The Struggle for the Republican Party in 1960

THE STRUGGLE POR TWE -PUBLICAN

PARTY IN 1960 JOHN ANDREW

he approach of the 1960 presidential election unleashed a struggle for the soul T of the Republican party as party conservatives attempted to seize control from the moderate “modern Republicans” supported by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Spurred by the certainty that after two terms in office, Eisenhower could no longer be the party’s candidate, conservatives determined that the moment had arrived to redefine Republican ideology through its 1960 platform, returning to the traditional conservative political principles from which it had strayed during the Eisenhower Administration. So began a conflict that continued to rage within Republican ranks until 1980, with the nomination and victory of President Ronald Reagan.

The central issue in this struggle was whether the Republican party should continue to embrace Eisenhower’s philosophy of modern Republicanism. According to Eisenhower, modern Republicanism “recognizes clearly the responsibility of the Federal Government to take the lead in making certain that the productivity of our great economic machine is distributed so that no one will suffer disaster [or] pri- vation, through no fault of his own.” Free enterprise was the key to America’s economic prosperity, and economic control was best left “in the hands of localities and the private enterprise of states wherever we can.” For free enterprise to be healthy, Eisenhower believed, “you must have, first, integrity in your fiscal opera- tions of the government; second, you must preserve a sound dollar or all of our plans for social security and pensions for the aged fall by the wayside, they are no good; and thirdly. . . dispersion of power [between government and the private sector is necessary] .”’

Under Secretary of Labor Arthur Larson called this philosophy “New Republicanism,” a middle-of-the-road consensus that demanded the federal government take firm responsibility for the general welfare, social security, and intervention

John Andrew is a professor of history at Franklin and Marshall College.

‘Press conference, 14 November 1956, quoted in Howard Fyle, Deputy Assistant to the President, to Mrs. Jane Reining, 28 February 1957, Dwight David Eisenhower White House Central Files [hereafter WHCF], General File, box 580, 109-A-I7 ( l ) , Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library [hereafter DDE] .

614 THE HISTORIAN

to alleviate suffering or correct substandard conditions. Some responsibility could- and should-be delegated to state or local governments, but the choice of means was a federal responsibility. Such a moderate political platform was essential if the Republicans were to retain power in the 1960 election. If Republicans nominated a candidate “identified with an extreme conservative position,” he warned, the Democrats would choose a candidate from the great middle and control the government; thereafter, “it would be difficult indeed for the Republicans to get back in.”2 For both Eisenhower and Larson, modern Republicanism represented the American consensus. Everyone else was an extremist of some sort, and was in the minority. Citizens for Modern Republicanism opened a national office in New York City to promote the Eisenhower philosophy and find a successor for 1960.’

Conservatives disagreed that modern Republicanism was the future of their party, charging that all Eisenhower had done was to codify the Democratic New Deal. They resented his acceptance of most New Deal legislation, his defense of federal over state authority, and his refusal to defend Senator Joseph McCarthy in the wake of his political downfall, and they were outraged that he had continued Truman’s policy of containment and supported coexistence with the communist world. Their voices muted by Eisenhower’s defeat of Robert Taft for the 1952 nomination, conservative Republicans had found their influence limited by Eisenhower’s popularity throughout the 1950s. But as 1960 approached, they saw an opportunity to reshape party ideology for a new decade with the likely Republican nominee, Vice President Richard Nixon, whom they hoped might be one of their own. More liberal Republicans, on the other hand, sought to consolidate modern Republicanism and even move beyond its fiscal constraints by increasing defense spending and pursuing civil rights more aggressively.

The 1958 elections sharpened the conflict within the party and heightened the stakes. Republicans lost 48 seats in the House, sinking to their lowest level of representation since 1937. Those congressional defeats dashed Republican hopes that Eisenhower’s victories would lead the party to majority status in Congress, and encouraged both liberals and conservatives in the party to attack modern Republicanism. Each faction believed that only its program could create a Republican majority and secure victory for the party. Liberal and moderate

*Arthur Larson, A Republican Looks at His Party (New York, 1956), 19.

3Richard Graham to Richard Nixon, 27 September 1957, Gen. Corr., box 152, Citizens for Modern Republicanism, Nixon Pre-Presidential Papers, National Archives, Pacific Southwest Region [hereafter NPPI.

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE REPUBLICAN PARTY IN 1960 615

Republicans, led by New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller, promoted the conclusions of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund Special Studies Project, which urged more aggressive federal action in foreign as well as domestic policy. Conservatives coun- tered that only a truly conservative position could guarantee the future of the Republican party. “The present administration,” wrote one, “does not perhaps swim so enthusiastically with the tides as its [Democratic] predecessors; but this is a minor difference of mood; it is not a difference of prin~iple.”~

When Republican National Chairman Meade Alcorn asked party leaders to assess the 1958 defeats and suggest remedies, he found a faction-ridden party with a “big business” image and little support from working American~.~ Texas Republican party chairman Thad Hutcheson observed that among conservatives there was

. . . an overwhelming apathy and an almost sullen resistance toward the Republican cause, arising out of an apparent feeling that the Administration’s program had veered far away from what was originally promised toward big Federal government and big Federal spending, and that there was really not much basic difference between the two parties.6

The party needed to return to its traditional stance of limited government intervention and limited spending:

A fight on such principles would spread great enthusiasm for the 1960 election among our workers and potential supporters, whereas any turn toward the principles . . . of “Modern Republicanism” would, in my opinion, be disastrous to the future of the Party.7

But while Hutcheson argued for a conservative philosophy such as that of Barry Goldwater, other Republicans counseled Richard Nixon to move in the opposite

4Frank Meyer, “Principles and Heresies,” National Review 5 (4 January 1958): 17; see Prospect for America: The Rockefeller Panel Reports (New York, 1961); Rockefeller to Nixon, 3 April 1957, Gen. Corr., box 650, Nelson Rockefeller 1955-59, NPP.

5Alcorn to Dwight Eisenhower, confidential memorandum, 15 December 1958, Gen. Corr., box 25, Hon. Meade Alcorn, NPP.

6Hutcheson to Richard Nixon, 7 November 1958, Gen. Corr., box 364, Thad Hutcheson, NPP.

’Ibid.

616 THE HISTORIAN

direction, to embrace “progressive independence” to overcome the party’s ‘‘soulless’’ image while still emphasizing the danger of big government to individual freedomsSs

Dwight Eisenhower’s personal popularity and Republican control of the White House had masked these divisions at the party’s foundations during his administration. In the words of National Review’s Brent Bozell, “The Republican Party made Dwight Eisenhower its high priest, in exchange for its soul.” Because the party had abandoned its traditional conservative foundation in supporting Eisenhower, there was no longer an automatic conservative vote ready to back Republican candidates. Lacking any organizational power, the party was “recognizably a corpse.” Bozell urged the party to move back to the right. “A conservative electorate has to be created out of that vast uncommitted middle-the great majority of the American people who, though today they vote for Democratic or Modern Republican candidates, are not ideologically wedded to their programs or, for that matter, to any program. The problem is to reach them and to organize them.”9

Alcorn responded by appointing a Committee on Program and Progress. Chaired by Charles Percy, president of Bell and Howell and later Republican senator from Illinois, the committee was to define “the challenges and responsibilities facing the Republican Party in all areas of political activity” and suggest policies for the 1960~. ’~ Avoiding factionalism, it was to state a declaration of governing principles, not draft a legislative program or formal platform for 1960. Said Alcorn in his charge:

I hope that this Committee will provide the Republican Party with a concise, understandable statement of our Party’s long-range objectives in all of the areas of political responsibility and activity in the light of the social, technological and economic developments which you can reasonably anticipate during the years immedi- ately ahead.”

‘James Bassett to Nixon, 4 December 1958, Gen. Corr., box 66, James Bassett ( I ) , NPP.

9L. Brent Bozell, “The 1958 Elections: Coroner’s Report:’ National Review 6 (22 November 1958): 333-35 [emphasis in the original].

”Charles Percy Oral History, The Eisenhower Administration Project, Columbia University, 12; see also news release, Republican National Committee, 25 February 1959, Arthur S. Flemming Papers, box 22, Republican National Committee ( l ) , DDE Charlie McWhorter to Richard Nixon, 17 January 1959, Gen. Corr., box 25, folder; 13 March 1959, press release, Gen. Corr., box 25, Hon. Meade Acorn, NPP; Charles Percy to Interior Secretary Fred Seaton, 24 March 1959, Fred Seaton Papers, Republican Party Series, 1960 Campaign Subseries, box 2, GOP National Convention, Miscellaneous (2), DDE.

“Remarks by Republican National Chairman Meade Alcorn, Before the Republican Committee on Program and Press at Their Initial Meeting, March 1959, box 25, Hon. Meade Acorn, NPP.


The committee was to establish guidelines to “aid Republican policymakers, office- holders, workers, and voters to deal forthrightly and vigorously and effectively with the problems they must solve . . . through the application of sound and acceptable Republican principles.”12 The committee quickly established four task forces: national security and peace, human rights and needs, the impact of science and technology, and economic opportunity and progress. The broad responsibilities of each task force were partly intended to avoid special interest domination and resist the urge to draft specific 1egi~lation.l~

Establishment of the Committee on Program and Progress brought mixed reaction from Republicans. Richard Nixon spoke at the opening meeting of the committee and kept in contact with Percy throughout the committee’s deliberations. To the extent that the progressive Percy sought to liberalize the Republican agenda, Nixon supported him. Soon after Meade Acorn announced the membership of the committee, Human Events reported Republican lawmakers’ complaints that it was “just loaded with docile White House foll~wers,”’~ Conservative Republicans believed the White House had engineered the appointments to the committee and were angry that Senator Everett Dirksen and Representative Charles Halleck were the only two members of Congress on the committee. But though wary at the out- set, conservatives soon became comfortable with the committee’s work. Stephen Shadegg, Goldwater’s campaign manager in 1952 and 1958 and a member of the committee, wrote Goldwater that “you will recall I came away from the original meeting of the Republican Committee on Program and Progress with some reser- vations. I hasten to report the two day session of our task force in Chicago, concluded yesterday, was a thrilling and productive experience.” He classified many of his colleagues as “Goldwater Republicans” who would avoid “any support of ‘Me- tooism.”’ The task forces, he believed, would avoid temporizing and give “no con- sideration . . . at all to the possible present preferences of the mass voter^."'^ Goldwater warned that one of the parties “must be to the right, and that one must be ours.”16 To Goldwater’s delight, the committee recognized that “there is one great over-riding issue confronting the American public and indeed the world today. This

‘*Ibid.

13Percy to Seaton, 24 March 1959, Fred Seaton Papers, Republican Party Series, 1960 Campaign Subseries, box 2, GOP National Convention, Miscellaneous (2) , DDE.

I4Human Evenrs 16 (4 March 1959): 2.

15Stephen Shadegg to Barry Goldwater, 6 April 1959, box 3H506, Barry Goldwater Collection, Center for the Study of American History, University of Texas, Austin [hereafter BG].

I6Goldwater to Charles Percy, 10 April 1959, BG.

618 THE HISTOFUN

is the total war being waged between those who believe in individual responsibility and freedomy-in his view, the conservative Republicans-and “those who believe in a totalitarian materialistic phil~sophy.”’~

By June the four task force reports were ready in draft form. Nixon particularly favored the draft on human rights and needs. “On the one hand,” he observed, “it is consistent with conservative Republican philosophy on the role of government and on spending programs of the federal government. On the other hand, it has a broadly liberal tone and is not merely negative (another lock on the safe).”l6 Loolung to encourage “the presence of programs that would really strike the public,” Nixon wanted the report to portray the Republican Party as the party of the future, and forwarded Percy a memo that outlined “The Operational Importance of Goals that Promise Hope.”” Long-term goals were essential, the memo argued, to reversing the pessimistic perception held by many that Communism was the inevitable wave of the future,

In September, Percy reported to his colleagues that reaction to the drafts was one of “enthusiastic approval.” “The Republican party,” he said, “is not charting a course for the future by looking into a rear view mirror. . . . We will look like a party that enjoys solving problems, making decisions, and that regards the future with hope and confidence.”20 By now, however, conservatives were less enthusiastic. Stephen Shadegg complained that the report was too scholarly for the public to read and lacked a preamble that clarified basic philosophical concepts of the individual and government. “I feel that if we fail to present in singing language our determination to keep men free and to preserve the traditional values of our Judio-Christian [sic] society, we will be losing by default what otherwise might have been a great opportunity.”2’

Published in paperback as Decisions For A Better America, the report sought to achieve consensus between the liberal and conservative wings of the party, and in so doing produced a rather vague and bifurcated document. On one hand, it urged

”Shadegg to Goldwater, 4 May 1959, BG.

‘“Nixon to Bob Finch, 13 July 1959, Gen. Corr., box 630, Republican Committee on Program and Progress (4); Finch to Nixon, Gen. Corr., box 588, C. H. Percy (3), NPP; see also Percy to Arthur Flemming, 6 May 1959, box 22, Republican National Committee ( I ) , Arthur S. Flemming Papers, DDE Percy to Nixon, 23 July 1959 letter Gen. Corr., box 588, C. H. Percy (3), NPP.

”Nixon to Finch, 13 July 1959. The memo was written by Karl Hess.

2oPercy to members of the Republican Committee on Program and Progress, 8 September 1959, box 22, Republican National Committee (2). Arthur S. Flemming Papers, DDE; Percy to Nixon, 11 September 1959, Gen. Corr., box 588, C. H. Percy (2), NPP.

*‘Shadegg to Barry Goldwater, 17 September 1959, box 3H506, BG.


that Republican doctrine rest on a faith in the individual and an aversion “to government’s intrusion into the affairs of men in every walk of life.” O n the other hand, it argued that:

[The] Republican Party stands for a strong, responsive federal government, opening and advancing economic opportunities for the American people . . . using its strength to ward off inflation and depression . . . restraining and disciplining any who use their power against the common welfare . . . regulating wisely where the national interest demands it.22

Senator Jacob Javits asserted that it “demonstrates again when a composite of our Party is taken, the thinking is Eisenhower (modern) thinking.” Conservatives, on the other hand, resisted Eisenhower’s moderate pragmatism. In the words of one such conservative:

I hope that none of those connected with the present regime will get the idea that people are not waking up to the probably National objectives of our present leadership-namely, World Government (a Communist-Socialist World Government). May the devil take you, Eisenhower, and all the rest of the gang that are involved in this criminal operation.23

A more balanced assessment from a conservative viewpoint came from future Goldwater supporter Karl Hess, who complained that the report was

. . . the ultimate, it may be hoped, in the lemming-like Republican urge to accept Democratic programs, tacitly approve Democratic principles, but to propose imple- menting them in a more businesslike manner. Yet . . . it was done so well and so con- scientiously that most Republicans could find some rationalization for not opposing it.24

22Republican Committee on Program and Progress, Decisions For A Better America (Garden City, N.Y., 1960), 18-21,30,103-4.

23Javits to Nixon, 29 January 1960, Gen. Corr., box 381, Jacob K. Javits (2), NPP; George B. Fowler, Treasurer of the Valley Paper Company of Holyoke, Mass., to Spencer T. Olin, 3 November 1959, quoted in Eckard Toy, Jr., “Ideology and Conflict in American Ultraconservatism, 1945-1960,” (Ph.D. disserta- tion, University of Oregon, 1965), 29.

24Karl Hess, In a Cause That Will Triumph: The Goldwater Campaign and the Future of Conservatism (Garden City, N.Y., 1967), 59-60.

620 THE HISTORIAN

The committee’s recommendations focused on incremental rather than struc- tural changes in American life and public policy, pushing for expanded health care, for instance, with the “wise support of government” but “without bureaucratic restrictions or interference.” It implied that the real question was how best to man- age the country’s resources to solve problems, and did not see existing problems as challenging anything essential about American life. By accepting New Deal reforms while advocating limited government, it essentially endorsed modern Republicanism without speaking directly to that issue. That the committee tried to accommodate all points of view was particularly evident in its discussion of national security and peace. Freedom was the key to American foreign policy, the committee maintained, and the greatest threat was communism. This was the touchstone of conservative ideology, and the committee regarded “as a paramount goal of foreign policy the peaceful but unremitting support of the restoration of freedom to those who have been deprived of it by communism.” The report supported the Eisenhower Administration’s policy of a strong nuclear retaliatory force to prevent communist aggression, but warned against the “temptation to put too many eggs in one basket,” embracing the arguments of the administration’s critics by urging a “balanced military force and the provision of “whatever is necessary to insure our security as a nation.”25

The intent of the report, as Percy admitted, was political. The Republicans pro- posed to “lift the ceiling over personal opportunity and strengthen the floor over the pit of personal disaster” for Americans.26 Eisenhower hoped the report would be the basis for the 1960 platform as well as provide a better understanding of Republican principles. He did not publicly acknowledge the undercurrent of discontent that coursed through Republican ranks.27

To communicate their message of party unity, in mid-January 1960 House Republicans organized a series of speeches on “Meeting the Challenges of the Sixties.” Wisconsin Republican John Byrnes, chairman of the House Republican Policy Committee, began the series by arguing that the Republican purpose should be to “clarify the differences in party responses to the challenges of the 1960’s.” Skirting particulars, Byrnes asserted that the party shared a sense of purpose that rejected excessive spending or “statism” at homeT8 Other speakers focused on the Sino-Soviet peril and the need to encourage economic freedom. Any change in

25Decisions ForA Better America, 46,89,97-101, 151, 158. 173-74, 183.

2hPercy to Eisenhower, 8 February 1960, DDE Central Files, Official Files, box 710,138-C-l-F, DDE.

27Javits to Nixon, 29 January 1960, Gen. Corr., box 381, Jacob K. Javits (2), NPP.

28A copy of Byrnes’s speech is in Gen. Corr., box 119, The Hon. John W. Bymes, NPP.

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE REPUBLICAN PARTY IN 1960 62 1

national leadership or foreign policy would tempt the Russians to launch “Korean- type wars or nuclear blackmail.”29 Representative Gerald Ford of Michigan warned against “appearances of softness and domestic divisions which might spark the Communists into a miscalculation that could fuse a war.” Quoting repeatedly from the Percy Report and attacking Democratic spending plans, Ford concluded that our “ideas and faith can never be victorious over Communistic ideas through a greater application of materialism, statism, and so~ial ism.”~~

Economic freedom and growth were twin domestic themes that contained dangerous “perils” to American economic prosperity. The battle was between irrespon- sible advocates of increased federal spending and the “octopuslike growth of statism on the one hand, and the responsible guardians of fiscal responsibility on the other. Democratic programs, Arizona Republican John Rhodes cautioned, would “steal from our grasp the opportunities of the age ahead.”31 They contained built-in spending spirals that promised massive fiscal deficits and threatened the free enterprise system. In his concluding remarks, Charles Halleck reiterated that the Republican Party was best suited to meet the challenges of the sixties. It was, he insisted, united in a basic philosophy, whereas the Democrats were the party of expediency, of “gliberalities” without principles. The challenge to Republicans was to divorce themselves from the belief that “old ways of expressing ourselves are good enough,” and to find a way to engage the American

Since few doubted that Richard Nkon would be the party’s presidential nominee, the underlying question in this party conflict was essentially ideological. That question, in short, was the nature of the sixties decade. Was the United States enter- ing a new world that required candidates to look ahead (i.e., the moderates, in their view), or were the old approaches of conservatives sufficient to deal with a world that had changed little? As this debate unfolded, Robert Humphreys of the Republican National Committee Staff prepared a confidential analysis and policy

29Bob Wilson, “The Challenge of Preserving Peace: Part 1, The Sino-Soviet Peril,” Congressional Record, 86th Cong., 2d sess., 1960,106, pt.1: 799-802.

30Gerald Ford, “The Challenge of Preserving Peace: The Seven Dynamic Spearheads of Peace Power,” Congressional Record, 86th Cong., 2d sess. 1960, 106, pt. 1: 929-32; Robert Griffin, “The Challenge of Labor-Management Relations,” ibid., 1026-29.

31John Rhodes, “The Challenge of Enlarging Economic Freedom for Our Children: Part 1. The Perils to Economic Freedom,” Congressional Record, 86th Cong., 2d sess., 1960, 106, pt. 1:1029-32; Thomas Curtis, “The Challenge of Enlarging Economic Freedom for Our Children: Part 2. The Five Potentials to Roll Back the Economic Peril,” ibid., 1209-13.

32Charles Halleck, “The Party Qualified to Meet the Challenges,” Congressional Record, 86th Cong., 2d sess., 1960, 106, pt. 1:1213-15; see 86th Cong., 2d sess., 1960, 106, pt. 1419033-89.

622 THE HISTONAN

recommendations for the White House that concluded,“ We must realize we are talk- ing about a whole new world!“ The party and candidate that best understood the mood of the country would win the 1960 election, he warned, for voters were consumed less by particular policy concerns than by fears of advancing technology and automation in the space age, communism and the prospect of a nuclear war, social problems and racial tension, and economic inflation. The average person “feels lost and without guideposts; he suffers from a ‘please go-away’ psychosis; he over- indulges in the ‘escapism’ of religious revival, do-it-yourself, painting and photog- raphy, model making, e t ~ . ” ~ ~ A sense of unease or malaise predominated, and merely trying to reformulate a consensus on traditional issues was insufficient. The party or candidate who provided “hope and confidence” through new and bold ideas would be victorious in 1960. Republicans needed to rekindle hope rather than exploit lingering fears if they were to retain power in the upcoming decade.34

How to do that was the problem Republicans grappled with as they moved to develop a platform for the 1960 campaign. White House Press Secretary James Hagerty urged the president to clarify the party’s ideology and to fight for legislation that would return a Republican to the White House. Richard Nixon empha- sized that the chief issue for 1960 was survival against the communist menace; to him economic growth, civil rights, inflation, or urban redevelopment were sec- ondary. Nixon’s dilemma was that party conservatives rejected not only Democratic liberalism but the modern Republicanism he believed was necessary to reach voters outside the Republican party. Nixon needed a platform with which voters could identify, and one which voters would believe he sincerely embraced. Otherwise, he stood little chance of victory in November. “The critics have done such an effective job of creating the impression that I take positions solely for expediency that I think some drastic counter-offensive must be launched,” he wrote in early April. “Of course,” he admitted, “the very conservative Republicans are not going to be satis- fied with the position that I take until they see what the choice is. . , . They are against any change whatsoever [from traditional conservative positions], including good change.”35

”“Nineteen Sixty: A Study in Political Change,” Robert Humphreys Papers, box 12, 1960 Campaign and Election, DDE [emphasis in the original].

34 Ibid; see also George Romney, “The Challenge of the Sixties,” Modern Age 4 (Summer 1960): 229-34.

35Nixon to Claude Robinson, 9 April 1960, Gen. Corr., box 647, Claude Robinson 1960 (3), NPP; see also Robinson to Nixon, 1 April 1960, ibid.; Richard Nixon, The Challenges We Face (New York, 1960), 35, 54, 127; Memoranda for the President, from Jim Hagerty, 21 March 1960, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Ann Whitman Diary Series, box 1 1 , (ACW) Diary, March 1960 ( l ) , DDE.

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE REPUBLICAN PARTY IN 1960 62 3

The conservative forces could not be readily dismissed. Conservative Southern Democrats were beginning to take a close look at the Republican party in the face of racial integration and continued civil rights activity. But to woo them, conservative positions across the board were essential. In December 1959, William F. Buckley Jrls National Review had sponsored a debate over the question of “Nixon or Not?” One of his guests, Ralph de Toledano, said that although he feared Nixon was too liberal on some issues, he was at least strongly anti-communist. Robert Wood, President of Sears & Roebuck, who had warned two years earlier that Eisenhower’s political philosophy did not represent the real Republican party, insisted that the political mood of the people had shifted despite Eisenhower’s personal popularity. He urged the party to tap into a popular outcry against the rising federal presence in American life. Another correspondent complained that Eisenhower was “trying to cram ‘Modern Republicanism’ down our throats” but with no clear cause identified with the concept.36 The people in the West and South were particularly mistrustful. Reflecting on this unrest, Nixon friend Loyd Wright pleaded, “I do hope that when it comes time for the Platform we can have representation from the vast hordes of Republicans who have supported the Party for years, and who have well nigh abandoned hope because of modern Republicanism and the crucifying of our real republican^."^^

Conservatives close to National Review argued that 1960 was the time for a clean break with “practical politics”-modern Republicanism-and that loyalty to a truly conservative ideology should supersede all other considerations. “What use is it to spend energy to achieve political power,” one asked, “if the positive result is going to be nothing better than a mild decrease in our rate of growth towards collectivism at home and our surrender to collectivism abroad?” Worse, those efforts drained off energies that should be applied to “building a serious conservative opposition” to liberal Democrats. A “principled boycott” of the 1960 presidential election would be preferable to continued support of modern Republicanism, as it might ensure a conservative victory in 1964 either “through recapture of the Republican Party or through creation of a new alignment of forces.”38

Publication of Barry Goldwater’s The Conscience of A Conservative in 1960 was the first salvo in the conservative effort. Written at the urging of Clarence Manion,

’%ee Mrs. John Britton to Robert Gray, Administrative Assistant to the President, 16 May 1960, WHCF, General File, box 487, 109-A-2, 1960 (4), DDE; Gen. Corr., box 213, Ralph, Nora, deToledano ( l ) , NPP; see Robert Wood to Irving Salomon, 7 June 1957 and Morton C. Hull to DDE, 24 June 1957, WHCF, General File, box 580, 109-A-17 (3) and (41, DDE.

37Wright to Nixon, 18 December 1959, Gen. Corr., box 834, Loyd Wright, NPP.

38Frank Meyer, “Principles and Heresies,” National Review 7 (19 December 1959): 555.

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Old Guard Republican and dean of Notre Dame Law School, the slender volume was adapted by Brent Bozell from Goldwater’s speeches and Bozell’s own research. The Conscience ofA Conservative clearly articulated Goldwater’s conservative principles, and Goldwater was frank in his intent to advance an ideological conservatism. “Our objective,” Goldwater said, “is to take the onus from the word ‘Conservative’ and to make it acceptable to people who shy away from it today. . . . We can do this in a philosophical way, then we can attach the definitions and expo- sitions to the concrete subjects of legislation.” The book quickly became a best- seller, the paperback version selling over 700,000 copies within a year.39

The success of Goldwater’s book encouraged ideological conservatives to carry their message directly to the Republican National Convention. Throughout the spring of 1960 various Goldwater for President committees flooded GOP delegates with postcards and telegrams advocating his nomination. That most of these committees originated in the South created a difficult problem for the party. Goldwater advocates were committed and vocal, but most of them came from traditionally Democratic states; indeed, from states where the Republican party was essentially non-existent. They could create turmoil at the convention, but did not have sufficient strength to carry their states in November. The groundswell surprised even Goldwater, who had fully expected to support Nixon for the nomination. Whether driven by ego or conviction, or perhaps both, he began to waver. Concerned that Nixon’s liberal tendencies had “caused such consternation among the party workers across the country that we must employ means to get him back on the right track,” Goldwater expressed hope that the pressure would influence Nixon. If not, he concluded, “I would rather see the Republicans lose in 1960, fighting on principle, than I would care to see us win standing on grounds we know are wrong and on which we will ultimately destroy o~rse lves .”~~

By mid-April it was clear that at least two states, South Carolina and Arizona, would cast their convention votes for Goldwater. Richard Kleindienst, Arizona Republican Chairman, warned Nixon aide Charlie McWhorter that there was a perception among “hard core” Republicans that Nixon was flirting with liberals. According to Kleindienst, McWhorter told Nixon, “these conservatives don’t even

39Barry M. Goldwater, The Conscience of a Conservative (Shepherdsville, Ky., 1960); Goldwater to Shadegg, 20 January 1960, box 3H506, BG.

4oGoldwater to William Rehnquist, 31 March 1960, box 3H506, BG; see also Charlie McWhorter to Nixon, 29 March 1960, Gen. Corr., box 364, Thad Hutcheson, NPP.

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE REPUBLICAN PARI’Y IN 1960 62 5

want to accept a ‘middle of the road’ position, thinking that the voters are entitled to a clear choice between a pure liberal and a pure c~nservative.”~~ From California’s Loyd Wright came a warning that the conservative Republicans “are not crackpots. . . . They are people upon whom we must rely to punch door bells and to put up money.” They believed that “New Dealism, Fair Dealism and Modern Republicanism are nothing but socialism and fringes of communism,” and expected Nixon to embrace clear conservative positions. These groups could cause serious trouble for Nixon, said Wright, unless he seized their issues and provided strong conservative leadership. If he did not, one of two things would happen. “Barry Goldwater will stampede the convention because . . . thousands of people every day are singing his praises for fur- nishing Republican leadership, or, we will have another fiasco such as we had in 1948 and 1944, when Tom Dewey thought he could win by saying nothing,”42

Nixon tried to mend fences behind the scenes, writing that he would clarify his positions once the campaign began. But more important was what he did not say. In his correspondence with Republicans around the country, Nixon never directly answered questions about his political philosophy, and he evaded the conservatism issue completely. Instead, he focused on practical political questions-securing the nomination, suppressing open intra-party dissent, and banking on the assumption that conservative Republicans would prefer him to any Democratic nominee. President Dwight D. Eisenhower expressed a similar conviction in a personal letter to his sister-in-law Lucy. In response to her warning that Nixon should pick Goldwater for his vice president if he wanted to capture conservative voters, the president expressed his lack of patience with political extremists. The United States was “not going to the right.” It was not going to return to a nineteenth-century view of political and economic affairs. The vast majority of the American people, in Eisenhower’s view, were “going to demand that the government do something to give them an opportunity to live out a satisfactory life’’-in short, they favored modern Republi~anism.4~

Nixon remained out of touch with rising numbers of conservative grassroots organizations. In April the midwestern Young Republicans endorsed Goldwater, and by May a Youth for Goldwater for Vice President group had formed. Organized by Douglas Caddy and Marvin Liebman, it was headquartered in Chicago, the site

4‘Charlie McWhorter to Nixon, 13 April 1960, box 418, Richard G. Kleindienst; Thad Hutcheson to McWhorter, 5 April 1960, box 364, all in Gen. Corr., NPP.

42Loyd Wright to Patrick Hillings, 13 April 1960, box 834, Loyd Wright, NPP.

43Nixon to Loyd Wright, 30 April 1960, Gen. Corr., box 834, Loyd Wright, NPP; Lucy Eisenhower to DDE, 2 May 1960 and DDE to Lucy Eisenhower, 6 July 1960, DDE Papers, Ann Whitman File, Name Series, box 12, Edgar Eisenhower (1959-60), (2), DDE [emphasis in original].

626 THE HISTORIAN

of the Republican National Convention, and chaired by Robert Croll, a student at Northwestern University. By June, “Americans for Goldwater” had formed, chaired by Clarence Manion. One of the members outlined their objective: “Conservatives’ most urgent task this election year-and there is no second job that remotely approaches it in importance-is to make sure their ideological position is preserved as a recognizable political a1ternati~e.I’~~ In addition, South Carolina Republican chairman Aubrey Barker wrote convention delegates that “If there ever was a ‘time for a change’ it is now. . . . All the candidates holding themselves out for presidential nomination, proffer us the same bowl of thin soup we have already endured so, so long.”45 Change could come only if Barry Goldwater were elected president. The ultra-conservative John Birch Society also joined the effort, sending postcards endorsing Goldwater for President to Republican politicians around the

Knowing they could not dislodge Nixon as the Republican nominee, these groups intended to use their support for Goldwater to lobby against modern Republicanism at the convention. Goldwater himself urged the platform committee to adopt only a short statement of principles rather than lengthy positions on specific issues. By now Goldwater believed he could capture the vice presidential nomination, and remarked that there would need to be “marijuana in my veins” to pass up the 0pportunity.4~ Young GOP conservatives were solidly behind him as a vice presidential candidate. Their endorsement was important, as it showed that support for Goldwater was not confined to fringe or extremist groups like the John Birch Society. Drawn from campuses around the country, they formed a nexus for an organization that would reach beyond the South and West. As such, they represented a powerful force for change within the Republican party. But despite their sudden emergence and evidence of grassroots support, in 1960 they were still too new and their organization too skeletal to force significant concessions from ~ i x o n . ~ *

44National Review8 (23 April 1960): 251; Douglas Caddy to Marvin Liebman, 16 May 1960 [emphasis in original] and Liebman to Robert Croll, 6 luly 1960, Barry Goldwater File, box 29, Marvin Liebman Associates Collection, Hoover Institution Archives; National Review 8 (21 May 1960): 316; Bozell, “Goldwater on the First Ballot,” National Review 8 (18 June 1960): 388; David Franke to Aubrey Barker, 7 June 1960, box 3H504, BG.

45Barker to Frank Brophy, 21 June 1960, and Barker to Fred Airy, 29 June 1960, both in box 3H504, BG .

46Press release, 17 June 1960, box 3H505, BG. Several of the postcards can be found in DDE White House File, General File, box 570, 109-A-15, DDE.

47Quoted in David Reinhard, The Republican Right Since 1945 (Lexington, Ky., 1983), 154.

48National Review 9 (30 July 1960): 3h; New York Times, 23 July 1960,8.


A more immediate problem for both Nixon and conservative Republicans was Nelson Rockefeller. Determined to influence the party’s platform, even if he couldn’t capture its nomination, Rockefeller joined his conservative counterparts in attacking Nixon where he was most vulnerable, on ideas and issues. On “Meet the Press” in June, he challenged Nixon to state where he stood on the major issues of the day. Although aware that a party debate on issues would be fractious, Rockefeller nonetheless called for just that as a final attempt either to derail Nixon’s nomination at the convention or at least to shape the tenor of the campaign. Rockefeller advanced a series of proposals for an activist national government that would neglect no sector of the nation, “from depressed farm areas to disordered urban areas.” In addition, he urged the government to forge ahead in its protection of civil rights, guaranteeing every American the right to vote, equal educational and job opportunities, equal access to public facilities, and the right to live “where his heart desires and means permit.”49 Seeking to paint Nixon as too passive for the 1960s, Rockefeller encouraged the GOP to adopt the conclusions of his Special Studies Project as its platform. In the April issue of Foreign Affairs he advocated United States leadership, attention to the problems of Third World development, arms control, economic growth, civil defense, and the extension of freedom throughout the world. His ideas, in short, represented a progressive extension of modern Rep~blicanism.~~

Rockefeller’s strategy was effective, and his challenge posed a strategic political dilemma for Nixon. Compared to Rockefeller’s comprehensive vision of the future, Nixon’s concentration on anti-communism seemed not only negative but danger- ously narrow. While party conservatives fretted that Nixon was too liberal, he in turn worried that a careless response to Rockefeller would cast him as too conservative to attract the middle-of-the-road voters necessary for victory in the fall. Attorney General William Rogers, a Nixon friend and advisor, reviewed Rockefeller’s statements carefully and concluded that there was little in them that Nixon could not endorse in principle and that he should avoid any head-on dis- agreements. The real danger from these proposals lay in their call for specific remedies for specific ills. The Percy Committee had managed to finesse party divisions through vague language about the value of individual freedom and the need for self-discipline. Now Rockefeller was calling for Republicans to be “as specific as we

49Baltimore Sun, 31 December 1959; see Republican National Committee, press release, 19 July 1960, Gen. Corr., box 588, C. H. Percy ( l ) , NPP; see televised interview, Chicago, 19 July 1960, copy in box 247, 1960, DNC Papers, LBJ.

5n“Purpose and Policy,” Foreign Afairs 38 (April 1960): 370-90; see “Meet the Press” interview, 12 June1960, box 247,1960, Democratic National Committee Papers [hereafter DNC], LBJ.

62 8 THE HISTORIAN

can be” to avoid the Democratic trap of making broad promises “with no clear indi- cation as to how they were going to carry them O U ~ . ’ ’ ~ ~

The struggle now shifted to the 1960 platform committee. As Eisenhower’s assigned chairman, Charles Percy was caught in the middle. Although Nixon and Eisenhower sought to shape the final document along the lines of modern Republicanism, and Rockefeller to go even further, the committee was predomi- nantly conservative and determined to forestall them. Percy’s solution was to avoid specific proposals in favor of vague general principles, but Rockefeller threatened a floor fight if his ideas were not incorporated into the platform. A floor fight would provide conservatives with a forum to advance their arguments for less government activism, a stronger policy of anti-communism, and opposition to all civil rights activity at the federal level, which Nixon wanted to avoid if at all possible.52

Nixon and Rockefeller met in New York City on 22 July to hammer out platform language that both could accept, and the result was an energetic GOP platform endorsing the need for change. Its emphasis on the 1960s as “an age of profoundest revolution” heralded “the birth of new nations, the impact of new machines, the threat of new weapons, the stirring of new ideas, the ascent into a new dimension of the universe.”53 Calls for greater economic growth, development of new weapons technology, federal aid for public school construction, and active attention to human welfare issues formed the foundation of the GOP platform. The platform declared racial discrimination to be immoral and unjust, and stronger measures for civil rights received approval, although to appease conservative southerners, the language avoided any direct endorsement of sit-ins. When the platform was

5’Rogers to Nixon, 17 June 1960 and 19 June 1960, Gen. Corr., box 653, William P. Rogers 1960 (2), NPP; “Rockefeller’s Proposals, Civil Rights,” 7 July 1960, Fred Seaton Papers, Republican Party Series, 1960 Campaign Subseries, box 3, Republican National Convention (1960 Republican Civil rights Proposals), DDE; New York Times, 10 July 1960, clipping in box 247, 1960, DNC Papers, LBJ; John W. Byrnes’s remarks before the GOP platform committee, 19 July 1960, Gen. Corr., box 119, The Hon. John W. Byrnes, NPP.

52See Charles Percy Oral History, The Eisenhower Administration Project, Columbia University; Charles Percy to the author, personal letter, 28 August 1992; David Murray, CharlesPercy ofIllinois (New York, 1968), 47-53; John Kessel, “Political Leadership: The Nixon Version,” and Karl Lamb, “Civil Rights and the Republican Platform: Nixon Achieves Control,” both in Inside Politics: The National Conventions, 1960, ed. Paul Tillett (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., 1962), 39-54 and 55-84 respectively; Paul David, “The Presidential Nominations,” in The Presidential Election and Transition, 1960-1 961, ed. Paul David (Washington, D.C., 1961). 1-30.

531960 Republican Party Platform, in Arthur Schlesinger Jr. ed., History of Presidential Elections, J789-1968, vol. 4 (New York, 1971), 3510-35.


adopted at the convention, Vermont Royster praised Nixon’s political skills in cut- ting “the umbilical cord that bound him to the Eisenhower program.”54 But while compromise had been reached, only the realities of political power kept conservatives within party ranks. As the New York Times warned, Barry Goldwater’s senti- ments reached beyond fringe groups of the far right and were “privately expressed by many influential Republican conservatives supporting the Nixon ~andidacy.”~~ One of them was Walter Judd, who gave the keynote speech on 25 July.

A former missionary in China and strident anti-communist, Judd was a hero to conservatives, and his name had repeatedly been mentioned as a vice presidential possibility. Insisting that the times were too perilous for Republicans to simply blame all the country’s problems on the Democrats, Judd presented a long and vig- orous defense of freedom. The country’s very survival was at stake, he argued; it was essential for the United States to “win the cold war.” To do that, “we must let loose in the world the dynamic forces of freedom in our day as our forefathers did in theirs, causing people everywhere to look toward the American dream.” Only a restrained government that promoted freedom, not centralization and statism, would succeed. Partisan, persistent, and conservative, Judd aroused the enthusiasm of the assembled delegates and emboldened conservatives to believe that Nixon now owed them the vice presidential post.56

Conservatives found one more opportunity to demonstrate their convictions when Barry Goldwater was nominated for president. Goldwater commanded the hearts, if not the votes, of many delegates in the convention hall, and while his nomination was more symbolism than threat, it allowed him to seize the podium. Two days earlier Goldwater had addressed the convention “about the heart and soul of our great historic Party.”57 Now, he urged Republicans of all ideological persuasions to unite behind the candidacy of Richard Nixon, warning conservatives to “show the strong sense of responsibility which is the central characteristic of the conservative

54Theodore White, The Making ofthe President, 1960 (New York, 1962), 183-205,388-90; Memo, 12 June 1964, G281 (3), Nixon Misc (as VP), Drew Pearson Papers, LBJ; Chandler Davidson, Race and Class in Texas Politics (Princeton 1990), 225; Tillett, “The National Conventions,” 36-40; C. Lichenstein memo, 15 September 1961, series 258, box 1,1960 Election Chapter, NPP; Wall StreetJournal, 25 July 1960, series 69, box 1, Campaign 1960 (July), Richard Nixon Library, Yorba Linda, California.

55New York Times, 24 July 1960,38.

56Walter Judd, “We Must Develop a Strategy for Victory-To Save Freedom-Freedom Everywhere,” 25 July 1960, box 48, Politics, 1960, Walter Judd Papers, Hoover Institution Archives [emphasis in original].

570fFcial Report of the Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Republican National Convention (n.p., 1960), 57-60.

630 THE HISTOW

temper.” The election was not about getting even with other Republicans. “We have lost election after election in this country in the last several years because conservative Republicans get mad and stay home,” he said. “Now, I implore you, forget it. . . . We have had our chance. We have fought our battle. Now, let’s put our shoulders to the wheel of Dick Nixon and push him across the line. . . . If we want to take this party back, and I think we can someday, let’s get to

In his nomination acceptance speech the next evening, Richard Nixon did not men- tion the struggles over modern Republicanism or the platform that had so consumed the party during the preceding months, but he did articulate a favorite theme of party conservatives when he argued that “It is time to speak up for America.” Outlining the forces of communist aggression that would confront the next president, Nixon warned that a “race for survival” would characterize the 1960s. He attacked the Democrats for their political cynicism, insisting that “while it is dangerous to see nothing wrong in America, it is just as wrong to refuse to recognize what is right about America.”59

Nixon’s anti-communist rhetoric did not mollify Republican conservatives, who resented his final choice of the moderate Henry Cabot Lodge for vice-president and determined to oppose the liberal forces within the party that had shaped the 1960 platform. For the moment they heeded Barry Goldwater’s advice, knowing full well that Richard Nixon controlled the party apparatus, and recognizing that the Democratic nominee and platform were a far more important concern in the short run. But as columnist Richard Rovere observed, conservatives seemed to respond more to Goldwater than to his plea. Many delegates remained determined to fasten a more conservative ideology onto the GOP, and even Goldwater himself indirectly attacked the Republican platform, arguing that Republicans could win in 1960 only by proclaiming “their devotion to a limited government which is the servant and not the master of the people.”60 National Review warned that

[Clonservatives now feel, and some will doubtless continue to feel through and beyond election day, that neither Kennedy-Nixon nor Democratic-Republican any longer offers conservatives a meaningful choice. If so, conservatives cannot in con-

581bid., 290-91.

59Richard Nixon, “It Is Time To Speak Up For America:’ [28 July 19601, reprinted in Schlesinger, History ofAmerican Presidential Elections, vol. 4,3550-55.

“Rovere, “Letter,” reprinted in &chard Rovere, The American Establishment and Other Reports, Opinions, and Speculations (New York, 1962), 76-78; Barry M. Goldwater, “A Conservative Sets Out His Credo,” New York Times Magazine (31 July 1960), 16; Goldwater, “How to win in ‘60: No Mollycoddling,” Newsweek 56 ( 1 August 1960): 19; see also memorandum from Charles Edison, 5 August 1960, box 212, folder 6, Clare Boothe Luce Papers, Library of Congress.


science support or vote for either one or the other, but must find other channels for giving expression to conservative principles.61

The struggle for the Republican party did not cease after the convention, although publicly the conservatives supported Richard Nixon’s nomination. Supporters of Judd and Goldwater met in the Pick-Congress Hotel before leaving Chicago to discuss a nationwide conservative movement and formulate plans to seize control of the party by 1964. Youth for Goldwater advocates and other conservative activists in Chicago determined to work together in the future. Within weeks after the Republican Convention, an Interim Committee for a National Conservative Youth Organization had issued a call for a summit meeting of young conservatives for early September in Sharon, Connecticut. Out of that group would emerge the fullest repudiation of modern Republicanism, starting with the organization of Young Americans for Freedom and its articulation of a conservative ideology in “The Sharon Statement.” John F. Kennedy’s defeat of Nixon in November 1960 accelerated efforts to promote ideological conservatism. Four years of relent- less effort by conservatives would shift the GOP well to the right by 1964.62

Barry Goldwater and his conservative supporters captured the party in 1964, but Goldwater’s crushing defeat in the 1964 presidential election, together with the Democrats’ super-majority in both the House and the Senate, was a serious setback not only for conservatives but for the Republican party in general. Despite that defeat, the Goldwater candidacy energized grass-roots conservative organizations that raised millions of dollars for conservative Republicans. Then, in the years that followed, three developments dramatically changed the domestic political land- scape in the United States. First, the emergence of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society greatly enhanced the role and activism of the federal government, making that activism itself a divisive issue between liberals and conservatives. Second, the civil rights movement created a backlash that drove many conservative Southern Democrats into Republican ranks. Finally, the prolonged war in Viet Nam deeply divided the country and the Democratic party. All three developments created a conservative backlash that manifested itself in the candidacy of Ronald Reagan by the mid-1970s, eventually putting Reagan in the White House by 1980. This heralded the apparent defeat of Republican moderates, and after 1980 they found the GOP increasingly hostile as the party moved steadily to the right.

61Narional Review 9 (13 August 1960): 69-70.

62See Marvin Liebman, Coming Out Conservative: An Autobiography (San Francisco, 1992), 15lff; John Andrew, The Other Side of the Sixties: Young Americans for Freedom and the Rise of Conservative Politics (New Brunswick, N.J., forthcoming).

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The Struggle for the Republican Party in 1960

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