The Ukrainian Weekly 2009-34

8/14/2019 The Ukrainian Weekly 2009-34

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Published by the Ukrainian National Association Inc., a fraternal non-profit association

$1/$2 in UkraineVol. LXXVII No.34 THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY SUNDAY, AUGUST 23, 2009TheUkrainianWeekly

InsIde:

For the record: Yushchenkos response to Medvedev page 3. Commentary: Europes share in Ukraines malaise page 5. Ukrainian Medical Association meets in Vancouver page 11.

by Zenon Zawada

Kyiv Press Bureau

KYIV Ukraine is stuck in a gray buf-fer zone between two systems of collec-tive security, in the view of Valeriy Chaly,the deputy director of Kyivs RazumkovCenter, and the nations permanent inter-nal conflict has forced it to the geopoliti-cal sidelines with the threat that onlyglobal powers will decide its fate.

Though the nation elected a firmly pro-NATO president in Viktor Yushchenko,Ukraine lost its chance at deeper Euro-Atlantic integration because of the non-consolidation of political elites and theinadequate understanding of nationalinterests and priority tasks, Mr. Chalysaid.

We are practically locked in a zone,which in my view is a rather dangeroussituation for Ukraine, Mr. Chaly notedduring a mid-July press conference hesaid was intended to raise awareness andspark discussion on Ukraines geopoliti-cal future. Our definitive place and roleare undefined. Its this transitional stateof a buffer transit zone which is threaten-ing, in my view.

Mr. Chaly is among Ukraines fore-most foreign policy experts, directinginternational programs for 12 years at the

Razumkov Center for Economic andPolitical Research, a leading Kyiv think-tank financed by scores of international

funds and institutions.The Vinnytsia native served on the

National Security and Defense Councilbetween 1997 and 1999, and attends theannual Yalta European Strategy confer-ence, where Ukraines elite gathers to dis-cuss the nations future.

Ukraines NATO entry isnt relevant atthe moment, Mr. Chaly said, as theVerkhovna Rada lacks a critical majoritythat would cardinally change Ukrainesforeign policy priorities and orientations.

NATO is not ready, Ukraine is notready. And, unfortunately, politicizationis continuing and its possible that thisping-pong game with NATO will be asubject for the presidential campaign, he

said.While its often suggested thatUkraines leadership ought to opt for aneutral, non-aligned status between theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) and the Russian Federation, for-eign policy specialists know thats not aviable option, he said.

Ukraine is already failing to finance itsarmed forces according to legislative

On the 18th anniversary of independence

Ukraine on the geopolitical sidelines

(Continued on page 10)

Eighteen years ago, on August 24, 1991, this was the scene outside theUkrainian Parliament building as Ukraines independence was declared.This historic photo was taken from a window inside the Parliament build-ing by Chrystyna Lapychak, who was assigned at the time to The UkrainianWeeklys Kyiv Press Bureau.

Chrystyna Lapychak

Ukrainian Independence Day

by Zenon ZawadaKyiv Press Bureau

KYIV What initially sparked hopesfor change is turning into politics asusual.

As Arseniy Yatsenyuks campaignersignite scandals and post billboards claim-ing the rather nerdy-looking 35-year-oldwill save the country, mounting evi-dence reveals his presidential campaignhas little potential to change much ofanything, observers said.

His financers are the same old oli-garchs, and his campaign advisers arerecycled from the campaigns of ViktorYanukovych and Leonid Kuchma, accord-ing to reports.

Meanwhile in his bid to appeal to thebroadest electorate, Mr. Yatsenyuk isavoiding taking positions on key issues orproposing specific reforms or programshe would pursue as president.

Hes like generic beer, trying toappeal to the biggest amount of voters byhaving the least content and taste, Kyivpolitical expert Ivan Lozowy said. Butfrom the point of view of election tech-nology, its probably the right way to go.

Indeed, Mr. Yatsenyuk has succeededin keeping his third-place position in the

presidential race.About 11 percent of voters said they

would vote for Mr. Yatsenyuk, and morethan 13 percent of those certain to vote onJanuary 17, 2010, said they will choosehim, according to a poll of 2,006 respon-dents conducted between July 20 and 28by the Razumkov Center for Economicand Political Research in Kyiv.

Meanwhile, 13.3 percent of respon-dents said they fully support Mr.Yatsenyuks current political activity,compared with 16.7 percent full supportfor opposition leader Viktor Yanukovych,12.7 percent for Prime Minister YuliaTymoshenko and 5.7 percent for PresidentViktor Yushchenko.

A good part of Mr. Yatsenyuks successis based on being a new face amidst afield of candidates that largely repulsesUkrainian voters, who have seen them allbefore, experts said.

His platform comes down to: Im abetter choice than these jerks youre usedto, who youre not happy with, Mr.Lozowy said. In this configuration, thelast thing he wants is to take a position onany issue. The bottom line is he doesntwant to tackle these issues.

Yatsenyuk presidential campaign:

Change, or politics as usual?


At the Ukrainian World Congress annual meeting on August 20 at Lviv PolytechnicalUniversity (from left) are: Ukraines Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, UWC

President Eugene Czolij and UWC Vice-President Maria Shkambara.

Zenon Zawada

by Zenon Zawada

Kyiv Press Bureau

LVIV Prime Minister YuliaTymoshenko impressed the UkrainianWorld Congress (UWC) at its August 20annual meeting here not only with a sup-portive address, but also with her decision

to lead the Cabinet of Ministers the priorevening in passing a resolution to restoregovernment financing for diaspora pro-grams.

The prime ministers sudden embraceof the Ukrainian diaspora arrives before

Yulia Tymoshenko addresses UWC,promises funding for diaspora programs



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THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY SUNDAY, AUGUST 23, 20092 No. 34

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Protest against Medvedev letter

KYIV Dozens of activists from theUkrainian Peoples Party held a demon-stration in front of the Russian Embassy

in Kyiv, RFE/RLs Ukrainian Servicereported on August 14. They were pro-testing Russian President DmitryMedvedevs August 11 letter to UkrainianPresident Viktor Yushchenko criticizingKyivs foreign policy towards Russia,which he called Mr. Yushchenkos anti-Russian course. Protesters demandedthat Mr. Medvedev withdraw his state-ment and apologize to Ukraine. They alsowarned that similar protests would beheld in front of Russian Consulates inother Ukrainian cities if their demandsare ignored. (RFE/RL)

Reaction to Medvedevs accusations

KYIV A newly released poll showedthat Ukrainians perceive Russian

President Dmitry Medvedevs recentaccusations about Kyivs anti-Russianbehavior in different ways, RFE/RLsUkrainian Service reported on August 19.In Lviv and Kyiv people reacted nega-tively to Mr. Medvedevs accusations.But in the southern and eastern Ukrainiancities of Mykolayiv and Donetsk, respec-tively, respondents were not so critical ofMr. Medvedevs charges against Ukraine.The findings were made by the RazumkovCenter, which on August 12-18 conducteda telephone poll of 3,040 residents ofKyiv, Lviv, Mykolayiv, Donetsk andSymferopol. Valeriy Chaly, the interna-tional program director at the RazumkovCenter, said the findings also show that asignificant part of the Ukrainian popula-tion is not even aware of PresidentMedvedevs open letter to his Ukrainiancounterpart , Viktor Yushchenko.However, Ukrainians in all cities per-ceived Moscows decision to hold off ondispatching a new ambassador to Ukraineas an unfriendly act. (RFE/RL)

Explosion rocks Donetsk plant

KYIV A powerful explosion thun-dered on August 16 in the northern part ofDonetsk. According to the local Internetpublication Ostrov, a private pyrotechnic

plant blew up. According to eyewitnesses,the explosion was so strong that windowswere broken in the nearby houses. TheEmergencies Ministry in the Donetskregion refrained from comments on the

cause of the accident, but did report thatthere were no fatalities or injuries. Some100 tons of pyrotechnics were stored atthe facility, which is located in theYakovlivka settlement. (Ukrinform)

Russia sees victory on NATO issue

KYIV The Russian Foreign AffairsMinistry considers it a victory of com-mon sense that Georgias and UkrainesNATO memberships are no longer on theinternational political agenda, said a high-ranking Russian diplomat, according tonews reports released on August 15.Russia and NATO bear common respon-sibility for security on the Euro-Atlanticarea. The fact that the theme of these twocountries membership in NATO is nolonger on the political agenda is above alla victory of common sense, RussianDeputy Foreign Affairs MinisterAlexander Grushko said in an interviewwith Interfax. Everybody now has anoth-er chance to think about strengtheningcooperation on real security problemsrather than deal with the consequences ofpolitical projects that were inherited fromthe past, Mr. Grushko said. (Interfax-Ukraine)

Kyiv protests pollution of Sevastopol Bay

KYIV Ukraines Ministry of ForeignAffairs (MFA) sent a note of protest toRussia over the pollution of SevastopolBay by the Russian Black Sea Fleet, acting

First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs YuriiKostenko said on August 17. FollowingRussian President Dmitry Medvedevsaddress, the Ukrainian Foreign AffairsMinistry has sent another note of protestover the pollution of the Sevastopol Baywaters, he said. Mr. Kostenko said that anagreement between Ukraine and Russiaforesees that in such cases Russia shouldimmediately allow a Ukrainian environ-mental service to take a water sample,however, this had been ignored. He said


In Film Clips: Kimjongilia, documen-tary about North Korean regime (August9) by Thaya Salamacha, an editors cor-rection was incorrectly rendered, chang-ing the word plight to flight, instead offight. The sentence should read: As anAmerican of Ukrainian descent, and hav-ing lived through a time when humanrights abuses in Ukraine were invisible tothe world, I am deeply moved by theNorth Koreans fight for freedom and forrecognition before the world of their pain-ful history.

Correction

by Brian Whitmore

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

Patriarch Kirills recent high-profilevisit to Ukraine was interrupted by anunwanted visitor from the past: JosephStalins ghost.

A five-decade-old letter from the SovietCommunist Party archives, made availableto RFE/RLs Russian Service as PatriarchKirill was wrapping up his 10-day visit toUkraine, illustrates the extent to which thepatriarchs predecessors were involved inStalins efforts to wipe out the UkrainianGreek-Catholic Church in the 1940s.

The letter, from then-Russian OrthodoxPatriarch Aleksy I to the head of the SovietCouncil on Religious Affairs, GeorgyKarpov, was dated December 7, 1945,

when the Kremlin was consolidating con-trol over territories in heavily Catholicwestern Ukraine after World War II.Karpov was a colonel in the NKVD, a pre-decessor to the Soviet KGB.

In the letter, Aleksy informs Karpov ofan initiative group that was being formedin Greek-Catholic dioceses in westernUkraine that would pressure clergy toagree to disband their Church and convertto Orthodoxy.

More than 800 priests have alreadyjoined the initiative group, and it is expect-ed that by the New Year the entire clergywill have done so with the exception of asmall number of diehards, Aleksy wrote.

At the time of the letter, all of theUkrainian Greek-Catholic Churchs bish-

ops had been either imprisoned or exiled,making the clergy especially vulnerable topressure as Stalin sought to eradicate theVaticans influence.

What strikes me most about that letteris that, within the context of the particularpower relationships that were in place,[Patriarch Aleksy I] really sounds like hewas trying to give a semblance of ecclesi-astical credibility to what was otherwise

clearly a blatant act of state intervention in

Church affairs, said Andrii Krawchuk, theformer president of the University ofSudbury in Ontario, and the author of thebook Christian Social Ethics in Ukraine.

In another letter, published in earlyAugust by the Austrian Catholic newsagency Kathpress, Nikita Khrushchev, thena member of the Soviet Politburo and ahigh-ranking official of the CommunistParty of the Ukrainian SSR, informedStalin of work undertaken to dismemberthe [Ukrainian Greek-Catholic] Churchand transfer the... clergy to the OrthodoxChurch. That letter was dated December17, 1945, just 10 days after Aleksys corre-spondence.

The Rev. Ihor Yatsiv, press secretary forthe head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic

Church, Lubomyr Husar, told RFE/RLsRussian Service that the documents shedimportant light on efforts by Soviet author-ities to liquidate Catholicism in westernUkraine.

The most important thing this letterillustrates is that these initiative groupswere not established by the Greek-Catholicdioceses themselves, as had been previ-ously claimed, but rather that they wereinspired by the Soviet authorities, theRev. Yatsiv notes.

Echoes of the past

Stalin allowed the Russian OrthodoxChurch, which had been suppressed fol-lowing the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, tooperate officially again from 1943 albeit

under tight Soviet supervision in aneffort to intensify patriotic support for theauthorities during World War II and after.

In Stalins regime the idea was to sub-sume everything into one centralized aegis,namely the Russian Orthodox Church,which itself was subject to strict controlsand even repression by the state, the Rev.

Moscow Patriarchs visit to Ukraineby Pavel Korduban

Eurasia Daily Monitor

Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill vis-ited Ukraine from July 27 to August 5 inorder to suppress the pro-independencemood among the local clergy and morebroadly, to assert Russian religious andcultural domination. The patriarch madeit clear that he would oppose plans,backed by Ukrainian President ViktorYushchenko, to create a local OrthodoxChurch fully independent of Russia moreenergetically than his predecessor, AleksyII.

Patriarch Kirill also allowed Party of

Documents shed light on Soviets

suppression of Ukrainian Catholic Church

Regions of Ukraine leader ViktorYanukovych to use his visit to benefit hispresidential election campaign, whichindicates that Moscow will probably backhis bid as it did in 2004.

During his visit Patriarch Kirill osten-tatiously ignored the rival OrthodoxChurch Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP),although UOC-KP Patriarch Filaret want-ed to meet him. Adding insult to injury,the Russian patriarch acted as if the UOC-KP did not exist at all. Strictly speaking,this is the case from the point of view ofthe Moscow Church as Patriarch Filaretwas excommunicated after he split fromthe Moscow Church in 1992. The UOC-KP is still not officially recognized by therest of the Orthodox world.

President Yushchenko supports theUOC-KP, viewing it as the basis for

establishing a single Ukrainian OrthodoxChurch independent from Moscow patri-archs and Russian cultural influences.This would perfectly fit his idealisticmodel of a monolingual and monoculturalUkraine distanced from Russia as muchas possible, which he has pursued sincehis election as president in 2004. Thisideal is impossible to achieve in the mod-ern world, and the same is probably trueof Mr. Yushchenkos dream of a nation-wide independent Church.




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THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY SUNDAY, AUGUST 23, 2009 3No. 34

Question: Do you have anything to say about a rather scathing attack by theRussian president in a blog yesterday about Ukraine, among other things, saying

that their efforts to get into NATO were anti-Russian and that he basically [Dmitry] Medvedev said he looks forward to a new government in Ukraine?

Philip J. Crowley: Well, first of all, on the subject of Ukraine, it is a sover-eign country. It has the right to pursue its interests in any way that it chooses. Ithink Vice-President [Joe] Biden made that clear during his recent visit toUkraine.

It is important for Ukraine and Russia to have a constructive relationship. Imnot sure that these comments are necessarily in that vein. But going forward,Ukraine has a right to make its own choices, and we feel that it has a right to joinNATO if it chooses. And, obviously, we support that right.

Philip J. Crowley, assistant secretary of the U.S. Department of State, speak-ing during the daily press briefing on August 12.

Quotable notes

Following is the English translationprovided by the Embassy of Ukraine, ofPresident Viktor Yushchenkos August 13letter to President Dmitry Medvedev ofRussia. The English text of the Ukrainianpresidents letter was released on August14.

Respected Dmitry Anatolyevych:

I have perused your letter of 6 August2009. Straightforwardly speaking, I amvery disappointed with its unfriendlynature.

I agree that there are serious problemsin the relations between our countries, butyour absolute denial of Russias responsi-bility for them surprises me.

Our state has never betrayed the prin-ciples of friendship and partnership fixedin the Agreement of 1997 [and] was doingits best to ensure fruitful and mutuallybeneficial development of bilateral rela-tions. Moreover, in accordance with theabovementioned agreement our countrieswere to build up relations with each other

based on principles of mutual respect andsovereign equality.

Yet, I would like to set aside the emo-tions and proceed to the objective analy-sis of the state of bilateral relations.

Ukraines position on last years eventsin Georgia is well-known and coincideswith positions of almost all other coun-tries of the world. Its core is indisputablerespect towards sovereignty, territorialintegrity and inviolability of borders ofGeorgia or any other sovereign state.

The accusations of supplies of weap-ons to Georgia are groundless. Its ashame that, despite numerous clear andcomprehensible explanations of the legal-ity of its activity on the arms market fromthe Ukrainian side, the Russian side con-tinues the consecutive campaign aimed atshaping the image of Ukraine as a state

that does not obey international regula-tions and regimes in the sphere of mili-tary technical cooperation. In this regard Iwould like to remind that Georgia hasnever been and is still not a subject to anyinternational sanctions or embargo onsupplies of arms, military equipment and

dual-use goods imposed by either theU.N. Security Council, the OSCE, theEuropean Union or other internationalorganizations. Moreover, the propositionto impose such restrictions within theframework of the OSCE, made by Russiaafter the Russian-Georgian conflict, foundno support.

Ukraines NATO integration coursemay not be subject to Russias politicalcriticism either. It forces us to againrepeat the common truth that the right tochoose international means of ensuringones national security, including the par-ticipation in military-political alliances, isan integral part of the national sovereign-ty of any state and Russia has to respectthat. I would like to remind you that the

Law of Ukraine On Foundations ofNational Security of Ukraine approvedby the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in2003 with support from the leadership ofthe current opposition provides for inte-gration of Ukraine with NATO up to full-fledged membership. The president ofUkraine follows that.

Also [I] would like to once againemphasize that the desire of our countryto gain membership in NATO is in noway aimed against Russia and that thefinal decision on accession of Ukraine toNATO will be made only after a nationalreferendum.

I would like to point out separately thatArticle 17 of the Constitution of Ukraineprohibits deployment of foreign statesmilitary bases on Ukrainian territory. Yet,our state keeps to its international treaty

by Pavel Felgenhauer


Russian President Dmitry Medvedev haspublicly attacked his Ukrainian counterpartViktor Yushchenko and called his adminis-trations policies deliberately anti-Russian.

In an open letter and in a video postingon his official Kremlin blog, Mr. Medvedevaccused Ukraine of supporting barbaricattacks by the pro-Western regime of

President Mikheil Saakashvili during theRussian invasion of Georgia in August oflast year. Mr. Medvedev alleged that civil-ians and Russian peacekeepers were killedby Ukrainian weapons, while Kyiv is con-tinuing to supply the Georgian military withmore arms and shares responsibility for thecrimes committed.

Mr. Medvedev accused the Ukrainianleadership of conspiring with theEuropean Union on natural gas tradeissues against Russian interests, blockingthe activities of its Black Sea Fleet inCrimea, suppressing the use of theRussian language and the UkrainianOrthodox Church element that is subordi-nate to Moscow. Mr. Medvedev castigat-ed Ukraine for aspiring to join NATO,falsifying history by emphasizing thecrimes of totalitarian Communist rule andpromoting nationalist leaders who collab-orated with the Nazis as well as disrupt-ing economic ties (www.kremlin.ru,August 11).

The Russian president expressed hisdisgust with Ukraine in a highly aggres-sive tone, implying that the Kremlin isfed up in dealing with Kyiv. Tensionbetween Russia and Ukraine, accordingto Mr. Medvedev, is very high. A numberof recent tit-for-tat diplomatic expulsions

were described as outrageous. After list-ing the negative Ukrainian actions, Mr.Medvedev announced that Moscow willnot send the newly appointed AmbassadorMikhail Zurabov to Kyiv until Ukrainianpolicies change, in effect downgradingdiplomatic relations.

Mr. Medvedev emphasized that theKremlins disgust is not against brother-ly Ukrainian people, but PresidentYushchenko and his government.Commentators in Moscow believe thatthe Kremlin will refuse to have any deal-ings with Kyiv until there is a regimechange and Mr. Yushchenko is ousted.The Russian policy in dealing with Mr.Yushchenko seems to be in essence thesame as with Mr. Saakashvili. The hopeapparently is that the coming Ukrainianpresidential election on January 17, 2010,will oust Mr. Yushchenko and a pro-Mos-cow administration will be elected(Kommersant, August 12).

Last year Moscow announced that ithad invaded Georgia to defend Russiancitizens. Ukraine has the largest Russianand Russian-speaking population outsideof Russia itself. Soon after the Russo-Georgian war, French Foreign MinisterBernard Kouchner suggested that Russiamight next move against Ukraine orMoldova under the same pretext (Reuters,August 27, 2008).

Former Ukrainian Ambassador in theUnited States Yuri Shcherbak said hebelieves that Moscow might be contemplat-ing a possible invasion of Ukraine to parti-tion its territory, arguing that Ukraine is afailed and ungovernable state (www.newsru.com, May 21).

After Mr. Medvedevs anti-Yushchenkobroadside, the leader of the Eurasian

FOR THE RECORD: Yushchenkos letter to Medvedev

ANALYSIS: Russian military weakness could delay conflict with Ukraine

obligations on the temporary deploymentof the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraineuntil May 28, 2017, and fully complieswith provisions of the relevant basicagreements of 1997. On the other hand, Iam forced to admit serious problems incompliance of the Russian side with the

basic agreements regarding use of land,real estate, radio frequencies, navigationequipment, etc. Throughout the period ofdeployment of the Black Sea Fleet ofRussia in Ukraine, its command has beenrudely and systematically violating thebilateral agreements and legislation ofUkraine, and the Ukrainian side has beenconstantly informing the Russian sideabout that.

Ukraine consistently supports thedevelopment of pragmatic economic rela-tions with Russia, especially in the energyfield. Ukraine has started a program ofmodernization of its gas transport systemto bring it to the highest internationalstandards and is ready to invite the poten-tial of European countries and of other

parties to the process. Our country hasmany times proved in practice its reliabil-ity as a partner in the transportation ofenergy resources: gas, oil and nuclearenergy fuel. Ukraine was one of the fewcountries in the world which in June thisyear welcomed the initiative of theRussian Federation to start a multilateraldialogue on improving the internationallegal framework in energy security that inour opinion should be based upon theEnergy Charter and other relevant docu-ments.

Your letter also repeats regular andwell-known accusations aimed at depriv-ing Ukraine of its view of its own history,our own national interests, foreign policypriorities. I am convinced that such ques-tions as history, along with native lan-guage, culture and family ethics are fun-

damental principles for development ofthe state and identification of theUkrainian nation.

By raising the question of recognitionof the Holodomor in Ukraine of1932-1933 at the international scene theUkrainian people also pay tribute to mil-

lions of Russians, Belarusians, Kazakhsand representatives of other nationalitieswho died of starvation in the Volgareg ion , the Northern Caucasus,Kazakhstan and other parts of the formerUSSR. It is known that during the Lightthe Candle campaign dedicated to the75th anniversary of the Holodomor inUkraine, burning candles in hundreds ofcities worldwide, including in Russia,proved multi-ethnic solidarity withUkraine in recognition of the fact.

In no way I can agree with the allega-tion about the ousting of the Russian lan-guage from public life in Ukraine.Elementary impartial evaluations of thelanguage situation in Ukraine and Russiashow completely opposite facts. It is in

the Russian Federation where membersof the Ukrainian minority have virtuallyno ability to realize the right to fulfilltheir national and cultural needs. Thewell-known findings of internationalorganizations prove that.

Responding to concerns about thealleged intervention of the Ukrainian gov-ernment in the affairs of the OrthodoxChurch, I would like to note the follow-ing. The Ukrainian leadership respectsthe canons and traditions of Churches andreligious organizations. The Church inUkraine is separated from the state; eachcitizen has the right to profess any reli-gion. However, no one may prohibit thecitizens to freely express their position onany issues, including those religious.

Movement (a Kremlin-connected nationalistthink-tank), Alexander Dugin, told reporters,that The downgrading of diplomatic rela-tions has created a pre-war situation andthat, Russia is preparing to cease to recog-nize Ukrainian territorial integrity, as it didwith Georgia. An armed conflict may soonbegin in Crimea and eastern Ukraine thatwill result in these territories becoming aRussian protectorate.

According to Mr. Dugin, war has beendeclared not against Ukraine, but America,that is attacking Russian influence withinthe post-Soviet space. Mr. Yushchenko isnot important, stated Mr. Dugin, it is mere-ly a sick blister, while the real foe is theUnited States (RIA Novi Region, August11).

The Kremlin insists its conflict is with theregimes in Kyiv and Tbilisi, but not withour longtime Orthodox brothers thepeople of Georgia and Ukraine. A recent

public opinion poll by the independentLevada Center showed a strong dislike ofUkraine, with 47 percent of Russias popula-tion having a negative attitude and 44 per-cent positive, while Georgia scores evenworse, with 63 percent negative and 25 per-cent positive. The U.S. scored slightly better,with 40 percent negative and 47 percentpositive. The pollsters believe these publicattitudes are the direct result of state policies

and propaganda (Kommersant, August 12).Mr. Medvedev has introduced legislationto legalize the use of Russian forces abroadto defend Russian soldiers and citizens,fight piracy and defend foreign nationsagainst threats. He announced during ameeting with leaders of Parliament that thelegislation is connected with the Georgiawar, so that in the future these questionswill be clearly regulated. Duma leaders




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by Taras Kuzio


On August 10 President DmitryMedvedev accused President ViktorYushchenko of taking Ukraine on an anti-Russian course (www.blog.kremlin.ru,

August 10). Moscow also recently engagedin tit-for-tat diplomatic expulsions (EurasiaDaily Monitor, July 31).

The two Ukrainian diplomats expelledwere Ukraines Consul General in St.Petersburg Natalia Prokopovych and OlehVoloshyn, a senior adviser to the Ukrainianambassador in Moscow. Russia claimedthat this was in response to the unfriendlyactions of the Ukrainian authoritiestoward two Russian diplomats. It regardedKyivs actions as an openly anti-Russianstep that harms the development of rela-tions between Russia and Ukraine (www.mid.ru, July 29).

Ukraines Ministry of Foreign Affairs(MFA) and National Security and DefenseCouncil (NSDC) both expressed their sur-

prise over the Russian response. We arevery surprised at such a severe and unfortu-nate reaction by the Russian side, the MFAstated (www.mfa.gov.ua, July 29). The MFAhad provided to its Russian counterparts adossier of documents outlining the undiplo-matic activities of the two expelled Russiandiplomats. On the question of the Russianambassadors adviser it was tied to his open-ly anti-Ukrainian statements as well as theOdesa consul general and his de facto sup-port for radical political forces (www.mfa.gov.ua, July 29).

The two expelled Ukrainian diplomatshad never been involved in undiplomaticactivities and were not warned at any stageby Moscow. The MFA claimed that the twoexpelled Russian diplomats breached the

1961 Vienna Convention on DiplomaticRelations and had intervened in Ukrainesinternal affairs. Volodymyr Ohryzko, firstdeputy chair of the NSDC and former for-eign affairs minister, described the Russianresponse as a return to the tried and testedreactionary Soviet mentality of the Homo

Sovieticus in responding to absolutely law-ful actions by [the Ukrainian] state(Ukrayinska Pravda, July 30).

On July 31 Ukrayinska Pravda was toldby unofficial sources that the two so-called diplomats, as Mr. Ohryzkodescribed them, were involved in espio-nage and subversive activities. OdesaConsul General Oleksandr Grachevfinanced and sought to cooperate withlocal political leaders by drawing on fundsgenerated by illegal hard currency opera-tions undertaken through shadow econom-ic structures. This illegal espionage activ-ity in support of Russias political steps,sought to recruit agents of influence toadvance Russian interests in Ukraine.

One of these controlled political groups

was the Odesa-based Rodina Party, whosemembers were accused of the murder of aUkrainian nationalist in Odesa in April(EDM, June 16). Mr. Grachev was directlysubordinated to the Federal Security Service(known by its Russian acronym as FSB)leadership, who passed his reports directlyto Prime Minister Vladimir Putin(Ukrayinska Pravda, July 31). Mr. Grachevsapartment, purchased with these illegallyearned funds, was located in the same build-ing in Odesa as Rodina Party leader IgorMarkovs office.

Expelled Senior Adviser VladimirLysenko undertook active espionage andsubversive activities in Ukraine, the samesources told Ukrayinska Pravda (July 31).Lysenko established unofficial contacts

with representatives of local organs of powerwith the aim of obtaining confidential infor-mation on Ukraines position in negotiationsover the Black Sea Fleet (UkrayinskaPravda, July 31).

Mr. Lysenko also sought to recruit agentsof influence among the Crimean Tatar com-

munity with the aim of replacing the leader-ship of the Mejlis (the Tatars unofficial par-liament) with individuals of a more pro-Russian orientation. The Crimean Tatarshave long been pro-Ukrainian in their orien-tation and Mejlis leaders were elected to theVerkhovna Rada within Rukh (1998) andthe Our Ukraine bloc (2002, 2006, 2007).

A third area long suspected of Russiandiplomats was their subversive activitieswith the FSB based in the Black Sea Fleet tosponsor public protest actions. When, forexample, NATO vessels arrived inSevastopol they organized protests in sup-port of the Russian navy. Anti-NATO andanti-American protests began in earnest inCrimea in summer 2005, immediately afterViktor Yushchenko was elected president.

They were organized against Ukraines jointexercises within the framework of NATOsPartnership for Peace (PfP). Moscow hadnot mobilized similar protests in Crimeaagainst these exercises in 1995-2004 underPresident Leonid Kuchma.

Russian leaders, Crimean Communistsand Crimean Russian nationalists haverepeatedly warned that if Ukraine movedtoward NATO membership it would do sowithout Crimea. This threat of using separat-ism to undermine a countrys trans-Atlanticintegration was implemented in Georgia inAugust 2008. Crimea has never been regard-ed, unlike Abkhazia or South Ossetia, as afrozen conflict. Nevertheless, the Ukrainianauthorities are preparing for future conflictscenarios and, not coincidentally after the

expulsion of Russian diplomats, a large-scale anti-terrorist exercise was held inCrimea on August 3-7 organized by theAnti-Terrorist Center of the Security Serviceof Ukraine (known by its Ukrainian acro-nym as SBU).

The SBU Alpha unit, units from the

Ministry of Emergency Situations, InternalAffairs Ministry special forces and theUkrainian navys marines worked togetherwith the authorities during the planned exer-cises. The twofold aim of the exercises wasto ascertain the level of cooperation betweenthe Ukrainian security forces and the author-ities in the event of a state of emergencyor undertaking anti-terrorist operations(www.sbu.gov.ua, July 28). Both scenariosinvolved countering hypothetical threatsfrom terrorists (in this case, a euphemismfor separatists).

Leaked information about Mr.Lysenkos work with the FSB explainswhy the SBU last month demanded thewithdrawal of the FSB from the Black SeaFleet by December (EDM, July 14). The

ostensible reason for the FSB being inSevastopol is to provide security for theBlack Sea Fleet. Judging from Ukrainiansources, this should be secondary to work-ing with Russian diplomats in the fields ofespionage or subversion.

However, it remains unclear if Ukrainestougher line toward Russian espionage andsubversion is a product of the election cam-paign to increase Mr. Yushchenkos nation-alistic credentials in western Ukraine orgrowing Russian intelligence activitiesagainst Ukraine, or a combination of both.

The article above is reprinted fromEurasia Daily Monitor with permission fromits publisher, the Jamestown Foundation,www.jamestown.org.

by Taras Kuzio


In line with implementing stricter securi-ty policies in Sevastopol and Crimea, theSecurity Service of Ukraine (SBU) is adopt-ing tougher policies towards Russian intel-ligence activities in the peninsula. Thesefollow the August 2008 decrees restrictingthe movement of Russian Black Sea Fleetvessels in and out of Sevastopol withoutUkrainian consent.

The SBU has officially given its Russian

equivalent, the Federal Security Service(FSB), until December 13 to remove itselffrom Ukraine. SBU chief ValentynNalyvaichenko warned that if the FSB hasnot left by that date, then they would bearcriminal responsibility, adding The crimi-nal code contains an article on espionage.(www.pravda.com.ua, June 28).

The FSB officers also operate in counter-intelligence matters. Russia utilizes itsdomestic intelligence agency (the FSB) inits dealings with the CIS (Commonwealthof Independent States), because it is regard-ed as the near abroad (the ForeignIntelligence Service, or SVR is used in thefar abroad). This is the equivalent of theFBI rather than the CIA operating in Centraland Latin America.

Mr. Nalyvaichenko explained that he hadconsulted the Ukrainian Foreign AffairsMinistry before advising Moscow of thecancellation of the protocol permitting theFSB to operate in Sevastopol. NineteenFSB officers currently operate inSevastopol. Russian intelligence has alwaysbeen thought to support separatist, anti-NATO and anti-American groups and par-ties, even providing Black Sea Fleet person-nel who wear civilian clothes to participatein protests.

Mr. Nalyvaichenko revealed that one

factor behind the decision to terminate theright of the FSB to maintain its presence inSevastopol was that they did not restrictthemselves to the naval base. Foreign spe-cial services operate in the city ofSevastopol. And this is against Ukrainianlaw, he said (www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian,June 18).

One member of the Verkhovna RadasCommittee on National Security andDefense, Oleksander Skybinetskyi, said thatmost Ukrainian experts in security affairsare concerned that Russian intelligence

orchestrates various groups and protestmovements that are hostile to Ukrainiansovereignty. The SBU has instituted crimi-nal charges against separatists and broughtin political leaders for interrogation. Theleader of the Progressive Socialist Partyfaction in the Sevastopol City Council,Yevhen Dubovyk, was recently questionedafter he threatened radical steps to uniteSevastopol and Crimea with Russia(Ukrayinskyi Tyzhden, June 12).

A second factor of concern to the SBU isthe possible recruitment of Ukrainian citi-zens who comprise the majority of the20,000 workforce in the fleet and military-industrial enterprises that provide servicesto it. Financial inducements are hard toresist when pay in the fleet and its ancillary

industries is twice that in other Russiannaval units and many times higher than theaverage pay in Ukraine.

Why the FSB needs to be involved in thesecurity of the Black Sea Fleet is puzzling,since this would more normally be the taskof military intelligence. Ukrainian militaryintelligence operates in Sevastopol, and it isassumed by Kyiv that Russian militaryintelligence maintains a presence within thefleet.

The ostensible reason the Black SeaFleet claims it needs Russian intelligence

NEWS ANALYSIS: Ukrainian-Russian diplomatic war intensifies

NEWS ANALYSIS: Ukraines SBU challenges Russias FSB in Crimeaunits is to safeguard the security of the fleeton foreign territory. The question is againstwhom? The SBU has offered to provide fullsecurity for the fleet. Mr. Nalyvaichenkorevealed that the SBU had established anew powerful counter-intelligence unit inSymferopol, Sevastopol and other cities ofCrimea. This unit would be ideally suitedto protect the fleet, he added (NezavisimayaGazeta, June 15). As soon as this unit wasestablished, Mr. Nalyvaichenko advised hisRussian counterparts that the FSB was nolonger required in Crimea.

The SBU could deal with law and orderand terrorist issues. We do not need assis-tance or the physical presence of foreignsecret services, Mr. Nalyvaichenko said(Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 15). TheRussian reaction was predictably negativeand similar to President ViktorYushchenkos August 2008 decrees. TheRussian Foreign Affairs Ministry reiteratedthat the FSB was in Ukraine based on earli-er agreements in relation to the fleet; theycould only be removed through mutualagreement (www.pravda.com.ua, June 18).

Anatoliy Tsyganok, the head of theRussian Center for Military Forecasting,believes that the FSB will ignore theUkrainian demand (www.pravda.com.ua,June 17). Kiril Frolov, a representative of

the Institute for the CIS, warned of anasymmetrical response from Russia forthis unfriendly Ukrainian act against theRussian state (www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian,June 18). It remains unclear how Russia canretaliate, since Ukraine has no military baseon its territory and the SBU only has a min-imal presence in its diplomatic representa-tions within Russia.

The old and technologically obsoletevessels in the fleet are not a threat to thefour NATO member-countries on the BlackSea. The only occasion they have been used

is in the August 2008 invasion of non-NATO member Georgia. NATO has longknown everything it needed to know aboutthe fleet. In December 1991, this authorfaxed to Ukrainian members of Parliament,after they had held a successful referendumon independence, copies of the pages per-taining to the Black Sea Fleet in theInternational Institute for Strategic StudiesMilitary Balance. Open source IISS publi-cations were purchased by the SovietEmbassy, which then classified them asconfidential and they were subsequently

placed in the restricted areas (spetsfond)of Soviet libraries.

Sevastopol has been neglected by Kyivsince independence. The city has fewmemorials dedicated to Ukrainian history,but is full of Russian and Soviet symbolstying the twice hero city to Russia. Thecitys youth is educated exclusively onRussian history, Russian patriotism and loy-alty to Russian statehood. The fleet playsan important role in this process, whichtranscends its military function, especiallyin the areas of education, propaganda, infor-mation and culture (Ukrayinskyi Tyzhden,June 12).

On June 12 Ukrayinskyi Tyzhden asked:What about official Kyiv? Well, itundertakes a policy of non-interference in

the internal affairs of Ukraine. Russianpolicies towards Sevastopol are conductedwithin the context of great power politics.Ukrainian policies, in contrast, are the pri-vate affair of individual patrioticallyinclined persons who have become accus-tomed to disinterest from official Kyiv(Ukrayinskyi Tyzhden, June 12).

The article above is reprinted from

Eurasia Daily Monitor with permission from its publisher, the JamestownFoundation, www.jamestown.org.


5/32


Visit our archive online: www.ukrweekly.com

by Andreas Umland

Much can be heard from Western visi-tors to Ukraine or observers analyzing thepost-Soviet region that Kyiv politics todayis a mess. Hardly anybody (least of all,Ukrainians themselves) will disagree.

Even lowbrow citizens of the EuropeanUnion may come up with an opinion oncurrent Ukrainian affairs, and criticize theensuing political chaos in Kyiv.

Sometimes, Western ignorance mixeswith European arrogance to re-producestereotypes about Ukraine eerily similarto the way in which former KGB officersin Moscow would like to portray Europeslargest new democracy.

Worse, what mostly remains unmen-tioned in Western European assessmentsof current Ukrainian affairs is that theforemost Western organization dealingwith Ukraine, the European Union, bearsresponsibility for the current political dis-array in Kyiv. Most analysts would readi-ly agree that the EU perspective played a

considerable role in, or even was a neces-sary precondition for, the quick stabiliza-tion and democratization of post-commu-nist Central Europe. Many political scien-tists would admit that, in Western Europetoo, peace, stability and affluence duringthe last 60 years have been closely linkedto European integration.

However, few EU politicians andbureaucrats are prepared to state in publicwhat would seem to logically follow fromthese observations concerning theUkrainian case. If EU prospects and mem-bership had a clearly beneficial effect fromTallinn to Dublin, then the absence of aEuropean perspective for a manifestlyEuropean country means also the absenceof that effect in the case of Ukraine.

The post-war notion of Europe isintimately linked to the economic, socialand political dynamism of increasing pan-continental cooperation. When we sayEuropean today we often mean the EUand the largely positive repercussionswhich the integration process had and hason securing economic, political and socialprogress across borders.

In the light of these historically recentachievements, some, however, forgetabout the state of Europe in general, andof some European countries in particular,before integration. Much of pre-warEuropean history was, by contemporarystandards, far messier than Ukrainian

politics. Remember the League ofNations, the Weimar Republic or theSpanish Civil War?

Enlightened Eastern European intellec-tuals too might admit that, without theprospect of EU membership, their coun-tries could today look more like Belarus orGeorgia rather than Portugal or Ireland.Both Western and Eastern European politi-cal elites and governmental apparatusesneeded a road map toward a better andcommon future. Only when European inte-gration, whether after World War II or theCold War, provided such a vision was itthat politicians, bureaucrats and intellectu-als of many EU member-states got theiract together, and made their countries morepolitically and economically successful..

If one admits the relevance of the pros-pect of, preparation for and eventualattainment of EU membership for theinternal development of many Europeanstates, one should also acknowledge theeffects that an explicit denial of such avision has on Ukraines elites. Kyiv findsitself left in the old Europe of the pre-war period.

Unlike politicians in most otherEuropean countries, Ukraines leadersstill have to navigate through a world ofcompeting nation-states, shifting interna-tional alliances, introverted politicalcamps, and harsh zero-sum games wherethe win of one national or internationalactor is the loss of the other. That is howdomestic and European politics func-

tioned across Europe before (and eventu-ally resulted in) the two world wars. Eastof the EUs current borders these incen-tive structures are still largely intact andled to, among numerous other negativerepercussions, the recent wars in theBalkans and Caucasus.

Most Ukrainians themselves would bethe first to admit that Ukraine today is notready for EU membership or even forcandidacy status.

However , many pro-EuropeanUkrainians find it difficult to understandEU policies and rhetoric concerning theseissues: Why, on the one hand, is Turkey anofficial candidate for EU membership, andRomania or Bulgaria already full mem-bers, when Ukraine, on the other hand, is

not even provided with the tentative pros-pect of a future candidacy? Is Turkey moreEuropean, and are Romania or Bulgariareally that much higher developed thanUkraine? Didnt the Orange Revolutionand two subsequent parliamentary elec-tions all approved by the Organization

PRAGUE On Sunday, August 16,RFE/RLs Ukrainian Service, known locallyas Radio Svoboda, marked 55 years ofbroadcasting uncensored news and infor-mation to the people of Ukraine.

In 1954, when the station started broad-

casting to what was then known as theUkrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, peoplecaught listening to Radio Svobodas mes-sages of freedom and democracy were sub-ject to arrest. Nearly half a century later, in2002, Radio Svoboda hosted Ukraines firstever presidential debate.

When communism fell, many thoughtour mission was over, but for our journal-ists, it was just the beginning, said RadioSvoboda Director Irena Chalupa. In thisperiod of democratic transition, we are nowUkraines most popular and trusted interna-

tional news source.Radio Svoboda has received many mes-

sages of congratulations from leading U.S.po l icy-makers , members o f theBroadcasting Board of Governors and aformer RFE/RL president.

During the period of Soviet domina-tion, your service was a lifeline toUkrainians struggling for their basichuman rights and freedom. Since the res-toration of Ukraines independence, theUkrainian Service has continued to pro-vide objective, quality broadcasting asUkraine consolidates democracy, wroteSen. Benjamin Cardin (D-Md.), chair-man, U.S. Helsinki Commission.

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former U.S.national security advisor, wrote: Bykeeping open for so many years the

COMMENTARY: Europes share in the Ukrainian malaise

RFE/RL celebrates 55 years of news broadcasts to Ukraine

The EU commits

a mistake of his-

torical dimensions

denying Kyiv amembership

perspective.

for Security and Cooperation in Europe(OSCE), the Council of Europe and theEU show the adherence of Ukrainians todemocratic rules and values? HasntUkraine been more successful than otherpost-communist countries in averting inter-ethnic strife and in integrating nationalminorities? Didnt the elites and popula-tion of Ukraine show restraint when ten-sions were building up between conflictingpolitical camps in Kyiv, or as a result of

provocative Russian behavior in Crimea?Of course, there are also recent devel-opments in Ukraine that point in theopposite direction. They include continu-ing governmental corruption, increasingpolitical stalemate, stagnating publicadministration reform, and halting indus-trial restructuring.

However, with every passing yearsince the Orange Revolution, one asksoneself more and more: Are the varioussetbacks in Ukraines recent political andeconomic transition the reasons for, orrather a result of, the EUs continuingunwillingness to offer a European per-spective for Kyiv? May it be that onecause for Ukraines frustrating domesticconflicts and halting economic transfor-

mation is the indeterminacy of the coun-trys foreign orientation? Could it be thatthe EUs demonstrative scepticism withregard to Ukraines ability to integrateinto Europe is becoming a self-fulfillingprophecy? Arent the leaders of the EUthemselves, to some degree, becomingresponsible for Ukraines continuing fail-ure to meet European standards?

As a result of EU introvertedness, Kyivis left in a geopolitical nowhere land.Lacking a credible long-term vision of itsown, Ukraine becomes the unofficial bat-tlefield in a political proxy war betweenpro-Western and pro-Russian governmen-tal and non-governmental organizationsfighting for the future of this key, yetunconsolidated European country.

Without the disciplining effect that acredible EU membership perspective pro-vides, there is no commonly acceptedyardstick against which the elites behav-ior could be measured.

Ukrainian politicians, bureaucrats andintellectuals lack a focal point in the con-

duct of their domestic and internationalbehavior. They are left to guess what theWests and Russias real intentions withregard to Ukraine are, and how theyshould behave in order to secure econom-ic development and political indepen-dence, for their country.

The stabilization of Ukraine is not onlyin the interests of the citizens of thisyoung democracy, but should be also akey political concern for Brussels, Parisand Berlin. An economically weakened,politically divided and socially crisis-rid-den Ukrainian state could destabilize andexhibit disintegrative tendencies.

Ukraines population could polarizealong l inguis t ic l ines wi th theUkrainophone west and center put againstthe Russophone south and east. Such adevelopment, in turn, could serve as apretext for Russian intervention withgrave repercussions not only for EasternEuropean politics, but also Russian-Western relations.

In a worst-case scenario, the entire

post-Cold War European security struc-ture could be called into question.

The EU membership perspective con-stitutes a key instrument for the West toinfluence Ukrainian domestic affairs. Theprospect of future European integrationwould reconfigure political discourse andrestructure party conflicts in Kyiv.Neither the Ukrainian common man norRussias political leadership are, in dis-tinction to their stance on Ukraines pos-sible NATO membership, principallyopposed to the idea of a Ukrainian futureentry into the EU.

Even an entirely official statement bythe EU on the possible admission ofUkraine to the EU some day would obligethe EU and member-states to do little dur-

ing the next years. The delegation of theEuropean Commission in Kyiv is alreadyengaged in a wide range of cooperationprojects with the Ukrainian government.Offering Ukraine a European perspectivewould require only few practical changesin the current conduct of EU policiestoward Kyiv. Yet, such an announcementwould have a benevolent impact on thebehavior of Ukraines elites and make adeep impression on the population of thisyoung democracy (as well as in Russia).

The EUs leaders should try to see thelarger picture, remember the recent pastof their own countries and stop theirunhistorical cognitive dissonance. Theyshould try to understand Ukraines cur-rent issues against the background of the

Western and Central European statesexperience of instability before their par-ticipation in European integration. In theinterest of the entire continent and all itspeoples, they should offer Ukraine aEuropean perspective sooner rather thanlater.

Dr Andreas Umland is a lecturer incontemporary East European history atThe Catholic University of Eichstaett-Ingolstadt in Upper Bavaria general edi-tor of the book series Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society and co-edi-tor of the German-Russian journalForum for the Ideas and History of

Contemporary Eastern Europe. Thisarticle appeared, in Russian andUkrainian, first in Zerkalo nedeli/Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, and, in English, on theOpen Democracy website. Dr. Umlandsubmitted it on August 13 for publicationin The Ukrainian Weekly.

access of Ukrainians to the world at large,the Ukrainian Service of RFE/RL hascontributed directly to the emergence of afree Ukraine in a free Europe.

Freedoms light burns brightly thanks tothe dedication of all who have contributed

through the years to this wonderful ser-vice, Rep. Marcy Kaptur (D-Ohio), co-chair, U.S.-Ukraine Congressional Caucus:

Tom Dine, former president of RFE/RL noted; For 55 years, RFE/RLsUkrainian Service has provided theUkrainian nation and state a critical ser-

vice in the peoples pursuit of separateidentity, an open society, national inde-pendence and sovereignty. The radiosdirectors, journalists, engineers, assistantsin Kyiv, throughout the country, in neigh-boring countries and in Prague have

assembled high-quality and pertinentdaily reports of accurate and relevantnews, information and commentaryincluding about Ukraines unique classi-cal music over the generations. Thisreporting has contributed to the evolutionof a free and democratic Ukraine.


6/32


Last year, on August 24, 2008, the government of Ukrainecommemorated its independence from the Soviet Union with amilitary parade, complete with scores of tanks, missile launch-ers, 30 aircraft and other heavy artillery. The event took place

soon after the Russian Federations invasion of Georgia, however, the decision to holda military parade was made well before the invasion.

It was the first military parade to commemorate independence in seven years; the40,000 attendees of the spectacle could only gain access with government passes orinvitations. Ukraines Defense Minister Yurii Yekhanurov led the display down Kyivs

August

242008

Turning the pages back...

Last years anniversary celebrations of Ukraines independence were marred byRussias invasion, just over two weeks earlier, of Georgia. It was a dangerous timeand the situation was seen as threatening to Ukraine. Many commentators opined

at the time that Ukraine could be next. Reacting to the events in Georgia,President Viktor Yushchenko underscored: A threat to anyones territorial sover-eignty is a threat to our own sovereignty. And he gave this expression of solidarityeven more substance by traveling, along with the presidents of Poland, Estonia,Latvia and Lithuania, to Tbilisi, where they stood in a central square to tell the peo-ple of Georgia: We are with you.

Soon afterwards, speaking at the 2008 Ukrainian Independence Day commemora-tions in Kyiv, President Viktor Yushchenko said: We, the Ukrainian people, are themaster (hospodar) of our dear land. No one will ever decide for us what language tospeak and what church to pray in. No one will ever tell us what road to follow. Healso spoke of Ukraines complete return to a single European home as a matter ofthe nearest, already achieved prospect and noted that joining the European securitysystem (he did not use the word NATO) was the most effective way to defendUkraine and Ukrainians.

Now, a year later, as Ukraine prepares to mark the 18th anniversary of its indepen-dence, there are new threats from Russia, expressed in the exceedingly arrogant letterfrom Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to President Yushchenko (see last weekseditorial) that alleged Ukraine has an anti-Russian stance and accused the Ukrainian

president and his administration of a litany of wrongs that harmed relations withRussia. Ignoring the views of Ukrainian citizens as well as Russias well-knownposition, the political leadership of Ukraine stubbornly continues to pursue accessionto NATO, Mr. Medvedev wrote. (Imagine, Ukraine had the gall to ignore Russiasposition!) In addition, Russia is once again asserting its special interest in Ukraineand inserting itself into Ukraines democratic elections, with Mr. Medvedev hopingfor a new political leadership and declaring that he sees no prospects for improvedrelations under the current administration.

At about the same time, the patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, while visit-ing Ukraine, declared that the Russians and Ukrainians are one and the same people,and held the first-ever Kyiv sitting of the Russian Orthodox Churchs synod. (He alsooffered that he could become a citizen of Ukraine and spend more time there to main-tain his religious influence. How helpful!) Observers in Ukraine saw Patriarch Kirillsvisit as an assertion of Russian religious and cultural domination, as well as a Kremlin-backed exertion of Moscows authority in Ukraine. And, lest we forget, there was anovertly political component to the patriarchs visit as well: he was met in Kyiv andaccompanied to Donetsk by Viktor Yanukovych, leader of the Party of the Regions ofUkraine and a candidate for president.

Thus, as Ukraine gets set to celebrate its most important national holiday,Ukrainian Independence Day, on August 24, there surely is trouble on the horizon.Much of it emanates from a neighbor that is hardly neighborly, but there are diffi-culties also within Ukraine.

Political infighting in the country has halted progress on all fronts political, eco-nomic, social, cultural, etc. Indeed, one could say this is a new post-Soviet period ofstagnation. With the presidential election season soon to begin, there is precious littlehope that any significant progress will be made on those fronts. And, of course, thestagnation at home affects Ukraines standing on the international scene.

Hardly anyone speaks these days of Ukraines prospects for membership inNATO, and even the more likely accession of Ukraine to the European Unionseems to be on the back burner. The primary reason cited is the political disarrayin Kyiv. Mr. Yushchenkos talk last year of Ukraine soon returning to itsEuropean home now seems a far-off vision as Western European leaders havechosen to basically ignore Ukraine.

Historian and political analyst Dr. Andreas Umland writes in this issue that theEuropean Union bears some responsibility for the chaos in Ukraine, arguing that whatthe EU did in helping to stabilize and democratize Central Europe it most certainly did

not do in Ukraine. The prospects of EU membership, he underscores, made thosecountries more successful both politically and economically. The EU, however, hasnot offered Ukraine a European perspective, he notes, adding, May it be that onecause for Ukraines frustrating domestic conflicts and halting economic transformationis the indeterminacy of the countrys foreign orientation? As a result of the EUs inac-tion, Dr. Umland writes, Ukraine today finds itself in a geopolitical nowhere land.

We strongly concur. While the new Obama administration deserves kudos for itsattention to Ukraine most notably the visit to Kyiv of Vice-President Joe Biden theEuropean Union deserves a reprimand. As the EU dithers in offering Ukraine a mem-bership perspective, Russia attempts to reassert itself as a great power. The EUsinaction may ultimately turn out to be a detriment not only to Ukraine area-wise thelargest country in Europe but to the members of the European Union themselves.

The 18th anniversary

The UkrainianWeekly

Prime Minister Tymoshenko isdenounced by the Ukrainian NationalAssociation Press in the USA, screamsthe highly misleading headline over theop-ed by Borys Danik (Brama, August 3).

Mr. Danik is, of course, entitled to hisopinion of Yulia Tymoshenko (highlypositive) and of the Ukrainian diaspora(highly negative), but he is not entitled tomisrepresent the Ukrainian NationalAssociation and its publications.

Seeing the sensational headline to theop-ed, readers get the impression that theUNAs publications, and by extension theUNA, truly have denounced the primeminister of Ukraine, a leading candidatefor president. And, readers would assumethat the piece is about those publications.However, Mr. Daniks op-ed is actually acommentary on recent events in Ukraine,plus a criticism of what he sees as thediasporas position on Ms. Tymoshenko,with a vilification of the UNAs two

newspapers thrown in for good measure.(Why Mr. Danik feels the entire

diaspora is against Ms. Tymoshenko is amystery. In fact, from the letters wereceive here at Svoboda and TheUkrainian Weekly, it is clear that thediaspora is mostly split between support-ers of Ms. Tymoshenko and ViktorYushchenko.)

As to the substance of the accusationagainst the UNAs publications, it mustbe stated that Svoboda and The UkrainianWeekly have published editorials and

commentaries criticizing PresidentYushchenko, Prime Minister Tymoshenko,Viktor Yanukovych of the Party ofRegions of Ukraine and other leaders inUkraine as warranted by their actions and

words. It cannot be stated that the publi-cations have taken a concerted standagainst Ms. Tymoshenko in particular.

The editorial cited by the op-ed writerin question (published in Svoboda on July24) comments on a strategic course out-lined by a member of the YuliaTymoshenko Bloc, not Ms. Tymoshenkoherself, and warns about the results ofsuch a course should it be adopted by Ms.Tymoshenko. Futhermore, Mr. Danikpresents the words of a Kyiv journalistquoted in that editorial as the words ofthe editorial itself. Thus, what the op-edwriter presents as Svobodas position isnot the newspapers position at all.

Finally, a comment: reaction to editori-al material usually should be printed in

the publication in which it appeared, asreaders are familiar with the originalpiece and can then evaluate a letter-writ-ers reaction for themselves. Publishingsuch reaction elsewhere does not affordreaders the opportunity to read the origi-nal art icle being commented on.Oftentimes, as in this case, it also createsan unfounded and skewed perception.

Roma HadzewyczEditor-in-chief

Svoboda and The Ukrainian WeeklyAugust 4, 2009

Daniks misleading headline, unfounded accusations

A letter from the editor

Biden speaks the truth

On August 3, Brama (www.brama.com) posted what it labeled Op-ed: Prime

Minister Tymoshenko is denounced by the Ukrainian National Association Press in theUSA. On August 4, the editor-in-chief of The Ukrainian Weekly e-mailed a letter tothe editor of Brama reacting to the headline and the allegations made in the op-edwritten by Boris Danik.

Receiving no response, she inquired on August 10 about the fate of the letter. MaxPyziur, CEO of Brama, replied on August 11: This particular letter will not be pub-lished on Brama. Responsibility for this decision is mine.

Due to that decision, The Weekly feels it has no other choice than to publish its edi-tor-in-chiefs letter in order to counter the impression created by the op-ed on Brama.Below is the text of the letter.

Speaking the truth: Biden on Russia,

analysis and commentary by David J.Kramer, The Weekly Standard, August 1:

In an interview with the Wall StreetJournal on July 23, [U.S. Vice-PresidentJoe] Biden described a Russia with alooming demographic crisis, a witheringeconomy, and a banking sector in trouble.He noted Russias interest in negotiatingfurther cuts in nuclear weapons becausethey cannot afford to maintain even cur-rent levels. Russia is having difficultyadjusting to loss of empire, Biden said,adding that it is clinging to something inthe past that is not sustainable.

In a separate interview over the week-end with Reuters, [the outgoing EuropeanUnion Ambassador to Russia Marc]Franco cited Russias insufficiently devel-oped civil society and lack of freedom of

the press. I do believe, Franco said, thatyou cannot have rule of law without thebasic elements of democracy, implyingfree elections and a vibrant civil societysupported by a free press.

In their descriptions of currentRussia, both Biden and Franco were onthe mark.

In an appearance on Sundays Meetthe Press, Secretary of State HillaryClinton described Russia as a greatpower and reiterated President [Barack]

Obamas hope to see a strong, peaceful,and prosperous Russia. White House presssecretary Robert Gibbs said in a statementSaturday evening, The president and vice-president believe Russia will work with usnot out of weakness but out of nationalinterest.

Alas, that is wishful thinking.Contrary to Bidens description of Russiasleaders as pretty pragmatic in the end andlikely to cooperate with the U.S. out ofnational interest on issues such as Iran, thevery problems he identified are likely tomake Russia a more difficult country withwhich to engage. We and Russian leaderssimply do not share many national inter-ests, to say nothing of common values.

A Russia facing the kinds of problemsBiden and Franco described is more apt todeflect its populations attention from thegrowing number of difficulties at home by

projecting onto others like neighboringGeorgia or Ukraine. Theres nothing like athreat from Tbilisi or Kyiv or fromNATO enlargement to drum up popularsupport and take everyones minds off theproblems at home, at least temporarily.

A Russian leadership facing thekinds of problems Biden and Francodescribe is less, not more, likely to worktogether with us on a whole host of issues.

IN THE PRESS




7/32


A perspective

from Canada, U.K.Dear Editor:

It was interesting to see that MyronKuropas, in his column (August 9) hasjoined the entire country in participating inthe national debate on health care, which,upon witnessing some of the televised townhall meetings, could also be termedSearching for the socialist bogeymanunder the hospital bed.

Health care, of course, is a very compli-cated and vital issue, and deserves to bewell debated. I venture to share my opiniononly because I have lived in Canada and theUnited Kingdom, which have government-subsidized health care programs, and theUnited States, which does not, and I havehad the opportunity to avail myself of medi-cal care in all three countries.

In my personal experience I have noticed

very little difference in the level of care Ihave received. In all three countries I havefound that medical care, when I needed it orrequested it, was prompt, efficiently deliv-ered and of a very high quality.

The only difference is that here in theUnited States, unlike Canada and the U.K.,I am often called upon to pay hefty out-of-pocket costs for portions of medical proce-dures that are not covered by my healthinsurance plan, despite the astronomical andever-escalating premiums that I pay.

Given the choice, Ill take the bogeymanany day.

The Most Rev. Paul Chomnycky, OSBMStamford, Conn.

The letter-writer is bishop of theUkrainian Catholic eparchy in Stamford.

Why does Kuropas

parrot party lies?Dear Editor:

I was deeply disheartened to read MyronKuropas column of August 9. Why woulda man who clearly cares about his commu-nity conspire to spread absurdities about ourdesperately needed health care reforms byparroting party lies suggesting the govern-ment wants to pull the plug on Baba? Heknows better than that.

The New York Times of Wednesday,August 12, quotes the AARP on exactly thispoint and says The rumors out there areflat-out lies. The House bill would provideMedicare coverage for optional consulta-tions with doctors who advise patients onlife-sustaining treatment and end-of-lifeservices, including hospice care.

Why does Dr. Kuropas (in sync withcountless other party warriors) deploy suchscare tactics in defense of bloated insurancecompanies and their ruthless, greedy execswho have grown rich from the suffering andmisery of the needy?

What would Taras Shevchenko say?

Askold MelnyczukMedford, Mass.

Joseph Stalin

and FDRs prioritiesDear Editor:

Kudos to Dr. Myron Kuropas for hisexcellent column Lost without a trace (July26). Of special interest was his book reviewof The Forsaken American Tragedy inStalins Russia by Tim Tzouliadis.

The Depression of 1929 and blatant mis-information by our State Department misledmany Americans to seek better fortunes inStalins Soviet paradise. Yet, once thesemisguided immigrants were relieved oftheir passports, they soon became trapped

in the USSR without any legal recourse ofreturn or exit.Appeals to our government for help were

ignored since FDR surrounded himself withSoviet apologists like Joseph Davies andWalter Duranty and whose Cabinet consist-ed of quite a few socialist progressiveslike Harry Hopkins, Alger Hiss, HenryWallace, H.D. White and others.

Thus, in his mind and heart, FDR soonbecame Stalins most famous and ardentapologist himself.

FDR knew and ignored the UkrainianFamine of 1933, his urgent priority at thattime being recognition of the USSR.

He similarly ignored Stalins brazen Nazicollaboration in 1939. So much so, that heassured an audience in 1944 that the Russians

were perfectly friendly and not trying to gob-ble up the rest of Europe or the world.So much so that FDR even talked about

giving Stalin the blueprints of the A-bomb and talking about this repeatedly.

Later, when Stalin replaced the Rumaniangovernment with Communists, evenChurchill couldnt persuade Roosevelt tosign a letter of protest.

Notre Dame historian Wilson Miscomble(in his From Roosevelt to Truman) finds itextremely difficult to fault the most idolizedpresident of the 20th century; yet it is unde-niable that FDR all but invited the Soviettakeover of Eastern Europe. Yalta was mere-ly another way station on a course FDRhad charted long ago.

Finally FDR campaigned to keep

America out of war but knew war was inevi-table. We were, after all, already fighting theJapanese with our Chenault Flying Tigervolunteers from China and embargoedJapans Middle East energy resources. Wewere forcing Japan to strike but supposedlydidnt know where.

Yet a perennial test question asked ofJapanese military officer cadets during the1930s was: Where would hostilities begin ifthe enemy was America? The obviousanswer was Pearl Harbor due to its location,isolation and harbor structure.

Whether Pearl Harbor was an intentionalor unintentional sacrifice will probablynever be known. But it is incomprehensiblethat the base would have been so poorly pre-pared for invasion or why three aircraft car-

riers mysteriously left the base prior toDecember 7, 1941.In any case, Pearl Harbor accomplished

all of FDRs objectives: united Americansfor war and resolved the Depression by pro-viding jobs.

Andrew M. Senkowsky, D.D.S.Van Etten, N.Y.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

We welcome your opinion

The Ukrainian Weekly welcomes lettersto the editor and commentaries on a vari-ety of topics of concern to the UkrainianAmerican and Ukrainian Canadian com-munities. Opinions expressed by colum-nists, commentators and letter-writers aretheir own and do not necessarily reflect

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Please note: THE LENGTH OF LETTERSCANNOT EXCEED 500 WORDS.

So, Mykola Hohol, whatve you got sayfor yourself on this, the 200th anniversaryof your birth? Who were you? A Ukrainian?A Russian? Time to fess up, buddy!

In her well-documented 2007 bookNikolai Gogol: Between Ukrainian andRussian Nationalism, Edyta M.Bojanowska, an assistant professor ofRussian literature at Rutgers University,provides a nuanced answer.

Gogol, writes Dr. Bojanowska, was nota Russian nationalist. Despite public assur-ances of his personal commitment toRussian nationalism, Gogol proved incapa-ble of delivering his message as an artist,she writes. Gogols Russian nationalism

was not a deeply and sincerely held convic-tion but a rather contrived aspect of hispublic service.

Russian and French critics had suspectedGogols contrived Russian persona earli-er. Critic Semyon Vengerov, Dr.Bojanowska informs us, claimed thatGogol had not a drop of love for Russiawhich appeared in his works as a deadkingdom of dead souls yet had inexhaust-ible reserves of love for Ukraine...

Critic Faddei Bulgarin believed, accord-ing to Dr. Bojanowska, that Gogol did notknow Russia, the Russian language, orRussian ideas, that he notoriously liedabout Russia, failed to show a singleinstance of nobility in Russian, life...Gogols contemporary French reviewers

were shocked by his portrayal of Russia.Jules Barbery dAurevilly was struck byGogols merciless satire of Russias entirenational and social organism. To the extentthat Gogols Russia was a colossus,dAurevilly wrote, it was a colossus ofstupidity and triviality.

Dr. Bojanowska agrees. Gogols fictionon Russia, she writes, offers a nationalrebuke rather apotheosis... While folkloricstylization and historicity, the hallmarks ofhis nationalism, distinguish Gogols imageof Ukraine, his image of Russia has nosuch layering. Only contemporaneity exist-ed in Gogols fiction on Russia, its princi-pal theme being a huge and corrupt govern-ment bureaucracy. Even in his novelDead Souls, Gogol presents Russian

uniqueness as a catalog of faults andvices.

Stung by critiques of his classic workand concerned, no doubt, with his career,Gogol tried to make amends but even thenhe wasnt contrite enough. He replaced hisformer condemnation of Russia as a nationwith the idea that Russia had not yetattained true nationhood, though he claimedit was imminent.

Gogols relation to Ukraine was lessconflicted, though it too evolved overtime, writes Dr. Bojanowska. In hisEvenings on a Farm [Near Dikanka]Gogol celebrates Ukraine as a nation...united by organic culture, historical memo-ry and language... The stories themselvesdepict an absolute separation between the

Russian and Ukrainian worlds. The politi-cal dimension of the stories generates apowerful message of the irremediable frac-tures in the Russo-Ukrainian body politicand a celebration of Ukraines viability as anation.

Gogols Ukrainian nationalism peakedwhile he was researching Ukrainian history,explains Dr. Bojanowska, who reviewedmany of his manuscripts. Gogols unpub-lished fragment Mazepas Meditationsshows best the authors politically riskyexploration of Ukrainian history in that it

validates Ukraines historic right to inde-pendence. So fascinated was Gogol withUkrainian history that he once hoped tomove to Kyiv and to devote himself to eth-nographic and historic research on Ukraineas a professor at the university. His plansnever materialized.

Born in the Ukrainian Kozak village ofSorochyntsi in the Poltava region of theRussian empire in 1809, Gogol was a con-temporary of Taras Shevchenko, a painter/poet born in 1814. Both lived for a time inSt. Petersburg, where their budding geniuswas recognized by Russians, Gogols byAleksander Pushkin, Shevchenkos by KarlBriullov, a painter. Both wrote plays. Gogol

authored The Inspector General (madeinto a Hollywood movie starring DannyKaye in 1949). Shevchenko penned NazarStodolya. Both died in their 40s. Today,Gogol is recognized as a great Russianwriter. Shevchenko is heralded as the poetlaureate of Ukraine.

Was Gogol less of a Ukrainian thanShevchenko? I think not. During theUkrainian phase of his literary career,Gogol published Evenings on a Farm(1831) and Taras Bulba (1835), his clas-sic work about the Zaporozhian Kozaks(made into a Hollywood movie starring YulBrynner in 1965). As Jeffrey Meyers pointsout in his introduction to the Barnes andNoble edition of the satiric novel DeadSouls, The [sic] Ukraine was then part of

Russia and Gogol had been educated in theRussian language. If he wanted to establisha serious (as opposed to a merely provin-cial) reputation, he had to write in Russianrather than Ukrainian.

Dead Souls and The Overcoat werepublished in 1842, as was a second,Russified version of Taras Bulba. Whilehe Russified his Cossacks, writes Dr.Bojanowska, Gogol also Ukrainianizedthe idea of Russia. The cradle and treasuryof Slavdom in Gogols view, Ukraine couldreorient Russia towards its Slavic roots...When trying to create a sympathetic imageof Russianness, Gogol kept reaching for hisUkrainian particulars that he held dear: folksongs, love of revelry, Cossack abandon,variegated southern culture.

According to Dr. Bojanowska, it was in1836 that Gogol made his transition fromamateur Ukrainian to professional Russianwriter. Analyzing Gogols fiction in the1903 Russian journal Questions ofPhilosophy and Psychology, Dr. V. Chizhconcluded that Gogol was mentallyderanged. The difference between Gogolsportrayal of Ukraine before 1836, and hisportrayal of Russia after this date, the for-mer exuberantly favorable and the latterharshly critical, writes Dr. Bojanowska,represents for Chizh a clear and indisput-able symptom of Gogols deep psychiatricproblem. Remember the Soviets? Theytoo believed that detractors were derangedbecause only crazy people could possibly

dislike Russia.So who were you, Mykola baby? Ibelieve you were a writer with a trueUkrainian heart, an irrepressible talent,forced to write in Russian in a repressiveRussocentric empire, and the world recog-nized you as a literary giant. And, my dearcheeky fellow, you did it all while mockingthe Russians. I love you, man. Rest inpeace.

Myron Kuropass e-mail address [email protected].

faces and placesby myron b. kurpoasFaces and Places

by Myron B. Kuropas

Yo, Mykola, waz up?


8/32


NEWS AND VIEWS

by Anna Procyk

On May 24 Russian Prime MinisterVladimir Putin paid homage to Anton

Ivanovich Denikin, a prominent leader ofthe White movement, by placing a wreathon the tsarist generals grave in Moscow.For many years viewed as one of the vilestenemies of the Soviet regime, fighting theBolsheviks as well as the armies of indepen-dent Georgia and Ukraine under the bannerof Russia One and Indivisible, Denikinhas now been fully rehabilitated and proper-ly reburied in his native soil. After the sol-emn consecration of the generals tomb-stone, celebrated by the Patriarch ofMoscow and All Russia, Mr. Putin respond-ed to questions of the somewhat bewilderedreporters covering the ceremony by urgingthem to read Denikins memoirs.

A bit earlier, while chatting withArchimandrite Tikhon Shevkunov, known

as the leader of the most conservativenationalist wing within the RussianOrthodox Church, Mr. Putin confided that aperusal of the generals memoirs had com-pletely changed his perception of Denikinin history. What Mr. Putin found especiallyinspiring was the fact that for the leader ofthe White movement even thinking aboutsplitting Russia was considered a crime, inparticular when such thoughts were applied

to Ukraine. The Russian Prime Minister wasalso impressed by Denikins firm assertionsthat no one had the right to meddle in whatwere considered Russias internal affairs.

Mr. Putin would be even more impressedwith the thoughts and deeds of the tsaristgeneral if he had time to examine the docu-ments and papers of the White movementdeposited at the Hoover Institution Archivesin Stanford, Calif., and at the BakhmeteffArchive of Russian and East EuropeanHistory at Columbia University.

From these carefully preserved recordshe would learn that for the White movement even before Denikin became the supremecommander the preservation of theRussian empire was an objective of utmostimportance. The British and French diplo-mats viewed this preoccupation as an obses-sion that was constantly interfering withrational thought and sound military actionon the part of the White political and mili-tary leadership. It is this obsession with theempires indivisibility that has been consid-ered the main reason for the horrors of thecivil war and the ultimate defeat of theWhite cause.

This preoccupation can be detectedalready in the first letter written by thefounder of the White movement, Gen.Mikhail Alekseev, when the tsarist officerswere just beginning to congregate in theDon after the Bolshevik coup in Petrograd.In this note the general focused not on theevents in the Russian capital, but almostexclusively on the political developments inUkraine. Because he considered the Whiteforces that eventually became the VolunteerArmy still too weak to interfere militarily inthe political affairs of Ukraine, Alekseevurged that an intelligence service be imme-

Black knight in a White generals saddle: Putin, Denikin and Ukrainediately established in Kyiv to monitor theactivities of the Ukrainian government.

From this time on, the Volunteer Armycontinually meddled in the politics of

Ukraine by endeavoring to discredit its lead-ers in the eyes of the Entente and by mini-mizing Ukraines fighting potential in con-versations with foreign diplomats.

When, in spite of these efforts, the Frenchand British agents in Ukraine whose dis-patches the Volunteer Armys secret servicewas skillfully intercepting began reportingto their governments in the beginning of1919 that the Ukrainian army was muchstronger than White leaders cared to admitand when Ukrainian foreign emissariesscored some notable successes in the diplo-matic field, the White movement, now underDenikins guidance, decided that it was timeto adopt new, more aggressive tactics.

First, orders were given to search forways and means to weaken the Ukrainianmilitary by weaning the well-organized, dis-ciplined units from western Ukraine, theUkrainian Galician Army, away from thecentral command. Denikins intelligenceagents succeeded in this endeavor by bring-ing about an agreement between theVolunteer Army and the Galicians by theend of 1919.

Secondly, it was decided that steps had tobe taken to deprive the Ukrainian diplomaticapparatus of some of its most skillful emis-saries, especially those who were of Jewishbackground. Thus, it could be consideredhardly a coincidence that in 1919 there wasa sudden surge in acts of violence againstthe Jewish inhabitants of Ukraine. The newsof these events must have been greeted witha degree of congratulatory satisfaction inDenikins milieu, especially when a

Volunteer Army agent planted in theUkrainian headquarters began reportingabout the atmosphere of utter confusion anddismay among the Ukrainians. In dispatchessent almost daily with the signature of a cer-tain Capt. Marinovich, it was reported thatthe head of the Ukrainian Directory, SymonPetliura, appeared to be on the verge of los-ing his mind because his orders categoricallyforbidding his men from participating in actsof violence against Jews went unheeded.

The immediate consequence of theseunfortunate events was the resignation ofone of the Directorys ablest diplomats,Arnold Margolin. In an explanatory notethis prominent Jewish jurist and civic leaderwrote that even though he was fully awarethat the Ukrainian Directory was not respon-sible for inciting these heinous incidents, thepressure of public opinion did not permithim to act otherwise.

These devious acts perpetrated by theWhite leaders most likely would not undulyshock the sensibilities of Putin, a formeragent of the KGB himself. But from thedocuments in the archives as well as frominformation in Denikins multi-volume his-tory of the civil war, Putin could also learnthat at the end of the struggle for RussiaOne and Indivisible, some of the formertsarist officers in the White movement choseto join the Red Army because by that time,as they explained, it was evident that theBolsheviks were reuniting Russia.

This choice was considered morallyunacceptable by Denikin. During his yearsas an emigr in France and the United Stateshe never missed an opportunity to condemnthe Bolshevik regime. He viewed as betrayal

Anna Procyk is a associate professorof history at Kings County College, CityUniversity of New York. She is the authorof Russian Nationalism and Ukraine:The Nationality Policy of the VolunteerArmy during the Civil War, (Edmonton-Toronto: Canadian Institute of UkrainianStudies, 1995). (Continued on page 14)


9/32


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