic task was to get the case for change off the ground. They were advocating change, after all, and quite a serious change. It should not be too much to expect them to make a case worth answering. If the whole campaign were nothing more than an exchange of laughable and worthless arguments, then it was the Yes campaign that deserved to lose. They established no case to answer.

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In fact, the failing of the Yes campaign went much deeper because as it developed, theirs was a campaign based on a deep contradiction. The well-established arguments for changing the British electoral system really have been arguments for proportional representation. There is a principled case to be made for that – not one I agree with, but there is one. An essential of that case amounts to the point that significant bodies of opinion which organize themselves into political parties should have representation in Parliament. That is just the point of the argument – there are a variety of points of view amongst the electorate, they are all equally valid, and each should have its share of representation. There should be no hegemony of the large parties, and ideally, we would end up with a Parliament – so it is hoped – more or less mirroring the various points of views of the electorate. That brings all the problems of coalition into the picture. And, if it is thought about properly it raises many more problems about how these parties would really behave when seeking power. But despite the problems, that mirroring of public opinion does make for some kind of principled case in favour of proportional representation. But as we heard many times, and quite rightly, the Alternative Vote is not a proportional system. That does not necessarily leave it with nothing to take from the advocacy of PR, since it could be argued that the alternative vote is, most of the time, more proportional than the existing system. There are points about that which might be disputed. One is that simulations of some past elections suggested that it would have resulted in less proportional outcomes. On the other hand, in those cases – the Conservative victory of 1983, and the Labour one of 1997, are two – were cases where it was in any case clear which party was to form the government. So they might have had a bigger majority, but their majority was big enough anyway. On the other hand, the close elections of recent times – 1992 and 2010 stand out – the outcome would have been more proportional. Another, more serious, doubt arises from the issue of the fate of the smaller parties. AV would surely result in more Liberal Democrats, and their supporters fall easily into the trap of supposing that makes it 'fairer'. But it would probably do nothing for the other smaller parties, and those that have achieved Parliamentary representation – the Nationalists and the Greens – might well be harmed. Caroline Lucas – the sole Green MP – is, after all, one of the people elected with much less than 50% of the vote. But what did the Yes campaign say about it? They tried to make out that it was an advantage of AV that it oppresses 'extremist' parties. It is true that it does that. An extremist party might win a Parliamentary seat on a smallish proportion of the vote, but under AV, as the weakest parties are eliminated, their supporters would presumably back the other 'moderate' candidate. The 'extremist' would find it hard ever to achieve the 50% in the last count needed for election. It might even be true that it is an advantage of a system that it prevents the election of 'extremists' although there must be some doubt about the democratic credentials of a system which is specifically advocated for damaging certain parties. But beyond that, and much more to the point, this argument flies in the face of the argument for proportional representation – it flies in the face of it. On the one hand we are told that democracy and 'fair votes' demands that organized political groups with moderate support are entitled to Parliamentary representation. But in our referendum, as the Yes campaign argued it – along with many longstanding advocates of proportional representation – the opposite claim was made: That AV would be welcome for preventing the election of certain groups. The contradiction is as deep as the arguments for change were shallow. That is why, in the end, there should be no doubt that a decisive 'No' vote – and a closing of the issue – was the only proper outcome. Those who needed to make the case for change could not do so, and could not even maintain a basic coherence in their position.

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A King’s Think Tank Society Publication editor@kingsthinktank.com www.kingsthinktank.com