The U.S. Air Force in the Air War Over Serbia, 1999

6 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2015

The U.S. Air Forcein the Air War Over Serbia, 1999

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2015 7

Daniel L. Haulman

T he last major United States militaryoperation of the twentieth century wasnoteworthy in a number of ways. It

marked the first time NATO took part in combatoperations against a sovereign nation. It was the lasttime manned aircraft shot down manned enemy air-craft. The operation resulted in no American casual-ties. It ended one of the worst instances of genocidein a century of genocide. Most importantly, it was thefirst air campaign that produced victory without theuse of ground forces. Operation Allied Force, or theAir War Over Serbia, resulted in victory without anyAmerican or NATO “boots on the ground.”

In early 1998, violence erupted within Kosovobetween Yugoslavian (Serb) forces and the KosovoLiberation Army (KLA). As a result, a ContactGroup consisting of the foreign ministers of sixnations, the United States, the Russian Federation,the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italymet in London during March in an attempt to dis-cuss the growing war within Kosovo. Partly inresponse to two statements from the ContactGroup, dated March 9 and 25, the United NationsSecurity Council passed Resolution 1160 on March31. It urged a political settlement of issues inKosovo, supported greater autonomy for Kosovowithin Yugoslavia, and banned arms sales anddeliveries to Yugoslavia. The resolution also con-demned the use of excess force by Serbian paramil-itary police forces against the civilian population,and denounced any terrorist activity such as thatwhich the Serbs claimed the KLA performed.1

In May and June, NATO leaders met in Brus -sels to consider military options. In June, an agree-ment between Yugoslav President SlobodanMilosevic and Boris Yeltsin, President of Russia,allowed the formation of a Kosovo DiplomaticObserver Mission, consisting of representatives fromseveral nations, to report on freedom of movementand security conditions in the troubled province. Thesix-nation Contact Group continued to meet, andissued statements on June 12 and July 8 on theincreasing deterioration of conditions in Kosovo.Serbian police security forces in Kosovo, in an effortto deprive the KLA of their civilian supporters,began to drive ethnic Albanians from their homes.

The UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, acknowl-edged “excessive and indiscriminate use of force bySerbian security forces and the Yugoslav Armywhich has resulted in numerous civilian casualtiesand…the displacement of more than 230,000 per-sons from their homes.” These words were incorpo-rated into United Nations Security Council Resolu -tion 1199 passed on September 23, that demanded aceasefire in Kosovo, dialogue between the warringparties, the end of action by security forces againstcivilians, and the safe return of refugees.2

Concurrently, the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization prepared to exercise air strikes, if nec-essary, to enforce UNSCR 1160. Dr. Javier Solana,Secretary-General of NATO, stated on September24, the day following the passage of UNSCR 1160,that the alliance was preparing to act. Solanaannounced that the North Atlantic Council had justapproved issuing an activation warning thatincreased its level of military preparedness andallowed NATO commanders to begin identifyingforces required for possible air operations.3

On October 12, 1998, Richard Holbrooke,President Clinton’s special envoy to the Balkans,flew to Belgrade and warned the Yugoslavian pres-ident that if he failed to comply with UN resolu-tions, he risked NATO air strikes. Lt. Gen. MichaelE. Short, USAF, who commanded NATO air forcesin the theater, accompanied Holbrooke. He spokepersonally with Milosevic, telling him essentiallythat the question was not whether NATO planeswould be flying over Kosovo, but whether theywould be taking photographs or dropping bombs.On October 13, NATO’s North Atlantic Councilauthorized activation orders for air strikes. UnitedStates aircraft and aircrews deployed to Europe inpreparations for air strikes against Serbia.4

The threat produced diplomatic results inBelgrade. On October 15 and 16, Yugoslavian repre-sentatives signed agreements to allow a Kosovo ver-ification mission on the ground and an air verifica-tion mission. On October 24, the United NationsSecurity Council passed Resolution 1203, whichendorsed the verification missions. However,Milosevic, as president of Yugoslavia, had signedneither agreement, suggesting that he could later


Daniel L. Haulman is Chief, Organizational Histories, at the Air Force Historical Research Agency,Maxwell AFB, Alabama. After earning a BA from the University of Southwestern Louisiana and an ME(Master of Education) from the University of New Orleans, he earned a Ph.D. in history from AuburnUniversity. Dr. Haulman has authored three books, including Air Force Aerial Victory Credits, TheUSAF and Humanitarian Airlift Operations, and One Hundred Years of Flight: USAF Chronology ofSignificant Air and Space Events, 1903-2002. He has written several pamphlets, composed sections ofseveral other USAF publications, and compiled the list of official USAF aerial victories appearing onthe AFHRA’s web page. He wrote the Air Force chapter in supplement IV of A Guide to the Sources ofUnited States Military History and completed six studies on aspects of recent USAF operations thathave been used by the Air Staff and Air University. He has also written a chapter in Locating Air ForceBase Sites: History’s Legacy, a book about the location of Air Force bases. The author of fifteen publishedarticles in various journals, Dr. Haulman has presented more than twenty historical papers at histori-cal conferences and taught history courses at Huntingdon College, Auburn University at Montgomery,and Faulkner University. He co-authored, with Joseph Caver and Jerome Ennels, the book TheTuskegee Airmen: An Illustrated History, published by New South Books in 2011. This work isextracted from another book chapter. An abridged version appeared in Air Force Magazine.

(Overleaf) The A–10Thunderbolt II was a majoraircraft in the air war overSerbia. (All photos USAF.)

IN EARLY1998, VIOLENCEERUPTEDWITHINKOSOVOBETWEENYUGO -SLAVIAN(SERB)FORCES ANDTHE KOSOVOLIBERATIONARMY (KLA)

claim he had never made such a commitment him-self. After intense negotiations between Milosevicand Dr. Javier Solana, the Secretary General ofNATO, with NATO military leaders present to rein-force the threat of NATO air strikes, Milosevicreluctantly agreed on October 25, to sign an agree-ment to remove “excess” Serb police and paramili-tary forces from Kosovo and allow the verificationmissions to proceed. Gen. Wesley K. Clark, USA,Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR)was present at the signing.5

The aerial verification agreement allowedNATO reconnaissance aircraft such as USAF U–2sand MQ–1 Predators, to verify the removal of Serbforces from civilian areas of Kosovo. A week later,NATO formally approved aerial surveillance mis-sions over Kosovo, Operation Eagle Eye, whichbegan on October 29, 1998. 6

Operation Eagle Eye aerial verification flightsover Kosovo took place in conjunction with theground verification mission or KVM (KosovoVerification Mission). The Organization for Securityand Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) providedapproximately 1,400 personnel for that part of theverification process. The ground mission arrived inKosovo in November under the leadership ofWilliam Walker, a former U.S. ambassador to ElSalvador.7

Resolution 1203, in addition to endorsing theverification missions in Kosovo, also called for theenforcement of previous UN Security CouncilResolutions 1160 and 1199. The United Nations andthe North Atlantic Treaty Organization spoke withone voice on the need for Yugoslavia to reduce itsmilitary presence in Kosovo, to allow the return ofrefugees, and to eventually agree to greater auton-omy for Kosovo and its ethnic Albanian majority. Italso called “for prompt and complete investigation,including international supervision and participa-

tion, of all atrocities committed against civiliansand full cooperation with the InternationalTribunal for the former Yugoslavia, including com-pliance with its orders, requests for information andinvestigations…”8. As a result of the resolution, anInternational Criminal Tribunal for the FormerYugoslavia convened, with Louise Arbour appointedas chief prosecutor.9

The crisis intensified in November andDecember, 1998. Milosevic forbade the entrance ofUnited Nations war crimes investigators to deter-mine whether ethnic cleansing and genocide hadoccurred in Kosovo. On November 17, the UNpassed Security Resolution 1207, condemningYugoslavia for failing to arrest and transfer threeindividuals indicted by the International CriminalTribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.10

The final crisis began in January 1999. OnJanuary 8 and 10, the KLA ambushed and killedfour Serbian policemen near Stimlje, Kosovo. OnJanuary 15, fighting erupted around the village ofRacak, as Yugoslavian police forces advanced intothe area. The KLA retreated from the town. Severalpeople were shot and wounded during the advance.The Yugoslavian forces cornered about thirty menand boys in the cellar of a house. Letting the boysgo, they took the twenty-three men elsewhere. Thenext day, villagers found their bodies. They had beenshot at close range. The Yugoslavs had apparentlytargeted the men of the village, probably in retalia-tion for the killing of their own police earlier in themonth. International investigators soon determinedthat forty-five persons had died in Racak, includingtwo women and a twelve-year-old boy. Nine KLAsoldiers were also found dead. Walker, head of theKVA, accused the Yugoslavian authorities of a mas-sacre.11

International response was quick. U.S.President William “Bill” Clinton, responding quickly


(Near right) SlobodanMilošević was thePresident of Serbia from1989-97 and President ofthe Federal Republic ofYugoslavia from 1997 to2000.

(Far right) Lt. Gen. MichaelE. Short, USAF, who com-manded NATO air forces inthe theater.

MILOSEVICRELUC-TANTLYAGREED ONOCTOBER 25,TO SIGN ANAGREEMENTTO REMOVE“EXCESS”SERB POLICEAND PARA-MILITARYFORCESFROMKOSOVO

to Walker’s report, condemned the killing of thecivilians in Kosovo. Yugoslavian authorities refusedto allow Arbour to investigate the killings at Racak,and demanded that Walker, head of the KVM, leavethe country.12 On January 19, the United NationsSecurity Council denounced the Racak massacreand Serbia’s refusal to allow a UN investigation. Atthe same time, General Clark met in Belgrade withPresident Milosevic. Clark demanded thatMilosevic pull his security forces out of Kosovo orface air strikes. Meanwhile, Yugoslavian Army andSerbian police units attacked ethnic Albanian vil-lages around Racak for the third day. On January30, NATO authorized its Secretary General, Solana,to launch air strikes on Serbia.13

Milosevic reacted to the pressure by agreeing topeace talks at Rambouillet, France, between repre-sentatives of Yugoslavia, the Kosovo LiberationArmy, and NATO. The talks began on February 7.News reports that a bomb had exploded in down-town Pristina, capital of Kosovo, killing three ethnicAlbanian civilians, soured the opening of negotia-tions. To stop the atrocities, NATO demanded thatits troops be allowed to enter Kosovo. DuringFebruary, Serbia’s President Milan Milutinovic andYugoslavia’s foreign minister Zivadin Jovanovicechoed Milosevic’s opposition to the possible deploy-ment of foreign troops into Serbia. At the same time,Kosovar Albanians demanded a referendum onindependence and rejected calls to disarm.14

The U.S. Air Force began extensive deploymentof forces to the theater in preparation for possiblewar as early as February 19, the day before the orig-inal deadline set for an agreement at Rambouillet.

The Contact Group extended the deadline toFebruary 23, the day the Kosovar Albanian delega-tion agreed to a NATO peace plan. The KosovoLiberation Army officially agreed to the terms onMarch 8. However, Yugoslavia refused to agree tothe deployment of foreign troops in Kosovo; Serbswithin the province continued to force ethnicAlbanians from their homes there; and theYugoslavian army massed along the border ofKosovo in anticipation of a greater conflict.15

On March 12, while prospects for war overKosovo escalated, Poland, the Czech Republic, andHungary joined NATO as full members of thealliance. This demonstrated not only the increasingisolation of Yugoslavia internationally, but also thecontinuing decline of Russian influence in centraland eastern Europe. However, Russia still sup-ported Serbia.16

To prevent another conflict in the Balkans sim-ilar to the 1995 war in Bosnia, NATO and the par-ties within Kosovo met again in Paris on March 15,to follow up the Rambouillet talks. These discus-sions produced little success. On March 18, theKosovar Albanian delegation to the Paris talkssigned the proposed peace agreement, which wouldhave granted them autonomy within Serbia but notfull independence. However, the Yugoslavian gov-ernment still refused to allow foreign troops intoKosovo, and the talks ended without a signaturefrom the Serbian delegation.17

Yugoslavia’s prolonged recalcitrance increasedthe likelihood of war, especially after a Finnishforensic investigation led by Helena Ranta onMarch 16, revealed that the more than forty ethnicAlbanians killed by Serbs in Racak in January wereunarmed civilians. Undeterred, the Serbs launcheda new offensive in Kosovo called OperationHorseshoe on March 20, forcing thousands of ethnicAlbanians from their homes northwest of Pristinain an attempt to deprive the KLA of popular sup-port. The next day, Yugoslavian special forces killedten ethnic Albanians in Srbica and shelled sevennearby villages. Following reports of shooting andlooting by Yugoslavian security and paramilitaryforces, and fearful of being captured as hostages, ashappened to international peacekeepers in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, international observers in theKosovo Verification Mission evacuated from Kosovoto Macedonia. On March 24, the air verification mis-sion, Operation Eagle Eye, also ended. The path wasnow clear for NATO air operations, if necessary. 18

While the verification missions ended,Holbrooke returned to Belgrade for last-minutetalks with Milosevic, but reported no change in theSerb leader’s position. On March 22, NATO autho-rized Secretary General Solana to launch air strikesagainst Serbia. Solano then directed General Clarkto initiate air operations against Yugoslavia. OnMarch 23, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution, spon-sored by Senator Joseph Biden Jr., authorizingPresident Clinton to conduct military air operationsand missile strikes against Yugoslavia. The Houseof Representatives failed to pass the resolution, butby the War Powers Resolution of 1973, the


ON JANUARY19, THEUNITEDNATIONSSECURITYCOUNCILDENOUNCEDTHE RACAKMASSACREANDSERBIA’SREFUSAL TOALLOW A UNINVESTIGA-TION

President was authorized to use U.S. military forcesfor up to sixty days without Congressional approval.The stage was set for war over Kosovo.19

Operation Allied Force began March 24, 1999,and marked the first time NATO went to waragainst a sovereign country in the 50-year history ofthe alliance. Exclusively an air campaign, AlliedForce involved the militaries of several NATO coun-tries, but the United States provided the leadershipand the majority of the forces. NATO launched thewar on Serbia not for the national interest of any ofits members, but to enforce United Nations resolu-tions and to stop an “ethnic cleansing” campaign inKosovo that included forced evictions. However, theUnited Nations Security Council never directlysanctioned NATO’s military action, partly becauseof the opposition of Russia, a veto-carrying member.The United States called its portion of Allied ForceOperation Noble Anvil.20

The two operations, one within the other, pur-sued common goals. General Clark served as NATOcommander for Allied Force, also called the Air WarOver Serbia. The campaign’s focus on air powermagnified the significance of Clark’s CombinedForce Air Component Commander (CFACC),General Short, who also served as commander ofthe Sixteenth Air Force and Allied Air ForcesSouthern Europe (AIRSOUTH). Short directed theair campaign from the NATO Combined AirOperations Center (CAOC) at Vicenza, Italy,although most of the combat aircraft were basedelsewhere. Sixteenth Air Force had been the first toemploy the expeditionary wing concept, whichrotated preselected USAF organizations for morepredictable deployments overseas. Allied Force’slargest footprint was in Italy. On February 19, 1999,the United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE)activated the 16th Air and Space ExpeditionaryTask Force-Noble Eagle, with headquarters atAviano, not far from Venice, to support the opera-tion. At the same time, USAFE also activated the16th and 31st Air Expeditionary Wings at Aviano,and the 100th Air Expeditionary Wing at RAFMildenhall, in the United Kingdom. As the warintensified, the Air Force committed more organiza-tions to the effort. The United States Navy deployedships armed with Tomahawk Land Attack CruiseMissiles (TLAMs) to the Adriatic Sea, just off thewestern coast of Yugoslavia.21

The United States and its NATO alliesemployed a broad spectrum of weapons systems forthe operation. On the opening night of Allied Force,March 24, 1999, the NATO CAOC managed 214strike aircraft. They came not only from Aviano AirBase in Italy, on the Adriatic Sea, but also from asfar away as Germany, the United Kingdom, and theUnited States. American aircraft comprised morethan half of the strike aircraft on the first day. Theyincluded three types of strategic bombers, used todestroy elements of Yugoslavia’s integrated airdefense system and key military command and con-trol targets. B–52s from the 2d Expeditionary BombGroup-NOBLE ANVIL, based at RAF Fairford, andrefueled by KC-135s stationed at the same base,

launched precision cruise missiles to open the cam-paign. The bombers had deployed to England fromthe 2d and 5th Bomb Wings based in the UnitedStates. The tankers had deployed to England fromthe 366th Wing. B-1s that had deployed to RAFFairford from the 28th Bomb Wing, also took part inthe opening of the campaign. B–2 bombers enteredcombat for the first time, flying long round-trip mis-sions from Whiteman AFB in Missouri toYugoslavia and back, a 29-hour round trip, withnumerous aerial refuelings. The B–2s belonged tothe 509th Bombardment Wing, and they carried thenew Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) whoseprecision satellite guidance enabled it to hit vari-able targets, regardless of weather or time of day.The U.S. Navy also took part in the initial airstrikes, using ship-launched Tomahawk missiles tohit similar targets. While NATO aircraft from othercountries played important roles in the campaign,NATO depended more on the United States thanany other country for night operations, precision-guided munitions, identification of aircraft beyondvisual range, airborne command and control, andintelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissancedata.22

USAF fighter aircraft, based at Aviano Air Basein Italy, also assumed prominent roles in the con-flict. Among them were F–15s to counter theMiG–29s the enemy launched against the attackingaircraft. On the first night, March 24, 1999, twoUSAF F–15C pilots of the 493d ExpeditionaryFighter Squadron each shot down one MiG–29,using AIM–120 missiles. These missiles had theirown homing radar, allowing pilots to “launch andleave” instead of hanging around to provide radarguidance to the missiles. AIM–120s also had longerrange than infrared-guided missiles, allowing thedowning of enemy aircraft from beyond visualrange. A Dutch F–16 pilot also shot down a MiG–29that night. On the third night of Allied Force, anF–15C pilot of the 493d Expeditionary FighterSquadron shot down two MIG–29s in aerial combatover Yugoslavia, using AIM–120 missiles. Thus, inthe first three days of the conflict, NATO pilots shotdown five of the best Yugoslavian fighters, with nofriendly aircraft losses.23

Operation Allied Force over Serbia in 1999, hadsimilarities and differences with Operation DesertStorm, over Iraq, eight years earlier. In both opera-tions, the air component commander wanted tobegin with the destruction of enemy command andcontrol and communication structures in the enemycapital and deprive the enemy of his ability tocounter American airpower. General Short wantedto hit Belgrade as hard as Baghdad had been hit in1991. However, General Clark at first limitedShort’s targets in the enemy’s largest city, becausehe wanted to limit civilian casualties. He alsowanted American air power to hit the Serbian tanksin Kosovo that were threatening Albanian civiliansthere. As a result, Operation Allied Force at firstfocused more on small military targets on theground, which were much more difficult to hit thanstrategic targets such as electrical power plants,


OPERATIONALLIEDFORCEBEGANMARCH 24,1999, ANDMARKED THEFIRST TIMENATO WENTTO WARAGAINST ASOVEREIGNCOUNTRY

and which required the aircraft to fly lower, makingthem more vulnerable to enemy antiaircraftdefenses.24

Milosevic surprised NATO and United Statesmilitary leaders by not coming to terms after thefirst three nights of bombing, March 24 to 26. Someof those leaders suspected that Milosevic, after agesture of defiance to placate Serbian extremistssupporting him, would capitulate early. They werewrong. Despite the temptation to use radar to guidetheir extensive air defense network’s arsenal ofsurface-to-air missiles (SAMs), the Serbs largelyturned off the radar, knowing that NATO fighterswith high-speed, anti-radiation missiles (HARMs)could zero in on them. As a result, throughout theconflict, the SAMs remained a threat. So also didanti-aircraft artillery (AAA) and shoulder-launchedinfrared-guided missiles, which persuaded NATOto keep its aircraft flying at an altitude of at least15,000 feet. The higher altitude missions degradedthe accuracy of air strikes, because small targetssuch as tanks could not be seen from high alti-tude.25

Besides F–16s from such organizations as the31st Air Expeditionary Wing based at Aviano AirBase, a host of other USAF aircraft types partici-pated in Operation Allied Force. Among them wereA–10 aircraft, more effective than faster lesser-armored aircraft against ground forces, and as aresult, General Short made plans to deploy moreA–10s to the theater. Additionally, EC–130s servedas Airborne Battlefield Command and ControlCenter (ABCCC) aircraft. Unmanned and unarmedRQ–1 Predator reconnaissance and surveillanceaircraft, based at Tazsar, Hungary, assisted theA–10 pilots in locating and destroying small enemytargets such as enemy artillery pieces. The Predatorallowed real time intelligence to enable air strikesto be more effective against moving targets such asthe Yugoslavian Third Army in Kosovo.26 The C–17also took part in the Air War over Serbia. Havingcompleted its testing less than four years earlier, itwas the only USAF transport capable of carryingoutsize cargo into certain airfields, such as Tuzla AirBase in Bosnia.27

By the end of March, NATO aircraft and mis-sile strikes had hit more than fifty targets inYugoslavia. With portions of the Yugoslavian airdefense system crippled, NATO launched air strikesin daylight for the first time. Russia, with closepolitical ties to Serbia, requested that the UnitedNations halt the NATO airstrikes, but the SecurityCouncil voted down the resolution by an over-whelming 12 to 3 vote. 28

The NATO air campaign against Yugoslaviaproceeded remarkably well, in terms of attrition,until March 27, the fourth night of the operation,when Serbian SA-3 surface to air missiles tookdown a USAF F–117 Nighthawk. General Shorthad anticipated some air losses, but not this partic-ular aircraft type, a stealth fighter famous for itsability to avoid significant radar detection and itsvirtual invisibility at night. The Serbs fired twoSAMs and only one struck its target. SAM fire had

succeeded despite the enemy’s limited use of radarto guide it. Analysts later speculated how the Serbshad been able to down the venerable F-117: it hadflown a somewhat predictable path; it could havebeen detected when it became more visible on radaras it opened its weapons-bay doors; the aircraftmight have become more observable when itbanked, increasing its radar cross section momen-tarily; the RC–135 Rivet Joint aircraft might havefailed to locate a key SA-3 battery; the F–16CJs car-rying HARMs had left the area, temporarily remov-ing the threat to enemy radar equipment; theEA–6B aircraft might not have been in the bestposition to jam enemy radar.29

In light of the shootdown, there was some posi-tive news. A USAF A–10 pilot from the 81stExpeditionary Fighter Squadron located thedowned pilot and vectored a helicopter rescue teamto save him within a few hours of his ejection. Theeffort involved the cooperative efforts of A–10,MC–130, MH–53, and MH–60 pilots and crews.F–16 pilots covering the mission, sustained byKC–135 tankers, remained airborne for more thannine hours. The A–10 pilot, the pilot of the leadMH–53, and the MH–60 pilot who carried out therescue all earned the Silver Star that day. Notably,this incident demonstrated the progress made sincethe 1995 downing of Captain Scott O’Grady overBosnia, who had to evade enemy forces for six daysbefore he was rescued.30

Despite extensive NATO air strikes overKosovo and the rest of Serbia, the Yugoslavian “eth-nic cleansing” campaign intensified at the end ofMarch. Large columns of refugees migrated out ofthe besieged province into Albania, Macedonia, andMontenegro, and the Serbian forces burned thehomes of the refugees to discourage them fromreturning. In the course of five days, some 50,000Kosovar civilians fled their homes.31

By the end of March, a week into the air cam-paign, Milosevic showed no signs of capitulating,and actually intensified his ground campaign inKosovo, forcing ever increasing numbers ofrefugees to flee to neighboring states. BetweenMarch 24 and 31, more than 100,000 people fledKosovo to Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro. Asa result of Milosevic’s intransigence, NATO mem-bers expan ded the target list to include sites in thecentral part of the Serbian capital, and on March31, NATO aircraft struck the headquarters of theYugoslavian Army’s Special Unit Corps in down-town Belgrade.32

The expanding NATO target list grew toinclude not only more sites in Belgrade but alsoSerbian fielded forces in Kosovo. On March 30,General Short launched the Combined AirInterdiction of Fielded Forces (CAIFF), a new stageof the air campaign designed specifically to crippleor destroy Milosevic’s ground troops in Kosovo, butit was initially limited to a ten-mile penetration ofthe province. Clouds and bad weather challengedthe early missions, hindering NATO’s ability todestroy its relatively small targets effectively andmount a steadily increasing pressure on the enemy.


MILOSEVICSURPRISEDNATO ANDUNITEDSTATES MILITARYLEADERS BYNOT COMINGTO TERMSAFTER THEFIRST THREENIGHTS OFBOMBING

A–10s served well for combat search and rescue, butafter their first successful attack against a Serbiantruck park on April 6, the armored attack aircraftproved especially useful against enemy groundforces in Kosovo.33

On April 1, Yugoslavian forces captured threeU.S. soldiers on patrol near the border of Kosovoand Macedonia and sought to use the hostages asleverage to restrict the air campaign, as Serbs haddone with United Nations personnel in Bosnia in1995. This time the tactic did not work. GeneralsClark and Short did not want to reward hostage-taking, and European allies did not pressure themto do so because this time, the hostages were Ame -ricans. The campaign continued without dimi nu -tion.34

Since March 1998, more than a half millionpeople had been displaced from their homes inKosovo, a fifth of them in the last week of March1999. Without reducing the air campaign, NATOand the United States inaugurated an additionaloperation called Sustain Hope to airlift humanitar-ian supplies to the refugees in Albania. The UnitedStates called its part of the new operation ShiningHope. On April 4, a USAF C–17 airlifted relief sup-plies from Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, toTirana, Albania. The 86th Contingency ResponseGroup deployed to Tirana, where they increased theairfield capacity to allow more than 400 daily take-offs and landings where earlier there had been onlyten. For Joint Task Force Shining Hope, the USAFprovided 930 airmen, two-thirds of the total person-nel. In the first month of Operation Sustain Hope,allied transports that included USAF C–5s, C–17s,and C–130s airlifted more than 3,000 tons of food,medicine, tents, supplies, cots, blankets, sleepingbags, and other relief cargo for refugees in campslocated outside of Kosovo. Major General William S.Hinton, Jr., USAF, commanded the operation. OnApril 10, NATO approved Operation Allied Harbor,an additional humanitarian effort to aid refugeesfrom Kosovo.35

Meanwhile, NATO airstrikes on Belgrade con-tinued, and were not limited to aircraft. On April 3,NATO missiles struck central Belgrade for the firsttime, destroying the Yugoslavian and Serbian inte-rior ministries. Some of these missiles were

Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs), launchedfrom U.S. Navy ships in the Adriatic. On the sameday, B–1s deployed from the United States to RAFFairford, where they were equipped with conven-tional air-launched cruise missiles (CALCMs) foradditional attacks on Belgrade. On April 8, a NATOcruise missile destroyed the main telecommunica-tions building in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo,which had been used to help coordinate Serbianground operations in the province.36

Strategic debates accompanied tactical success.General Clark and his air component commander,General Short, disagreed on the operation’s mostimportant target set. General Clark insisted thatthe “jewel in the crown” was the Yugoslavia’s tanksand troops in Kosovo. But General Short “never feltthat the Third Army in Kosovo was a center of grav-ity.”37 He preferred to strike key fixed electrical,communication, transportation, and industrialstructures in Belgrade than tanks, vehicle-drawnartillery pieces, and troops hidden in the forests ofKosovo. Spotting small moving targets under treesand behind hills was especially difficult for USAFand other NATO pilots who flew at altitudes highenough to erase the effectiveness of shoulder-launched missiles and AAA. Clark continued tofocus on the destruction of fielded military forces inKosovo, using F–16s, F–15s, and A–10s, but heallowed Short to use his B–2s and F–117s, alongwith the Navy’s TLAMs, to strike Belgrade. Clarkwas caught between two extremes: U.S. Air Forceofficers who wanted to attack more targets in theYugoslavian capital, and certain NATO allies inEurope who wanted to severely limit the targetsstruck there. General Clark later wrote, “no singletarget or set of targets was more important thanNATO cohesion.”38

While General Clark overruled General Shortby insisting the air forces strike the YugoslavianThird Army in Kosovo, and not focus on targets inBelgrade, the Pentagon did not permit him to add aground campaign that would concentrate Serbfielded forces in Kosovo, making them more vulner-able to NATO air strikes. This concept includedusing U.S. Army Apache attack helicopters in TaskForce Hawk. Although the helicopter task forceexisted, NATO leaders would not authorize aground campaign, and the U.S. Secretary of Defensewould not allow the use of the helicopters overKosovo, where they would be more vulnerable thanthe fighters to ground fire. As a result, Clark kepthis operation focused on an air campaign thatwould not include attack helicopters except as a pos-sible future threat. General Clark listed some of thelikely problems planning or launching a majorground campaign would engender: a longer war;more casualties; increased cost; unpredictable con-sequences; lack of detailed planning; perceivedadmission that the air campaign failed; limited per-sonnel; and difficulty maintaining public support.39

Like other generals in the U.S. Army, GeneralClark doubted that an air campaign could ever suc-ceed without an accompanying ground campaign.He remembered that the Soviet Union, despite air


A C–5 Galaxy transport air-craft prepares to launchfrom Aviano Air Base, Italy.The C–5 was one of themany aircraft at Avianosupporting NATO'sOperation Allied Force.

GENERALCLARK ANDHIS AIR COM-PONENTCOMMAN-DER,GENERALSHORT, DIS-AGREED ONTHE OPERA-TION’S MOSTIMPORTANTTARGET SET

supremacy, had failed to keep Afghanistan undercontrol during its failed long-term occupation in the1980s. He recalled that the United States and itscoalition partners forced Iraqi troops out of Kuwaitonly after a weeks-long air campaign was cappedby a short but intense Allied invasion involving“boots on the ground.” He knew that NATO airpower worked in 1995 against the Bosnian Serbspartly because it had been accompanied by aCroatian ground offensive. There was no suchoffensive in Kosovo. The closest thing to it was theresistance of the Kosovo Liberation Army withinKosovo itself.40

Three weeks into Allied Force, Serbian troopsremained deeply entrenched in Kosovo, andMilosevic showed no sign of relenting. To applymore pressure, General Clark called for a signifi-cant increase in the number of aircraft devoted tothe operation. When the campaign opened onMarch 24, only 430 NATO aircraft were committedto the war. Within a few weeks, that number morethan doubled.41

Air raids against Serbian ground forces inKosovo intensified during April. On the 14th, theAir Force assigned five new air expeditionary wings,the 48th, 52nd, 60th, 86th, and 92nd, to join thethree (the 16th, 31st, and 100th) that alreadyserved the 16th Air and Space Expeditionary TaskForce-Noble Anvil. The aircraft types available tothese eight wings, deployed from stateside baseswith their crews, included F–16, F–15, and F–117fighters, A–10s attack airplanes, and E—8s andEC–130s for communications. A–10 pilots, supportpersonnel, and aircraft deployed from the 74thFighter Squadron at Pope AFB, North Carolina, toserve with the 81st Expeditionary FighterSquadron of the 40th Expeditionary OperationsGroup. On April 11, the 81st moved from Aviano AirBase, in northern Italy, to Gioia del Colle in extremesouthern Italy, where it could more effectively tostrike targets in Kosovo. At the same time,Macedonia, a country that had itself declared inde-pendence from Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia in1991, allowed NATO to use its air space for flightsagainst Serbian forces. NATO attack aircraft couldnow enter Serbia and attack its targets in Kosovomore easily.42

The first Allied Force NATO air raid thatcaused significant civilian casualties occurred onApril 12, when an F–15 dropped precision-guidedmunitions to destroy a railroad bridge nearLekovac. Unfortunately a passenger train wascrossing at the time, and about thirty civilians losttheir lives.43

When fighters attacked ground targets amongthe trees and villages of Kosovo, they did not alwayshit them. Flying at high altitudes to reduce thechances of being hit by ground fire, pilots sometimesmisidentified moving objects on the surface. In onenotable case on April 14, NATO fighters thatincluded an F–16 and a French Jaguar accidentallyhit two refugee convoys because the pilots confusedthe long column of tractors and other vehicles asenemy tanks. General Short subsequently decided

to allow certain aircraft to fly in at lower altitudesfor target identification.44

While air raids on fielded Serbian forces inKosovo continued, NATO gradually shifted more ofits weight to the bombardment of Belgrade’s leader-ship and command, control, and communicationsystems . On April 21, cruise missiles struck radioand television stations in the Serbian capital, aswell as the political offices of Milosevic, crippling hisability to control and disseminate propaganda.NATO later used the 4,700-pound GBU “bunker-busting” bomb to damage Milosevic’s huge nationalcommand center, some of which was buried 100 feetbelow the ground.45

During April, General Clark prepared hisattack helicopters for possible use against Serbianfielded forces in Kosovo. He deployed Task ForceHawk, which included twenty-four U.S. ArmyApaches, from Germany to Albania. In an unusualmove, Air Mobility Command temporarily relin-quished operational control of its deployed C–17s inthe theater to the United States Air Forces inEurope. The Air Force flew 737 C–17 missions todeliver twenty-four Army helicopters and theirassociated resources, including 7,745 passengersand 22,937 short tons of cargo. As a result, TaskForce Hawk tied up crucial air space over southernEurope needed for Operations Noble Anvil andShining Hope46

As NATO’s air campaign continued, interna-tional pressure against Milosevic to cease hisKosovo ground offensive intensified. On April 21,the European Union stopped delivery of petroleumproduct deliveries to Yugoslavia. On the same day,NATO missiles struck the headquarters ofMilosevic’s Serbian Socialist Party and his privateresidence in Belgrade, as well as radio and televi-sion stations in the enemy capital. On April 23, at aNATO summit meeting in Washington, D.C., NATOrevised its objectives and on May 1, the NorthAtlantic Council approved an expanded the targetlist which included more infrastructure facilities.Further, Turkey and Hungary approved the basingof NATO strike aircraft on their territories to allowthem to attack targets in Serbia around the clock.Eventually NATO aircraft flew combat missionsfrom bases in fifteen countries.47

By May, the air campaign against Serbia hadbecome a long-term commitment, and the Air Forcemobilized Air Force Reserve Command units to sup-port Operation Allied Force, eventually calling sixtanker wings and one rescue wing to active duty.USAF aircraft devoted to the Noble Anvil campaignmore than doubled, from 203 to 514 (the total num-ber of NATO aircraft was higher, but the USAF con-tinued to furnish a majority of the almost 1,000NATO airplanes eventually devoted to AlliedForce). USAF aircraft eventually flew 150 strikesorties per day. Targets ultimately included refiner-ies, communication lines, electrical power grids, anddual-use communication structures; howeverNATO maintained strict control over which targetscould be hit and which were off limits. GeneralShort could generate 1,000 strike sorties a day by


THREEWEEKS INTOALLIED FORCE,SERBIANTROOPSREMAINEDDEEPLYENTRENCHEDIN KOSOVO,ANDMILOSEVICSHOWED NOSIGN OFRELENTING

early May and could destroy targets more quicklythan they could be approved by the leaders of thevarious nations in the alliance. NATO approval ofcertain targets sometimes took as long as twoweeks, and there were two air tasking orders, onefor NATO, and one for the U.S. only, which hinderedthe effectiveness of the operation.48

The increased pressure began to have an effecton the Serbian leader. Milosevic agreed on May 1, torelease the three U.S. soldiers his forces had cap-tured near Kosovo’s border with Macedonia amonth earlier. By releasing the hostages to U.S. civilrights activist Reverend Jesse Jackson, Miloseviclikely sought some political advantage, but probablyrealized that holding the hostages would not dimin-ish the intensifying air campaign.49

Serbian surface-to-air missiles and antiaircraftartillery failed to down a single NATO aircraft dur-ing the entire month of April, but on the night ofMay 2, 1999, Serbian forces celebrated their shoot-ing down of a second USAF airplane by an SA-3missile. This time it was an F–16CG piloted by Lt.Col. David Goldfein (call sign HAMMER 34), com-mander of the 555th Fighter Squadron, who hadjust finished an air strike against Serbian surface-to-air missile sites near Novi Sad. Like the F–117pilot shot down earlier, Goldfein did not stay inenemy territory very long. Within hours, an MH–60Pave Hawk helicopter crew rescued him. Lt. Col.Steve Laushine, who had commanded the rescue ofthe F–117 pilot in March, also led this mission, fly-ing in one of two MH–53 Pave Low helicopters thatescorted the MH–60. Four A–10s of the 40thExpeditionary Operations Group covered the threehelicopters.50

The Serbs had little time to celebrate. The nextday, May 3, USAF F–117s dropped BLU-114 sub-munitions on five transformer yards of Belgrade’s

electrical power grid, cutting off electricity to sev-enty percent of Yugoslavia and threatening commu-nications with headquarters of the Yugoslav 3rdArmy in Kosovo. Subsequent air strikes, using thesame weapon, took out most of the electrical poweragain in later days, preventing its permanentrestoration. Air strikes also destroyed a sizablevehicle and munitions factory in the enemy capital,significantly reducing Serbia’s industrial produc-tion and depriving thousands of workers of employ-ment.51

Unlike ground fire, Serbian aircraft failed todown a single NATO aircraft during the campaign.In fact, the opposite happened. On May 4, F–16CGpilot Lieutenant Colonel Michael H. Geczy of the78th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron shot downanother Yugoslavian MIG–29 over Kosovo, the fifthand final USAF aerial victory of Operation AlliedForce, and the sixth such victory by NATO pilots.Like the other four aerial victories of USAF pilotsover MIG–29s in 1999, the AIM-120 missile provedit could hit an enemy aircraft from beyond visualrange, despite the fact that this incident occurredduring daylight hours. At first, Geczy could see theenemy aircraft only on radar, but he also saw thefireball that resulted from his missile’s impact.52

Although much of the air campaign focused onenemy ground troops and their vehicles in Kosovo,General Short continued air strikes on Belgrade.Mistargeting curtailed the latter part of AlliedForce on May 7, when a B–2 dropped a Joint DirectAttack Munition (JDAM) on the Chinese Embassyin the Yugoslavian capital, killing three andwounding twenty persons. President Clinton calledthe attack a “tragic mistake.” Air campaign plan-ners using faulty maps had identified the buildingas the Federal Directorate for Supply andProcurement. The resultant political furor forced


An F–16 Fighting Falconfrom Shaw Air Force Base,S.C., takes off from Aviano.The F–16 is one of morethan 170 aircraft deployedto Italy in support ofNATO's Operation AlliedForce.

THEINCREASEDPRESSUREBEGAN TOHAVE ANEFFECT ONTHE SERBIANLEADER

General Clark to draw a five-mile-radius circle incentral Belgrade within which NATO airplaneswere forbidden to strike for almost two weeks. Theaccident and subsequent bombing restrictions gaveMilosevic a break and more time to resist capitula-tion.53

As an almost inevitable result of its intensifiedbombing campaign over Serbia, NATO munitionssometimes struck civilians accidentally. For exam-ple, on May 14, bombs struck Korisa, a village insouthern Kosovo, killing seventy-nine people andwounding fifty-eight. A few days later, a NATObomb killed inmates in a jail in the town of Istoknear Pristina in Kosovo. NATO believed the facilitywas no longer being used as a prison but as anenemy command center. Later, on May 22, NATOadmitted to have accidentally bombed the Kosarearea after Kosovo Liberation Army forces took it,killing seven and injuring fifteen to twenty-fiveKLA soldiers. One of the KLA leaders, HashimThaqi, called the bombing a technical mistake, sinceSerbian forces had been in control of the area, andurged continued and even more intense NATOairstrikes.54

On May 12, Joint Task Force Shining Hope, thehumanitarian counterpart of Operation AlliedForce, opened Camp Hope, the first of three campsfor assisting Kosovar Albanian refugees. The goal ofthe simultaneous operations was the same: to saveethnic Albanians threatened with the loss of theirlives or homes as a result of a Serbian militaryoffensive in Kosovo.55

The NATO air campaign against Serbia contin-ued throughout May, showing no signs of diminish-ing or ending without a reversal of Yugoslavian pol-icy. In fact, the United States Air Forces in Europeactivated two additional air expeditionary wings in

Turkey during the month, bringing the wing total toten.56 Diplomatic pressure on Milosevic also inten-sified. On May 22, the United Nations InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslaviaindicted Milosevic and four other Serbian leadersfor crimes against humanity, which threatened thepopularity of their cause. The next day, NATOresumed bombing the Yugoslavian electricity grid,depriving much of the country of power. On May 21,the 104th Expeditionary Operations Group beganflying A–10 missions from Trapani Air Base inSicily, just two days after its arrival. The increasingA–10 attacks became more effective than earlierones because a ground offensive by the KosovoLiberation Army, launched on May 25, forced theSerb forces to mass, making them more vulnerableto air attack. By the end of the month, NATO strikeaircraft flew more than 250 sorties per day.Unfortunately, the KLA offensive (OperationArrow) did not last long and bogged down after onlythree days.57

At the same time, air attacks on infrastructurein Belgrade intensified. On May 24, precision-guided weapons destroyed much of the Serbian cap-ital’s electrical power grid, even more effectivelythan the May 3 attacks. Without electricity, Serbianmilitary leaders were hard-pressed to maintaincommunications with their forces in Kosovo. Theabsence of electrical power likely increased popularpressure against Milosevic, partly by crippling histelecommunications propaganda machine and ruin-ing the computer connections of the banking indus-try. More significantly for the NATO air warriors,the attacks on the Belgrade electrical grid largelyparalyzed what remained of the Serbian air defensenetwork.58

A combination of military and diplomatic pres-sure ultimately succeeded in convincing Milosevicto accept a peace deal. On June 2, 1999, ViktorChernomyrdin, representing Russia, and Finland’sPresident Martti Ahtisaari, representing theEuropean Union, flew to Belgrade to pressure theSerbian leader into an agreement. The next dayMilosevic finally approved talks between seniorYugoslavian and NATO officers, which began onJune 5.59

When the talks temporarily collapsed on June7, General Clark disagreed with critics whocharged that Allied bombing discouraged negotia-tions. In fact, he believed that the continued bomb-ing increased the likelihood of restarting negotia-tions. With NATO authorization, he approved airstrikes on Batanjica airfield and an oil refinery atNovi Sad. On June 7, two B–52s and one B–1dropped eighty-six MK 82 munitions and clusterbombs on Serbian troops in Kosovo, effectivelyending the Serbian offensive against the KLA. OnJune 9, Serbia agreed to all NATO terms, includ-ing immediate withdrawal from Kosovo. The nextday, the withdrawal began. Milosevic also agreedto allow multinational peacekeeping forces intoKosovo and permitted the return of refugees. Hisonly consolation was that Kosovo would remainpart of Serbia and not all the peacekeepers would


An A–10 rolls down thepavement in Yugoslaviaduring Operation AlliedForce.

A COMBINA-TION OF MILI-TARY ANDDIPLOMATICPRESSUREULTIMATELYSUCCEEDEDIN CONVINCINGMILOSEVICTO ACCEPT APEACE DEAL

be from NATO (Russian forces would also takepart).60

On June 10, 1999, after seventy-eight days ofbombing, NATO suspended air strikes. However,General Clark remained vigilant, and remainedready to resume them if the Serbs had shown anysigns of noncompliance. Concurrently, the UNSecurity Council passed Resolution 1244. The votewas 14-0, with China abstaining. The resolutioncalled for an end of violence and repression inKosovo; return of refugees; withdrawal of allYugoslav military, police, and paramilitary forcesfrom the province; and the deployment of an inter-national peacekeeping force of some 50,000 troops,which were almost identical to the NATO condi-tions. Milosevic more willing allowed internationalpeacekeeping forces in Serbia’s Kosovo province ifunder the auspices of the UN rather than NATO,and was more cooperative when some of the troopswere Russian. Kosovo came under temporary inter-national civilian control, but remained, at least tem-porarily, part of Serbia.61

On June 11, NATO inaugurated JointGuardian, a peacekeeping operation in Kosovo.The United States portion of the new operationwas called Operation Decisive Guardian. Threedays later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed Gen.Wesley Clark to suspend construction of tworefugee camps in Albania because the Kosovarscould now return to their homes within Serbia. ByJune 20, Milosevic and the Serbs had demon-strated compliance with NATO and UN demands,and Operation Allied Force formally ended.Operation Sustain Hope (Shining Hope) concludedon July 1. During that operation, USAF C–17s andC–130s flew 1176 airlift missions to deliver wellover 3,000 tons of humanitarian cargo, includingsome 4,000 tents, 476,000 rations, and 5,000 blan-kets.62

The air campaign had intensified tremendouslybetween March 24 and June 20. The number of airexpeditionary wings committed to Operation NobleAnvil, the U.S. portion of Allied Force, had expandedfrom three to ten. The number of USAF aircraftdeployed had doubled, and by the end of the opera-tion, 13,850 USAF airmen were deployed at twenty-four locations. What was originally conceived to be acontingency operation to force Milosevic’s compli-ance with NATO demands morphed into a majortheater war, with more than a third of the USAFfront-line fighters involved.63

During Allied Force in 1999, B–2 bombersbased in the United States flew extremely long-range missions to destroy key facilities in Serbia,using precision-guided munitions. Targets includedairfields, army bases, munitions storage facilities,engineer depots, arms and heavy equipment facto-ries, petroleum storage facilities, smelters, and anaviation repair base. One B–2 dropping precision-guided weapons could destroy 16 different targetson only one sortie, although such a sortie fromMissouri to Serbia and back was an extremely longone, requiring multiple aerial refuelings on the way.Still, the cost would be considerably less than the

use of sixteen non-recyclable cruise missiles such asTLAMs.64

Air Force Special Operations Command per-sonnel and aircraft flew important missions duringOperation Allied Force (Noble Eagle). Contributingorganizations included the 16th Special OperationsWing, the 352d Special Operations Group, and the720th Special Tactics Group. Four AC–130s fromthe 4th Special Operations Squadron flew 124armed reconnaissance and battlefield air interdic-tion sorties from Brindisi. Four MC–130s from the67th and 9th Special Operations Squadrons flew atotal of seventy-five combat sorties, also fromBrindisi, mostly to refuel nine MH–53 helicoptersfrom the 20th and 21st Special OperationsSquadrons. These aircraft proved instrumental incombat search and rescue operations, especiallyafter the downing of the F–117 and F–16 aircraftduring the operation. Four additional helicopters,MH–60s from the 55th Special OperationsSquadron, performed additional combat search andrescue sorties. The special operations helicoptersflew a combined total of 481 sorties out of Brindisi,Italy. Two additional MC–130s from the 7th SpecialOperations Squadron at RAF Mildenhall flew sev-enty-three combat sorties to drop psychological war-fare leaflets over Serbia, having picked them up atRamstein. Supplementing the leaflets were radiobroadcasts from a pair of 193rd Special OperationsWing EC–130s that flew eighty-one combat sortiesfrom their deployed base at Ramstein.65

During Operation Allied Force, organizations ofthe Air Mobility Command flew 2,130 airlift mis-sions. Between mid-February and into July 1999,they carried more than 32,000 passengers and52,645 short tons of cargo to from, and within south-eastern Europe. During the same operation, AirMobility Command tankers refueled a great varietyof aircraft flying to and within the combat zone.They included fighters, bombers, and transports,not only from the U.S. Air Force, but also from otherservices and allied nations. Between the beginningof air strikes on March 24 and the conclusion of hos-tilities on June 9, USAF KC–10s and KC–135s flew9,000 missions and transferred 348.5 millionpounds of fuel to receiving aircraft. Without aerialrefueling, the non-stop B–2 missions fromWhiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, to Yugoslavia,and back would have been impossible. By the end ofOperation Allied Force, NATO marshaled 175tankers based at twelve operating locations.66

Operation Allied Force lasted for seventy-eightdays and involved approximately 38,000 NATO sor-ties. The Air War Over Serbia proved historic formany reasons. It was the first major USAF air cam-paign in which no friendly air crews were killed ortaken prisoner; in fact, there were no NATO casual-ties. USAF pilots shot down five enemy MIG–29 air-craft, while the Serbs shot down only two mannedUSAF aircraft, using surface-to-air missiles, andboth the downed F–117 and F–16 pilots were res-cued within hours. Only two of the many USAFA–10s involved in the operation received any battledamage. Allied Force saw the first combat use of the


BY JUNE 20,…OPERATIONALLIEDFORCE FORMALLYENDED.OPERATIONSUSTAINHOPE …CONCLUDEDON JULY 1


B–2 Spirit “flying wing” stealth bomber. Neverbefore had the Air Force employed all three of itsstrategic bombers of the late twentieth century, theB–52, B–1, and B–2, in the same combat operation.C–17s, the Air Force’s latest transport aircraft type,flew their initial combat missions. For the firsttime, USAF Predator unmanned aerial vehicleshelped locate enemy targets for destruction.67

More significantly, air power had achievedsomething new. For the first time, NATO went towar against a sovereign nation and conducted anair campaign without an accompanying majorground offensive. When reporters asked GeneralJohn Jumper, commander of the United States AirForces in Europe, how many tanks NATO aircrafthad destroyed, he responded, “enough.” He andGeneral Short knew that destroying tanks was notthe primary objective, because the most importanttarget was the will of Slobodan Milosevic, makingthe strikes on Belgrade more decisive. JohnKeegan, the military historian, noted that the AirWar Over Serbia in 1999 “proved that a war couldbe won by air power alone.” John A. Tirpak, editorof Air Force Magazine, held a similar opinion. Henoted “For the first time in history, the applicationof air power alone forced the wholesale withdrawalof a military force from a disputed piece of realestate.” General Wesley K. Clark, overall comman-der of the operation, addressed the claim in hisbook Waging Modern War, admitting that his ownefforts to organize a NATO ground campaign cameto nothing. What remained was air power alone.Clark himself was amazed that there was not a sin-gle Allied combat casualty in what proved to be avictorious war.68

The United States dominated the NATO oper-ation, not only providing its leadership but also themajority of its aircraft and the leading technology.The USAF furnished 29,552 of the 38,004 NATOsorties, and over 400 aircraft, including:

USAF Aircraft and Sorties

214 fighters 8,889 sorties18 bombers 322 sorties175 tankers 6,959 sorties43 transports 11,480 sorties

1,038 ISR sorties834 special ops sorties496 UAV sorties

Air Mobility Command aircraft flew 2,130 air-lift missions that transported 32,111 passengersand 52,645 short tons of cargo. USAF KC–135 andKC–10 tankers flew some 9,000 missions andtransferred more than 348 million pounds of fuelwhile airborne. Other USAF aircraft includedRQ–1 Predators, E–3 AWACS, E–8 JOINT STARS,RC–135s, U–2s, and EC–130s. Among the specialoperations and rescue aircraft and crews takingpart were AC–130, MC–130, EC–130, and HC–130aircraft, as well as MH–53, HH–60, MH–60, andHH–60 helicopters. Of the 28,018 munitionsexpended by NATO, the USAF delivered 21,120.The U.S. Air Force dropped more than 650 of thenew Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs), whichproved to be more accurate than traditional bombsbecause GPS satellite signals guided them. In foggyor cloudy weather, they were even more accuratethan laser-guided or television-guided bombs. Butthe percentage of precision-guided weapons inAllied Force was lower than that for OperationDeliberate Force four years earlier. The U.S. AirForce expended a total of 8,618 tons of munitions.Finally, U.S. intelligence sources provided 99 per-cent of target nominations for the air campaign,because NATO depended almost entirely on UnitedStates technology to link intelligence informationwith operations.69

The legacy of the successful air campaign con-tinued into the twenty-first century. Hundreds ofthousands of ethnic Albanian Kosovars safelyreturned to their homes within Serbia, guardedfrom the threat of Serbian military and paramili-tary forces, which had withdrawn from theprovince, by thousands of international peacekeep-ers. On October 6, 2000, Milosevic lost reelection inSerbia, and on February 12, 2002, he faced theUnited Nations War Crimes Tribunal at TheHague, Netherlands, for the first international trialof a head of state for war crimes. Operation AlliedForce demonstrated that nations determined to useairpower effectively in the name of humanity couldstop genocide. The operation allowed the people ofKosovo to regain their sense of peace and securityat home, and contributed eventually to its full inde-pendence from Serbia in 2008. More importantly, ina military sense, Operation Allied Force provedthat an air campaign could succeed in winning awar without a significant ground campaign, andwith very few casualties. The experience of AlliedForce reinforced the fact that military forces can bemost effective tools for the accomplishment of polit-ical foreign policy objectives. In this case, the toolwas air power.70 �

A B–2 Spirit prepares toreceive fuel from a KC–135during a mission in theEuropean Theater support-ing NATO Operation AlliedForce.

FOR THEFIRST TIME,NATO WENTTO WARAGAINST ASOVEREIGNNATION ANDCONDUCTEDAN AIR CAM-PAIGN WITH-OUT ANACCOMPANY-ING MAJORGROUNDOFFENSIVE

1. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1160,dated March 31, 1998. 2. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199,dated September 23, 1998; HQ USAF, The Air WarOver Serbia Initial Report, Sep. 30, 1999 (AFHRA IRISno. 01149318), p. 11; Julie Kim, “Kosovo ConflictChronology: September 1998-March 1999,” April 6,1999, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reportfor Congress; USAFE History, 1998-1999, vol. I, p. xx. 3. Press Statement from Secretary General of NATOissued on September 24, 1998; Wesley Clark, WagingModern War (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), p. 145. 4. USAFE History, 1998-1999, vol. I, p. xxii; JulieKim, “Kosovo Conflict Chronology: September 1998-March 1999,” April 6, 1999, Congressional ResearchService (CRS) Report for Congress; Interview of Lt.Gen. Michael C. Short, by Public Broadcasting Service(AFHRA IRIS number 01129172, call numberK570.051-24, 1998-1999), p. 5-7.5. United Nations Resolution 1203 dated October 24,1998; Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War (New York:Public Affairs, 2001), pp. 152 and 157. 6. HQ USAF, The Air War Over Serbia InitialReport, Sep. 30, 1999 (AFHRA IRIS no. 01149318), p.11; Julie Kim, “Kosovo Conflict Chronology: September1998-March 1999,” Apr. 6, 1999, Congressional Re -search Service (CRS) Report for Congress. 7. “Operation Eagle Eye,” Allied Joint ForceCommand Naples (http://jcfnaples.nato.int/page7194727). 8. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1203dated October 24, 1998. 9. Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War (New York:Public Affairs, 2001), p. 325. 10. Julie Kim, “Kosovo Conflict Chronology: Septem -ber 1998-March 1999,” April 6, 1999, CongressionalResearch Service (CRS) Report for Congress.11. Tim Judah, War and Revenge (New Haven, Ct.:Yale University Press, 2000), p. 193. 12. USAFE History, 1998-1999, vol. I, p. xxiii; JulieKim, “Kosovo Conflict Chronology: September 1998-March 1999,” April 6, 1999, Congressional ResearchService (CRS) Report for Congress ; Col. ChristopherE. Haave, USAF, and Lt. Col. Phil M. Haun, USAF, edi-tors, A–10s Over Kosovo (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AirUniversity Press, 2003), p. xxvii; HQ USAF, The AirWar Over Serbia Initial Report, Sep. 30, 1999 (AFHRAIRIS no. 01149318), p. 11.13. Col. Christopher E. Haave, USAF, and Lt. Col. PhilM. Haun, USAF, editors, A–10s Over Kosovo (MaxwellAFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 2003), p. xxviii; JulieKim, “Kosovo Conflict Chronology: September 1998-March 1999,” April 6, 1999, Congressional ResearchService (CRS) Report for Congress.14. Ibid.; USAFE History, 1998-1999, vol. I, p. xxiv;HQ USAF, The Air War Over Serbia Initial Report,Sep. 30, 1999 (AFHRA IRIS no. 01149318), p. 11. 15. Julie Kim, “Kosovo Conflict Chronology:September 1998-March 1999,” April 6, 1999, Congres -sional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress;USAFE History, 1998-1999, vol. I, p. xxiv. 16. USAFE History, 1998-1999, vol. I, p. xxv. 17. HQ USAF, The Air War Over Serbia InitialReport, Sep. 30, 1999 (AFHRA IRIS no. 01149318), p.11; USAFE History, 1998-1999, vol. I, p. xxv; Julie Kim,

“Kosovo Conflict Chronology: September 1998-March1999,” April 6, 1999, Congressional Research Service(CRS) Report for Congress. 18. HQ USAF, The Air War Over Serbia InitialReport, Sep. 30, 1999 (AFHRA IRIS no. 01149318), p.11; Julie Kim, “Kosovo Conflict Chronology: September1998-March 1999,” April 6, 1999, CongressionalResearch Service (CRS) Report for Congress; Col.Christopher E. Haave, USAF, and Lt. Col. Phil M.Haun, USAF, editors, A–10s Over Kosovo (MaxwellAFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 2003), p. xxviii;USAFE History, 1998-1999, vol. I, p. xxv; Wesley Clark,Waging Modern War (New York: Public Affairs, 2001),p. 173. 19. HQ USAF, The Air War Over Serbia InitialReport, Sep. 30 1999 (AFHRA IRIS no. 01149318), pp.7-8; Col. Christopher E. Haave, USAF, and Lt. Col. PhilM. Haun, USAF, editors, A–10s Over Kosovo (MaxwellAFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 2003), xxviii; JulieKim, “Kosovo Conflict Chronology: September 1998-March 1999,” April 6, 1999, Congressional ResearchService (CRS) Report for Congress; U.S. CongressionalResolution 21, 106th Congress. 20. HQ USAF, The Air War Over Serbia InitialReport, Sep. 30, 1999 (AFHRA IRIS no. 01149318), p.12; Julie Kim, “Kosovo Conflict Chronology: September1998-March 1999,” April 6, 1999, CongressionalResearch Service (CRS) Report for Congress; “To Warin the Balkans,” Air Force Magazine, vol. 82, no. 5 (May1999) p. 16.21. HQ USAF, The Air War Over Serbia InitialReport, Sep. 30, 1999 (AFHRA IRIS no. 01149318), pp.8, 20; Col. Christopher E. Haave, USAF, and Lt. Col.Phil M. Haun, USAF, editors, A–10s Over Kosovo(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 2003), pp.xiii-xiv, xxix, xxxii, 20-23; Organization Record Card ofthe 16 Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force-NOBLE ANVIL, at AFHRA/RSO; William M. Butler,Fifty Years on NATO’s Southern Flank: A History ofSixteenth Air Force, 1954-2004 (Aviano AB, Italy:Sixteenth Air Force Office of History, 2004), p. 11. 22. HQ USAF, The Air War Over Serbia InitialReport, Sep. 30, 1999 (AFHRA IRIS no. 01149318), pp.21-22; “To War in the Balkans,” Air Force Magazine,vol. 82, no. 5 (May 1999), p. 16; Julie Kim, “KosovoConflict Chronology: September 1998-March 1999,”April 6, 1999, Congressional Research Service (CRS)Report for Congress; Interview of Lt. Gen. Michael C.Short, by Public Broadcasting Service (AFHRA IRISnumber 01129172, call number K570.051-24, 1998-1999), p. 17; Roy Handsel, “Talking Paper on B–2Participation in Operation Allied Force,” given toauthor during visit to Eglin Air Force Base, home of the678th Armament Systems Squadron. 23. 16th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force,Special Order GF-024 dated 23 August 1999; Interviewof Lt. Gen. Michael C. Short, by Public BroadcastingService (AFHRA IRIS number 01129172, call numberK570.051-24, 1998-1999), p. 10; Benjamin S. Lambeth,The Transformation of American Air Power (Ithaca,NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 162-164.24. Ibid, pp. 185-186.25. Interview of Lt. Gen. Michael C. Short, by PublicBroadcasting Service (AFHRA IRIS number01129172, call number K570.051-24, 1998-1999), pp. 9-


NOTES

11, 14; HQ USAF The Air War Over Serbia InitialReport, Sep. 30, 1999 (AFHRA IRIS no. 01149318), p.23. 26. Col. Christopher E. Haave, USAF, and Lt. Col. PhilM. Haun, USAF, editors, A–10s Over Kosovo (MaxwellAFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 2003), pp. xvii, xxxii;Interview of Major James Hoffman by Ninth Air Forcehistorian Gary Lester, 4 Aug 2005; Susan H. H. Young,“Gallery of USAF Weapons,” Air Force Magazine, vol.83, no. 5 (May 2000), pp. 143-144. 27. Ibid., p. 148.28. Julie Kim, “Kosovo Conflict Chronology: Septem -ber 1998-March 1999,” April 6, 1999, CongressionalResearch Service (CRS) Report for Congress; “To Warin the Balkans,” Air Force Magazine, vol. 82, no. 5 (May1999), p. 17.29. Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transformation ofAmerican Air Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UniversityPress, 2000), 200-202; HQ USAF The Air War OverSerbia Initial Report, Sep. 30, 1999 (AFHRA IRIS no.01149318), pp. 23-24.30. HQ USAF The Air War Over Serbia Initial Report,Sep. 30, 1999 (AFHRA IRIS no. 01149318), pp. 23-24;Col. Christopher E. Haave, USAF, and Lt. Col. Phil M.Haun, USAF, editors, A–10s Over Kosovo (MaxwellAFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 2003), p. xxix; “To Warin the Balkans,” Air Force Magazine, vol. 82, no. 5 (May1999), p. 17; Interview of Lt. Gen. Michael C. Short, byPublic Broadcasting Service (AFHRA IRIS number01129172, call number K570.051-24, 1998-1999), p. 22;Dale Zelko e-mail messages to Daniel Haulman, Sep.17 and Oct. 5, 2009; Darrel Whitcomb, “The Night TheySaved Vega 31,” Air Force Magazine, vol. 89, no. 12(December 2006); Rudi Williams, “Daring RescuesSnatch Pilots from Jaws of Enemy,” Defense LinkNews Article dated Feb. 17, 2000; “Rev. Jesse L.Jackson: Wins Freedom for American POWs inYugoslavia,” Jet, May 17, 1999. 31. Julie Kim, “Kosovo Conflict Chronology: Septem -ber 1998-March 1999,” April 6, 1999, CongressionalResearch Service (CRS) Report for Congress.32. Ibid.33. HQ USAF The Air War Over Serbia Initial Report,Sep. 30, 1999 (AFHRA IRIS no. 01149318), pp. 24, 30;Col. Christopher E. Haave, USAF, and Lt. Col. Phil M.Haun, USAF, editors, A–10s Over Kosovo (MaxwellAFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 2003), pp. xiii-xiv, xxiv,xxx; Interview of Lt. Gen. Michael C. Short, by PublicBroadcasting Service (AFHRA IRIS number01129172, call number K570.051-24, 1998-1999), pp.15-16.34. Col. Christopher E. Haave, USAF, and Lt. Col. PhilM. Haun, USAF, editors, A–10s Over Kosovo (MaxwellAFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 2003), p. xxix.35. HQ USAF The Air War Over Serbia Initial Report,Sep. 30, 1999 (AFHRA IRIS no. 01149318), pp. 25-26;Col. Christopher E. Haave, USAF, and Lt. Col. Phil M.Haun, USAF, editors, A–10s Over Kosovo (MaxwellAFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 2003), p. xxx; Daniel L.Haulman, One Hundred Years of Flight: Chronology ofSignificant Air and Space Events, 1903-2002(Washington, DC: Air Force History and MuseumsProgram, 2003), pp. 154-155. 36. Col. Christopher E. Haave, USAF, and Lt. Col. PhilM. Haun, USAF, editors, A–10s Over Kosovo (MaxwellAFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 2003), p. xxix;Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transformation ofAmerican Air Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UniversityPress, 2000), pp. 185-186. 37. John A. Tirpak, “Short’s View of the Air Cam -

paign,” Air Force Magazine vol. 82, no. 9 (September1999). 38. Interview of Lt. Gen. Michael C. Short by PublicBroadcasting Service, AFHRA IRIS number 01129172,pp. 1-2, 14, 19; HQ USAF The Air War Over SerbiaInitial Report, Sep. 30, 1999 (AFHRA IRIS no.01149318), p. 24; Gen. Wesley Clark, Waging ModernWar: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat (NewYork: Public Affairs, 2001), pp. 243, 245, 430.39. Ibid., pp. 246, 305, 311, 320, 367, 438-441. 40. Ibid., p. 430. 41. Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transformation ofAmerican Air Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UniversityPress, 2000), p. 184. 42. Col. Christopher E. Haave, USAF, and Lt. Col. PhilM. Haun, USAF, editors, A–10s Over Kosovo (MaxwellAFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 2003), pp. xxx-xxxi, 15-19; Organizational Record Card of the 16th Air andSpace Expeditionary Task Force-NOBLE ANVIL, atAFHRA/RSO. 43. Marcus Tanner, “Up. to 100 Feared Dead as NATOBombers Strike Kosovo Village,” The Independent, May15, 1999; Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transformation ofAmerican Airpower (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UniversityPress, 2000), p. 205. 44. Interview of Lt. Gen. Michael C. Short, by PublicBroadcasting Service (AFHRA IRIS number01129172, call number K570.051-24, 1998-1999), pp.14-15; Col. Christopher E. Haave, USAF, and Lt. Col.Phil M. Haun, USAF, editors, A–10s Over Kosovo(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 2003), p. xxx. 45. Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transformation ofAmerican Air Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UniversityPress, 2000), p. 187. 46. HQ USAF The Air War Over Serbia Initial Report,Sep. 30, 1999 (AFHRA IRIS no. 01149318), pp. 26-27,29.47. Ibid., pp. 30-31; Col. Christopher E. Haave, USAF,and Lt. Col. Phil M. Haun, USAF, editors, A–10s OverKosovo (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press,2003), p. xxx; Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transfor -mation of American Airpower (Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press, 2000), p. 187.48. HQ USAF The Air War Over Serbia Initial Report,Sep. 30, 1999 (AFHRA IRIS no. 01149318), pp. 27-31;USAFE History 1998-1999, vol. I (AFHRA call numberK570.01, Jan 1998-Dec 1999, vol. I, IRIS number01147645), p. 165.49. Col. Christopher E. Haave, USAF, and Lt. Col. PhilM. Haun, USAF, editors, A–10s Over Kosovo (MaxwellAFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 2003), p. xxxi.50. Chris Roberts, “Holloman Commander RecallsBeing Shot Down in Serbia,” (http://www.f-16.net/news_article2167.html; Dale Zelco e-mail messages toDaniel Haulman, Sep. 17, and Oct. 5, 2009; RudiWilliams, “Daring Rescues Snatch Pilots from Jaws ofenemy,” Defense Link News Article dated Feb. 17,2000; Col. Christopher E. Haave, USAF, and Lt. Col.Phil M. Haun, USAF, editors, A–10s Over Kosovo(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 2003), p.xxxi.51. USAFE History, 1998-1999, vol. I, p. 193;Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transformation of Ame -rican Air Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,2000), p. 188.52. 16th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force,Special Order GF-024 dated 23 August 1999. 53. HQ USAF The Air War Over Serbia Initial Report,Sep. 30, 1999 (AFHRA IRIS no. 01149318), p. 31;Interview of Lt. Gen. Michael C. Short, by Public


Broadcasting Service (AFRHA IRIS number 01129172,call number K570.051-24, 1998-1999), pp. 17-18; Col.Christopher E. Haave, USAF, and Lt. Col. Phil M.Haun, USAF, editors, A–10s Over Kosovo (MaxwellAFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 2003), pp. xxxi.54. Ibid., p. xxxii; Marcus Tanner, “Up. to 100 FearedDead as NATO Bombers Strike Kosovo Village, TheIndependent, May 15, 1999; Steven Pearlstein, “NATOAdmits Bombing Kosovo Rebels,” Washington Post,May 23, 1999, p. A27.55. USAFE History, 1998-1999, vol. I, p. xxvii. 56. Organization Record Card, 16 Air and SpaceExpeditionary Task Force-NOBLE ANVIL, atAFHRA/RSO; HQ USAF The Air War Over SerbiaInitial Report, Sep. 30, 1999 (AFHRA IRIS no.01149318), pp. 33-34. 57. HQ USAF The Air War Over Serbia Initial Report,Sep. 30, 1999 (AFHRA IRIS no. 01149318), pp. 31-32;USAFE History, 1998-1999, vol. I, p. xxvii; Col.Christopher E. Haave, USAF, and Lt. Col. Phil M.Haun, USAF, editors, A–10s Over Kosovo (MaxwellAFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 2003), pp. xxxii-xxxiii,19-20; Interview of Lt. Gen. Michael C. Short, by PublicBroadcasting Service (AFHRA IRIS number01129172, call number K570.051-24, 1998-1999), p. 2;Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transformation of Ameri -can Air Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,2000), p. 189. 58. Ibid., pp. 188-189. 59. HQ USAF The Air War Over Serbia Initial Report,Sep. 30, 1999 (AFHRA IRIS no. 01149318), pp. 31-32;USAFE History, 1998-1999, vol. I, p. xxvii; Col.Christopher E. Haave, USAF, and Lt. Col. Phil M.Haun, USAF, editors, A–10s Over Kosovo (MaxwellAFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 2003), pp. xxxii-xxxiii,19-20; Interview of Lt. Gen. Michael C. Short, by PublicBroadcasting Service (AFHRA IRIS number01129172, call number K570.051-24, 1998-1999), p. 2;Gen. Wesley K Clark, Waging Modern War (New York:Public Affairs, 2001), pp. 365, 370, 442; Benjamin S.Lambeth, The Transformation of American Air Power(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 189. 60. HQ USAF The Air War Over Serbia Initial Report,Sep. 30, 1999 (AFHRA IRIS no. 01149318), pp. 31-32;USAFE History, 1998-1999, vol. I, p. xxvii; Col.Christopher E. Haave, USAF, and Lt. Col. Phil M.Haun, USAF, editors, A–10s Over Kosovo (MaxwellAFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 2003), pp. xxxii-xxxiii,19-20; Interview of Lt. Gen. Michael C. Short, by PublicBroadcasting Service (AFHRA IRIS number01129172, call number K570.051-24, 1998-1999), p. 2;Gen. Wesley K Clark, Waging Modern War (New York:Public Affairs, 2001), pp. 365, 370, 442; Benjamin S.Lambeth, The Transformation of American Air Power(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 190. 61. USAFE History, 1998-1999, vol. I, pp. xxvii-xxviii;Col. Christopher E. Haave, USAF, and Lt. Col. Phil M.Haun, USAF, editors, A–10s Over Kosovo (MaxwellAFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 2003), p. xxxiii; Reportby MSgt. Timothy M. Brown, “AFSOC in the Balkans:Provide Promise to Noble Anvil, 1992-1999” (HurlburtField, Fla.: Air Force Special Operations CommandHistory Office, 2000), p. 52; Benjamin S. Lambeth, TheTransformation of American Air Power (Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 190. 62. HQ USAF The Air War Over Serbia Initial Report,Sep. 30, 1999 (AFHRA IRIS no. 01149318), p. 34;USAFE History, 1998-1999, vol. I, p. xxviii; Col.Christopher E. Haave, USAF, and Lt. Col. Phil M.Haun, USAF, editors, A–10s Over Kosovo (Maxwell

AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 2003), p. xxxiv;USAFE History 1998-1999, vol. I (AFHRA call numberK570.01) Jan 1998-Dec 1999, vol. I; IRIS number01147645), p. 276.63. HQ USAF The Air War Over Serbia Initial Report,Sep. 30, 1999 (AFHRA IRIS no. 01149318), pp. 22, 33-34. 64. John A. Tirpak, “Short’s View of the Air Cam -paign,” Air Force Magazine vol. 82, no. 9 (September1999); B–2 Post Kosovo Briefing Slides by 509 BombWing of Air Combat Command (June 1999), sent fromRoy M. Handsel of the 678th ARSS to author by e-maildated Mar. 27, 2008.65. Report by MSgt. Timothy M. Brown, “AFSOC inthe Balkans: Provide Promise to Noble Anvil, 1992-1999” (Hurlburt Field, FL: Air Force History SupportOffice, 2000), pp. 43-45, 54 , 70.66. “Air Refueling Ensures Global Reach and GlobalPower,” historical report from the Air MobilityCommand history office, January 2007, pp. 24-25; HQUSAF The Air War Over Serbia Initial Report, Sep. 30,1999 (AFHRA IRIS no. 01149318). 67. Ibid., pp. 7, 23-24, 32-33, 36, 46, 48; Col.Christopher E. Haave, USAF, and Lt. Col. Phil M.Haun, USAF, editors, A–10s Over Kosovo (MaxwellAFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 2003), pp. xiii, xv, xvii;Susan H. H. Young, “Gallery of USAF Weapons,” AirForce Magazine vol. 90 no. 5 (May 2007), p. 142;USAFE History, 1998-1999, vol. I, pp. xxvii-xxviii;Interview of Lt. Gen. Michael C. Short, by PublicBroadcasting Service (AFHRA IRIS number01129172, call number K570.051-24, 1998-1999), p. 21;Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War (New York:Public Affairs, 2001), pp. 430, 438; John A. Tirpak,“Lessons Learned and Re-Learned,” Air ForceMagazine (August 1999), p. 23. 68. HQ USAF The Air War Over Serbia Initial Report,Sep. 30, 1999 (AFHRA IRIS no. 01149318), pp. 7, 23-24,32-33, 36, 46, 48; Col. Christopher E. Haave, USAF, andLt. Col. Phil M. Haun, USAF, editors, A–10s OverKosovo (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press,2003), pp. xiii, xv, xvii; Susan H. H. Young, “Gallery ofUSAF Weapons,” Air Force Magazine vol. 90 no. 5 (May2007), p. 142; USAFE History, 1998-1999, vol. I, pp.xxvii-xxviii (material used is U); Interview (U) of Lt.Gen. Michael C. Short, by Public Broadcasting Service(AFHRA IRIS number 01129172, call numberK570.051-24, 1998-1999), p. 21; Wesley K. Clark,Waging Modern War (New York: Public Affairs, 2001),pp. 430, 438; John A. Tirpak, “Lessons Learned and Re-Learned,” Air Force Magazine (August 1999), p. 23. 69. Air War Over Serbia Fact Sheet, contained inTestimony, CSAF to SASC/HASC on Readiness(AFHRA IRIS no. 01149329) tab 4; Gen. Wesley K.Clark, Waging Modern War (New York: Public Affairs,2001), p. 427; “Refueling Highlights, 1992-2007,” pub-lished by the Air Mobility Command history office in2008; Roy Handsel, “Talking Paper on B–2Participation in Operation Allied Force,” given toauthor during his visit to Eglin Air Force Base, Fla.,home of the 678th Armament Systems Squadron; Col.Mark D. Shakelford and others, “The MaterielSolution,” in Air War Over Serbia: Aerospace Power inOperation Allied Force, vol. II (2.1.0.3) (Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, 2000), p. 29. 70. HQ USAF The Air War Over Serbia Initial Report,Sep. 30, 1999 (AFHRA IRIS no. 01149318), p. 24; Col.Christopher E. Haave, USAF, and Lt. Col. Phil M.Haun, USAF, editors, A–10s Over Kosovo (MaxwellAFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 2003), p. xxxiv.


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The U.S. Air Force in the Air War Over Serbia, 1999

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