DUSAN SIDJANSKI

compared to three-quarters of the State coun- cillors. As usual jurists are dominant with 35 (18%) in National Council and 22 (48%) in Council of States. Despite some better representa- tion of women, they are still highly under- represented in both Chambers with 27 and 5 respectivdy. Even with one woman member of Federal Council, Swiss politics remains pre- dominantly a matter for men.

Finally, with party discipline not being a distinctive feature of Swiss parties, the new legislature’s performance will depend heavily on representatives’ personal choices when it comes to making decisions on issues, such as energy, environment and the European Community.

1.

2.

Notes and References 3.

An Eight Nations Study, 1973-1976, 4. (Cologne: Central-Archive, University of Cologne, 1979) p. 163. According to Jacques Nicola (‘L’absten- tionisme en Suisse’ in Sidjanski and others, 5.

Les Suisses et la Politique, (J&me: H. Lang, 1975), p. 194, abstention of male voters had a mildly adverse effect on the left and the Inde pendent party in 1971, while the abstention of women damaged the left and, to a lesser degree, the Radical and Liberal parties. The gap between men and women diminished in the 1975 election:

Parttiipation in thefederalelections 1971 and 1975 by sex

1971 1975 Men 72 61 Women 49 46 Men + Women 60 53 Swiss Surveys 1972 and 1976, Department of Political Science, University of Geneva. Univox, Beme University, June 1987. D. Sidjanski, ‘Turnout, Stability and Left- Right Dimension’ in Switzerland at the Polls. The National Elections of 1979, Howard R. Penmti-ran (editor), p. 113. An Eight Nations Study, op. cit., p. 36.

The Turkish General Election of 29 November 1987

BRUCE GEORGE MP AND MARK STENHOUSE House of Commons, London SWlA OAA, Enghd

The modem Turkish Republic founded in 1923 by Kemal Atatiirk, after the defeat and collapse of the Ottoman Empire, has struggled to evolve western style democracy. Periods of democratic rule undermined by instability, have been followed by brief but decisive military interventions. The turmoil and near anarchy that marred the final years of the 1961 Constitution was replaced by a short period of military rule between 1980 and 1983. Only three approved parties contested the 1983 elections, which could not be construed as truly democratic. However, they were important as a symbol of the Turkish transition or return to democratic practices. Elections to the unicameral 450 seat Grand National Assembly (GNA) on 29 November 1987 heralded a significant advance towards the establishment of a genuine pluralistic party system. Only the extreme Ieft and certain rightist Islamic fundamentaIist parties were unable to participate.

The Party System

During the first term of.. the Motherland government of Turgut Oral (1983-87),

dramatic changes occurred throughout Turkish politics. In 1983 the military a~inistration Ied by President Kenan Evren allowed new parties to be founded. On the left this led to merger between the Social Democratic and Populist Parties in 1985 and the creation of the Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkci Parti- SHP). The Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti-DSP) had the former prime minister Biilent Ecevit established as leader following the national referendum of September 1987. Ecevit and six-times premier Siileyman Demirel were among those banned from political activity by the military. The referendum was called to determine whether the prohibition should be continued. As a consequence of the referendum result, the post- military near hegemony of the Motherland Party (Amvatan Partisi-ANAP) was challenged by the True Path Party (Dogm Yol Patiisi-DYP). Under the leadership of Siileyman Demirel the DYP was essentially a continuation of the defunct Justice Party. One of the dominant themes of the election, which affected both left and right, was whether the new parties could withstand the challenge of those they had

I74 The Turkish General Election of 29 November 1987

supplanted. However, the 1987 election proved conclusively that ANAP was not only the party of government but also the major force on the centre-right, although Demirel’s DYP was far from extinguished. The SHP emerged as the main opposition to ANAP and the chief party on the moderate left. With no representation in Parliament the DSP has an uncertain future com- pounded by Ecevit’s announc~ent of his retirement immediately after the election.

Domestic and International Ramifications

Domestically, the election was crucial for a number of reasons. Prime Minister Turgut Ozal had initiated many far reaching reforms which threatened both elite interests and traditional assumptions. His amendment of the Election Law of January 1984, was a notable example of an attempt to liberalize the political system within the constraints laid down by the military. In the economic sphere, Ozal has followed a free market approach which sharply contrasts with the Kemalist tradition of dtatism. His privatization programme of State Economic Enterprises (SEES) forms an integral element of this strategy. Above all the election was a major test of whether Turkey possessed the capacity to hold a democratic contest without a recurrence of past traumatic domestic unrest.

The Turks were particularly anxious to gauge the nature of foreign reaction to the election in the light of their application to join the European Economic Community. It seems that the majority of western .govemments were banking on a victory for Ozal. This preference was motivated by respect for his handling of the economy and the belief that Turkey required continuity and stability. Obviously Turkey has not convinced all of its many critics that democracy has been fully restored. Allegations of human rights violations and the trial of members of the Confederation of Revolutionary Labour Unions (DISK) continue to cause great concern. The arrest of Haydar Kutlu and Nihat Sargin two communist leaders arriving from exile in West Germany, just before the election, was seized upon as evidence that Turkey has not returned to democracy.

The Electoral System

Turkey has long sought a suitable dectoral system but the diversity of methods employed indicates their previous lack of success. Between 1946 to 1960 the majority system was employed but this was seen as inequitable. During 1961 to 1965 the D’Hondt system with quota was adopted but this was replaced in turn by the

National Remainder system (196 5 -69) which encouraged both the emergence of new parties and the development of political polarization. From 1969 to 1983 the ‘simple’ D’Hondt system was introduced. The method employed today is the D’Hondt system with restricted options and a double barrier. Under its provisions a candidate from a political party cannot be elected to the GNA unless they receive at least 10 per cent of the total number of votes cast throughout the country. A party must have a completed organization in at least half of the 67 provinces and in at least one-third of the districts affiliated to the provinces. They are also required to nominate two candidates for each parlia- mentary seat in at least half of the provinces. In essence the system is one of reinforced pro~~ionality with high thresholds and rewards for the majority partv. The 1987 elections exemplified the point, with ANAP receiving just over 36 per cent of the vote but obtaining 64 per cent of the parliamentary seats. All the major opposition parties denounced the system as unjust claiming the outcome would erode &al’s moral authority. However, the system was intro- duced to prevent small parties from having undue influence in making or obstructing governments. The role of the fundamentalist National Salvation Party during the late 1970s was one particularly pertinent example. Furthermore, prior to the military coup of 1980 the country was plagued by internecine warfare. terrorism and rampant economic difficulties.’ The establishment of stability was of paramount importance in the construction of a new electoral system.

The Course of the Campaign

The life of the first &al government was due to expire in November 1988 but the national referendum of September 1987 was perceived to be generally indicative of the mood of the country. Its ostensible purpose was to determine whether the banned politicians should re-enter politicaf life. &al campaigned vigorously for the retention of the prohibition and although the ‘yes’ vote triumphed, it was less than by 0.4 per cent. Ozal assumed that the opposition vote would be divided and the overwhelming majority of the 49 per cent who voted ‘no’ would support his candidature. Encouraged by the result Ozal caught his rivals by surprise, announcing an early election for 1 November. This date was altered to 29 November when the opposition parties successfully appealed to the Constitutional Court, which ruled that &al had acted un- constitutionally in prohibiting the organization of party primaries to choose electoral candidates. Nevertheless, the annulment of Article Eight of

BRUCE GEORGE MP AND MARK STENHOUSE 175

the Electoral Law worked against the interests of the opposition parties. The tumult of centrally chosen lists being overturned was compounded by the divisive nature of the primaries. One of the consequences was a move leftwards by the SHP with many well established political figures failing to make the lists. In the DYP many of Demirel’s trusted aides were unsuccessful. During the primaries &al was able to unify potentially disparate elements within his own party without the need for such a contest.

The campaign itself was brief, with economic issues dominating. In a poll conducted by the Istanbul daily Cumhunjet, 80 per cent of respondents believed Turkey’s most important problem was economic.2 As an economist Ozal possessed a considerable advantage and he emphasized some good indicators of success. The growth rate of 8 per cent in 1986 was the highest for 4 years and Ozal pointed out that business confidence had increased. Set against this was an inflation rate approaching 50 per cent, a growing external debt, the devaluation of the Turkish lira and unemployment around 20 per cent. The negative side of the Turkish economic ‘miracle’ was a major contributory factor in the decline of ANAP’s percentage of the vote, although this was not reflected in the number of seats they received.

&al was more secure when berating Demirel and Ecevit for their failure to save Turkey from t,he political and economic collapse of the 1970s. Ozal sought to portray many of his opponents as representing the old order that had precipitated the chaos that led to the mi1iJat-y intervention of 1980. During the campaign Ozal himself became a major issue, dominating Turkish politics to such an extent that his opponents criticized his style of government as excessively authoritarian and dominant. Even his health became an area of contention. In February 1987 he underwent triple heart by-pass surgery in the United States. Ozal cancelled a number of engagements during the campaign and intense speculation revolved around his ability to last the pace. Despite the vigorous polemical nature of the electioneering, defence and foreign policy hardly figured due to the general consensus on the subject.

In an increasingly westernized campaign, party strategies became dominated by personalities. SHP leader Erdal fnonii grew visibly in political stature as he was transformed from an academic ill-at-ease in his new surroundings into a credible political figure. His economic criticism of the Ozal adminstration was summed up by the effec- tive newspaper advertisements showing a hand squeezing a lemon as a powerful symbol of Turkey’s economic privations. However, given the bitter divisions on the left, Ozal was able to

concentrate much of his attention on the threat posed by Demirel’s DYP. ANAP’s electoral strategy was carefully balanced between respect for traditional Islamic values and a futuristic approach promising to transform Turkey into the ‘Japan of Western Asia’. In response Demirel launched a series of attacks on &al’s economic record without offering any coherent alternative. His television appearances were uninspiring and laboured, a particularly damaging fact in view of the DYP’s almost total reliance on the charis- matic impact of their leader. The DSP were even more reliant on the personality of Biilent Ecevit, who devoted most of his time to attacking the SHP. Ecevit was handicapped by a totally inadequate party organization and memories of his last period in office.

The average of major polls during the cam- paign saw ANAP at just over 40 per cent with a general narrowing of their support. Despite the erroneous nature of many predictions forecasting ANAP’s percentage of the vote, as expected they secured a commanding majority falling just short of the critical 300 seat mark in the GNA. Breaking this barrier would have enabled &al to make constitutional change without recourse to a referendum. Nevertheless, 292 seats was obviously a satisfying return for a party with only 36 per cent of the vote. Clearly the DYP polled better than expected splitting the right wing vote. Although expressing disappointment at the outcome Iniinii must have been satisfied with the performance of the SHP in establishing his new party as the dominant left of centre force.

Reasons for ANAP’s Success

Many political analysts assumed that when ANAP faced a genuine democratic election they would be defeated but this appraisal neglected certain important factors. It must be remembered that &al inherited the premiership against a background of profound disaffection with the events of pre-1980. Ozal exploited this fear of the past but he also projected hope for the future. In addition to this positive message ANAP skilfully used the advantages of incumbency. They had greater financial resources than their rivals and a near monopoly of radio and television exposure prior to the official campaign. Due to legal restrictions television campaigning for all parties did not start until a week before polling day. Above all ANAP benefited from the rewards conferred by the D’Hondt electoral system. Despite the inroads made by Demirel into the conservative vote, the sheer size of the right con- stituency meant that internal divisions within Ozal’s own party and those between ANAP and DYP were manageable. The SHP and DSP were

176 The Turkish General Eiection of 29 November 198 7

fighting for hegemony over a smaller and shrinking constituency. Hence, factionalism on the left was far more damaging. A possible merger between the two parties was rejected by Ecev,+ but even union would not have prevented an Ozal victory. With the inclusion of the fundamentalist Welfare Party, right wing parties gained 30 per cent more of the vote than their left counterparts. Supported by a seemingly inbuilt conservative majority Ozal also demon- strated an ability to outwit his political opponents from both ends of the spectrum. His promise of continuous stability, economic progress and a sense of well-being proved electorally appealing.

Provisional Analysis

ANAP achieved good results in all regions but they were strongest in the central and eastern provinces. For the most part, Eastern Turkey is a deeply religious, highly agrarian, isolated and backward area. The proximity of the region to the Soviet Union has tended to reinforce conservative values, given the history of mutual animosity between the two nations. Furthermore, Eastern Turkey is the region most vulnerable to a Soviet offensive in terms of numerical inferiority. ANAP secured all the seats in Agri, Bingol, Gumushane, Mus, Rize and Van, areas which are located close to the Soviet border. In the 1983 election these constituencies had either voted for ANAP or the Nationalist Democracy Party.3 The north-eastern province of Kars which had been dominated by the left after the 1977 elections, also returned a majority of ANAP members.

Virulent anti-communism may well have been a significant electoral factor in the East but the role of religion should not be discounted. Turkey is an offically designated secular state but 99 per cent of the population are Muslim. The success of Necmettin Erbakan’s fundamentalist Welfare Party in Diyarbakir and Bingol, where they received over 20 per cent of the vote, underlines the close links between religion and politics in Eastern Turkey.3 Of the major parties, ANAP demonsuated the greatest sympathy towards Islam. Ozal, a devout Muslim,5 campaigned in favour of the right of students to wear religious dress in defiance of President Evren’s wishes. Undoubtedly, ANAP reaped the benefits of their policy of religious toleration in rural areas.

It would be misleading to see the eastern and western regions as dichotomous. ANAP faced much sterner competition from the SHP in Western Turkey but they enjoyed some notable successes. ANAP’s share of the vote in lstanbul far exceeded their national percentage and in Ankara they comfortably defeated the SHP. In the urban centres &al’s economic modemiza- tion programme was given a greater emphasis together with ANAP’s general technocratic orientation. The regional voting patterns suggested that ANAP managed to project an ideology flexible enough to have wide-ranging appeal. ANAP’s highest percentage was in Malatya where they obtained 58.67 per cent of the vot8 but 16 ‘clean sweeps’ in all regions of the country emphasized their overall superiority.

The SHP were most successful along the Aegean and Mediterranean coastlines. Izmir swung towards the left and the SHP keenly con-

1977 + -I- +

1983 -I- +

1987

Justice Party Republican People’s Party National Salvation Party

Motherland Party Populist Party Nationalist Democracy Party

Motherland Party (ANAP) Social Democrat Populist Party (SHP) True Path Party (DYP) Democratic Left Party (DSP)

TABLE 1. Results of the last three Turkish general elections

Year Parties Votes % Seats Electoral system employed

36.9 41.3

8.5

189 213

24

45.15 211 30.46 117 23.27 71

The ‘simple’ D’Hondt

system

The ‘simple’ D’ Hondt

system

36.31 292

24.74 99 19.14 59

8.53 0

The D’Hondt system with

restricted options and

double barrier

+ = Now defunct

Smaller parties contesting the 1977 and 1987 elections have been omitted. In 1983 only three parties contested.

BRUCE GEORGE MP AND MARK STENHOUSE 177

tested the north-western provinces of Edime, Kirklareli and Tekirdag. In the southernmost areas of Hatay and Icel they obtained 50 per cent of the seats. Significantly, the SHP’s worst performance was in Erzurum 1 where they only received 7 per cent of the vote. They did win both seats in Tunceli which is located in Eastern Turkey but this has a history of being a left wing enclave. The SHP obtained just under 49 per cent of the vote and the combined total of the two left parties amounted to almost two-thirds of the Tunceli electorate.’

The importance of charismatic leaders and intense regional loyalties were two major factors which cut across carefully delineated ideological lines. ANAP’s strong performance in Istanbul’s second electoral district (Fat+) was largely condi- tioned by the fact that Ozal contested the constituency. Furthermore, ANAP maintained their position of superiority in the regional strongholds of Konya and Kayseri. The SHP obtained over 30 per cent of the vote in all four of Lzmir’s electoral districts but their best result was in Izmir-3 where Inijnii stood. Yozgat maintained its reputation as a bastion of right wing extremism, with a strong showing for Alparslan Tiirkes and his neo-fascist Nationalist Labour Party.8 Demirel stood in his home base of Isparta where the DYP won all four seats with 60 per cent of the vote. This staggering discrepancy between the Isparta result and the DYP’s national performance emphasizes the importance of regionalism. Ecevit contested Zonguldak and consequently, the DSP averaged 25 per cent but having failed to beat the national barrage they were unable to benefit from the Zonguldak result. In Zonguldak-1 ANAP suffered one of their worst performances in the election, polling under 22 per cent, but they still gained two seats due to the vagaries of the electoral system.

The Future

Predicting future events is a hazardous under- taking in political science and this is particularly true of Turkey where changes can occur with bewildering speed. The stability of Turkish democracy cannot be taken for granted in view of the military interventions of 1960, 1971 and 1980. The election results of 1987 may have laid the foundations for a new two-party system which may help to prevent the polarization and dissension of pre-1980 Turkish politics. Erdal Inonil suggested immediately after the election that both parties on the left would have to seriously consider the benefits of a merger. This prospect was enhanced with the retirement of Ecevit after the DSP’s failure to beat the, barrage and gain parliamentary representation. Ozal also

announed his intention to seek a union with the DYP, although it seems unlikely that Demirel would agree to such a proposition. If these mergers are successful Turkey will enjoy the advantages of a two-party system. It would be mistaken to see a simple correlation between political stability and the composition of a two party system. However, in view of recent Turkish history fewer parties may be one means of ensur- ing.greater domestic harmony.

Ozal’s strategy in the new Parliament is the subject of much debate. Many predict a new round of price rises and austerity measures similar to those introduced in January 1980 in order to resolve Turkey’s growing economic problems. Analysts such as David Barchard argue that ANAP aspires to a position of authority similar to the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan9 Further constitutional changes are certainly conceivable but any major reform would reqhire another referendum. The Turkish electorate may be reluctant to vote in yet another ballot. The role of the opposition is of utmost importance. Will the SHP become a credible alternative party of government? Had Iniinii faltered Ecevit’s party would have gained parlia- mentary representation. Inonii’s own position seems quite secure given the poor showing of potential rivals in the election.

The Turkish military are slowly withdrawing from politics but Ozal’s relationship with the armed forces remains deeply ambivalent. In July 1987 Ozal audaciously vetoed the appointment of the new Chief of General Staff but he bowed to military pressure over the continuing ban on the Turkish Communist party. azal is likely to con- tinue with his objective of institutionalizing civilian government without jeopardizing Turkish stability. President Evren’s seven year term expires this November and the nature of his successor will give a clear indication of the way in which Turkey is progressing. Civil-military relations seem to be moving towards the European ethos of civilian control.

In terms of foreign policy Turkey’s EEC application and relations with Greece are likely to predominate. Western reaction to the Turkish elections was generally favourable and should enhance their progress towards full community membership. However, many European obser- vers would argue that Turkey needs to har- monize much of its legislation with that of the EEC, further improve its human rights record and develop a credible economic and industrial infrastructure before admission. On the other hand, a straight rebuttal could increase anti- western feeling and propel Turkey towards even closer co-operation with their Middle Eastern allies.

178 The Turkish General Election of 29 November 198 7

Following the Aegean crisis of March 1987, a Notes and References period of Greco-Turkish &tenle ensued exempli- fied by the Davos mini-summit on 30-31 January 1988. It is rather premature to judge whether this will result in a genuine rapproche- ment. Nevertheless, any agreement, however limited, would not only benefit NATO but help to reduce tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean.

All these external and domestic calculations may be thrown into disarray if &al’s health deteriorates. Possible successors include Adnan Kahveci, &al’s chief adviser, Husnu Dogran and Yusuf Boskurt &al, the Prime Minister’s younger brother and former head of the influ- ential state planning organization. It is doubtful whether any of these figures could unify the disparate elements within ANA.P as successfully as its founder. The concern for Ozal’s well-being demonstrates the importance of a charismatic leader in Turkish politics but it also highlights the fragile nature of Turkish democracy. Ozal’s departure could leave a political vacuum m which instability could once more flourish. In the words of a diplomat in Ankara ‘I see nothing that has been established in Turkey to preserve political stability after Ozal. There could well be anarchy again and the army would step in without a qualm.“” Such dire predictions may be unnecessarily pessimistic but Turkish democracy requires both support and understanding to survive.

1. For details of the pre-1980 turmoil see Kenneth MacKenzie, ‘Turkey Under the Generals’. Coq%ct Studies, no. 126, January 1981: and a thoughtful analysis of the breakdown of Turkish democracy during this period is provided by C. H. Dodd, The Crisis OJ’ Turkish Democracy. (The Eothen Press, 1983).

2. Cited in Briefing, 9 November 1987. 3. The Nationalist Democracy Party were the

favoured party of the military in the 1983 elections. Led by General Ulusu this military endorsement adversely affected their electoral prospects.

4. Milliyet, 1 December 1987. 5. In 1977 Gzal unsuccessfully fought Izmir

for the fundamentalist National Salvation Party.

1987.

6. Turkish Daiiy News, 3 December 1987- lnternational Edition.

7. MiN<vet. 1 December 1987. 8. Tiirkes had been the leader of the

Nationalist Action Party before the military intervention. Between 1974 and 1980, the party was accused of murdering nearly six hundred people.

9. The Financial Times. 27 November 1987. 10. The Sunday Telegraph. 22 November