The Tormented Triangle (1)

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Crisis States Research Centre

The Tormented Triangle: The Regionalisation of Conflict

in Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic1

JenniferGiroux (Centre for Security Studies, ETH)David Lanz (Swisspeace/University of Basel)

Damiano Sguaitamatti (Centre for Security Studies, ETH)

Introduction

In February 2008, approximately four thousand rebels from eastern Chad travelled a thousand

kilometres across the entire country to attack the capital, NDjamena, with the aim of oustingPresident Idriss Dby. At first sight this seemed to be a strictly Chadian affair: an attack by adisenfranchised group of men from one of Chads marginalised peripheries against theircorrupt government. However, a closer look reveals a more complicated regional picture. Theweapons and pick-up trucks that the Chadian rebel used in the attack were provided by theSudanese government in Khartoum. The rebels had prepared their attack in western Darfurand north-eastern Central African Republic (CAR), and many fighters among their ranks weremercenaries from these areas. Dby was nearly ousted, but in the end he managed to repel therebellion and stay in power. The reason for this is that the leaders of the main groupsattacking NDjamena the Union des forces pour la dmocratie et le dveloppementand the

Rassemblement des forces pour le changement quarrelled over who would succeed him.Furthermore, as the rebels became bogged down and ran out of ammunition, France, a long-standing ally of Dby, decided to support him and allow weapons provided by Libya to reachthe Chadian capital. Also crucial was the military support of the Justice and EqualityMovement (JEM), a rebel group from western Sudan, whose leadership hails from the sametribe as Dby the Zaghawa.

This attack in NDjamena was a manifestation of a process of armed conflict regionalisationthat has connected the crises in Darfur, eastern Chad and north-eastern CAR. Initially in 2005,when violence erupted in Chad and later in CAR, the media, human rights advocates andsome analysts described these conflicts as a simple spill-over from the war in Darfur, or theDarfurisation of the region. In this logic, the causes and symptoms of the Darfur conflict,which many of them had labelled genocide, had merely been transplanted from Darfur intoneighbouring cross-border areas. This narrative favoured the Chadian and CAR governmentsof Idriss Dby and Franois Boziz as well as their supporter and former colonial powerFrance, as it diverted attention from their own shortcomings and responsibilities. TheDarfurisation thesis has since been deconstructed and discredited as a number of recentstudies have elucidated the intrinsic roots of the conflicts in Chad and CAR (ICG 2006,2007b; Marchal 2007; Tubiana 2008a; Berg 2008).

1The authors wish to thank Blaise Burnier, Julian Thomas Hottinger, Didier Pclard, Matthias Siegfried, Judith

Vorrath and Laurie Nathan for their invaluable feedback, as well as CSS staff for the stimulating discussions, inparticular Myriam Dunn, Simon Mason and Victor Mauer for their most helpful suggestions. Any omissions ormistakes are the sole responsibility of the authors.


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It is now understood that armed conflict in north-central Africa (Chad, Sudan and CAR) has aregional dimension. However, this paper goes further and agrees with Marchal (2006b) thatthe conflicts in Darfur, eastern Chad and north-eastern CAR have become so interwoven thatthey form one system of conflict rather than three distinct conflicts. The discourse onregional conflict systems gained momentum in the post-Cold War era as scholars started to

analyse conflicts through a regional prism that takes into account the considerable speed withwhich security threats can travel across space (Lake and Morgan 1997; Buzan and Wver2003). Such dynamics have been referred to as regional conflict formations, where conflicts

become interconnected and bound by their geographic proximity, making them more complex(Rubin et al. 2001). Similarly, Wallensteen and Sollenberg (1998: 623) defined such systemsas regional conflict complexes, which involve situations where neighbouring countriesexperience internal or interstate conflicts, and with significant links between the conflicts. Innorth-central Africa, this process of regionalisation of armed conflict is facilitated by specificstructural conditions (state deficiency, uncontrollable hinterlands, regional instability, andtrans-border trade, migration and identities) that have come to the fore since the escalation ofthe Darfur conflict in 2003. In the following discussion we will thus refer to the Tormented

Triangle as a label for the regionalised armed conflicts in this region. The aim of this paper isto make sense of regionalised conflict in north-central Africa, in particular the structuralfactors that have caused it and the dynamics sustaining it.

Figure 1: A regional conflict system takes shape as a result of the interplay between structural

factors and conflict dynamics, activated by catalysing events

In order to analyse the Tormented Triangle we employ a generic analytical framework thatdifferentiates between conflict dynamics (actions and events) and the more profoundcalculations of the conflict parties, based on material incentives, normative frameworks and

other structural preconditions (see Figure 1). There are two caveats that have to be mentionedwith regard to the analytical framework we use. First, while we are concerned with the emergenceof regionalised conflict as a result of structural conditions (black arrow), there is also the reverseeffect of regionalised wars shaping the structural conditions (grey arrow). Second, this graph in noway implies determinism in the relationship between structure, dynamics and outcome. Thestructure may be characterised in terms of specific incentives, geographic pre-conditions or aspecific political environment (Herbst 2000; Hentz 2007). At the level of manifest conflict

behaviour, scholars have pointed at different characteristics of contemporary warfare, such asdifferent strategies and actors involved in conflicts, as well as their various inter-linkagesacross state boundaries (Kaldor 2001; Hentz 2007; Buzan and Wver 2003).

Guided by this analytical framework, the paper begins with a descriptive account of howtheTormented Triangle took shape through a series of key events that led to the regionalisation of

Trigger

Structure RegionalConflict

System

Dynamics


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conflict in north-central Africa. The following section delves deeper by highlighting thedifferent structural elements pertaining to whythe Tormented Triangle emerged. Our analysisis embedded in a larger body of theoretical and empirical research on regional conflictformations. Contemporary armed conflicts in Africa and elsewhere frequently have regionalmanifestations, and there has been substantial research, for example with regard to the Mano

River States (Marchal 2002, Richards 1996, Adebajo 2002), the Great Lakes (Rubin et al.2001, Prunier 2009) and the Horn of Africa (Lunn 2008). In addition, there have been someattempts to conceptualise the emergence of regional conflict formations (or regionalcomplexes) in general, and in the third section we explore these, as well as question whethersuch concepts are helpful for the understanding of the Tormented Triangle. We conclude byoutlining a number of policy implications for conflict management and resolution in thecontext of regionalised conflicts in north-central Africa.

Dynamics of regionalised conflict:Howthe Tormented Triangle took shape

When examining the triangle of intersecting national boundaries in north-central Africa, it ishelpful to visualise a braid. Chad, CAR and Sudan each represent a thread that is definednot only by its borders, but more so by multiple ethnic groups, languages, traditions and

beliefs. Such elements are further woven into a vast and diverse topography that ranges fromdense forest and savannah in the south to long stretches of arid deserts in the north. Anexamination of a map of this region (see Figure 2) reveals deceptively clear state boundariesthat are challenged by the reality of porous borders, which allow goods and people to travel

between states, contributing to the patchwork nature of this region. Such fluidity has muchsignificance as problems and events often reverberate across state boundaries.

Figure 2: The tri-border region of eastern Chad, north-eastern CAR and Darfur

Source: Center for Security Studies, ETH, Zurich

Taking such descriptive characteristics into account, this section will discuss key historicalevents that led to the escalation and interweaving of conflicts in north-central Africa(primarily eastern Chad, north-eastern CAR and Darfur in western Sudan), beginning withevents from decolonisation to the Darfur conflict (1960-2003), and then proceeding toexamine the current regionalisation of armed conflict (2003-2008). Through this discussionwe aim to illustrate the regions complexity, which is articulated in the fluidity of alliances,


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regional influences and rapid changes in power. We utilise a loose chronological approach todescribe how the Tormented Triangle took shape via notable domestic conflicts, actors andstrategies that were used within these three countries.

1960-2003

Chadian independence meets conflict and regional influence

Chad and the CAR fell under French colonial rule within the federation of Afriquequatoriale franaise. Shortly after independence, both countries quickly fell into internal

power. In 1966, civil war erupted in the Muslim north of Chad in response to interethnictensions driven by the poor management and autocratic rule of Chads first president,Franois Tombalbaye, a member of the southern Sara ethnic group. This conflict representedone of the first signs of regional factors playing a role in Chadian politics, as the principalinsurgent group from the north, known as FROLINAT (Front de libration nationale duTchad) was founded in Nyala, Sudan (Prunier 2007: 43). Tombalbaye held power until 1975when he was killed during a coup led by General Felix Malloum, another southerner. In 1976,

a split occurred within FROLINAT leading Hissne Habr to leave the group and found hispro-western Forces armes du nord (FAN). At the same time, Goukouni Oueddei emerged asthe leader of FROLINAT and eventually became president of Chad in 1979 with Libyansupport. He remained in power until 1982 when FAN, who had retreated to Darfur andeastern Chad, took over NDjamena and their leader Habr declared himself president(Azevedo 1998).

In the late 1970s, the situation in Chad had become increasingly turbulent and represented anearly form of the Tormented Triangle as external powers sought to control the country andcounter each others influence. Libya stepped up its involvement due to Colonel MuammarGaddafis aspirations to extend his influence into Central Africa. The Libyan military, aided

by Oueddeis rebel forces, occupied parts of northern Chad, and they used Darfur to launchinvasions in the east (Burr and Collins 1999). Habr, on the other hand, controlled southernChad including NDjamena. He enjoyed support from Sudans President Nimeiry andreceived military aid from France, the US, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which sought to counterLibyas expansion (Behrends 2007: 113).

In 1990, Habr was removed from power as General Idriss Dby assumed leadership during amilitary coup that was, once again, aided by Libya. Darfur was used as a staging groundwhere cross-border attacks occurred between Dbys Libyan-supported forces and Habrsarmy (Prunier 2007: 69ff.). President Dby, a member of a clan within the Zaghawa tribe,stacked the armed forces with members from the Zaghawa, with these continuing to dominate

the military through the 1996 and 2001 elections, both of which Dby won (Marchal 2006a).He failed to reform Chads political structure and at the same time maintained a favourablerelationship with Sudan and France (ICG 2006: 2f.). Despite Chads violent post-colonialhistory, the 1990s brought some level of stability. Subsequently, however, internal dissentrose, culminating in 2005 when key members of the ruling elite joined the rebellion barelytwo years after oil production commenced in the south.

A similar tale in the Central African Republic

While Chad experienced massive turmoil, CAR endured its own post-independence

challenges and external influences. Following independence, CAR endured multiple coupsuntil 1965, when former colonial soldier Jean-Bdel Bokassa overthrew President David


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Dacko. Bokassa initially enjoyed support from France but the increasing brutality of hisregime led France to abandon him. Bokassa sought Libyan backing, but in 1979 he wasforcibly removed by the French military. Dacko was restored to power until the state military,led by General Andr Kolingba, took over power in 1981 (Foka 2009). Kolingba, a memberof the Yakoma tribe that inhabits parts of southern CAR, ruled as a corrupt military dictator

and catered mainly to the Yakoma-populated southern belt of CAR while enjoying Frenchsupport (Berg, 2008; ICG 2007b). The ethnic favouritism resulted in internal dissent amongstthe non-Yakoma groups and an unsuccessful coup attempt in 1983. According to Berg (2008:20), Kolingbas rule brought in a period establishing for the first time ethnic identity as thecrucial factor in the political culture of the Central African Republic.

In the early 1990s external pressure to democratise led to CARs first elections in 1993 inwhich Kolingba lost to Ange-Flix Patass a politician who came from both the Gbaya andKare tribes, yet grew up in Paoua in the north, which is home to the Kaba tribe. Rather thanaddressing economic and political problems, Patass launched a broad effort to weaken theYakoma-dominated military and stacked the French-backed Presidential Guard with members

from the Kaba thus perpetuating the political exploitation of ethnicity (Ngoupand 1997).These divisions fuelled violence in 1996 when the military launched three mutinies. As aresult, the African peacekeeping force known as Mission interafricaine de surveillance desaccords de Banguiwas created to monitor and quell hostilities. This development providedFrance with an exit strategy out of CARs deteriorating political and social situation.Deprived of French patronage, Patass similar to Bokassa lobbied for Libyan support.Thus the Gaddafi-created Community of the Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) got involvedand provided a peacekeeping force for Patass and his presidential guard. Additional backingcame from the Congolese rebel group Mouvement pour la libration du Congo led by Jean-Pierre Bemba (ICG 2007b:14ff.). Similar to Chad, the webbed tale unfolded in CAR as thosein control of power in the centre appealed to foreign sponsors and utilised regional and

colonial alliances to prop up their weak regimes.

Sudans constant storm

Meanwhile Sudan, which gained independence from the UK in 1956, was in the midst of acivil war that lasted from 1955, when army units in the south mutinied and formed the Anya-

Nya movement, until 1972, when peace was achieved through the Addis Ababa Agreement.Divisions between the dominant Arab and Muslim population in the north and a non-Arab,mostly Christian and animist population in the south kept the country fundamentally divided.The seeds for these divisions were sown by the British policy of governing the north and

south under separate administrations and transferring power to northern elites at the time ofindependence (Johnson 2006). In the absence of major conflict from 1972 to 1983, oildevelopment and exploration commenced. However, the discovery of oil added anotherconflict dimension to a country that continues to be torn over the distribution of political

power and economic resources from the centre to the periphery. Civil war erupted in 1983and triggered a series of events that would lead to the involvement of regional actors.

The Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA), a southern rebel group, was formed in theearly 1980s in reaction to President Gaafar Nimeirys attempts to introduce Muslim politicalgovernance, which included imposing sharia law and dissolving the southern Sudanesegovernment (Johnson 2006). Nimeiry ruled until 1985, when a coup forced him out of power

and through elections brought Sadiq al-Mahdi into power. In 1989, al-Mahdi was overthrownin a coup by the National Islamic Front (NIF), which installed Omar al-Bashir as president.


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With the north receiving external support from its Muslim neighbours, such as Libya, theSPLA was aided in particular by Mengitsus Ethiopia and by Musevenis Uganda (De Waal2007a, 2007b).2

Regional alliances as well as cross-border movement of armed groups were a key factor

during the second Sudanese civil war from 1983 to 2005. Northern CAR, for example, wasused by both parties, with the SPLA using it as a safe haven while the Sudanese governmentstaged attacks against the SPLA in western Bahr el-Ghazal from there (Africa Confidential,April 2002). The civil war lasted until 2005 when the SPLA and Khartoum concluded thirtymonths of negotiations and signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Theagreement granted southern Sudan autonomy, a referendum on self-determination in 2011 andan equal distribution of oil revenues from the south. However, the CPA was overshadowed bythe conflict in Darfur, which began before the North-South negotiations concluded, as well as

by the less-publicised conflict in eastern Sudan, tentatively terminated through the EasternPeace Agreement of 2006.

2003-2008

Traded Alliances: the story of Sudan and Chads deteriorating relations

As shown above, north-central Africas post-colonial history has been marked by conflictsthat have frequently included the involvement of external actors. Since 2003, cross-borderentanglement in this region has been reinforced by escalating conflicts. This is particularlytrue for the conflict in Darfur, which began to gain media attention in 2003 (De Waal 2004).This led to cross-border alliances coming to the fore while creating massive refugee flowsthat have added immense pressure to already fragile societies struggling with their owndomestic challenges. Initially, the conflict involved theJanjaweedArab militia supported by

the Sudanese military and the central government, versus the Sudan Liberation Movement(SLM/A) and JEM rebel groups. However, as fighting progressed, fluid loyalties andinfighting surfaced within the rebel movements, causing divisions between JEM and SLM/A,as well as other rebel groups in this region (Tanner and Tubiana 2007).3Furthermore, as theDarfur conflict escalated, Chads domestic situation erupted in political turmoil that set off aseries of events leading to shifting alliances between the Chadian and Sudanese governments(Tubiana 2008a).

Refugee flows from Sudan into neighbouring Chad and CAR were a factor in the process ofregionalisation in addition to shifting tribal and state alliances within the competing groups.The Zaghawa ethnic group dominates JEM. Chadian President Dby, who belongs to the

Zaghawa tribe, initially maintained his alliance with Khartoum, as demonstrated by hisattempts to arrest Khalil Ibrahim, the head of JEM, and send Chadian troops to supportSudan, and his role in brokering the 2004 ceasefire agreement between Khartoum and theDarfur rebel groups (Behrends 2007; Berg 2008).4 However, Khartoum expected Dby to

2It bears noting that Sudan and Uganda were involved in a proxy war where Kampala supported the SPLA andKhartoum backed the Lords Resistance Army in Northern Uganda. In 1999, Museveni and al-Bashir signed theNairobi Agreement, which began to repair the damaged relations between the neighbouring countries.3For example, in 2005 during the peace negotiations in Abuja, the SLM/A split into two groups, one headed byMinni Arkoy Minawi, a Zaghawa, the other one led by Abdel Wahid el-Nur, a Fur.4A ceasefire was established in NDjamena in 2004. Dby was later removed from the mediation process at the

request of JEM and SLM/A, which distrusted Dby as he had been a long-time supporter of the Sudanesegovernment. The African Union subsequently took over mediating duties and transferred the negotiations toAbuja, Nigeria. The negotiations were concluded in May 2006 when the SLM/A Minawi faction and the


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apply more pressure on the Zaghawa Darfur rebels, while Dby, who was losing popularity,increasingly needed the domestic support of the Zaghawa elite to keep his governmenttogether. By 2005, Dby had caved into political pressure and dissolved the alliance with al-Bashir, opting to support the Darfur rebels (Berg 2008; Tubiana 2008a). At this critical

juncture, fluid alliances shifted and gave birth to a deepening regionalised conflict.

What caused Dby to suddenly shift from his support of Sudan to backing the Zaghawa rebelsin Darfur? An examination of this heated period reveals that the Dby regime was weakeneddue to political malfeasance and to the eroding support of the Zaghawa elites. Dby, whoseterm was to end in 2006, modified the constitution and removed the two-term limit through alargely unpopular 2005 referendum, which caused broad dissatisfaction and inspired adesertion from the government of many Zaghawa military members. At the same time, the

beginning of oil production in southern Chad increased possibilities for spoliation within thestate apparatus, which increased competition among the ruling Zaghawa elites (Marchal2006a: 475).

Due to Dbys traded alliances, Khartoum stepped up its support for Chadian rebel groupsthat sought to topple Dbys regime. A prime example of this shift is found in the January2006 attack on the Chadian border town of Adr that was carried out by the Darfur-basedFront uni pour le changement (FUC), a Chadian rebel group supported by Sudan. This attackled Dby to openly condemn Sudans support of this group and such cross-border violence(Small Arms Survey 2007). As Behrends (2007: 124) aptly notes:

The government of Sudan has demonstrated an unmasked interest in helping tooverthrow Dby by enlisting the help of Chadian Zaghawa opposed to their

president, and by doing so, also weaken the Darfur rebels. On the other side of theborder Dby explicitly supported rebels against Sudan.

The situation further escalated in April 2006 when the Mahamat NoursFUC used the safetyprovided within Darfur, arms supplied by Khartoum and the route provided through north-eastern CAR to attack NDjamena, in an attempt to overthrow Dby (Berg 2008: 30f; Tubiana2008a: 20f.). Following this attack, a peace deal between Sudan and Chad was brieflyachieved in 2006 through the Tripoli Agreement, but fighting soon resumed and intensified in2007. A similar Khartoum-supported attack on the Chadian capital took place in February2008 and nearly succeeded in toppling Dby (Tubiana 2008a).

A deepening braid with Central African Republic

While Sudan and Chad each had intensifying conflicts that became increasinglyinterconnected, CAR also became a player in this regional conflict system as its northernregion offered largely ungoverned territory for transit and refuge (ICG 2007b; Tubiana 2008a:20f.). While much of CAR conflict remains internal, Dbys influence on CAR centralgovernment as well as Chadian and Sudanese rebels use of the north-eastern region as amaelstrom of political and criminal activity has generated a regional dynamic.

In 2001, Franois Boziz was accused of involvement in a coup attempt against Patass andsought refuge in Chad, where he enjoyed the hospitality of Dby as well as backing fromFrance, Congo, Congo-Brazzaville and Gabon (Berg 2008). With assistance from Dby,

Sudanese government signed the Darfur Peace Agreement, although the agreement was never implemented(Nathan 2006; Lanz 2008b).


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Boziz amassed a group of fighters that consisted of impoverished young men and ex-combatants from Chad and CAR (Debos 2008). Boziz returned to CAR from Chad foranother coup attempt, which met with success in March 2003, ousting Patass (Berg 2008).The subsequent period is significant as it highlights the web of alliances that characterise theTormented Triangle.

In 2004, former supporters of Boziz, many of whom were Chadian and upset by brokenpromises of compensation for their efforts in assisting the coup, began to attack governmenttargets (Debos 2008). In response, Dby sought to act as a mediator and to counsel theChadian rebels. These efforts met with some success, but many remained frustrated and eagerto take up arms. According to Debos, some of the Chadian disaffected rebels drifted to thenorthwest of the country (CAR), where they continued to harass and loot the local population(Debos 2008: 230). Others, however, returned to Chad to join local rebel movements.Eventually, many of these disaffected individuals joined the rebellion in north-eastern CARlaunched after the 2005 elections by the Union des forces dmocratiques pour lerassemblement(UFDR) which serves as an umbrella organisation for other armed groups

(ICG 2007b). Interestingly, in an indication of how volatile alliances can be, the UFDRattracted former enemies who joined forces in order to oust Boziz, whom they accused ofneglecting the Vakaga Region in terms of development and political representation (Spittaelset al. 2009).

Not only are Chadians involved with local rebel groups and criminal gangs throughoutnorthern CAR, but on the governmental side the inner circle of Bozizs personal security, in

particular the presidential guard, consists of Chadian soldiers, although many of them leftafter the February 2008 attack on NDjamena. In addition, Chadian troops have been involvedin key peacekeeping missions, such as the UN Mission in Central African Republic and Chadand the more recently created regional peacekeeping mission Force multinationale en

Centrafrique. Human Rights Watch (2007b) further noted that:

Chadian anti-Dby rebel groups have based themselves in CAR and Chadianarmy troops have carried out independent raids against CAR rebel groups on CARterritory, and have also engaged in abusive looting raids inside CAR, someinvolving the rape of civilians.5

Furthermore, CAR President Boziz accused Khartoum of supporting armed groups in thenorth-eastern region of his country, although Sudan has denied such claims (Small ArmsSurvey 2007). Khartoums interest in supporting the northern CAR rebel movements is due tothe desire of Sudan to use the rebellion to blackmail Boziz and persuade him to limit

Chadian influence in CAR, thus depriving Sudans enemy Dby of an ally in the region(Prunier 2007). Thus Khartoums role in CAR, while limited, includes the provision ofmilitary training to armed groups in CAR, in particular the UFDR (ICG 2007b).

In summary, the conflict dynamics within this tormented triangle reveal a web of state andnon-state actors that strategically utilise regional alliances and fluid borders to obtain ormaintain power. As we have highlighted, each state has a history of domestic cleavages thathave led to conflict. These local conflicts create regional turbulence, with conflict in Sudaninfluencing turmoil in neighbouring Chad and CAR and vice versa. This conflict system has

5However, according to Human Rights Watch, incursions of Chadian troops are more frequent in the CARs

north-western Ouham and Ouham-Pend province than in the north-eastern Vakaga province, and are thus morerelevant in the context of the north-western rebellion of theArme populaire pour la restauration de ladmocratie(see also Spittaels et al. 2009).


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become tightly woven to reveal a braided tormented triangle where key events, such as theconflict in Darfur, present a trigger to conflict regionalisation.

Structural background of regionalised conflict: why the Tormented Triangle took shape

The previous section described a series of events and actors that constitute the dynamics ofthe regional conflict system in north-central Africa. These events were fostered by a particularstructural environment. This section sheds light on a range of interlinked structural conditionsthat have given rise to the regionalisation of the conflicts in Darfur, eastern Chad, and to alesser extent in north-eastern CAR. In other words, it attempts to explain why the TormentedTriangle took shape.

Statehood and clientelism

Both CAR and Chad qualify as so-called weak or even failed states in the sense that their

governments are unable to deliver political goods to the entire population. These goodsinclude, most importantly, security, but also benefits such as a functioning legal system,health care, education and critical infrastructure (Rotberg 2004). The current regime in Chadis headed by the quintessential example of a president who takes power in a coup and then:

concentrates government power in his own hands and members of his own ethnicgroup, while paying no heed whatsoever to notions like separation of power.(Berg 2008: 12)

Since his usurpation of power in 1990, Idriss Dby has built an elaborate system of patronage,where governmental positions are systematically given to members of his clan as well as toco-opted former enemies for their personal enrichment. This practice has allowed Dby to

rule since 1990, but has completely eroded institutions and made Chad one of the mostcorrupt countries in the world (ICG 2008). It has also fostered armed factionalism as

political power can only be obtained through the force of arms (Marchal 2006a).

The situation in CAR is even worse. As noted in the previous section, President Boziz cameto power in 2003 thanks to Chadian mercenaries, and his rule today hardly extends beyondthe capital Bangui, a situation that has led the International Crisis Group to call CAR aphantom state (2007b). Boziz is the latest ruler in:

a series of cleptocratic regimes [that] have availed themselves of the resources ofthe country to enrich themselves while embroiling peacefully coexisting ethnic

groups in competition with one another. (Berg 2008: 18)

Similar to Dby, Boziz maintains power by appealing to foreign sponsors, especially France,Libya and Chad, and by monopolising power in the hands of family members and members ofhis ethnic group, the Gbaya. (Berg 2008: 22). Sudan is different from Chad and CAR insofaras the central government is more capable and relatively effective in the area aroundKhartoum. However, political power and resources remain concentrated in the hands of anelite from the Nile Valley around Khartoum, and consequently peripheral areas such asDarfur have been systematically marginalised (Johnson 2006). Despite the hyper-dominanceof the central government, the Sudanese state is characterised by persistent instability, withdifferent elite factions constantly vying for power. In this turbulent state the use of military

power to manage peripheries remains the default option, to the detriment of building a moreconsolidated and inclusive system of governance (De Waal 2007b).


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What Sudan, Chad and CAR have in common is the inability of ruling elites in the capital toproject the Weberian monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in their hinterlands. As aresult, those holding power in the centre are constantly threatened by rebellions that maymaterialise in peripheral areas. To counter this threat, the ruling elites are compelled to enterclientelistic relationships with insurgent groups, secret services and governments of the region

a key factor for conflict regionalisation (De Waal 2007a: 1). Such relationships entailarming and mobilising rebel groups across the border and unleashing them against theinsurgents and the civilian population that apparently supports them. It also includesappealing to regional powers, such as Libya, in order to secure their patronage, for example

by allowing them to use peripheries as strategic rear bases.

Hinterlands in post-colonial states

It is common knowledge that the borders of many African states were drawn arbitrarily by thecolonial powers, dividing areas that had strong historic links and bringing them under the ruleof separate, distant capitals. Thus, in many large post-colonial states in Africa, the hinterlandsare historically, economically, politically and culturally dissociated from their capitals andoriented towards neighbouring areas across the border. Eastern Chad, north-eastern CAR andDarfur provide telling examples in this respect. For example, eastern Chad is almost athousand kilometres from NDjamena and during the rainy season overland travel is difficult.Eastern Chad is the site of the historic Wadai Sultanate, which was an independent politicalentity for centuries (Behrends 2007). Likewise Darfur was independent until 1916, when theBritish incorporated the Darfur Sultanate into Sudan. Furthermore, Darfur is several hundredkilometres from Khartoum and geographically distinct from the Nile Valley and NorthernSudan (Prunier 2007: 1-4). CAR presents the most extreme example of a hinterland: thedistrict of Vakaga in the northeast is almost a thousand kilometres from Bangui, and during

half of the year it is completely inaccessible overland. Furthermore, people in the northeast donot speak Sanjo, CARs national language, and most of them are Muslims. In terms ofculture, politics and trade, north-eastern CAR is oriented towards Abch in eastern Chad and

Nyala in South Darfur as opposed to Bangui or any other part of CAR (ICG 2007b: 25).

Isolated hinterlands coupled with state weakness have fostered the regionalisation of armedconflict in north-central Africa insofar as they offer strategic rear bases for rebels fromneighbouring countries. For example, in 1990 Dby invaded Chad from Darfur and overthrewthe Habr regime; more recently, Chadian rebels used north-eastern CAR before launchingtheir attacks on NDjamena in April 2006 and February 2008; and the Darfur rebels haveoperated extensively in eastern Chad. Furthermore, the power vacuum in their peripheries

requires the ruling elites of Sudan, Chad and CAR to build clientelistic networks on one or theother side of the border in order to gain a military advantage and to tap into the lucrativetrans-border trade. This has involved arms deliveries to transnational tribal groups, whichcontribute to escalating and regionalising armed conflict.

Historic pattern of regionalised conflict and integration

The border region between Sudan and Chad historically constituted an intermediate zone withthe Sultanate of Wadai on one side and the Sultanate of Darfur on the other. According toBehrends (2007: 101), the two sultanates were similar in strength and size and, for the mostof the 17thand 18thcentury, they fought each other over allegiance, land, slaves or control of

trade routes. The frontier region where armed conflict is taking place today representedan area for strategic competition between the two regional powers. The people living between


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Wadai and Darfur were forcibly integrated into one or the other sultanate. Local chiefdomslearned to instrumentalise big-power rivalry, and when one of the regional powers weakened,they would shift their allegiance (Behrends 2007: 102). As a result, the frontier region

between Chad and Sudan was characterised historically by a pattern of regionalised conflict,integration and shifting allegiances. When Wadai and Darfur were colonised by the French

and the British respectively, the border became more of a dividing line than an intermediatezone (Behrends 2007: 106). People and goods nonetheless continued to cross the borderfreely and local affiliations rooted in tribal origin, language and religion dominated theiridentities. When Sudan and Chad gained independence in 1956 and 1960 respectively, theformer intermediate zone was separated by a clear dividing line, and Darfur and eastern Chad

became peripheral areas, whose inhabitants were systematically neglected by their capitalsand used to fight proxy wars, most violently in the 1980s and again since 2003.

The status of the border area between Sudan and Chad as a historic intermediate zonerepresents a structural aspect of the process of regionalisation of armed conflict in north-central Africa. The people in the region share a common story of being squeezed between two

regional powers that posed a constant existential threat to them. Hence, they have learned tofight in self-defence a tradition that continued to be fostered in the context of post-independence turmoil in Sudan and Chad. They are also susceptible to opportunistic allianceswith bigger powers on both sides of the border in order to gain an advantage locally, forexample in land struggles.

Trans-border ethnic communities

The regionalisation of conflict in north-central Africa has also been fostered by the presenceof ethnic communities inhabiting the border areas whose loyalties primarily lie with their kin,

rather than with the central elites. There are various such groups in north-central Africa, butthe role of the Zaghawa, also called the Beri, is particularly significant. The Zaghawa havetraditionally lived in eastern Chad and northern Darfur, although they have spread all over theregion in the past few decades. As Tubiana writes (2008a: 22), for the Zaghawa, like othernomadic Arab tribes of the region, the border has never existed: a person can be born in oneof these countries and live in the other, and feel that they belong equally to both. TheZaghawa consist of three sub-clans the Kobe, the Wogi and the Bideyat and they arehighly differentiated socially and politically, which has led to many internal rivalries (Tubiana2008b). The Zaghawa have traditionally been important stakeholders in the region, given their

position in the cross-border trade between Chad and Sudan. Their role has been enhancedsince Idriss Dby, a Bideyat Zaghawa, took power in Chad in 1990. As a result, manyZaghawa have been placed in influential positions in the Chadian government, securityapparatus and economy. The access to power and resources of Zaghawa in Chad has fosteredan increasing awareness among the Zaghawa in Darfur of their disenfranchisement within theSudanese state. It is thus not surprising that Zaghawa leaders have played a key role in theDarfur rebellion that broke out in 2003 (Marchal 2006a: 470f.). As mentioned above, pressurefrom members of the ruling Zaghawa elite in NDjamena led Dby to support the Darfurrebellion.

Ethnic solidarity across borders is not automatic. However, the fact that the ruling elite inNDjamena consisted of a group whose kin in neighbouring Sudan were being persecutedmade it difficult for the Chadian government to remain uninvolved especially given thatDby is highly dependent on the support of a narrow Zaghawa elite. This constellationinevitably drew the Chadian government into the war in Darfur and led to the break-up of the


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alliance between Dby and al-Bashir, which was crucial for the relative stability of the regionin the 1990s. As a result, a violent proxy war between Sudan and Chad ensued, therepercussions of which gravely affected the region. Trans-border ethnic communities such asthe Zaghawa have added to armed conflict in the region through cross-border trade ofweapons and other military material (Tubiana 2008a: 36ff.).

Cross-border migration and trade

As described above, the area between Sudan, Chad and CAR did not historically function as aborder, and even when the line of demarcation appeared on the map, people and goods stilltravelled more or less freely across it. Indeed, there are longstanding migration and trans-

border trade between eastern Chad, north-eastern CAR and Darfur, which continue eventoday and have contributed to spreading armed conflict in the region. After the Frenchimposed colonial rule in 1909 and dismantled the Wadai Sultanate, many people from thearea east of Wadai migrated further east into British-ruled territory in Darfur (Behrends2007). The migration of Chadians into Darfur continued during the colonial phase as well asafter independence. Migration accelerated in the 1980s when eastern Chad was afflicted bysevere droughts and civil war. The Chadian migrants, many of them from Arab tribes,aggravated the competition for land in Darfur caused by ecological deterioration, populationgrowth and mismanagement of resources. These local conflicts were militarised as Darfur

became the stage of a proxy war between Libya and the West over the control of Chad(Prunier 2007). Chadian migration also played a role in the most recent conflict in Darfur, andin its spread to eastern Chad. Disenfranchised young men from Arab tribes in Chad wererecruited into the ranks of the notoriousJanjaweed,and not surprisingly, similar Arab militiagroups eventually formed in eastern Chad, apparently comprising men with a very similar

background (ICG 2008b).

Cross-border trade has been important in the region, which is logical given that eastern Chad,north-eastern CAR and Darfur have been oriented more towards each other than towards theirrespective capitals. Indeed, there has been little restriction of cross-border movement ofgoods, as governments in the region lack the capacity to control their borders. This hasfacilitated the regionalisation of conflict insofar as it has allowed trade of military materialacross the border. It has also fostered the proliferation of small arms and the emergence of a

pool of combatants with fluid loyalties, as described below. CAR is a case in point. Thecountry has a 1,200-kilometre frontier with Sudan, but the government only maintains two

border posts (ICG 2007b). Consequently, as Tubiana writes (2008a: 20f.), north-eastern CARacts as an area of transit and trade for nomadic peoples [...] and rebel groups from all

neighbouring countries. The border between Darfur and eastern Chad is similarly porous.Thus, the Darfur rebels are procuring most of their weaponry from eastern Chad (Tanner et al.2007).

Combatants with fluid loyalties

Since the commencement of the Darfur conflict in 2003, a large number of armed groupshave emerged in north-central Africa (Prunier 2008). Some of these groups have a politicalagenda, but many seem to be motivated primarily by economic opportunities. Debos research(2008) differentiates this argument and shows that there is a pool of armed men, whoselivelihood and social identity depend on their status as combatants. Returning to their home

communities is difficult for these men, as they are often stigmatised as a result of the violencethat they have perpetrated. Many of these fighters have, at some point, been integrated into


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regular security forces, only to return to being insurgents when that option became morelucrative or when their leader was ejected from the government. In other words, thesecombatants have fluid loyalties, which means that they can be mobilised for any project:they will defend the government or fight insurgencies, be it in their own country or in foreignstates.

The presence of a pool of combatants with fluid loyalties has been an important factorexplaining the regionalisation of armed conflict in north-central Africa. These combatantshave made it easy and cheap to instigate rebellions or to fight counter-insurgencies inneighbouring countries. If governments had to send their armies to invade other countries,they would be much less capable of destabilising their neighbours militarily, and lessinterested in doing so. However, the presence of combatants that are cheap and easy tomobilise makes the option of proxy warfare attractive. Thus, President Boziz took power inCAR thanks to such actors, and they subsequently instigated the rebellion in north-easternCAR. Many of these combatants are fighting as part of Khartoum-sponsored rebel groups ineastern Chad; theJanjaweed and the Darfur rebels may also have recruited from them.

Conceptualising Regional Conflict Systems

Our analytical framework distinguishes between structural conditions and catalysing eventsthat set in motion conflict dynamics, leading to the formation of a regional system ofconflicts. The previous two sections revealed how and why this system developed in north-central Africa. Our aim here is to place this case within the regional conflict literature byexamining how some scholars have understood the emergence of regional conflict formations.A relevant question in this context is whether, as Hentz (2007) suggests, regionalised conflictsconstitute a new type of war that is distinct from existing categories such as inter-state wars,civil wars or new wars. To answer this question, a comprehensive comparative analysis

beyond the scope of this paper is needed. However, it is possible to identify the specificcharacteristics of regional conflicts, and for this purpose we use a set of criteria that scholarsof conflict theory have put forward to identify different types of wars: the actorsinvolved inconflict; the strategies they use; the aims they pursue; and the territory and space wherearmed conflict takes place (Thompson 1973; van Creveld 1991; Lake and Morgan 1997;Goodhand and Humle 1999: 16f.).

Actors

Since World War II interstate wars have by far been outnumbered by civil wars, which are bydefinition struggles between armed groups within a country and their government.Regionalised conflicts feature a broader variety of actors that may or may not include thegovernment. Non-state actors are particularly important in regionalised conflicts, in particularthose linked to cross-border populations. Therefore it is indispensable to take into accountlinkages between communities across state boundaries. As Buzan (2003: 248) puts it:Regional security in Africa is [] substantially defined by the sub-state level and non-stateactors are as big a part of the spreading of conflicts as states. Thus, cross-border amities andenmities between sub-state and state actors have played a major role in regional conflictsystems. In an earlier study, Thompson (1973) identified a set of conditions for regionalsubsystems, noting the prominent role that multiple actors (two or more) play within a

regional system where geographic proximity and intense interdependence are significantfactors. As described in this case study, the clientelistic relationship between three key


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governments and multiple transnational armed actors was an important driving factor for theregionalisation of the conflict in north-central Africa, creating a web of shifting alliances thathas led to perpetual regional instability.

Territory and spaceHentz (2007) has coined the term wars across states in order to capture the regional logic ofmany wars in Africa. Such wars are distinct in that they are not confined to the territory of astate, but take place in the border regions of several states. Indeed, the strict territoriality ofstates gravitating around their capitals is a European concept. As Herbst (2000: 40ff.) notes,

before colonisation hardly any part of Africa had developed a coherent nation-state. ManyAfrican states today continue to have fluid territoriality with peripheries constantly advancingand retracting (Geiger 2008). It is these hinterlands that provide the space for regionalisedconflicts. Thus, in the context of the Tormented Triangle, armed conflict takes place in

peripheral areas that have neither been included in, nor directly controlled by, the respectivegovernments of Sudan, Chad and CAR. These areas have remained oriented towardscommercial and religious centres in the region outside or inside the country, rather than theirstate capitals (Bierschenk and Sardan 1997). In order to assert control, governments haverelied on clientelistic relationships with local armed groups. Hence it is not surprising that theregionalisation of armed conflicts in north-central Africa was driven by these cross-border

populations and the armed groups in the region.

Strategies

In terms of the strategies of conflict actors, the conflict in north-central Africa seems similarto what Kaldor (1999: 97f.) has labelled new wars, which borrow from both revolutionary

warfare and counterinsurgency. On the one hand, conflict parties are unable to permanentlycontrol territory, and therefore resort to a variety of tactics to secure the populations support(Weinstein 2007). On the other hand, actors have used counter-insurgency tactics, aimed atdestroying the civilian support base of the enemy and making civilians the main target ofmilitary operations (Goodhand and Humle 1999: 14). Regionalised wars are thereforecharacterised by excessive brutality and massive displacement, as violence is perpetuateddirectly against civilians. This is the case in Darfur, where over one third of the populationhas been uprooted since 2003.

Aims and incentives

The aimof wars is a disputed subject in contemporary civil war literature, the main bone ofcontention being whether or not wars are political and what such political warfare wouldimply (Hentz 2007: 20ff.; Kaldor 1999: 69-89; Goodhand and Humle 1999: 16). In thiscontext, a range of scholars have moved away from trying to find aims or associatedcauses of war. Instead, they have looked at the likelihood of the outbreak of war as well asincentives for actors to fight wars, with a particular focus on economic factors (Collier andHoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003). The relative importance of economic incentivesversus political motives remains disputed (Nathan 2005; Marchal and Messiant 2002), but itis clear that economic factors play a role both in the emergence and in the regionalisation ofconflicts. As the analysis revealed, cross-border trade networks were important in the

Tormented Triangle, for example by linking communities in peripheral areas and making


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weaponry available to armed groups. However, unlike other regional conflicts, lootableresources only play a marginal role in north-central Africa.

Conclusion and policy implications

Our analysis reveals that while the original causes of armed conflict in Darfur, eastern Chadand north-eastern CAR are largely separate, they have merged into a regional system ofconflict that transcends state boundaries. The emergence of this conflict system wasfacilitated by a series of interlinked structural conditions. These conditions includefragmented states, power vacuums in hinterlands, the presence of trans-border ethnic groups,a caste of young armed men in search of the next war as well as perpetual regional instability.The process of conflict regionalisation in north-central Africa is historically rooted. However,the current system of regional conflict was catalysed by the escalation of violence in Darfur in2003, and subsequently took shape as a result of events such as the inflow of refugees fromDarfur into eastern Chad, the increasing trans-border activities of armed groups and thecollapse of the Chad-Sudan alliance that had previously stabilised the region. The diagnosisof the crises in Darfur, eastern Chad and north-eastern CAR as one system of interlockedconflicts results in a series of policy implications. Most fundamentally, we argue that in thecontext of north-central Africa, the state-based approach that dominates the analysis of, andresponse to, armed conflict must be replaced with a regional lens.

This approach is relevant insofar as the worldwide attention generated by the Darfur conflicthas resulted in a multitude of interventions to manage armed conflict in Darfur, easternChad and north-eastern CAR. The region is host to the worlds largest humanitarian operationwith hundreds of relief agencies and thousands of humanitarian workers delivering aid tothose affected by armed violence, in particular displaced people. There have also beendifferent initiatives to make peace through mediation and negotiationsbetween rebel groupsand their respective governments The African Union (AU) mediated between the Darfurrebels and the Sudanese government in Abuja, Nigeria from 2004 to 2006; along with the UN,the AU continues to organise peace negotiations with the aim of ending the Darfur conflict.At the same time, Libya has tried to broker deals between various Chadian rebel groups andPresident Dby, while CAR is preparing for an inclusive political dialogue (Sguaitamatti2008). None of these processes has borne fruit and some have arguably made matters worse

by contributing to the fragmentation of the rebel groups (Lanz 2008b). North-central Africa isalso host to different peacekeeping missions, most notably the UN-AU Mission in Darfur(UNAMID), which at full deployment is supposed to comprise more than 25,000 personnel,and the European Union Force (EUFOR) that brought 3,500 well-equipped European soldiers

to Chad and CAR (Seibert 2007). Both missions have robust mandates that allow for theproactive use of force to protect civilians, but neither has made a significant difference in theregion so far.

The primary challenge in terms of conflict management is to recognise that north-centralAfrica constitutes a complex interconnected conflict system and consequently there is a needto devise, as Rubin (2001:7) argued in the context of regional conflict in the Great Lakes,sets of policies that address multiple arenas and sources of conflict within a given region inan integrated way. An important reason for the ineffectiveness of the current policies, asmentioned above, is that the regional dimension of the conflicts in Darfur, eastern Chad andnorth-eastern CAR has not been sufficiently addressed and thus a series of recommendations

for conflict managers derive from this deficiency. Thus it is important for humanitarian actorsto recognise that the distinction between refugees and internally displaced persons is largely


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artificial in the context of regionalised conflicts transcending state boundaries. Displacedpeople within their countries or across the border are similarly vulnerable and they shouldtherefore be awarded the same level of protection and assistance.

International mediators are essential to address the historic marginalisation of hinterlands by

brokering agreements between rebel groups and the government that determines the sharingof power and wealth between the centre and the peripheries. The AU is currently doing this inDarfur and similar processes could be useful in Chad and CAR as well, although these

processes should go beyond merely dividing state power and resources among the strongestarmed groups. While this classic approach to peacemaking is relevant, it is not sufficient.Parallel processes that engage the leadership of tribes in the region, not just one country, arecrucial, as are negotiations between governments of the region, in particular between Chadand Sudan. Regional organisations are probably the most suitable mediators given thelegitimacy they confer on a process and the broad support they can mobilise. However, therelevant sub-regional organisations either do not include all three states (i.e. theIntergovernmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa and the Economic

Community of Central African States) or they are discredited as tools of Libyas dominancein the region (i.e. CEN-SAD). The AU is therefore the most obvious mediator, although thefailure of the Abuja negotiations has negatively affected its image. To enhance the legitimacyof mediation processes in the region, the leverage of supporting structures, such as groups offriends, is key, even as the negotiations continue to take place under auspices of the AU andthe UN.

In terms of peacekeeping, the required response to regionalised conflicts is a mission thatspans across different countries. This is partly the case of EUFOR, which operates in Chadand CAR. However, the main axis of the Tormented Triangle is between Darfur and easternChad and at present the cooperation between EUFOR and UNAMID is limited. It is

imperative that the two missions improve their communication and collaboration. If not,security provided in one area makes another area across the border relatively less secure,which risks undoing the humanitarian gains of peacekeeping altogether.

The logic of conflict management is short to medium-term. It is important to complementthese efforts with a long-term conflict resolution approach that aims to tackle the structuralcauses that led to the formation of the Tormented Triangle. Three initiatives appear to be

particularly important in this context. First, a sustained effort should be made by internationalactors to improve governance in CAR, Chad and Sudan. Conflicts are less likely to erupt if a

broad range of political parties, ethnic groups and regions are included in government.Inclusivity will also enhance the governments legitimacy and improve its capacities to

govern. At the same time, it is important to go beyond the central government and appreciatethe governance capacities of other actors. In this context, efforts to strengthen localgovernance structures in areas affected by conflict will be particularly useful in terms of

preventing armed violence in the future. International actors have significant leverage in CARand Chad and to a lesser extent in Sudan. If they devise the right incentive packages it would

be possible to improve governance in the long run.

Second, conflict resolution in north-central Africa requires comprehensive disarmament,demobilisation and reintegration programmes in order to neutralise transnational groups ofcombatants with fluid loyalties. Contrary to such programmes in the past, the emphasis must

be on their sustainability. This means that they must address the social stigmatisation of

combatants as well as their livelihood needs so that their reintegration into civilian life lastslonger than the beginning of the next war. Third, it is essential to build the capacity of tribal


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groups to resolve conflicts over land. Indeed, fertile land is scarce in the semi-arid climate ofnorth-central Africa and competition over land has been an important source of conflict in theregion. Inclusive processes are required to address the land needs of nomads as well assedentary farmers and to activate traditional mechanisms for land sharing.

The challenge of pacifying the Tormented Triangle is considerable and will continue tooccupy the international community in the future. The first step, however, is to get thediagnosis right by recognising that a process of regionalisation has taken place andtransformed armed conflict in such a way that conventional instruments of conflictmanagement and resolution are no longer effective. A new regional approach is needed.


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Abbreviations

AU African Union

CAR Central African Republic

CEN-SAD Community of the Sahel-Saharan States

EUFOR European Union Force

FAN Forces armes du nord

FROLINAT Front de libration nationale du Tchad

FUC Front uni pour le changement

JEM Justice and Equality Movement

SLM/A Sudan Liberation Movement

SPLA Sudan Peoples Liberation ArmyUFDR Union des forces dmocratiques pour le rassemblement

UNAMID UN-AU Mission in Darfur


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WP33 Kripa Sridharan, Regional Organisations and Conflict Management: comparing ASEAN and SAARC,(March 2008)

WP34 Monica Herz, Does the Organisation of American States Matter? (April 2008)WP35 Deborah Fahy Bryceson, Creole and Tribal Designs: Dar es Salaam and Kampala as Ethnic Cities in

Coalescing Nation StatesWP36 Adam Branch, Gulu Town in War and Peace: displacement, humanitarianism and post-war crisis

(April 2008)WP37 Dennis Rodgers, An Illness called Managua (May 2008)WP38 Rob Jenkins, The UN peacebuilding commission and the dissemination of international norms (June

2008)WP39 Antonio Giustozzi and Anna Matveeva, The SCO: a regional organisation in the making (September

2008)WP40 Antonio Giustozzi, Afghanistan: transition without end (November 2008)WP41 Niamatullah Ibrahimi, At the Sources of Factionalism and Civil War in Hazarajat (January 2009)WP42 Niamatullah Ibrahimi, Divide and Rule: state penetration in Hazarajat, from monarchy to the Taliban

(January 2009)WP43 Daniel Esser, Who Governs Kabul? Explaining urban politics in a post-war capital city (February

2009)WP44 Francisco Gutierrez et al, Politics and Security in Three Colombian Cities (March 2009)

WP45 Marco Pinfari, Nothing but Failure? The Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council as Mediatorsin Middle Eastern Conflicts (March 2009)WP46 Anna Matveeva, The Perils of Emerging Statehood: civil war and state reconstruction in Tajikistan

(March 2009)

These can be downloaded from the Crisis States website (www.crisisstates.com), where an up-to-date list of allour publications including Discussion Papers, Occasional Papers and Series 1 Working Papers can be found.


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