The Unlucky Country 1

Afghanistan’s Strategic Significance and Insecure Future

Senior Research Seminar

Austin Shopbell

Dr. Leonardo Figueroa-Helland

13 DEC 2013

Abstract:

In approximately one year, the United States and the greater International Community will

remove all combat forces from the South Asian nation of Afghanistan; numerous guesses

surround the potential results of the withdrawal, but none have definitively painted a complete

picture. This report attempts to fill that gap. The author combines both the historical and

contemporary context with several political and international relations theories that collectively

provide the reader with a comprehensive understanding of the past, present, and future of

Afghanistan. Considered theories include: Neorealism, English School, Indigenous, Islamic, and

the regional geopolitical struggle. Collectively, the theories can be generally understood to

accept that peace and a sense of stability is possible in the long term, but will be very difficult to

achieve.

Keywords:

Afghanistan, Taliban, ISAF, Future, International Relations, Security Studies

                                                                                                                         1  Title  refers  to  Hamid  Karzai’s  remarks  in  2001  after  learning  of  Massoud’s  assassination;  found  in  Coll,  chapter  “What  an  unlucky  country…”  

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“The Security Forces had to learn or suffer.” -John A. Nagl, referring to the British experience during the Malayan Emergency “The nation that will insist upon drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking by cowards.” -Sir William F. Butler, Charles George Gordon (1889) “…Another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin-war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by evading and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. Where there is a visible enemy to fight in open combat, the answer is not so difficult. Many serve, all applaud, and the tide of patriotism runs high. But when there is a long, slow struggle, with no immediately visible foe, your choice will seem hard indeed.”

-President John F. Kennedy, address to Westpoint graduates, 1961  

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Table of Contents

Epigraphs…01 Maps Geographic…03 Ethnic Dispersion…04 ISAF Dispersion…05 Research Question…06 The Literature…08 The Answer…10 Literature Review…12 Part I: Afghanistan’s History Introduction and Early History…19 Durrani Empire…20 Anglo-Afghan Wars…21 Monarchy…25 PDPA and Conditions Leading to Invasion…26 Soviet War in Afghanistan…28 Chaos and Civil War in Afghanistan…32 The First Afghan War Was Over, the Second Had Begun…34 Taliban Control and Downfall…36 Usama bin Laden, al Qaeda, and Prelude to Invasion…38 Post September 11th and US Invasion…41 Part II: Battlespace Afghanistan Today Afghanistan Tribal Disposition and Social Composition…43 Status and Organization of Conflict…48 Bilateral Security Agreement…48 Afghanistan National Government…52 Afghan National Security Forces…54 The Enemy…56 Part III: The Future of Afghanistan Neorealist Theory…62 English School Theory…67 Indigenous Theory…70 Pashtun Economic…71 Central Asian…72 Islamic…76 Geopolitics…81 Appendixes A: Abbreviations…87 B: Definitions…88 C: Principal Characters…89 D: Civilian Casualties by Cause…90 E: ANSF /ISAF Operations…90 Bibliography…91

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Maps:

Geographic 2

                                                                                                                         2  Courtesy  of:  http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/AfghanistanTopographicalMap_full.jpg  

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Maps:

Ethnic Dispersion 3

                                                                                                                         3  Courtesy  of:  http://www.afghan-­‐network.net/maps/Afghanistan-­‐Map.pdf  

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Maps:

ISAF Dispersion 4

                                                                                                                         4  Courtesy  of:  NATO/ISAF,  Key  Facts  and  Figures  

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Introduction, Research Question, Literature Review:

Introduction:

It isn’t yet light when the young girl, 12 years old and already in her seventh year of

classes, snatches her three pieces of paper and one pencil and disappears into the rural night air.

Her family is determined that she earn an education, so she will walk the three miles to spend

eight hours in the classroom-without eating-before walking the three miles home to chores and

homework. Waiting for her amongst the shadows are two men, both of whom wear black

turbans. Each cradles his Kalashnikov and feels the familiar wood warm under the rough skin;

the village mullah has announced that the girl will not attend school, and they are here to do his

work. This scenario-which occurs daily in Afghanistan-is the perfect example of the bifurcation

of the conflict occurring in Afghanistan today. The South Asian country is at a crossroads

between modernist and traditionalist forces, and the future perpetually suffers as a result. After

discussing the strategic, operational, and social context affecting contemporary Afghanistan, this

research identifies several theories that will likely inform the future of the country, its people, the

region, and the international community as a whole. Sadly, none of these philosophies promise a

beneficial future for the conflict-ridden nation. But by equipping the girl with the flashlight of

the potential future, she may be able to sense the dangerous men in her path and take a different-

albeit longer-path to school.

Research Question:

Following the devastating attacks of September 11th 2001 against US infrastructure and

civilians, American and NATO combat troops invaded Afghanistan, capturing Kabul exactly one

month and six days after the start of conventional US military operations in the country. In the 12

years since, the War in Afghanistan has been put on the backburner and the Taliban, who were

once thought to be all but eradicated, have been able to mount a complex and deadly resurrection.

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International Security Assistance Force combat troops are scheduled to leave the nation by late

2014, leaving a small garrison of trainers to assist the Afghan National Security Forces.

Generally, no one can say with confidence what will happen after the 2014 withdrawal date, and

speculations are extremely varying. Given this scenario, this research attempts to paint a useful

portrait of various possibilities for the future of Afghanistan.

Research into the future of Afghanistan is timely and has direct connotations for the

surrounding region. Neither the United States nor any other Allied force has committed to a

certain number of trainers remaining in the country following the withdrawal of combat troops.

As such, this report will supply policy makers with a basic framework of different potential

outcomes, as well as the most likely outcome. Afghanistan has historically been extremely

important for regional strategy; it is a key player in the India-Pakistan rivalry, shares a large land

border with Iran, and a smaller border with China. Separately and collectively, India, Iran, China,

Pakistan, the Central Asian states, and the Western powers each have interests in a “favorable”

Afghanistan and will seek to achieve these interests. Thus, there is a distinct possibility that

Afghanistan’s future will be informative of the future of the region. This research, then, adds to

the discourse on politics, geopolitics, and international relations in South Asia. Additionally, the

history of Western involvement in Afghanistan’s history of conflict-which is substantial but

mainly forgotten or ignored-has, to a large degree, informed and created conditions that exist to

this day, and was partially responsible for the 9/11 attacks. Under threat of repeating these past

mistakes with the same dire consequences, this research is a critical component for political,

social, military, and international relations study and analysis.

This research couples civilian-led scholarship with a military background; it is thus

intended to address several audiences concurrently. Principally, this report will propose a myriad

of potential outcomes to American policy makers in the intelligence, diplomatic, defense,

executive and legislative communities. These outcomes will allow the respective policy maker to

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adjust and tailor the operations of his/her organization to meet or avoid the listed potential

outcomes. Secondly, this report is being written as a document that will lend itself to casual

observation for non-policy makers; interested students and other individuals with little knowledge

of the situation in Afghanistan will hopefully enjoy reading the research while gaining an in-

depth, theoretical knowledge of the situation. The results of the study can be used to determine

future actions and end states in the prosecution of the War in Afghanistan. This report will help

to predict which direction Afghanistan will turn, allowing US policy makers to strategically

respond proactively rather than reactively.

The Literature:

The future of any country is obviously an incredibly important question with an infinite

number of aspects; as such it draws a wide range of speculation. As a warzone in which the

world’s most powerful country is engaged, Afghanistan draws even more speculation than other,

equally destitute nations. A global audience of governments, non-governmental agencies,

businesses, security analysts, religious scholars, human health and welfare specialists,

environmentalists, sociologists, and other experts have a significant stake in the future of the

country. Accordingly, each organization and interested party is actively attempting to assess the

country’s future. While the United States and Afghanistan recently made significant progress in

diplomatic discussions, there are still critical elements of a legal agreement allowing US troops to

stay in the country after 2014 that remain contentious. The agreement-and subsequent US

response- will specify the exact amount of remaining troops. Because this metric is so indicative

of the future, no professional organization has publicly released its opinion of Afghanistan’s

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future. Many suppositions exist, but each “guess” is dependent on the amount of ISAF forces that

will remain in the country. 5

While no official agreement regarding the future of Afghanistan has yet been released,

there are copious amounts of literature available that detail the country’s history and society, as

well as current security, political, economic, and religious indicators. Combining a historical-

cultural examination of Afghanistan’s past with current indicators of nation strength-a

comprehensive, accurate analysis of Afghanistan today-will allow researchers to better

understand future potential outcomes.

To accomplish this goal, the research seeks to understand each factor shaping

tomorrow’s Afghanistan by dividing the project into three sections. Section one will detail

Afghanistan’s history, culture and social context. Section two will focus on Afghanistan today,

conceptualizing the region as a commander would a battlespace. 6 This section will describe

relevant belligerents in the conflict, the status of the conflict as well as current operations, and an

in-depth look at the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Section three will

discuss several of the theoretical prospective scenarios that exist today. These scenarios include

neorealism, the English School, Indigenous perspective, an Islamic worldview, and finally a

discussion of the regional geopolitics.

                                                                                                                         5  This  research  will  use  the  term  “guess”  as  opposed  to  “theory”  in  order  to  portray  the  myriad  of  guesses  as  relatively  un-­‐founded,  which  they  are.    The  future  of  Afghanistan  is  anybody’s  guess:  a  truly  analytic  and  balanced  report  that  would  expound  a  “theory”  has  yet  to  be  released,  as  discussed  in  the  “Literature  Review”  section  of  this  document  6  “Battlespace,”  according  to  Wikipedia’s  synthesized  definition  from  various  DoD  sources,  comprises:  “a  unified  military  strategy  to  integrate  and  combine  the  armed  forces  for  the  military  theater  of  operations…it  includes  the  environment,  factors  and  conditions  that  must  be  understood  to  successfully  apply  combat  pressure,  protect  the  force,  or  complete  the  mission.    This  includes  enemy  and  friendly  armed  forces,  infrastructure,  weather,  terrain,”  and  other  non-­‐combatant  populations/forces.    Because  Afghanistan  has  been  a  battlefield  for  so  long,  and  because  of  the  integrated  civil-­‐military  objectives  inherent  to  a  counterinsurgency,  this  term  is  appropriate  to  describe  the  situation  in  Afghanistan  

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The Answer:

This study assumes several constants in order to retain relevancy. Principal amongst

these assumptions is that the US/ISAF combat mission will not be extended past the 2014

deadline. This is a relatively safe assumption to make due to several indicators; both heads of

state (Obama and Karzai) have expressed personal and political desire for an agreement to a

unilateral disengagement of combat forces. General political will internationally is also calling

for a return of US troops, and there seems to be little American Congressional or public pressure

to remain in combat. A second assumption made is the presence of some number of US/ISAF

advisory and/or counter-terror teams remaining in the country post-2014, coupled with substantial

amounts of foreign aid. This assumption, while still reasonable, is made with moderately more

risk. While the US and Afghanistan have recently experienced a significant diplomatic

breakthrough in the legal agreement allowing the presence of international advisory forces, the

most critical part of the framework (a Bilateral Security Agreement) was not part of the

breakthrough. The US has set an unofficial deadline for finalization of 31 OCT 2013, with

stipulations of pushing it as far back as APR 2014. 7 Should this agreement NOT be finalized, all

US/ISAF options (including all foreign aid) will be cut off from Afghanistan totally (with fairly

obvious connotations). While the risk of this occurrence is certainly not negligible (it did occur in

Iraq), it is unlikely. 8 Thirdly, the project assumes that the situation in Afghanistan will remain on

the general trajectory upon which it is currently tracking; international terrorist groups, such as al

Qaeda, will not make a sudden and unexplainable resurgence, Karzai will not totally cede power

to the Taliban, no foreign/regional power will physically intervene (beyond an escalation of

                                                                                                                         7  The  Bilateral  Security  Agreement  (BSA)  is  the  legal  framework  that  would  allow  the  presence  of  troops  and  foreign  aid  to  be  used  in  Afghanistan;  the  most  important  element  of  the  framework  is  the  stipulation  that  guarantees  American  trial  for  servicemen/women  accused  of  a  criminal  charge  while  deployed,  for  more,  see  “Bilateral  Security  Agreement”  in  Part  II  of  this  report  8  For  a  brief  review  of  the  consequences  from  pulling  our  troops  from  Iraq-­‐which  occurred  in  2010:  http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/10/22/us_could_ve_prevented_bloodletting_in_iraq_retired_gen_john_allen  

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current covert activities) in Afghanistan following the withdrawal of the US, amongst other

general remainders of the status quo.

An understanding of historical and current events, combined with a foundational-level

reading about the conflict and general situation in Afghanistan reveal several possible scenarios

regarding the most likely environment in the country post-2014. This report will analyze several

of these scenarios in different theoretical frameworks, including: neorealism, the English School,

Indigenous, Islamic worldview, and regional geopolitics. Neorealism cites tribal differences,

historical conflict, status of the conflict and regional dynamics to explain a likely descent into low

intensity civil war before a return to relatively rigid sectionalism and Pashtun dominance. The

indigenous theory uses both the Pashtun economic and the Central Asian theory, of which four

scenarios are considered possible, as an example to explain the Afghan future. Concurrently, the

theory applies possible outcomes that may result in a more peaceful and productive future. This

Islamic theory, while not considered indigenous to the case of Afghanistan, will likely play a role

due to the geographical location of the “Islamic world.” It describes three sects of Islamic

international thought, and describes a theory for Afghanistan by using the most modern

Islamization of Knowledge theory. Regional geopolitics concludes by citing the strategic

location of Afghanistan-in relation to Iran, Pakistan, India, China, and Russia-for natural

resources, international trade, and international terrorism.

This analysis of future affairs obviously begins in late 2014, with the diminished US

troop presence in the country. While elements from the occupation and prior history will be

considered and discussed in the research, they are not considered part of the research question;

this report does not analyze the factors from the 9/11 attacks to the current situation that put

Afghanistan into it’s current position as those factors are outside the scope of this research. This

report is geared to address roughly the next 10 years of Afghanistan’s future with an approximate

termination of analysis in 2024. The report has implications for post-2024, but does not attempt

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to seriously consider the environment after that time. It is also mainly limited to Afghanistan; the

report discusses the relationships between regional states and players in the conflict, but does not

attempt to address threats to the region outside of Afghanistan.

Literature Review

The available literature pertinent to my research question is, essentially, endless.

Scholars, politicians, governments, warfighters, economists, journalists; all manner of individuals

have a stake in Afghanistan's future. Accordingly, each individual organization releases its own

form of analysis regarding its stake in the country, bringing with it the organization’s inherent

biases, strengths, and weaknesses. Due to the wide variety of available sources, this report will

focus on scholarly documents, research articles and journals, defense analysis, intelligence

reporting, and regional experts; this literature review generally discusses some of the most

valuable resources in order that they’ll appear in the research.

For a detailed understanding of the indigenous perspective of history during the times of

the first modern Western incursions into Afghanistan during the 19th Century, this research

utilizes Bijan Omrani’s Afghanistan and the Search for Unity. Omrani, an English-trained

researcher of Central Asian decent, describes an in-depth analysis of both successful and failed

methods used by Afghan leadership during the first interactions with the West. The essay begins

with the goal of analyzing three different leaders of Afghanistan and their governance, while

attempting to allow the reader to draw his/her own connections from the past to the present.

Rather than explicitly describing the authors take on how the past informs the future, that job is

left to the reader, after being given Omrani’s detailed examples. Specifically relevant for this

research, Omrani’s analysis of both Abdur Rahman and King Amanullah were used almost

singularly for the comparison of leadership styles (both of which were considered ultimate

failures).

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Unquestionably one of the most important time periods in Afghanistan’s modern history

is the Soviet invasion and subsequent US/Saudi/Pakistani support for mujahedin elements. For

the purpose of understanding this time period, the report utilizes Ghost Wars: The Secret History

of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion until September 10th, 2001 by

Steve Coll. The book does an excellent job illustrating the American proxy war-fought against the

Soviets and through the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence-during the 1980’s. Additionally, the

book describes the rise of the Taliban, life under their rule, and the civil war that continued

amongst the mujahedin factions following the Soviet demise. The research extensively utilizes

Coll’s analysis of this time period in its description of this segment of Afghanistan’s history.

Additionally, the conditions found in 1991-1994, before the Taliban gained any type of influence,

can serve as an analysis of a potential outcome following the American withdrawal. Coll’s work

has served as a major inspiration and source of knowledge throughout my interest in the area.

Because of this, central tenets and passages of this work are prominently utilized throughout the

research.

Understanding the civilian analysis on current civil and military operations in

Afghanistan is crucial for a balanced understanding of the battlespace assessment. The research

relies on a myriad of reports to accomplish this objective, but Congressional Research Service

reports are utilized most heavily due to their reliability, ease-of-access, and objectivity of

analysis. Specifically, two CRS reports are prominently featured: “Afghanistan: Politics,

Elections, and Government Performance” and “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security,

and U.S. Policy,” both written by Kenneth Katzman in early August 2013. Collectively, these

two reports provide an accurate and (seemingly) unbiased examination of the current state of

affairs in Afghanistan, finding major problems ranging from social, to governmental, to

economic, and to overall security. The Afghan government is hopelessly corrupt, with efforts at

limiting the corruption considered either nonexistent or a complete failure (perhaps an indication

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of the status of the government itself). A mining industry is being set up to bolster the

independent states economy, but is significantly hindered by bureaucratic backlog and the

pervasive corruption. Official figures detailing the Afghan National Security Forces (National

Army and Police) are promising and appear on track for transfer from US support (they officially

lead all offensive operations in the country and are responsible for security in Kabul), but these

figures may be deceiving. ANSF suffer from serious recruitment/retention issues, and are

illiterate-literally and figuratively. CRS reports are made for Congressional scrutiny, in order to

give law/policymakers better understanding of the subject area; as such, the reports are lean on

recommendation or inference and heavy on factual and statistical data. Both reports are crucial to

understanding contemporary Afghanistan, and are utilized extensively to describe the on-the-

ground situation.

The United States is both the most powerful entity and most important determinant in the

Afghanistan equation. Accordingly, battlespace assessment reports from the Department of

Defense-the organization charged with prosecution of the security assistance mission-are

invaluable for understanding the current state of military and security affairs in Afghanistan. To

this end, the report utilizes “Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan” reports to

gain an in-depth US and ISAF military perspective on the conflict. The most current report at the

writing of this proposal, released in July 2013, paints a hopeful yet sobering picture of the

progress toward stability, ultimately contending that without significant international support the

Western-engineered government apparatus will quickly fall and that the Afghan government

remains dependent on outside support. Due to the nature of the time-intensive conflict, the

insurgency will NOT be defeated under the US timeframe for withdrawal of combat troops, and

the government will not be strong enough to support itself without substantial outside assistance.

A significant indicator of the validity and true representation of the Afghan government will be

the April 2014 elections and whether Karzai will allow the democratic process to continue

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uncontested. The report does not discuss potential outcomes were this to occur as it is considered

outside the scope of the report. The article also acknowledges significant gains in social

development, counterinsurgency metrics, and counterinsurgent narrative; these gains are tenuous

at best and depend on the post-2014 ISAF troop presence.

Understanding the historical and ethnic background that comprises modern-day

Afghanistan is critically important for understanding the current operational and hospitable

environment found in Afghanistan today, which is so obviously instrumental in the nation’s

future. Central to this element of the research is Amin Tarzi’s “Political Struggles over the

Afghanistan-Pakistan Borderlands.” The essay’s analysis of the current importance of the Durand

Line, remnants of British colonial control, and of the dominant ethnic group in Afghanistan

(Pashtun) are invaluable in understanding an indigenous philosophy that will outlast both radical-

Islamist and Western influence. While touching on the modern history of Afghanistan, the article

significantly paints a picture of the influence the Afghan-Pakistan diplomatic situation will have

on any future Afghanistan, and provides both an impetus and recommendation for change.

For a broader, more operational sense of the conflict in Afghanistan (and elsewhere), this

report will utilize David Killcullen’s Counterinsurgency. Killcullen is an Australian infantry

company commander with actual combat experience in counterinsurgency, who is also a

revolutionary world-class thinker about insurgency/counterinsurgency philosophy. Killcullen

earned his doctorate from the University of New South Whales, is a US State Department

advisor, and was a principal architect of FM 3-24. 9 His argument for the recognition of a global

insurgency facing the West is important for policy makers (with strong influences from the

English School), but this study focuses on one comparatively small passage in the text. Killcullen

claims that a major stumbling block the US has created in Afghanistan is the American tendency

to build the government from the top down. Citing historical accounts from the time of

                                                                                                                         9  Field  Manual  3-­‐24/Marine  Corps  Warfighting  Publication  3-­‐33.5:  Counterinsurgency    

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Alexander the Great, Killcullen maintains that Afghanistan has always been a tribal society, from

which power started at the tribal level before being elevated to local, regional, and finally

“national” prominence. This analysis plainly describes a root cause of current governmental

instability in Afghanistan and supports the supposition that, without dominating the other tribes

through force, Afghanistan will remain leaderless.

Former militant, resident of Pakistan, and journalist/scholar Ahmad Rashid’s analysis of

the region is an indispensable resource for this project; any Western-based analysis of the Central

Asian region, especially including Pakistan and Afghanistan, would be totally incomplete without

his input. Following the September 11th attacks against the United States, his first text in his

trilogy on the region was required reading at the White House, Pentagon, and Central Intelligence

Agency (the text is Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia). In order

to keep this work as up-to-date as possible, the report utilizes other sources for learning about the

Taliban and conditions before 9/11. However, his trilogy’s final text: Pakistan on the Brink: The

Future of America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan is an incredibly important resource used throughout

the research; it is the predominant source of the author’s understanding of the current and future

prospects for Afghanistan. Able to provide balanced, critical, and insightful perceptions of the

indigenous forces at play in the international system, Rashid also has an equally balanced and in-

depth understanding of the Western perspectives on those forces.

For a non-Western overview of international relations theories-and how they apply to

Afghanistan today-this report principally utilizes two separate sources that elucidate the Central

Asian and Islamic theory. Distant Futures and Alternative Presents for South Asia, written by

Indian scholar Sohail Inayatullah, admirably applies indigenous Indian theory to Pakistan, which

can relatively easily be conferred onto the case of Afghanistan for the purposes of this research.

Inayatullah’s task is not an easy one; the constant state of conflict between Pakistan and India

forces the reader to objectively determine the value of Inayatullah’s research and the amount of

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bias it contains. Distant Futures doesn’t attempt to justify any element of that conflict; rather, it

prescribes several non-Indian methods for stabilizing the region. Because of his objective take on

Pakistan, this paper is incredibly important to this research’s understanding of non-Western but

applicable theories for the future. In the same pursuit for the non-Western perspective, this

research relies upon International relations theory and the Islamic worldview written by

Afghanistan expert Shahrbanou Tadjbaksh. 10 The essay is an excellent resource for non-Muslims

to better understand the international concepts preached by the Islamic tradition, and her

discussion on the Islamization of Knowledge movement occurring in Islam today serves as an

extremely helpful metric for measuring the future of Afghanistan in a progressive yet traditional

manner.

A foundational survey of the literature reveals that Afghanistan faces many problems.

Much of the country’s history is of foreign domination and subsequent resistance, the nation is

deeply divided upon tribal lines, the Afghan government and it’s security apparatus is too corrupt

for functional control and the US military recognizes significant gains in the nation but admits the

tenuousness of each gain. From the start of the US invasion and subsequent reconstruction, the

international community-led by the US-followed a distinctly Western top-down approach rather

than distinctly Afghan bottom-up; indeed, the whole paradigm may have been flawed. The

United States, along with members of the International Security Assistance Force, have been in

the region for (almost exactly) 12 years with significant cost, but have seen few permanent

changes and are now poised to end combat operations in the country. One year from now, the

combat mission in Afghanistan will have ended and the Western-supported government will be in

charge of all security with severely limited US force application. Research articles and journals,

scholarly novels, defense analysis, and regional experts, combined with an

                                                                                                                         10  Tadjbaksh  lives  and  researches  in  France,  is  of  Iranian  origin,  and  is  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  where  she  completed  all  of  her  higher  education  

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operational/battlespace awareness, lends itself to the analysis and conclusions for the resultant

theories.

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PART I: Afghanistan’s History: In the Shadows-

Introduction and Early History:

Afghanistan has had a long and storied past, unknown to most Westerners. The region

known today as “Afghanistan” and her people “Afghan’s,” has been of international strategic

importance since the dawn of time. Afghanistan is located barely over 1000 kilometers from

Mesopotamia, the “Cradle of Civilization,” and was thus the home of some of the world’s earliest

humans. Archaeologists have found evidence of early humans in Northern Afghanistan from as

long as 50,000 years ago, and many experts believe that these agricultural communities may have

been home to some of the earliest human attempts at farming. After 2,000 BCE, Indo-Europeans

began migrating into Central Asia, setting up some urban civilizations but relying mostly on

tribal, agrarian social structures. 11 Mesopotamia, the world’s first empire, met its downfall in

2005 BCE. It is possible that the Mesopotamian downfall was the work of “barbarians” coming

from Central Asia and specifically Afghanistan. 12

Afghanistan and Central Asia underwent several, successive empire and regime changes

before writing was introduced to the region at approximately 500 BCE. Undoubtedly influenced

by whichever ruler claimed sovereignty over these people, Afghans likely resisted complete

domination by further identifying with a tribal, local/community based power structure. In the 5th

Century BCE, the Greek scholar Herodotus found in Afghanistan a traditional tribe-based society,

similar to the one found today. Men came to power from the ground up; driven men accumulated

influence and power amongst his family and tribe before being elevated by his peers to a position

of local, and finally regional, importance. 13 Indeed, In 330 BCE, by the time Alexander the

Great marched into Central Asia in pursuit of the Persian king Darius, he found a tribal society

                                                                                                                         11  Schroder,  Afghanistan  12  Boot,  Invisible  Armies,  Book  I  Chapter  IV.    Author  attributes  downfall  to  tribes  from  Southwestern  Iran,  but  surmises  that  due  to  close  proximity,  Afghan  tribes  may  have  participated  as  well  13  Killcullen,  Counterinsurgency,  describes  Herodotus’  account  of  Deiokes,  the  first  King  of  the  Medes  

Shopbell  20    

governed only remotely by regionalist rule. He found this area, a region and culture comprised of

modern-day Afghanistan, to be the most difficult and costly to subdue. 14

Following Alexander’s costly conquest of Central Asia, Afghanistan withstood different

waves of foreign rule, spawning mostly from the division of the Macedonian Empire following

Alexander’s death. Between the 3rd and 8th centuries AD, Afghanistan was a Buddhist state, ruled

by the Maurya Empire from modern-day India. Various rulers came and went, but Buddhism

remained in Afghanistan until the end of the 7th Century when the Umayyad Dynasty defeated the

Persian Sassanian empire. “The complete conversion of Afghanistan to Islam occurred during the

rule of the Gaznavids in the 11th Century.” 15 While under Islamic rule, Afghanistan was home to

significant conflicts over control of territory between the Shi’a Mughal Empire and the Sunni

Safavid Dynasty of Persia. Most native Afghanis, including an overwhelming number of the

dominant Pashtuns, fought against the Safavid army. Following the assassination of the Persian

Emperor, Safavid rule was weakened and a senior officer in the Persian army-Ahmad Shah

Durrani-formed a monarchy in Afghanistan.

Durrani Empire:

After seizing power in 1747 through a regional Loya Jirga, Ahmad Shah was able to

unite disparate Pashtun tribes with other ethnic minorities and formed a regional empire

encompassing much of modern-day Afghansitan, Pakistan, Iran and parts of India, thus forming

the first regional affiliation of tribes that would become known as “Afghanistan.” 16 A strong

ruler, Ahmad Shah’s empire lasted wholly until his death in 1772. Rule passed peacefully to his

                                                                                                                         14  Romey,  The  Forgotten  Realm  of  Alexander  15  Katzman,  Afghanistan:  Post-­Taliban…,  Background  pg  1  16  Tarzi  and  Lamb,  Measuring  Perceptions,  page  3.    Loya  Jirga  means  “grand  assembly”  and  is  a  traditional  method  for  political  activity  and  association;  the  Loya  Jirga  is  a  traditionally  Pashtun  undertaking  but  has  been  recently  extended  to  include  the  other  tribes,  involving  a  large  congregation  of  important  individuals  meeting  to  resolve  major  events,  conflicts,  and  other  important  happenings,  Jirga’s  can  last  for  very  long  periods  of  time  as  decisions  can  only  be  reached  by  the  group  and  arguments  can  go  on  for  days  

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sons, who received “but nominal homage from the tribal chieftains.” 17 The sons spent much of

their rule quelling tribal uprisings, and moved the capital from Kandahar to Kabul within the first

generation for increased security. Taking advantage of significant contention amongst the

Durrani clan for control over territory as well as the empire, Dost Muhammad Khan advanced on

Kabul from Kashmir in 1826. After capturing the capital, he declared himself emir of the empire

and sought to retake lost terrain.

Anglo-Afghan Wars:

While in control, Dost Muhammad Khan faced a myriad of internal and external security

threats, presiding over the first Anglo-Afghan war. Seeking to retake lost territory, Persia

attacked several provinces-including Herat-in Afghanistan with Russian support. Fearing a

Russian takeover in the event of an Afghan defeat, Britain attempted to initiate diplomatic

discussions with the Afghan leader. Britain viewed Herat as a strategically imperative buffer

zone, keeping Russian hegemony from threatening English colonies in India. 18 The British

diplomat was accepted into the Afghan capital, but negotiations ultimately failed. Upon their

withdrawal, the British delegation saw evidence of Russian presence in Kabul itself. 19 Their

subsequent report sparked the First Anglo-Afghan War and the first Western war in Afghanistan

since the time of Alexander the Great. Eerily similar to both the Soviet Union and the American

invasions centuries later, the British invaded Afghanistan quickly and easily in April 1839,

installing a British-backed ruler in the capital within three months of invasion. The Afghans

rebelled against the foreign power and dictator, coalescing around Pashtun leader Dost

Mohammad Khan and gradually decreasing the territory effectively held by the British. After a

decisive British route of his troops in spring 1839, Dost Mohammad was forced to flee the region,

                                                                                                                         17  Encyclopedia  Britannica  18  Ibid  19  The  British  reported  the  presence  of  a  “Russian  agent”  in  Kabul  as  their  reason  for  termination  of  discussions  and  diplomatic  withdrawal.    It  is  likely  that  their  subsequent  reports  and  testimony  to  the  Russian  presence  was  exaggerated    

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leaving several sons to unify the tribes as leaders of the low-intensity warfare. Ignorant of the

politico-security situation on the ground, the British decided to evacuate their Kabul garrison in

early January 1842; 4,500 soldiers (mostly Indian colonial troops) and 12,000 civilian followers

left the British lines. Smelling blood, the Afghan tribesmen fell upon the retreating British and

Indian colonial soldiers. 30 miles and one week later, only ONE Englishman made it back to

British-held India, along with roughly 40 Indian soldiers. 20

In response to the utter destruction of the army, Britain doubled down on its claims for

Afghanistan and sent in many more colonial troops from India. At the same time and under more

competent leadership, troops stationed in Kandahar and Peshawar reached Kabul by late summer

1842, killing and destroying as they moved through the countryside. 21 Unable to subdue the

restive populace, the commander of British troops in the region ordered all troops to be evacuated

before winter 1842. British troops briefly re-occupied Kabul, destroying the Grand Bazaar and

freeing several captives from the earlier British defeat. 22 Following this bloody conclusion to the

First Anglo-Afghan War-a resounding defeat for the British-Dost Mohammad returned to power.

The British occupation and brutal pillage of the country terrified the population and planted a

deep social hatred of foreign invasion and influence. 23

Dost Mohammad seized upon the comparably “unified” tribal Afghanistan following the

expulsion of the British. After re-establishing control of Kabul, he eventually took Kandahar (in

Southern Afghanistan) before extending his influence north. In 1855, Dost Mohammad ended his

feud with Britain and moved against the Persian army in the West. He captured Herat less than

                                                                                                                         20  Boot,  Invisible  Armies,  scene  immortalized  by  Thompson:  “Remnants  of  an  Army.”    Cold,  dehydration,  and  Afghan  guerrillas  had  essentially  annihilated  the  entire  British  column  21  Baxter,  The  First  Anglo-­‐Afghan  War,  1997  22  The  Bazaar,  one  of  the  most  vibrant  marketplaces  of  the  region,  was  destroyed  as  retaliation  for  the  destruction  of  the  British  column  in  the  January  1842;  as  an  interesting  side  note,  the  author  read  a  2011  report  from  a  British  military  unit  in  Kabul  which  was  shocked  to  find  that  some  Afghans  still  hold  today’s  soldiers  accountable  for  the  destruction  of  the  Bazaar  171  years  ago  23  Ibid;  the  British  invasion  of  Afghanistan  may  be  responsible  for  a  significant  amount  of  distrust  of  foreigners-­‐particularly  amongst  tribal  Afghans-­‐found  in  Afghanistan  today  

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one month before his death in June 1863. 24 Reign passed to his sons, with Afghanistan’s

territorial and governmental control remaining essentially static. However, in early summer

1878, tensions with Britain again boiled over, resulting in the Second Anglo-Afghan War.

Sher Ali Khan, Dost Mohammad’s son and ruler of Afghanistan, once again refused to

allow the British to set up a diplomatic mission in Kabul. Seeing that Russia was officially

communicating with the Afghan ruler, Britain again feared increasing Russian hegemony over

their “buffer” area for the Indian colonies; this time, they sent over 40,000 troops with superior

weaponry to forcefully assert British foreign policy. 25 Given their numerical and technological

superiority, the British quickly captured a significant amount of Afghan territory. During the

British invasion, Sher Ali Khan died peacefully in Mazar-i-Sharif and control of the Afghan

crown passed to his son. Sher Ali’s son, eager to prevent a total British takeover, signed an

agreement that ostensibly resulted in a pseudo-neutrality between the two powers, total British

control over all Afghan foreign policy, and the removal of all British forces from Afghan

territory. Although a formal English diplomatic delegation remained in Kabul, the Afghans

promptly killed the diplomat and his family; following their death the English Crown abandoned

its objective of maintaining a mission in the nation. 26

Of immense contemporary consequence, this time period saw the creation of

Afghanistan’s borders as they are recognized today. Most controversially-and most importantly-

was the Durand Line created in 1893 that separated British India (areas of which are now modern

day Pakistan) from Afghanistan. At the time, the Afghan emir thought of the line as a “temporary

concession of a nature similar to that which he had been obliged to make in order to secure

British recognition [for his right to rule domestic policy] in 1880.” 27 This seemingly arbitrary

                                                                                                                         24  Encyclopedia  Britannica  25  The  First  Anglo-­‐Afghan  War  consisted  of  an  initial  invasion  force  of  only  21,000  troops,  these  numbers  come  from  various  British  military  documents  26  Boot,  Invisible  Armies,  page  170  27  Tarzi,  Political  Struggles…,  page  19,  Tarzi  argues  that  the  emir  believed  his  concession  for  British  control  of  foreign  policy  AND  his  acceptance  of  the  Durand  Line  as  purely  temporary  stop-­‐gap  measures  designed  in  order  to  alleviate  British  pressure    

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border is a critical element of understanding the modern politics and social context of

Afghanistan. Consequently, it will be detailed and referred to in greater depth later in this

research.

Afghanistan became a virtual protectorate of British control for 40 years, until war-weary

England formally relinquished total control of Afghan foreign policy in August 1919. In 1880,

following the Second Anglo-Afghan War, control of the Afghan crown was taken by Abdur

Rahman Khan; known as the “Iron Amir,” Abdur Rahman was able to unify the tribes and bring a

sense of nationality previously unknown in Afghanistan. 28 Abdur Rahman modernized many

parts of the country through intense centralization and his “iron” punishments, installing for the

first time a chiefly religious right to rule. 29

…Within 20 years, at the end of his reign, the country was a unity, possessing a standing army, institutions of central and local government, a civil service, a tax collection system; the roads were safe, the tribes generally obedient, and the writ of government ran far more deeply into the lands of the tribes than had ever been the case before…He was the first to change the idea of kingship in Afghanistan…He saw that for centralized government, there had to be a single, strong leader. His means of changing the conception of kingship was by religion. Kingship came not from jirgas, he said, but from God. 30

Abdur Rahman’s example of total control over religion as a unifying and commanding

force over the disparate tribes remained following his death in 1901 for several decades. King

Amanullah, taking the throne in 1919 and immediately launching the Third Anglo-Afghan War,

which would finally rid Afghanistan of all British control, was the first to challenge this

traditionalist view of governance. 31 Amanullah possessed familial ties to Kabul’s “elite,” a

burgeoning group of intellectuals who favored Westernization and modernization for the country,

and was an ardent supporter of women’s rights. The King initiated serious attempts to distance

the hegemony of state over religion and in fact even attempted to completely isolate the two

                                                                                                                         28  Abdur  Rahman  was  a  grandson  of  Dost  Mohammad,  keeping  control  of  the  Afghan  Crown  in  the  Khan  dynasty  29  Punishments  described  by  Omrani  as  “tyranny”  30  Omrani,  Afghanistan  and  the  Search  for  Unity  31  Ibid  

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institutions from each other; the national conscription army was severely cut in favor of social

and educational advancements; diplomatic missions from the world over were established in

Kabul, with varying foreign policies gaining prominence in Afghan politics; education was made

compulsory, with drastic improvements in women’s education, health, and social freedoms. 32

Facing a total reversal over their centuries-old way of life, the tribes rebelled. Lacking the strong

national army that had benefitted Abdur Rahman, King Amanullah was unable to put the

rebellion down and was forced to flee, abdicating his throne and moving in exile to Sweden in

early 1929. In his wake, the tribes descended into civil war, while the leader of the tribe that had

displaced Amanullah took nominal control in Kabul for several months.

Monarchy:

After the overthrow of central leadership, various tribal leaders took control and were

eventually displaced or assassinated. This period of turnover came to an abrupt end when 19 year

old Mohammad Zahir Shah assumed power and established a strong monarchy following the

assassination of his father. The ascendancy of the young King issued in a 40-year reign of

perpetual monarchy-one of the longest in Afghanistan’s history. The time period was marked by

an initial re-consolidation of centralization, with the National Government again gaining

influence over the tribes. Zahir Shah utilized tribal militias and grievances to pit the secular

tribes against each other, while the government improved general tribal life by accepting aid

projects from both the Soviet Union and the United States. 33 The Afghan government eased

traditionalist restrictions on women, promulgated a constitution and bicameral legislature, and

became increasingly internationally-focused. Interestingly, some older Afghans cite this time

period as one of Afghanistan’s best. Potentially hoping to limit the influence of the USSR on the

                                                                                                                         32  Ibid  33  Katzman,  Post-­‐Taliban  …,  pg  2,  both  Cold  War  powers  attempted  to  mitigate  the  influence  of  the  other  through  public  works  and  infrastructure  projects:  the  USSR  built  transportation  infrastructure  and  Bagram  Airfield  (both  of  which  it  utilized  extensively  in  the  coming  invasion),  while  USAID  provided  chiefly  energy  and  agricultural  reforms    

Shopbell  26    

small but growing communist factions in his country at the time, Zahir Shah built significant

political and military-industrialist ties with the Soviet Union. 34

By the 1970’s, the Afghan government faced increasing internal and external threats in

addition to a very unstable, weak economy. One third of the legislature was chosen by the people

of Afghanistan; while this democratic “experiment” was hailed by the West, it also allowed the

political creation and nourishment of both right and left wing extremist groups. Students

attending chiefly Marxist institutions in Kabul created the communist People’s Democratic Party

of Afghanistan (PDPA) with Soviet guidance and support. Concurrently, religious scholars and

leaders from both Kabul and the tribes coalesced around a new, fanatical brand of Islam

emanating from the Middle East. In 1979, the deeply conservative Muslim cleric Ayatollah

Khomeini rose to power in Iran; his election and subsequent religious edicts spread into

Afghanistan across the porous Western land border, energizing Afghan populations with the

religious-political revival. 35

PDPA and Conditions Leading to Invasion:

Signaling the end of his rule, King Zahir Shah and his entire family traveled to Italy in

July 1973 for medical treatment. The King’s cousin and Prime Minister, Mohammad Daoud,

seized power in a nonviolent coup, receiving significant help and guidance from leftist military

officers, elements of the PDPA, and the KGB. 36 Daoud proclaimed himself the First President of

Afghanistan and promoted progressive politics and strong state-centric economic reforms while

engaging in nepotism and heavy-handed repression of dissent. At the time, the military was

highly influenced by the PDPA because “the military was the portion of the state apparatus where

the Soviet model of modernization was most influential.” 37 Indeed, the Soviet Union and its

                                                                                                                         34  Ibid,  pg  2  35  Coll,  Ghost  Wars,  pg  40  36  Ibid,  pg  2  37  Rubin,  The  Fragmentation  of  Afghanistan,    pg  104  

Shopbell  27    

intelligence service, the KGB, had even established overt and covert political advisory units

within the Afghan army and throughout Kabul. 38 Daoud, who came to power with the help of the

PDPA and who considered himself a military ruler, was thus highly influenced by the Soviet

Union and communist ideology. During his tenure, the PDPA attempted large scale, rapid

modernization programs and split into two semi-rival factions: Khalq (“masses” faction) and

Parcham (“banner” faction). 39 The Khalq faction, which was composed of mostly the middle and

lower level Pashtun-dominated officer corps, drew significantly more recruitment amongst the

bulk of the Afghan army. Parcham consisted mostly of the urban, more-modernist middle and

upper classes amongst the Afghan population.

Despite a late start, Khalq seems to have overtaken Parcham by 1978. During 1975 and 1976, as Soviet interest in the PDPA increased, Parcham and Khalq competed for recognition by the international communist movement as the genuine Marxist-Leninist Party of Afghanistan. Instead they encountered pressure-presumably unwelcome-to unite. 40

While subscribing to his communist over-seers, Daoud followed the example of his disposed

predecessor; he continued to play the two powers off the other, gaining financial, agricultural, and

infrastructure aid and using it to strengthen his rule in a “precarious balancing act.” 41 By 1978,

however, Daoud “fell off his beam. He arrested communist leaders in Kabul after they staged a

noisy protest.” 42 With formal Soviet authorization, and active participation by members of the

KGB, the PDPA and Afghan military staged a coup on 27 APR 1978. Soviet KGB and Afghan

Army forces attacked the Presidential Palace; after a 12 hour firefight, the entire Daoud family

                                                                                                                         38  Coll,  Ghost  Wars,  pg  39  39  Katzman,  Post-­‐Taliban  Governance,  Security,  and  US  Polisy,  pg  2,  and  Rubin,  pg  104:  according  to  Katzman,  modernization  included  redistribution  of  land  and  inclusion  of  more  women  in  government  40  Rubin,  The  Fragmentation  of  Afghanistan,  pg  105  41  Coll,  Ghost  Wars,  pg  39;  Coll  discusses  Daoud  only  minimally,  dedicating  only  six  lines  in  his  700  page  book  to  Daoud’s  tenure,  thus  seemingly  dismissing  the  impact  Daoud  had  on  the  rise  of  communist  rule  in  Afghanistan,  while  other  sources-­‐including  Rubin-­‐maintain  that  his  rule  was  instrumental  in  the  PDPA’s  success.  42  Ibid;  the  PDPA  was  protesting  the  assassination  of  a  senior  liaison  officer  for  Parcham,  potentially  at  the  hands  of  the  Khalq    

Shopbell  28    

(including women and children) were exterminated and by 30 APR 1978, Khalq leaders were in

nominal control of the country. 43

Seizing the initiative presented by the unrest, and objecting to the communist reforms that

were already taking place in the nation, the right-wing Islamist movement, calling themselves the

“mujahedin” and inspired by the Iranian example, launched a violent revolt in Herat in March

1979, hacking to death several dozen Russian political agents and their families. The Soviet Air

Force, flying out of Kabul, flew vengeance sorties against Herat and, by April 1979 had killed

20,000 civilians in Herat alone. 44 The Islamic rebellion and it’s mujahedin fighters gained steam,

revolting against the Leninist-style heavy-handed crackdown on dissent. Khalq and PDPA

leaders believed that Iran and Pakistan were covertly sending fighters and clerics into

Afghanistan and were helping foment the dissent, which was spreading throughout the

countryside. 45 Infighting within the Khalq led to the political assassination of the movement’s

leader, replaced by an unstable and even more aggressively-Leninist Hafizullah Amin. The

Soviet leadership became increasingly concerned about the PDPA longevity in the face of the

Islamic movement and found Amin intolerably hostile to USSR political and operational

objectives. Their desperation for a stable ally in Afghanistan would inspire a drastic move with

global ramifications: ramifications that still have a profound affect on the global political

dynamic.

Soviet War in Afghanistan:

“From the very first hours after cables from the US embassy in Kabul confirmed that a

Soviet invasion had begun, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter’s most determined cold warrior,

                                                                                                                         43  In  June  2008,  US  forces  found  a  mass  grave  outside  Kabul  containing  the  remains  of  the  Daoud  family  and  security  forces  44  Ibid,  pg  42  45  Ibid,  pg  42;  over  the  summer,  the  United  States  also  made  the  first  of  many  payments  to  the  Islamic  insurgents  with  the  goal  of  challenging  communist  control  over  the  country.      

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wondered if this time the Soviets had overreached.” 46 The Soviet invasion began in textbook air-

assault fashion in the early morning hours of 25 DEC 1979 and ended as the bodies of Soviet

troops, strapped onto tanks and covered with snow, rumbled out of the Salang Highway on 15

FEB 1989. The literature regarding the Soviet War in Afghanistan is immense; any interested

party need only perform a rudimentary “Google” search for the time period in order to quickly

gain an enormous amount of information regarding the conflict. Because of the length, depth,

and scope of the invasion, and because the minute details of the occupation are not entirely

relevant to contemporary or future Afghanistan, This research will only briefly discuss the

overview of the conduct and after action review from the war. It will instead focus on the

belligerents of contemporary relevance and any lasting consequences of the war. 47

Following the Politburo’s decision to conventionally invade Afghanistan, covert Soviet

advance teams entered the country in early December 1979. A late night Christmas Eve airborne

operation dropped shock troops into Kabul, who quickly seized strategic objectives including the

airfield, various military installations, and the Presidential Palace; early Christmas morning, the

40th Army invaded with mechanized infantry, armor, and artillery units penetrating the nation

from two different approaches. Hafizullah Amin was promptly killed in a costly assault on his

residence and was replaced by the Soviet-installed Babrak Karmal, a Parcham leader who had

been exiled following Amin’s rise to power. Intended to quickly pacify the nation through a

“blitzkrieg,” the invasion and subsequent occupation of all major metropolitan areas not

surprisingly had the reverse effect; it spawned an increased sense of nationalism directed against

the foreign invader, and the mujahedin’s Islamic insurgency grew exponentially. 48

                                                                                                                         46  Ibid,  pg  50;  Brzezinksi  was  the  United  States  National  Security  Advisor  to  President  Jimmy  Carter  47  For  interested  readers,  Steve  Coll’s  previously  cited  Ghost  Wars  provides  an  excellent,  in-­‐depth  analysis  of  the  regional  consequences  and  actions  on  during  the  Soviet  War  in  Afghanistan;  additionally,  Ahmed  Rashid’s  trilogy:  Taliban,  Descent  into  Chaos,  and  Pakistan  on  the  Brink,  provides  consistent  reporting  on  the  continued,  regional  impacts  of  the  Soviet  invasion  48  Ibid,  pg  51;  Coll  describes  the  textbook  invasion  and  subsequent  insurgency/counterinsurgency  throughout  his  text  

Shopbell  30    

Throughout the conflict, both the United States and Saudi Arabia funded elements of the

mujahedin, with the United States funneling billions of dollars of aid, including advanced

weaponry, through the proxy services of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). 49

Importantly, and with significant future ramifications, the United States allowed the ISI total

control over fund dispersion and allotment. Answering a call for Jihad, or Holy War against the

foreign invader, Arabic fighters flocked to the South-Asian nation. The United States, ISI, and

various Afghan groups established sanctuaries in Pakistan, amongst the fiercely independent

Pashtun tribes, and in the mountainous North and North East regions of the nation. The status

and various resistance abilities of the mujahedin closely followed tribal lines; militaristic

Pashtuns mounted the most capable defense, while Tajiks and Uzbeks often had to re-learn

warfare lessons through trial-and-error. 50 Throughout the conflict, the vast majority of forces

battled the Soviets as guerrillas, only rarely-and usually with disastrous consequences-engaging

the Soviets with conventional tactics. 51 As the occupation wore on, mujahedin benefactors and

tactics advanced as well. “The elite [mujahedin groups] evolved from a nationalistic group based

on Afghan exclusivity to a non-statist Islamist group that felt as comfortable in Pakistan as they

did in Afghanistan.” 52 Many of these fighters would go on to form the backbone of the Pakistan-

controlled Taliban. Initially uncoordinated, the Afghans operated out of an estimated 4,000

kinetic origins of attack throughout the country: in response to the adaptive demands of an

insurgency, they eventually coalesced around a core group of major mujahedin commanders who

received support from the US, Saudi Arabia, and ISI, many of whom will be discussed later in the

report. 53

                                                                                                                         49  Barlett,  The  Oily  Americans,  Saudi  Arabian  intelligence  matched  many  US  funds  dollar  for  dollar,  combined  with  Saudi  private  citizens  and  Islamic  charities  also  donating  additional  millions  to  the  rebels  50  Roy,  The  Path  to  Victory  and  Chaos,  the  tribes  and  ethnicities  will  be  discussed  in  great  detail  in  following  sections  of  this  report  51  Guerrilla  warfare  is  characterized  by  small,  highly  mobile  and  lightly  armed  fighters  engaging  the  enemy  in  limited,  low  intensity  warfare,  typically  utilizing  “hit-­‐and-­‐run”  tactics  designed  to  maximize  enemy  casualties  over  a  short  period  of  time  while  minimizing  unit  casualties    52  Tarzi,  Political  Struggles  Over…,  pg  24  53  Roy,  The  Path  to  Victory  and  Chaos  

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Throughout the occupation, Soviet forces concentrated their counterinsurgency (COIN)

operations amongst the centers of population, rarely venturing into the 80% of Afghanistan that

was considered rural and outside the Red Army’s reach. 54 When they did, they utilized mass-

force, scorched earth campaign tactics; these tactics resulted in the slaughter of more civilians

than fighters and destroyed local agrarian economies. Combined, the two factors resulted in the

quickly increasing radicalization of the rural Muslim population. Contrary to basic population-

centric COIN, Soviet forces remained highly separated from the Afghan urban population and

were seen as the invading and occupying force. 55 Realizing that they were losing the conflict, the

USSR installed the former head of the dreaded Afghan secret police, Mohammad Najibullah, as

the new President of Afghanistan. Najibullah’s command increased its control over the National

Army and spread its international presence, shooting down several Iranian aircraft and covertly

attacking targets inside Pakistan. Over the course of the conflict, the Soviets were unable to deny

sanctuary and supply routes from Pakistan into Afghanistan-vast quantities of financial aid,

communications equipment, and increasingly sophisticated weapons reached rebel groups. In

later years, the CIA even gave some mujahedin fighters Stinger surface-to-air/surface-to-surface

missiles; these shoulder-fired and highly portable weapon systems were able to negate the Soviet

heli-borne operations-the USSR’s greatest advantage-and seriously threatened air resupply

around major airfields. 56

Towards the later years of the conflict, the USSR was facing increasing financial and

political ruin; the costs of the Afghan War were unbearable in the face of a deteriorating

communist agenda across the Soviet bloc and even in Moscow itself. By the time of their

withdrawal, the USSR had lost approximately 14,453 personnel, 451 aircraft, numerous other

                                                                                                                         54  Amstutz,  Afghanistan:  The  First  Five…,  page  127  55  Killcullen,  Counterinsurgency,  provides  definitions  and  examples  of  doctrinally-­‐sound  COIN  OPS  56  Coll,  Ghost  Wars,  the  utilization  of  the  FIM-­‐92  Stinger  weapon  system  has  been  hailed  as  the  most  important  escalation  of  the  conflict  and  almost  singularly  responsible  for  the  defeat  of  the  Red  Army,  Coll  acknowledges  the  important  role  these  missiles  played  but  disputes  the  contention  that  they  essentially  won  the  war  

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vehicles, and had spent billions of dollars. 57 After attempting to consolidate the Afghan National

Government and reinforce Najibullah’s position, the Red Army completely left Afghanistan on

15 FEB 1989, spending a total of nine years, two months and three weeks in country.

Chaos and Civil War in Afghanistan:

As previously stated, the mujahedin coalesced around a core group of principal leaders

who were mostly favored by the Pakistani ISI to receive the military aid. Following the retreat of

the Red Army in early 1989, these forces turned against each other for control of Afghanistan

and, broadly, control of the regional Islamist movement. Afghanistan descended into a virtual

civil war with many combatants and a constantly changing number of fronts. Najibullah’s

government lasted much longer than the mujahedin, CIA, or KGB predicted; his army (receiving

continued financial and material aid from the USSR) held Kabul and other strategic population

centers. For three years, Najibullah successfully played the mujahedin against each other,

allowing the rebel infighting to weaken and further divide the movement, often directly along

tribal and even familial lines. 58

There were several principal commanders involved in the Afghan Civil War; the

following are some of the commanders who played the largest part in the future of Afghanistan,

and some are still active to this day. Directly north of Kabul, Ahmad Shah Massoud’s Tajik-

dominated Jamiat-e-Islami had developed a guerrilla army and functional society, successfully

defending the Panjshir Valley against Soviet occupation for the entire conflict with considerably

little outside support. Several ethnic minorities-including Uzbek commander Abdul Rashid

Dostum-eventually joined Massoud’s forces in the Panjshir and coalesced into the Northern

Alliance, which will be discussed in depth. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami was favored

                                                                                                                         57  These  numbers  were  found  on  Wikipedia,  with  a  citation  from  the  American  VFW  that  had  expired:  through  separate  sources  I  have  confirmed  that  these  numbers  are  relatively  accurate  but  are  not  meant  to  be  exact  58  Coll,  Ghost  Wars,  the  entire  section  regarding  Najibullah’s  government  as  well  as  strategic  postures  of  mujahedin  units  comes  from  this  work  

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by ISI and was mostly composed of Pashtun Khalq forces. The group absconded into the

mountains, targeting threatening leadership networks while gaining territory against Najibullah’s

regime.

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar…was moving systematically to wipe out his rivals in the Afghan resistance…as the Soviet Union soldiers pulled out, Hekmatyar and ISI had embarked on a concerted, clandestine plan to eliminate his rivals and establish his Muslim Brotherhood-dominated Islamic Party as the most powerful national force in Afghanistan. 59 Hekmatyar is still active in the Afghan battlespace to this day, maintaining closer ties to

Iran than to Pakistan. His group was widely condemned for significant brutality against civilians

during and after the Soviet invasion, although significant numbers of civilians were killed by all

sides. 60

The fall of the Berlin Wall signaled the fall of Afghanistan’s most important trade partner

and source of support. Without the economic lifeblood of the USSR, Najibullah’s communist

government was unable to maintain the high operational-tempo required for control of Kabul.

From the North, Massoud’s Northern Alliance-now in complete and conventional warfare against

Hekmatyar- descended upon the final remnants of the communist regime in Kabul. Hekmatyar’s

forces, numerically exceeding his Northern opponent’s, advanced from the south. While the rival

mujahedin factions encircled Kabul, internationally-renown Islamic leaders (including Usama bin

Laden) attempted to bring the two factions to an agreement that could prevent a continuance of

the civil war, already responsible for the deaths of so many civilians. The negotiations failed. In

a testament to the commander’s unconventional warfare aptitude and audacity, Massoud utilized

traditional Afghan fighting customs as a weakness: knowing that Hekmatyar and many other

mujahedin commanders would disengage all communications over night, the Tajik commander

utilized the communications blackout to exploit his opponent and moved many of his forces into

                                                                                                                         59  Ibid,  pg  181  60  Five  other  commanders  and  parties  were  operational  in  the  civil  war;  with  the  exception  of  Massoud,  all  were  comprised  of  predominantly  Sunni-­‐Islamist  Pashtun  fighters,  they  are  not  principally  involved  in  events  that  have  created  contemporary  Afghanistan  and  will  be  discussed  in  section  two  of  this  report  

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Kabul while Hekmatyars forces were either asleep or unable to communicate about the invasion.

Massoud entered Kabul, quickly overwhelmed Najibullah’s final defenses, and established

extremely advantageous fighting positions for his forces before Hekmatyar could even be woken

up. Within a week, Hekmatyar’s forces had been entirely routed from Kabul and were relegated

to haphazardly “lobbing” indirect fire onto the city, killing as many civilians as enemy forces, and

Najibullah had been placed under house arrest. 61

“The first Afghan war was over. The second had begun.” 62

Massive amounts of conventional and guerrilla fighting continued in Kabul and the

surrounding countryside for years. Hekmatyar’s Islamist forces, backed by Pakistan’s ISI,

controlled different parts of Kabul and different parts of the country on a daily basis. 63 The

Northern Alliance, which claimed sovereignty and established a government for Afghanistan

under Prime Minister Rabbani, controlled most of Kabul and the entire Northern parts of the

country. Tribal warlords again sprang up out of the chaos; the corrupt belligerents allowed

lawlessness, extortion, the drug trade, and violent crime to seize the rural parts of the country.

Abroad, “Islamist violence connected to Arab veterans of the Afghan jihad surged worldwide.” 64

Brutal violence in Afghanistan had reached levels that surpassed even the anti-Soviet resistance,

with everyday Afghan citizens forced to choose between two evils.

In 1994, therefore, people were generally highly supportive and enthusiastic when a

group of devout Muslims sporting black turbans rode into Kandahar on shiny new Toyota Hilux’s

in the spring and summer. These young men, who called themselves “Taliban” and followed a

devout form of Islam known as Deobandism, started out with small intentions, initially acting as a

                                                                                                                         61  Ibid,  pgs  235-­‐237  62  Ibid,  pg  237  63  Pakistan  was-­‐and  still  is-­‐intent  on  seeing  a  friendly  government  installed  in  its  Western  neighbor;  regional  interference  in  Afghan  affairs  has  been  a  recurring  theme  throughout  the  country’s  history  and  will  be  discussed  later  in  the  report  64  Ibid,  pg  275,  Coll  cites  different  terrorist  plots  and  attacks  aimed  at  many  different  targets,  including  the  United  States  

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type of business-security force that meted out vigilante justice against the corrupt and terrorizing

warlords in Kandahar. 65

The Taliban assembled their story so that Pashtuns could recognize it as a revival of old glory. The Taliban connected popular, rural Islamic values with a grassroots Durrani Pashtun tribal rising. They emerged at a moment when important wealthy Pashtun tribal leaders around Kandahar hungered for a unifying cause. The Taliban hinted that their militia would become a vehicle for the return to Afghanistan of King Zahir Shah from his exile in Rome. They preached for a reborn alliance of Islamic piety and Pashtun might. 66

As their movement gained influence, their moderate Islamist stance began to deteriorate. “But as

the months passed and their legend grew, they began to meet and appeal for backing from

powerful Durrani Pashtun traders and chieftains.” 67 The Taliban’s one-eyed Pashtun leader and

former mujahedin fighter, Mullah Omar, quickly gained a mystical reputation for merciless

justice and devout piety; his exploits ranged in extent from the capture and public torture of a

child rapist before hanging the offender from a tank barrel, to donning a cloak housed in the

Kandahar Madrassa that had purportedly belonged to the Prophet Mohammad himself. 68

Although relatively little is known about Mohammad Omar the man, it is believed that the first

Taliban were Afghan refugee’s living in Pakistan attending Madrassa (Taliban can be translated

to “student of Islam”) studying under Omar’s tutelage in the Frontier Provinces of Pakistan.

Many were orphans of the Afghan violence, while many others were “Afghan Islamic clerics and

students, mostly of rural, Pashtun origin…former mujahedin who had become disillusioned with

conflict among mujahedin parties and had moved into Pakistan to study in Islamic seminaries

(“madrassas”)…” 69 By November 1994 they had secured control of Kandahar and were quickly

expanding their territory. Sometime between the fall of Kandahar and early 1995, Pakistan’s ISI

became significantly involved in the Taliban movement. “Pakistan had all but invented the                                                                                                                          65  According  to  Katzman:  Post-­‐Taliban…,  pg  4  note  4,  “The  Deobandi  school  began  in  1867  in  a  seminary  in  Uttar  Pradesh,  in  British-­‐controlled  India,  that  was  set  up  to  train  Islamic  clerics  and  to  counter  the  British  educational  model”    66  Ibid,  pg  283,  Coll  apparently  grasped  much  of  his  understanding  of  the  Taliban  from  Ahmad  Rashid’s  Taliban:  Militant  Islam,  Oil,  and  Fundamentalism  in  Central  Asia  67  Ibid,  pg  285  68  Ibid,  pg  283,  and  Katzman:  Post-­‐Taliban…  pg  4  69  Katzman,  Post-­‐Taliban…,  pg  4  

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Taliban, the so-called Koranic Students.” 70 Attempting to use the Taliban as a vehicle to both

quell the turbulence and install a friendly regime in its neighboring country, the ISI and Pakistani

military supported the Taliban with “arms, ammunition, fuel, and military advisors…” 71

As the year progressed, fighting between Massoud and Hekmatyar continued in Kabul

while the Taliban continued their constant march north and west. By September 1995, the

Taliban ousted Massoud ally Ismail Khan from power in Herat Province and had captured

significant amounts of Hizb territory as well. Seeing that Hekmatyar could not overcome Jamiat

to take Kabul, and that the leader was despised by his own tribe-the Pashtuns-in addition to all

other ethnicities for his wanton use of artillery on civilian locations, Pakistan abandoned

Hekmatyar and shifted funds entirely to the Taliban. Caught between Massoud’s Kabul to the

North and the advancing Taliban from the South, Hekmatyar was forced to abandon his command

and ally with the Rabbani/Massoud government. Realizing the Taliban’s unstoppable momentum

and seeming popular appeal, Massoud, Rabbani, and several allies abandoned their Kabul

positions favorably in September 1996. 72 These forces went back to Massoud’s homeland and

familiar territory: the Panjshir Valley, where they formed the Northern Alliance and continued to

contest Kabul from the Taliban. The region, commanded militarily by Massoud and politically

by Rabbani, was the only part of Afghanistan that the Taliban failed to capture.

Taliban Control and Downfall:

The Taliban victoriously rode into Afghanistan’s capital on 27 SEP 1996. “Taliban

gunmen subsequently entered a U.N. facility in Kabul to seize Najibullah, his brother, and aides,

and then hanged them.” 73 They were castrated and tortured before being displayed from a traffic

light, signaling a new regime in Afghanistan’s history. After they captured Kabul, and while

                                                                                                                         70  Randall,  Osama:  The  Makings…,  pg  26  71  Giraldo,  Terrorism  Financing…,  pg  96  72  Katzman,  Post-­‐Taliban…,  pg  5,  the  fighters  abandoning  Kabul  left  essentially  unopposed  with  most  heavy  weaponry,  supplies,  and  personnel  intact  73  Ibid,  pg  5  

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continuing to fight Massoud, the Taliban quickly became much more radical. They moved away

from their moderate, vigilante status, and lost both international and domestic support for their

increasingly strict adherence to Islamic customs. 74 Education for boys was slashed and, when it

occurred, tightly controlled by religious teachers. Television, dancing, music, and other

“immoral” elements of modern civilization (mostly components of Western culture) were banned

at the risk of severe physical punishment. Two gigantic Buddha statues, carved above Bamiyan

city during Afghanistan’s Maurya period, were destroyed on Mullah Omar’s orders as

representations of a false idol. 75 Particularly harsh and criticized for its stance on girls and

women, the Taliban forbade them from attending school or working outside the home, and it was

a crime to show any skin except hands, ankles, and (occasionally) eyes in public. Executions,

especially for women accused of adultery, were common and public, often occurring in the old

Afghan soccer stadium. While the Taliban controlled just about the only export-opium-it also

preached against the use of any type of alcohol or drug, and citizens caught using were severely

punished or killed. International Islamic terror organizations, including al Qaeda and others, were

granted protected access and given free reign throughout Afghanistan; this would be the Taliban’s

near-fatal mistake. 76

In early September 2001, two Arab journalists entered Northern Alliance lines. They had

been granted an interview with Massoud himself; a rare honor, and the two journalists had

excellent recommendations and credentials. They waited for the interview for several days before

finally being granted an audience with the Tajik commander on 09 SEP 2001. That morning, the

journalists set up their recording equipment, read their target a list of prepared questions, and

detonated a bomb that had been hidden in their camera. Massoud was unable to survive this

                                                                                                                         74  Ibid,  pg  5  75  The  demolition  of  these  statues  brought  significant  global  condemnation;  both  Japan  and  Switzerland  have  since  committed  to  rebuilding  the  statues,  although  the  status  of  the  repairs  remains  uncertain  as  the  statues  were  completely  destroyed  76  This  section,  detailing  life  under  the  Taliban,  is  formally  derived  from  Katzman:  Post-­‐Taliban…  page  5,  and  supplemented  by  the  authors  own  understanding  of  Taliban  rule  from  popular  sources  

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assassination attempt, the last of many. The Lion of the Panjshir was the most recent victim of

Usama bin Laden’s battle-proven international terrorist organization, al Qaeda. 77 Initially

unorganized and leaderless against the expected Taliban and al Qaeda offensive, Northern

Alliance units rallied around Uzbek General Dostum and were critical in the overthrow of the

Taliban in the following months.

Usama bin Laden, al Qaeda, and Prelude to Invasion 78

The goal of this research is not to highlight al Qaeda, Usama bin Laden (UBL) or other

international terrorist organizations as it is not intended to be counterterrorism or COIN research;

that being said, the Saudi radical-Islamist leader’s role in the status and context that Afghanistan

currently finds itself is impossible to ignore. Therefore, this section briefly addresses bin Laden’s

mid to late history and the justifications for his various attacks throughout the region and against

the West. Usama first entered the country that would host his planning for the 9/11 attacks in

May 1996, where he quickly formed a personal and professional bond with Mullah Omar and the

Taliban. Bin Laden had spent much of the Soviet invasion living in Pakistan, setting up supply

and training infrastructure for the mujahedin while gaining global renown as an international

Islamist figurehead and financier of jihad, more than an actual participant in the act itself. 79 No

evidence has yet surfaced to suggest that bin Laden or al Qaeda directly received any American

funds for the prosecution of the Soviet War. By the time that the Soviets had withdrawn from

Afghanistan, in early 1989, bin Laden and several other Arabic figures had formally created al

Qaeda.

                                                                                                                         77  Connections  to  al  Qaeda  and  bin  Laden,  and  a  similar  description  of  the  assassination,  is  found  in  Coll,  Ghost  Wars,  pgs  574-­‐583  78  This  section  utilizes  chiefly  sources  from  the  9/11  Commission  Report  and  Coll,  Ghost  Wars  79  He  did  directly  fight  Russian  forces  in  one  firefight  in  Paktia  Province  during  the  Battle  of  Jaji,  which  garnered  significant  credibility  and  admiration  amongst  other  Arab  fighters;  his  role  in  actual  combat  throughout  the  occupation  and  even  in  the  battle  itself  was  actually  extremely  limited    

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Al Qaeda’s stated goals included “opposing non-Islamic governments with force and

violence;” although this and other operational goals certainly predisposed the group to anti-

Western activity, it was not until approximately 1992 that bin Laden became seriously and

aggressively anti-West. 80 Both al Qaeda and bin Laden are (were) devoutly Sunni entities,

targeting all non-Sunni’s for extermination. Bin Laden advocated, and al Qaeda utilized, a

violent form of Islamist international relations known as Qutbism. 81 After failing in his bid to

win a Saudi contract to wage war on the Kingdom’s behalf in the first Gulf War, and possibly

becoming embarrassed when the Royal Family turned instead to the “infidel” Americans, bin

Laden began to preach against his home nation, for which he was deported and sent into exile in

the Sudan in 1992. There are various accounts that may explain bin Laden’s relatively sudden

shift to aggressive anti-Western targeting.

According to an account later provided to the CIA by a source in Saudi intelligence, the Saudi officer assigned to carry out the expulsion assured bin Laden that this was being done for his own good. The officer blamed the Americans. The US government was planning to kill him, he told bin Laden, by this account, so the Royal Family would do him a favor and get him out of the kingdom for his own protection. 82

This misinformation (UBL had yet to be identified even as a threat), combined with the fact that

the West had been permitted into the Holy Lands of Saudi Arabia, and because of bin Laden’s

already anti-Western views, resulted in the issuance of a fatwa, or religious decree meant as law,

declaring war against the United States for its support of the Israeli occupation of Lebanon and

Palestine, as well as it’s garrison in Saudi Arabia, in August of 1996. Before the fatwa had been

issued, however, CIA assets in Sudan had identified al Qaeda-and in particular the organization’s

leader- as a threat in 1994; by March 1996 the US had applied sufficient diplomatic pressure

                                                                                                                         80  PBS:  Frontline,  Background  al  Qaeda  81  For  more  information  on  Qutbism,  consider  Paul  Berman  2003:  Terror  and  Liberalism  82  Coll,  Ghost  Wars,  pg  231  

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(later targeting al Qaeda infrastructure with Tomahawk cruise missiles) to convince Sudan to

expel him. 83

He traveled to Jalalabad, outside of Taliban control, and set up radical Islamist operations

in his new home. There, he executed the August 1998 deadly attacks against the American

embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, moved under Taliban protection outside Kandahar, and

escalated his involvement in foreign terrorist organizations while continuing to plan against

Western interests in the region. By early 1999, bin Laden had authorized Khalid Sheik

Mohammad to begin the preparations for the 9/11 attacks; additionally, bin Laden appointed

leadership for the undertaking, supplied the financial backing, and lent his training infrastructure

to the cause. In the following years, the hijackers entered the United States in waves and

continued refresher training for their mission. 84 Given the personal and professional closeness of

bin Laden and Mullah Omar, contrasted with the inherent need for secrecy, upper levels of the

Taliban leadership may or may not have known about the impending attack against American

civilians and infrastructure before the attack occurred. However, there is no denying that the

Taliban were aware of previous al Qaeda attacks on civilians and supported the same goals; the

two organizations shared training camps, supply infrastructure, and a common ideology. In any

case, Mullah Omar refused to hand bin Laden over to the American authorities after September

11th.

Following the US invasion, bin Laden initially retreated to the mountainous Afghanistan-

Pakistan border where he continued to command al Qaeda. In March 2002, American SOF units

wounded and almost captured bin Laden during Operation Anaconda; in a major set back and

embarrassment for US leadership, he and several other top al Qaeda leaders were able to slip

through the Northern Alliance/Afghan encirclement and, presumably, find refuge in Pakistan.

After this, he released a limited amount of guidance and operational support for al Qaeda and the

                                                                                                                         83  The  9/11  Commission  Report,  2004  84  Ibid,  2004,  there  is  almost  zero  evidence  to  suggest  that  bin  Laden  did  not  have  a  direct,  active  role  in  the  planning  for  the  attacks  

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global radical Islamist movement before being forced into almost total secrecy in the face of the

largest manhunt in human history. Until “Geronimo’s” death in June 2011 during Operation

Neptune Spear, the terrorist leader served as more of an inspirational figure-head than active

operational commander, planner, or financier.

Post September 11th and US Invasion:

After the September 11th attacks the Taliban refused to hand over bin Laden, now the

most wanted man in the world. 85 CIA officers landed amongst Northern Alliance lines in mid-

September 2001, followed soon after by US Army Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha

(ODA) teams. Combined with American airpower, the CIA and ODA teams assisted the

Northern Alliance in significantly weakening Taliban communications, infrastructure, and

training capacities. After approximately three weeks of sustained aerial bombardment, the first

conventional American forces landed in Afghanistan on 07 OCT 2001. 86 On 13 NOV 2001,

Northern Alliance forces retook Kabul with almost zero resistance and Taliban fighters from

across the country consolidated in Kandahar, their political and spiritual homeland, before

retreating to the lawless border regions between Pakistan and Afghanistan. By 01 DEC 2001 US

forces were firmly in control of all major population centers and the Taliban had been decimated;

Mullah Omar was believed to have fled to Pakistan where he continued to command what little

remained of the Taliban.

The subsequent US invasion and current status of Afghanistan as a counterinsurgency

battlespace will be analyzed in Part Two of this report. Throughout its history, Afghanistan’s                                                                                                                          85  Mullah  Omar  and  bin  Laden  were  personally  and  professionally  close;  however,  traditional  Pashtun  tribal  custom  also  dictated  that  a  guest  in  a  residence-­‐as  bin  Laden  was  considered  in  Afghanistan-­‐must  be  cared  for  and  protected  no  matter  the  cost  to  the  host.    This  same  custom  would  be  displayed  to  Navy  Seal  HM1  Luttrell  during  Operation  Red  Wings  in  June  2005.    HM1  Luttrell  was  the  sole  survivor  after  his  team  was  ambushed  on  the  botched  operation.    Wounded,  he  stumbled  upon  an  Afghan  village;  the  Pashtun  villagers  protected  him  despite  demands  from  the  Taliban  at  the  threat  of  the  villagers  lives,  and  returned  the  SEAL  to  American  forces.    This  was  chronicled  in  his  novel  Lone  Survivor:  The  Eyewitness  Account  of  Operation  Red  Wings  and  the  Lost  Heroes  of  SEAL  Team  10  86  For  more  on  the  covert  CIA  role  in  leading  the  Northern  Alliance  over  the  Taliban  in  OCT  2001,  consider  reading  First  In:  An  Insiders  Account  of  how  the  CIA  Spearheaded  the  War  on  Terror  in  Afghanistan,  written  by  the  units  CO  Gary  Schroen    

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location has made it a location of seemingly constant conflict; from contributing fighters that

radicalized the downfall of the earliest empire, to its first interactions with Western influence and

Alexander the Great, to tribal divisions that coalesced into unified nationalism during the Anglo-

Afghan Wars, to the same nationalism exhibited during the anti-Soviet jihad and to the current

insurgency tearing apart the country, Afghanistan has seen more than it’s fair share of conflict.

Sadly, history has a way of repeating itself, especially when it is ignored and forgotten. The

history of Afghanistan, while bloody and depressing, may well inform its future.

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Part II: Battlespace Afghanistan Today: Contemporary Intuition

This section details the status of forces and occupation of Afghanistan found today. It

goes into further detail about the tribes and ethnicities that socially comprise Afghanistan, the

objectives and goals of the US/ISAF at this point in the conflict, provides a description and

analysis of the various security forces and their capabilities-including both insurgents and

counterinsurgents-and attempts to paint a perspective on the operational view of daily life in

Afghanistan. Beyond a brief discussion, the report will not attempt to provide an analysis of how

or why the theater looks the way it does, except for how those reasons affect contemporary and

future Afghanistan; the philosophical, tactical, and strategic reasons for the battlespace and

country as it appears today are too much to discuss in one report and are outside the scope of this

work. To gain a much more in-depth understanding of these reasons, consider reading Ahmed

Rashid’s Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, as it provides

a well-researched, in-depth, and regional take on the issues for consideration.

Afghan tribal disposition and social composition

Afghanistan is an Islamic nation and has been for hundreds of years; different leaders

have brought varying degrees of religiosity to their rule, but the Islamic tradition has influenced

each considerably. Officially, the country is considered 80% Sunni and 19% Shiite, while less

than 1% of the population are categorized as Hindu, Sikh, or “other.” Containing two official

languages (Dari and Pashtu) and 31.1 million individuals, it is home to four tribes that comprise

the indigenous and most dominant percentage of the country.87

The largest, most historically dominant, and arguably the most important ethnic group for

the future of Afghanistan are the Pashtuns. Comprising 42% of the nation, Pashtuns are

principally found in the South and South East regions of Afghanistan along the Durand Line with

                                                                                                                         87  CIA:  The  World  Factbook,  Afghanistan,  numerical  statistics-­‐People  and  Society,  2013  

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Pakistan. Regionally, approximately 43 million Pashtuns live in this area-considered their tribal

and ancestral homeland-with only 30.1% (13.0654 million) of them actually living in

Afghanistan. 88 The fact that the Durand Line split the two ethnic groups has been a significant

source of tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan since the former’s inception and has been a

major impetus for justifying Pakistani interference in Afghan affairs. Mostly because of this line,

“Afghanistan has set out to undermine Pakistan’s territorial integrity, and Pakistan has aimed at

thwarting Afghanistan’s political independence.” 89 Many Afghan Pashtuns consider themselves

the only true Afghan’s, and groups from both sides of the border desire an autonomous or semi-

autonomous region for their homeland (in the case of Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Provinces

this ideal has been informally achieved). This tension is the source of continued geopolitical

friction and will be addressed later in this report. Pashtuns are a rigidly male-dominated society;

the Taliban is a principally Pashtun organization and Pashtun values-especially regarding gender-

have permeated the group. The tribes are known for a shifting sense of leadership and a pseudo-

contradictory, highly organized conception of hierarchy. Socially, the structure is described as “a

segmentary lineage system. There is a hierarchy of social groupings starting at the local level,

then proceeding upward through various levels to an entire ethnic group. These relationships are

based on kinship….” 90

The hierarchy of identity and loyalty was expressed by a Pashtun politician in the 1970’s: “I have been a Pakistani for thirty years, a Muslim for fourteen hundred years, and a Pashtun for five thousand years…” Kinship and ethnic relations have always been more important than abstract concepts based on ideologies. This imposes intrinsic divisions on the Pashtun, and makes it difficult for them to unite. The classic way to overcome local barriers is to unite against an invader, as they are doing now. 91

This is true for leadership as well, and extends itself to the national fight against the Taliban.

Opportunity is chief in Pashtun culture: alliances will fall apart and vengeances will form after

                                                                                                                         88  Ibid,  2013,  the  remaining  29.7974  million  living  in  Pakistan  89  Tarzi,  Political  Struggles  Over  the  Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan  Borderlands,  pg  27  90  Tainter,  Pashtun  Social  Structure…,  pg  1  91  Ibid,  pg  3  

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almost no provocation except that it benefits one party in the agreement. This tendency has made

both ISAF and Afghan National Government affiliations with Pashtun sects concurrently tenuous

and untrusting.

The second most populous-and arguably second most dominant-ethnic group comprising

Afghanistan is the Tajik people. Comprising 27% of the country, Tajiks inhabit mostly the

northern and western provinces of the country. Compared with their Pashtun counterparts, Tajiks

are considerably more modernist, less pre-disposed to radical Islam, and diametrically opposed to

the Taliban. 92 Tajiks are spread throughout Central Asia, and more Tajiks actually live in

Afghanistan than in Tajikistan (8.3986 million reside in Afghanistan while only 6.3201 million

reside in Tajikistan). 93 The majority of Tajiks in Afghanistan speak Dari and have Persian

(Iranian) roots; interestingly, the vast majority are followers of Sunni Islam.

The Tajiks have proven themselves significantly more receptive to joining the

government forces; they are slightly over-represented in the new Afghan National Army and have

held key strategic defense policy and leadership positions. 94 Ahmad Shah Massoud, an ethnic

Tajik, was among the most successful rebels in the anti-Soviet insurgency and the only leader to

defend territory against the Taliban (the largest percentage of forces comprising the Northern

Alliance are Tajik). Regionally, Tajiks are less-predisposed to radical Islam than Pashtuns; citing

their “nomadic tribal traditions,” many Tajiks reject strict adherence to Sharia (Islamic) law. 95

Although they recognize Islam as a unifying force, Tajik loyalties lie principally amongst their

                                                                                                                         92  Ibid,  pg  4  93  CIA:  The  World  Factbook,  Afghanistan,  and,  Tajikistan,  numerical  statistics-­‐People  and  Society,  2013  94  Katzman,  Post-­‐Taliban…,  pg  30;  Tajiks  comprise  approximately  33.3%  of  the  ANA  while  only  27%  of  the  nation  95  Collins,  The  Political  Role  of  Clans…,  pg  183;  author  cites  studies  conducted  in  Uzbekistan  and  Kyrgyzstan,  but  given  the  ethnic  and  geographic  closeness  of  the  groups  of  people,  and  the  historical  resistance  to  radicalization,  this  can  additionally  be  applied  to  Afghan  Tajiks    

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clan and village; these loyalties lead many Tajiks to “express disdain for ‘calls for jihad’ and

skepticism of ‘Islam’s ability to solve political and economic problems.’” 96

Comprising the bulk of Afghanistan’s Shiite minority is the Dari-speaking Hazara ethnic

population. The approximately 10% of the Afghan population who identify themselves as Hazara

are scattered throughout Afghanistan, with their strongest concentration found in central and

eastern Afghanistan; significant populations are also found in Pakistan and Iran. Traditionally,

the Pashtun population of Afghanistan has considered the Hazara ethnicity to be less prestigious

and viewed the people with derision. Because of their significant participation in the Soviet

government of Afghanistan during the 1980’s, Human Rights Watch has identified substantial

Taliban oppression through massacres and attempted genocide against the Hazaras. 97

Additionally, simmering tensions from the post-Soviet civil war exist between the Hazaras and

the Tajiks; these tensions have sporadically boiled over throughout the previous decade.

Following the US invasion, Hazara’s have taken advantage of the increased educational

and modernist opportunities for advancement.

The Hazaras have historically been looked down upon by the Pashtuns, who have tended to employ Hazaras as domestic workers and other lower and lower middle class professions. Observers report that many Hazaras, including Hazara women, are earning degrees or pursuing training in information technology, medical, and other highly skilled professions and that they are becoming dominant in many of these higher paying sectors of the Afghan economy 98

These educational advancements will likely pave the way for future advancement and increased

economic prosperity for the modernizing Hazaras. Additionally, the Hazaras newly found

political prominence has altered the United States presence in the region; the Bilateral Security

Agreement that has yet to be signed but has been ratified by a national Loya Jirga (discussed later

in this section), calls for the maintaining of a US troop presence in central Afghanistan-amongst

                                                                                                                         96  Ibid,  pg  183;  quotations  refer  to  Collins’  cited  study  of  the  population  97  In  February  2001,  Human  Rights  Watch  released  the  report  “Afghanistan:  Massacre  of  Hazaras”    98  Katzman,  Politics,  Elections…,  pg  3;  author  cites  a  2010  New  York  Times  article  

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the core of the Hazara population-following the end of the official troop withdrawal in order to

protect the people should the Taliban again threaten the ethnicity with genocide. 99

Roughly equivalent in population size to the Hazaras (comprising approximately 9% of

the population) are the Uzbek ethnicities; this group is found principally along the Afghan-

Uzbekistan and Afghan-Turkmenistan border in the north and speak both Dari and Turkish.

Principally Sunni Muslim, the Uzbeks first gained a portion of national power in Afghanistan

during the Soviet invasion. Commander Abdul Rashid Dostum spent a significant amount of the

occupation fighting for the communist government of Afghanistan and with Soviet troops.

However, after seeing that the Soviets would lose the war, he switched sides and, with the Tajik

commander Massoud, formed the Northern Alliance, successfully withstanding Taliban control.

Partially explained by Dostum’s willingness to work with the Soviets, “many Uzbeks in

Afghanistan are leftwing and highly secular,” although they are underrepresented in the ANA. 100

The Uzbek social hierarchy is slightly larger than some of Afghanistan’s other tribes, making

large-scale political organization and impact more productive and easier. “They consider not

only their village, in which most inhabitants are somehow related…but usually several

neighboring villages, linked by marital alliances, to be part of that clan.” 101 Similar to the Tajiks

and Hazaras, Uzbeks oppose and have been targeted by the Taliban over the past two decades.

While Uzbeks are more conducive to working with Western and Afghan National Government

forces, some of the most intense fighting of the US occupation of Afghanistan has been in areas

populated relatively heavily by Uzbeks, and their loyalties, like the Pashtuns, have switched

relatively quickly in previous engagements. 102

                                                                                                                         99  Diplonews,  Afghanistan,  US  Launch…,  15  NOV  2012  100  Ibid,  pg  4,  Uzbeks  comprise  approximately  6.3%  of  the  security  forces  101  Collins,  The  Political  Role  of  Clans…,  pg  176  102  For  example,  Mazar-­‐i-­‐Sharif  (fourth  largest  city  in  Afghanistan)  was  the  location  of  one  of  the  most  violent  and  conventional  conflicts  in  the  Afghan  War  

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Status and Organization of Conflict

The United States and 48 member countries still operate throughout Afghanistan and the

surrounding region, although this number is increasingly shrinking. Collectively, these nations

operate under a mostly singular command, known as the International Security Assistance Force

(ISAF). The military commander is General Joseph F. Dunford Jr (United States Marine Corps),

and the senior civilian representative is Ambassador Maurits R. Jochems (Netherlands).

Although this number changes daily, ISAF a has total strength of 86,834 personnel, with the US

contributing three quarters of the force. 103 For purposes of organization, the nation of

Afghanistan has been divided into six administrative regional commands: Regional Command

(RC) North, RC West, RC South, RC Southwest, RC East, and RC Capital. The United States is

the lead nation of RC’s Southwest, South, and East; Germany is the lead nation in RC North;

Italy is lead nation in RC West; and Turkey is lead nation in RC Capital. Afghan National Army

and Security Forces are divided between each RC, considered under command of the respective

RC lead nation, operate with ISAF forces in a trainee-capacity, and contribute an additional

187,000 troops throughout the country. 104 Although due consideration will be accorded to each

contributing nation in ISAF, this report will focus on the American contribution insofar as ISAF

is discussed, as the US is the highest contributor of personnel to Afghanistan, is in control of the

mission, and was the driving force behind the initial invasion and subsequent occupation.

Bilateral Security Agreement

The lynchpin of the continuation of the ISAF force remaining in Afghanistan following

the 2014 deadline is an internationally understood legal agreement between the United States and

Afghanistan known as a bilateral security agreement (BSA). The BSA, as a corollary to the

broader and significantly more general strategic partnership agreement, stipulates the exact

                                                                                                                         103  NATO/ISAF,  ISAF:  Key  Facts  and  Figures,  data  current  from  01  OCT  2013  104  Ibid,  2013  

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abilities and restrictions on the foreign troop presence after 2014. Negotiations for the terms of

the agreement began on 15 NOV 2012 and were scheduled to last no more than one year.

Specifically, the talks attempted to resolve major issues of friction between the two countries,

including; conditions for the training, advisory, and assistance role of US troops; the right of US

troops charged with crimes in Afghanistan to be tried in American courts; enhanced pledges of

American support in the event of a violation of Afghan sovereignty (especially against Pakistan);

and specific roles for various forms of kinetic warfare, including drone strikes, SOF High Value

Target acquisition/aggressive counterterrorism warfare, and the use of light infantry units in

searching and seizing Afghan homes. 105 Both sides entered the negotiations with several key

assumptions, including:

…Full respect for Afghan sovereignty and Afghan national interests, including advancing the cause of peace and security across Afghanistan, strengthening the capacity and capabilities of Afghan national security forces so that they can independently provide security for the Afghan people and defend the country against external threats, and pursuing both countries’ shared goal of eliminating trans-national terrorism. 106

Additionally, negotiations began with shared assumptions that the United States does not seek a

permanent troop presence in Afghanistan, or a presence that is considered threatening by

Afghanistan’s neighbors. 107

Given the recent nature of the Afghan-US relationship, it should perhaps be no surprise

that the one-year deadline has come and passed without an official BSA being signed by both

parties. In June 2013, negotiations faltered and President Karzai suspended the process all

together after learning that the United States favored a potential settlement with the Taliban, but

had not requested the Afghan president’s opinion on the matter. For much of the year, the

framework of the BSA remained unresolved. In mid-October 2013, the United States Secretary

                                                                                                                         105  David  Zucchino,  Los  Angeles  Times,  15  NOV  2012:  http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/15/world/la-­‐fg-­‐us-­‐afghan-­‐talks-­‐20121115  106  Diplonews,  Afghanistan,  US  Launch…,  15  NOV  2012  107  Ibid,  2012  

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of State John Kerry and Afghan President Hamid Karzai announced that they had reached a

tenuous agreement for the BSA, and that the agreement would be contingent on Afghanistan’s

citizen approval through the democratic deliberations of a 2,500-person loya jirga. The BSA was

sent to the Loya Jirga in mid-November and had been ratified with “overwhelming approval”

from the national delegation within four days, with strong recommendations that Karzai sign the

document before the first of the year. 108 Unfortunately, President Karzai backtracked-ignoring

the Loya Jirga-and refused to sign the document until after the next presidential elections (in

April 2014), while concurrently and informally adding several more contingencies to the

document. 109 If the document is not signed, the ISAF will end and the highest probable outcome

is that the entire American force deployment will end, along with a vast amount of its political

and infrastructure civilian operations for lack of security.

Amongst the American delegation, the general consensus is that Karzai has over judged

the American commitment to staying in Afghanistan and is holding the negotiations hostage upon

this belief, while in reality (publically) the Obama Administration does not view Afghanistan as a

“vital strategic interest.” 110 Generally, Afghans (especially those in cities) do not want the

Americans to leave and believe that their country will once again descend into civil war upon

their departure. 111 The loya jirga specifically is intent on keeping the American troops in the

country in order to remain in power and influence. Despite the drama, the BSA will likely be

signed in time for the Americans to renew their commitment with adequate time to plan for the

future troop presence. To prevent Karzai from losing too much face, they will make more minor

concessions, but Karzai will not get the majority of his new, emotionally-driven demands.

                                                                                                                         108  “Overwhelming  approval”  according  to  official  statement  from  US  ambassador  to  Afghanistan  109  The  main  contingency  is  that  US  forces  will  no  longer  be  allowed  to  enter  houses  in  Afghanistan,  and  if  this  contingency  is  violated  Karzai  will  nullify  the  agreement;  although  the  BSA  contains  significantly  curtailed  conditions  for  the  search  and  seizure  of  personal  properties  by  ISAF  forces,  it  does  not  deny  total  authorization  110  Rob  Nordland,  New  York  Times,  24  NOV  2013:  http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/25/world/asia/afghan-­‐council-­‐approves-­‐us-­‐security-­‐pact.html?_r=0  111  Rashid,  Pakistan  on  the  Brink…,  pg  16  

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Although the BSA has not been signed, the draft document waiting Karzai’s signature has

been released. Officially titled the “Security and Defense Cooperation Agreement between the

United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,” the document maintains its

initial agreements (including respect for sovereignty, non-permanent Western presence, and intent

to further the indigenous security capabilities of Afghanistan’s National Security Forces). From

there, the BSA prevents US forces from conducting direct action against the insurgents.

However, it does allow the use of extremely specific direct action by American special operations

against mutually-agreed counter terrorism targets. 112 Additionally, US forces may be required to

assist the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in counter-IED operations, which will

continue to put American forces at risk and, in the likely event of ambush, into kinetic battle.

Importantly, the agreement also guarantees the right to American trial for crimes committed by

servicemen/women in Afghanistan. The BSA transfers the entire security responsibility of the

counter insurgency onto the ANSF, freeing American troops from providing protection for the

populace and the government, while placing the US into a posture dictated by the battlespace

requirements (METT-TCM) on nine locations across the country. 113 Current weapon shipments

between the US and Afghanistan (the latter was recently approved for enhanced arms deals when

it was designated a non-NATO ally) will continue, as well as the current personnel exchange

program utilized by the military, diplomatic, and intelligence communities. In the event of

foreign aggression, the United States is not formally committed to using its military to intervene

in a breach of sovereignty, but intervening with kinetic force is considered possible and probable.

Only under extremely curtailed circumstances may US troops enter Afghan homes (troops may

enter homes only when the failure to do so will likely result in the loss of life to American or

Afghan troops or civilians) and can never enter mosques. There are no obviously apparent

                                                                                                                         112  Direct  action,  as  a  military  term,  means  kinetic  combat,  closing  with  and  destroying  the  enemy  through  the  use  of  small/crew-­‐served  weapons;  American  Special  Operations  may  still  be  used  outside  of  the  wire  as  a  raid/strike  force  against  terrorist  targets  that  threaten  the  state  or  American  interests  (this  is  the  only  ability  of  US  forces  to  engage  targets),  including  al  Qaeda  and  other  terrorist  groups  113  METT-­‐TC:  Mission,  Enemy,  Terrain,  Troops  available,-­‐  Time,  Civilian  considerations,  Media  

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geostrategic or economic advantages to either party in the BSA, beyond what this report has

discussed. 114

Afghanistan National Government

An incredibly important element of Afghanistan’s future is the ability of the government

to govern. After the extremely successful US invasion, American military and political leaders

falsely believed that their job had finished, and US foreign policy capacity was already switching

to Iraq. 115 The December 2001 Bonn Agreement, complemented by Western-dominated loya

jirgas, resulted in the framework for the government of Afghanistan as it appears today. After a

brief stint as interim President, Burhanuddin Rabbani turned over official control of the country

to Hamid Karzai in December of 2001. In Afghanistan’s first elections following the American

invasion, Karzai was elected President and a national constitution was ratified. The Constitution

outlined a divided system of government, with one president and two vice presidents serving in

the executive capacity, a bicameral assembly serving as parliament, and a national judiciary. The

Constitution was ratified with systems that strongly favor the likelihood of continued Pashtun

presidency, as they are the most populace ethnicity, and the National Assembly parliament would

serve as the minority tribe’s system of representation. Each branch is assisted by a small (and

failing) bureaucracy; the most important tool of the bureaucracy for all three branches of

government is the General Administrative Office, which is “taking on a policymaking role by

helping the National Assembly draft laws and advising Karzai on what legislation to sign or

veto.” 116 The president, who is term-limited to two, five-year terms (Karzai is term limited in the

next presidential election in April 2014), serves as commander in chief of the armed forces, head

of state, and has broad powers to appoint high-ranking officials. Karzai has interpreted these                                                                                                                          114  US  DoS,  Afghan  MFA,  Security  and  Defense  Cooperation  Agreement  …,  NOV  2013  115  Much  commentary  has  been  penned  about  the  reasons  the  West  abandoned  Afghanistan  as  a  geostrategic  priority  in  favor  of  Iraq,  and  all  of  it  is  significantly  too  long  for  analysis  here;  suffice  it  to  say  that  military  leaders  (who  controlled  the  Bush  foreign  policy)  were  enamored  with  the  World  War  Two  tenet  of  terrain  as  the  key  center  of  gravity  in  any  conflict  116  Katzman,  Politics,  Elections,  and…,  pg  8  

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privileges to include appointing “not only cabinet ministers but also members of the Supreme

Court, judges, provincial governors and district governors, local security chiefs, and members of

supposedly independent commissions…” 117 The Karzai administration is anything but on good

terms with the American’s: “he frequently told top US officials that of the three ‘main enemies’

he faced-the United States, the international government, and the Taliban-he would side first with

the Taliban.” 118 The National Assembly has some power to curtail these appointments and

political alliances, and has executed that power recently with limited success. It is the nation’s

pre-eminent government institution for non-Pashtuns and, as the branch charged with the creation

and ratification of laws, has passed legislation to protect the rights of the minority ethnicities. It

is divided into several committees and sub-categories-similar to the American legislature.

Unfortunately, the distinctly Western top-down approach seeded many of the problems

seen today in Afghanistan. In his brief discussion of the current state of the Taliban, prominent

counterinsurgency theorist David Killcullen cites a historical account of power accumulation in

the time of Alexander the Great; Deiokes, the first King of the Medes (a tribal confederation on

the Western edge of today’s Afghanistan) gained his power at the smallest level before working

his way up to regional, and finally monarchical control.

Now, what Herodotus is describing here is a member of a local elite…using the delivery of justice-dispute resolution, mediation, settling of disputes among the community-as a means to acquire local legitimacy and political power from the bottom up in a traditional society, one where people live ‘in scattered villages without any central authority…’ Deiokes is starting to successfully transition…into the formal authority, the rule of law, and the political structure of the state. 119

In tribal societies, such as Afghanistan, groups have always come to power at the tribal

level before working their way to the national. He summarizes, “local nonstate actors [gain]

                                                                                                                         117  Ibid,  pg  7  118  Rashid,  Pakistan  on  the  Brink…,  pg  95  119  Killcullen,  Counterinsurgency,  pg  148-­‐149;  author  references  account  from  Herodotus  of  Halicarnassus  

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influence through the local exercise of law and order…and then translating that influence into

formal political authority through processes of state formation from the bottom up.” 120

Afghan National Security Forces

A critical component of ISAF’s counterinsurgency policy is the handover of all security

responsibilities to Afghan security forces: this necessarily entails adequate and capable security

forces, and is a critical metric for the sustainability of the Afghan National Government into the

future. Local military/police forces as well as US SF-advised neighborhood watch programs

augment the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which is comprised of the Afghan

National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). 121 Officially, the ANA “leads”

80-90% of all combat operations, and conducts some of these operations completely free of ISAF

support.122 However, this is a point of significant contention and one that this research is not

adequately able to judge. As such, this report will summarize the official capacities of the ANSF

as they appear on paper, before analyzing a critique of these capabilities as well as a summation

of the problems inherent with this type of research.

Already in overall control for security of the capital, the Afghan National Army is in the

process of taking control for every facet of the counterinsurgency, including the

politico/development component of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. For the first time, it is

being led by more ethnic Tajiks and Hazaras than Pashtuns, as recruitment efforts have struggled

to overcome the fear of retribution many Pashtuns feel should they join the ANSF. The ANA

receives substantial and continued military training and arms shipment deals with the United

States and the greater international community, including Great Britain, Germany, and Russia.

ANA equipment capacity is set up according to a limited autonomous combat operational

                                                                                                                         120  Ibid,  pg  149;  brackets  replace  “gaining”  121  Local  units  are  similar  in  organization/intent  to  American  national  guard  military  units  and  county/city  police  forces  122  Katzman,  Post-­‐Taliban  Governance…,  pg  32  

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capability paradigm known as “Shoot, Move, Communicate.” Under this paradigm, the ANA is

equipped according to the needs of a light infantry unit: (against Hamid Karzai’s objections) the

ANA is not equipped with battle tanks or other offensive armored vehicles. Rather, it is designed

to “enable them to operate autonomously, including operation and sustainment of a combined

arms force.” 123 As such, the withdrawal of Western troops will result in gaps in Afghan medical

evacuation, close air support, direct/indirect fire abilities, and intelligence gathering. By the time

of the withdrawal, the Afghan Air Force is scheduled to possess and adequately maintain

approximately 140 principally Russian-built Mi-series gunship, attack, and transport helicopters.

124 The Air Force lacks a sizable fixed-wing attack aircraft inventory, which could lead to

diminished abilities for close air support and resupply.

Assuming that the previously-discussed Bilateral Security Agreement is signed in a

timely fashion, the ISAF combat mission will not officially end until late 2014, and Western

troops will continue to augment ANSF units in combat engagements and operations until that

time. Currently, the ANSF is “shouldering the majority of the burden of fighting the insurgency,

[and]…has exceeded expectations in its ability to take over the counterinsurgency from ISAF,

although progress was uneven in some…areas.” 125 Throughout 2013, the ANSF has been the

lead organization in 87% of all operations, and Afghan special operations/commando units have

led 86% of all counter terrorism direct action missions. 126 The ANA is particularly adept at

battalion level infantry operations, given the extensive military experience of the soldiers.

Communications between the units in combined arms operations have improved, but missing

logistical, leadership, and support enablers continue to limit the ability of the ANA. The lack of

trust between the ethnicities, corruption, absenteeism, and criminality amongst the Afghan

                                                                                                                         123  US  DoD,  Report  on  Progress  Toward…,  pg  70  124  Katzman,  Post-­‐Taliban  Governance…,  pg  33  125  US  DoD,  Report  on  Progress  Toward…,  pg  48  126  Ibid,  pg  48;  reference  Appendix  E  “ANSF/ISAF  Operations”  

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National Army will continue to plague the force for many years, though it is not the greatest

threat facing the forces.

This information, which comes mostly from the American military or government-related

academies (including the Congressional Research Service), takes a decidedly optimistic view of

the situation, especially when compared to almost all popular reporting going on in Afghanistan

today. Many of these reports hold that while the ANSF may officially lead operations, the

Afghan leadership apparatus is rarely able to overcome setbacks, and the imperative for mission

success forces ISAF leadership to step in. Additionally, the ethnic tensions native to the military

recruitment scheme will exasperate the counterinsurgency, as “the new Afghan Army cannot

defeat the Taliban without more Pashtuns in its units, and Pashtuns are unlikely to be recruited as

long as they are intimidated by the Taliban.” 127 While there is no question that unit training and

readiness has improved drastically over the last several years, the endemic corruption,

criminality, penetration by the enemy, support and structural limitations of the ANA, ethnic

tensions, and quality of the soldiers raises serious questions of the unit’s effectiveness. This past

year has been the first instance of significant ANSF combat operations, and only then with

significant US intervention. In the end, an unbiased source of information will only come from

spending time studying the Afghan National Security Forces in person, and seeing first-hand the

ability of the government to wage war in the most general sense of the term.

The Enemy

To date, 3,397 International Security Assistance Force members, an untold number of

Afghan National Security Force servicemen/women, and tens of thousands of Afghan civilians

have lost their lives since the United States entered Afghanistan in September and October 2001.

                                                                                                                         127  Rashid,  Pakistan  on  the  Brink…,  pg  87  

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128 The Taliban in Kabul and most major cities were quickly routed by the combination of

American airpower and indirect fire assets with Northern Alliance ground units, and throughout

the country Taliban units were either killed or forced to the Pakistan border by early December of

2001. Indicative of the Afghan perspectives of the radical-Islamist government, “once it became

clear that the Taliban would lose in 2001, every region of the country turned against them,

including the Pashtun south.” 129 Following the quick victory in Afghanistan, American military

and political attention was quickly pulled to Iraq, and the resultant security vacuum following the

transfer of combat power allowed the resurrection of tribal warlord’s, who were paid by the US to

take over security while the new Afghan National Government was being created. Taking

advantage of the initial confusion between the Afghan and Iraq invasions, Pakistan saw another

opportunity to install an Islamist government in its neighbor to the West, and the ISI began to

“revive the Taliban insurgency…” 130 This resurrection started slowly, and would eventually

“blowback” against the Pakistani state itself in the form of the Pakistani Taliban, which is now

that nations greatest threat. However, President Karzai saw the emerging threat and repeatedly

petitioned the Bush administration for attention to the problem; he received no serious response

from the Americans, and Pakistan continued to increase its support for the Taliban.

During 2001 to mid-2006, U.S. forces and Afghan troops fought relatively low levels of insurgent violence with focused combat operations mainly in the south and east where ethnic Pashtuns predominate…toward the end of this period, U.S. and partner commanders considered the insurgency mostly defeated and NATO/ISAF assumed lead responsibility for security in all of Afghanistan…the optimistic assessments proved misplaced when violence increased significantly in mid-2006.” 131

After 2006, the insurgency grew almost exponentially: by 2008, 40% of the country was off-

limits for civilian Western aid personnel, and by 2009 General Stanley McChrystal was the first

                                                                                                                         128  As  of  09DEC2013,  not  all  ISAF/ANSF  fatalities  were  combat  related,  and  accurate  figures  of  ANSF/civilian  deaths  were  kept  only  sporadically  throughout  the  conflict;  the  vast  majority  of  civilian  deaths  have  been  at  the  hands  of  the  insurgency,  reference  Appendix  D  “Civilian  Casualties  by  Cause”  129  Tainter,  Pashtun  Social  Structure…,  pg  4  130  Rashid,  Pakistan  on  the  Brink….,  Pg  31  131  Katzman,  Post-­‐Taliban  Governance…,  pg  19  

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American combatant commander to admit the counterinsurgency effort was failing, and that there

was a potential for mission failure should the initiative not be re-claimed from the Taliban. 132

Today, the Taliban are just one of a myriad of groups fighting against the National

Government and the ISAF. In addition to the Taliban, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami are

active in the northern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan, the Pakistani Taliban (while mainly

threatening the Pakistani government) have launched cross-border raids against ANSF and US

targets, and the Haqqani faction has proven to be particularly dangerous to forces operating in the

battlespace, and is purported to be protected by Pakistan’s ISI. Additionally, there are

unconfirmed reports that tribal organizations have set up informal, private security militias, and

may have had authorization to do so from the Afghan National Government. If these reports are

correct, these fighters-while envisioned by provincial authorities as a form of “friendly” guerrilla

warfighter-are just as likely to attack ISAF/Afghan National Government forces as the insurgents.

133 Overall, the insurgents continue to have a significant impact and element of control of the

population in RC-South West, around Helmand and Kandahar city; this metric can be deceiving,

however, as the areas of their greatest influence are widely rural and barely populated, suggesting

that the Taliban do not control the center of gravity in the COIN effort and are simply attacking

high-profile terrain-based targets. 134 The complexity of their attacks has increased drastically (the

seven month period from March to October 2012 saw a 20% rise in such attacks), but almost all

other metrics of attacks have decreased significantly. 135

Unquestionably, the “core insurgent faction in Afghanistan remains the Taliban,” and the

Taliban are also the most likely insurgent group to come to national power. 136 The movement is

                                                                                                                         132  Ibid,  pg  20;  Strategy  Assessment  and  Recommendations  30AUG2009    133  Rashid  and  Katzman  differ  on  this  topic,  and  the  author  of  this  report  was  unable  to  confirm  which  scholar  was  correct;  reference  Katzman,  Post-­‐Taliban…,  pg  35  and  Rashid,  Pakistan  on  the  Brink…,  pg  110  134  US  DoD,  Report  on  Progress  Toward…,  pg  25;  only  .5%  of  the  population  lives  in  the  six  most  violent  districts  referenced  in  this  report,  leading  to  speculation  that  the  Taliban  do  not  control  the  people  (the  center  of  gravity)  135  Ibid,  pg  23  136  Katzman,  Post-­‐Taliban  Governance…,  pg  13  

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likely still headed by Mullah Omar, who (it is believed) remains in either Karachi or Quetta, in

Pakistan. It remains a chiefly Pashtun, deeply conservative and radically anti-Western

movement, and poor relations with all other minority tribes in the country. The movement has

already begun its shift away from kinetic operations, and has greatly attempted to limit civilian

collateral damage (a relatively new development in the conflict):

The guidance to avoid Afghan civilian casualties coincides with an increased focus by Taliban leaders on nonkinetic means of influencing the local population, such as leveraging teachers and Imams to indoctrinate students in Taliban precepts and improving relationships with influential local leaders and elders. 137

It has had recent mixed success in securing the support of the population. Several provinces,

including the Taliban’s symbolic homeland Kandahar, have seen significant revolts against the

Taliban occupation, which could be a sign that the Taliban are generally not accepted. The

Taliban are at least tacitly supported by senior elements of both the Iranian and Pakistani

governments; there is a general agreement amongst American policy makers that the Pakistani

military and/or ISI still fund some parts of the Taliban, and there is no doubt that they afford

senior leaders protection in the country. 138 Although the Taliban’s “shadow governments” were

largely displaced following the American troop surge in 2009, it is likely that some semblance of

Taliban governance exists even in “pacified” regions of the country, mostly through the

propagation of the Taliban’s “shadow courts” that promote Sharia Law and harsh justice. 139

During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Jalaludin Haqqani formed the Haqqani

Network and, upon joining the mujahedin resistance, became a major recipient of American

military aid. The Haqqani Network is still operational in Afghanistan and considered “perhaps

the most potent threat to Afghan security;” before the US invasion Haqqani had joined the

                                                                                                                         137  US  DoD,  Report  on  Progress  Toward…,  pg  20  138  The  majority  of  all  Taliban  leaders  killed  by  the  United  States  in  the  conflict,  have  been  killed  by  drone  strike  in  Pakistan  139  For  the  historical  role  of  justice  as  power  throughout  tribal  Afghanistan,  reference  “Afghan  National  Government”  section  of  this  report,  or  Killcullen:  Counterinsurgency  

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Taliban, though it has since split from that organization. 140 The Haqqani faction is considered

significantly more Arabic than the Taliban, and consequently closer to al Qaeda. The faction is a

favorite of the Pakistani ISI, which sees the network as a potential ally in the future Afghan

political economy, and senior American officials have described the organization as “the veritable

arm of the ISI.” 141 Because of this, it has aggressively targeted Indian interests in the nation, and

has received financial and lethal aid from the Pakistani government. In late November 2012, the

Haqqani Network announced that they would follow the lead of the Afghan Taliban in

negotiations with the Afghan government, and to date have not broken that declaration.

However, the United States has targeted the faction particularly aggressively in the last half of

2013: since July 4th 2013, the US has successfully killed three of the four top leaders of the

Haqqani network (all were killed in Pakistan). 142 Additionally, tribal Afghans have recently

broken many agreements with the Haqqani faction, even in Khost Province (the Haqqani familial

homeland). While it is diminishing, the future threat emanating from the Haqqani organization is

unclear and dependent on American counter terrorism operations in the region, which is outside

of the scope of this research.

Neither al Qaeda nor Gulbuddin Hekmatyar have a significant footprint in Afghanistan,

and neither is particularly threatening of ISAF/Afghan National Government interests at this

point. However, given the two groups’ historical involvement with the nation, their presence is

worth mentioning. Current estimates place the number of al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan to be

between 50-100 individuals, and most serve only in a support and logistics role. The Arab Spring

has proven to be a ‘mixed-bag’ for al Qaeda, providing serious problems and benefits for the

Arabic terrorist group, and has consequentially drawn the preponderance of the group’s

operational attention and future goals. Organizationally, it is a completely different group from

                                                                                                                         140  Katzman,  Post-­‐Taliban  Governance…,  pg  15  141  Ibid,  pg  16;  testimony  from  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  Chairman  Admiral  Mike  Mullen  142  Courtesy  of:  http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/h/haqqani_network/index.html  

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the one that attacked the US on September 11th, but retains much of its potential and intent for

anti-Western violence. Thus, its presence in the region (and in any region) is certainly worth

monitoring as it could very easily again use Afghanistan to threaten international interests. Allied

with the al Qaeda group that operates in Afghanistan is Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami,

which is almost as insignificant on the battlespace. Hizb-e fighters infrequently conduct

operations against Western targets in Afghanistan, but more often clash with the Taliban for

control of territory. Amongst all insurgent groups operating in Afghanistan, it is considered the

most amenable to a political power-sharing agreement with the Afghan National Government. 143

                                                                                                                         143  Katzman,  Post-­‐Taliban  Governance…,  pg  15  

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Part III: The Future of Afghanistan: Flashlight for the People

After analyzing Afghanistan’s historical and contemporary contexts, the obvious next

question to evaluate concerns the future of the South Asian country. To elucidate different

possible outcomes for the country, this research will examine the theoretical interpretations of

Neorealism, the English School, Indigenous Theory, Islamic worldview, and the geopolitics of

the region. Each section contains a brief discussion of the theory and its relation to the research,

followed by the application of the theory to Afghanistan-given the former and current conditions

in the country-in order to paint a picture of the future. Additionally, it is important to reiterate

that each theory depends on the status of Western withdrawal and condition of Afghanistan in late

2014. While each theory will discuss specific conditions for its application, each theory assumes

(at a minimum) that some level of ISAF troops will remain in the country, the previously

discussed Bilateral Security Agreement will be ratified before 01 JAN 2014, and that no drastic

changes will occur on either “side” of the conflict in the following year.

Neo-realist Theory:

The United States is undoubtedly the most powerful actor in Afghanistan at this point. In

terms of military, economic, and infrastructural support systems, the United States has the

preponderance of capital and power amongst overt players in Afghanistan. 144 As such, its

dominant form of international relations philosophy, known as the Realist theory, is worth

considering and will play some role in any future Afghanistan. This theory can be understood to

trace its roots back to a previously mentioned philosopher; Thucydides’ classical account during

the fifth-century BCE of the Peloponnesian War between the Greek States takes a decidedly

realist view of the conflict. International relations, as a Western academic discipline, did not get

its official start until 1919 in Britain and the realist theory was one of the first that was understood                                                                                                                          144  This  statement  is  admittedly  masochist  and  egotistical;  however,  analyzing  Afghanistan  from  a  Realist  standpoint  (as  will  be  discussed  further  in  the  text),  this  assumption  can  only  be  proved  correct  

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and propagated as a means to avoid war. Since that time, realist theory has branched into several

different variations, including the classical and neo-realist. This paper examines only the neo-

realist theory, as it has become the dominant form of American-and indeed many other world

powers-international relations today. 145 Realism is broadly concerned with power accumulation

and balance in the international system, roles of the individuals in governance, and power

politics.

A positivist theory, neo-realism is itself divided into two perspectives on power:

offensive realism and defensive realism. 146 Again, in the interests of space and precision, this

paper will focus on defensive realism for two key reasons: the theories founding father, Kenneth

Waltz, is a defensive realist, and the balance of power between Afghanistan and the West is so

great that offensive realism can be considered to be redundant. “Defensive realists…maintain

that it is unwise for states to try to maximize their share of world power, because the system will

punish them if they attempt to gain too much power. The pursuit of hegemony…is especially

foolhardy.” 147 For an in-depth explanation of neo-realism and especially defensive realism, see

Waltz: Theory of International Politics.

Neo-realism has several tenets that set it apart from classical realism and describe the

international dynamic. Principally, neo-realists believe that great powers in the international

system act in an anarchic environment; there is no power greater than that of the state and thus no

regulation of the state. “Anarchy is an ordering principle; it simply means that there is no

centralized authority or ultimate arbiter that stands above states.” 148 In this system, each actor is a

rational entity with the ultimate goal of state survival. “…Great powers are trapped in an iron

                                                                                                                         145  Mearsheimer,  Structural  Realism,  “…the  realist  tradition  reached  it’s  nadir  in  neorealism”  pg  78    146  Positivist  refers  to  any  theory’s  devotion  to  finding  a  “scientific  method”  for  conducting  social  research  and  policy;  according  to  classical  theorist  Morgenthau,  realism  is  an  empirical  rather  than  normative  paradigm  (how  power  is  utilized  rather  than  of  what  it  is  constituted)    147  Mearsheimer,  Structural  Realism,  pg  78;  for  a  potential  testament  to  the  merits  of  defensive  realism,  a  2010  case  study  in  International  Relations  Theories  regarding  the  ability  of  China  to  rise  peacefully  (pgs  89-­‐91)  has  much  more  closely  followed  the  predictions  of  defensive  as  opposed  to  offensive  realism  148  Ibid,  pg  79  

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cage where they have little choice but to compete with each other for power if they hope to

survive…power is a means to an end and the ultimate end is survival.” 149 This anarchy, however,

is offset by a balance of power that is used by the international community to regulate each others

actions; if one nation over steps its bounds, the international community will be strong enough to

unite and, changing the balance of power, militarily defeat the offending nation as each nation

retains some offensive military capacity. Because of this “balancing” tendency of nations,

defensive realists believe that states will accumulate –in Waltz’s words-an appropriate amount of

power to “maintain their positions in the system.” 150 This fascination with power suppresses so-

called critical theories of power, including feminist and spiritual, these theories do not conform to

the dominant realist system (and in fact questions many of its underlying assumptions).

“Different accounts of power…are all seen as escapist, idealist and impractical since they do not

conform to the vision of the state planner…” 151 Generally, and importantly in the case of

Afghanistan, neo-realism takes a depressing view of international relations in which states

(especially those who consider themselves weak, at risk, or otherwise ill-favored by the

international system) will aggressively attempt to improve their power through improvements in

the security situation and military might.

The neo-realist scenario for the future of Afghanistan holds that some amount of Western

troops, between five and ten thousand and composed mostly of US but also other ISAF partners,

remain in Afghanistan. A very small amount of these troops, mostly SOF and Joint Special

Operations Command (JSOC) elements, are utilized for direct action counter terrorism, while the

vast majority are conventional forces who act in a training capacity for the ANSF and local police

forces. The West still supplies billions of dollars annually in aid (until 2024), although much of it

is wasted on corruption or otherwise directly funneled to the Taliban. Infrastructure

                                                                                                                         149  Ibid,  pg  78  150  Ibid,  taken  from  Waltz  Theory  of  International  Politics,  pg  82  151  Inayatollah,  Distant  Futures…,  pg  54  

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improvements are completely handled by the Afghan bureaucratic systems with extremely small

USAID and other development agency oversight. The diplomatic delegation support is

considerable and led by the Scandinavian countries with significant support from Great Britain

and the United States. Neither the US nor the Afghan government have a significant role in the

daily life of the mostly agricultural populace. The April 2014 election has gone as smoothly as

possible; Hamid Karzai is replaced by another Pashtun leader amid several relatively small

terrorist attacks directly preceding and on Election Day in many of the major cities, with little

actual voter turnout.

It is principally because of the neo-realist framework (especially that of the Pentagon and

other security apparatus’) that the US and other committed nations are aggressively pushing for

the maximum-possible amount of troops to stay in country. Given the professed frailty of the

ISAF gains made, corruption in the Afghan government, decreasing Western public support for

the war effort, and continued radical Islamic insurgency throughout the countryside, a neo-realist

view would likely hold that Afghanistan would be essentially unable to survive in the

international system, remaining economically and materially dependent on outside support.

Although the Western-engineered government will likely last for several years, the Taliban will

once again seize the momentum that it lost after the 2009 troop surge and, through both combat

and negotiations, will take back large portions of the rural countryside. The Afghan National

Army will remain in control for several years in most major cities, including Kabul but excluding

Kandahar. After several years of initial low-intensity and terrain/population-based warfare, an

uneasy peace will be achieved throughout the country. Eventually, external support for the

Taliban will dwindle after increasing American covert diplomatic, espionage, and SOF

interference with Pakistani and Saudi funding channels. When the Taliban begin to lose their

financial foundation, many of the non-Pashtun tribes (in conjunction with several more moderate

Pashtun families, potentially including the majority of the Durrani tribe) will rise against the

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Taliban, re-igniting guerrilla warfare. 152 They will likely be clandestinely assisted by many of the

regional actors, including (ironically) Pakistan and India, and potentially China, Russia, and Iran.

Once the rebelling tribes have gained enough power to seriously threaten the Taliban, the nominal

government of Afghanistan and the ANA will re-engage in combat with the Taliban, serving as

the fighters for the cumulative third stage of combat in the insurgency. 153 The Taliban will

eventually be defeated, but will not be defeated by a Western army so much as by the Afghans it

claims to represent.

This tribal momentum that results in the defeat of the Taliban will also consequentially

destroy the Afghan government in place today. Almost as soon as the Taliban have been

defeated, the government’s power will be superseded by tribal and familial organizations that will

initially serve as the insurgency’s organizational structure in the conflict with the Taliban.

Concurrently, the tribes will be connected with an increased sense of unification that will push the

tribes to form it’s own, semi indigenous form of government based around a strong leader,

independent tribes, and an agrarian economy. Afghanistan will eventually find its place in the

international system but will continue to possess only a minimum amount of power.

A significant element of the realist perspective on the future of Afghanistan depends on

the amount of both overt and covert foreign activity and influence in Afghanistan. As part one

clearly demonstrated, Afghanistan has a long and storied history of serving as a battle ground

between nations and outside powers; from conflicts between Persia and Macedonia, to Britain and

Russia, to Pakistan and India: Afghanistan has rarely been truly free of foreign interventions. The

realist perspective holds that this will not change: all of the surrounding states (and several world

powers) have a stake in the future of Afghanistan and will not passively allow an opportunity to                                                                                                                          152  The  Durrani  tribe  (also  known  as  the  Popalzai)  is  the  family  of  President  Hamid  Karzai;  they  initially  worked  with  the  Taliban  during  the  mid-­‐1990’s  before  angering  the  Mullah  Omar  and  fighting  against  them  153  Mao  Tse-­‐Tung,  On  Guerrilla  Warfare:  according  to  Mao,  three  phases  of  an  insurgency  exist:  First,  political  work  amongst  the  affected  population  to  inspire  future  violence  against  the  occupier;  Second,  guerrilla  warfare  with  the  objective  of  weakening  the  infrastructure  and  support  for  the  occupier,  and;  Third,  conventional  war  against  the  occupier  

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advance those interests to pass. 154 Neo-realism holds that Pakistan and India will continue to

fight over Afghanistan for geographic control, Pakistan and Afghanistan will continue to contest

the Durand Line and territorial control over the Pashtun homeland, China will extract as many

natural resources from Afghanistan as possible, and Iran will continue to support groups it

believes will be most conducive to prominent Iranian positions. This international contention

over their homeland will have the effect of inspiring Afghans to identify increasingly closely to

their tribal and familial roots in order to protect their independent identity, resulting in inflamed

regionalism and decreased nationalism. However, the extremely high amount of competing

interests and possibilities for interference make it impossible to accurately guess the outcome of

the interference; beyond an assured promise of some level of interference, neo-realism cannot

predict who will gain the highest amount of power in the impending struggle.

English School Theory

Despite its name, the English School theory has never been very English. Considered an

alternative and re-imagining of the Realist and Liberalist discourses, the English School began to

be crafted through the writings of Hadley Bull in the mid-20th Century. It was intended as a new

conceptualization of international relations discourse in the West, one that would not be restricted

to the realist and idealist paradigms. It was revived in the 1990’s, and has recently come back

into significant utility in dominant international relations discourse: “This sense of resurgent

paradigm was prompted in part by the recognition that it represented a distinct position that was

inhospitable to the rationalist assumptions underpinning both neorealism and neoliberalism.” 155

Although the English School attempts to be recognized by philosophers of science, it cannot be

understood as a positivist theory.

                                                                                                                         154  Specific details of the geopolitics of the region will be discussed in depth later in the section  155  Dunne,  The  English  School,  pg  138  

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This theory has several tenets, designed to challenge and surpass the dominant realist and

liberalist paradigms. Among them, the English School argues that “the appropriate frame for IR

was not ‘interstate relations’ or the interactions of any other ‘units,’” as claimed by several other

theories. 156 Rather, the focus should be on the entire global political system, comprising states,

NGO’s, corporations, institutions, and the general human community. This system is designed to

“illuminate complex changes in world order. Such an interpretive understanding of theory is at

odds with the positivist pursuit…” 157 Along this same vein, the English School attempts to

delineate different concepts and identifying the boundaries of each one, based on historical and

normative schema. The ‘global political system’ must be analyzed with a multi-dimensional,

historical understanding that stresses the human element as it is critical to the diplomacy and

extension of human rights. 158 According to Barry Buzan, “The English School stands for the

convicton that ideas, rather than simply material capabilities, shape the conduct of international

politics, and therefore deserve analysis and critique.” 159 Additionally, all work is considered

biased by the values of the author, which has an impact on the politics of the international

community. Because of this, values should be stated and explored with critical scrutiny in order

to come as close as possible to “a position of detachment.” 160

The central problem in world politics was, according to Bull, how to construct a form of international society that was both orderly and just. His answer to the Weberian question ‘What shall we do, and how shall we live?’ was not to enter the realm of ideal theory with fictional assumptions and make-believe states. Unlike moral philosophers, Bull believed that the IR theorist doing normative inquiry needed to stay close to state practice. What mattered were not normative ideas per se but the ideas that practitioners believed in and sought to implement. This involves elaborating the context within which actors take decisions as well as understanding that in politics values are often irreconcilable and that terrible choices have to be made. 161

                                                                                                                         156  Ibid,  pg  139  157  Ibid,  pg  139;  “global  political  system”  also  comes  from  the  text  158  According  to  Dunne,  the  human  element  (this  authors  words)  goes  beyond  the  historical  facts,  and  must  include  the  “how  and  why”  in  a  historical  context      159  Buzan,  From  International  to  World…,  2004  160  Dunne,  The  English  School,  pg  138  161  Ibid,  pg  140;  author  quotes  Rawls  (2005)  and  Wight  (1991)  

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Concisely, the English School “continues to offer an alternative way of studying IR which is

rooted in the history of current and past states systems, and guided by moral questions about the

adequacy of the current inter-state order.” 162

Importantly, the theory claims that the key identifier of an international society is that it is

comprised of a confederation of states bound by a common set of rules in their relationships

(namely, mutual respect for sovereignty). The society also is influenced by certain non-state

international actors, such as international NGO’s, powerful religions, and the superstructure of

the UN, and by the motivations that comprise them. This system can be described as an “inter-

state theory” as it “refers to the shared interests and values ‘linking all parts of the human

community.’” 163

This idea of an international society has some connotations for the future of Afghanistan,

as well as general commentary on the American invasion that may influence the future.

Principally, as a third-world and economically un-viable nation, Afghanistan can be considered at

the fringe of the international society. Because it is not a close ally and cultural exchange before

9/11 was minimal, the actual intervention was considered globally justified. “Had the attack

emanated from France, solidarism within ‘western’ international society would have demanded a

different approach.” 164 Because Afghanistan remains an unstable, economically weak, and

mostly easily-dominated entity in the international system, the English School theory holds that

the future for Afghanistan will continue to be more of the same. The current insurgency will

remain, as the execution of the American Global War on Terror has served as a rally cry for

solidarity and anti-Western revolution throughout the Islamic Umma, and this will not cease in

the near future. Regionally, overt foreign aggression will be minimal, as the nations comprising

ISAF (many of the most powerful actors in the international society) will force regional non-

                                                                                                                         162  Ibid,  pg  140  163  Ibid,  pg  148  164  Totten,  The  English  School  of…,  pg  14  

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aggression. However, the geopolitical stakes shared by many of Afghanistan’s neighbors will

compel those nations to maintain and/or increase their levels of covert involvement in

Afghanistan. Because of the continuing insurgency and pervasive covert influence on

Afghanistan, the English School Theory can be broadly understood to follow the Neorealist

theory’s perceptions for the future of the South Asian country.

Indigenous Theory

Because of the previously mentioned international conflict occurring in Afghanistan, and

the turbulent failed attempts at modernization (including King Amanullah and the current US

occupation), a specifically Afghan theory of international relations does not exist. Afghan

scholars who have attempted to propagate such a science have either been silenced by whatever

government happened to be in power or were supported and protected-and thus extremely

influenced-by an external power (such as the PDPA’s relations with the Soviet Union and current

scholarly relations with the United States and/or Islamism). In either case, conditions that

fostered a nationally indigenous theory have never existed. Fortunately, other regional/cultural

theories do exist that can be successfully applied to Afghanistan for analysis: these include

Pashtun, Central Asian, and Islamist. 165 The indigenous theory shares many assumptions for

consideration with the neo-realist theory. The United States leaves a small garrison of trainers

and potentially counter terror forces that does not really interact with the population, and the

impact of the nominal Afghan government on its citizens is relatively small, especially outside of

the cities. The ANA cedes rural parts of the country to tribal or Taliban control and various

international actors attempt to pull the government and its people in differing directions.

                                                                                                                         165  This  work  is  purposefully  leaving  out  the  Arabic  theory,  which  has  a  rich  and  detailed  discourse  on  international  relations:  during  a  19  FEB  2013  lecture  at  Westminster  College,  Pakistani  human  rights  advocate  Dr.  Fouzia  Saeed’s  first  point  of  address  was  that  South  Asians-­‐including  Afghans-­‐are  NOT  Arabic;  this  point  was  stressed  repeatedly  throughout  the  lecture  and  in  other  academic  sources,  clearly  showing  that  Arabic  IR  is  anything  but  indigenous  to  Afghanistan    

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Before analyzing each discourse and its relations to Afghanistan, however, it is important

to note the slightly tenuous nature of the term “indigenous.” This section attempts to highlight

the most localized, culturally-driven and accepted conception of the future; however, due to the

omnipresence of sources that have been influenced by the West or other parties through the

globalization of Western/non-native education, and due to this author’s failure to personally

spend time in the region, these indigenous sources may be slightly influenced by outside powers

and not completely representative of the native populace. These sources and interpretations

represent the highest level of understanding and accessibility of the representations for an

indigenous theory available in the United States.

Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group and historically most powerful tribe, the Pashtun

people found along the Afghan-Pakistan border, have their own unique system for interacting

with outsiders. In the mid-eighteenth century Ahmad Shah Durrani unified the country under his

Pashtun rule; since that time Afghanistan has been under almost continuous Durrani-Pashtun

domination. 166 Each ruler has used a different form of international relations when interacting

with non-Afghans, and the unique theory has differed according to the timeframe and personal

disposition of the ruler. Because no single theory exists, this report utilizes the Pashtun economic

method as a means for understanding their relations with non-Pashtuns or other outsiders. This

general economic philosophy can be extended as a basic conception of Pashtun international

relations.

The Pashtun culture stresses independence, self-reliance, and constant competition with

other men. “A Pashtun man may engage in economic relations with non-Pashtun without losing

his honor, but also considers it acceptable to cheat non-Pashtuns…because of the competition

                                                                                                                         166  During  the  post-­‐Soviet  civil  war,  Tajik  Rabbani  led  the  government  in  name  only;  his  command  did  not  extend  outside  of  the  capital  city  or  the  northern  fortress  formed  to  fight  Taliban  rule,  he  represents  the  only  non-­‐Pashtun  ruler  since  Durrani  (including  in  contemporary  Afghanistan)  

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within Pashtun society, Pashtun men look to establish friendships with outsiders.” 167 Because of

the stress placed on constantly competing for the better deal, in any relationship, serious questions

rise regarding the ability of the indigenous Pashtun system to give-and-take in the international

system.

The Central Asian theory is significantly more broad and regional than the specific

Pashtun theory. It originates in India and is intended to address many of the Central and South

Asian nations, including: Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India itself.

Depressingly, and in a testament to realism, the West has already significantly interfered in the

region with the political effect of permeating the local system with an almost patronage system of

neorealism. In Afghanistan specifically, there is a “deep pessimism” regarding the future

following 2014. 168 However, “fortunately, there are alternative visions for South Asia outside of

conventional categories [through the use of] various South Asian futurists.” 169

These visions comprise a myriad of options; from the democratization of political and

economic power, to a radically Buddhist ecological ethic, to critical traditionalism, and to

enhanced cultural-community strength, many scholars have posited many conceptions for the best

route forward. Generally, these can be synthesized into a prominently indigenous theory that

stresses ecological awareness and community similar to the vision Gandhi espoused: “a global

community of villages marked by full participation and the welfare of all.” 170 This tradition has

been applied to the case of Pakistan, which can also lend itself (with some changes) to

Afghanistan’s future.

                                                                                                                         167  Tainter,  Pashtun  Social  Structure…,  pg  1  168  Rashid,  Pakistan  on  the  Brink…,  pg  17  169  Inayatollah,  Distant  Futures…,  pg  57;  brackets  added  for  clarity  to  context  and  replaced  “…as  we  show  by  summarizing  the  perspectives  of…”  170  Ibid,  pg  58;  quotes  A.T.  Ariyaratne  1990  

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The following four possibilities, and their definitions, come entirely from Sohail

Inayatullah, “Distant Futures and Alternative Presents for South Asia.” Quotations will be cited

with the page number.

The first potential regional future, and current trajectory of Pakistan, can be termed a

Disciplined Capitalist Society. “…The military and a strong centrist civil service create the

conditions for the development of a national bourgeoisie,” which may be critical in stemming

radicalization and other anti-state behavior. 171 Secondly, Islamic Socialism could spread across

the region, particularly in states-like Afghanistan-with a majority Muslim population. In such a

conception, an Islamist government provides welfare for its constituents through rigid state

control of the economy. This approach is similar (but not identical) to Afghanistan’s “Iron

Amir,” Abdur Rahman Khan. The Amir had total control over the economy and state apparatus’,

but also maintained control over the social and political life of his subjects, which the Islamic

Socialist discourse does not envision. Additionally, it differentiates from the PDPA and Soviet

controlled Afghan government during the 1970’s and 1980’s; the Afghan governments at that

time effectively pursued a Leninist-style communist direction, in which religion was mitigated

with the goal of eventual eradication. Third, Inayatullah describes a return to an entirely Islamic

state. This possibility is especially true in Pakistan but additionally shares connotations with

Afghanistan as well. Many radical groups, including the Taliban, desire this outcome but to the

extreme, desiring an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan as it was when the Prophet walked the earth.

The search for perfection and its unattainability is the central problem of Islamic political theory. Muslims believe that they did have a perfect state and society, and to recover just that becomes the present task. Instead of rethinking the impossible ideal, or developing structures to balance one-man power, advice is given on how to tolerate tyranny. The result has been an overdeveloped (too much power) State and an underdeveloped civil society (not enough active participation). Modernity has added to this duality by making the cynicism even worse. 172

                                                                                                                         171  Ibid,  pg  58;  author  quotes  himself  from  1992  172  Ibid,  pg  59  

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Finally, the fourth vision for the future is considered an End to Sovereignty. Regional and

international actors, including Pakistan, India, America, Iran, China, and many other foreign

influences sufficiently destroy and replace Afghanistan’s military, economy, culture, and

government with whatever interest suits the aggressor nation. This has been witnessed

throughout the various international conflicts in Afghanistan’s history and, to some extent, can be

said to be actively occurring now. In this event, the people of Afghanistan will sacrifice basic

human rights for the preservation of their culture.

Both Inayatullah and preeminent Afghanistan/Pakistan reporter Ahmed Rashid have

identified separate indigenous paths out of these four scenarios. According to Inayatullah, these

paths revolve around three elements of change. For Afghanistan, the successful Indigenous

theory is one that does not force unity, decreases centralization of power, and re-imagines the

discourse of identity and social purpose. 173 Throughout antiquity, Afghanistan has been a tribal

nation, and the tribal identity (for every ethnicity) is still the most important descriptor of both

identity and loyalty. Rather than attempting to force a national identity onto the nation of tribes,

the focus of change should be at the tribal level; attempting to accept the differences on a human

level between the tribes in order to improve relations, greatly unifying the people of Afghanistan

under a non-national banner. Occurring with this decentralization of national power, the impetus

for change occurs at the discourse level. Currently in Afghanistan (and the region), the dominant

discourse regarding the self involves a non-wavering belief in religion, independence,

competition, and inherent superiority. 174 Changing the discourse from “the other is the enemy” to

“we can achieve a beneficial future” is the only way to secure a peaceful, harmonious future for

Afghanistan.

                                                                                                                         173  Ibid,  pg  59    174  Tainter,  Pashtun  Social  Structure…,  pg  1  

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Concurrently, other regionally indigenous scholars envision a slightly different

conception of the future. Specifically in Afghanistan and Pakistan (as opposed to the broader

South Asian region), the dependent economy and current discourse of the war serve as the

greatest threats to future peace. In 2011, the World Bank identified 97% of Afghanistan’s

economy as reliant on international military spending. 175 Following 2014, the vast majority of

that spending will be withdrawn, leaving a major discrepancy. This economic dependence not

only makes Afghanistan a non-player in the international system, it also will spell continued

violence as people and tribes fight over resources for survival. Seeming to echo the regional

paradigm, Afghanistan and Pakistan both specifically share substantial problems with the

indigenous discourse. The Afghan-Taliban, Afghan-US/ISAF, and Afghan-Afghan discourse are

all fraught with suspicion, lack of communal cooperation, and constant in-fighting. Although two

parties in an arrangement seek the same end state, cooperation and mutual benefit is non-existent.

This can clearly be seen in the 2013 BSA fiasco; Karzai suspended all talks of the future for US

forces after learning that the United States and other international actors were conducting talks

with the Taliban…behind the Afghan National Government’s back.

Peace will have to be built layer upon layer, district upon district, and group by group, in the Afghan way rather than through grand conferences. Despite the violence, the faster all sides, including the US military, can develop confidence-building measures and act on them, the faster the process will develop. Providing an office for the Taliban negotiators would be a major step. But ultimately, with Western forces leaving Afghanistan and the weak Kabul government clearly unable to carry out its responsibilities, only an end to the violence and a political deal with the Talban can ensure the survival of the Afghan state. The future of Afghanistan and the region depends on whether that will be possible or renewed civil war will follow the Western withdrawal. 176

                                                                                                                         175  Rashid,  Pakistan  on  the  Brink…,  pg  92;  author  cites  a  2011  Los  Angeles  Times  article  describing  the  World  Bank  Report  176  Ibid,  pg  136  

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Islamic

Outside of the region, the dominant form of international relations (when not adhering to

the West’s IR, as in Iraq’s case) can be understood as the Islamic theory. 177 Although

Afghanistan is an Islamic nation and has been since the time of the Prophet, it is not found in the

Middle East and has its own South Asian and tribal theory of interactions with outsiders as

demonstrated by the indigenous perspective. However, Afghanistan has been a battleground for

Islamic forces and government’s since its conversion: Buddhist empires in modern-day India

fought pitched battles against the Persian and Arabic forces to the east, and Persia threatened

Afghanistan for several hundred years following Durrani’s unification of the tribes. Today, a

radical form of Islamism-which this paper considers an alien ideology-is alive in Afghanistan

through the Taliban, and the Islamic population equates to an Islamic government. Therefore,

while identifying Islamist international theory as “indigenous” would be a mistake, any research

on the countries future would be remiss without acknowledging the effects of the Islamic world

view on the South Asian country. As such, this paper discusses the various forms of Islamism

and Islamic political thought before concluding with an analysis of the Islamization of

Knowledge occurring in the Islamic world today.

Islam has long had a complex history with the West. From the earliest confrontations

between the two cultures and religions during the crusades to the dismantlement of the Islamic

Ottoman Empire following the conclusion of World War One, the two philosophies have long

seen the other as contradictory to itself. In Islamic jurisprudential theory, this divide between the

cultures has resulted in the bifurcation of the world into two spheres: Dar al Islam (abode of

Islam) and the Dar al Harb (abode of war). Dar al Islam’s relations with Dar al Harb have

resulted in three conclusions that represent the Islamic worldview: classical, which cites the

                                                                                                                         177  The  American  creation  of  Iraq’s  government  and  subsequent  foreign  policy  during  reconstruction  of  the  country  has  resulted  in  an  extremely  Western-­‐ized  version  of  international  relations  

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traditions and ideals of Muhammad’s words, actions and interpretations; defensive reactionary,

which has evolved as a spin-off to its encounters with the West and has resulted in a modernist

movement and a deeply conservative, anti-Western Islamism; and the postmodern, Islamization

of knowledge reconciliation, which attempts to accept certain ‘universalist’ scientific and

philosophical insights of the Dar al Harb and apply an Islamic tradition to them. 178

The classical understanding is the origin of the conceptual bifurcation of the world into

the two Dar’s. This understanding informed the historical expansion of the Islamic world, during

the conquests from modern-day India to Spain, which led to the need for an international relations

conception. The ultimate goal and justification for the domination of new territory is the

spreading of the Sharia law, increasing the Muslim population. 179 Thus, Classical Islamic

international relations can be read to promote peace. War is justified in order to bring peace and

(the Islamic conception of) the true path to the righteous life: “an alternative reading would

therefore establish that peace is not only the origin, but also the most important objective of

interstate interactions, and war is an exception that states may resort to only in cases of self-

defense.” 180

Two different approaches to Islamic international relations comprise the defensive

reactionary theory, and both were created as a direct response to the total domination and

penetration of the Islamic World, when the Ottoman Empire fell after World War One. While

the victorious powers divided the conquered land, Islamic scholars, culturists, and government

officials identified with either the Modernist or the Islamist response to the contact between

cultures. The Modernist reaction saw the only path to survival of the Islamic world as a path that

approved of adoption of many central tenets of European political and scientific thought; “the

survival of the Muslim Umma in the face of European ascendance required, in their views, a

                                                                                                                         178  Tadjbakhsh,  International  Relations  Theory…,  pg  176  179  Ibid,  pg  178;  author  cites  Mirbagheri  (2006)  180  Ibid,  pg  178  

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recognition of the compatibility of Islam and reason.” 181 These scholars maintained that the

Islamic tradition actually encouraged the pursuit of knowledge and reason as a means to a

productive life. The Modernist reaction is considered not successful; however, it may be seeing a

resurgence in certain groups (including various political parties in Egypt) who have maintained

Islamic governance and international relations while becoming increasingly modern and

competitive in the international system. Conversely, the second reaction is the complete opposite

of the Modernist view. Known as the Islamist reaction, the conservative reaction has largely

eclipsed Modernism and calls for the complete avoidance of all Western culture and denial of

scientific beliefs. Islamists believe that the only way to ensure the survival of the Islamic

tradition is by “purifying [the Islamic tradition] from the corruption of foreign influence,

‘Westoxification…’” 182 Rather than the Abode of Islam and the Abode of War, most Islamists

view the world as the Abode of the Oppressed and the Abode of the Oppressor; these terms are

taken from the Qu’ran and paint the Western world as the explicit oppressor. Believing that

capitulation to any form of Western thought or culture “erodes divine authority, expresses and

accelerates Western power, and inhibits the establishment of a legitimate Islamic social system,”

it is important to note that Islamism cannot and should not be identified as identical to the

Western idea of “radical Islam.” 183 Although it closely resembles the rationalization of violence

against the West, Islamism does not explicitly advocate armed struggle through jihad, so much as

complete distance from Western culture and total avoidance of Western influence.

Succinctly, a third response to the West can be identified as a “postmodern response to

the globalization of ideas,” or reconciliation. 184 Rather than a mostly complete subservience to

the West (Modernism) or mostly complete avoidance of the West, Islamization of knowledge

emphasizes “the end purpose of a ‘good life’ in terms of morality and ethics for the Islamic good,                                                                                                                          181  Ibid,  pg  180  182  Ibid,  pg  181;  “Westoxification”  is  a  term  coined  by  Ayatollah  Khomeini  of  Iran-­‐a  devout  Islamist,  brackets  added  for  clarity  183  Ibid,  pg  181  184  Ibid,  pg  182  

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and for introducing faith in addition to rationality and materialism as the principles of

knowledge.” 185 Reconciliation involves the conceptualization and accommodation of the global

community “within the general Muslim outlook.” 186 A strong example of this theory is the case

of Turkey, which has maintained its Islamic government, foreign policy, and traditions, while

becoming increasingly stable, economically prosperous, and competitive in the international

system.

Because this Islamization of knowledge movement is young (it only came about in the

last quarter of the 20th Century), and accepts some level of reconciliation with the West, it is a

worthy model of comparison to the case of Afghanistan. Again, this theory is applicable under

the auspices that the Bilateral Security Agreement will be ratified, Western forces will be

stationed throughout the country as trainers for the Afghan National Army, a new Pashtun

president will be inaugurated in April, and the Taliban will remain the greatest threat facing the

government and non-radicalized people of Afghanistan.

Conceptualizing this Islamization of knowledge in the case of Afghanistan, the only way

to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan will be through negotiations, de-radicalization

campaigns, and potentially the surrender of some terrain and population centers to the Taliban.

Following the withdrawal of all American combat troops from Afghanistan, the Afghan National

Government will remain weak, corrupt, and incompetent. Diplomatic, economic, and other forms

of government aid will be accepted but improvements to the Afghan government will be slow.

Economically, the government of Afghanistan will seek to expand it’s agricultural base; already

the most prolific source of income for the nation, Western technologies that increase crop yield

and irrigation techniques will be rapidly brought into the country and justified as simple

enhancements of the Abrahamic-era art of agriculture. Afghanistan will never be an economic

                                                                                                                         185  Ibid,  pg  182  186  Abusulayman,  Towards  an  Islamic  Theory…,  pg  91  

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powerhouse, as it will be focused on agriculture and a small, Chinese dominated mining industry,

although it may become increasingly less dependent. The Afghan National Government will

likely stand for several years, although it will continue to lose credibility. Eventually, a more

representative and devout body of leaders will take control of the presidency, the National

Assembly, or both. They will de-centralize the government (similar to recommendations of the

Indigenous and Central Asian Theories), thus removing the ethnic justifications for corruption. 187

Subscribing to Islam’s belief in the benefits of welfare and providing for the citizens in their tribe

and representative area (and of the greater Umma), these leaders will assist an international

delegation charged with investigating and prosecuting corruption in the government. Although

these measures will not be totally effective and few individuals will actually be charged, the non-

Afghan delegation will decrease many of the rampant problems, thus improving legitimacy and

strength against the Taliban. Afghanistan will be a markedly more conservative force in the

international community; although it will maintain closer ties to the Arab bloc (particularly Saudi

Arabia), it will not espouse violent anti-Western ideals.

Insurgent groups will likely retake the initiative relatively quickly and be granted control

of some terrain and Pashtun population centers through negotiations. Violence will likely

diminish, as Afghan National Government efforts will switch from kinetic warfare (clashes will

continue to occur and will be executed for control and security of the population) to de-

radicalization campaigns. Western arms shipments and other technologies will be accepted and

utilized extensively by the military and government. Although they will barely maintain the

Afghan National Security Forces, they will play an important role later in the conflict as the

National Government and armed forces become stronger (though de-centralized). The Taliban

will continue to claim legitimacy, but will lose many justifications for their presence following

                                                                                                                         187  For  example,  under  Pashtun  law,  it  is  considered  honorable  to  cheat  non-­‐Pashtuns;  making  ethnicities  chiefly  responsible  for  their  specific  tribe,  the  justifications  for  corruption  will  be  significantly  reduced  

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the withdrawal of Western combat troops. 188 Fewer Afghans will join the Taliban; combined

with an increasingly legitimate government, these factors will seriously threaten radical Islamic

justifications and abilities, and the Taliban will be forced to become significantly less violent/less

radical in order to survive. The most optimistic interpretation of the theory may hold that

eventually, the Taliban will entirely lose legitimacy and will be forced to join the National

Government of Afghanistan, although they will always remain the most conservative members of

the delegation. Additionally, the Islamization of Knowledge theory would likely hold that fewer

nations will engage in covert or overt breaches of Afghan sovereignty out of respect for an

increasingly legitimate Islamic government.

Geopolitical

Afghanistan has always been of significant importance in international geopolitics, as the

numerous battles for control of the country should make abundantly clear. Afghanistan has

served as a buffer zone between the Persian Empire and the Greek city-states, a nexus for trade

through the Silk Road, and most recently as a contested line of demarcation separating the lands

of conquered Christendom from the Islamic middle-east. While mostly lacking in natural

resources, Afghanistan shares a border with one of the world’s preeminent oil-producing nations

and continues to hold strategic potential for the transportation of that oil; to the North East,

Afghanistan shares a small border with a rising world power, and has significant responsibility in

the export and import of terrorism assets targeting that world power. It directly shares a border

with several nuclear-armed states, including China, Pakistan, and (potentially) Iran, and is

geographically close to two more: India and Russia. As such, the motivations, capabilities, and

potential for involvement from each nation must be addressed. A critical component for the

longevity of the Afghan National Government is the non-interference of these international

actors. Sadly, no legal protections from foreign aggression (overt or covert) have been decided:

                                                                                                                         188  In  essence,  they  will  be  turned  into  “rebels  without  a  cause”  

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“A critical international conference in…2011, which was supposed to receive pledges of

noninterference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs by neighboring states…failed to achieve its

objectives.” 189

Principally among the countries with influence on Afghanistan is Pakistan. An accurate

dissemination of the potential and actual involvement (and their “justification”) is close to

impossible to conclude given the inherent secrecy of such actions and poor relations between the

United States and Pakistan. Another South Asian nation, Pakistan is a nuclear armed nation, with

a strong Suuni Islamic tradition and extensive record of involvement in Afghanistan’s affairs, for

two main reasons; first, the Pakistani state-and especially the military and intelligence services-

sees India as an omnipresent threat that is intent on the destruction of its northern neighbor, and;

Second, Pakistan and Afghanistan have long shared a territorial dispute over the Durand Line.

Pakistan favors an Afghan political settlement, but only on Pakistani terms and with significant

oversight. Since its partition with India, the two countries have been in a constant state of war,

and both still post troops staring each other down across the shared border. Pakistan has planned

and executed terrorist attacks against the Indian state through the use of proxy terror groups

(including the 2008 Mumbai attacks) for generations, and both states often commit gross human

rights violations in their competition for control of Kashmir. Pakistan has long been intent on

having a non-Indian ally to its West, and elements within the government continue to pursue that

goal. 190 It continues to fund many elements of the insurgency (although it confusingly faces its

own Islamist insurgency as a “blowback” result of its support for those groups), and explicitly

allows top terrorist/insurgent leaders to use Pakistan as a safe operational point of origin for their

attacks across the border. Secondly, in a testament to the continuing effects of colonialism, the

Durand Line separating the two countries continues to be a major source of friction. The line was                                                                                                                          189  Rashid,  Pakistan  on  the  Brink…,  pg  188  190  The  instability  of  the  Pakistani  state  is  difficult  to  overlook:  while  it  has  a  semi-­‐functional  nominal  government,  it  has  lost  most  of  its  legitimacy  to  lead  amongst  the  population,  and  often  appears  to  work  against  itself;  this  is  especially  true  of  the  ISI,  which  is  responsible  for  domestic  assassination  and  terror  programs,  and  can  almost  be  considered  a  non-­‐government  entity  due  to  its  lack  of  oversight  and  control    

Shopbell  83    

seemingly arbitrarily drawn through the Pashtun homeland, splitting familial, tribal, and clan

identities across two nationalities. The line has never been considered legitimate by either

Afghanistan or the Pashtun tribes (a huge reason both Afghanistan and Pakistan have had such

difficulty unifying the Pashtun population in this area). Unless the two countries can agree to a

mutually-beneficial respect for the line’s sovereignty, “…for the foreseeable future the pendulum

of affairs between Pakistan and Afghanistan most likely will remain in the zone of mistrust,

swinging between indirect conflict and periods of fake friendship.” 191 Given the extremely poor

relationship Pakistan has with the United States and Afghanistan at this time, it is highly likely

that the support for radical Islamist parties in Afghanistan will continue following the end of the

ISAF combat mission (there is no reason for Pakistan to cease its support for the groups), and the

territorial disputes will continue to act as the ‘elephant in the room’ between the nations and cast

serious problems on future negotiations.

On the other side of Pakistan’s support for an Islamist government in Afghanistan is

India, which has its own desires for a stable, non-Islamist and anti-Pakistan state. India is also a

nuclear-armed rising world power with significantly more international clout and economic

abilities than Pakistan. However, India and Afghanistan share separate ethnicities, religions, and

histories: India is comparably pro-West and the Muslim population is a very small minority.

Throughout the ISAF occupation, India has supported Afghan National Government stability and

ISAF goals for two reasons, security and economic, and has used similar methods to improve

each. Although the Indian government and military is not as obsessed with the threat from

Pakistan as the reverse, the Pakistani use of militants against Indian targets could expand should a

deeply-conservative, Islamist government takes control of Afghanistan as Pakistan desires. To

prevent the future use of Afghanistan in attacks against India, the Indian government has funded

significant infrastructure improvements, including student and military scholarship programs,

                                                                                                                         191  Tarzi,  Political  Struggles  Over…,  pg  19  

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agricultural improvements, and road/energy construction projects. However, it has stayed out of

all regional cooperation programs led by the United States, demanding that any cooperation

agreement must not include Pakistan (which is not a reality for negotiations). Thus, “India’s

interests in Afghanistan [are] hardly benign but intended to keep Pakistan under pressure.” 192

Because the Indian government sees any talks capitulating to the Taliban-thereby increasing

Pakistani control in the region-they are generally not supportive of a political settlement. Indian

efforts appear to be working, as public opinion surveys routinely show that Afghans have a

positive view of India. 193 Additionally, India has entered into several comprehensive trade and

economic partnerships with Afghanistan; many infrastructure projects have the dual effect of

promoting political security (by assisting with the security of the populace) and expanding

economic viability in the future.

Of all Afghanistan’s neighbors, it has the most complex relationship with Iran, second

only to Pakistan. A Shiite nation, Iran has publically professed its support for the Suuni Afghan

National Government, while actively funding the insurgency with lethal aid. Not surprisingly, its

principal strategic goal in the country is the denial of the American presence. Thus, although it

has shied away from using its asymmetric military arm Hezbollah in the Afghan conflict, it has

armed the Taliban, Hizb-e-Islmai, and other insurgent groups with lethal aid and training as a

form of proxy war against the Americans. This dichotomy of foreign policy intent can be seen in

Iran’s political hopes for the future: although it is willing to fund the insurgency in order to bleed

American foreign policy, it does not support Afghan talks with the Taliban as (like India), it

believes talks will yield too much Pakistani influence. 194 Iran is intent on securing a substantial

role in any future government, and has made significant steps in that direction. Afghanistan’s

western provinces, (along the border with Iran) are the most economically developed and have

                                                                                                                         192  Rashid,  Pakistan  on  the  Brink…,  pg  132;  brackets  replaced  “were”  and  added  to  maintain  context  193  US  DoD,  Report  on  Progress  Toward…,  pg  177  194  According  to  Rashid,  Iran  sees  Pakistan  as  complicit  in  the  Western  invasion  of  the  region,  and  has  helped  foment  the  anti-­‐Pakistan  Pakistani  Taliban;  thus,  it  supports  a  Taliban  insurgency  but  not  a  Taliban  government  

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the highest level of infrastructure, mainly thanks to Iranian support. It has already donated more

than $500 million dollars to the reconstruction effort, particularly in the West and to the mostly

Shiite Hazara ethnicity, in efforts to foster pro-Iranian sentiment amongst the population. Ideally,

Iran favors a stable Afghanistan that cannot be economically influenced by foreign powers.

Using Afghanistan as a “transport” nexus for its energy reserves could open up vast new markets

through the creation of a pipeline across Afghanistan and into the Soviet-bloc nations to the north

of Afghanistan, China, and eventually to India. Serious problems with this goal, however, exist.

As long as the United States has any element of leverage in Afghanistan (which will be many

years), the pipeline will be highly contested and challenged in order to prevent Iran escaping

Western sanctions. Additionally, Russia has historically favored a monopoly on control for

almost all energy distribution between Europe and Asia, and a non-regulated Iranian pipeline will

face concurrent challenges from Russia and the West. 195 Finally, India would be unlikely to

invest in a pipeline that crosses Pakistani territory as the ability to regulate flow through the

pipeline would obviously give too much leverage in the conflict between the nations.

Although only sharing a 76 kilometer (47.2 mile) land border, China has a significant

stake in the future of the South Asian nation for economic and security reasons. While the

possibility of using Afghanistan to transport energy resources could be a boon for both China and

Iran, the realistic possibility of that occurring in the near future are slim to none. However, China

has taken a lead in increasing the viability of the small mineral and natural resources that

Afghanistan possesses: almost all of the infrastructure improvements in this sector during the past

decade have been conducted by China. It is considering the creation of a rail system throughout

Afghanistan designed with the principle purpose of transporting those natural resources, and has

accorded Afghanistan observer status to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization while expanding

                                                                                                                         195  Ballesteros-­‐Martin,  Geopolitical  Analysis…,  pg  12  

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Afghanistan’s role in regional economic summits. 196 However, Afghanistan’s instability and lack

of security has the capacity to spread to China. Minority extremist groups gaining experience in

the War in Afghanistan have occasionally shifted to targeting Chinese interests. On the Chinese

side of the border, the small Muslim population has the potential for radicalization, and has

already conducted some low-profile attacks against local elements of the Chinese state. China

believes these attacks will only be stopped with a more stable Afghan ally. Regionally, its

foreign policy objectives are divided between India and Pakistan. China is quickly increasing

major economic agreements with India, but has given Pakistan its nuclear capacity and greatly

improved the “armor” component of the Pakistani land forces. 197 Over the last decade, China

appears to be drifting away from its military-to-military connection with its unstable friend

Pakistan to a much more stable economic relationship with India. Thus, in future conflicts

between India and Pakistan over Afghanistan, China’s role and support is unclear.

                                                                                                                         196  US  DoD,  Report  on  Progress  Toward…,  pg  178  197  Rashid,  Pakistan  on  the  Brink…,  pg  195  

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Appendix A: Abbreviations:

ANA: Afghan National Army

ANP: Afghan National Police

ANSF: Afghan National Security Forces, comprising the military and National Police

BSA: Bilateral Security Agreement

COIN: Counterinsurgency

DoD: American Department of Defense, bureaucratic institution responsible for all asymmetric and conventional military forces, though not necessarily all unconventional: reference JSOC

IR: International Relations

ISAF: International Security Assistance Force, command for allied operations in Afghanistan

ISI: Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency

JSOC: Joint Special Operations Command: black-operations/guerrilla warfare units of the US military and intelligence apparatus, including CIA drone and HUMINT strike teams, DEVGRU, and Delta Force, commanded by both the Pentagon and intelligence agencies

KGB: Committee for State Security; Soviet intelligence and black operations command

ODA: Operational Detachment Alpha

PDPA: Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan, Soviet-backed communist party that arose in the 1970’s

SF: United States Army Special Forces, also known as Green Berets

SOF: Special Operations Forces, including Army SF and the 75th Ranger Regiment, Navy SEALs, Marine Special Operations Command and Force Reconnaissance, Air Force Combat Controllers and Pararescuemen, and/or elements of JSOC

UBL: Usama bin Laden

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Appendix B: Definitions:

Battlespace: Unified military strategy and term designed to integrate and combine armed forces in a particular theater of operations. Includes the environment, restrictions and advantages to combat pressure and mission completion, enemy and friendly unit dispersion, infrastructure, weather, terrain, etc.

Center of Gravity: Source of power that provides moral or physical strength in a conflict; central source of strength

Dar al Islam: In Islamic legal theory, the realm of Islam or the Islamic world

Dar al Harb: In Islamic legal theory, the realm of war; realm of non-Islamic governments

Fatwa: religious decree meant as law; can only be truly issued by a respected Islamic scholar or cleric

Hizb-e Islami: Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s mujahedin movement during the anti-Soviet resistance, subsequent civil war, and Taliban occupation. The movement is active to this day.

Jamiat-e-Islami: Rabbani and Massoud’s political apparatus in Pakistan during the Soviet War, Afghan Civil War, and the Taliban occupation.

Jihad: Struggle to attain Godliness; interpreted by the West as Holy War

Khalq: One of two factions of the PDPA; first party to come to power following the assassination of Mohammad Daoud that was overthrown by the Soviet invasion.

Loya Jirga: Grand Assembly; traditional Afghan method of national political association.

Madrassa: Religious schools; those found around the Durand Line are widely accused of being centers for fanaticism.

Parcham: One of two factions of the PDPA; first party to come to control following the Soviet invasion in late 1979.

Umma: In Islamic thought, a nation or community with a shared social history

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Appendix C: Principal Characters (in order of appearance):

Ahmad Shah Durrani: Pashtun officer, created the first unified Afghanistan in mid- 18th century

Dost Muhammad Khan: First Amir of Afghanistan, took control several generations after Durrani

Abdur Rahman Khan: “Iron Amir,” strong nationalist and Islamist, total unification under stiff repression

King Amanullah Khan: Modernist president during World War I; sent into exhile

King Zahir Shah: Teenage King of Afghanistan, had longest reign of Afghanistan’s history, eventually exiled

Mohammad Daod: First President of Afghanistan, Parcham leader, deposed by Khalq and KGB just preceding Soviet invasion

Hafizullah Amin: First Khalq President of Afghanistan, took power following the Soviet invasion

Najibullah: Communist President of Afghanistan, deposed and arrested by mujahedin in 1994 and killed by Taliban in 1996

Ahmad Shah Massoud: Tajik military commander of Northern Alliance, successfully resisted Communist and Taliban rule, killed 09 SEP 2001

Abdul Rashid Dostum: Uzbek general who fought with the Soviets before switching sides and allying with the Northern Alliance

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar: ISI favored Pashtun mujahedin commander Hizb-e-Islami

Burhanuddin Rabbani: Political leader of the Northern Alliance and nominal President following the overthrow of Najibullah, leader of political alliance advocating talks with the Taliban before his assassination in 2011

Mullah Mohammad Omar: Former mujahedin; founder and commander of the Afghan Taliban

Usama bin Laden: International terrorist, commander of al Qaeda, responsible for using Afghanistan as training and operational headquarters for the 9/11 attacks

General Joseph F. Dunford (USMC): Commander, International Security Assistance Force

Ambassador Maurits R. Jochems (NDL): Senior Civilian Representative to ISAF

Hamid Karzai: Current President of Afghanistan, ethnic Durrani Pashtun

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Appendix D: Civilian Casualties by Cause

Appendix E: ANSF and ISAF Operations

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