Síntesis. Revista de Filosofía. IV(1) (enero-julio 2021); pp. 133-155 Artículo de investigación DOI: 10.15691/0718-5448Vol4Iss1a350 THE SUFFICIENCY OF SPINOZISTIC ATTRIBUTES FOR THEIR FINITE MODES Michael Anthony Istvan Jr. 1 Austin Community College Recibido: 28.10.2018 – Aceptado: 30.10.2019 ABSTRACT Some passages throughout Spinoza’s body of works suggest that an attribute in its absolute nature provides a sufficient condition for all of its modes, including the finite ones. Other passages suggest that an attribute in its absolute nature fails to provide a sufficient condi- tion for its finite modes. My aim is to dispel this apparent tension. I argue that all finite modes are ultimately entailed by the absolute nature of their attribute. Furthermore, I ex- plain how the Spinozistic positions that appear incompatible with this view are in fact com- patible. As I see it, we should read those passages where Spinoza says that no finite mode ultimately follows from the absolute nature of its attribute as saying merely that no finite mode ultimately follows in one-by-one fashion, independent of an infinite series of other modes, from the absolute nature of its attribute. Keywords: Spinoza; Attribute; Mode; Necessitarianism; Explanatory Rationalism. -------------------------------------------- 1 [email protected]
SomepassagesthroughoutSpinoza’sbodyofworkssuggestthatanattributeinitsabsolutenatureprovidesasufficientconditionforallofitsmodes,includingthefiniteones.Otherpassagessuggestthatanattributeinitsabsolutenaturefailstoprovideasufficientcondi-tion for its finitemodes.Myaim is todispel thisapparent tension. Iargue thatall finitemodesareultimatelyentailedbytheabsolutenatureoftheirattribute.Furthermore,Iex-plainhowtheSpinozisticpositionsthatappearincompatiblewiththisviewareinfactcom-patible.AsIseeit,weshouldreadthosepassageswhereSpinozasaysthatnofinitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattributeassayingmerelythatnofinitemodeultimatelyfollowsinone-by-onefashion,independentofaninfiniteseriesofothermodes,fromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.Keywords:Spinoza;Attribute;Mode;Necessitarianism;ExplanatoryRationalism.
Therearestrongreasonstobelievethat,forSpinoza,nofinitemodeisulti-matelyentailedbytheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.Inotherwords,andas several commentatorshaveargued,2 thereare strong reasons to thinkthatanattribute,consideredinitsabsolutenature(thatis,asontologicallypriortoitsmodes:see1p5d),isnotsufficientforitsfinitemodes(see1p21-23,1p28,1p28d,2p30d,4p4d;KV1.2I/34).3Ontheotherhand,andassev-eralcommentatorshavealsoargued,4 therearestrongreasons tobelievethatanattribute,considered in itsabsolutenature,does in factprovideasufficientconditionforallofitsmodes(includingthefiniteones)(see1p17s,1p25s,1p29,1appII/77;KV1.3.2,KV1.4.8;KV1.6.3I/41/23,CM1.3I/243;Ep.12,Ep.21,Ep.43,Ep.81,Ep.83).Myaiminthispaperistodispelthis
3AllSpinozacitationsarefromGebhardt’sLatincriticaleditionSpinozaOperaandusethefollowingformat:abbreviatedworktitlefollowedbyOperavolumenumber,pagenumber,and linenumber.Thetitleabbreviationsarestandard:LettersandReplies(Ep);Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect (TdIE); Short Treatise (KV); MetaphysicalThoughts(CM);Theological-PoliticalTreatise(TTP);PoliticalTreatise(TP);HebrewGram-mar(HG);Descartes’sPrinciplesofPhilosophy(DPP).So,forexample,“DPP1/263/5”isDes-cartes’sPrinciplesofPhilosophy:volume1,page263,line5oftheOpera.Followingstandardpractice,citationsfromtheEthicsusuallyreferonlytotheformalapparatusoftheEthicsitself—thefirstArabicnumeralindicatingthepartofthebookandthefollowingletterab-breviationsindicatingthetypeofpassage:“a”foraxiom;“app”forappendix;“c”forcorollary,“d”fordefinition(whenitcomesrightafterthepartnumeral)ordemonstration(formost,butnotall,oftheotherpositions);“lem”forlemma;“p”forproposition;“pref”forpreface;“s”forscholium;“exp”forexplication.Hence“3p59sd4exp”istheexplicationofthefourthdefinitionofthescholiumtothefifty-ninthpropositionofEthicspartthree.Withexceptiontotheoccasionalmodificationofmyown,translationsarefromCurley.ForLetters29-84IrefertoShirley’stranslation.
4 See Carriero 1991; Deleuze 1988, 93-94; Della Rocca 1996, 95-96; Della Rocca2008, 69-78;Garrett 1999, 103-130;Griffin2008, 71-93;Hampshire1970;Huenemann1999, 224-240; Koistinen 1998, 66; Koistinen 2003, 283-310; Lovejoy 1964, 151-157;Nadler2006,84-121;Newlands2007;Steinberg1981,35-68;Viljanen2008,412-437.
Afterafewquickpointsofclarification(Section2),Imaketwogeneralmoves.First,Iarguethattheevidencefortheviewthatanattributeinitsabsolutenatureprovidesasufficientconditionforallofitsmodesisstrongerthantheevidencefortheviewthatanattributeinitsabsolutenaturedoesnotprovideasufficientconditionforitsfinitemodes(Sections3and4).AsImakeclear,Spinozastatesthatanattributeinitsabsolutenatureprovidesasufficientconditionforallofitsmodesmorefrequentlythanheseemstostate thatanattribute in itsabsolutenaturedoesnotprovideasufficientconditionforitsfinitemodes.Perhapsmoreimportantly,theviewthatanattributeinitsabsolutenaturedoesnotprovideasufficientconditionforitsfinitemodesconflictswithoneofthecorefeaturesofSpinoza’sphilosophi-calvision: thoroughgoingexplanatoryrationalism.Second, Iproposehowwemightexplainawaythosepassagessuggestingthatfinitemodesarenotultimatelyentailedby theabsolutenatureof theirattribute (Section5). IsuggestthatwereadthosepassageswhereSpinozasaysthatnofinitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattributeassayingsome-thingmore specific: that no finitemodeultimately follows in one-by-onefashion(asopposedtoaspartofaninfiniteseriesoffinitemodes)fromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.
2.POINTSOFCLARIFICATION
First,here iswhat ImeanwhenIspeakofonething,A,beingasufficientconditionorreasonorcauseforanotherthing,B.AisthesufficientconditionforBifthebeingortruthofAissufficientfor(orenoughtohave)thebeingortruthofB.Thatistosay,AisthesufficientconditionforBifBisoristruewheneverAisoristrue.Inthiscase,ifAisthesufficientconditionforB,thenifAobtains,happens,hasbeing, is true,orwhatever, thenBmustneces-sarily—isguaranteedto—obtain,happen,havebeing,betrue,orwhatever.6
Now,inadditiontotheterm“ultimately”Ialsohaveaninclinationtoaddtheterm“completely,”asin:yultimatelyandcompletelyfollowsfromx.Unfortunately,addingtheterm“completely”hasproventocausemorecon-fusionthanclarification.Sounliketheterm“ultimately,”Iwillnotuseitfromhereout.Nevertheless,itmightbehelpfultounderstandwhyIhavethisin-clination.Theissueunderdiscussioninthispaperiswhetherfinitemodesultimately(andcompletely)followfromtheabsolutenatureofGod.Iliketothinkoftheterms“ultimately”and“completely”workingtogetherhereasfollows.TheultimatecauseofagivenfinitemodeistheabsolutenatureofGod.Sothroughhowevermanyintermediatesteps—intermediaryinfinitemodes(see1p21-1p23)—theremaybebetweenafinitemodeback(backorpriornottemporallyinthiscase,butontologically)totheabsolutenature,thatabsolutenatureistheultimatecause:thebuckstopsattheabsolutena-ture;thereisnocausefurtherback(“vertically,”thatis,ontologically)thanthatnature.Now,Iaminclinedtoaddintheterm“completely”toindicatethatthisultimatecause(thisultimatecausethatistheabsolutenature)allbyitself, that is,withoutthehelpofanythingelseonthesameontologicallevel (and alsowithout the help of randomness), is enough for the finitemodeinquestion.Ineedtomakethisclearbecauseofhowpeoplesome-timesspeak.Itistypicalforonetosay,forexample,thatstrikingthematchwassufficientforfiretoappear.TheabsolutenatureofGodisnotsufficientfor its finitemodes inthisway(inthis loosesenseofbeingsufficient). Inorderforthefireinquestiontoappearitisnot,technically,enoughsimplythatthematchbestruck.Thereneedstobeoxygenandvariousotherfactorsinplaceaswell.Tosay,however,thatabsolutenatureofGodissufficientforagivenmodeistosaythattheabsolutenaturecompletely,thatis,withoutthehelpofanyotherfactoronthesameultimateontologicallevel,producesthatfinitemode.
Spinozaseemstodenythatafinitemodecanultimatelyfollow—thatis,ei-therdirectlyorindirectly—fromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.Hisrea-sonisthat,sincewhateverultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofanattributemust be infinite and eternal (1p21-1p23), finite and durationalmodeswouldnotbefiniteanddurational(theywouldbeinfiniteandeter-nal)iftheydidultimatelyfollowfrom,thatis,iftheydidhavetheirsufficientsourcein,theabsolutenatureoftheirattribute(1p28and1p28d,1p21-23,2p30d,4p4d;KV1.2I/34).Nofinitemodeisultimatelyentailedbytheab-solutenatureofitsattribute,soSpinozaseemstosuggest.Instead,eachfi-nitemodeisentailedbypreviousfinitemodesadinfinitum.
Everysingularthing,oranythingwhichisfiniteandhasadetermi-nateexistence,canneitherexistnorbedeterminedtoproduceanef-fectunlessitisdeterminedtoexistandproduceaneffectbyanothercause,whichisalsofiniteandhasadeterminateexistence;andagain,thiscausealsocanneitherexistnorbedeterminedtoproduceanef-fectunlessitisdeterminedtoexistandproduceaneffectbyanother,whichisalsofiniteandhasadeterminateexistence,andsoon,toin-finity. . . . [W]hat is finiteandhasdeterminateexistencecouldnothavebeenproducedbytheabsolutenatureofanattributeofGod[orbyanythingthathasbeenproducedbytheabsolutenatureofanat-tributeofGod(see1p21-1p23)].(1p28-1p28d)
In several places Spinoza seems to corroborate the view that finitethingsdonotultimatelyfollowfromtheabsolutenatureoftheirattribute(2p30d,4p4d;KV1.2I/34).8AtKV1.2,forexample,Spinozasuggeststhat,besidestheattributeitself,finitemodesareneededtobringaboutagivenfinitemode.Theattributeinitsabsolutenaturedoes,Spinozamakesclearhere,“cause”eachofitsfinitemodes,butsimplyinthesensethattheattrib-uteinitsabsolutenatureisaconditionrequiredforeachofitsfinitemodesto be. The attribute is thusmerely agrounding ornecessary condition; itmerelymakesafinitemodecapableofexistence.Theattributeinitsabsolutenature isnotasufficientcondition,soSpinozamightbe takentosuggest.HereistheKVpassageinquestion:
[A]lthoughinorderthata[finite]thingmayexistthereisrequiredaspecialmodificationandathingbesidetheattributesofGod,forallthat,Goddoesnotceasetobeabletoproduceathingimmediately.For,ofthenecessarythingswhicharerequiredtobringthingsintoexistence,somearethereinorderthattheyshouldproducethething,andothers inorder that the thingshouldbecapableofbeingpro-duced.(KV1.2I/34)
finitemodeisultimatelyentailedbytheabsolutenatureof itsattribute.10ThisispuzzlinginthelargercontextofPart1oftheEthics.Onseveralocca-sionsSpinozaclaimsthateverything—andsoeveneachfiniteindividual—ultimately follows from the absolute nature of its attribute (see 1p17s,1p25s,1p29,1appII/77;KV1.3.2,KV1.4.8;KV1.6.3I/41/23,CM1.3I/243;Ep.12,Ep.21,Ep.43,Ep.81,Ep.83).
Weseesomethingveryclosetothis intheTTP,whereSpinozasaysthattheeternaldecreeofGodhaspredeterminedallthings.“Theeternalde-cree of God, by which he has predetermined all things.” (TTP 16.20III/199/18) The key is noting not only that the eternal decree predeter-minesallthings,butalsothattheeternaldecreemustultimatelyfollowfromtheabsolutenatureofGod.Theeternaldecreemustultimatelyfollowfromthe absolute nature of God either in that it is one of the infinite-eternalmodes(whethermediateorimmediate)thatultimatelyfollowfromtheab-solutenatureofGodorinthatitistheabsolutenatureofGoditself.
Thatthispassageisasdefinitiveasthepreviousoneisclearsolongasweattend to the fact that its phrase “God’s supreme power” (summaDei po-tentia)isbutastylisticvariantof—butnonethelessequivalentto—“God’sabsolutenature”(absolutaDeinatura).Thattheoneisastylisticvariantoftheothermakessense in itselfand is in factguaranteedby the following
-------------------------------------------- 10Wemust be careful to note the possibility that the two following assessments
equations when taken together (as premises): (a) God’s supreme powerequals(sive)God’s infinitenature(1p17sII/62/15-16);(b)natureequals(sive)power(5p25d);(c)God’sinfinitepowerequals(sive)God’sabsolutenature(1appII/77).11
Thefollowingpassageisdefinitiveaswell,ascomesintoreliefwhenweteaseouttheimplications:“Godmustbecalledthecauseofallthingsinthesamesenseinwhichheiscalledcauseofhimself”.(1p25s)ThisquotesaysthatGodcauseseachthing—evenme—inthesamesenseinwhichGodcauses himself. In otherwords, each thing follows fromGod in the samesenseinwhichGodfollowsfromhimself.InwhatsenseisGodself-caused?Thatis,inwhatsensedoesGodfollowfromhimself?Godfollowsfromhim-selfbyhisabsolutenatureand thusbyabsolutenecessity.12BecauseGod
Now,onemightthinkthatthispassageneednotbereadasstronglyasIamreadingithere.TosaythatGodcausesthingsinthesamesensethathecauseshimselfis,accordingtoaweakerreading,tosaysimplythatGodis,necessarily, thecauseofeverything.Perhaps.But Ihavereservations.Myreservationsarenotonlybecauseof theotherpassages inmypaper thatsupportthereadingthateachthingfollowsfromGod’sabsolutenature.MyreservationsarebasedonwhatIseeinthe1p25passagesandthepassagestowhichSpinozarefersreaders inthosepassages. Inthecontextof1p25SpinozaisnotsayingmerelythatGodisnecessarilythecauseofeverything.Heissaying(i)thatGodisnecessarilythecauseofeverything(including—asshouldgowithoutsaying,eventhoughitisimportanttosay—everythingabouteverything)and,inparticularthat(ii)thatthenecessityofthedivinenature isnecessarily the causeof everything (including everything abouteverything).BeforeIexplainwhythesetwoclarificationsmotivatemyres-ervations, letme layout the textualreasonswhyIseementitled tomaketheseclarifications.1p25makesclearthatGodisthecausenotonlyoftheexistencebuttheveryessenceofeverything.Sinceathingisexhaustedbyitsexistenceplusitsessence(thereisnothirdaddition),tosaythatGodisnecessarilythecauseofboththeexistenceandtheessenceofeverythingisthereforetosaythatGodisnecessarilythecauseofeverything(includingeverythingabouteverything)(pointi).Now,at1p25sSpinozasaysthathisproofforGodismoreclearlydemonstratedsimplyby1p16.At1p16Spinozasays that the necessity of the divine nature necessarily entails infinitelymanymodes(entailswhatevercanfallunderaninfiniteintellect)(1p16es-peciallyinlightof1p16d).Sinceeverything(includingeverythingabouteve-rything)canfallunderaninfiniteintellect,thenecessityofthedivinenatureis necessarily the cause of everything (including everything about every-thing(pointii).Now,whymightallthisberelevanttosupportingmyreser-vation?Well,ifwetakethedivinenaturediscussedhere,thatis,thedivinenatureinitsnecessity,astheabsolutenatureofGod(whichseemsatleastreasonable),thenthismeansthat1p25isindeedclaiming,atleastimplicitlywhenwelooktothepassagescited,thattheabsolutenatureofGodisnec-essarilythecauseofeverything(includingeverythingabouteverything).ItshouldbeclearwhyIambeingfastidiousherewithsuchtalkof“everythingabouteverything.”SuchtalkmakesclearthatthereisnothinginexcesstoanythingthatfailstobenecessarilycausedbytheabsolutenatureofGod.Wearrive,therefore,backtomyoriginalreadingof1p25s.Insteadofmerelymaking therather tameclaim(tamerelative towhatSpinozahasalready
saidatthispointintheEthics)thatGodisnecessarilythecauseofeachthing,at1p25sSpinozaissayingthattheabsolutenatureofGodisnecessarilythecauseofeachthingand,indeed,ofeveryaspectofeachthing.The“every-aspect”qualifier, it shouldbeclear,undercuts themainviablealternativeview: that theabsolutenatureofGod ismerelyagroundingornecessaryconditionforfinitemodes.PerhapsiftheabsolutenatureofGodwerethecauseofeachthingbutonlyinsomerespect(saytheiressencebutnotexist-ence),thenthatreadingwouldhavemoretraction.Spinozaisinsteadsug-gestinginthese1p25passages,however,thatnoaspectofanythingfailstobecausedbytheabsolutenatureofGod.
Thatthisremarkisequallydefinitiveisclearsolongasweattendtothefactthatitsphrase“thepowerofasupremelyperfectBeinganditsimmutabledecree”isastylisticvariantofeitherthephrase“God’sabsolutenature”orthephrase“God’sabsolutenatureandhisinfinite-eternalmodes.”Thattheoneisastylisticvariantofeitherthefirstorthesecondisguaranteedbythefollowingfacts,takentogether.(1)Thereis,bydefinition,nopowergreaterthanthepowerofwhatissupremelyperfect,andGod’sabsolutenatureistheonlythingthatissupremelyperfect.Note,inlinewiththis,thatthepowerofa supremely perfect Being is just another way of saying God’s supremepower.Thatissignificantbecause,asIexplainedintheabovediscussionof1p17s2,“God’ssupremepower”isastylisticvariantof“God’sabsolutena-ture.”(2)Whatisimmutablecanbe,inSpinoza’smetaphysics,onlytheab-solute nature of God or the infinite-eternalmodes that ultimately followfromthatnature(recalltheabovediscussionoftheeternaldecreeofGodatTTP16).—Now,ifthephrase“thepowerofasupremelyperfectBeingand
itsimmutabledecree”isastylisticvariantsimplyofthephrase“God’sabso-lutenature,”thentheabovepassageindicatesthateveryfinitemodeulti-matelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.For,inthiscase,thepassagewouldsaythatallthingscometopassbyGod’sabsolutenature.If,ontheotherhand,thephrase“thepowerofasupremelyperfectBeinganditsimmutabledecree”isastylisticvariantofthephrase“God’sabsolutena-tureandhisinfinite-eternalmodes,”thentheresultturnsouttobethesame.For,inthiscase,thepassagewouldsaythatallthingscometopassbyGod’sabsolutenatureandhisinfinite-eternalmodes.Sinceinfinite-eternalmodesallultimatelyfollowfromGod’sabsolutenature,tosaythatallthingscometo pass byGod’s absolute nature and his infinite-eternalmodes is to saysimplythatallthingscometopassbyGod’sabsolutenature—thefirsten-tailsthesecond.
Withregardtoyourquestionastowhetherthevarietyofthingscanbedemonstratedapriorisolely fromtheconceptionof [Cartesian]Extension[asaninertmass(seeLetter81)], I thinkIhavealreadymadeitquiteclearthatthisisimpossible.ThatiswhyDescartesiswrongindefiningmatterthroughExtension;itmustnecessarilybeexplicatedthroughanattributewhichexpresseseternalandinfiniteessence....Astowhatyouadd,thatfromthedefinitionofanything,
ConsiderLetter12aswell.HereSpinozadescribestwoversionsofthecosmologicalargument:theversionfoundintheancients(andwhichSpi-nozaaccepts),andtheversionthat“recentperipatetics”falselyattributetotheancients(andwhichSpinozarejects).Astherecentperipateticsseethecosmologicalargument,theremustbeafirstcause—God—sinceanactualendlesssequenceofcauses into thepast isabsurd.As theancientssee it,however,whatisabsurdisnottherealityofanactualendlesssequenceofcauses,butratherthatthemembersofthissequencefailtobedeterminedbythatwhichexistsbyitsownnature:God.Hereisthepassage:
“[T]hemorerecentPeripateticshave...misunderstoodthedemon-stration bywhich the Ancients tried to prove God’s existence. . . .[T]heforceofthisargumentdoesnotlieintheimpossibilityoftherebeinganactualinfiniteoraninfiniteregressofcauses,butonlyinthesuppositionthatthingswhichdonotexistnecessarilybytheirownnature[,whichnoneofthemembersofthatinfinitecausalsequencedo,]arenotdetermined[determinari]toexistbyathingwhichdoesnecessarilyexistbyitsownnature.”(myemphasisEp.12)
WhatismostimportanttonoticehereisthatSpinozaspeaksofthatwhichexistsbyitsownnature,whichcanbenothingelsethanGodinhisabsolutenature,asdeterminingeachmemberoftheinfinitesequence.Godinhisab-solutenatureis, therefore,notameregroundingcause,amerenecessarycondition, for eachmember of the sequence. After all, amere groundingcause,amerenecessarycondition, forxdoesnotdeterminex.God inhisabsolutenatureis,rather,thecompletecause,thesufficientcondition,foreachmember.14
haps.Afterall,“determinare”(theactiveinfiniteform)canmeantosetboundariesupon,ortoresolve.Nevertheless,Shirleyprovidesagoodexplanationwhytheterm“determinare,”inSpinoza’sthought,“isneverusedinthesenseoftodecide,resolve,andsoforth.Itisal-waysused in the sense thatgives rise to thephilosophical term ‘determinism’” (Shirley1992,25-26).
Butwhyexactlyisitthecasethatifnofinitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute,thenthatrequiresthepresenceofchanceinSpinoza’ssystem?Itmightnotseemsoobviousatfirstwhythepresenceofchance,andthustheviolationofSpinoza’sthoroughgoingex-planatory rationalism,would indeed result. After all, the sumof all finitemodesofanattributeatagiventimetnwillbeentailedbythesumofallfinitemodesattn-1.16Anythingthathappensintheinfinitechainofthesesumsoffinitemodesateachmoment(sumsthat,forthesakeofbrevity,Iwillcall“worldstates”)isguaranteedbythepasttoplayoutexactlyasitdoes.Sinceanyoneoftheworldstatesentailsallthefollowingworldstates,thereisineffectcompletedeterminism.17Inlightofthecompletedeterminismofthehorizontal-temporalorder,theremightseemtobenoviolationofexplana-toryrationalismevenonthereadingof1p28and1p28dinquestion:thead-mittedlynaturalreadingthatnofinitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheab-solutenatureofitsattribute.
Buthereiswhythepresenceofchance,andthustheviolationofSpi-noza’s thoroughgoing explanatory rationalism, would result if no finitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureof itsattribute.Assumethatnofinitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattrib-ute.Considernowtheentirechainofworldstatesitself,theentiresequencethatextendsintoboththeinfinitepastandtheinfinitefutureandwheretheposteriorstatesareutterlydeterminedbytheprior.Whatisthefullexpla-nationfortheinfinitechainofworldstatesasawhole,achainthatIwillcall“alpha”?Whatcompletelyexplainswhyalphaasawholeobtainsratherthansomeother infinite chain?18 Theexplanation cannotbe that alpha is self-caused.Asachainofmodes,alphaisdependentontheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.The explanationalso cannotbe that finitemodesbeyondalphamakeitnecessarythatalpha(ratherthansomeotherchain)obtains.Asthetotalchainoffinitemodesofagivenattribute,therearenofinitemodesbe-yond alpha that could play such a role. (Any finitemodes beyond alphawouldbelong to adifferent attributeand there canbeno interactionbe-tweenattributes:1p10s,2p5,2p5d.19)Theonlyotheroptionthatremainsastowhatprovidesthefullexplanationforalpha(andthusforwhyalpharatherthansomeotherinfiniteseriesobtains)isthatalphaultimatelyfol-lowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.20Now,ifalphaultimatelyfol-lowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute,theneachofthefinitemodesthatmakeitupmustultimatelyfollowfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattrib-ute.For ifx-y-zasapackageultimately follows fromtheabsolutenature,thenitistrivialthatanygivenmemberofthatpackage(say,y)ultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenature.Weareassuming,however,thatnofinitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.Accordingtoourassumption,then,itcannotbethecasethatalphaultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.Therefore,wearecompelledtosay
LeibnizexplainsinhisFifthLettertoClarke,itmayverywellbetruethattheoccurrenceoffiniteindividualxisentailedbythepreviousworldstateG,suchthatwehavethehypothet-icalproposition“ifG, thenx.”But,asLeibnizasks,whatabout theentirechainofworldstates?“Wemust,”Leibnizsays,“distinguishbetweenanabsoluteandahypotheticalneces-sity.”AsLeibnizputsitinOntheUltimateOriginofThings,inordertoexplaintheultimateorigin of “the chain of states or series of things, the aggregate ofwhich constitutes theworld,”wemustmovefrom“hypotheticalnecessity,whichdeterminedtheposteriorstatesoftheworldbytheprior,tosomethingwhichisabsoluteormetaphysicalnecessity.”Thatwhichhasabsoluteormetaphysicalnecessityis,LeibnizsaysintheMonadology,“outsidethesequenceorseriesofthisdetailofcontingents,howeverinfiniteitmaybe”(37-39).
19SeeGarrett1999,121;DellaRocca2008,54-58,97-103.20Theonlyotheroption, inotherwords, is thateitheralpha immediately follows
Theissueastowhetheralphahasafullexplanation,whichcanmeanonlythatitisfullyexplainedbytheabsolutenatureoftheattributeinquestion,isofcentralconcernintheinterpretivedebateastowhetherSpinozaisastrictormoderatenecessitarianor,inotherwords,whetherheisanecessitarianorsimplyadeterminist.Onthestrictnecessitar-ian (or simply necessitarian) reading,which has as its key evidence Spinoza’s repeatedclaim that everything flows entirely from the absolute nature ofGod, everything—eveneachfinitemode—isasnecessaryasGodinhisabsolutenature:namely,absolutelyneces-sary.Onthemoderatenecessitarian(orsimplydeterminist)reading,whichhasasitskeyevidence1p28and1p28d,noteverythingisabsolutelynecessary.Onlytheattributesthem-selves,andtheinfinite-eternalmodesthatSpinozadescribesin1p21,1p22,and1p23asultimatelyemanatingentirelyfromtheabsolutenatureoftheirattributes,areabsolutelynecessary.However,onthisview,finitemodesdonothaveabsolutenecessity,butsomelessernecessity(intheliteraturecalled“hypotheticalnecessity”).Now,allsidesinthede-bateagreethatthereisaninfiniteregressofcausesattheleveloffinitemodes(nocausaldead-endordead-start);eachfinitemodeisatleastpartiallyafunctionofpreviousfinitemodesadinfinitum.Asthemoderatenecessitarianordeterministreadinguniquelyholds,however,eachfinitemodeisneverfullyafunctionoftheabsolutenatureoftheirattribute.Sincethereisnobuck-stoppingarchetemporally(as,again,everyoneinthedebateagrees)butalsonosufficientbuckstoppingarcheontologically (asmoderatenecessitarian inter-pretersmusthold,lesttheybeforcedtoconcedethateverythingisabsolutelynecessary),nofinitemodeisultimatelyfullyexplainedbywhatfullyexplainsitselfandthusnofinitemodecanhavetheabsolutenecessityofthatwhichfullyexplainsitself.(Finitemodes,in-stead,enjoymerely thenecessityof theendlesslydeferredbuckstoppingarche.)Onthisview,then,alphadoesnothaveafullexplanation.
HereisalistofthosewhoseemtoholdthatSpinozaiscontradictoryonthematter,thatis,thatheendorsesstrictnecessitarianismanditsdenialandso,ineffect,thathethinksalpha isentailedby theabsolutenatureof theattribute inquestionandthat it isnotsoentailed.Bennett1984,111-124;Jarrett1978,55-56;Matson1977,76-83.
Delahunty (1985, 155-165) is the only prominent commentator, of which I amaware,thatexplicitlyendorsesthemainremainingoption:thatadefinitivedecisioncannotbemadeeitherway.
thediscussion,theviolationofSpinoza’sexplanatoryrationalismwouldre-sultfromtheassumptionthatnofinitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheab-solute nature of its attribute. For if alpha (the entire sequence of finitemodes)hasafullcause,thentheabsolutenatureofalpha’sattributepro-videsthatcause.Butiftheabsolutenatureofalpha’sattributeprovidesthatcause,thenitisnotthecasethatnofinitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.
5.RESOLVINGTHETENSION
The evidence in favor of the interpretation that, for Spinoza, every finitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattributeisstrongerthantheevidenceinfavoroftheinterpretationthat, forSpinoza,nofinitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.Whates-pecially tips the scale, inmyview, is that the interpretation according towhichnofinitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsat-tributeresultsinaviolationoftheexplanatoryrationalism,andtherejectionofchance, that isso foundational toSpinoza’svision.As Isee it, then, theevidencefortheinterpretationthattheabsolutenatureofanattributeisin-sufficientforitsfinitemodesmustbeexplainedawayifthereistobeanyresolutionofthetension.22
Now,itmightbesaidthatIcannotputmuchweightonthefactthatalphawouldlackasufficientexplanationifnofinitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.Onwhatgrounds?Well,accordingtosomecommentators,23Spinozafailstoconsiderthefullexplanationforalphaasawhole.ThatSpinoza“overlook[s]thehardquestionabouttheen-tire series” is evident, Bennett says, by the fact that Spinoza writes “asthoughourabilitytoanswerthewhyquestionaboutanyparticular[finitemodeintheseries]isenough[toexplaintheentireseriesandthus]tomeetthedemandsofexplanatoryrationalism.”24
doesultimatelyfollowfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.25Iwilldis-cussthepassageinquestionbeforeImoveontomysuggestionforresolu-tion of the apparent tension. That passage itself, in fact, provides an im-portantclueastohowthetensionistoberesolved.
Thepassage that Ihave inmind isLetter64.HereSpinozasuppliesTschirnhausandSchullerwithsomeexamplesofthosemodesthat,asde-scribed in1p21-1p23,ultimately follow fromtheabsolutenatureof theirattribute.Whenhecomestothosemodesthatfollowultimatelybutnotim-mediatelyfromtheabsolutenatureoftheirattributes(thosemodesknownin the literatureasmediate infinite-eternalmodes),Spinozasuggests thattheoneunderExtension(thatis,themediateinfinite-eternalmodefollow-ingultimatelyfromtheabsolutenatureofExtension)is“thefaceoftheen-tireuniverse”.Forfurtherassistanceastowhathemeans,hedirectshiscor-respondenttothescholiumofthe7thlemmaof2p13s.Inthislemma,Spinozaexplainsthateachbodyisacompositeofsmallerbodiesandthateachbodycanpreserveitsidentityandindividualitythroughvariousinternalchangesifandonlyifitscomponentbodiesmaintaintheproperpatternofmotionandrestamongthemselves.Spinozathensaysthatwecankeepproceedingupwards, through largerand largercomposite individuals,untilwereachthe material universe itself as a composite super-individual(2p13slemma7s,II/101-102).Sothesuggestionisthatthesuper-individual,whichispresumablymadeupofall finitemodesofExtensionastheyarerelatedacrosstime,iswhatSpinozameansbythefaceoftheuniverseandthusthemediateinfinite-eternalmodeunderExtension.Themediateinfi-nite-eternalmodeunderExtensionthuswouldamounttoalphaunderEx-tension.Sinceallinfinite-eternalmodes,whetherimmediate(1p21)orme-diate(1p22),ultimatelyfollowfromtheabsolutenatureofthegivenattrib-ute,Spinozaispresumablysayingthatalphaultimatelyfollowsfromtheab-solutenatureofthegivenattribute.26Herearethekeypassagesinquestion.
[T]heexamplesyouaskforofthefirstkindare:inthecaseofthought,absolutelyinfiniteintellect;inthecaseofextension,motionandrest.An example of the second kind is the face of the whole universe,which, although varying in infinite ways, yet remains always thesame.SeeScholiumtoLemma7precedingProp.14,11.(SpinozaEp.64)
So farwehaveconceivedan individualwhich is composedof [thesimplestbodies,thatis,]bodieswhicharedistinguishedfromonean-other only bymotion and rest, speed and slowness. . . . But ifweshouldnowconceiveofanother,composedofanumberofIndividu-alsofadifferentnature,weshallfindthatitcanbeaffectedinagreatmanyotherways,andstillpreserveitsnature. . . .ButifweshouldfurtherconceiveofathirdkindofIndividual,composed[NS:ofmanyindividuals]ofthissecondkind,weshallfindthatitcanbeaffectedinmanyotherways,withoutanychangeofitsform.Andifwepro-ceedinthiswaytoinfinity,weshalleasilyconceivethatthewholeofnatureisoneIndividualwhoseparts,i.e.,allbodies,varyininfiniteways,withoutanychangeofthewholeIndividual.(2p13lemma7s)
Somemaysaythatthefaceoftheuniverseisnotallbodies,butsimplylawsofnatureorperhapsthepatternofmotionandrestofthesuperindi-vidualinquestion(seeYovel1991).Spinozaistalkingaboutallbodies,how-ever.He is talkingaboutan individual, a super-individual,whose compo-nentsincludeallbodies.OnemaysaythatSpinozaistalkingaboutallbodiesatagiventime.Spinozaneversaysthat,though.Also,Spinozatendstospeakfromtheperspectiveoftheeternal.Whenhesaysallbodies,then,thedefault--------------------------------------------
First,thephrase“thefaceofthewholeuniverse”neednotreferto[thesumofallfinitemodesofagivenattribute]but[merely]tothosefeaturesofthat[supercom-posite]individualwhichenableittoretainitsidentitythroughchange....Second,ifwedointerpret“thefaceofthewholeuniverse”asreferringtothat[supersumoffinitemodes],thenwemaketroubleforourselveselsewhere.Themediateinfi-nitemodeoftheattributeofextensionissupposedtofollowfromtheabsolutena-tureoftheattributeofextension....Ifthemediateinfinitemodeofextensionfol-lows in thatway fromtheattributeofExtension,and ifwe identify themediateinfinitemodeofextensionwiththetotalityoffinitethings,thenthetotalityoffinitethingsfollowsfromtheattributeofextension.Idonotseehowthetotalityoffinitethingscan followfromtheattributeofextensionwithout itsbeingthecasethatindividualfinitethingsalsofollowfromtheattributeofextension....Unless[one]ispreparedtoattributeagrandinconsistencytoSpinoza,[one]oughtnottoiden-tifythemediateinfinitemodewiththetotalityoffinitethings.(Curley1993,131-132)
istoregardhimassayingallbodiesever:“allbodies”is,literally,allbodies—andsoacrossalltime.Thenotionoftemporalityisindeedexplicitintheverypassageathand.Spinozadescribesthesuper-individualasbeingthesameevenasitsparts,thatis,allbodies,varyininfinitewaysacrossinfinitetime.ThustheverycontextofthepassageindicatesthatSpinozaistalkingaboutallbodiesacrossall time.Moreover, if the facewassimplyallbodiesatagiventime,thatwouldmeanthatthereareinfinitefacesoveralltime—onefaceforeachsliceoftime.ButnotonlydoesSpinozamerelytalkaboutthefaceoftheuniversesingular, theabsolutenatureofGodproduceswhatitproducesfrometernity,thatis,inaneternalinstantratherthanateachtime-slicethroughoutsempiternity.Lastly,evenifthereweretheseinfinitefaces,alphawouldbethesumofthesefaces.AndsinceeachofthesefaceswouldfollowfromtheabsolutenatureofExtension,sotoothenwouldalpha.ThisisallthatIneedhere.
SoIsayonceagain,theevidencefortheinterpretationthatnofinitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattributeshouldbeexplainedawayifthetensioninquestionistobedissolved.Forstrongerev-idence is tobefoundin favorof the interpretationthateveryfinitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.1p28and1p28d,inlightof1p21-1p23,isthemainevidencefortheinterpretationthatnofi-nitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.ThatiswhereIwillfocusmyattention,then.
Whenwelookat1p28and1p28dinisolationfromtherestofSpinoza’swritings,thenaturalreading,andtheonethatLeibniztakes,isthatSpinozadeniesthattheabsolutenatureofanattributeistheultimatesufficientcauseforeachfinitemode.However,inlightofalltheevidencetotheeffectthateverythingultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenature(suchthattheabso-lute nature is notmerely necessary but also sufficient for everything), itseemsthat1p28mustbereadinamorerestrictedsense.Takingacueespe-ciallyfromSpinoza’sendorsementofthefactthatthewholepackageoffinitemodes(alpha)ultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenature(aswejustsawwhenlookingatEp.64andlemma7s),andtakingacueingeneralfromthefactthatSpinozaoftenstresseshowfinitemodesareinextricablyimbedded,“interconnected”(TTP3.3),within“thecommonorderofnatureasawhole”(alpha) (2p29s, 2p30d, 4p4d, 4p4c, 4p57s; Ep. 12 IV/54/10-15;TdIE40,TdIE55,TdIE65,TdIE75;CM1.3I/241/30ff,CM2.9I/266),Ifinditmostreasonabletoread1p28and1p28dasdenying,notthattheabsolutenatureultimatelyproduceseachfinitemode,butmerelythattheabsolutenatureultimatelyproduceseachfinitemodeonebyone,inpiece-by-piecefashion.Spinozamustmeansimplythattheabsolutenatureofanattributedoesnot
producefinitemodesindividually,inisolationfromeveryothermemberofthepackage—piecemeal.Hemustmeanthat,sincetheabsolutenaturepro-ducestheentirepackageoffinitemodes,anygivenfinitemodenecessarilycomestogetherwithall theothers, inwhichcase it ismisguided, insomesense,tosingleoneoutasifthatoneallonitsownfollowedfromtheabso-lutenature.SincetheabsolutenatureofGodproducesanygivenfinitemodein the sense that it produces thewholepackageof finitemodes, 1p28d’sclaimthat“whatisfinite...couldnothavebeenproducedbytheabsolutenatureofanattributeofGod”isnottobeseenatrejectingtheclaimthattheabsolutenatureofGodproducesanygivenfinitemodeinthesensethatitpro-ducesthewholepackageoffinitemodes.1p28disrejectingsomethingelse.1p28disrejectingthesortofscenariowherewhatisfiniteisproducedbytheabsolutenatureofGodandyetdoesnotnecessarilycometogetherwitheveryotherfinitemodeacrossalltime.
The essence ofman does not involve necessary existence, that is,fromtheorderofNatureitcanhappenequallythatthisorthatmandoesexist,orthathedoesnotexist.
By“agivenman”hereSpinozameansagivenman,suchasme,asheisallbyhimself, isolatedfromeverythingelse. In isolationfromeverythingelse,agivenmandoesnotultimatelyfollowfromtheabsolutenatureofGodand
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