The UN Security Council and Libya, 2011: At the Crossroads ... · and the theory of the RAM and the...

1 Florian Gruenwald, A911047

The UN Security Council and Libya, 2011:

At the Crossroads of Realpolitik and

Idealism

BA International Relations

Department of Politics, History and International Relations

Loughborough University

Florian Grünwald

A911047


Abstract

Few events in world politics reverberate more than international military

interventions. NATO operation “Unified Protector” in Libya, legitimated by the UN

Security Council and lasting from March to October 2011, was a case in point.

According to the countries involved, namely Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark,

France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Qatar, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey,

the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States, it was a

humanitarian campaign in order to protect the lives of Libyan civilians. However, this

claim is very much disputed and critics argue that the coalition states only acted to

promote their own interest by violent means. To investigate this controversy, the

present dissertation will examine the main drivers of the intervention. It will ask

whether the motivations of the permanent members of the UN Security Council (the

US, the UK and France) really were the idealistic and selfless furthering of

humanitarian concerns, or whether they were in fact related to their national interest

or domestic politics. To increase the precision and clarity of the argument, we will

employ two widely-used models within Foreign Policy Analysis: the Rational Actor

Model and the Domestic Politics Model. Applying both models, we argue that the main

rationale in the case of the US and the UK was indeed idealism. By contrast, the

predominant reason for the participation of France seems to have been President

Nicolas Sarkozy’s desire to enhance his domestic reputation. Disposing of the

knowledge derived from this analysis, - that genuine humanitarian interventions are at

least sometimes possible -, the dissertation will subsequently investigate their future

feasibility. Focusing on the Permanent Five members and veto powers of the UN

Security Council, the US, China, Russia, the UK and France, we will conclude that

humanitarian interventions will probably be less likely in the time-frame under

examination, the next 10 years from 2012-2021 because of dissension between the P5

and a lack of military capability. Political controversies within the UN Security Council

surrounding the intervention in Libya have made consensus on future operations

implausible. Expanding the focus further, we find that decreasing military capacity due

to declining defence budgets within the US, the UK and France will arguably reinforce

this development and lead to a lower likelihood of future humanitarian interventions.


To conclude, we will take a normative stand and analyse the implications this has on

world politics, positing that this outcome is detrimental to the improvement of global

human rights.


Contents

1 Introduction 5

2 Description and Analysis of the UNSC, the RAM and the DPM 12

3 The degree of idealism in the passing of UNSCR 1973 and the subsequent military

intervention by the P3 states 18

4 Lessons from Libya for the Future of Humanitarian Interventions 31

5 Conclusion 40

6 Appendix A 43

7 Appendix B 49

8 Appendix C 60

9 Bibliography 61


Introduction

At the moment these lines are written, it has been more than five months after the

international military intervention in Libya ended. Nonetheless, the final verdict about a

number of fundamental issues the campaign raised is still outstanding. In particular, we are

entitled to ask how idealistic the decision of the UN Security Council (UNSC) members, the

US, the UK and France (P3) was to allow and conduct a forceful intervention in Libya,

undertaken in a NATO framework as operation “Unified Protector” from the 24th of March to

the 31st of October 2011 (NATO, 2011, 1). Furthermore, what are the ramifications of this

campaign for the future of humanitarian interventions legitimated by the UNSC? By

addressing those essential questions, the present study aims to contribute to advancing the

state of research on this topic. Chapter One of the dissertation will lay out a concise

illustration of the UNSC and its role with regard to the campaign in Libya. Furthermore, it will

set out the necessary definitions and explain the theoretical models, the Rational Actor

Model (RAM) and the Domestic Politics Model (DPM), which will be used in the second

chapter to illuminate the degree of idealism in the decision of the P3 to permit and

undertake an intervention in Libya. There, the models will be applied to examine this issue in

an objective framework. Using the tools of Foreign Policy Analysis, we will conclude that the

degree of idealism in legitimating the military campaign was very significant, unlike what is

often claimed in the popular media (Beaumont, 2011, 1). Out of the P3, the UK and the US

arguably had idealistic motivations; only the case of France can be explained by domestic

political rationales. Expanding the focus, the third chapter will then consider the

consequences of operation “Unified Protector”. What lessons can we draw from the events

for the future of humanitarian interventions? Reviewing the controversial manner in which

the operation was legitimized, and the military difficulties encountered by the partaking

states1, we will argue that similar actions will be less likely to happen in the future. The

normative issues this raises will finally be addressed in the conclusion. In general, the

dissertation will be empirical and analytical, grounded in actual events, reliable sources and

current data. Primary literature such as official speeches, governmental documents and

press releases will therefore be widely used in the project, supported by theoretical scholarly

work, academic papers and news articles. The general approach taken will be a case study

method, concentrating on Libya but maintaining the potential to abstract from the given

1 Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Qatar, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States (NATO[1], 2011, 1).


example. Limitations of the dissertation and possible criticisms include the choice of the

models used in Chapter Two as incomplete, or the qualm that showing future political

developments must necessarily be an unfounded claim. However, we argue that the RAM

and the DPM are the most-widely used models in Foreign Policy Analysis and that, due to

data and space constraints, an extension of the analysis – even if desirable – is not possible.

Furthermore, the predictions we make in Chapter Three are based on current events and

developments which have already been observed; therefore, we do not engage in random

speculation but in theoretically-sound scenario building.

The first chapter of the dissertation will thus be centred on the UNSC, necessary definitions

and the theory of the RAM and the DPM. The UNSC contains 15 member states. Its main

drivers, however, are the Permanent Five (P5), the US, China, Russia, the UK and France

which also yield veto power on substantive matters (Sarooshi, 2001, 1). Importantly,

allowing a military intervention in another country is a core right of this committee, a power

it exercised on the 17th of March by passing UNSCR 19732 (See appendix A), permitting the

use of “all necessary measures” to protect Libyan civilians (UNSC[1], 2011, 3) attacked by

Muammar Qaddafi’s forces which were about to crush the domestic rebellion (Al Jazeera,

2011, 1). Therefore, the supporters of the resolution maintained that the intervention was

humanitarian in nature, motivated solely by the objective of protecting human rights and the

lives of the Libyan population. “Humanitarian intervention” as a fundamental concept of the

following analysis will subsequently be defined and for the purpose of this introduction can

be summarized as a forceful breach of a country’s sovereignty to protect its population

(MacLean, MacMillan, 2009, 1).

But what were the true objectives of the drivers of the intervention, the P3? Were they

humanitarian, national interest related or linked to the achievement of domestic political

goals? The public and the scholarly community are both divided on this issue. Whilst certain

academics see the conduct of the operation as mainly motivated by idealistic rationales

(Joens, 2011, 4; Bellamy, Williams, 2011, 23; Achcar, 2011, 1), others are more sceptical, and

even regard it as a barely veiled pursuit of the interveners’ national interest (Bush,

Martinielle, Mercer, 2011, 1; Friedman, 2011, 2). As basic terms of the dissertation, idealism

2 Out of the 15 UNSC members, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, France, Gabon, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States voted affirmatively. Brazil, China, Germany, India and the Russian Federation abstained.


will subsequently be defined and explained and national interest be conceptualized

(MacLean, MacMillan[1], 2009, 1; Nye, 1999, 1).

To address the research questions most effectively, we will proceed inductively, examining

the campaign in Libya and reviewing the case in depth, and only thereafter generalizing

more widely. The approach taken will be empirical as opposed to philosophical or normative

since we are concerned with explaining the intervention and analyzing its consequences.

Furthermore, we will consider the operation in Libya as a “paradigmatic case”, a typical

instance of a phenomenon (Flyvbjerg, 2006, 15). This will, in Chapter Three, enable us to

abstract from it and deduce the political and military feasibility of future UNSC legitimated

humanitarian interventions. Even though this analysis will be qualitative, we do take a

methodologically positivist standpoint, assuming that real-world events can be

independently observed and examined to arrive at objective conclusions (Scott, Marshall,

2009, 1). Nonetheless, we are aware that all explanations in the social sciences can only be

context and time dependent, and should not have the pretension to be all-encompassing.

This means that the “universal scope and precision of theories in the natural sciences”

cannot be approached by explanations in their social counterpart (Fay, 1983, 106).

Nevertheless, abstract generalizations of phenomena are possible and this is what we are

aiming to achieve by addressing the set questions.

Firstly, we will examine the RAM in the context of rationality in the social sciences in general.

However, it is vehemently disputed how helpful rational assumptions in IR are (Walt, 1999,

2), and whether it is possible to reduce a complex social entity like “the state” to the famous

metaphor of the “black box”; “a unitary actor, with coherent and stable values, well-

grounded beliefs, and a capacity to carry out its decisions” (Elster, 1987, 9). A simple transfer

of individual rationality to collectivities might lead to a conceptual fallacy, as Robert Jervis

has pointed out (Kahler, 1998, 12). Collective objects seem to be less rational due to

“governments or coalitions that pursue contradictory goals, organizational or institutional

incapacity in strategy choice [and] alternation of different groups (with different preference

orderings) in power” (ibid.).

Therefore, we will aim to sidestep these ontological disputes and not utilize the RAM to

explain or predict state behaviour, for which we would have to subscribe to its underlying

assumptions with regard to states as unitary actors and rational choosers (ibid.). By contrast,

the model will be employed as a test for the rationality of the decision of the P3 states to


forcefully intervene in Libya for which we only have to accept the model as correctly

incorporating rational choice theory. Hence, whether the metaphysics of states as unified

actors and anthropomorphised choosers obtain, indeed, does not concern our examination:

We will only focus on the result as opposed to the process. Nonetheless, employing this

model allows us to structure the analysis, increase its degree of precision and clarity and

specify an account of rational choice.

The RAM itself will be developed according to Allison and Zelikow’s “Essence of Decision”

(Allison, Zelikow, 1999, 24-25). Whilst we do rely solely on one source for this model, it is

probably the theoretically most sophisticated statement of the RAM, “inspiring generations

of scholarship” (Ikenberry, 1999, 1); and, accordingly, an appropriate basis for the RAM. It

indicates an accurate account of rational reasoning which will later be used to test the

decision by the UNSC to legitimate operation “Unified Protector” for its rationality.

Having addressed the RAM and defended our choice, the next section of Chapter One will

then focus on the DPM. We will employ this construct as a test for domestic political

justifications, noting its explanatory importance but not assuming that states are mostly or

exclusively motivated by domestic considerations. This model is somewhat less sophisticated

than the RAM and rests on three main theses which are taken from Ostrom and Job’s work,

“The President and the Political Use of Force”, regarding presidential popularity, the state of

the economy and the position in the electoral cycle, hypotheses which were quantitatively

tested and verified by the said authors (Ostrom, Job, 1986, 9-10). The three statements will

be supported by reference to academics who set out very similar theses (Yetiv, 2004, 83-

84/97; Miller 1999, 1). Therefore, the DPM we develop will be theoretically sound and can

be used to examine whether operation “Unified Protector” was driven by domestic political

concerns.

Having illustrated the theory of both models in Chapter One, in Chapter Two they will be

applied to analyze whether the NATO operation was actually in the interest of the

intervening states or motivated by domestic political purposes. Commencing with the RAM,

the goals and objectives of the partaking states with regard to Libya will be set out. These

are synthesized from their respective national security doctrines (See: French Government,

2008; UK, 2008; White House, 2010). Even though some of the documents might appear

slightly outdated, they still constitute suitable sources since states’ national interest as

defined in Chapter One generally is very stable. As these documents focus on the security


interests of the P3, they will be supplemented by academic and newspaper articles

considering economic rationales and national prestige.

For the international community the two most likely alternative ways to react to the crisis in

Libya, were the passing of resolution 1970 the 26th of February 2011 (UNSC[2], 2011, 1) but

no further forceful measures (See Appendix B) or active military engagement in the country

itself, the second alternative the one chosen by the UNSC which entailed the passing of

UNSCR 1973 and the ensuing NATO operation.

Subsequently, the consequences of both paths and their respective costs and benefits will be

compared. This will enable an examination of whether the intervention actually was in the

national interest of the P3 as far as we can ascertain on the basis of our investigation. If the

latter alternative was in fact the rational one for those states, idealistic objectives or

domestic political motives can be excluded3. Given that the first alternative was superior in

cost-benefit terms, this would suggest that the operation was not within the national

interest of the P3 and that idealism could have been the driver, therefore.

First, however, we need to examine whether domestic political considerations can explain

the campaign, focusing on the P3. In case the model indeed sufficiently accounted for the

intervention, an idealistic motive within the P3 states can be excluded as the striving for

domestic political objectives would, by definition, render this intention impossible.

The first statement of the DPM considers the governmental approval rating. A low score

would, we posit, point towards a diversionary motive for military action by the

administration (Ostrom, Job, 1986, 9). To apply this proposition, the necessary data will be

taken from public opinion polls of the US, France and the UK (French Poll, 2011, 1; UK Poll,

2011, 1, US Poll[1], 2011, 1; US Poll[2], 2011, 1).The second thesis, advancing an

unsatisfactory economic state as a reason for foreign military operations (Ostrom, Job, 1986,

10), will be tested using two indicators, equally weighted, which arguably affect citizens’

well-being (and therefore satisfaction with their government) most, namely the level of

domestic inflation and the rate of unemployment. The data used here will be taken from

official surveys (US (I), 2011, 1; US (U), 2011, 1; UK (I), 2011, 1; UK (U), 2011, 1; France (I),

2011, 1; France (U), 2011, 1). A case of especially high unemployment or inflation could

therefore contribute to explaining the operation in Libya. The third part of the model 3 We, in line with the most common theories in International Relations such as Realism or Liberalism, assume that statesmen are predominantly concerned with maximizing the national interest. If the evidence examined confirms this theory, a further enquiry into different motivations for the military campaign will, accordingly, not be necessary.


considers the proximity of the next election, putting forward the proposition that an election

in the next three months increases the chance of the use of military force abroad due to

“rally around the flag” effects leading to higher governmental popularity (Ostrom, Job, 1986,

10). Of course, testing the intervention along the given three dimensions might, due to

mutually-contradictory indicators, lead to a less definite result. However, in this case, we will

weigh the different hypotheses, trying to make the reasoning as comprehensible and clear

as possible to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the decision to allow operation “Unified

Protector” was motivated by a domestic rationale within the P3.

Having applied the RAM and the DPM in Chapter Two, a final evaluation concerning the level

of idealism of operation “Unified Protector” can be given. Three answers could possibly

obtain. If one of the two models gave a sufficient account of the campaign, idealism could be

ruled out. Only the third possibility, seeing both models fail to provide an acceptable

explanation of the intervention, would facilitate an argument for idealistic motivations of the

P3 states (See Appendix C). If not excluded by the preceding analysis, the case for idealism

will then be supported by governmental speeches (Sarkozy, Cameron, 2011, 1; Obama, 2011,

1) and the appeal of the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P)4.

Having examined the degree of idealism in operation “Unified Protector”, Chapter Three of

the dissertation will subsequently illustrate possible inferences from this case with regard to

future UNSC legitimated interventions. How might the UNSC react towards similar

emergencies in the future? Whilst this might appear rather speculative, the projections will,

however, be based on current data and implications of the intervention which have become

apparent already. To facilitate this future scenario, the dissertation will focus on the P5, the

P3 complemented by the two remaining veto powers, Russia and China. It will be based on

one crucial assumption which is, however, well supported by the available evidence: That

the US, the UK and France are the main drivers of and will, in the foreseeable future, be

generally supportive towards humanitarian interventions whilst China and Russia are, and

will remain, critical of this concept (Bellamy, Wheeler, 2008, 12-13). What directly follows

from this assumption is that if the P3 do not take the lead in the UNSC and on the ground,

future humanitarian interventions will be rather unlikely. But will Russia and China permit

the adoption of humanitarian interventions in the UNSC? And do the Western powers, in

times of fiscal austerity, still possess the necessary military capabilities to conduct them?

4 The (disputed) principle in international law that countries have the responsibility to protect their population. In case they fail to do so, other states potentially have the right to intervene to ensure (Bellamy, 2010, 1).


To investigate this issue, chapter Three will examine the short (2012-2014) and mid-term

future which we will conceptualize as the next 10 years, from 2012-2021. For the former

examination, we will especially concentrate on the complaints by China and Russia about the

Western “hijacking” of resolution 1973 (Lavrov, Medvedev, 2011, 1; Sun, 2011, 1; Xinhua,

2011, 1) and the negative consequences for future resolutions violating state sovereignty to

protect civilians. The recent veto cast by those two states against a resolution condemning

the Syrian regime in October 2011 (UN[3], 2011, 1) and February 2012 (Harris, 2012, 1)

supports the claim that the inference to a lower probability for future humanitarian

interventions is not mere speculation.

Expanding our viewpoint further into the future, we will focus on the defence capabilities of

the P3, showing the military difficulties of France and the UK during the Libyan campaign

(Norman, Fidler, 2011, 1). Hence, the projected future cuts in the defence budgets of the P3

(The White House[1], 2010, 1; UK MoD, 2010, 1; Chantrill, 2011, 1; Morin, 2010, 1), entailed

by necessary future fiscal austerity (OECD, 2011, 233), will likely impair their abilities to

conduct humanitarian interventions abroad even further5. Therefore, contrary to many more

sanguine analysts (Bellamy, Williams, 2011, 21), we argue that UNSC legitimated

interventions will be less probable in the future.

Hence, even though operation “Unified Protector” might have been driven by idealistic

concerns, the military capabilities of western non-US nations are lacking. Furthermore, the

US government in times of budgetary tightening cannot uncomplicatedly justify military

actions which are not directly serving the national interest, especially not if the US has to

bear the main burden, as the Libyan case has illustrated (Gates, 2011, 1). This reinforces the

previous argument, pointing towards the future lower likelihood of such actions.

Finally, the dissertation will address the question of whether less humanitarian interventions

are actually desirable. We will conclude that this is not preferable as in the past there were

arguably too few as opposed to too many interventions. In many cases, the international

community should have intervened but failed to do so, confirmed by the examples of the

genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Darfur. Therefore, we

argue that an even lower number of interventions cannot be welcomed.

Having delineated the outline of this dissertation, the first Chapter will now illustrate the

theory of the UNSC and the models to be used in the later analysis: the RAM and the DPM.

5 Assuming the non-use of ground troops due to public concerns about casualties which cannot be justified by the national interest.


Description and Analysis of the UNSC, the RAM and the DPM

The UNSC, the focal point and prism of this dissertation, was established in 1944 at the

Bretton Woods conference and has, apart from an enlargement from eleven to fifteen

members in 1965, institutionally and power-politically remained very much unaltered since

its founding act. Given the supreme influence of the P5 in the council which comes from

their veto powers, their long membership in the committee and their military and economic

power, this dissertation will limit the analysis to those five states as the key drivers of the

UNSC and the most important decision-makers in this council (even though the votes of the

remaining nine countries of course matter, nonetheless) (Sarooshi, 2001, 1). As stated in

article 24 of the UN charter, the primary function of the UNSC is the “maintenance of

international peace and security”. Thus, it has the right to “determine the existence of any

threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” (UN, 1944, Article 39). In

order to effectively address these dangers to peace, the council disposes of a number of

tools, the most important of which, for the purpose of this dissertation, is to “take such

action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international

peace and security” (UN, 1944, Article 42). Whilst there is certainly a disconnect between

article 39 which addresses inter-national as opposed to intra-national conflicts, in customary

international law this article has now usually been used to address human rights violations

occurring within the territory of a sovereign state, as the UN charter itself was built on the

principle of absolute state sovereignty (UN, 1944, Article 2(4)) and did not recognize the

principle of humanitarian interventions. Accordingly, when Colonel Muammar Qaddafi

magnified his efforts to violently crush the Libyan rebellion without sparing civilians (Al

Jazeera, 2011), the UNSC used their right to legitimize the use of force against the Libyan

government by passing UNSCR 1973 the 17th of March, permitting the exercise of “all

necessary measures” to protect civilians in Libya (UNSC[1], 2011, 3). The resolution was

sponsored by France and the UK, its most outspoken supporters, and Lebanon representing

the opinion of the Arab League, whilst the US was more sceptical and signalled its support

only 36 hours before the vote (Jones, 2011, 4). The abstentions of China and Russia, by

contrast, were rather unexpected as both countries had continuously opposed a foreign

intervention in Libya (Chamberlin, 2011, 2-3). Their permitting UNSCR 1973 to pass was

certainly a surprise even though it was clear that both states would refrain from partaking in

its enforcement and therefore, out of the P5, it would be the P3 which were to implement


the resolution. Subsequently, NATO operation “Unified Protector”, initiated the 21st of

March, directly drew on this document to affirm its legality.6 Whilst this resolution certainly

allowed a forceful intervention, explicitly introducing a no-fly zone, it is still very much

debated whether the NATO countries, by effectively acting as the Libyan rebels’ air force, in

fact went too far in their interpretation of the resolution, an issue which will be taken up

again later. The supporters of this resolution nevertheless claimed that the campaign was in

fact a humanitarian intervention, it being defined as the

“entry into a country of the armed forces of another country or international organization

with the aim of protecting citizens from persecution or the violation of their human

rights” (McLean, McMillan, 2009, 1).

More specifically, we will complement the present definition by the fact that the

intervention is happening against the will of the target country.

But was this intervention humanitarian in nature and therefore idealistic? Or were its main

drivers in fact national objectives or domestic political rationales? The scholarly community

is rather divided on this central question. Whilst certain authors see the intervention as

intending to stop “barbarous acts” (Jones, 2011, 4), a “new politics of protection” (Bellamy,

Williams, 2011, 23) or without plausible alternative (Achcar, 2011, 1), others maintain that

the “West” conducted “humanitarian imperialism” (Bush, Martiniello, Mercer, 2011, 1) and

intended “regime change” (Friedman, 2011, 2). Hence, due to the disagreements within

academia, we will further investigate the subject of whether it was national interest,

domestic politics or really idealistic concerns which actually motivated the intervention in

Libya. In this context idealism will be defined as the

disinterested striving for the achievement of ideals, “ultimate object[s] or aim[s] of

endeavour, especially [...] of high or noble character” (Howe, 2010, 1).

For the purpose of this dissertation, it will be sufficient to note that the selfless furthering of

human rights is comprised by this definition.

Idealism, hence, is contrasted by the concept of national interest which is often exemplified

as

6 For a concise timeline of the intervention see Al Jazeera, 2011, 1.


“the interest of a state, usually as defined by its government, indicating what is best for

the nation in its relations with other states” (McLean, McMillan[1], 2009, 1).

It is very clear, however that this expression is deficient. Would it really be in a country’s

national interest if its government commenced an aggressive war, doomed to fail? For this

reason, “defined” in the above phrase will be replaced by “interpreted”. We maintain that

there is a core national interest for each state which an incumbent government generally

attempts – more or less successfully – to pursue. Even though the term “national interest” is

essentially contested, with some authors maintaining that the will of the democratic body

politic, which could include idealistic goals like democracy promotion abroad, should indeed

count as its manifestation (Nye, 1999, 1), the present analysis will focus on its external

ontology, fundamental rationales which apply to all states equally, and concentrate on its

more objective contours which can, we maintain, be determined by an impartial spectator.

To clarify this concept we propose three pillars which jointly encompass a state’s national

interest: National security, prosperity and prestige which – even though interconnected and

cross-referential – are not reducible to each other. We will consider security as safety for the

nation, its territory, sovereignty and way of living; prosperity as the maintenance of an

expanding state economy and the welfare of its citizens; and prestige as a country’s image

held by other nations and global civil society. Those three notions further the “well-being” of

a state as such and therefore constitute intrinsically-good values which should, mediated by

the respective international position of a state, form the fundament of the national policy. In

a non-crisis situation, we argue that the three principles can generally be ordered serially, in

order of descending importance: Prosperity, security and prestige. What exactly the best

policies to advance the national interest are, is, of course, open to disagreement and

controversy. Connected to the national interest is the maintenance of specific international

norms7 in the international system as they can directly affect national security, prosperity

and prestige. Why states support certain norms, however, is disputed. Explanations range

from constructivist accounts taking into consideration the strategic culture8 of a state, to

liberal theses giving importance to a state’s domestic political system to Realist explications,

7 “A shared expectation of behaviour that connotes what is considered [...] desirable and appropriate. Norms are similar to rules or regulations in being prescriptive, although they lack the formal status of rules” (Scott, Marshall, 2009, 1). 8 “A state or nonstate actor’s shared beliefs and modes of behavior, derived from common experiences and narratives, which shape ends and means for achieving national security objectives” (NSIC, 2011, 1).


reducing norms to solely power-political instruments. Nonetheless, for the application of the

RAM, we will only consider norms as they are connected to our definition of the national

interest, advancing or impairing its three principles. This does by no means signify that the

remaining explanations are negligible. Nevertheless, we maintain that those illustrations are

not linked to the national interest and can even lead to behaviour which directly conflicts

with it. Below, we will, due to its relevance to our case, focus on the norm of international

non-intervention, enshrined in the UN Charter, article 2(4). Given that state practice (speech

acts and real decisions) has significant implications for international law (See: ICJ, 1944,

Article 38), such a consequential decision as to suspend the principle of state sovereignty in

the case of Libya directly affects this norm and has, accordingly, direct consequences for

states’ national interest.

Having covered the necessary analytical concepts, we will now further discuss the DPM. The

RAM, as outlined above, is a parsimonious model in its basic structure and does not require

further theoretical explanation. The DPM, by contrast, cannot be considered an equally well-

developed model as the RAM. Conceptionally, this “model” is less sophisticated and its

boundaries are rather fluid. In fact there does not exist one widely-recognized version of the

DPM but different academics employ diverging conceptions. Therefore, we cannot claim to

be using the DPM but only one of its adaptations. The model itself rests on two assumptions:

The promotion of domestic political goals can trump the pursuit of the national interest and

its explanatory power can, at times, suffice to make sense of foreign policy decisions. Given

these presumptions, we will set out the DPM’s three main tenets. The first thesis states that

in times when the

“president is experiencing little overall success, it will be natural for him to pursue actions

that will deflect attention away from failure. A ‘successful’, highly visible use of force may

be seen as a needed tonic. Consequently, we assume that a decline in presidential success

will promote the acceptance of risk and a greater propensity to use force in the

international arena” (Ostrom, Job, 1986, 10).

The second item is related to the state of the domestic economy. A recession


“may lead the president to look for strategies to deflect attention from the lack of

economic success and to bolster his sagging image. As the state of the economy worsens,

the overall propensity of the president to use force will increase” (Ostrom, Job, 1986, 9).

Thirdly,

“during an election campaign period, the president may well try to look ‘presidential’. The

anticipated favourable attention following a political use of force may be an incentive for

the president to initiate such action to boost his and/or his party’s electoral chances”

(Ostrom, ob, 1986, 10).

As the UK does not have a president, we will apply the same theses to its Prime Minister,

David Cameron. All three statements have been tested and verified by Ostrom and Job and

do yield explanatory value for the political use of force (Ostrom, Job, 1986, 18-19). Even

though the article is based on American data only and explains the political use of force

which does not completely coincide with the decision to conduct a military intervention, we

nonetheless argue that the similarities are significant and the above tenets can be used as

the body of a DPM to scrutinize the decision of the P3 to allow and carry out their operation

in Libya. Furthermore, other authors have come to similar conclusions, suggesting that

“force may be used in the belief that it will divert attention from such things as a sagging

economy, rising unemployment, or public disapproval” (Yetiv, 2004, 83), citing the case that

“it was only when Bush was associated with dramatic global events that his polls rose

sharply” (Yetiv, 2004, 97). This is also confirmed by R. Miller who claims that “it might not be

an overstatement to suggest that virtually every war since 1800 has been attributed, at least

in part, to efforts of state leaders to deal with domestic problems” (Miller, 1999, 1). The

DPM therefore does have empirical validity and will, accordingly, be used as the second test

to find out the motive for the passing of UNSCR 1973 and the subsequent military campaign.

Now, however, it is legitimate to ask why only the RAM and DPM were included in the

selection of models. A possible answer to this is, we must admit, only partially satisfactory.

One noteworthy reason for the choice of the models is their theoretical standing as widely

recognized and used (Allison, Zelikow, 1999, 13). Therefore, we believe that we have indeed

chosen the two most important models with the highest explanatory power for the given

topic. Nonetheless, another reason is the availability of data and the scope of the


dissertation. To be able to operationalise the other two recognized concepts in “Essence of

Decision”, the Organizational Behaviour and the Governmental Politics Model, we would

have to dispose of significantly more data of the decision-making procedures in the

respective countries and the bargaining power of governmental officials involved in making

the final choice about commencing the intervention. Even more information would have

been needed if we had decided to include a psychological model taking into account mental

characteristics of decision-makers. Hence, given the advantage of only requiring publicly

available date for the RAM and DPM we have decided to focus on the said models. This does

mean that we are susceptible to the charge of being partially data-driven. However, at this

point there does not seem to be a realistic alternative to the present approach. Moreover,

the scope of this dissertation does not allow a more in-depth analysis including further

models. Having addressed possible points of criticism and disposing of the theoretical

framework and fundamental definitions we will now proceed with the examination

regarding the motivation of the P3 states in passing UNSCR 1973 on 17th March 2011 and

conducting a military operation within Libya.


The degree of idealism in the passing of UNSCR 1973 and the subsequent military

intervention by the P3 states

To conduct this investigation, we will use a two-staged test, employing the RAM and the

DPM illustrated above and commencing with the former model in order to analyze the

question of whether allowing and conducting a forceful intervention in Libya was within the

national interest of the P3 and, whether the decision was therefore rational according to this

criterion. Having done so, we will apply the DPM and ask whether the decision to initiate the

operation was driven by domestic rationales within the US, the UK or France. Afterwards, if

neither the RAM nor the DPM persuasively explains the decision of the US, the UK or France

to intervene, we will construct an argument for idealistic objectives by their respective

governments.

Applying the Rational Actor Model

The national interest of the P3 states and their national goals and objectives

To ground the RAM, the national interest of the P3 countries with regard to the Libyan case

will be set out in the following section. According to this yardstick, the payoffs of the

alternatives available to the P3 will subsequently be judged in order to determine the most

rational one. Given the three serially-ordered dimensions of the national interest, domestic

prosperity, national security and national prestige, we will begin with listing factors

concerning Libya which could potentially influence the prosperity of the P3.

In this regard, the significant production of 1,789,000 bbl/day (No. 18 of oil production

world-wide, around 2% of global output) (CIA, 2011, 1) of high-quality “sweet crude” in

Libya, able to impact world petrol prices (Krauss, 2011, 1), and concomitant highly-priced

contracts to exploit Libyan oil fields arguably had to be the most weighty considerations as

the country has few other natural resources and its economy is comparatively small (GDP

74th position globally) (CIA [2], 2011, 1). Before the intervention, all P3 countries had

valuable economic interests in Libya, mostly oil contracts9 (Kovalyova, Farge, 2011, 1). To

maximize domestic prosperity the P3 should have two main objectives: To improve (or at

least maintain) the position of their local petroleum companies through enabling them to 9 In the case of the UK, BP had concluded a one billion contract to exploit Libyan oil fields, French Total SA had

major investments in the country (Stratfor, 2011, 1) and U.S. oil companies Conocophillips, Marathon Oil Corp,

Hess Corp and Occidental Petroleum Corp possessed highly-priced contracts (Reuters, 2011, 1).


receive contracts in Libya, and to strive for an appropriate general oil price to stimulate their

economies. The US, France and the UK as the world’s major oil importers (CIA [1], 2011, 1)

should therefore generally be interested in a low oil price.

Proceeding to relevant considerations to ensure the national security of the P3, the crucial

item, assuming that Libya had not been a military threat to the P3 in 2011, is the protection

from terrorism, mentioned in all national security doctrines (French Government, 2008, 7;

UK, 2010, 27; The White House, 2010, 18). This had been effectively ensured before the war,

as Qaddafi had ceased terrorist operations and had reined in Islamic terrorism (Lawrence,

2011, 1). France, due to its geographical position, has an additional security objective, the

“protection” of the country from immigrants crossing the Mediterranean, which, as the

French government feared, could exceed the absorptive capacity of the country (RFI, 2011,

1), a policy that Qaddafi’s regime had supported (Wakida, 2011, 1). Lastly, all P3 countries

must be interested to be regarded as benign and respected representatives in the global

assembly of states to maintain their national prestige. As supporters of the R2P and the

upholding of human rights, this means respecting this norm and pursuing a policy seen as

consistent with their previous statements in this regard.

The possible alternative ways to respond to the humanitarian crisis in Libya

Having examined the national interest of the P3 states, we will now set out the available

alternative ways of reacting towards the humanitarian crisis in Libya, focusing on the one

chosen and the second most plausible course. Apart from passing UNSCR 1973 and deciding

to forcefully intervene in Libya, the international community could have passed UNSCR 1970,

enforced the sanctions and embargoes and left the situation to unfold without further

interference. To be able to determine which alternative was in fact the rational one within

the interest of the P3, a cost-benefit analysis of both will now be undertaken, commencing

with the actual choice of the UNSC and examining their impact on the criteria laid out above.

Being important for the subsequent analysis, it is to be stressed that UNSCR 1973 was

passed at a moment when Qaddafi was likely to be only days from crushing the insurgency10

(Shadid, 2011, 1) and at the point of voting it was clear that the P3 would enforce the

resolution.

10 In this case the status quo concerning foreign investment and security would have arguably been maintained.


The cost-benefit analysis of the two alternatives

Alternative I - Intervention

We will begin with judging the impact of the decision to pass the resolution on the

investments of P3 companies which is, however, difficult to determine exactly. In case of a

successful rebellion, subsequently constituting a new government, firms within the countries

supporting the resolution and conducting the military campaign to support the insurgency,

France, the UK and the US could have hoped for an increased share of oil contracts.

Nonetheless, the exact outcome regarding new foreign investment, at this point, was

unclear as the dynamics within the upcoming government could not have been known in

advance. Had the insurgency, despite foreign support, failed, companies within the P3 would

potentially have lost their investments. Even though, given that the rebels would obtain

Western support, the chances for success were arguably higher than for their defeat. The

effects of the intervention on the global oil price were more easily estimable. Since Libyan oil

extraction could not have been sustained during a prolonged civil war, world output of high-

quality crude oil would have decreased. Additionally, markets would have been troubled by

a war in this economically-strategic region, aspects, both of which would have caused the

global oil price to rise, harming the economy of all P3 states. Furthermore, the costs of

conducting the military operation would have decreased the national prosperity of the P311

directly.

With regard to the national security of the P3, legitimizing the intervention probably harmed

their interests. As Qaddafi had ceased supporting terrorist acts and opposed Islamist terror

groups (Lawrence, 2011, 1), the status quo was rather satisfactory for the P3 states.

Upsetting this stability could bring few benefits but entailed the risk of seeing Al Qaeda or

other terrorist factions exploit a possible future chaos within the country. For France, the

decision was risky in that Qaddafi’s support against immigration would certainly have been

lost with the position of a possible new government on the issue unclear. Moreover, a

prolonged war could have led to a surge in refugees trying to escape to France. Additionally,

the precedent of the first UNSC legitimated humanitarian intervention against a

“functioning” state12 would possibly have weakened the international non-intervention

norm, a development to be welcomed by the P3 as militarily strong states with global

11 The final costs totalled around £300 Million for the UK (Taylor, 2011, 26), $2 Billion for the US (Baron, 2011, 1) and €300 Million in the case of France (LeParisien, 2011, 1). 12 With only the no-fly zone over Iraq following the First Gulf War as a similar case (Fixdal, Smith, 1998, 8).


security interests. Yet, we judge this factor as significantly outweighed by the security

threats stated before.

The national prestige of the P3 was probably served by passing UNSCR 1973 as the US, the

UK and France could express their desire to uphold human rights and protect civilians. Given

their strong support for the principle of humanitarian intervention and the R2P, a failure to

defend their proclaimed values would have entailed pronounced criticism from their

domestic constituencies and world civil society.

Alternative II – No intervention

However, how would the second alternative have affected the national interest of the P3?

Having passed UNSCR 1970 unanimously, the international community could have decided

not to interfere further and let the events on the ground unfold naturally with a victory of

Qaddafi as likely outcome. Therefore, the future of investments of P3 companies within

Libya would be rather unclear. The possibilities range from the preservation of the status

quo to a complete expropriation of foreign assets by a sanction-infuriated colonel, affecting

the P3’ national interest from neutrally to negatively. The global oil price would likely have

been lower than in the first alternative, however, due to a probably swift victory of Qaddafi’s

forces and the subsequent reconstitution of the full oil extraction which was not included in

the UN sanctions (UN[2], 2011, 1). This would have benefited all P3 states.

In case of no action other than UNSCR 1970, the P3 states would likely have been more

secure. The satisfactory state of Qaddafi suppressing Islamic terrorism and retaining

immigrants would have been restored and a high number of war refugees avoided.

The prestige of the US, France and the UK would have likely been damaged. Being firmly

committed to the R2P and having been asked to help by the Arab League and the Libyan

insurgency (Fadel, 2011, 1), they would, if having failed to support the rebels and push for a

strong resolution, likely have been accused of double standards and hypocrisy with regard to

human rights.

Determining the rational choice of the P3 with regard to the available alternatives

Comparing the two alternatives, the negative consequences of the intervention for the

prosperity of the P3 likely tend to overweigh its positive effects. Firms of the UK, France and

the US might have been favoured by the new government, but their national economies


would have been harmed through a higher oil price. Adding the financial costs of the

intervention to their already strained budgets, the intervention probably harmed their

domestic prosperity overall. The national security of all P3 states would have been clearly

weakened by the first course juxtaposed to the second. Only the criterion of national

prestige would have unequivocally favoured the first alternative. Nonetheless, weighing all

factors and considering the order of the three facets of the national interest, we can

conclude that alternative two, with no further action than UNSCR 1970 was likely the one

maximizing the national interest of the P3. Of course, this analysis is not an unassailable

resultant. Different prioritizing or expanding the factors composing the definition of the

national interest might lead to a contrary outcome.

Having found that the decision to initiate a humanitarian intervention in Libya likely was

against the P3’s national interest, we will now apply a Domestic Politics Model to examine if

intrastate rationales can explain the intervention.

Employing the Domestic Politics Model

As set out above, we will apply the criteria of general voter satisfaction with the president (in

the case of France and the US or the Prime Minister for the UK), the state of the economy

and the position in the electoral cycle to analyze whether the P3 intervened in Libya out of

domestic political motives. Firstly, with regard to the approval rating of the President or PM,

we posit that a low level will increase the likelihood of a foreign intervention as the head of

state might in this way attempt to achieve domestic unity behind the government. Secondly,

we hypothesize that in case of a depressed domestic economy, the government will also

more probably conduct military operations abroad to divert attention from economic

difficulties. Lastly, during election times the President or PM might attempt to appear

“presidential” and, to reach this objective, conduct a humanitarian intervention abroad.

Applying the principles of domestic approval and the state of the economy, we will analyze

their absolute levels and percental changes. If both indicators conflict, we will give more

importance to the former value which we assume to be generally more meaningful13 to

assess voting intentions. We will examine the case of France first, proceed to the UK and

conclude with the US. Having completed the analysis, we will weigh the three criteria and

assess the persuasiveness of the DPM for each country.

13 Additionally, the measured percental changes can, due to the low numerical values of the indicators, be rather high, the importance of which appears, arguably, exaggerated.


Domestic Politics in France

In the case of France, the percentaged change of voter satisfaction towards Nicolas Sarkozy

was negative in the months preceding UNSCR 1973, but only insignificantly. From December

2010 over January to March 2011, the decline only averaged one percent, an insignificant

value in a statistic with a marginal error of 2.3%. By contrast, the absolute voter satisfaction

had reached 29%, its lowest value in Sarkozy’s presidency to that point (French Poll, 2011,

1). According to the first hypothesis, this could point towards a diversionary motive by the

president.

Source: French Poll, 2011, 1.

Blue (red) line: Percentage of voters (dis)satisfied with President Sarkozy.

Having considered general approval of the President we will now scrutinize the general state

of the French economy. Whilst the CPI14 indeed rose by around 17% between February and

March 2011, its absolute value in March was 2% and within the normal range of historic

inflation (France I, 2011, 1).

14 We are employing the CPI (Consumer Price Index) here, as this indicator measures the inflation in consumer prices, probably the most suitable device to illustrate the effects of inflation on consumer purchasing power and therefore voter satisfaction with the economic policies of their present government.


Source: France I, 2011, 1.

Viewing the unemployment figures, the data shows no percental change between January,

February and March 2011. Nonetheless, the absolute level of French unemployment, 9.7%,

was one of the highest within the last 10 years (France U, 2011, 1). Assessing inflation and

unemployment, the state of the French economy was not disastrous or quickly deteriorating

but also certainly far from satisfactory. This could have been a motive for Sarkozy to launch a

diversionary operation abroad.

Source: France U, 2011, 1.


Finally, we will examine the third criterion, the position in the electoral cycle. The French

presidential election, scheduled to take place the 22nd of April 2012 (France E, 2011, 1), was,

with more than 13 months remaining, probably too far away to be a significant factor in the

calculations of the present French government. Concluding, we find a possible domestic

political rational for initiating an intervention abroad due to low presidential popularity and

a weak domestic economy. After the assessment of France we will now proceed with

examining the case of the UK for possible domestic motives for a military intervention.

Analysing the case of the UK

Judging from voting intention of UK citizens, the conservatives received a rather stable share

of 41-43 percent of potential votes (UK Poll, 2011, 1), a satisfactory result and not a likely

reason to risk this popularity through adventurous foreign policy diversion.

Source: UK Poll, 2011, 1.

Red line: Conservatives.

Blue line: Labour.

Yellow line: Liberal Democrats.

Examining the state of the British economy, the rate of inflation fell from 4.4% in February

2011 to 4.0% in March, a decrease of 10% (UK I, 2011, 1). Nevertheless, this level signified a

historically very high CPI, and could give a motive for distraction through an intervention.


Source: UK I, 2011, 1.

The unemployment rate was very stable in the beginning of 2011, marginally decreasing

from 7.8% in January to 7.7% (ca. 1.3% change) in February and March. Nonetheless, this

rate was rather elevated if seen in the context of the last 10 years (UK U, 2011, 1) which also

could point towards a diversionary rationale.

Source: UK U, 2011, 1.


Examining the electoral calendar with the next UK general election in 2015 (UK E, 2011, 1), a

manipulative motive in this regard can clearly be excluded. Having weighed all three

dimensions, high governmental popularity, a rather weak but not extremely dire state of the

economy and elections far in the future, we would judge it rather improbable that domestic

considerations were an important factor in the UK’s consideration to support UNSCR 1973.

Applying the DPM to the US

In the US, President Obama’s approval rating had changed from 49% in January 2011 to 48%

in February and 45% in March, a decrease by around 8% (US Poll [1], 2011, 1). Whilst this

does constitute a setback for the president, it is not a great or very uncommon change as

can be seen from the graph. Given that a satisfactory US presidential approval rating is

judged to be around 48% (Madhani, 2011, 1), 45% does not seem to warrant a foreign

intervention.

Source: US Poll, 2011, 1.

US inflation in March 2011 had risen by 27% from its February level. However, its absolute

value of ca. 2.7% was within the normal historical range as can be inferred from the table

(US I, 2011, 1).


Source: US I, 2011, 1.

US unemployment had decreased from 9% in January 2011 to 8.9% in February and 8.8% in

March (US U, 2011, 1). However, these levels represented extremely high values historically.

Source: US U, 2011, 1.

Therefore, judging both indicators combined, a foreign military intervention to distract

attention from the domestic economy could be plausible.


Contrary to this, electoral engineering does not seem to have played a part as the next

nation-wide election would be held in November 2012 (US E, 2011, 1), more than 18 months

away from UNSCR 1973.

Weighing the criteria for the P3

To summarize the foregoing exposition, a domestic political argument can persuasively be

made for the French decision to support the resolution. This is further supported by the

pronounced criticisms voiced against President Sarkozy’s government for unethically

supporting autocratic local rulers during the preceding months of the “Arab Spring” (Mikail,

2011, 1). A change of course, pursuing an opposite policy would therefore have made sense

to improve his tarnished domestic reputation and can be explained by his desire to silence

his critics. In the case of the US government, the intervention could be supported by an

economic argument. However, this is contradicted by the reluctance of the US to support

the resolution and to actively engage in the country (Brown, 2011, 1) until shortly before the

point of voting in the UNSC. The least forceful argument for domestic politics can be made

for the UK. Whilst economic indicators point towards a diversionary motive, the general

governmental approval was rather high and therefore would make a war abroad a risky

endeavour. This is also supported by the distance of the next election, by the time of which

the cursory effects of the intervention would not have affected voting anymore.

The case for idealism

Reviewing the results of the RAM and DPM, the only states for which an idealistic motivation

to act is possible are the US and the UK. Their concern for human rights can also be inferred

from their support for the principles of the R2P (R2P, 2011, 6) and its endorsement in UNSC

resolutions (UN [3], 2006, 2). Additionally, President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron

had also made their concern for civilians in Libya clear through official statements and press

releases with the former stating that he authorized the intervention to stop “this brutal

repression and a looming humanitarian crisis” and the latter insisting that “he did not want a

repeat of Srebrenica15” (Wintour, Watt, 2011, 1). By contrast, French president Sarkozy’s

claiming that the intervention would only stop once Qaddafi did not represent a threat for

15 An episode during the Yugoslav wars in 1995 when Serb General Ratko Mladic ordered to massacre more than 7000 unarmed civilians in Srebrenica under the close observation of Dutch UN forces which, along with the UN as such, failed to act (BBC, 2005, 1).


the Libyan people anymore and ascribing the intervention to his concern for Libyan civilians

(Sarkozy, 2011, 1) cannot be taken seriously. Indeed he could be charged with hypocrisy in

the face of Tunisia and Egypt where he maintained a continuous support for Ben Ali and

Mubarak in the time of their popular revolutions (Mikail, 2011, 1).

Seeing genuine idealism as a possible motivator of military action gives hope for a more

humane international order with less domestic large-scale human rights violations deterred

by the possibility of a foreign intervention. But will future humanitarian operations be

politically feasible in the UNSC and militarily possible on the ground? To examine this

question, we will now extrapolate the most important lessons about the future of

humanitarian interventions from the Libyan case.


Lessons from Libya for the Future of Humanitarian Interventions

As illustrated above, the different motivators to conduct humanitarian interventions, ranging

from idealism to domestic concerns or the maximization of the national interest, are crucial

to explain why states embark on such chancy endeavours. Nevertheless, political and

practical considerations are equally important. Will the UNSC legitimize future humanitarian

interventions? And will their usual drivers, the US, France and the UK, still have the military

capabilities to conduct these expensive and technologically demanding operations? To

address this problematic, we will proceed with first scrutinizing the political ramifications of

the implementation of UNSCR 1973. As the global political environment is rather fluent and

unstable, our focus will encompass the short term, conceptualized as the next three years

from the passing of UNSCR 1973, 2012-2014. Having undertaken this examination, we will

proceed to study the effects of the projected military budgets and the general fiscal situation

of the P3. As the defence budgets for the said states is known for the next years and their

general economic situation will likely determine their future size, we will be able to stretch

our outlook until the next 10 years, 2012-2021. We will find that political and military

aspects in fact reinforce each other to decrease the future probability of humanitarian

interventions.

Political implications of UNSCR 1973, 2012-2014

Concentrating on the political effects of “Operation Unified Protector”, it is clear that the

intervention had rather drastic ramifications on the dynamics within the UNSC. Whilst

UNSCR 1973 indeed allowed states to take “all necessary measures [...] to protect civilians

and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya”16 (UNSC

[1], 2011, 1), the resolution did not specify how wide “necessary” could be interpreted

(apart from excluding an occupation force) and most importantly if regime change would be

a legitimate objective of the NATO operation. However, this motive, even if not openly

stated17, most likely was an important rationale for NATO whose aircrafts effectively

constituted the rebel air force, and whose member countries supplied technical support,

training and weapons to the insurgency (Overhaus, 2011, 2). This led Russia and China to

openly voice their opposition to this “violation of the mandates stipulated by the UN

16 The former name of current “Libya” under Qaddafi 17 If “regime change” had been part of the draft resolution it would have most certainly entailed a veto of China and Russia, concerned about limiting the international challenge to state sovereignty.


Security Council Resolutions” (Lavrov[1], 2011, 1). The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs

also expressed that “we oppose the use of force in international relations and have serious

reservations with part of the resolution” (Sun, 2011, 1). Both countries therefore felt that

NATO had violated the agreement within the UNSC and taken advantage of their abstentions

which enabled the adoption of the resolution. This supports the argument that Russia and

China, irritated about the alleged abuse of UNSCR 1973 and concerned about a possible

repetition of this case, will be more reluctant in the next years to permit similar resolutions

in the UNSC. This will, subsequently, decrease the likelihood of humanitarian interventions

which obtain their international legality and legitimacy through their endorsement by the

UNSC. Indeed, this development can already be observed when a UNSC resolution

condemning the Syrian government for its human rights violations was vetoed by Russia and

China the 4th of October 2011 and the 4th of February 2012. Justifying their vote, the UN

representative Li Baodong stated that China opposed “interference in Syria’s internal affairs”

and the Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin expressed that this resolution might lead to

another “Libyan-style foreign military intervention”. Both states articulated their irritation

that the “resolution authorising the use of force to protect civilians was misused by NATO to

bring down Col Muammar Gaddafi's regime” (Trevelyan, 2011, 1). Therefore, we argue that

further humanitarian interventions in the short term will be less likely, as an existing UNSC

resolution is necessary for the intervening governments to justify the operation to their

domestic constituency, foreign governments and world public opinion.

Nonetheless, governmental policies and political considerations evolve and adjust to

changing situations. Hence, it would be a fallacy to deduce from temporary Chinese and

Russian grievances about the implementation of UNSCR 1973 to the impossibility UNSC

legitimated interventions further in the future. To address this question, we will analyze the

current condition of the armed forces of the P3 states and their future defence budgets

which will enable a forecast of their military capabilities in the next years18.

Military feasibility of future humanitarian interventions, 2012-2021

In order to analyse this dynamic, our argument will be based on the fact that the Chinese

and Russian unwillingness to conduct humanitarian interventions has been a constant in

18 We are aware that defence budgets might be a slightly imprecise measure of actual capabilities as they do not give information about how efficient the funds are used. However, they nonetheless provide a general impression about force strength and its effectiveness, sufficient for the present analysis.


international relations and is arguably so deeply entrenched in their strategic culture that it

is not very probable to change even in the mid-term future. Thus, we will exclude both

countries from the examination since they will not likely conduct a humanitarian

intervention in the years we are considering.

The campaign in Libya illustrated the insufficient state of the military of France and the UK to

conduct even this rather small operation in the close vicinity of Europe. Indeed, the NATO

operation would have been impossible without US logistics, reconnaissance, command and

control and ammunition (Norman, Fidler, 2011, 1). The extent of the US assets deployed

(coloured green) as opposed to all other NATO resources can be assessed from the graphic

below and demonstrates the American military preponderance in the operation.


Source: Gertler, 2011, 16.


Indeed, “by 27 March, 1602 sorties had been flown of which 983 were undertaken by US

planes. The US also provided 80% of air refuelling, almost 75% of aerial surveillance and

100% of all electronic warfare missions. Without the US, the whole thing would not have

happened” (Wintour, Watt, 2011, 1). This demonstrates the current inability of the UK and

France, to autonomously conduct (predominantly aerial) humanitarian interventions. But

have both states, recognizing their lack of military capacities, increased their defence budget

accordingly? If the projected military spending of the UK is examined one finds a reduction

from 45.6 Billion in 2011 to 44.4 Billion in 2015, graphically displayed below (Chantrill, 2011,

1). Taking into account inflation, this reduces the real value of defence spending even

further and leads to the conclusion that the ability of the UK to conduct independent military

operations abroad will be impaired even more.

Source: Chantrill, 2011, 1

A reduction in military strength can also be expected in the case of France, whose defence

budget is scheduled to grow from 30.15 Billion in 2011 to 31 Billion in 2013, a nominal

increase of 3% (Morin, 2011, 1). Taking into account estimates until 2015, spending is

forecast to grow by 1.5% (SDI, 2011, 1). Nonetheless, this is likely19 below future inflation

rates and therefore constitutes a decrease in absolute spending, undermining the future

military capacity of France. The preceding analysis accordingly leads to the conclusion that, -

if military spending is taken as yardstick and no major internal restructuring measures are

undertaken -, both states will likely be less able to conduct a humanitarian intervention

19 Given the present inflation level of 2.5% (France (I), 2011, 1) and the fact that French inflation was rarely below 2% in the past (See: IndexMundi, 2011, 1)


similar to the one in Libya. As the graph below shows, the US will also be affected by a

declining military budget even though it remains large in absolute terms. At least $450

Billion must be saved over the next decade to which a possible $500 Billion more might be

added.

Source: Chantrill[1], 2011, 1

Nonetheless, as US president Obama credibly states, the country will maintain its military

superiority (Brookes, 2011, 1). The 2012 strategic guidance posits that the “DoD [US

Department of Defense] will continue to develop joint doctrine and military response

options to prevent and, if necessary, respond to mass atrocities” (DoD, 2012, 12). Therefore,

it is undisputable that the US will in the mid-term future possess the capability to conduct

humanitarian interventions even if pressures to economize on the spending of such non-vital

operations will be increasing. However, even though the capacity for humanitarian

interventions will remain, the likelihood is growing that the US, in the face of declining

European support, will become more unwilling to carry them out and pay their costs,

especially if the country has to bear the main burden in their conduct. This was illustrated

when, during the campaign in Libya, US President Obama was criticised by politicians from

all parties who opposed the use of force not serving the national interest (Richter, Parsons,

2011, 1). Moreover, as former US Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, expressed strongly in

a speech addressing Operation Unified Protector,


“there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress – and in the American

body politic writ large – to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that

are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary

changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense” (Gates, 2011, 1).

Hence, it is probable that the US will show less support for humanitarian interventions in a

future with declining financial possibilities to pay for operations which do not directly serve

the national interest, especially given that allied NATO support, as demonstrated above, will

be decreasing even further. Of course, this is no irreversible prediction but depends on US

public opinion, congressional views and governmental policy. Future decision-makers could,

therefore, hold more positive opinions about humanitarian interventions and support their

conduct.

Looking at the time horizon beyond the current budgets, it is unlikely that significant

increases in the defence budgets of the P3 will be possible. By contrast, a considerable

decline in military spending is the more likely scenario with the stated negative effects on

the ability of the P3 to conduct humanitarian operations abroad. The reason for this

prognosis is the impact of the excessive accumulation of sovereign debt which will, as

forecast, condition the economic situation of the US, the UK and France for many years. As

the graphic below demonstrates, assuming a fiscal consolidation of 0.5% each year, it will

take five years for France to stabilise its government debt to GDP ratio, nine for the UK and

twenty years for the US. The OECD therefore demands that large fiscal tightening is required

within the UK and the US within the next 15 years (2011-2026): 10-11% of GDP for the US, 6-

8.5% of GDP for the UK from their 2010 position (OECD, 2011, 226).


Source: OECD, 2011, 233

Similarly, the US congressional budget office demands that “policymakers will have to

substantially restrain the growth of spending [or] raise revenues significantly over their

historical share of GDP” (CBO, 2011, 16). France is not exempted from this scenario either

and “requires substantial fiscal consolidation” (OECD, 2011, 240). As it will hardly be

politically possible to increase taxes to such a level as to be able to effect this budgetary

consolidation, spending will have to be curtailed and most likely, future defence budget will

not be exempted from this decrease. Furthermore, all forecasts assume stable economic

growth, a resolution of the euro crisis and eventual sovereign debt sustainability (OBR, 2011,


48). In case these presuppositions will not be realized, a much direr scenario leading to an

even lower defence capability is very probable. This mid term outlook shows that there will

almost certainly be no increases in the defence budgets of the P3; significant decreases are

much more likely. Hence, generous financing of future humanitarian interventions will not

be forthcoming, with the chance of their occurrence accordingly decreasing.

Therefore, given the current political disagreements within the UNSC, decreasing defence

budgets and future fiscal austerity, we argue that humanitarian interventions like Operation

“Unified Protector”, conducted directly by Western states, will, in the time frame under

examination, decline in their likelihood or will not even take place at all anymore, a gap

which will not be fulfilled by Russia or China.


Conclusion

The conclusion of the preceding discussion turns out to be somewhat ambiguous. The

analysis of the Libyan intervention has demonstrated that idealism in international relations

is, unlike claimed by (Neo-)Realists, possible and, at times, as in the case of operation

“Unified Protector”, a real driver of states. This makes more benign international relations

imaginable, a place where power politics and the maximization of the national interest are

overweighed by humanitarian concerns. Nonetheless, an important caveat must be made

about whether it will still be politically and militarily feasible to conduct humanitarian

interventions in the future. This capacity will, as we have argued, be significantly diminished

and constrained for at least the next 10 years, from 2012-2021. In this final section we will

summarize the preceding discussion and spell out the normative conclusions of the previous

analysis.

To examine the issue as to how idealistic the decision by the P3 to intervene in Libya was, we

based our argument on the two best-known and widely-used models in Foreign Policy

Analysis, the Rational Actor Model and the Domestic Politics Model. We employed the

former model in order to analyse whether the P3 intervened in Libya to advance their

national interest, the latter concept to find out if domestic political motives can explain the

intervention. Whilst there exist further models, especially taking into account bureaucratic

politics, Groupthink and idiosyncratic psychological characteristics of decision-makers, out of

data and space constraints we had to limit our argument to the RAM and DPM. Applying the

RAM first, we found that UNSCR 1973 and the military operation in Libya were not in the

national interest of any of the P3 states but likely damaged their national prosperity and

national security. Only the criterion of national prestige clearly favoured the choice of the P3

states for military action.

In our next step we examined whether the P3’s intervention in Libya could be attributed to

domestic political motives. We found that the case of the US and the UK did not fit the DPM

convincingly. By contrast, the decision of the government of France to support UNSCR 1973

and the intervention can be explained rather persuasively by this model and the motive of

President Nicolas Sarkozy to improve his reputation with the French electorate. This

argument is further confirmed by the previous support of the French government for the

former autocratic rulers of Tunisia and Egypt, Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak, and demonstrates

that the endorsement of UNSCR 1973 and the participation in NATO operation “Unified


Protector” were not motivated by the concern for the Libyan people or the humanitarian

situation within the country. This makes French avowals to have promoted human rights

rather unconvincing. By contrast, the public statements of the US and the UK government

claiming to have intervened in Libya for idealistic motives seem to be more credible.

Accordingly, this illustrates that idealism in international relations is possible and

humanitarian interventions can be conducted out of genuine concern for the victims of state

repression, potentially making possible a more benevolent international order with less

intra-state violence and human rights violations.

Admittedly, this would necessitate at least the credible threat to conduct humanitarian

interventions against oppressive rulers, implying the actual political and military capacity to

do so. This capability, however, will rather unlikely be forthcoming in the mid-term future,

defined as the next 10 years until 2021. Having initiated operation “Unified Protector”,

NATO states faced substantial criticism from China and Russia which argued that “The West”

had abused their goodwill and metaphorically “hijacked” the resolution to effect regime

change. This led to their increased scepticism towards the idea of limited humanitarian

interventions and subsequently to their veto of a UNSC draft resolution in October 2011 and

again February 2012. Therefore, we argue that this political animosity towards humanitarian

interventions conducted by Western organizations like NATO will likely impede the passing

of resolutions similar to UNSCR 1973 in the next years. But even if the disputes within the P5

were settled, the continued feasibility of (aerial) humanitarian operations seems

questionable. Having observed a significant lack of non-US military capacity during the

Libyan operation, a future decrease in the defence budgets of the UK and France will

arguably further aggravate this impotence. Given the generally unsatisfactory economy

within the P3 states and the additional European sovereign debt crisis, an increase in military

budgets within the next 10 years can, in the absence of a major international crisis, almost

certainly be excluded. As a result, we see the potential for future operations to protect

assaulted civilians in foreign countries as rather low.

Given this conclusion, should we welcome fewer international humanitarian interventions?

One could certainly argue that even idealistically driven military interventions could have

deleterious consequences; good intentions do not necessarily ensure positive outcomes.

Hence, we will expand our viewpoint to encompass the post Cold War era to be able to

determine if there have been too many or too few humanitarian interventions. Since 1990, a


large number (compared to the Cold War period) of UN-mandated humanitarian

interventions was conducted20. Even though no operation received unanimous international

approval and several were met with pronounced criticism, there are also many scholars who

consider at least some of these operations a success in that more lives were saved than lost

through the military campaigns. Furthermore, it is unambiguous that the number of

casualties directly caused by these interventions is negligible compared to the death toll of

humanitarian crises where the international community should have intervened to prevent

further civilian deaths but failed to do so (Caplan, 2010, 1). The most salient cases in this

regard are the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 with between 600 000 and 800 000 casualties

(Verpoorten, 2005, 28) and the ongoing ethnic cleansing in the Darfur province of the

Republic of Sudan with possibly more than 300 000 deaths up to this day (Mazen, 2011, 1).

Considering this point, one could object that an intervention in these cases would have only

exacerbated the situation. However, there exists a rather wide scholarly consensus that

many civilian deaths could have been prevented by a timely and decisive military

engagement within those countries (UN[1], 2007, 1). This illustrates that even in times of

more political room for manoeuvre and adequate military capacity, many humanitarian

emergencies world-wide were not addressed by the international community or responded

to too late or indecisively. We deduce, therefore, that even less humanitarian interventions

will aggravate this dearth of concern for civilian suffering in foreign countries at turbulent

times in international politics when possibly more – not fewer – humanitarian interventions

might be needed. This is certainly good news for oppressive rulers all over the world; for

their subjects it is not.

20 in Somalia (UNOSOM I, 1992), Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNPROFOR, 1992), Rwanda (UNAMIR, 1994), Haiti (UNMIH, 1994), Albania (Operation Alba, 1997) and East Timor (UNAMET, 1999) (Caplan, 2010, 1).


Appendix A

UN security council resolution 1973 (2011) on Libya

Recalling its resolution 1970 (2011) of 26 February 2011,

Deploring the failure of the Libyan authorities to comply with resolution 1970 (2011),

Expressing grave concern at the deteriorating situation, the escalation of violence, and the heavy civilian casualties,

Reiterating the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population and reaffirming that parties to armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians,

Condemning the gross and systematic violation of human rights, including arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and summary executions,

Further condemning acts of violence and intimidation committed by the Libyan authorities against journalists, media professionals and associated personnel and urging these authorities to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law as outlined in resolution 1738 (2006),

Considering that the widespread and systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity,

Recalling paragraph 26 of resolution 1970 (2011) in which the Council expressed its readiness to consider taking additional appropriate measures, as necessary, to facilitate and support the return of humanitarian agencies and make available humanitarian and related assistance in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Expressing its determination to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian populated areas and the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance and the safety of humanitarian personnel,

Recalling the condemnation by the League of Arab States, the African Union, and the Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference of the serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law that have been and are being committed in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Taking note of the final communiqué of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference of 8 March 2011, and the communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union of 10 March 2011 which established an ad hoc High Level Committee on Libya,

Taking note also of the decision of the Council of the League of Arab States of 12 March 2011 to call for the imposition of a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe areas in places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure that allows the protection of the Libyan people and foreign nationals residing in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,


Taking note further of the Secretary-General's call on 16 March 2011 for an immediate cease-fire,

Recalling its decision to refer the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since 15 February 2011 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, and stressing that those responsible for or complicit in attacks targeting the civilian population, including aerial and naval attacks, must be held to account,

Reiterating its concern at the plight of refugees and foreign workers forced to flee the violence in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, welcoming the response of neighbouring States, in particular Tunisia and Egypt, to address the needs of those refugees and foreign workers, and calling on the international community to support those efforts,

Deploring the continuing use of mercenaries by the Libyan authorities,

Considering that the establishment of a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya constitutes an important element for the protection of civilians as well as the safety of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and a decisive step for the cessation of hostilities in Libya,

Expressing concern also for the safety of foreign nationals and their rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Welcoming the appointment by the Secretary General of his Special Envoy to Libya, Mr Abdel-Elah Mohamed Al-Khatib and supporting his efforts to find a sustainable and peaceful solution to the crisis in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Determining that the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Demands the immediate establishment of a cease-fire and a complete end to violence and all attacks against, and abuses of, civilians;

2. Stresses the need to intensify efforts to find a solution to the crisis which responds to the legitimate demands of the Libyan people and notes the decisions of the Secretary-General to send his Special Envoy to Libya and of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to send its ad hoc High Level Committee to Libya with the aim of facilitating dialogue to lead to the political reforms necessary to find a peaceful and sustainable solution;

3. Demands that the Libyan authorities comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, human rights and refugee law and take all measures to protect civilians and meet their basic needs, and to ensure the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance;


Protection of civilians

4. Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory, and requests the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary-General immediately of the measures they take pursuant to the authorization conferred by this paragraph which shall be immediately reported to the Security Council;

5. Recognizes the important role of the League of Arab States in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security in the region, and bearing in mind Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, requests the Member States of the League of Arab States to cooperate with other Member States in the implementation of paragraph 4;

No fly zone

6. Decides to establish a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians;

7. Decides further that the ban imposed by paragraph 6 shall not apply to flights whose sole purpose is humanitarian, such as delivering or facilitating the delivery of assistance, including medical supplies, food, humanitarian workers and related assistance, or evacuating foreign nationals from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, nor shall it apply to flights authorised by paragraphs 4 or 8, nor other flights which are deemed necessary by States acting under the authorisation conferred in paragraph 8 to be for the benefit of the Libyan people, and that these flights shall be coordinated with any mechanism established under paragraph 8;

8. Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures to enforce compliance with the ban on flights imposed by paragraph 6 above, as necessary, and requests the States concerned in cooperation with the League of Arab States to coordinate closely with the Secretary General on the measures they are taking to implement this ban, including by establishing an appropriate mechanism for implementing the provisions of paragraphs 6 and 7 above,

9. Calls upon all Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to provide assistance, including any necessary over-flight approvals, for the purposes of implementing paragraphs 4, 6, 7 and 8 above;

10. Requests the Member States concerned to coordinate closely with each other and the Secretary-General on the measures they are taking to implement paragraphs 4, 6, 7 and 8 above, including practical measures for the monitoring and approval of authorised humanitarian or evacuation flights;


11. Decides that the Member States concerned shall inform the Secretary-General and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States immediately of measures taken in exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph 8 above, including to supply a concept of operations;

12. Requests the Secretary-General to inform the Council immediately of any actions taken by the Member States concerned in exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph 8 above and to report to the Council within 7 days and every month thereafter on the implementation of this resolution, including information on any violations of the flight ban imposed by paragraph 6 above;

Enforcement of the arms embargo

13. Decides that paragraph 11 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall be replaced by the following paragraph : "Calls upon all Member States, in particular States of the region, acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements, in order to ensure strict implementation of the arms embargo established by paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1970 (2011), to inspect in their territory, including seaports and airports, and on the high seas, vessels and aircraft bound to or from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 9 or 10 of resolution 1970 (2011) as modified by this resolution, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel, calls upon all flag States of such vessels and aircraft to cooperate with such inspections and authorises Member States to use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances to carry out such inspections";

14. Requests Member States which are taking action under paragraph 13 above on the high seas to coordinate closely with each other and the Secretary-General and further requests the States concerned to inform the Secretary-General and the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) ("the Committee") immediately of measures taken in the exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph 13 above;

15. Requires any Member State whether acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements, when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraph 13 above, to submit promptly an initial written report to the Committee containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspection, the results of such inspection, and whether or not cooperation was provided, and, if prohibited items for transfer are found, further requires such Member States to submit to the Committee, at a later stage, a subsequent written report containing relevant details on the inspection, seizure, and disposal, and relevant details of the transfer, including a description of the items, their origin and intended destination, if this information is not in the initial report;

16. Deplores the continuing flows of mercenaries into the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and calls upon all Member States to comply strictly with their obligations under paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) to prevent the provision of armed mercenary personnel to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;


Ban on flights

17. Decides that all States shall deny permission to any aircraft registered in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya or owned or operated by Libyan nationals or companies to take off from, land in or overfly their territory unless the particular flight has been approved in advance by the Committee, or in the case of an emergency landing;

18. Decides that all States shall deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1970 (2011) as modified by this resolution, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel, except in the case of an emergency landing;

Asset freeze

19. Decides that the asset freeze imposed by paragraph 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall apply to all funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories, which are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Libyan authorities, as designated by the Committee, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, as designated by the Committee, and decides further that all States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of the Libyan authorities, as designated by the Committee, or individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, as designated by the Committee, and directs the Committee to designate such Libyan authorities, individuals or entities within 30 days of the date of the adoption of this resolution and as appropriate thereafter;

20. Affirms its determination to ensure that assets frozen pursuant to paragraph 17 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall, at a later stage, as soon as possible be made available to and for the benefit of the people of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

21. Decides that all States shall require their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction to exercise vigilance when doing business with entities incorporated in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya or subject to its jurisdiction, and any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and entities owned or controlled by them, if the States have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such business could contribute to violence and use of force against civilians;

Designations

22. Decides that the individuals listed in Annex I shall be subject to the travel restrictions imposed in paragraphs 15 and 16 of resolution 1970 (2011), and decides further that the individuals and entities listed in Annex II shall be subject to the asset freeze imposed in paragraphs 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011);


23. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall apply also to individuals and entities determined by the Council or the Committee to have violated the provisions of resolution 1970 (2011), particularly paragraphs 9 and 10 thereof, or to have assisted others in doing so;

Panel of experts

24. Requests the Secretary-General to create for an initial period of one year, in consultation with the Committee, a group of up to eight experts ("Panel of Experts"), under the direction of the Committee to carry out the following tasks:

(a) Assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) and this resolution;

(b) Gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies, regional organisations and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures decided in resolution 1970 (2011) and this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance;

(c) Make recommendations on actions the Council, or the Committee or State, may consider to improve implementation of the relevant measures;

(d) Provide to the Council an interim report on its work no later than 90 days after the Panel's appointment, and a final report to the Council no later than 30 days prior to the termination of its mandate with its findings and recommendations;

25. Urges all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures decided in resolution 1970 (2011) and this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance;

26. Decides that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall also apply to the measures decided in this resolution;

27. Decides that all States, including the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, shall take the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Libyan authorities, or of any person or body in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or body, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was affected by reason of the measures taken by the Security Council in resolution 1970 (2011), this resolution and related resolutions;

28. Reaffirms its intention to keep the actions of the Libyan authorities under continuous review and underlines its readiness to review at any time the measures imposed by this resolution and resolution 1970 (2011), including by strengthening, suspending or lifting those measures, as appropriate, based on compliance by the Libyan authorities with this resolution and resolution 1970 (2011).

29. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.


Appendix B

“The Security Council,

“Expressing grave concern at the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and condemning the violence and use of force against civilians,

“Deploring the gross and systematic violation of human rights, including the repression of peaceful demonstrators, expressing deep concern at the deaths of civilians, and rejecting unequivocally the incitement to hostility and violence against the civilian population made from the highest level of the Libyan government,

“Welcoming the condemnation by the Arab League, the African Union, and the Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference of the serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law that are being committed in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

“Taking note of the letter to the President of the Security Council from the Permanent Representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya dated 26 February 2011,

“Welcoming the Human Rights Council resolution A/HRC/S-15/2 of 25 February 2011, including the decision to urgently dispatch an independent international commission of inquiry to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, to establish the facts and circumstances of such violations and of the crimes perpetrated, and where possible identify those responsible,

“Considering that the widespread and systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity,

“Expressing concern at the plight of refugees forced to flee the violence in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

“Expressing concern also at the reports of shortages of medical supplies to treat the wounded,

“Recalling the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its population,

“Underlining the need to respect the freedoms of peaceful assembly and of expression, including freedom of the media,

“Stressing the need to hold to account those responsible for attacks, including by forces under their control, on civilians,

“Recalling article 16 of the Rome Statute under which no investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with by the International Criminal Court for a period of 12 months after a Security Council request to that effect,


“Expressing concern for the safety of foreign nationals and their rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

“Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

“Mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations,

“Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,

“1. Demands an immediate end to the violence and calls for steps to fulfil the legitimate demands of the population;

“2. Urges the Libyan authorities to:

(a) Act with the utmost restraint, respect human rights and international humanitarian law, and allow immediate access for international human rights monitors;

(b) Ensure the safety of all foreign nationals and their assets and facilitate the departure of those wishing to leave the country;

(c) Ensure the safe passage of humanitarian and medical supplies, and humanitarian agencies and workers, into the country; and

(d) Immediately lift restrictions on all forms of media;

“3. Requests all Member States, to the extent possible, to cooperate in the evacuation of those foreign nationals wishing to leave the country;

ICC referral

“4. Decides to refer the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since 15 February 2011 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court;

“5. Decides that the Libyan authorities shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and, while recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute, urges all States and concerned regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully with the Court and the Prosecutor;

“6. Decides that nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a State outside the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that State for all


alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya established or authorized by the Council, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by the State;

“7. Invites the Prosecutor to address the Security Council within two months of the adoption of this resolution and every six months thereafter on actions taken pursuant to this resolution;

“8. Recognizes that none of the expenses incurred in connection with the referral, including expenses related to investigations or prosecutions in connection with that referral, shall be borne by the United Nations and that such costs shall be borne by the parties to the Rome Statute and those States that wish to contribute voluntarily;

Arms embargo

“9. Decides that all Member States shall immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from or through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel whether or not originating in their territories, and decides further that this measure shall not apply to:

(a) Supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, and related technical assistance or training, as approved in advance by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 below;

(b) Protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya by United Nations personnel, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development works and associated personnel, for their personal use only; or

(c) Other sales or supply of arms and related materiel, or provision of assistance or personnel, as approved in advance by the Committee;

“10. Decides that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya shall cease the export of all arms and related materiel and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya by their nationals, or using their flagged vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

“11. Calls upon all States, in particular States neighbouring the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, all cargo to and from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export


of which is prohibited by paragraphs 9 or 10 of this resolution for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

“12. Decides to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, upon discovery of items prohibited by paragraph 9 or 10 of this resolution, seize and dispose (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 9 or 10 of this resolution and decides further that all Member States shall cooperate in such efforts;

“13. Requires any Member State when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraph 11 above, to submit promptly an initial written report to the Committee containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspections, the results of such inspections, and whether or not cooperation was provided, and, if prohibited items for transfer are found, further requires such Member States to submit to the Committee, at a later stage, a subsequent written report containing relevant details on the inspection, seizure, and disposal, and relevant details of the transfer, including a description of the items, their origin and intended destination, if this information is not in the initial report;

“14. Encourages Member States to take steps to strongly discourage their nationals from travelling to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to participate in activities on behalf of the Libyan authorities that could reasonably contribute to the violation of human rights;

Travel ban

“15. Decides that all Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals listed in Annex I of this resolution or designated by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 below, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory;

“16. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 15 above shall not apply:

(a) Where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligation;

(b) Where entry or transit is necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process;

(c) Where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that an exemption would further the objectives of peace and national reconciliation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and stability in the region; or

(d) Where a State determines on a case-by-case basis that such entry or transit is required to advance peace and stability in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the States subsequently notifies the Committee within forty-eight hours after making such a determination;

Asset freeze


“17. Decides that all Member States shall freeze without delay all funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories, which are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the individuals or entities listed in Annex II of this resolution or designated by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 below, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, and decides further that all Member States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of the individuals or entities listed in Annex II of this resolution or individuals designated by the Committee;

“18. Expresses its intention to ensure that assets frozen pursuant to paragraph 17 shall at a later stage be made available to and for the benefit of the people of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

“19. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 17 above do not apply to funds, other financial assets or economic resources that have been determined by relevant Member States:

(a) To be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services in accordance with national laws, or fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after notification by the relevant State to the Committee of the intention to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets or economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such notification;

(b) To be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant State or Member States to the Committee and has been approved by the Committee; or

(c) To be the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgment, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgment provided that the lien or judgment was entered into prior to the date of the present resolution, is not for the benefit of a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraph 17 above, and has been notified by the relevant State or Member States to the Committee;

“20. Decides that Member States may permit the addition to the accounts frozen pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 17 above of interests or other earnings due on those accounts or payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the provisions of this resolution, provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to these provisions and are frozen;


“21. Decides that the measures in paragraph 17 above shall not prevent a designated person or entity from making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such a person or entity, provided that the relevant States have determined that the payment is not directly or indirectly received by a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraph 17 above, and after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to make or receive such payments or to authorize, where appropriate, the unfreezing of funds, other financial assets or economic resources for this purpose, 10 working days prior to such authorization;

Designation criteria

“22. Decides that the measures contained in paragraphs 15 and 17 shall apply to the individuals and entities designated by the Committee, pursuant to paragraph 24 (b) and (c), respectively;

(a) Involved in or complicit in ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses against persons in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including by being involved in or complicit in planning, commanding, ordering or conducting attacks, in violation of international law, including aerial bombardments, on civilian populations and facilities; or

(b) Acting for or on behalf of or at the direction of individuals or entities identified in subparagraph (a).

“23. Strongly encourages Member States to submit to the Committee names of individuals who meet the criteria set out in paragraph 22 above;

New Sanctions Committee

“24. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council (herein "the Committee"), to undertake to following tasks:

(a) To monitor implementation of the measures imposed in paragraphs 9, 10, 15, and 17;

(b) To designate those individuals subject to the measures imposed by paragraphs 15 and to consider requests for exemptions in accordance with paragraph 16 above;

(c) To designate those individuals subject to the measures imposed by paragraph 17 above and to consider requests for exemptions in accordance with paragraphs 19 and 20 above;

(d) To establish such guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed above;


(e) To report within thirty days to the Security Council on its work for the first report and thereafter to report as deemed necessary by the Committee;

(f) To encourage a dialogue between the Committee and interested Member States, in particular those in the region, including by inviting representatives of such States to meet with the Committee to discuss implementation of the measures;

(g) To seek from all States whatever information it may consider useful regarding the actions taken by them to implement effectively the measures imposed above;

(h) To examine and take appropriate action on information regarding alleged violations or non-compliance with the measures contained in this resolution;

“25. Calls upon all Member States to report to the Committee within 120 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 9, 10, 15 and 17 above;

Humanitarian assistance

“26. Calls upon all Member States, working together and acting in cooperation with the Secretary General, to facilitate and support the return of humanitarian agencies and make available humanitarian and related assistance in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and requests the States concerned to keep the Security Council regularly informed on the progress of actions undertaken pursuant to this paragraph, and expresses its readiness to consider taking additional appropriate measures, as necessary, to achieve this;

Commitment to review

“27. Affirms that it shall keep the Libyan authorities’ actions under continuous review and that it shall be prepared to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in this resolution, including the strengthening, modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed at any time in light of the Libyan authorities’ compliance with relevant provisions of this resolution;

“28. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.”

Annex I

Travel ban

1. Al-Baghdadi, Dr Abdulqader Mohammed

Passport number: B010574. Date of birth: 01/07/1950.

Head of the Liaison Office of the Revolutionary Committees. Revolutionary Committees involved in violence against demonstrators.


2. Dibri, Abdulqader Yusef

Date of birth: 1946. Place of birth: Houn, Libya.

Head of Muammar Qadhafi’s personal security. Responsibility for regime security. History of directing violence against dissidents.

3. Dorda, Abu Zayd Umar

Director, External Security Organisation. Regime loyalist. Head of external intelligence agency.

4. Jabir, Major General Abu Bakr Yunis

Date of birth: 1952. Place of birth: Jalo, Libya.

Defence Minister. Overall responsibility for actions of armed forces.

5. Matuq, Matuq Mohammed

Date of birth: 1956. Place of birth: Khoms.

Secretary for Utilities. Senior member of regime. Involvement with Revolutionary Committees. Past history of involvement in suppression of dissent and violence.

6. Qadhaf Al-dam, Sayyid Mohammed

Date of birth: 1948. Place of birth: Sirte, Libya.

Cousin of Muammar Qadhafi. In the 1980s, Sayyid was involved in the dissident assassination campaign and allegedly responsible for several deaths in Europe. He is also thought to have been involved in arms procurement.

7. Qadhafi, Aisha Muammar

Date of birth: 1978. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.

Daughter of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime.

8. Qadhafi, Hannibal Muammar

Passport number: B/002210. Date of birth: 20/09/1975. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime

9. Qadhafi, Khamis Muammar



Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime. Command of military units involved in repression of demonstrations.

10. Qadhafi, Mohammed Muammar


Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime.

11. Qadhafi, Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar


Leader of the Revolution, Supreme Commander of Armed Forces. Responsibility for ordering repression of demonstrations, human rights abuses.

12. Qadhafi, Mutassim


National Security Adviser. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime.

13. Qadhafi, Saadi

Passport number: 014797. Date of birth: 25/05/1973. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.

Commander Special Forces. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime. Command of military units involved in repression of demonstrations.

14. Qadhafi, Saif al-Arab


Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime.

15. Qadhafi, Saif al-Islam

Passport number: B014995. Date of birth: 25/06/1972. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.

Director, Qadhafi Foundation. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime. Inflammatory public statements encouraging violence against demonstrators.

16. Al-Senussi, Colonel Abdullah

Date of birth: 1949. Place of birth: Sudan.


Director Military Intelligence. Military Intelligence involvement in suppression of demonstrations. Past history includes suspicion of involvement in Abu Selim prison massacre. Convicted in absentia for bombing of UTA flight. Brother-in-law of Muammar Qadhafi.

Annex II

Asset freeze

1. Qadhafi, Aisha Muammar


Daughter of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime.

2. Qadhafi, Hannibal Muammar

Passport number: B/002210. Date of birth: 20/09/1975. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime.

3. Qadhafi, Khamis Muammar


Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime. Command of military units involved in repression of demonstrations.

4. Qadhafi, Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar


Leader of the Revolution, Supreme Commander of Armed Forces. Responsibility for ordering repression of demonstrations, human rights abuses.

5. Qadhafi, Mutassim


National Security Adviser. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime.

6. Qadhafi, Saif al-Islam

Passport number: B014995. Date of birth: 25/06/1972. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.


Director, Qadhafi Foundation. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime. Inflammatory public statements encouraging violence against demonstrators.


Appendix C

Was the decision to legitimize the intervention in Libya within the national interest of the P3,

was it driven by internal political motives or could it have been motivated by idealistic

reasons?

Source: Present author, 2011.

Rational Actor Model

Sufficiently explains

the decision

Does not explain the

decision sufficiently

Sufficiently explains

the decision

Does not explain the

decision sufficiently

Domestic Politics

Model

Idealist or domestic

political motivation

ruled out

Idealist motivation ruled

out

Case for idealist

motivation can be made

UNSCR 1973


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http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=us%20national%20security%20strategy&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCcQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.whitehouse.gov%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Frss_viewer%2Fnational_security_strategy.pdf&ei=t7OpTuyJKYaO8gP5h6SXDA&usg=AFQjCNGFojGF51OBMdOOydQZXriPCQJPwQ&cad=rja




http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2012/assets/defense.pdf

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7328080.html

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