The Transpersonal Self

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The Art of the Transpersonal SelfTransformation as Aesthetic and Energetic Practice

A Dissertation Submitted to theDivision of Media and Communications

of the European Graduate Schoolin Candidacy for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

By

Norbert oppensteinerDecember !""#


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Acknowledgments

One guiding thread of this dissertation is the relationality of human existence. The becoming

of this dissertation just like the continued becoming of myself is a plurality, it is the

flowing together of different threads that form the nexus that is this dissertation, that form the

ever shifting nexus that I call my self!.

"y appreciation and profound thanks go to my supervisor, #rof. $olfgang %chirmacher for

the guidance he has given, a guidance which has made me grow, made me reach, or & in

different words fostered my becoming.

#rof. "artina 'aller and #rof. $olfgang (ietrich both read the first draft of this dissertation.

They have provided valuable critical feedback but my gratefulness runs much deeper than

that. )or years of inspiration I thank them both and $olfgang (ietrich for providing so many

of the key tunings for the following pages. The song may be mine but the tuning fork to

which the music is set has been provided by him.

This work finally would never have seen the light of day without *osefina. +our critical

reading, your support and love have provided the beacon on which to chart my course through

this adventure, this challenge. Te uiero mucho.


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Table of Contents

$hy write-..................................................................................................................................%tate of the /rt and (efinition of Terms.................................................................................... 0

1#ost2modernity.......................................................................................................................3

4erwindung 1twisting, distortion, fading2 and $eak Thinking ...........................................567ationality, Transrationality................................................................................................. 5The Transpersonal.................................................................................................................589omo :enerator....................................................................................................................53

Objective................................................................................................................................... ;;"ethodological iet?sche and the @irth of :reek Tragedy ....................................................665.;. The /pollonian 9egemony............................................................................................6A5.6.


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8.=.


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Why write?

The uestion that needs to be asked at the beginning of every written work, and indeed even

more so at the beginning of a work of the si?e of a dissertation is why write? ot to escape what we are at the moment. >ot from some

fearful rejection of what is towards some perceived perfection or paradise of what might be,


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but in order to give this perpetual process of becoming a certain, temporary shape, try to

fashion it in a certain style and direction which always remain contingent.

The movement that might occur perhaps could be perceived, by oneself, as a step

towards the subjectively better. This subjectively better would simultaneously be the only

standard of measurement in a world without fetters, without a grand book of levers and no

overall system of coordinates in which this movement could be inscribed and measured for its

progress or direction. 9owever, in a certain (eleu?ian sense, we might still become the

cartographersof our own space the cartographers of a twisted path on a map that is a

constant work in progress and will need to be partially redrawn time and again 1(eleu?e and

:uattari, 5A302.

I would thus like to answer these first two uestions, not uite coincidentally with a

uote from "ichel )oucault a uote which has haunted me and to which I have returned

again and again ever since I came across it in the fall of ;DD= I am not interested in the

academic status of what I am doing, because my problem is my own transformation J...K. $hy

should a painter work if he is not transformed by his own painting-! 1)oucault, 5AA0a 5652

$riting can so be perceived as part of a practice of the self, a transformation one

effects on oneself and the conditions of possibility for both this transformation and also this

very I! which has been cast here upon paper with such a seemingly easy stroke will be the

topic of this dissertation. If there is something likefreedomthen I would propose that it might

be found within a certain awareness of the self and of its possibilities of becoming, the

transrationaland transpersonalconditions of which it will be the work of this dissertation to

sketch.

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In the end this is also the task of theory in my opinion to contribute to a

transformation of the self, by showing how things could also be different instead of, as "ichel

)oucault 15AADb A2 says, legitimating what is already known!. The good life will not be

reali?ed in theory, in discourse alone we will not be saved, transformed or reconciled. +et

insofar as the continuous practice of becoming necessitates effecting a shift in the self, a

change of perspective, a certain work performed on oneself, finding out to what extent it is

possible to think differently for me is a crucial step towards a transformative practice and

towards opening a door to a different perception & even if it consists in the recognition of the

point in this process at which we have to let go of rational cognition.

In a personal vein my purpose thus is the following to think until that curious moment

at which knowledge has to give way to intuition and understanding, and so to also thinkingly,

but notpurelythinkingly, trace the path towards that transrational moment in which, through

a rebound effect of a certain constellation of knowledge and practice, a transformation of the

self can occur.

State of the Art and Definition of Terms

@efore any discussion of the contents can commence, some terms which will be used

freuently need clarification as to their meaning in the framework of this study. %ince several

of those terms also have been the topic of freuent, and often heated, debates in different

academic arenas it furthermore needs to be asserted at which point we shall enter the

discussion. %ome of those notions introduced in the following will be reassessed during the

course of this work, will be interpreted differently, evolved further, changed or altered.

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9owever, in order to do so a provisional starting point and location within the state of the art

needs to be established.

(Post)modernity

)ollowing $olfgang (ietrich I shall use the term modernity as designating the societal

project characteri?ed by >ewtonian physics,


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)ar from challenging only the philosophical assumptions of #latonicB%ocratic thought,

>iet?scheFs critiues also concern the long tradition deriving thereof which ultimately leads

into modernity. The division between real and apparent world, truth, objectivity 1scientificity2,

the self&grounded autonomous subject 1(escartesF cogito2 as well as notions of civili?ational

progress or the humanistic ideal of enlightenment so become the target of >iet?scheFs vitriolic

and dissolving attacks.

In the twentieth century this critical line of investigation has been followed up,

amongst others, by thinkers such as "artin 9eidegger 15AA62, $olfgang %chirmacher 15A362,

:ianni 4attimo 15A33M 5AA02, *ean&)ranNois Eyotard 15A3=M 5A332, *acues (errida 15A032,

:illes (eleu?e and )lix :uattari 15A3=M 5A302, "ichel )oucault 15A0;M 5A33b2 and *ean

@audrillard 15AA6M 5AA=2. This list is by no means exclusive or exhaustive but points to a

certain strand of critical thinking of importance for this dissertation. The field of critical

engagements with modernity is far from unified but reaches out in manifold strands, ranging

from the different version of #ostcolonialism to various waves of feminist critiues and ueer

and gender studies and #eace research.

This debate often has circled around a criticism or deconstruction of the metaphysical

1or metanarrative2 foundations of modernity.etaphysics here can be understood as any kind

of thinking that is grounded in ultimate foundations or first principlesM those principles from

which all other thinking can derive and which themselves remain beyond uestioning. *ean&

)ranNois Eyotard 15A3= ;0ff.2 renders those first principles as metanarratives, from which

legitimation for further 1scientific2 knowledge originates, but which themselves are not open

to proof of rational argument. Eyotard shows how this concern with legitimation via first

principles arises with #lato and his cave allegory and continually resurfaces as for example

in /ristotle or in (escartesF !iscourse on ethod 15A3= ;A2. $ith (escartesF "ogito the

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thinking subject is posited as an autonomous and self grounded I,! and so is supposed to

provide the stable foundation from which all further argumentation can derive. Eyotard calls

this foundation the story of the mind! 15A3= ;A2. It is a story, or 1meta2narrative,because on

its own premises it can neither be proven nor refuted.

This critiue calledpostmodern so concerns itself with making visible and contesting

the exclusionary tendencies inherent to metaphysics. %uch metaphysical or, in the words of

:ianni 4attimo 1;DD82 also strong thinking, is seen as ultimately leading to violence. To

illustrate this point about violence, "ichel )oucault 15A33b2 sets out to show how the

historical establishment of reason is not the result of an ever more inclusive historical

advance of progress, but that reason is, on the contrary, built on the constitution and

subseuent exclusion of unreason as madness.

$ith the same author the #latonic relation between truth, power and knowledge is

inverted 1)oucault, ;DDDg2. In the #latonic understanding, )oucault asserts, truth and

knowledge could be opposed to 1political2 power and therefore could work as its corrective.

$hile it thus remained possible for #lato to pit a powerless truth against a truthless power,!

1)oucault, ;DDDg 662 )oucault inverts this relation by pointing out that in fact, knowledge

and power advance together and that truth is only ever the result of a specific strategic

constellation between them 1;DDDg2.

In the wake of the postmodern critiue, concepts like the truth, the autonomous and

self grounded subject, progress, civili?ation, solvability of conflicts and even peace, have

therefore become sites of contestation and debate. >either of those terms can today be taken

for granted any more and many pertinent uestions from different directions have been raised

about what has been excluded through the tradition of thought which builds on them or uses

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them as if they were pre&given and would remain the ever same, unwavering and unchanging

through the times.

$e can thus grasp the postmodern, in the words of *ean&)ranNois Eyotard, as

incredulity towards metanarratives! 1Eyotard, 5A3= xxiv2 & a definition from which

$olfgang (ietrich derives the following

#ostmodernity should not be misunderstood as the historical epoch that follows

modernity, although the prefix post! might suggest this. 9owever, post! also refersto a reflection of something, in this case, of modernity. Therefore, post! indicates that

the social value system of the time span that it circumscribes refers to a condition

which, although preceding it, still has effects and remains relevant at a particular point

in time. If this were not the case, the prefix post! would be redundant. #ostmodernity,

then, describes the state of mind of one or several generations that have had to

painfully disassociate themselves from the great truths of the previous epoch, without

having found for themselves a new unitary system of reference. This state could be

described by the word dis&illusionment. 1(ietrich and %Lt?l ;DD8 ;362

9owever, regarding the critiue of these first principles, it is also becoming increasingly

obvious that what has started with >iet?scheFs scathing analyses has up until now remained

largely a critiue that, contesting rationality and pointing out its limits and lacunaes, itself still

advanced by rational means

;

.The critiue of rationality by rational methods in the end seems

to have come full circle, in the recent reali?ation of an increasing dis&illusionment about dis&

illusionment, or as :ianni 4attimo refers to it, disenchantment about disenchantment

JwKe are all by now used to the fact that disenchantment has also produced a radical

disenchantment with the idea of disenchantment itselfM or in other words, that

;%ee also (ietrich, ;DD8b ;8

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demythification has finally turned against itself, recogni?ing that even the ideal of the

elimination of myth is a myth. 14attimo, 5AAA ;A2

/t its limit point there today arises the uestion of whether the postmodern rejection of

metaphysics and subseuent dis&illusionment has proven to be tenable and indeed livable.

)rederic *ameson 15A3= xii2 seems to arrive at a very similar uestion when asking whether

the great master&narratives, which *ean&)ranNois Eyotard deemed to be unsustainable, have in

fact disappeared or might not, much rather, merely have gone underground,! towards a

continuing but now unconsciouseffectivity as a way of thinking about! and acting in our

current situation!.

$hat in conseuence can be seen emerging in current discussions having taken note

of the necessary shortcomings of a critiue of rationality itself carried out by rational means

are uestions revolving around transrationality and transpersonality. This dissertation and the

topics dealt with therein have to be seen as part of this emerging debate which, while still

anchored with one foot in postmodern grounds, is already reaching out with the other,

wondering whether it will dare to put its foot down and where it might land. This step,

wherever it finally will land, should in any case not be interpreted as a step forward, a step

beyond or one that perhaps overcomes an obstacle, but much rather as a twistingmovement 1a

$erwindung2. The current work therefore begins from a postmodern vantage point, taking to

heart the incredulity towards metanarratives. 9owever, by the very token of this incredulity

postmodernity has largely remained a venture of critiue. The current work, while heeding the

importance of a postmodern critiue, wants to twist postmodernity towards a practice that is

no longer 1purely2 critical and rational but much rather affirmativeand transrational.

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Verwindng (twisting! distortion! fading) and Weak Thinking

The term $erwindungderives from the thinking of "artin 9eidegger 15A062 and it is here

used in :ianni 4attimoFs 15AA=, 5AA0, ;DD82 interpretation of 9eideggerFs thoughts. $hile

being highly critical of the metaphysical tradition and the violence that is inherent to it,

4attimo points out that this tradition still forms part of the historical hori?on from which

contemporary thinking arises. 4attimo sees the rejection of metaphysics in the light of a truer,

more adeuate description of reality as impossible, because such thinking & by the very same

token of a categorical rejection & would fall back into the metaphysical categories it tries to

critici?e 15AA02. The relation that one can establish with metaphysics is thus not one of

overcoming as the perpetual movement of higher unifications which increasingly become

more true & but on the contrary, one that cannot do otherwise than establish a relation of

$erwindung one of resigned acceptance of continuation, of distortion! 14attimo, 5AA0 62.

4attimo so contrasts the notion of overcoming 1%berwinden2 with the 9eideggerian$erwindung 15AA0 6, =2. $hile the former carries the connotation of a step towards an

increasingly accurate correspondence to the objective truth, the former, while giving up on the

notion of an objectively discernable true world, still accepts metaphysics as part of its heritage

to which it resigns itself, but from which it also heals itself and thus, while giving this

metaphysical heritage a certain space, simultaneously twists and distorts! 15AA0, 62 it into a

new place

@ut since it is not a case of correcting the errors of metaphysics with a more

objectively true vision of how things stand, the way out of metaphysics is shown to be

more complicated. $e do not have before us any objectivity that, once discovered in

what really is, could provide a criterion by which to change our thoughts, as though

metaphysics might be set aside as an error or a discarded and worn&out piece ofclothing. J...K This term J$erwindungK, preserving also a literal connection with

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%berwinden, to overcome, means, however, in practice to recover from an illness

while still bearing its traces, to resign oneself to something. 14attimo, 5AA0 5532

%imilarly, 9eideggerFs Cnglish translator *oan %tambaugh 1in 9eidegger, 5A06 3=2 points out

that "artin 9eideggerFs $erwindungis not identical to overcoming in the sense of something

that is defeated! and left behind! or that one has gotten rid off!. $erwinden, she asserts,

also has the connotation of incorporating,! however without the notion of being elevated by

such incorporations into new and progressively higher unities. $erwindung, especially in the

connotation given to it by 4attimo so operates in conceptual proximity to the idea of a

working&through modernity 1durcharbeiten2 as *ean&)rancois Eyotard 15AA=2 has coined it.

)rom such an understanding of $erwindung :ianni 4attimo develops his own concept

of weak thinking 1;DD82. &eak is a form of thinking which is aware of its own situatedness

and contingency, takes into account the historical background against which and within which

it is formed 1owing to what 9eidegger calls the thrownness! of being62 and thus, per

definition cannot occur according to a logic of verification and of rigorous demonstration,

but only by means of that old, eminently aesthetic instrument called intuition! 1;DD8 ;602.

&eak thinking is impure 1;DD8 ;;32 for it still contains parts of the 1strong2 metaphysical

tradition. 9owever, instead of rejecting this tradition, weak thinking embraces, declines and

distorts strong metaphysics.

/gainst the background of the magnificent metaphysical truth 4attimo so states the

weakness of the own thought from the very beginning and thus refrains from building another

grand narrative with an even better, and more perfected overarching truth 1CchavarrPa and

'oppensteiner, ;DD8 58A2. :oing beyond 4attimo this approach enables a positive re&

engagement with metaphysics, bewaring its violent tendencies but integrating and

6%ee also Thiele, ;DD6 ;5=.

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acknowledging it as part of our past and 1in a twisted form2 possibly also future. @oth the

concepts of weak thinking and $erwindung will recur freuently in this study and especially

the former will be developed further in the following chapters, in particular as in light of the

concepts of transrationality and transpersonality.

"ationality! Transrationality

/s regards the uestion of rationality and transrationality I take the former to be one of the

hallmarks of the project of modernity. I understand rationality as the method of proceeding by

reason. The term transrational has first been coined by 'en $ilber 15AAA, ;DDDa, ;DDDb,

;DD52. The prefix trans'derives from Eatin and signifies across, beyond, through 1$alch,

;DD; 5;D2. The transrational thus describes a process which, while also acknowledging

reason, transcends it.

In a #ost&9egelian interpretation this might result in the including and sublating

transcendence of rationality itself within transrationality 1(ufhebung2 & towards a higher unity.

In a non&dialectical, weak interpretation, instead of elevating and unifying, the rational is

twisted away from the purity of its form 1the rational so no longer serves as the proverbial

ultima ratio2 towards the acknowledgment of fields of experience beyond rationality. The

manner in which the /pollonian and (ionysian will be related in the course of this

dissertation thus gives rise to a transrationality which does not contain them both in a higher

unity, but is the always precarious and always different relation of two weak principles which

are not dialectical but are mutually part of each other and therefore contingent and co&

determining.

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The Trans#ersonal

The term transpersonal is also freuently used in this study. It shares with the transrational not

just the prefix trans', but also its origin in transpersonal psychology It derives from the field

of transpersonal psychology and has been introduced by /braham "aslow 1@attista, 5AA8

;2. )or use within the psychological field it has been defined in the following way

Transpersonal, meaning beyond the personal, refers to development beyond

conventional, personal or individual levels. "ore specifically, transpersonal refers to

development beyond the average, although such higher functioning turns out to be

more common than previously was thought. Transpersonal development is part of a

continuum of human functioning or consciousness, ranging from the prepersonal

1before the formation of a separate ego2, to the personal1with a functioning ego2 to

the transpersonal 1in which an ego remains available but is superseded by more

inclusive frames of reference2. 1%cotton, 5AA8a 62

In differentiation to such a psychological understanding of transpersonality I will be

using the term in a more philosophical connotation. $hat is thus of interest here is not so

much a model of the developmentof the self as it is proposed for example by developmental

psychologyor 'en $ilberFs 15AA8, ;DDDa2 concept of an expansive and including model of an

evolutionary self which goes through successive phases becoming ever more holistic more

encompassing, integrated and comprehensive.

$hat $ilber 15AA82 outlines might also be termed an (rt of the )elf, however he

describes the hierarchicalversion of such an /rt, striving for ever higher forms of reali?ation

and implying a developmental telosinherent to all of humanity. )or $ilber, development of

the self implies an unfolding through pre&given and describable stages, until the self reaches

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first its mature egoic form 1the centaur2 and subseuently transcends this form into higher

stages of being 1subtleand causal2. On each level the self materiali?es as an individual form

1surface structure, the personal and concrete expression2 which is shaped and determined by

the pre&given, unconscious structural potentials and limitations! 1$ilber, 5AA8 =82 specific

to that level 1deep structures2.

$hile my project thus shares many common spaces with the work of $ilber 1as

indeed the very terms transpersonal and transrational also signify2, one crucial difference

regards the uestion of those developmental hierarchies. In comparison, my /rt of the %elf is

set against a more open hori?on, whose transformations are intuited by the experiencing

person and whose necessities are co&derived from the concrete surroundings without,

however, embedding those transformations into an overall frame of universal reference. In

simple terms it might be stated that what will be proposed here is more the 1relational,

situational2 outsideperspective rather than $ilberFs view which turns the ga?e insidethe self

to find the pre&existing potentialities which for him always already slumber inside us=.

In the present dissertation the transpersonal will be understood much rather in

connection with certain theories of subjectivity 1and subjectivation2 which problemati?e the

idea of a single, coherent and stable individual subjectivity 1the


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the uestions of being and becoming. In summary, it can be concluded that the present work

is an /rt of the transpersonal%elf because it 152 acknowledge the individual person as one

form of experienced existence, yet also 1;2 intuits larger frames of reference as for example

the notion of an aesthetic&energetic sphere which will be developed throughout this

dissertation.

$omo %enerator

Of special importance for this dissertation is the ground that has already been covered by

$olfgang %chirmacher 15A3A, 5AA5, 5AA=a, 5AA, 5AA8, ;DDD, ;DD5, ;DD, ;DD0a, ;DD0c2

with his concepts of homo generator and artificial life. @oth concepts raise the uestion of

post&metaphysical living and ask how a good life can still remain possible for humanity at the

dawn of the twenty first century. "oving from a 9eideggerian being&in&the&world to a

(eleu?ian being&for&the&world 1%chirmacher, 5AA8 82 homo generatorfocuses on the active

self&generative powers of the human being. %chirmacher 1;DD0c =2 here recurs to 9annah

/rendtFs concept of natality, as the explosive ability in politics and private life to start a new

life at any moment.!

9umans, %chirmacher 1;DD0c2 asserts, have always been a self&generating beings but

it is only with homo generator that this feature characteri?ed in the context of this

dissertation as the art of giving oneFs life a certain, distinct, form comes to the forefront. /s

human beings we are therefore artificial by nature! as it is within human nature to become

differently, to use the technologies at our disposal in order to turn ourselves into somebody or

1in the /ge of >ew "edia, of Internet and %econd Eife2 something else. This sets in motion a

process of becoming which is never finished

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$ith openness as our existential taste and co&evolutionary power as our design, 9omo

:enerator favors eternal revisions and safeguards the freedom of creation.

1%chirmacher, ;DDD ;2

/omo generatoralso acknowledges that what is necessary for agelingendes 0eben1a life of

accomplishment2 is a certain forgetfulness. The good life, the successful life, indeed, can

never be grasped theoreticallyM it remains cognitively elusive, rationally ungraspable. $hat

does remain possible is to attain glimpses of this good life of which we so can become

vaguely aware!, but always on the condition that we need to forget at once! what we have

glimpsed 1%chirmacher, ;DDD =2. /nd yet, we all live this good life, every day, without being

aware of it and, in fact, also on the conditionof not being 1rationally2 aware of it.

Theoretically, the gelingendes 0eben remains unattainable, it is impossible to pre&

design it according to some master&plan, but practically we live it every day. It occurs, as

%chirmacher says behind our backs!8. $hat he so proposes is an affirmative practice of

living. It is a practice because it wants to be lived instead of just being theoretically

determined and it is affirmativefor it acknowledges and embraces all facets of life.

It is this double move of simultaneously turning away from 1strong2 metaphysics while

also sidestepping the traps of rationalism which characteri?e an important element for this

dissertation. /omo generatorprovides a conceptual model for what is at stake here the

uestion of how an art of living can concretely be envisionedM an art of living which makes

use of different methods and techniues of a transformation of the self and takes to heart

)riedrich >iet?scheFs 15A0= ;6;2 premonition that what is needful!, is to give style! to

8Quote from personal notes taken during $olfgang %chirmacherFs lectures at the Curopean :raduate %chool1C:%2 during the summer of ;DD8.

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oneFs existence, without, by this very same token, believing that the good life could be

planned.

In this undertaking of using the technologies available for generating the own life

$olfgang %chirmacher and "ichel )oucault agree when the former concludes that everyone

is capable of developing an aesthetic self!! 1%chirmacher, 5A3A 2. The very artificiality of

human life, in fact, makes the styli?ation of such an aesthetic self part of human nature. The

self!, %chirmacher 1;DD0c 02 concludes, exists in no other way than as engaged in form&

giving!0. /s regards those technologies of existence $olfgang %chirmacher places a strong

emphasis on the creative potential of the >ew "edia while the focus in this dissertation will

be placed more on those technologies of the self which can be derived from the realm of

transpersonal psychology and theater practices.

The ethic which %chirmacher proposes in light of this inability to plan a gelingendes

0ebenis an ethics characteri?ed by several features

Gelingen eigt sich allein im nachhinein, vollieht eine 2rdnung, deren erkmale

3nberechenbarkeit, 0eichtigkeit und Gelassenheit sind4 1%chirmacher, 5AA 23

Gnpredictability, lightness and, most importantly Gelassenheitare three of the characteristics

determining for a Gelingensethik the ethics concomitant to the accomplished life. This

ethics is completed with a commitment to compassion 1%chirmacher, 5A3A2. This compassion

has to be understood not as an abstract compassion towards an other that is known only at one

remove, but as a concrete practice which is embodied in a physically conveyed empathy!

0Translation by !aniel Theisen at httpBBhome.bway.netBdannyBwolfgangB,last accessed *++-.++-.3/ccomplishment J:elingenK shows itself only after the fact, and brings about an order whose characteristicsare unpredictability, lightness and releasement J:elassenheitK.! Translation by !aniel Theisen athttpBBhome.bway.netBdannyBwolfgangB,last accessed *++-.++-.

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1%chirmacher, 5A3A 2. 7ecogni?ing oneFs own face in the suffering of others gives

compassion an understanding of a basic connectivity of life which goes beyond mere

individuality. (rawing on both the $estern philosopher /rthur %chopenhauer and the Indian

Gpanishads, %chirmacher asserts

!as Gaukelbild, das uns vormacht wir seien vom 0eiden aller 5reatur durch

6ndividualit7t gesch%tt, erbricht, und 2pfer und T7ter erkennen sich als dieselben4

T(T T$( ()6 8 das bist du4 !ie itleidshandlung ist ethisch bedeutsam, gerade

weil sie nicht auf die einelne )ituation ielt, sondern mit dem 9ganen !asein der

&elt und dem 0ose der enschheit: verbunden ist4 1%chirmacher, 5AA=b 02A

$ith that %chirmacher asserts the ethical dimension which is inextricably linked to the

concept of homo generator. The generative function of the natality inherent to homo

generatoris thus not to be understood as a facile anything goesbut on the contrary always

comes together with the task of facing up to oneFs life. / gelingendes 0ebenis one for which

also responsibility needs to be claimed and affirmed, but without, however, for this reason

falling into a culture of guilt. *ust like herBhis failures belong to homo generatorin a similar

manner as the own successes, homo generatoralso rejects the blame for everything you have

not started yourself! 1%chirmacher, ;DD0b =2.

@oth failures and successes are but two sides of the same coin if they are approached

with the ethical fourfold of compassion, Gelassenheit, lightness and trust that the

unpredictability inherent to life will lead towards thegelingendes 0ebenwithout our planning.

AThe mirage which leads us to believe that by our individuality we are protected from the suffering of allcreature shatters, and victim and perpetrator recogni?e themselves as the same T/T T4/" /%I that is you.The act of compassion is ethically significant exactly because it does not aim at the single situation but connectsto the whole being&there of the world and to the fate of humanity!.! Translation by ;orbert 5oppensteiner

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&b'ectie

The uestion which drives this dissertation is the ages&old uestion of how is one to live?If

we understand postmodernity, like it was defined above, as incredulity towards metanarratives

and if we therefore assume that the tenets of a strong truth which in former times could serve

to ground a way of living like the believes in progress, enlightenment, civili?ation,

development, but also in religions like


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1/pollonian2 and energetic 1(ionysian2 practice. I will thus, approximate an (rt of the

Transpersonal )elf.

)rom the ethical uestion of how is one to live?Gltimately a double objective derives

)irst to sketch a transpersonal art of living and a fashioning of the self beyond morals and,

secondly, to show how such an undertaking also takes us withpostmodern philosophy out of

postmodernity and re&opens the plane of transcendence towards a transrationality.

In order to achieve this objective, I will first re&take some critical moments of $estern

philosophy, interpreting with )riedrich >iet?sche and $olfgang (ietrich the current situation

as(pollonian /egemony. %econdly, I will show the specific effects of this hegemony on the

forms ofsubjectivation, and establish with "ichel )oucault that a subjectivity, which is open

to transformation, necessarily has to be thought without recurring to either morals or the

strong category of the Truth.

Thirdly, in counterpoint to the /pollonian hegemony, I will develop a concept of art

and establish how, through relating the(pollonian once more with the!ionysian, an(rt of

Transformation becomes possible, which is perceived in relationality and aims for a

1verwindende2 transfiguration of the subject through putting into dynamic play both

(ionysian 1energetic2 and /pollonian 1aesthetic2 elements. )ourthly, this /pollonian

(ionysian interplay shall be linked to a radicali?ed version of the )oucauldian understanding

of power towards an energetic power. / transpersonal idea of subjectivity will be developed,

perceiving subjectivation as perpetual process within an aesthetic&energetic sphere of

becoming in severality.

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)ifthly, I will complement this(rt of the Trans'personal )elfwith an ethics that does

not derive its validity from a formal code of behavior and which is thus not a moral ethics, but

on the contrary an aesthetic and energetic oneM and will, sixthly, draw out several concrete

practices of the self, as they are applicable and usable in the technological age of the twenty

first century.

I will finally show how such a trans&rational practice ultimately takes us beyond the

field of theory back into a realm of experiential understanding beyond postmodernity, a weak

transcendent realm where 1scientific, rational2 knowing has to give way to the intuition of

understanding.

ethodological Considerations

The main methodological problem posed by this dissertation is reflected in the uestion of

how one can thinkingly and theoretically approach something which eludes theoriing- 9ow

is it possible to approximate theoretically something which is beyond rational description-

The main method proposed in this dissertation starts from an analysis, recombination and

interpretation of certain practices, certain works which, following )oucault, the self performs

on itself.

)rom here I will trace a connection from these practices to a type of experience which

is linked to a certain understanding of the self leading further to an art of living. This method,

however, at first sight might be seen to hit a barrier exactly at the very moment when an

argument for a limitation of the reach of theory in favor of the practice of living is put forth.

/t this point recourse to empirical methods might perhaps appear logical.

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9owever, in light of the implicit critiue of empiricism that is also inherent in this

work, any empirical research leading to scientific knowledge will consciously be avoided

when encountering this point of theoretical rupture in favor of an argument for e


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The termphilosophy andphilosopher for the purposes of this work are therefore taken

in the broader sense of the word, including as my main sources the works of "ichel )oucault

and )riedrich >iet?sche. "y affiliation with philosophy ends whenever it is stipulated that in

order to philosophi?e one needs to have a system which is something I do not claim for

myself. It is in this respect that I follow "ichel )oucault, who defines philosophy not by a

certain system or syntax but via its content philosophy for )oucault is the 1critical2

preoccupation with uestions of truth and freedom55. It is, he asserts, an activity or movement

The movement by which, not without uncertainty, dreams and illusions, one detaches

oneself from what is accepted as true and seeks other rules that is philosophy. The

displacement and transformation of frameworks of thinking, the changing of received

values and all the work that has been done to think otherwise, to do something else, to

become other than what one is that too, is philosophy. 1)oucault, 5AA0l 6;02

This movement which, according to )oucault, makes a venture philosophical is also the

movement of becoming differently. This activity of detaching oneself from what has been

held as true is simultaneously a movement of freedom.

On my own trajectory & which I understand as philosophical in this sense & I so remain,

without chagrin or regret, an assemblerwho takes what he needs but also has no ualms to cut

and continue with something else, if what previously has been found no longer fits his

purposes5;. It is in this sense that I intend to take serious )oucaultFs famous statement that he

wishes his books to be read like a kind of tool&box, which others can rummage through to

find a tool which they can use however they wish in their own area! 1)oucault, 5A0=2.

55%ee also %chmid, ;DDD ;8A.5;I owe a debt of thanks to #rof. (r. "artina 'aller for reminding me of the strings that come attached if onetakes up the mantle of the academic discipline of philosophy. %ince I have no intention of letting this work be

pulled by those strings I prefer to sever them right away and choose a path which, while perhaps more eclectic,hopefully is no less meaningful.

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iet?sche have been chosen as guiding grid, also because they lend themselves

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to both a postmodern, immanent, interpretation but can also be used towards providing

pathways for a re&opening of the plane of transcendence and an art of existence. Gltimately

those >iet?schean and )oucauldian concepts are so transposed to a series of practices and

techniues of living derived from a different tradition and different cultures of origin, once

more following @raidottiSs idea of transposable concepts as nomadic notionsF that weave a

web connecting philosophy to social reality, theoretical speculation to concrete plansM

concepts to imaginative figurations! 1@raidotti, ;DD8 02.

/s far as the use of sources goes, the main bulk of research so has undoubtedly been

conducted on the works of "ichel )oucault and furthermore on )riedrich >iet?sche. $ith

those two authors I have ventured to stick as closely as possible to their own texts, with two

main rules for exceptions. The first one consists in those authors who are of such an

importance in their own right that it might be impossible not to familiari?e oneself to some

extent with their works. This goes for :illes (eleu?e in general and for his treatises on

)oucault1(eleu?e, 5A332 and >iet?sche 1(eleu?e, 5A362 in particular, as well as for :ianni

4attimoFs;ietsche1;DD;2. The second exception was made for literature drawing on those

two authors and of such relevance for the state of the art of the topic at hand that they cannot

be ignored $ilhelm %chmidFs(uf der )uche nach einer neuen 0ebenskunst1;DDD2 would be

one such example and in a similar vein I am indebted to the works of @racha Cttinger on the

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many of the ideas developed in this work. The third case fitting neither rule nor exception is

the work of $olfgang (ietrich 15AA3, ;DD8aM ;DD8b, ;DD8c2 and especially but not

exclusively his interpretation of )riedrich >iet?scheFs /pollo and (ionysius. $olfgang

(ietrichFs influence on this study rightly belongs right next to "ichel )oucaultFs and

)riedrich >iet?scheFs. $hile the mistakes I might have made of course are my own, it

remains to be said that without his inspiration and guidance none of this would actually have

been possible. The freuent and crucial reliance I make on especially the energetic

understanding of the (ionysian is drawn from $olfgang (ietrichFs work.

/ few further words on the use of the works of )riedrich >iet?sche and "ichel

)oucault are in order. /lthough the understanding that can be gleaned from )riedrich

>iet?scheFs /pollo and (ionysius 15A80, 5A83, 5A0=2 are one of the guiding threads for this

dissertation, I originally had intended to predominantly draw from >iet?scheFs early period,

making an exception only for the The Gay )cience 15A0=2 which truly is his lifestyle book.

This, however, has proven to be impossible since the /pollonian and (ionysian surface at

different times throughout >iet?scheFs whole work and really can not be separated from many

other crucial concepts of his thought. In the end I think that this study has profited from not

sticking to the original working plan in this case.

The works of "ichel )oucault have provided more of a difficulty to narrow down

from the beginning, especially since his influence is so prevalent throughout this whole

research work. Gltimately I have decided to focus on his middle and late period of work, the

reasons for which I think are fairly apparent.

The middle period shows his pre&occupation withpower, discourse andpractices, and

it will be an energetic re&interpretation of power around which a lot of the work of my

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dissertation hinges 1)oucault, 5A0=, 5A00a, 5A00b, 5A3Da, 5AADa, ;DDDc2. The late period is

identified commonly with the %econd and Third 4olumes of the /istory of )elesh15A3Db2.5=If such a periodi?ation is taken to be admissible, then the early period would span the time from the original

)rench publication ofadness and "iviliation in 5A= until The 2rder of Things in 5A05. The middle periodwould gyrate around two major publications!iscipline and #unish in 5A0 and The &ill to 5nowledge in 5A08Mfollowed by the late period with the above mentioned 3se of #leasure and "are of the )elf, both publishedshortly before )oucaultFs death in 5A3=, as corner&pieces.

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dedicated to an(rt of the )elf,is always also and even primarily a personal undertaking this

obviously influences my thoughts and writings. In this light also the works of theorists like

$olfgang %Lt?l 1;DD62, )rancisco "uUo? 1;DD82 and *ohan :altung 15AA82 can be found in

the following pages, providing an ethical background for this(rt of the Transpersonal )elf. I

hope it will become sufficiently clear in the course of this dissertation that ethical here by no

means implies moral.

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*+ A#ollo and Dionysis

9e JmanK is no longer an artist, he has become a work of art J...K.!1)riedrich >iet?sche, 5A80 602

The work of )riedrich >iet?sche stands at the cradle for large parts of twentieth century

philosophy. The influence of his thought spans the bridge from such diverse thinkers such as,

for example, "artin 9eidegger, %igmund )reud, and yes, "ichel )oucault. )oucault himself

has asserted this influence on his thought at several instances during his life and reading

>iet?sche at a young age might have been the same revealing experience it has been for so

many contemporary thinkers. $hat this chapter and the next one will focus on is to establish a

connection between these two thinkers, )riedrich >iet?sche and "ichel )oucault, a

connection which will fully become apparent in the third chapter and which will lead us

towards the(rt of the Transpersonal )elf.

To be more concise, the aim of this introductory chapter is to work out the first part of

an interpretive frame which shall serve as the theoretically guiding grid for the whole

dissertation. The second part of this frame will be provided in the subseuent chapter, when

we will be re&taking from a )oucauldian point of view some of the topics dealt with now

under a >iet?schean light. @oth together will constitute the frame from which one can

approach the main topic the(rt of the Transpersonal )elf.

This first chapter thus serves several purposes )irst we will approximate a certain

style of living as practiced by the ancient pre&%ocratic :reeks. $e will see how their

understanding of a distinct style of life is concretely derived from an interplay of two forces

the /pollonian and (ionysian. $e will secondly establish how this interplay was to be fatally

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disrupted and thirdly approach some possible conseuences of the subseuent/egemony of

(pollo and )uppression of the !ionysian.

Gltimately it will become necessary to supersede this 1like any2 theoretical frame at

the point at which theory fades. 9owever, in order to be able to twist 1verwinden2 our

theoretical foundations, we need to first make explicit what they are and this will be the

topic of chapter one and two.

*+*+ ,riedrich -iet.sche and theBirth of Greek Tragedy

$hen )riedrich >iet?sche published the Birth of Greek Tragedy15A802 as his first book in

530;, there might have been a myriad of purposes on his mind. %ome of them, indeed, are

fairly obvious and have been much discussed amongst those evident reasons one might

safely rate his hopes for a rejuvenation of Curope through :ermany 1a hope which he was

very soon to give up on2 and another obvious motive in this book is to give expression to his

admiration of $agner, for which he would in the preface to a later edition also critici?e

himself harshly.

9owever, there are two things of interest for what is at stake here which unite

>iet?scheFs first work with many of his later writings. The Birth of Greek Tragedy 15A802is

first of all, like also his later Gay )cience 15A0=2 a life'style book. They are both life&style

books in the sense that they both deal with a certain style of living understood as a way of

conceiving oneself and of giving oneFs life a distinct shape. 9owever, while the Gay )cience

is a work of a more prospective kind and so deals with >iet?scheFs reflections on his own way

of living and with the ways of living he saw during his time or wished to see coming or bring

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about in the future, theBirth of Greek Tragedy deals with a way of living that at >iet?scheFs

time was long dead and gone.

In the latter >iet?sche 15A802 analyses the cosmovisions of the ancient :reeks. /nd he

chooses a rather peculiar approach at that, for he looks at :reek life&style through the lens and

focus of :reek tragedy an art form. The time span for which >iet?sche takes the :reek

tragedy into view is no coincidence It is the period of time in which something happens that

)oucault 15AA0e2 probably would call aproblematiation a practice which has hitherto been

taken for granted and accepted starts to lose its self&evidence, becomes problemati?ed and

thus appears in discourse as a uestion and problem. >iet?sche deals with the crucial time&

span in :reek history in which in the realm of art the ancient tragedy withered to be replaced

through the >ew /ttic comedy. %imultaneously, this is also the period in which philosophy

started to appear on the scene in its modern form with the advent of %ocrates and #lato.

$hat >iet?sche 15A802 suggests is that this shift is more than a coincidental

simultaneity between a change in the realm of arts 1replacement of the tragedy by /ttic

comedy2 and in the realm of thought 1a new system of thinking which arises with #lato2. 9e

contends that together with those two occurrences a whole way of living and perceiving the

world undergoes a fundamental change and break.

This in turn brings us to the second interesting pre&occupation which already can be

found in theBirth of Greek Tragedy and which would stay with >iet?sche for most of his

creative life the two principles of the /pollonian and (ionysian. /nd it is those two

principles, or to be more precise the change of relationbetween those two principles and the

different ways in which they are portrayed which, in >iet?sche, connects the uestion of

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1%ocraticB#latonic2 philosophy with the uestion of the :reek tragedy and ultimately the way

of living.

/t this point we need to take a closer look in order to discern how exactly one of those

three elements 1the shifting perception of the (ionyisanB/pollonian relation2 traverses the

other two elements the life and death of tragedy in the realm of the arts and the onset of

%ocraticB#latonic thought. $ith $olfgang (ietrich 1;DD8c2 I will argue that what ultimately

emerges from this shift is a changed cosmovision, a changed perception of self and universe

and how those two relate to each other.

)ollowing theBirth of Greek Tragedy in the chronology of its account let us begin

with an approach to the realm of the arts. This immediately leads to the :reek world of

divinities. In the form of /pollo and (ionysius the /ncient :reeks had the peculiar habit of

venerating two gods of the arts and, as $olfgang (ietrich 1;DD8c 602 puts it they honored

both gods in kind!.

On the one hand, the deity of formal beauty, aesthetics and style or, as (ietrich renders

it, the :od of form /pollo. On the other hand, the wild revelries of the


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conditioning each other in the form of a co&dependence and dynamic inter&relation. iet?scheFs account of this time points to the conflictive nature of this interplay and to the

shifting relation between the two principles. /pollo and (ionysius were not always and at

each time evenly matched and eually balanced. The picture that so arises of :reek society is

thus of a way of perceiving the world in which, first, the two principles of form 1aesthetics2

and content 1energetics2 are perceived as mutually conditioning each other. It is, secondly, a

worldview which is inherently conflictive but which does not at all deny this potential for

conflict but, on the contrary, celebrates it as source of creative energy. /nd it is thirdly a

cosmovision in which the ever shifting relation between both elements is perceived as

absolutely necessary for human life to remain meaningfully possible.

The celebration and symbolic expression of this complex system in turn was :reek

tragedy. The ancient tragedy, far from being a mere form of amusement and far from being

focused solely on its theatrical happenings in the foreground, was an affirmation of this

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certain way of perceiving life, a clearly defined expression on how to deal with the uestions

of form and content or aesthetics and energy.

In the art of tragedy the aspects of both of those two gods surface in great detail The

/pollonian 1formal2 aspect gives the tragedy its structure, it serves to channel the (ionysian

energy. )or what is at stake in an(rt of the Transpersonal )elf it is important to reali?e that

>iet?sche furthermore renders this tragic /pollonian as the principle of individuation

according to stylistic and aesthetic criteria. Through the /pollonian structure the subject can

achieve individuality, separate form and distinctness. In :reek tragedy the /pollonian is thus

symboli?ed through the single, individual figure the tragic hero. Towards the end of his

creative life, >iet?sche would come back to this figure and describe the /pollonian the

following way

The word (pollonian! means the urge to perfect self&sufficiency, to the typical

individual,! to all that simplifies, distinguishes, makes strong, clear, unambiguous,

typical freedom under the law. 1>iet?sche, 5A83 6A2

The /pollonian so turns into the principle of individuation theprincipium individuationis

1>iet?sche, 5A80 682 which makes for individual identityand stability. The (ionysian on

the contrary is expressed on stage through the dithyrambic chorus. The chorus as main source

of tragic music pulls us into another direction The chorus is a collective which in itself and

through its music defies individuality and compels us towards a forgetting of ourselves,

towards losing and dissolving individuality in the wild effects of the music. The (ionysian

thus becomes the collectiveelement in which all individuality is potentially dissolved in an

energetic flow

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The word !ionysian! means an urge to unity, a reaching out beyond personality, the

everyday society, reality, across the abyss of transitoriness a passionate&painful

overflowing into darker, fuller, more floating statesM an ecstatic affirmation of the total

character of life as that which remains the same just as powerful, just as blissful,

through all changeM the great pantheistic sharing of joy and sorrow that sanctifies and

calls good even the most terrible and uestionable ualities of lifeM the eternal will to

procreation, to fruitfulness, to recurrenceM the feeling of the necessary unity of creation

and destruction.! 1>iet?sche, 5A83 6A2

The /pollonian soothes, calms and heals, but also asserts and fortifies individuality and

structure, whereas the (ionysian is the perpetual call to let go and give in, to lose inhibitions

and move from the conscious level towards the emotional, towards that which is not known

but felt vibrating through every pore and is thus experienced. :illes (eleu?e 15A38 552

provides us with an image of this intricate connection between the /pollonian form and the

(ionysian content (ionysius is like the background on which /pollo embroiders beautiful

appearances, but beneath /pollo, (ionysius rumbles.! On the background of the (ionysian

content the /pollonian forms of individuality become possible. %imultaneously, the

(ionysian pull towards dis&individuation is necessary for /pollonian individual beingto give

way to a new becoming.

)or the /ncient :reeks life was this always precarious balancing act between the two

principles, it became a taking into account and respecting both elements of life as well as their

conflictiveness. In this balancing act >iet?sche situates :reece not just geographically at the

border between two places which show the extreme prevalence of either the /pollonian and

(ionysian & 7ome and India

@ut from orgies a people can take one path only, the path to Indian @uddhism, and inorder that this may be endurable at all with its yearning towards the nothing it reuires

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the rare ecstatic states with their elevation above space, time and the individual. J...K

$here the political drives are taken to be absolutely valid, it is just as necessary that a

people should go to the path of the most extreme seculari?ation whose most

magnificent but also most terrifying expression may be found in the 7oman imperium.

J...K #laced between India and 7ome, and pushed toward a seductive choice, the

:reeks succeeded in inventing a third form. 1>iet?sche, 5A83 5;=, 5;2

In the negotiation between those two principles, between the formali?ing individuation of the

/pollonian and the energetic flow of the (ionysian, revelries the tragedy and the art of :reek

life took place.

To sum it up it is in this way that the /pollonianB(ionysian traverses the field of

tragedy and gives it meaning within a larger context, as crucial corner stones in a distinct

cosmovision characteri?ed by a striving for an always precarious balance between the

principles of form and content 1or aesthetic and energetic2 and the acknowledgment of

conflict as potentially creative, but in any case inevitable force in human life. $e now have

taken a look at the relation between two of our three elements 1the (ionysianB/pollonian and

the field of arts via tragedy2. @efore we can complete our first part of our theoretical grid and

draw the pertinent conclusions we will now need to take a look at the third element of

relevance for us in The Birth of Greek Tragedy& the %ocraticB#latonic moment.

*+/+ The A#ollonian $egemony

This brings us to the point of rupture within the :reek cosmovision, the point when the

balance between the two principles was to be fatefully upset. $ith the appearance of %ocrates

and #lato the scales were tipped in one direction and ultimately proved to be beyond the

possibility of regaining a balance. >iet?sche in this instance focuses on %ocrates, but it might

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be suggested that his disciple #lato here deserves our eual attention. $ith >iet?sche we will

so take a look at the changes occurring in the fifth century @.iet?sche, %ocrates 1together with Curipides2 is the first person to no longer

comprehend tragedy, to no longer grasp its emotional and energetic (ionysian pull. %ocrates,

the theoretical man! 1>iet?sche, 5A80 532 approaches the arts from a rational 1and thus

/pollonian2 point of view

5The latter necessarily has to remain a sketch. Important at this point is to draw out some of the lines of the/pollonian hegemony and subseuent developments in order to approximate why a search for alternatives might

be imperative. 9owever, the focus of this dissertation after all is on an /rt of the %elf and not so much on thehistorical overview which a more complete picture of the history of the /pollonianB(ionysian elements up until

modernity would necessitate. %uch a comprehensive account of 1Curopean2 history is neither possible norreuired here. $e will thus subseuently work out the elements of the /pollonian and (ionysian essential for anunderstanding of the /rt of the %elf, but will follow the details of the historical overview only as far as strictlynecessary.

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J...K %ocrates might be called the typical non'mystic, in whom, through a hypertrophy,

the logical nature is developed as excessively as the instinctive nature is developed in

the mystic. 1>iet?sche, 5A83 332

)or all his rational and intellectual capabilities which made him such a titan of his time, this

instinctive or intuitive element necessary to feel the (ionysian seems to have remained

underdeveloped in the %ocratic worldview. Eooking for structure, speech and aesthetics the

(ionysian element is thus downplayed. It is no coincidence that %ocrates found that he

himself was unable to play a musical instrument and places so much importance on

knowledge. Once more in the words of >iet?sche This is the new opposition the (ionysian

and the %ocratic and the art of :reek tragedy was wrecked on this! 1>iet?sche, 5A83 3;2.

@ut :reek tragedy had been, as we have just seen in the previous section, more than

just a form of theatrical amusement, it had been the expression of a cosmovision through

which a whole way of living had been celebrated. The shift that occurred when tragedy started

to wither might have been imperceptible at first, but it would turn out, as we shall see, to be a

fundamental break in $estern history. >iet?sche here in his account stays with %ocrates, but

for the purposes of this work it is necessary to follow the turn of events for a little longer and

also take %ocratesF most famous disciple into account. )or while it can be agreed with

>iet?sche that in %ocratesF theoretical man had found its origin, it was #lato who would begin

toformaliethis new way of life, which we will take a look at in the second chapter.

The foremost principle for this new way of life and founding ground for a new

cosmovision turned out to be a new category the Truth. Truth, at that point in history did not

constitute a new phenomenon as such, however it would become #latoFs lasting influence to

have taken this concept and filled it with a hitherto unknown meaning. Only with #lato does

truth become what we perceive of it today the Truth.

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In the #latonic understanding the truth is something that is derived from grasping

things as they really are truth is the effect obtained through an approximation to the pure

world of ideas, a world which lies beyond the mere and deceiving appearances and constitutes

a sphere where things reveal themselves in their essence. )oucault remarks on #lato that he

searched for the authentic, the pure gold! 1)oucault, 5AA3e 6==2. /nd he did so by taking a

look at the 1impure2 manifestations in the real world and then looking from above these

manifestations to a model, a model so pure that the actual purity of the pure! resembles it,

approximates it, and measures itself against it! 1)oucault, 5AA3e 6=2.

9aving the truth thus implies seeing things as they really are in their ideal and

abstract form which can be differentiated from the merely apparent world of everyday

existence. :ianni 4attimo sums up this #latonic invention of the truth

#latoFs stable and definitive world of ideas was supposed to guarantee the possibility

of rigorous knowledge of the mobile and mutable things of everyday existence.

14attimo, 5AAA ;A2

9owever, with positing such a world of ideas, the truth itself becomes an abstract category

which in principle works the same and is valid everywhere and at all times. Through the

history&making importance that is placed on the truth, the /pollonian elements of the formal,

the abstract and universal are favored. The truth can now become an abstract and formal

universalism an entirely /pollonian concept.

$olfgang (ietrich re&casts the >iet?schean interpretation of the /pollonianB(ionysian

once more by associating these two principles more explicitly with two tendencies on how to

organi?e a society the formal /pollonian becomes the moral worldview and the content of

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the (ionysian an energetic interpretation of the world. "oral in this sense implies the

interpretation of the world according to a formali?ed and universal code of conduct, an

absolute grid from which a division between good and evil can be derived and which

advances hand in hand with the formation of institutions. The energetic worldview, on the

other hand, strives towards harmony in the universe the harmony of society, nature, and

cosmos 1(ietrich and %Lt?l, ;DD82. 9armony reigns when the relations in a concrete place and

time are in order and balanced.

The energetic is thus primarily a uality of relationality, whereas morality is derived

from adherence to an externali?ed and abstract formal structure. Cxtrapolating this thought it

furthermore follows that the formal /pollonian worldview, as we have seen, also lends itself

easily to universali?ation, whereas the (ionysian harmony has to remain local and contingent.

$ith #lato and ever since in his wake /pollo is givenprecedence over (ionysius and with it

the category of the formal reigns within the "editerranean and in the cultures that derive from

this region

$ith the transition JRK to the concept of the one and only final truth the

"editerranean turns away from all its neighbours, invents philosophy as an

intellectual virtue and Curope as a cultural project. 1(ietrich, ;DD8c ;32

$ith the /pollonian the logical & the rational, the formal and aesthetic & triumphed over the

energetic and with it triumphed the political now understood as a formal and

institutionali?ed category of societal organi?ation. The first effects of this shift were so to be

perceived exactly in the field of societal organi?ation with the institutional development of

the city state of the#olis. The (ionysian fall from grace was fully corroborated later on with

the beginning of


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The reign of /pollo, the reign of the principle of form, came to its full force in the

institutionali?ations of iet?sche

calls $hite "enFs (isease! as the effect of the negation of (ionysian energy 1(ietrich,

;DD8c 602. The suppression of the energetic principle individually leads to blockages and, in

its extreme forms, to anomy. The formalistic reign of /pollo leads to the attempt at

controlling emotions via institutionali?ations and, in its extreme forms, to the fossili?ation and

petrification experienced within the modern state system and its ideas of tracked diplomacy

and conflict prevention.

On the effects of this /pollonian hegemony on a larger scale (ietrich points out that it

served to make Curope stubborn, self referential, strong and aggressive! 1(ietrich, 1;DD8a2

;2. On the outside this led to centuries of the Curopean expansionist drive of conuest and

colonialism which always went hand in hand with the


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claim to the Truth. "orals can so be defined as an abstract code of conduct, exclusively

regulating and setting down the universal precepts for the Good life. Through morals it

becomes possible to separate the Good from the@vil, the righteous from the sinners just as

through the :ood @ook the believers can be separated from thepagans.

Once the claim to ultimate truth and morals has been set down in principle, the 2thers,

those who do not follow this code of conduct, can at best be tolerated, but most of the time

they at least have to be shown the right path 1towards alternatively salvation of their souls, the

truth, development, progress, civili?ation or enlightenment2. /nd, as history has shown time

and again, once the claim to the absolute truth is established, also this negative and empty

tolerance is always endangered and can only too easily give way to that otherpractice of the


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reali?ation /ll efforts to aesthetici?e politics culminate in one point. That one point is war!

1@enjamin, ;DD; 5;52.

In a re&interpretation of @enjaminFs statement one could agree that with /pollo

rampant and unchecked the (ionysian is ever more pushed to the margins. The complete

formali?ation and aesthetici?ation of the social and political sphere can ultimately only be

hostile to life and become inhuman and can so lead to the complete rejection and

annihilation of the energetic force of life. The )ascist regimes from this point of view are not

the accidents of modernity but the culmination of its /pollonian tendencies.

@ut even if we do not push the argument until its logical conclusion in the )ascist

extremes, there still is something deeply disconcerting about the modern nation states and

their large scale statistical attempts at population management. The abstract and formal

figures of birth rates, life expectancies, crime rates, literacy and the subseuent measures

leading to hospitals per capita, literacy campaigns, sanitation projects, education policies,

reforms in penal laws etc. all those attempts to cull and optimiethis abstract figure of a

population according to predetermined statistical standards have been characteri?ed by

"ichel )oucault 15AADa and ;DD62 as biopowerin which all modern states are engaged in one

way or the other and to some extent.

@iopower is the power that does not need to kill the Other any more, that does no

longer regress to weapons and wars, but that just makes certain forms of Otherness disappear,

through certain policies disallowing certain lives, certain ways of living and thus, in the end,

certain people to exist. @ehind the functioning of biopower there is in each case an abstract,

formal, scientific or moral universalism, or in other words an /pollonian form.

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Gsing the terms of :illes (eleu?e and )lix :uattari 15A302, the /pollonian principle

is the one of the stratified & that whichsegmentsor territorialiesand ties the subject to the

principle of identity. Its expressions & discourse, structure, syntax & pull us in a certain

direction of individuation in the famous words of %tuart 9all 15AA8 8&5D2 they hail us into a

particular place and so induce the investment into pre&established identity categories. It is

only through this investment that those 1abstract2 categories are filled life. Eetting oneself be

hailed like this has, one the one hand, a stabili?ing effect on identity. On the other hand, it is

also petrifying and normali?ing. )alling into the /pollonian trap,performingidentities 1@utler

5AAA2 in line with those categories implies a discursive normali?ation of the subject according

to pre&given social standards. The fortified /pollonian principle so favors being, stability self&

sameness and is hostile to becoming, transformation and, ultimately, change.

@ut simultaneously also a door is opened when one reali?es with *udith @utler 15AAA2

that if identity isperformed, this implies that it can also be performed differently. It can be

performed not only in accordance with social standards but also in a disobedient way,

resignifying those identity categories to which we are being hailed. #erforming identity

differently implies refusing the standards of normality, like for example when Aueering the

boundaries of the white, >orth&/tlantic, heterosexual ideal of gender identity.

"ichel )oucault 1;DDDf 6682 points in a similar direction of resistance when stating

that maybe the task today is not to discover what we are, but to refuse what we are!. Those

kinds of resistance, however, always run the danger of entirely remaining within /pollonian

categories, in so far as becoming other! always implies becoming somebody else and the

danger of re&ensnarement is so never far off. In the seventies )oucault at first tried to

circumnavigate this danger with the gesture of a permanent, unceasing, refusal. Our task then

would be the perpetual displacement of identity, the unceasing becoming other.

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This rejection is fueled by the very )oucauldian virtue of the critiue 58of what has

made us who we are in order to find out how we could yet be different.50

The body without organsas conceptuali?ed by (eleu?e and :uattari 15A3=2 is yet

another kind of resistance along similar lines. /imed against the normali?ing discursive

practice par excellence the talking cureof )reudian psychoanalysis & the body without

organs is pure resistance. / body devoid of organs, (eleu?e and :uattari reason, is pure

surface, refusing the interiority which would make it an organism, something that is organi?ed

according to hierarchic, arborescent, principles. The body without organs so posits a barrier

against the thrust of psychoanalysis which is aimed at the interiorof the human being and

looks to decode the secrets that are hidden inside. In the schi?ophrenic rejection of the

bounded stable ego, in the refusal of all interiority and in the rhi?omatic exteriority of the

Thousand #lateaus, (eleu?e and :uattari aim to scramble and disrupt the organi?ing power of

the talking cure.

The line of thinking we will follow here, while drawing upon those approaches, is

different insofar as that what is aimed at is not so much a resistance to the /pollonian, but a

$erwindungof its hegemony. Total rejection of the /pollonian would imply, if ever possible,

an attempt to establish a new Truth and fall back into the violent suppression of the dynamic

balance between /pollonian and (ionysian elements.

@alancing the aesthetic, systemic, /pollonian once more with the (ionysian could

imply twisting the principle of individuation with an energetic practice. Thereby a door could

58%ee also @utler, ;DDD.50In his personal and professional life )oucault 15AA3d, 5AA0l2 unceasingly practiced this virtue by trying toefface his identity and rejecting all labels ascribed to him and trying to pin him to his identity 1%tructuralist,#oststructuralist, "arxist, /ntisychiatrist2.

=3


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be opened to a positive becoming, that is, not one borne out of rejection. $hat might be the

result is a $erwindungof individuality in the sense of an integrating letting go!. In the last

phase of his work "ichel )oucault also seemed to arrive at a similar conclusion, when the

preoccupation with resistance in his writings was successively replaced by uestions of a

positive(rt of the )elf. It seems as if, at the end, the gesture of resisting who we are became

wed to the problematic of how to still positively fashion oneFs life. )or this(rt of the )elf

)oucault, like >iet?sche before him, recurred to the ancient "editerranean area.

*+0+ Conclsion

$ith this first >iet?schean chapter we have achieved several crucial insights for our

theoretical grid. )irst we have worked out the details of the aspects of the /pollonian and

(ionysian, which were identified with formBaesthetic and contentBenergetic. )ollowing

$olfgang (ietrich we, in afirst transposition, likened the /pollonian and (ionysian to two

cosmovisions, the moral and energetic. In our first transposition we so started out with two

deities, two divinities of ancient :reece and then extrapolated certain principles.

%econdly, we were able to gain an insight over how different forms of relatingthose

two principles play themselves out on the societal levelM we have adopted the "acro&view &

the societal view, leaving aside the details of how this cosmovision was concretely lived.

Thirdly, we were already able to relate the /pollonian to a critical limitation of theori?ing and

will so need to take up this thread again in the following chapters. Thereof derived, fourthly, a

reuirement for the next chapter )or the completion of our theoretical framework and before

we approach the(rt of the Transpersonal )elf properly, it will now be necessary to re&take

those findings from an individual perspective to determine their exact relevance for an art of

=A


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living. $e will do so with "ichel )oucault. /fter a step of clarification in the third chapter

we shall then, in the fourth chapter read him against the grain and relate his work differently.

)ifthly, it has now become sufficiently clear what the immediate stakes for an (rt of

the Transpersonal )elfare 7elating the /pollonian once more with the (ionysian cannot be a

rejection of the aesthetic component and neither can it be the attempt to overcome everything

that has made us who we are in the #ostmodern age. The (rt of the Transpersonal )elf thus

could only become possible as a form of acknowledging both the /pollonian and (ionysian

components and of putting them into an affirmative relation once more, towards an /rt of

transforming ourselves.

9ere we so can, sixthly, formulate two overall ualifications for our attempt to create

an (rt of the Transpersonal )elf The outcome would 1a2 only be transpersonal if it would

become possible to twist 1verwinden2 the clear&cut /pollonian individuation 1which has led to

the autonomous, self&grounding subject of modernity2 with a (ionysian energetic fading of

personal borders and an opening of the self & while perhaps still acknowledging and affirming

the need for certain aesthetic, stylistic elements in our life. This (rt of the )elf 1b2 would be

trans'rationalif the %ocratic, #latonic rationality and cognition could once more be related to

the energetic, emotional and artistic and the drive to know and rationally grasp could also be

let fade away. The transrational could thus be found, to use the beautiful picture )riedrich

>iet?sche draws here for us in a )ocrates who practices music! 1>iet?sche, 5A83 A32.

D


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/+ Philoso#hy and S#iritality

)pirituality postulates that the truth is never given to the subject by right1"ichel )oucault, ;DD 52

In order to fully grasp the implications of the (ionysian and /pollonian for an(rt of the

Transpersonal )elf we now will return once more to ancient :reece, this time with "ichel

)oucault. The main source here will be his seminal lecture at the iet?sche breaks off & which is the moment of rupture occurring with #lato

and %ocrates. $hat, however, is of even greater importance for our purposes is that )oucault

focuses on what properly can be called an art of livingM his perspective is the "icro&

perspective which makes his approach so suited for our theoretical grid.

$ith this chapter we will approach and analy?e certain technologies of the self, which

are the result of a distinctive perception of oneself and which, I will argue, can be re&

interpreted along the lines of the relationality of the /pollonian and (ionysian. /t the end of

this chapter it will be possible to draw the findings from the first theoretical part of this work

together.

+et during this chapter it will also be necessary to gain an insight into how an (rt of

0iving has already been practiced, concretely, in the history of the $est. The objective hereby

is not to revive a :reek or /ntiue way of living & which might in any case be neither possible

nor desirable. $e are no /ncient :reeks and live no longer in /ntiuity. /nd yet, our current

living and all possible forms of individuation and subjectivation available at any given

5


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moment in time are, to a certain extent, also influenced and co&determined through the way

our historical hori?on has been constructed.

In this sense, shedding a different light on the past, unearthing different traditions and

highlighting blocked or abandoned developments can also give some pointers as to the present

state of being. If there is validity to the )oucauldian claim that will be advanced here in this

chapter, namely that between the #latonic and the "hristian "odel of subjectivation a third

model & the/ellenistic (rt of the )elf has been buried & then this might also give some further

insights into the 9egemony of /pollo established in the last chapter.

If the task and experiment for this dissertation, furthermore, is the re&linking of the

/pollonianB(ionysian towards an(rt of the Transpersonal )elf, then taking a close look at the

historical precedents which have co&determined us might well be crucial. >ot to resuscitate

pre&%ocratic :reece, but to find out what such an /rt of Eiving can still mean for us, living

today as we are in our own local, contingent, but also increasingly impure and thus to a

certain degree open hori?on.

The reasoning behind this chapter is so threefold )oucaultFs approach has been

chosen as complementing the macro&view of >iet?sche with a micro&view focusing directly

on subjectivation, and the two objectives are to gain an insight into the :reek /rt of the %elf

and this way to complete the first theoretical frame.

;


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/+*+ Placing the $ermenetics of the Sb'ect

The course "ichel )oucault taught at the


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understand such a $erwindung in this context as a movement of thought by which earlier

elements are twisted into a new position and thus re&evaluated and partially put into a

different frame and redrawn without, however, just declaring them obsolete, without

discarding or overcoming them in light of something that would be more true than that which

had been thought previously.

This can be exemplified by using :illes (eleu?eFs >oucault 15A332 as example.

(iscussing the works of the later )oucault, (eleu?e demonstrates how the concepts of earlier

phases continue to inform )oucault also during the time of his focus on /ncient :reece. +et

the focus has shifted and rather than positing a break, (eleu?e traces how the uestions of

relations of force, resistance, and the >iet?schean idea of the historicity, contingency and

finitude of the human subject which have earlier on led )oucault to proclaim the death of man

and to seek to analy?e constellations of power, now continue to inspire his work, although in a

different fashion. It is on this background that the problem of how it still might be possible to

lead a life of active subjectivation, of co&creating the own subjectivity and attaining an

understanding of ethics that is not guided by a iet?schean gesture,

rejected any claims to academic philosophy, this course is a step towards a critical re&

engagement with this discipline. $hat is evident in this course is that )oucault, while still

critici?ing the idea of philosophy as single means of accessing the truth, also comes to

espouse the idea of philosophy as something that can lead to apracticeand thereby change

the subject in its very being. #hilosophy can wrest the subject away from what it has taken for

granted and inspire a move towards as of yet uncharted becomings. This understanding of

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philosophy is risky, as it opens and demands the possibility for the philosopher to let

herBhimself be transformed by its practice

This is a form of philosophy which demands that the individual, to borrow >iet?scheFs

phrase, risks himself constantlyF. J...K it involves more than the search for objective

knowledge which has no implication for the subjectFs mode of existence. 1OFEeary,

;DD; 5==2

Therefore, )oucault couples the idea ofphilosophywith the concept ofspirituality. The latter

stresses and accentuates the active part of a practice and signifies a move into an experiential

field beyond the realm of pure knowledge 1of the self2.

(uring the time of this course at the

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The Transpersonal Self

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