To Washington 1916 - Ross GREGORY*

N 1916 Walter Hines Page returned to the United States for his first visit since becoming, over three years I earlier, American Ambassador to Great Britain. This

first personal confrontation of Page and his superiors in the administration of Woodrow Wilson-a depressing experience for the Ambassador-has meaning for the student who wishes to delve into the period of American neutrality. From it one readily can see the price Page paid for excessive devotion to a cause. Something of the President’s mind was revealed in his treatment of Page, when in action and words he displayed the most severe dissatisfaction with Britain and British policy during the period before the United States entered the war. But there was another side to Wilson’s mind, a side he was careful not to let Page see. In permitting Page to return to England, apparently with no new instruction, in failing to do what he gave the Ambassador reason to believe he might do, the President showed his unwillingness to translate dissatisfaction with Britain into policy - a characteristic of Wilson’s temperament which did much to determine the fate of the United States in the First World War.

It was a warm evening in August when Page stepped off the ship in New York. The city looked much the same as the last time he was there, but indeed much had changed

of Technology, Montgomery. The author is Assistant Professor of History at West Virginia Institute

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The Historian in the world in the three years of his embassy. The peace of the time of his departure in spring 1913 had vanished. In its place was a World War, which by summer 1916 was beginning a third year. The major battlefields were in Europe, and the Continent was bringing to an end an old era in a painful, expensive manner. The western front reached along an irregular line from Belgium to the Alps with British and French on one side, Germans on the other. If one belligerent or the other gained momentary advantage, nothing changed much territorially, for the war in the West had become a bloody, gloomy stalemate with no sign of an early end.

While it must have seemed luxurious to live in the United States during those days, even Americans were unable to feel the complete security they hoped neutrality would supply. Those individuals who followed events knew that neutrality had been precarious, that since war had begun the United States had moved from embroilment with one belligerent to controversy with another. Page, in fact, expected that he would spend most of the time in the United States discussing with the President and high administration officials the many problems his nation was experiencing. Although the most serious difficulties had involved the Germans and submarine warfare, by summer 1916 American-German relations had improved. In its so-called Sussex pledge earlier that year, Germany had promised to avoid torpedoing ships on which Americans legally could travel, and seemed to honor that pledge. Then the administration had turned attention to problems with the Allies, among whom Great Britain was the most persistent violator of American neutral rights.

The factor which had started Anglo-American relations on a dismal course in 1916 was British unwillingness to take part in Wilson’s program of mediation. Early in the year the President had sent to Europe his close friend and adviser,

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The Superfluous Ambassador Colonel Edward M. House, and in the belligerent capitals House had tested the acceptability of a new American policy. The result of the visit was the famous House-Grey memorandum of February 1916, a rather tricky proposal which called for Wilson’s mediation if Germany accepted the President‘s peace terms (assuming the British had done so), and American intervention on the side of the Allies if the Germans did not. House had left London believing that the British Government would select the time for Wilson to make his move. But despite repeated urging, it never did so. The President’s grand humanitarian progTam failed. Britain, it seemed, did not want peace.’

Denial of the mediation effort accentuated other diffi- culties - some recent: some long-standing - between the two Anglo-Saxon nations. Britain controlled the sea and attempted to use that advantage to prevent goods from reaching Germany. The Foreign Office used a variety of measures - broadening the contraband list, then a blockade which included not merely the Central Powers, but neutral nations bordering or easily accessible to enemy nations. The result was that a large measure of American commerce with Germany, Austria-Hungary, and such neutral nations as the Netherlands or Denmark was stopped, delayed or confiscated, frequently in violation of international law. There were other irritations, such as Britain’s censoring of American mail on its way to the continent, and in summer 1916 the famous “black-list” of American firms with which Britons were forbidden to deal and American firms were reluctant to deal for fear the British might place them on the list. The British Ambassador to the United States confessed that “the mere statement of what is being done

‘The House-Grey memorandum is reprinted in Charles Seymour, ed., The Intimate Papers of Colonel Harue (4 vols.; Boston, 1926-1928), 11, 201-202. Hereafter cited as Seymour, Colonel House. For subsequent correspondence between House and the British Foreign Secretary, see ibid., 215292.

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The Historian in the way of restriction would astonish the world.”2 Combined with German concession, these irritations had strained American-British relations the greatest since the war began.

As much as any American and more than most, Ambassador Page regretted that Anglo-American relations were so bad. An intense Anglophile, he was convinced that the future of the world depended upon Anglo-American friendship. He also was convinced that the British must not lose the war, and this conviction influenced his treatment of problems between Britain and the United States. If relations between the two nations had been uneasy - they certainly were when Page came home in 1916 - he placed blame largely on the United States’ propensity to apply a technical interpretation of international law. He could not understand why his government felt compelled to pester the Foreign Office about countless cases of ships and cargoes, or harass Britain with notes of protest while the British

’ fought for their lives, indeed the life of civilization, against an inhuman, undemocratic enemy. What Page proposed was that the United States state its legal position - since the dispute involved property and not lives - and wait for a settlement. Such approach would retain for Americans the claims which international law afforded and still keep in mind the large view of the war. For months he had described the problem in dispatches to the State Department and letters to President Wilson, to Colonel House, and others.5 And yet this correspondence had seemed to do

* Sir Cecil Spring Rice to Sir Edward Grey, July 31, 1916, Stephen Gwynn, ed., The L e t t m and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice (2 vols.; London,

‘It would be virtually impossible LO list all the correspondence in which Page reiterated his theme. Good examples are Page to the Secretary of State, Jan. 22, 1916, Feb. 15, 1916, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing P a p m (2 vols.; Washington. 1939-1940). I. 506-307, 705-706. Hereafter cited as The Laming Pupers. Many of Page’s letters to House and Wilson are published in Burton J. Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Walter Hines Page (3 vols.; Garden City, 1924-1926). Here- after cited as Hendrick. Page.

1929), 11, 341.

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The Superfluous Ambassador little. The State Department often did not acknowledge his telegrams; Wilson almost never answered the letters. It seemed to Page that no one cared about his opinion, when in July 1916 there came a message from the Secretary of State suggesting that Page take leave and come home, presumably - or so Page thought - to decide what to do about the British.4 At last he had the opportunity to do orally what he had been unable to accomplish through telegrams and letters.

Had Page known the reason behind Lansing’s cable he would not have been so anxious to return to the United States. The administration sent for him not to hear an opinion, but because they were tired of hearing it. For a year, officials in the State Department - Secretary Lansing, Counsellor Frank Polk - had been anxious to get the Am- bassador back to Washington. Page’s relations with the Department never had been good. Lansing he once described as a “library lawyer,” more interested in winning a technical point than seeing the true issue of the war. He perpetually complained to Wilson and House about receiving inadequate information or having confidential messages leaked to the press.6 Nor did Lansing respect Page. He probably knew of the Ambassador’s criticism, although Page avoided personalities in official dispatches. Personally inclined to- ward the Allies, Lansing nonetheless tired of Page’s persis- tently biased messages. He believed that the Ambassador was not a reliable spokesman in London and handled many

*In the State Department’s closed personnel files, Lansing’s telegram to Page was not available in the National Archives. Page referred to the message in a letter to Wilson, July 21, 1916, Hendridr, Page, 111, 508.

.Again, Page’s complaints are so numerous that one only need mention examples. One is a letter to House, Oct. 25, 1914, The Diary and Papers of Walter Hines Page, Houghton Library, Harvard University. Hereafter cited as Page Papers. Another is House’s diary notation about the problem, March 1. 1915, The Diary and Papers of Edward M. House, Yale University Library. Hereafter cited as House Papers.

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The Historian cases through the Consul General in London.6 When Polk became Counsellor in 1915 he found the story about Page incredible and joined his chief in urging some sort of change.’ But the President would say little one way or another about his ambassador in London.

Page also managed to acquire the ill-will of Colonel House, and perhaps this was the factor which persuaded an indecisive Wilson to call the Ambassador to the United States. A friend of Page, House also had the ear of Wilson, and through letters and trips to London acted as a go- between for the President and Ambassador. The Colonel knew of Page’s strong bias for the English, but feeling much the same way, had only kind words about Page for the President during the first months of neutrality. This attitude began to change.in the middle part of 1915, when House, sensing that Wilson felt uncomfortable about his ambassador, began to advise that Page come home for a breath of American opinion. In 19 16 House’s suspicion deepened. While on his “peace mission” to London and Europe, he received no cooperation from Page and the Ambassador wore him out with criticism of the administration.0 Page found it difficult to conceal resentment at House’s ability to go over his head and deal directly with British officials, sometimes about matters he did not know. The Ambassador also disliked House’s talk about a negotiated peace, for he did not want the war to end until Britain had won. Indicative of Page’s dissatisfaction was a diary notation he penned as the Colonel departed in February for the United States: “Last night House left London for Falmouth to

‘For Lansing‘s opinion of Page, see his War Memoirs of Robert Lansing (Indianapolis, 1936). supplemented with the “The Difficulties of Neutrality,” The Satudry Evening Post, CCIII (April 18, 1931), 6-7, 102-106. See also the Secretary of State to the President, Jan. 27, 1916, The Lansing Papers, I, 338.

‘So House noted in his diary, Oct. 31, 1915. See also Polk to House, June 19, 1916, The Papers of Frank Polk, Yale University Library.

OHouse to Wilson, Aug. 4. 1915, Seymour, Colonel House, XI, 62. O s e e House diary, Jan. 7, 12, 18, 19, Feb. 9, 10, 14, 1916.

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The Superfluous Ambassador sail for N. Y. on Friday. He cannot come again - or I go.”lO Back in the United States House began to hear of Page’s resentment and became angry. l1 Thereafter the Colonel frequently mentioned the Ambassador’s uncooperativeness to Wilson. In one letter he referred to Page as “a cog that refuses to work smoothly in the machinery you have set in motion to bring about peace and reconstruction of inter- national law,” and advised that Page return to the United States for a rest or permanently.13

Wilson agreed that Page needed some time in the United States, but for how long was undecided. At one point he thought about removing Page from London and appointing him Secretary of Agriculture. l3 Although the President eventually recalled Page in 1916, his treatment of the Ambassador while in the country further demonstrated an inability to decide what to do with the troublesome envoy.

The visit, for which the Ambassador had so much hope, turned out to be a dreadful experience and in retrospect a cruel performance by the President and administration. Anxious though most officials seemed to get Page home, when he arrived no one wished to talk to him. The attitude seemed to be that Page should have a pleasant time-go wherever he wished, do what he wanted - as long as he did not talk diplomacy. I t was a peculiar situation, in which the Ambassador to a belligerent country, a country with which the United States was having serious difficulties, found no audience among his superiors.

Shortly after arrival on August 11, Page came to Washington where he hoped to meet with the President

‘OFeb. 24, 1916. Hugh Wallace, an acqoaintance of House and Page, brought back

from I.ondon news of Page’s attitude. “One would think,” House noted in his diary, “if he could not accept the situation, he would quietly get out upon some pretext or other than the real one.” May 4, 1916.

=May 10. 1916, House Papers: see also House to Wilson. May 18, 1916, ibid.

”Wilson to House, July 2, 1916, ibid.

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The Historian and iron out American-British relations. Inviting Page to lunch, Wilson seemed cordial at first. But the President did not want to talk shop. As the Ambassador’s memorandum noted, there was “not a word about England, not a word about a foreign policy or foreign relations.” Page wanted a conference. Wilson procrastinated, told him to rest and come back. Two weeks later, another lunch with Wilson -still nothing about foreign relations.14 With no luck from the President, Page searched for House, perhaps to reach Wilson through an indirect route. No luck there either, the Colonel had “got off and hid.”16 The Ambassador did meet with Lansing several times, not because the Secretary wished to see Page, one must suspect, but because he was unable to avoid the Ambassador. Lansing gave him no more satisfaction than had the President. “The Secre- tary,” Page noted, “betrayed not the slightest curiosity about our relations with Great Britain. The only remark he made was that I’d find a different atmosphere in Washington from the atmosphere in London. Truly. All the rest of his talk was about cases.” Page and the American Ambassador to France lunched on August 22 with some cabinet members. Page’s comment: “We were not encouraged to talk-the local personal joke held the time and conversation.”16 Perhaps the most respect shown Page came from Counsellor Polk. Although the latter was “as bad as the Prest.,” and could not “get it out of his mind that Eng. is insulting us,” Polk did discuss the

After a fortnight of that kind of treatment it became apparent to Page that the administration had summoned him home and did not wish to hear his views. Insulted, angry, if Wilson and Lansing had forced the Ambassador

Memorandum, August, 1916, Page Papers: reproduced in Hendrick,

Page to House. Aug. 26, 1918, Page Papers. Page, 11. 171-179.

“Memorandum, Aug. 26, 1916, ibid; reproduced in Hendrick, Page,

I’ Page diary (undated). 11. 174-176.

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The Superfluous Ambassador to hold his tongue, they could not silence his private thoughts. Criticism of Wilson, which heretofore he had been unable or unwilling to express verily flowed from his pen: “the President suppressed free thought and free speech when he insisted upon personal neutrality. On this cushion of nonresponsibility the great masses fell back at their intellectual and moral ease - softened, isolated, bullied. That wasn’t leadership in a democracy, right here is the President’s failure.” l8 The bitterest attack Page reserved for Lansing. On the Secretary of State he loosed a memorandum of frustration and anger. Lansing was a “mere routine - clerk, law-book-precedent man; no grasp, no imagination, no constructive tendency or ability - measuring Armageddon, if he tries to measure it at all- with a six inch rule. And yet the public thinks him equal to the task. He writes Notes - big-sounding Notes to England and publishes them! Oh God! what a crime and a shame to have this manikin in that place now.”lS It was the latter part of August when Page made these comments, about the same time he wrote his wife of plans for the future: “of one thing I am sure. We wish to come home March 4 at midnight [when Wilson’s first term would expire] and go about our proper business. There’s nothing here that I wd for the world be mixed up with. As soon as I can escape with dignity, I shall make my bow and exit.”20

What was the meaning of all this evasion, which certainly was unfair and disrespectful to the Ambassador? Why did Wilson, a friend of Page, an admirer of many things British, certainly a man who did not wish the British to lose the war, avoid talking to his Ambassador? Why was Lansing, with whom Page had every right to expect meaningful discussion, so seemingly disinterested? The situation is

a memorandum, August, 1916, Page Papers; reproduced in Hendrick,

=Aug. SO, 1916, Page Papers. Page, 11, 175.

Aug. 26, 1916, ibid.

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The Historian further remarkable when one considers that Wilson, Lansing, all members of the administration were basically pro-British. The Secretary of State saturated his memoirs with expressions of sympathy for the Allies and at the time Page wrote such bitter criticism, Lansing noted his conviction: “I only hope that the President will adopt the true policy which is ‘Join the Allies as soon as possible and crush the German auto- crats.’ ’’ 21 In discussion with the Ambassador, Lansing betrayed not a word of this sympathy for the Allies. Loyal to the President, disgusted with Page, the Secretary did not wish to say anything to encourage the Ambassador in his course.

While dedicated to nonintervention for the United States, Wilson certainly had been more for the Allies than against them during much of the period of neutrality. He liked the British, was willing for the United States to supply them with munitions (as long as it was legal), and did not want to quarrel, if Britain would give the appearance of respecting American rights. But the British made the President’s job cumulatively difficult. The blockade pro- duced increasing harassment for American shippers who expected the government to assert their rights; the Foreign Office was leisurely (sometimes taking months) in answering American notes; then there was the blacklist business in 1916 which Wilson called “the last straw.”22 The President had sent a note to London protesting the blacklist, which the British did not answer for three months. Early in September Congress acted, empowering the President to retaliate commercially against countries which restricted American trade, and about the same time voted a huge naval appropriation. In the eyes of many Americans, including Wilson, the glitter which had illuminated the

pL Memorandum, Sept. 1916, “The President’s attitude toward Great Britain and its Dangers,” The Papers of Robert Lansing, Library of Congress; see also Lansing, Memoirs, 171.

=Wilson to House, July 23. 1916, House Papers.

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The Superfluous Ambassador British earlier in the war had disappeared or at least tarnished.

This change of attitude inevitably affected Page’s tasks and did much to explain the President’s unwillingness to discuss with him the problems of war. Knowing the Ambassador’s feeling, Wilson viewed him more as Britain’s representative than that of the United %ates. The President saw no benefit in hearing from Page what the Ambassador had been saying for months in letters. He knew as well that there was little possibility of changing Page’s mind. Wilson probably regretted that matters were uneasy with Britain, but indicating this to Page only would strengthen the Ambassador’s conviction. Better not to see him at all, if he could avoid it.

Page would not be put aside so easily. For five weeks he waited, occasionally writing the President to request a conference, intimating that he had an urgent message from the British Government.2a Meanwhile he spent time in the New York area with friends and relatives, and in Washington where he had conferences with Polk and managed to get Lansing to talk about relations with Britain-with no more satisfaction than before; Lansing was obsessed with cases. The Ambassador persisted in seeing Wilson. “I’m not going back to London,” he wrote his secretary in the British capital, “until the President has said something to me or at least till I have said something to him. I am now going down to Garden City and New York till the President send for me: or, if he do [sic] not send for me, I’m going to his house and sit on the steps till he come [sic] out.”**

Page’s patience finally bore fruit in an invitation to spend a night at the President’s summer house. Perhaps Wilson decided that he might as well hear out Page and get it over with. The meeting took place on September

’Sept. 18 and Sept. 20, 1916, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Library

*LHendrick, Page, 11, 179. of Congress.

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The Historian 22 at Shadow Lawn on the coast of New jersey. I t must have been a dramatic encounter for these two men who, now separated by the war, at one time had had much in common, Each was aware of the other’s feelings. Both had keen minds, schooled in logic and expression, sincere and eloquent. But because of different responsibilities and different views of war, the rhetoric of both men was useless.

There is no record of Page’s argument, but one can assume what he said. With frank, respectful words he probably told Wilson of Britain’s anxiety for American friendship; how exigencies of war called for extraordinary measures which the British hoped the United States would recognize and accept; that the future of the world depended upon Anglo-American cooperation with which the war must not interfere. The Ambassador brought along a German medal which commemorated the sinking of the British passenger liner Lusitania (which was to prove that the Germans did not regret that atrocity but indeed honored it), and data which included memoranda of conversations in London with British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey and other Cabinet members.

Page’s record of the c o n v e r s a t i o n has become an important document for study of the period of American neutrality, showing the President’s attitude in a critical phase. The Ambassador wrote Wilson’s response in a small notebook, approximately four by six inches, turned upside down, begun at the back. He wrote with such scarce legibility - unusual for Page - that it is reasonable to guess he wrote on his lap as he returned by train or auto from Shadow Lawn. “The P. said,” Page began, “he started out as heartily in sympathy w[ith the] Allies as any man cd be. But England had gone on doing everything she wished regardless of rights of others & Am[erican] pride (his pride) was hurt.” “The P. said,” Page continued, “tell those gentlemen for me-and there followed a homily about

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The Superfluous Ambassador damage done to any American citizen is a damage to himself. He described the war as a result of many causes - some of long origin. He spoke of England’s having the earth, of Germany’s wanting it. Of course the German system is directly opposed to everything American. But this didn’t seem to him to carry any very great reprehensibility.” Wilson told the Ambassador that because of the presidential election in November he would not do anything with the retaliatory legislation Congress had given him, but if provocation continued after the election (if he were elected) he would. The President felt that British delay in answering American notes showed contempt. When Page told of Eritain’s hope [and this apparently was the urgent message] that if Germany asked him to propose an armistice, the President would decline, Wilson answered that he would refuse to propose a purely military armistice, but if it were an armistice looking towards peace - “yes, I shall be glad.” Page’s scribbling concluded with Wilson’s remark that at first everyone he met favored the Allies, but now he “came across nobody who was not vexed with England.”26

The conference lasted an entire morning, and if Page’s notes contain only a portion of what was said, they covered the important issues, There seems to have been no hedging by either participant, nor is there evidence that one convinced the other of error. The discussion produced nothing encouraging for the Ambassador. Wilson gave him every reason to worry about the future, and left as possi- bilities almost every line of policy Page dreaded.

Not long after meeting Wilson, Page finally caught House. Discussion with the Colonel ran along generally the same topics as the interview at Shadow Lawn, but the tone differed. No longer addressing a superior official, Page unleased his emotions, delved into personalities in a scathing attack on American policy. House responded (as the Colonel

rections) in Hendrick, Page, 11, 185-186. *The notebook is in Page’s Papers; part of it is reproduced (with cor-

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The Historian recorded it) in much the same manner. Page’s opening remarks, critical of Lansing, showed profound regard for Wilson. “A feeling,” House noted, “I am afraid he exaggerates.” Page stated with satisfaction that Lansing believed the British Ambassador (Spring Rice) unfit for his post. To which House commented: “Page does not know that Lansing’s opinion of the British Ambassador is perhaps a shade higher than his opinion of Page himself.” The Ambassador admitted that Britain would have fought alongside France had the French (and not the Germans) violated Belgian territory (in contradiction to the moral and legal argument that Britain went to war to protect Belgium’s territorial integrity and to honor the pact assuring Belgian neutrality) , but he complained that poor relations with Britain largely were due to the United States, that no administration official understood the war. 2R

Angered at that statement, House responded with an argument probably more critical of Britain than any he delivered during the period of neutrality. He accused Britain of hypocrisy on the Belgian matter and mentioned American friendship and partiality for the Allies, despite which relations had worsened. He charged that if the United States entered the war, “we would be applauded for a few weeks and then they would demand money. If the money was forthcoming, they would be satisfied for a period, but later would demand an unlimited number of men. If we did it all, they would finally accuse us of trying to force them to give better terms to Germany than were warranted.”n All this from a man who had advised a break in relations with Germany, had urged the President not to take strong measures with Britain, and who regarded the British Foreign Secretary as one of his closest friends.28

’House diary, Sept. 25. 1916, Seymour, Colonel House, 11. 318-319.

=“It is . . . my good fortune that Fate has given me two such good friends as Woodrow Wilson and Edward Grey,” House had noted in his

Ibid., 319-320.

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The SuperAuous Ambassador It is remarkable how Page could induce anti-British

expressions from men basically pro-British. Lansing wished to join the Allies, and House had felt similarly for some time, his only restraint being knowledge that Wilson wanted to keep the nation out of the conflict. The President, one must confess, was truly angry at the British, and brought out his anger in his attitude toward Page. But he was not upset enough to do anything effective. He no more wished England to lose the war in 1916 than he had in 1914. Nonetheless, when speaking with Page, each person searched for unflattering remarks about England. They wearied of Page’s attitude, avoided saying anything to encourage the Ambassador in his biased view. Page’s single-mindedness influenced the administration to discount what otherwise might have been suggestions worth consideration. One was that the administration send a general and an admiral to study prosecution of the war; another which seemed sensible was that an eminent legal mind - Polk was acceptable to Page - go to England and discuss technical differences between the two countries. A third suggestion, that Page receive greater power of negotiation, was, as Lansing put it, “folly.”2* The Ambassador who had come to Washington hoping to dispose people in favor of the Allies, instead had increased their anger.

What became of the hostility toward England which the President and others were so careful to describe to Page? Was Wilson able to translate this dissatisfaction into policy? In one area only did he attempt what he warned Page he might do. After re-election Wilson went on a persistent but futile campaign to halt the war without a military decision. Although the effort irritated Page and the British,

diary April 50, 1915, ibid., I, 428. For an example of House’s stringent attitude toward Germany, see ibid., 11, 227-228.

-Memoirs, 160. Page incorporated his suggestions in a memorandum left for the Secretary of State, Sept. 1916, The Lansing Papers, I, 708-713.

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The Historian Wilson designed it more to forestall American intervention than to call Britain’s hand. Otherwise he did none of the things Page feared. The blockade tightened, censorship of mails continued, British policy by no means became conciliatory, and the President made no effort to retaliate or even protest vigorously. Perhaps Wilson explained in the conference with Page what he would do had he possessed an impartial attitude, had he been capable of erasing his deep-seated preference for the British. He could not do that, but he would not let Page know it. Perhaps he did not know it himself.

And what became of Walter Page after the discouraging experience in Washington? Nothing that was new. He returned to England to take up where he left off because no one suggested that he do anything different. The administration knew his attitude, had no confidence in his willingness to further the American cause in London, expected nothing from him, in fact, but still permitted his return. T o be sure, the Ambassador left the United States a saddened individual, but he had only himself to blame. Through his verbosity he induced the administration, particularly the President, to show only one state of mind, thus making it impossible for Page to judge how men like Lansing or House truly felt, or what Wilson temperamentally was capable of doing.

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