THE COLLECTOR'SFEDERAL EDITION

OF THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMIL-

TON IS LIMITED TO SIX HUNDRED

SIGNEDAND NUMBERED SETSOF WHICH

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The Works of\

AlexanderHamilton

Edited by

Henry Cabot Lodge

**The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for among old parchments ormusty records. They are written, as with a sunbeam, in the whole volume of human nature,by the handofthe Divinityitself,and can neverbe erasedor obscuredby mortalpower."

[HAMILTON_ThC Farltcer Refufed, x775, /Et. s8.]

**We are laboring hard to establish in this country principles more and more national,and free from all foreign ingredients_ so that we may be neither t Greeks nor Trojans_" buttruly AmeriL_tnS."--[HAMILTON1"OKING, 1796, 2_t. ]9.]

VolumeXI

G. P. Putnam's SonsNewYork and London_b¢_n|¢l_erb0cker_r¢_z

_.11

"_bc_ntckcrbockcrIPrc_,1Flewmork

THE FEDERALISTA COMMENTARY0N

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

REPRINTED FROM THE ORIGINALTEXT OF

ALEXANDER HAMILTON

JOHNJAY,A_DJAM_SMAmso_

._i?GOl

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION" P.GzL--THEAUTHORSHIP OF THE "FEDERALIST_: XV

II.--THEBIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE "FEDERALIST" xxxiIII.--THE TEXTOFTHE"FEDERALIST" X1

THE FEDERALIST

NO. I.---_ENERAL INTRODUCTION 3Purpose of the series to show the utility of the Union to

political prosperity, etc.

NO. II.---CONCERNINGDANGERS FROM FOREIGN FORCE

AND INFLUENCE 9

General introduction to the subject.

No. III.--THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED . I6The Union a protection against such dangers, by re-

moving the usual causes of just war, andby preventing vio-lations of compacts and treaties, on account of greaterefficiency and better character than are possessed by theState governments---The Union also better able to settleinternational differences.

No. IV.--THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED . 22

Unjust causes of war avoided--Creater ability to com-pel respect of other nations and prevent their attackingus from jealousy of our successful trade.

No.V.--THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED 28

Union secures us from foreign influence in the severalStates which would exist if they were not united, and pre-vents their alliance with foreign and rival nations.

vi ContentsPAOR

No.VI.--CONCERNINGDANGERS FROM DISSENSIONS

BETWEEN THE STATES 34

Reasonsforthesedissensionsif Statesremaindisunited,and especiallythe dangersfrom personal ambitionsinsmallStates--Historicalexamples--TheShaysrebellion--Argumentsof thosewhofavorseparateStatesansweredqHistoricalexamples-Appeal to the peoplefrom theseexanaples.

No.VII.--THESAMESUBJECT CONTINUED 42CausesfordissensionsamongStatesifdisunitedenumer-

ated.

No.VIII.--THECONSEQUENCESOF HOSTILITIESBE-TWEEN THESTATES. . 5_First,destructionoflifeandproperty;then,standing

armies,extensionof executivepower,the rise of the mili-taryoverthe civilpower---Objectionsto the Uniononthisscoreanswered--Armynotdangerousto liberty,if thereisa Union--Examplesof Greeceandof GreatBritain.

No. IX.--THEUNIONASASAPEOUARDAGAINSTDO-MESTICFACTIONAND INSURRECTION . 59

Dangerof thesetroublesin republics,andthe argumentthus afforded to the advocates of despotisms--The ad-vantage of a Confederacy--Historicalexamples---Montes-quieu's vlews--Distinction between confederationandconsolidation--Nature of a confederacy--TheproposedConstitutiona confederate-republicanform--TheLycianconfederacy.

No. X.--THE SAMESUBJECTCONTINUED • • 67Dangerof factionin the United States as elsewhere--

Nature of a faction--Modes of avoiding this dangerqSuperiorityof arepresentativegovernmentto ademocracyin preventingfactions--Theadvantageof a largerepublicin this respect.

No. XI.--THEUTILITYOF THEUNIONIN RESPECTTOCOMMERCIALRELATIONSAND A NAVY 79

Foreignnationsjealousof our commerce-Need of uni-fonnity of action--Respect commanded by a navy--Effectsof disuniononeommercc Onthe fisheries---Onthe

Contents viiPAGR

navigationoftheWesternlakesandtheMississippiriver--Jealousyof Spain--Advantagesof a navy--Internal com-merce--Europenotsuperiorto America.

No.XII._THE UTILITY OF THE UNION IN RESPECT TO

REVENUE 89Commercethe best sourceof wealth,and increasesthe

ability to pay taxes--Indirect taxation best suited toAmerica,and that must comefrom commerce--Taxationof this sort impossiblewithout Union--The results of adestructionof thisresource---Theneedofrevenue,and thebest sourcesforit ensuredby Union.

No.XIII.--ADVANTAGEOFTHEUNIONINRESPECTTOECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT 97

Onecivillistinsteadofmany--Smallconfederacieswillbeformed,eachasexpensiveasthesingleConfederacyproposed--Reasonsforthis.

No.XIV.--0BJECTIONSTOTHEPROPOSEDCONSTITU-TIONFROMEXTENTOFTERRITORYANSWERED . IOI

Distinctionbetweenarepublicandademocracy--Errorsastoancientrepublics--Extendingthelimitsofarepublic--TerritoryoftheUnitedStatesnottooextended,com-paredwithEuropeannations--JurisdictionoftheUnitedStateslimitedtoobjectsofgeneralinterest--PurposeoftheConstitutiontouniteStatesandaddtotheirnumber--IntercoursebetweentheStateswillbepromoted--AlltheStatesexposed,andallneedprotection.

No.XV.--THEINSUFFICIENCYOFTHEPRESENTCON-FEDERATION TO PRESERVE THE UNION IO9

Evil results of the present Confederation--Analysisofthe defects of the Confederation--Thetrue purposes ofgovernment--Impotenceof the Confederationforefficientgovernment---Experienceunderthe presentConfederation.

; No.XVI.--THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED I2I

Experienceofotherconfederacles--ThepresentCon-federationleadstodomesticwar,foreigninfluence,nationalruin,andmilitarydespotism--Unioncannotsoexist--Efficientgovernmentmustreachindividuals--Objectionsanswered.

viii ContentsPAGE

No.XVII.--THESAMESUBJECTCONTINUED i29The objectionthat thereservedrights of the Stateswill

be invaded--Thereal dangertheother way--Federal gov-ernmentstend to anarchy, not tyranny--The States willhave a superior influence--Reasonsfor thlsmHistoricalexamples.

No.XVIII.mTHESAMESUBJECTCONTINUED I35Historicalexamples.

No.XIX.mTHESAMESUBJECT CONTINUED I4_Historicalexamples.

No. XX._THE SAMESUBJECTCONTINUED I$2Theexampleofthe Netherlands.

No. XXI.--0THER DEFECTSOFTHEPRESENTCONFED-ERATION I$9

Nosanctionto its laws,nopowerto exactobedience,nopowerto punishdisobedience,no powerto useforcewiththe States,nopowerto assista Statein enforcingits ownlaws--Objectionas to interferingwithStatesanswered--Theprincipleof raisingmoneyby contributionsfromtheStates---Thisruleunequalandoppressiveandwillbecomeruinous--Theremedyproposed--Advantagesof taxesonarticlesof consumption,andof indirecttaxation.

No.XXII.--T_ESAMESUBJECTCONTINUED . I65No powerto regulatecommerce---Evilsof this lackof

power--Raisingtroopsby quota--Evilsof sucha system--The evilsanddangersarisingfrom theequalvote oftheStatesin Congress---Thewant of a judiciarypower--Theorganizationof Congressutterlyimproperforthe exerciseof suitablepowers--ThepresentConfederationneverrati-fiedby the people.

No. XXIII.--THE NECESSITYOF A GOVERNMENTASENERGETICAS THE ONE PROPOSEDTO THEPRESERVATIONOFTHEUNION . I80

Theobjectsof the federalgovernment--Thecommondefenceof the States andthe powersnecessary--Reasonswhythesepowersshouldnotbe lhnited--Failurein thisrespectof the Confederatlon--Remedlesof the C/restitu-tion.

Contents ixPAGE

No.XXIV.--THEPOWERSNECESSARYTOTHECOM-MONDEFENCEFURTHER CONSIDERED I8 7

Objectionasto standingarmy answered--Thesepowersgivento Congress--Limitationson Congress---Nointer-diction in State constitutions,with two exceptions,tostanding armies--None in articles of Confederation--Necessityof suchpowersin the federalgovernment--Ourcommercedemandsa navy.

No. XXV.--THE SAMESUBJECTCONTINUED I94Objectionthat Statescan providefor commondefence

answered--The commondefencecannot be entrusted totheseparateStatesbecauseit wouldbeoppressiveto someStates,mightbecomedangerousto all, wouldcreatejeal-ousiesbetweenthe States,andmightimperiltheauthorityof the Union--Provisionsof the Confederationin thisrespectc_Amistaketo restrainthe discretionof Congressin keepingor raisingarmies--Disadvantagesof militia--Standing armiessometimesnecessarywhenthere is noforeignwar--Exampleof PennsylvaniaandMassachusetts--Dangerousto restraintoo muchthefederalgovernment.

No.XXVI.--THEIDEAOFRESTRAININGTHELEGISLA-TIVEAUTHORITYIN REGARD TO THE COMMONDEFENCECONSIDERED . 20_

Its origin--Notinfavorhere---Theexclusionofmilitaryestablishmentsin timeof peace--Itsoriginandprogress_Givingthe authorityto Congressa sufficientsafeguard--Reasonsforthi= Objectionthat the Executivemay seizesuppliesansweredandan appealmadeonthis pointforUnion.

No. XXVII.--THESAMESUBJECTCONTINUED 2II

The objectionthat thenewgovernmentwillrequirethemilitary force to administerits laws considered--Thenationalgovernmentnot in dangerof popularill-willanymorethanthoseof the States--Reasonsforbelievingthatthe federalgovernmentwillbe betteradministeredthanthose of the States--Less liability to seditionagain_federalgovernment--Lesslikelyto requireforcethanthatproposedbythe opposition--l_easonsforthis---Thelawsofthe Union,so farasthey go,to be the supremelawof theland.

x ContentspA6I$

No.XXVIII.--THESAMESUBJECTCONTINUED. 2_6Casesin whichthe federalgovernmentmust useforce--

Equallynecessaryin plan of opposition--Employmentofforcecontrolledby Congress---IfCongressproveunfaithfulthere is the original right of self-defence---TheStates'securityagainst Federal usurpation--Further securityinthe extent of territory and the limited resourcesof thecountry.

NO. XXIX.---CONCERNINGTHEMILITIA 222Regulationofmilitiamustbe confinedtofederalgovern-

mentto secureuniformityof organizationand discipline--Objectionsthat no poweris givento federalmagistratetocall out possecomitatus,that dangermay be apprehendedfrom authority over militia, answeredmThe project of"Publius" fora militaryestablishmentandits advantages--The appointmentof officersof militia by States a suffi-cient safeguard--Objectionas to powerto ordermilitia todistant Statesanswered.

No.XXX.--CONCERNINGTHE GENERAL POWZR 01_TAXATION 23,Suchpowernecessarytoeveryconstitution--Evileffects

Ofwant of suchpower--Results in present Confederation--Objection that Congressshouldbe limited to externaltaxation answered--Evils and defects of the system ofrequisitions---Withoutgeneralpowerexistingfundswouldbe divertedin time of war--The generalpower willbringou_the resourcesof the country and give confidencetolenders.

No.XXXI.--THESAMESUBJECT CONTINUED 238The importanceof first principles---Inmorals and poli-

tias--Reasonsfor diversity of opinionon these matters--The positionsthus far establishedreviewed. The oppos-ing argumentsas to usurpations by the federalgovern-ment and as to federalaggressionson State governmentsreviewed--Thepopular sympathywith the State govern-ments.

No.XXXII.--THESAMESUBJECT CONTINUBD 245Objectionthat the generalpowerof taxationwouldin-

terferewiththe State levies considered--Barrieragainst

Contents xiPAGB

this danger--Federal sovereigntylimited--The only exoclnsivepower of taxationin the federalgovernmentis inlaying duties on imports--The power of taxation in allother respectsconcurrentwith that of the States--Proofof this--No repugnancybetweenfederaland Statepower--C_ncurrentauthoritythe necessaryresultof a dividedsovereignty.

No. XXXIII.--TH_. SAMESUBJ_.CTCONTINUED 25iObjectionsto incidentalpowersof taxationconsidered

mThese powersnecessarymTheirexpressgrant anact ofcaution--Thefederalauthoritiesand thentheirconstitu-ents the judgesof the proprietyof federalmeasures--Objectionsthat thetaxationlawsofthe Unionaresupremeconsidered,andthe necessityof this supremacyshown--Theselaws |irn_tedby the Constitution.

No. XXXIV.mTHE SAMESUBJECT CONTINUED ° 2S7

Concurrentauthority concerningtaxationthe only al-ternativeto completesubordinationof the States--Ab-surdity of denying the practicabilityof concurren_authority--ExamplesfromRomanhistory--Needsof thefederalgovernmen_forlargepowersof taxation.

NO.XXXV.--THE SAMESUBJECTCONTINUED 266Reasons fornot restrictingfederal governmentin the

matterof revenue--Restraintwould leadto inequalityof_axatlonand oppression--Objectionsthat the interest ofEaerevenuewould guardagainstan extremetariff,andthat all classes of tax-payingcitizenscannot be repre-sented,considered--Representationin Congressanalyzedin regardto taxation_od effectsof mixedrepresenta-_on andthe needof extensiveinformationamongrepre-sentatives.

No. XXXVI.--THE SXMZSUBJECT CONTINUED o . 274l_epresentatlonfurther consideredwith reference_o

taxation_The federal governmentable to exercise thepowerof internaltaxation--Betterthan the system ofrequisitions--Nodangerof conflictbetween State andfederalauthoritiesin regardto taxation--Minorobjectionsto powerof taxationconsidered.

xii ContentsPA_,B

No. XXXVII.---CoNCERNING THE DIFFICULTIES OFTHE CONVENTIONIN DEVISING A PROPER FORM

OF GOVERNMENT 285Difficultyofdiscussingpublicmeasuresin the right

spirit--Predeternfinedfriendsandenen_es--TheFederal/staddressedtoneither,buttothosewho wishmerelythehappinessofthecountry--Noveltyand difficultiesoftheworkpointedout--Theconstitutionofnecessitynotper-fect,buttheconventionworkedwithoutpartyfeeling,andall were finally satisfied.

No.XXXVIII.--THESAMESUBJECTCONTINUED,ANDTHE INCOHERENCEOF THE OBJECTIONS TO THE

NEw PLAN EXPOSED 295All governments of deliberation and consent hitherto

framed by individuals---Examples---Errors in the new sys-tem arise from lack of experience---The present situationof America--Exlsting evils shown, and the futility of theobjections and remedies of the opposition.

No.XXXIX.--THECONFORMITYOPTHEPLANTORE-PUBLICAN PRINCIPLES 308Onlya republicansystempossibleforAmerica--The

principlesofrepublicangovernmentshownby examples--The proposedConstitutionconformsto thestandard_ProofsofthisfromtheprovisionsoftheConstitution_Neitherwhollynationalnorwhollyfederal.

No. XL.--THE POWERS O_ THE CONVENTIONTO FORMA MIXED GOVERNMENT EXAMINED AND SUS-

TAINED 3,8The authorityunderwhichtheconventionactedex-

am{ned-Properevento haveexceededauthority,fromconsiderationsofdutymConstitutionmerelyrecommended--Necessity for a radical change---Whether the conventionexceeded its powers does not affect the question ofratification.

No.XLI.---GENERALVIEWO_TEEPOWERSCONFERREDBY THE CONSTITUTION 329

The quantity of power conferred--Not greater than itshould be---General objections considered--The objects

Contents xiiiPAGlg

of the powers conferred--Declaringwar and grantingletters of marque--Providingarmies and fleets--Reguolatingandcallingoutthe militia--Levyingtaxesandbor-rowingmoney.

No. XLII.--THE POWERSCONFE_EDBYTHECONSTI-TUTIONFURTHER CONSIDERED . 343Regulationofintercoursewithforeignnations--Ama-

bassadors,consuls,andtreaties--Punishmentofpiracy,feloniesonthehighseas,andoffencesagainstthelawsofnations---ReguLationofforeigncommerce--Thesanctionoftheslavetrade---Objectiononthatpointconsidered--MaintenanceofharmonyandproperintercourseamongtheStates--Inter-StatecommerceandtheIndiantrade--Coinageofmoney--Punishmentofcounterfeiters---Standardof weightsand measures_Naturalization--Bankruptcylaws--Ruleforprovingpublicacts--Post-roadsandpost-o_ces.

No.XLIII.--THESAME SUBJECTCONTINUED . 354Miscellaneouspowers--Copyrightsand patents--The

Federalcity--Punishmentof treason--Admissionof newStates--Governmentof territoriesand controlof publicproperty--Guarantyto everyState of a republicanformof government--Protectionof Statesagainstinvasionandagainst domestic violence---Assumptionof payment ofoutstandingdebts--Amendmentsto the Constitution--The establishmentof this governmenton the adherenceof nine States--Objectionthat this is a violationof theConfederation--RelationsbetweenratifyingStates andthosewhichrefuseto ratify.

No.XLIV.--RESTRICTIONSONTHEAUTHORITYOFTHESEVERALSTATES . 367

Forbiddingthe establishmentof treaties and alliancesbetween the States, the issue of letters of marque, thecoinageof money,the issueofbills ofcredit, the establish-ment of any legaltender other than gold and silver,thepassage of bills of attainder, the passage of e_-post-_actoLaws.the passage of laws impairingcontracts, the estab-lishmentof titles ofnobility, and the impositionof dutiesonexportsandimports--The powerto makealllawsneces-sary and proper to carry the precedingpowersinto execu-tion-Necessity of such a power--Prohibition of the

xiv ContentsPAGB

exerciseof any powersnot expresslydelegated--Positiveenumeration of general powers delegated--Negativeenumerationby specificationof reservedpowersand bysilence--Remedyfor an abuseof this generalpower--Thesupremacy of the Constitution,the constitutionallaws,and treaties--Oath of State and federaloffeersto supportConstitutlon--Nopartofthepowersdelegatedunnecessaryor improper.

No. XLV.--TH_. ALLEGEDDANGERPROMTHe.POWERSOF THE UNION TO THE STATE GOVERNMENTS

CONSIDERED 378ThenewConstitutionnotdangerousto theStategovern-

ments, because; the tendency in confederaciesis toweakenthe centralpower; the State governmentswillhave moreinfluenceamongthepeople; the Stategovern-mentsare essentialparts of the federal government;theofficersofthe UnitedStatesare lessnumerousthanthoseof the States; the reservedpowersarerelativelygreaterthanthosedelegated; theproposedchangeconsistslessingivingnewth_u in strengtheningoldpowers.

INTRODUCTION

I

THE AUTHORSHIPOF THE "FEDERALIST"

HE authorshipof certainnumbers of the Fed-eralisthas fairlyreachedthe dignityof a well-establishedhistoricalcontroversy,and has becomealmostas hopelessof settlementas the identityofJunius or the guilt of Mary, Queenof Scots. Incharacterit closelyresemblesthe formerquestion,ex-cept that the mysteryofJuniusis dueto his secrecy,_whilewiththeFederalistmoreauthorshaveconfessedthemselvesthan can be providedfor in the essays.

The discussionabout the Federalistbegannearlyseventyyearsago,has continuedat intervalsdownto the present day, and culminatedsometwentyyears since in two most elaborate essays,one byMr. Henry B. Dawson, the other by Mr. JohnC. Hamilton,which were prefixedto the editionsof the Federalistpublishedby those two gentlemenrespectively. It is of courseidle to supposethatany thing cannowbe writtenwhichwillconvinceorsatisfy everybodyas the true answerto this long-mootedquestion. Yet it is possible,perhaps,notonly to present the eVidence,includinga little thatis new,in a compactform,but alsoto state the case

xvi Introduction

and set forththe argumentsin brief and s_mplefashion,so thatthemeritsof the questionmaybereadilyunderstoodandeasilyappreciated.

The firststep is to employthe processof elim-inationwhichwill free us frommuch extraneousmatterand fromthe repetitionof many long andbewilderinglistsofnumbers.Wecanthrowoutfirstall thoseessaysof whichthe authorshiphas neverbeenquestioned.We can thendo the samewithcertainothersas to whichthe authoritiesare atvariance,but from whicha little examinationre-movesall doubt. This done, there will be left asmallnumberof essays,whichare the subjectofirreconcilableclaims,and on whichthis controversyreallyturns. The total numberof essays,accord-

' ingto modemnumbering,and as agreedto by bothHamiltonand Madison,is eighty-five. Ofthese,the.followinghave neverhad their authorshipdisputed,by any one,and are to be thus assigned:

To Hamilton: i, 6, 7, 8, 9, ii, i2, i3, xS,16,22,23,24,25,26, 27, 28,29, 3°, 3I, 32, 33,34,35,36,.59,60,61,65, 66, 67,68,69, 70,71, 72,73, 74, 75,76,77,78,79,80,81,82,83,84,85,rainall, 49.

To Madison:lO,14,37,38, 39,40, 41, 42,43,44,.45,46,47,48,--in all, 14.

ToJay: 2, 3, 4, 5,--in all,4.This disposesof 67numbers,and leaves i8 to be

stillaccountedfor--/, e.: 17,18,19,20, 21,49, 5o_51, 52, 53,54,55,56,57,58,62,63,64.

Wenowcometo the secondclassof essays,wherethe authorship,afterexamination,can be fixedwithentirecertainty. Number17 is claimedforMadi-

Introduction xvii

son in oneof his ownlists (thereare fourfromhishand),and in one of the two Jeffersonlists. Ham-ilton claimsit in all hisownlists, and Madisoncon-,cedesit to Hamiltonin threeofhis. WhenMadisonin any one of his four lists agreeswith Hamiltonas to the authorshipof any essay,it must be con-sideredas settled. Numberi7 thereforebelongstoHamilton. All the Hamiltonlists assignnumbersi8, i9, and 2o to Hamilton and Madisonjointly.Two of the Madisonlists give the authorship ofthese three papers exclusivelyto Madison. OneMadisonlist and one Jeffersonlist give i8 and 19exclusivelyto Madison,and 2owhollyto Hamilton.In his fourth and last list Madisonappends to No.i8 the followingnote: "The subjectof this and thetwo followingnumbers happenedto be taken upby both Mr. H. and Mr. M. What had been pre-pared by Mr.H., whohad enteredmorebrieflyintothe subject,wasleft with Mr.M.,on its appearingthat the latter was engagedin it, with largerma-terials, and with a viewto a more precisedelinea-tion, and from the pen of the latter the severalpaperswent to press." This note confirmsHamil-ton's statement that these three papers were thework of himselfand Madison,and to them jointlyNos. zS, I9, and so may thereforebe creditedwith-out any reserve. One Jeffersonlist and one Madi-son list give No. 2I to Madison. Three Madisonlists and all the Hamiltonlists giveit to Hamilton.No. 2z, therefore,can be set downlmhesitatinglytoHamilton. No. 64 is claimedby Madisonfor him-self in one of his lists; but in his three other lists,

xviii Introduction

and in one of the Jeffersonlist_, it is givento Jay.In fiveof the Hamiltonlists 64 is claimedforHam-ilton, and 54 is given to Jay. ChancellorKent'sHamiltonlist gives 64 to Jay, while the editionofx8xo credits both 64 and 54 to Hamilton. JayclaimedforhimselfNos. 2, 3, 4, 5, and 64,and theMS.of 64 has beenfoundamonghis papersand inhis ownhandwriting. There is thereforeno longerany doubt whatever as to 64,which can be givenwith absolutecertain_yto Jay.x

The eighteennumbers left over from the firstsiftingare nowreducedto twelve. Twoof the sixthus disposedof go to Hamilton,one goesto Jay,and the other three (i8, i9, and 20) to Hamiltonand Madisonjointly. This makesHamilton's t_ml5x; Jay's, 5; Madison's,as before, I4; and Madi-son's and Hamilton's jointly, 3. The twelve re-maJnlngnumbers(49, 5o, 5x, 52, 53,54, 55,56,57,58,62,and 63)are thoseover whichthe wholecon-troversyas to the authorshipof the Federalistreallyarises.

It now becomesnecessaryto notice brieflythevarious authorities in regard to the disputed au-thorship. The day beforehis fatal duel Hamiltoncalledat the officeof hisfriendEgbertBenson,andleft there a slip of paper in his own handwriting,whichread as follows:

"Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 54,by J."Nos. xo, I4, 37to 48inclusive,M.

zHamilton'serroras to No. 64 would seem _ohavebeen of longstanding,for in a note to the las_ numberof Cam_llus(x796)hecer-tainly suggeststhat he was hlm._ the author of that essay, Seo-col.vi.,p. x86.

Introduction xix

"Nos. t8, 19,_o,M.&H. jointly."All the othersby H."Mr. Egbert Bensonwas absent whenHamilton

called, but Mr. Robert Benson,his nephew,waspresent,saw thepaperdepositedby Hamiltonin avolumeof Pliny, and afterwardsexaminedit him-self. Judge Bensonon his returnpasted the slipthus left by Hamilton on the fly-leaf of his owncopyofthe Federalist. Thencehe removedit, aftermakinga copy,and presentedit for safe-keepingtothe NewYork Public Library,wherethe paper re-mained for someyears. It was still there in x8_8when, in the controversywhich then sprang up,William Coleman, the editor of the New YorkEveningPost,referredto it, and informedthe publicthat they couldcalland examineit. At somesub-sequenttime thisvaluabledocumentwasstolen,andit has neverbeenrecovered. In i8o2-i8o3 John C.Hamilton,at the requestand dictationofhis father,sent a list to Philip Church,a nephewof GeneralHamilton, which agreespreciselywith the Bensonlist. In 18o7the executorsof Hamilton'swill de-positedin the NewYork PublicLibraryHamilton'scopy of the Federalistin which the authorshipof the various numbers was said to be designatedin his own handwriting. Attention was called tothis fact by a letter in the Portfolio,attributed toChancellorKent, who there gave from the copythus depositeda list of the authors,correspondingexactlywith the Bensonlist. In iSio an edition ofHamilton'sworkswaspublishedin NewYork. Thesecond and third volumes contain the Federalist,

xx Introduction

and the authorof each paper is designated,as weare informedin the preface,"from a private mem-orandum in his own [Hamilton's]handwriting."The designationof authors in this edition is thesame as the Bensonlist, with one striking excep-tion: No. 54is given to Hamilton,and Jay is leftwith only four numbers. This differencewouldin-dicate either that the Por_oliolist was wronglygiven, or that the editor of the i8io edition hadsomelist of whichnothingis nowknown.

In a copy of the Federalistbelongingto FisherAmes,one of Hamilton'sintimate friends, the au-thors of the papers are designatedin accordancewith the Bensonlist.

I have in my possessiona copy of the Federal-ist of the edition of I8o2,which belongedto mygreat-grandfatherGeorgeCabot, who, li_e Ames,was a very closepersonalfriend of Hamilton. Tothe prefaceMr.Cabotappendedthis note: "Thoseby Mr. Jay and Mr. Madisonare now marked inthis edition,those without a mark are from the penof Hamilton." The markingcorrespondswith thatof the editionof i81o,fromwhichit may havebeentaken, and givesNo. 54to Hamiltonas wellas No.64. In the secondvolume,however,Mr.Cabothaswaferedin a slip of paper givinga list of the au-thors which correspondsexactly with the Bensonlist.

Thenthere is a list madeand preservedby Chan-cellorKent, whichhe says was revisedby Hamil-ton, andwhichdiffersfromthe Bensonlist by giving64 instead of 54 to Jay and 49 and 53to Madison

Introduction xxi

in additionto the fourteenassignedto himin theother Hamilton lists.

Finally, there is the Washingtonlist, which, sofar as I am aware,has neverbeenpublishedbefore,and forwhichI _roindebtedto the kindnessofJohnR. Baker, Esq., of Philadelphia. At the sale ofWashington'slibraryMr.Bakerpurchasedthe Gen-eral's copy of the Federalist,of the first editionof i788. On the fly-leafof the first volumeoccursthe followingmemorandumin Washington'swell-knownhandwriting:

"Mr. Jay wasauthor of Nos.i, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 54."Mr. Madisonof Nos. 1o, _4,and 37 to 48, ex-

clusiveof the last."Nos. 18, _9, 2o were the productionof Jay,

Madison,and Hamilton."All the rest of Gen.Hamilton."Washingtondied in 1799. He speaksof Hamil-

ton, it willbe observed,as "General,"and that fixeswithina yearthe timewhenhis list waswritten. Itmust have been madeup after July, 1798,and be-fore December,1799, and is therefore much theearliest list we have. It contains some curiousvariationsfrom all the other lists, and these differ-enceswouldseemto indicatethat Washingtonmadeit up from recollectionof informationderivedsev-eral years before from the authors. The stri_=ingand important fact is that this, the earliest list,drawnup by a singularlyaccurateman yearsbeforethere wasany thought of controversy,agreesin themain with the Bensonlist, and assignsthe twelvedisputedmtmbersunhesitatinglyto Hamilton.

xxii Introduction

We nowcometo the Madisonlists. The first ap-peared in the NationalIntelligencer,April 18, 1817,in a letter signed"Corrector," and was stated tobe from "indubitableauthority--a pencilledmemo-randum in the handwritingof Madisonhimself."The secondwasgivenby Madisonto RichardRushat about the sametime apparentlyas that of "Cor-rector." The third was publishedin the City ofWashingtonGazette,December15, I8i7, and wasstated "to be furnishedby Madisonhimself." Thefourth appearedin Gideon'seditionof the Federal-ist, published at Washington in 1818,and wastaken from Madison'snotes in his owncopy of thework.' These lists all agree in giving the twelvedisputed numbers to Madison, but they differamongthemselvesas to other numbers in a verymarkeddegree.

There are two Jeffersonlists. One was in hiscopyof the Federalist,and correspondswith themosterroneousMadisonlist, that furnishedto theWashingtonGazette,whilethe otherwasgivento hisfriend GideonGranger,and is identicalwith theBensonlist.2

Theonly informationderivedfrom Mr.Jay wasthat hewasthe authorof Nos. 2,3, 4, 5, and64. x

Thuswe find that the two principalauthorsofthe Federalistare at varianceas to the authorshipof twelveimportantnumbers.

Havingstatedwhat the authoritiesare,it merely' Thiscopyis nowinthe possessionof the Governmentin _aelibrary

of Congress.The Grangerlist isnowin thepossessionofthe Hon.RobertC.Win-

throp, of Boston.

Introduction xxiii

remains to examine them. Suggestionshave notbeenwantingthat the principalHamiltonlist, thatof Benson,never existed. It is difficultto seehowany one couldseriouslyentertain suchan idea, butin this inquiry I do not proposeto pass over anytheory which has even been hinted at. In hisintroductionto the Federalistwhichis markedbythe most extraordinarycare,and is thoroughto thelast degreein details,Mr. Dawsonsaysthat he hadan interview with Mr. Robert Benson,who waspresentin the officewhenHamiltoncamein and leftthe memorandum,and from this eye-witnessMr.Dawsonreceivedthe wholestory. Mr.Bensonsaidthat he sawHamilton and saw the list whichwasin Hamilton'shandwriting; that his unclemade acopyof it, whichstill exists,andthat hisunclethendeposited the original in the New York PublicLibrary. There,as has beensaid,the list remainedfor many years. There it could havebeen and nodoubtwas seenby any onewhochoseto look at it,and in 1818public attention was calledto it andeverybodywas invited to examineit. During allthose years its existenceand its authenticity werenever questionedfor a moment,evenin the some-what sharp controversywhichthen arose. To sup-posethat it did not exist, is to assumethat EgbertBensonand his nephewwere eitherliars or forgers,or both, and the mere statement that such an as-sumption is necessary,is sufficientto destroy atonceany theory that the Bensonlist never existedin Hamilton'shandwriting.

All the Hamiltonlists agreeexceptas to No. 54,

xxiv Introduction

whichtheeditionof181ogivestoHamilton.Chan-cellorKent'slistgives64toJay,whichiscorrect,and49and53toMadison.Astothetwolastthedifferenceispeculiar,buttheChancellorcorrectedhislistinlateryears,andowingtotheconfusionbetweentheoriginalandthemodem mnnbering,thechangesasto49and53seemtolosesignificance,especiallyastheyaretwoofthefirsttenofthedis-putednumbers,andthesetenallcomingconsecu-tively,mustonanyreasonabletheorybeassignedtooneortheotheroftheauthorsinablock.Thenextstepistofindouttheerrorsofthedif-

ferentauthoritiesastotheundoubtednumbers,inordertoproperlytesttheirvalueastothoseindis-pute.TheoneunquestionederrormadebyHam-iltonwasastonumber54.HegaveJayhiscorrecttotaloffivenumbersbutassignedhim54insteadof64.We arenowtryingthevalueoftheselistssimplyasdocumentsbytheordinaryrulesofhis-toricalevidence,andthiserrormaybejustlysaidtoimpairtheirauthority.Thisbeingadmitted,letusapplythesamerulestotheMadisonlists.InGideon'seditionof1818Madisonconcedes18,19,and2otobethejointworkofHamiltonandhim-self,andgives17and21toHamiltonand64tolay.In hisfirst ]]st, that of the NationalIntelligencer,heclaims i8, I9, and 2o as exclusivelyhis own work,and also64, whichbelongedto Jay. In the Rushlist Madisonagain claimedi8, I9, and 2ofor him-selfalone. In the WashingtonGazettelist he takes17, I8, x9,and 2x to himself,two of them beingjoint and two belongingto Hamilton,and gives2o,

Introduction xxv

whichwastheth{rdjointnumber,whollytoHam-flton.Theauthorityofthelistsotherthanthatoftheeditionof1818cannotbequestioned,forMadi-sonsaysinalettertoGideon,datedAugust2o,1818(Writings,_d.,iio)""Itmay,however,beproper,perhaps,toobservethatit[hiscopylenttoGideon]isnottheonlyonecontainingthenamesofthewriterscorrectlyprefixedtotheirrespectivepapers.I had,a considerabletimeago,attherequestofparticularfriends,giventhesameadvantagetotheir copies."

In the Hamiltonlists, then, wefind two errorsasto two numbers,whilein the Madisonlists there aretwelve errorsas to six numbers. Tried, therefore,by the list of admitted errors,Hamilton'sauthorityis shownto be six timesas goodas that of Madison.But this is not all. In 18o7 the Bensonlist, or onejust like it, was published,and in i8io came theedition of Hamilton'sworks,whichgavefour num-bers to Jay, fourteento Madison,and all the rest toHamilton. Yet it was not until 1817that the au-thority of these assignmentswas publiclydisputedfor the first time. Over ten years elapsed afterthe publicationin the PortfoliobeforeMadisoncon-tradicted Hamilton's list, whichis a very seriousmatter if weagainapplythe rulesofevidence. Theexcusethat it wouldnot havebeenbecomingin thePresidentto have entered upon a literary contro-versy will not do, for the publicationin the Port-folioprecededMadison'selevationto the presidencyby nearly eighteenmonths,and there wascertainlyno reason why a Secretary of State should not

xxvi Introduction

defendhis copyright. There is still another pointwhichtells against Madison. In a letter to J. K.Paulding,written in _83_,z as wellas in an unpub-lishedmemorandum"quoted by J. C. Hamiltoninthe introduction to his edition of the Federalist,Madisonargues frominternal evidencethat he wasthe author of certainof the disputedpapers. Thiswouldnot havebeen doneprobablyby a man whohad no doubtin his ownmind as to the essays,andit certainlywouldnot be the courseof any onewhohad contemporarymemorandato guide and assurehim. Madison'sargument from internal evidencemakesit clearthat he compiledhis listfrommemory.There is no direct evidencethat Ho:miltondid thesame,exceptfromhis error in regardto Jay's num-ber on the treaty power. The probabilities,how-ever, are strong that he also wrote his lists frommemory,and all the lists, therefore, stand on thesamefootingin this respect.

The argumentsfrom internal evidenceon bothsides,whether by Madisonor others, seem to befor the most part worthless. One, for example,isthat No. 49 speaksin terms of praise of Jefferson,and therefore could only have proceeded fromMadison. But the essayswerewritten in I788,andin 1788Hamiltonknew Jeffersonsimply as a re-

t Writingso_Madison,iv., x76.A carefulsearchfor this memorandum,whichMr.J. C. H_mil_on

alleges,in his editionof the Federalist(p. C), to have beenin theState Department,has failedto revealit. This is entlrely_m_mport-ant,however,as the memorandummerelydiffersverbally fromtheargumentin the letter to Paulding,whichis of unquestionedauthen-fifty.

Introduction xxvii

volufionaryleader,whowasrespectedbyallmen,andhadneverhadanypoliticalquarrelwithhim.Moreover,theessay,afterquotingJeffersonandpraisinghim,goesontorefutehisdoctrineastothepointinquestion.Itisalsosaidthat49continues48,andmustthereforebebythesamehand.Butthisargumentfailsifwe examinetheundoubtednumbers.No.9,forinstance,ison"theutihtyoftheUnionasa safeguardagainstdomesticfactionandinsurrection,"whileNo.xois"thesamesub-jectcontinued,"andNo.9isbyHamiltonandNo.iobyMadison.Astothehistoricalexamplescitedintheessays,MadisonandHamiltonusedthesameillustrations and drew from the same sources,asmay be seen from the notes and briefs of theirspeeches. The differencesin style are never suffi-cientlymarkedto lead to any safeconclusions.

This much, as has alreadybeen said,may be as-sertedwith confidence:that Hamiltonand Madisonboth relied upon their memories. We have there-forecertainconflictinglistsof the highestauthority,and ifwegomerelyuponthe documentaryevidencetried by the ordinaryrules of historicevidence,thebalanceinclinesvery stronglyin favorof Hamilton.The proportion of admitted errors, the ten yearswithout contradiction, and Madison'sargumentsfrom internal evidenceall tend to show in thestrongest way that Hamilton's memory was de-cidedly the more accurate. But if we go beyondthe direct documentaryevidence,the case is notquite so clear. The best Hamiltonlist, that givento Benson,was written in haste and at a most

xxviii Introduction

agitatingmoment.Itcontainsoneacknowledgedslipofthepenwhichgives54insteadof64toJay.Asan ingeniouswriter in the HistoricalMagazine(vol.8, 3o6)suggests,"37 to 48 inclusiveby M." mayhave beenanother slipfor "37 to 58 inclusive,byM." The essaysfrom 49 to 58 inclusive,all dealwith the samegeneralsubjectofthe popularelementin the Constitution,includingrepresentationin thelowerHouse,and on their face they certainlyseemto be fromthe samepen. Madison,in the letter toPauldingjust quoted, says that Hamilton'serrorsweredue,of course,to haste and a lapseofmemory,but if he himselfwas accusedof errors they couldonly be attributed to a want of veracity. This istrue to the extent that Madisongave time andthought to his assignmentand contradictedHamil-ton deliberately. Yet he, too, wrotefrommemory,and in fourlistshe madetwelveerrors,whichwerecertainlyowingto forgetfulnessand not to untruth-fulness.

The theory of the writer in the HistoricalMaga-zineprovidesvery comfortablyfor the ten numbersfrom 49 to 58inclusive,but it breaksdownutterlyas to 52and 53,the remainingtwo of the twelveindispute. As to these two I have very little doubt.I think they both belongto Hamilton. They followthreeundoubtedHamiltonnumbers,and they treatof the Senate,a subjecton whichHamiltonmadeamostelaboratespeechin the NewYork convention,and the generalline of thought and argument isthe same in both cases. It was, too, a topic to J

whichH_mi!tonhad givenparticularattention,and ]1

Introduction xxix

thismayhavebeenthereasonthathefellintoarterrorastonumber64,whichisconcernedwiththetreaty-makingpower of the Senate. As to everydoubtfulnumberoutsideof the ten from 49-58,Madisonwas in error,and this seemsto me to befatallyagainsthimasto62and63.Inregardtothedisputedten,Ihavebeenableto

cometonoconfidentconclusion.BeforeIknewoftheWashingtonlist,andbeforeIhaddiscoveredacuriousadditiontoNo.56intheeditionof18o2,IfeltthattheprobabilitieswereinfavorofMadison,andIwasinclinedtoassignthosenumberstohim,althoughnotsoconfidentlyasingiving62and63toHamilton.

The Washir_gtonlist, both fromits date and thecharacter of its author, seemsto me to tell very

"stronglyagainstMadison. Theotherpoint to whichI havejust alludedin regardto number56,hasneverbeen noticedbefore,so far as I am aware. Whenthe edition of x8o2was in preparation,Hamiltonwasaskedto reviseit, but declared,in the strong-est terms, that the Federalistmustbe printed as itwas written, and he also insisted that full credit.shouldbe ,givento Mr. Jay and Mr.Madisonin theprefacefor the excellenceof their work. The edi-tion was revised, unquestionably,I think, as Mr.Dawsonhas shown,by Wi11iamColeman,the editorofthe New¥ork EveningPost. Manychangesweremade, but, with one exception,they were utterlyunimportant, effectedno improvement,and werenearlyall purelyverbal. In number56,however,intreating of the regulationof the militia,a sentence:

xxx Introduction

is inserted,asmaybe seenby referringto that num-ber in this edition,whichrelatesto the need oflocalknowledgein dealingwith suchtroops. Thissentenceis a bit of military criticism,and couldhardlyhavebeenwrittenby anybuta rn_litaryman,for it wouldnot have occurredto a civilian. It isveryunlikelyindeedthat it wouldhaveoccurredtoColeman,and he certainlywouldnot have insertedit without Hamilton'sapprobation. On the otherhand, there is little doubt that the proof-sheetsofthis edition were seen by Hamilton,and the sen-tencein questionis very characteristicof Hamiltonand of his mode of thought. Hewasrigidlyscru-pulous as to changesin the Federalistand wasextremelyparticularas to the work of his fellow-writers. Hopkins,the publisherof the edition ofx8o2,wroteto Mr. J. C. Hamiltonthat the mostscrupulousdelicacywas observedin regard to theessaysofMadisonandJay, and that a portionof theworkwas reprinted becausea singlefavoritewordof Madisonhad been changedin one passage. Itis thereforein the highest degreeimprobablethatHamiltonwouldhaveaddedsuchan importantsen-tence himself,or permitted any one elseto add it,to an essaywhichhe did not know to be his own.Theinsertionof this sentence,therefore,pointsverystronglyto the conclusionthat Hamilton,in x8o2,considerednumber56his own,not in a momentofagitation and hurry, but when coolly examiningproof-sheets. If this was his opinionat that timeandundersuchcircttmstancesas to number 56,it isdifficultto believeeitherthathe wasmistakenas to

Introduction xxxi

that numberor as to theothertwelve in dispute.At the sametime,theWaqhlng_onlistand the sen-tencein number56 are not, of course,conclusive,and whilethesetwo bits of evidencehave almos_removedmy inclinationto believe in Madison'sauthorshipof thedisputednumbers,I am not evenyet completelysatisfiedthattheyarenothis work.

Theoutcomeofit all isthattheevidenceinregardto thetwelvedisputednumbersis soconflictingthat,althoughthebalanceisstronglyin Hamilton'sfavorthe bestwhichcan be doneis to presentthe plainfactsand all the argumentsas simplyand clearlyas possible,and thenleaveeveryone to drawhisconclusionsto suit himself. No one is entitledtoassignthe disputednumbersto eitherHamiltonorMadisonwithabsoluteconfidence.Theyweresurelywrittenby oneor theother,and withthatunsatis-factorycertaintywemust fainbecontent.

II

BIBLIOGRAPHYOF THE "FEDERALIST"

Protracted and minutesearch,supplementedbywidespreadadvertisements,andby the obligingaidof manykindcorrespondents,has enabledme to addonlytwo editionsto the list of editionsof the Fed-eralistalreadygiven by Mr.Dawson. In a few in-stanceswhereMr.Dawsonwasable to speak of aneditiononlyfromhearsay,I havesucceededin find-inga copyand in obtaininga full descriptionof it.This, however,is all, and the bibliographyof theFederalistwhich follows is in the main that of

xxxii Introduction

Mr.Dawson'seditionof x863,to whichthe readermay bereferredformuchminutebibhographicalin-formationwhichitdidnotseemnecessarytore-producehere.I.Thefirsteditionwasthatofx788,publishedby

J.andA.McLean,ofNewYork.ThefirstvolumeappearedMarch22,1788,andthesecondfollowedonMay 28th.Whenthesecondvolumeappearedtheessayswerestillrunninginthenewspapers,andnumbers78to85inclusivewerethereforefirstgiventotheworldinthisedition.Thetitle-page,isasfollows:

"The Federalist:/ A Collection/ of / Essays,/written in favourof the / new Constitution,/ asagreeduponby thefederalconvention/ SeptemberI7, I787./ In twovolumes/ Vol.I or Vol.II / NewYork:/ PrintedandsoldbyJ. andA.McLean,/ No.4I, Hanover-Square./ M.DCC.LXXXVIII."

Thisfirsteditionis nowvery rare, and copies,es-peciallyif they are in goodcondition,commandahigh price.

II. Thesecondeditionwas a Frenchtranslation,publishedin 1792,with the followingtitles:

"Le Fdd6rahste,/ ou / Collectionde qu_lquest_critsen faveurde / la Constitutionpropos_eauxl_tats-Unis/ de l'Am_rique,par la Conventioncon-voqu_e/ en x787; Pubhdsdans les ]_tats-Unisdel'Amdriquepar/MM.HAMILTON,MADISSONe-GAY,/Citoyensde1'EtatdeNewYork./ TomePremier.(or TomeSecond.)/ A Paris / ChezBuisson,Li-braire, rue Hautefuille,/ No. 20. / i792." ThetranslatorwasM.Trudainedela Sablidre,whoadded

Introduction xxxiii

a few explanatorynotes,an introductionof abouteighteenpages,anda translationofthe Constitution.This editionwasreissuedby the same publisherinthe _rne year. Thesecondissuewasidenticalwiththe first, exceptthat-the introductionwas omitted,:probably for political reasons. Neither Brunet(Manueldu Libraire)nor Graesse(Tr_sordesLivres_'ares)mentions the Fsderalist. Barbier (Diction-_aire des Anonymes) mentions this edition ofI792,but not-the secondFrenchedition of i795.Both.issuesof this first Frenchedition are of theutmost rarity. I have heard of but one exampleof the firstissue,the imperfectcopyin the libraryofHarvard College,referredto by Mr.Dawson. Thesecond issue is almost equallyrare. There is onecopyin the NewYorkState Library(mentionedbyMr. Dawson),anotherin the libraryof YaleCollege,and a third was sold at auction not long since,inBoston,for twenty-fivedollarsa volume. I am in-debted to Mr. AddisonVan Name of Yale Collegefor proofof the identityofthesetwoissuesof x79_,whichMr. Dawsoncorrectlyconjecturedto be thecase. I am also indebtedto Mr.HenryA. Homes,

, State Librarianof NewYork,in additionto manyother kind suggestions,for muchexact informationas to the Frencheditions.

III. A second French editionwas publishedini795. It was identicalwith the secondissue ofi792, omitting,like that, the introduction. Therewerethreeslightchangesin thetitle-page:"SecondeEdition" is insertedbefore"Tome Premier,"Jay's_:me is spelled correctly, and at the bottom,

xxxiv Introduction

instead of the usual date, appears UAn 3:de laR4publique." This edition also is of the utmostrarity.

IV. All that Mr. Dawsoncouldsay of the fourthedition of the Federalistwasthat "it is said thatin the yeari799 a neweditionof the Federalistwaspublishedin New York." Mr. Dawson,after themostexhaustivesearch,failedto find a copy,andonlyheardofone,or whatappearedto be one,in thecollectionof Mr. Force,whilehis ownvolumewaspassingthroughthe press,andhewasthereforecom-pelled to leave the existenceof such an editionlargelya matter of conjecture. This gap can nowbe filleck There is a copyof this edition,probablyunique, for the Porte copy seemsto have disap-peared, in the possessionof the Long Island His-toricalSociety,and I am indebtedto the kindnessofMr.GeorgeHannah,the librarianof the Society,formy knowledgeof its existenceand for the followingcopyofits title-page:

"The / Federalist/ A Collectionof / Essays /Written in favour of the/New Constitution/ Asagreeduponby the / FederalConvention/ Septem-ber I7, I787/ In two volumes/ Vol. I / Vol. II /NewYork/ Printedandsoldby JohnTiebout/ No.358Pearl St. / x799." It was simplya reprint ofthe editionof z788.

V. The fifth edition of the Federalistwas pub-lished,in two volumes,by GeorgeHopkins,of NewYork,in i8o2. In thiseditionmanychanges,nearlyall verbal, were made in the text. As has beenstated above ("Authorshipof the Federalist,"p.

Introduction xxxv

xix.) the reviser of this editionwas probablyWil-liam Coleman,the editorof the NewYork EveningPost. It was representedat the time and after-wardsthat thiseditionhadthe benefitofHamilton'ssupervision. The onecertainfact is that Hamiltonin the strongesttermsforbadeany alterations. Theresult,dueperhapsto this prohibition,wasthat thechangesand omissionswere,with one markedex-ception already alludedto, quite immaterial. Itseemsprobablethat Hamiltonsawthe proof-sheets,but whether he thoroughlyapprovedthe changesmust remaina matter of conjecture. This editionof 18o2is not raze.

VI. The sixth editionwas publishedin i8io byWilliamsandWhitingof NewYork,andformedthesecondand third volumesof the Writingsof Ham-il_n. It was edited by John Wells, a distin-guishedmemberof the NewYork bar, and one ofHamilton'spersonalfriends. Withbut fewand un-important changesitfollowedtheHopkinseditionof18o2,althoughthetextwassaidtohavehadthebenefitofthemarginalnotesmadebyHamiltoninhisown copy.Theprincipalandtheonlynewfeatureofthiseditionwasthatthenamesofthere-spectiveauthorswereappendedtoeachessay.ThisassignmentofauthorshipcorrespondswiththeBen-sonlist,exceptthatNo.54,aswellasNo.64,iSgiventoHamilton.Itisnotarareedition.VII.The seventheditionoftheFederalistwas

asingleoctavovolumeofsome477pages,publishedbyBenjaminWarnerofPhiladelphiaandWilliamGTeerofHarrisburg,andisnownotoftenmetwith.

Xxxvi Introduction

It was a simplereproductionof the W]!!_amsandWhitingeditionof i8io.

VIII. The eighth edition, in one volume,wasissued in i818 by BenjaminWarner of Philadel-phia,the publisherof the seventh,withwhichit wasidentical,the only new feature being an appendixcontainingthe articlesof Confederationandthe Con-stitutionofthe UnitedStateswiththe amendments.Thiseditionis rare.

IX. The ninth editionwas a largeoctavo of 67Ipages,and waspublishedin i818 by JacobGideon,in Washington. It was claimedthat this editionhad the sanctionand approvalof Madison. It cer-tainlyhad the benefitof the notesmadeby him onhis ownessays,and it containedhis assignmentofthe authorshipof the variousnumbers. Thetext isthat of the Williamsand Whitingeditionof iSIo,andthe changesin Madison'sessaysare verbalandunimportant. It contained,besidesthe Federalist,prefatory remarks, and in the appendix, Ham-ilton's "Letters of Pacificus,"Madison's"Letters ofHelvidius,"the articles of Confederationand theConstitutionof the United States. Copiesof thiseditionare not common.

X. The tenth edition was publishedby JacobGideonat Washingtonin i82i. It isa reprintofhiseditionof i818.

XI. The eleventheditionwas the firstof a seriesofeditionspublishedat Ha[lowell,Maine,by Glazier& Co., and their successors,who purchased theGideoncopyright. Someof these editionsare nowvery rare, whileothers are not infrequentlyto be

Introduction xxxvii

met with. The first appeared in i826. It is asinglevolumeoctavo,of 582pages,and is identicalwiththe Gideoneditionsof 1818and 1821.

XlI. The twelftheditionhas no existencethatMr. Dawsoncoulddiscover,exceptin the pagesofthe catalogueof theNewYorkStateLibrary. If itexisted,itwasa Hallowelledition,andidenticalwiththat of the precedingyear. Mr. Homes,the li-brarian,suggestedto Mr.Dawsonthat the entrywasa misprintfor 1837,the date of anundoubtedHallo-welleditionwhichwasin theNewYorkLibrary. Mr.Homeswritesmethat no editionof 1827has sincebeenfound,and that the questionstands as it didin 1863,when Mr. Dawsondiscussedit. It seemsimprobablethatanysucheditionof1827everexisted.

XlII. The thirteenthwas anotherHallowelledi-tion, identicalwiththe Gideoneditionandwith thatof 1825. Mr. Dawsonmentions the existenceofthis edition,but had neverseenor heardof a copy.Mr.Hannah,_informsme that there is a copyin thepossessionofthe LongIslandHistoricalSociety,andI haveheardofoneother. It waspublishedin 183_by Glazier,Masters,&Co.,and is apparentlyasrareas oneof the Frencheditions.

XIV. The fourteentheditionwas publishedin asinglevolume,duodecimo,at Washington,in 183i.Except for a few triflingchangesand the additionof an alphabeticalindex by Philip R. Fendall, amemberof the Washingtonbar, this editionwasanexact reprint of the Gideonedition,and was con-sideredby the Hallowellpublishersa violationoftheir copyright.

xxxviii Introduction

XV. The fifteentheditionwas publishedin onevolume,at Hallowell,by Glazier,Masters,& Smith,in x837. It was a reprint of the Gideoneditionofi818.

XVI. The sixteenth edition was a Portuguesetranslationpublishedby J. Villeneuve& Co.at Riode Janeiro in I84o. No copyis knownto exist inthis country. The title-page, which is given bySabin,is as follows: '!O Federalista,publicadoeminglezpor Hamilton,Madissone Jay cidadaosdeNova-York,e traduzido emportuguezpor.Riode Janeiro: Typ. Imperiale Const.de J. Ville-neuve& Co., I84O." I am indebtedfor my know-ledgeofthis andthe tenth editionmentionedabove,neither of whichare given by Mr.Dawson,to Mr.PaulLeicesterFord, author of the excellentBiblio-thecaHamiltoniana,whichhas just appeared in ahandsomeoctavo volume.

XVII. The seventeenthwas another HalloweI1edition,a relSrintof the othersfrom the samepress,and appearedin r842.

XVIII. The eighteenthedition was publishedinonevolumeby J. & G.S. Gideon,in Washington,inI845. It was a reprint of the editionof i8x8,withthe additionofthe index ofthe Washingtoneditionof x83I, with some improvements. Mr. Dawsonfailedto discovera copy of this edition,but I aminformedby Mr. P. L. Ford that there is a copy,fromwhichhe has taken the title-pagein hisBiblio-thecaHamiltoniana(p. 27), in the possessionof hisfather, Mr.GordonL. Ford,of Brooklyn.

XIX. Thenineteentheditionwaspublishedin one

Introduction xxxix

volume,in Philadelphia,by R. WilsonDesilver. Itwasa reprintofthe Gideoneditionof i818,withthealphabeticalindex of i83i and the additionof theact of Congressof January 23, x845,relating tothe electionof President. It wouldseem to havebeena reprintof the precedingeditionof I845.

XX. Thetwentiethwasa Hallowelledition,pub-lishedin i852by Masters,Smith,& Co.,andwas areprint of their other editions,withthe additionofan analyticalindex.

XXI. The twenty-firstwas alsoa HaUowelledi-tion,publishedin I857,and wasan exact reprint ofits predecessorof I852.

XXII. The twenty-secondedition of the Fed-eralistwas printed for the editor, Mr. Henry B.Dawson,at Morrisania,NewYork,and publishedini863. This edition,whichis the mostvaluableonehitherto published,was designedfor two volumes,of whichthe first alonehas appeared. The volumepublishedcontains the Federalistwith the ori-ginalnotesof the authors,a mostlearnedintroduc-tion discussingthe history,bibliography,text, andauthorshipof the essays,and a mostadmirablean-alyticaltable of contents,supplementedby a com-parative list, showingthe authorshipof the essaysas claimedby the variousoriginalauthorities.

XXIII. The twenty-third or "University" edi-tion waspublishedin onevolume,at NewYork,byCharlesScribner'sSons,in I864. It waseditedbyMr. Dawson,and wasa reprint of the first volumeof his largeredition,withoutthe introduction.

XXIV. The twenty-fourtheditionwas published

xl Introduction

in one volumeby J. B. Lippincott& Co.,at Phila-delphia,in z864. Thiseditionwaseditedby Mr.J.C. Hamilton, and contains, besidesthe essays,atable of contents,an historicalnotice, whichdis-cussesat length the history,text, and authorshipof the essays,the sixnumbersof the Continentalist(i78z), the resolutionof New York (i782) for ageneralconvention,a letter from Hamiltonto Clin-ton, Mayz4, z783,resolutionfor a generalconven-tion (i783),theaddressof the Annapolisconvention(z786),Hamilton'sspeechonthe Impostgrant,reso-lutionforan actofCongressfora generalconvention,February z7, z787,resolutionfor the appointmentof New York delegates,February 26, i78?, thearticlesof Confederation,Hamilton'sfirst plan ofgovernment,the federal Constitution as agreedupon by the convention,a table of collatedtexts,three essaysby Philo-Publius(W_ Duer),andan alphabeticalindex.

Thisconcludesthe list ofeditionsof the Federalistso far as I have been able to discoverthem. Itis quite possiblethat there have been otherspub-lishedin this countryor in Europein additionto thetwenty-fourdescribed,but if this is the case, themost careful inquiry and wide advertising havefailedto discoverthem.

IIl

THE TEXT OF THE " FEDERALIST_'

The essaysof the Federalistwere first printedin the newspapers,and werethen republishedwith-

Introduction xli

out substantialtextual changein the McLeanedi-tion of I788. In i8o_, the Hopkinsedition,de-scribedabove,appearedwithmany textual changesin the essayswrittenby Hamilton,and in i818 theGideonedition,withfurtherchangesin the Madisonessays. The newtext of these two editionswasadoptedin allsubsequenteditions,untilthe appear-anceof the one publishedin _863by Mr.Dawson,who reverted to the original text. Mr. John C.Hamilton,in his editiona year later, adoptedtheHopkinsand Gideontext. Thus it happensthatthere aretwo texts of the Federalistwhichcontendfor the honorof beingthe best and most authenticversionof thesefamousessays.

I havehad nohesitationin decidingas to the textto be adoptedin this edition. Mr.Dawson'sargu-ment in favor of the originaltext is unanswerable,and can be readily summarized. Theessaysof theFederalistwere written at a special time for aspecialpurpose. They formedan elaborateargu-ment,intendedto convincethe peopleofthe countryof the valueand usefulnessof the proposedConsti-tution, and it is, therefore,historicallyessentialthatwe shouldhave them in the preciseform in whichthey did their work.

The Federalistfurthermorewas the first au-thoritative interpretationof the Constitution,andwas mainlywrittenby the twoprincipalauthorsofthat instrument. It was the first expositionof theConstitutionand the firststep in the longprocessofdevelopmentwhichhasgivenlife,meaning,andim-portanceto the clausesagreeduponat Philadelphia.

xlii Introduction

It has acquiredall the weight and sanctionof ajudicialdecision,andhasbeenconstantlyusedas anauthority in the settlementof constitutionalques-tions. The essaysof Publiusare undoubtedlyagreat work upon the general subject of politicalfederation,and if they were nothing else, textualchangesand improvementswould be at least de-fensible,ifnot whollydesirable. But changesceaseto be permissiblewhenthe writingsin questionarenot only essayson the generalsubject of politicalfederationand governmentunder a written consti-tution, but are alsoargumentsintendedto serveaspecificpurposeat a particular time, whichhaveassumedthe weightand sanctity of judicialinter-pretation.

The authority for the .most extensivechanges,moreover,is by no meansclear. It is certainthatHamiltonopposedany alterations,and indeedfor-bade them. It is concededalsothat the changesinthe editionof i8o2 were not made by Hamilton,with the exceptionprobably of the paragraph inNo.56,andthe extent of hisapprovalof themis amatter ofconjecture. Thefurtherslightchangesinthe editionof z8_8have, it is true, the sanctionofMadison,but what we desirenowis not Madison'sargumentsin the phraseswhichhe preferredin I818,but in thewordswhichhe actua!!yusedin I787andI788.

Finally,thechangeswere,as a rule,tmimportan_,often trivial,withtwo or three exceptions,entirelyverbal,and, in my opinion,madeno improvement.The text of this edition, therefore,is the original

Introduction xliii

text of the newspapersand the McLeaneditionofi788 as adoptedby Mr. Dawson. I have added afewnotesgivingthe textof the subsequentchangesineverycasewhere,they seemedofthe slightestim-portance,or where,by any possibleconstruction,theycouldbeconsideredto affectthemeaningofthepassage.

In only one point is Mr. Dawson'seditionas itseemsto me open to criticism,and in that pointalonedoesthis editiondepartfrom his text. TheMcLeaneditionchangedthe originalnumberingofthe essaysasthey appearedin the newspapers. No.35of thenewspaperswasputbackin the seriesandnumbered29. Thinwasa properchange,becauseitplacedtheoriginalNo.35whereitbelongedinthenaturalsequenceof subjectsand arguments. TheoriginalNos. 29and 3° thusbecame30 and 3x,re-spectively. Then the McLeaneditiondividedtheoriginalNo. 3x into twoparts, andnumberedthem32and 33- Thischangehasno apparentreason,butit isperfectlyharmlessandunimportant. Theeffectof thesechangeswasto advancethe McLeanessaysonenumbereachoverthe newspaperoriginalsup to76, which became 77 in the book-form. The re-mainingessays, 78 to 85 inclusive,appearedfirstfromtheauthor'smanuscriptin theMcLeanedition,and werereprintedin the newspapersfromthat edi-tion probably with the newspapernumbering,sothat no No. 85 ever appearedin the newspapers.It is obviousthat the McLeaneditionmust havehad theapprovalof Hamilton,becausethelast eightnumberswere printed from_hismanuscript;andif

xliv Introduction

the editionhad his sanction,of coursethe arrange-ment and numberingmust have had it also, forthesewerethe onlypointsonwhichit differedfromthe newspapers. It is clear,therefore,tb_:tHamil-ton thought the McLeannumberingan improve-ment,and the changesthen made in this directionhave of courseno effectwhateveron the authorityof the Federalisteither as arg_mentor interpreta-tion.

Mr.Dawsonshowsby an _ngenlousbit of reason-ing that there was no "originalnumber 77," andaccordinglyomitsthat numberfrom hisedition,andthus makeshis lastnumber85. Thereisno ground,as I havepointedout, for thus adheringto an enu-merationwhichomitsonenumberbecausetherewasconfusionin the differingformsof originalpublica-tion, and whichhas no peculiarauthority or sanc-tion. Thereis,moreover,onefatal objectionto Mr.Dawson'ssystem,in the fact that the numberingofthe McLeaneditionhasbeen_!v_versallyadoptedinall subsequenteditionsandhasbecomethe standardof reference. It is to be regrettedthat Mr.Dawson,in deferenceto rigid antiquarianism,should havemarred his edition by a numberingwhich, for nosubstantialreason,differsfromtheacceptedstandardand which,on this account and by omitting onenumberaltogether,makesintelligentreferenceto itdifficult,if not impossible.

Thetext ofthisedition,therefore,is,as I havesaid,the untouchedoriginaltext, and the essaysare num-beredaccordingto what,in my opinion,is the origi-nal arrangement,andwhichis certainlythe best, as

Introduction xlv

it is the standardnumbering,thatofthe firsteditionof I788.

In conclusion,I have only to expressmy thanksto the many k_nd correspondentswho have givenme informationas to the Federalistand its edi-tions,and to state my obligationsto the workofMr.Dawson,to whosemasterly introductionand ad-mirableanalyticaltable of contentsthis and all thesubsequenteditionsof the essaysof Publiusmustbe largely indebted.

HENRY CABOT LODGE.May _I,,886.

THE FEDERALIST

¥OL.Xl...--LZ

4 AlexanderHamilton

act may, in this view,deserveto be consideredasthe generalmisfortuneof ma_l_nd.

Thisideawilladdthe inducementsofphilanthropyto those of patriotism, to heighten the solicitudewhichallconsiderateandgoodmenmust feelfor theevent. Happy will it be if our choiceshouldbedirectedby a judiciousestimateofour true interests,unperplexedand unbiassedby considerationsno_connectedwith the publicgood. But this is a thingmoreardentlyto be wishedthan seriouslyto be ex-pected. Theplanofferedto ourdeliberationsaffectstoo many particular interests, innovatesupon toomany localinstitutions,not to involvein its discus-sion a variety of objectsforeignto its merits,andof views,passionsand prejudiceslittle favorabletothe discoveryof truth.

Amongthe mostformidableofthe obstacleswhichthe new Constitutionwill have to encountermayreadily be distinguishedthe obviousinterest of acertain class of men in every State to resist allchanges which may hazard a diminution of thepower,emolument,and consequenceof the officesthey hold under the State establishments; andthe perverted ambition of another class of men,who will either hope to aggrandizethemselvesbythe confusionsof their country, or will flatterthemselveswith fairer prospectsof elevationfromthe subdivisionof the empire into several partialconfederaciesthan from its union under one gov-ernment.

It is not, however,my designto dwellupon ob-servationsof this nature. I am wellaware that i_

The Federalist 5

would be disingenuousto resolve indiscriminatelythe oppositionof any set of men (merelybecausetheir situations might subject them to suspicion)into interested or ambitious views. Candor willobligeus to admitthat evensuchmenmaybe actu-atedby uprightintentions;andit cannotbedoubtedthat much of the oppositionwhichhas made itsappearance,or may hereafter make its appear-mace,will springfrom sources,blamelessat least,if not respectablc the honest errorsof mindsledastray by preconceivedjealousiesand fears. Sonumerousindeed and so powerfulare the causeswhichserveto givea falsebiasto the judgment,thatwe,uponmanyoccasions,seewiseand goodmenonthe wrongas wellas on the rightsideof questionsofthe first magnitudeto society. This circumstance,ifdulyattendedto, wouldfurnisha lessonofmodera-tion to those who are ever so much persuadedoftheir beingin the right in any controversy. And afurther reasonfor caution,in this respect,mightbedrawn from the reflectionthat we are not alwayssurethat thosewhoadvocatethe truth areinfluencedby purer principlesthan their antagonists. Ambi-tion, avarice,personalanimosity,party opposition,and many other motivesnot more laudable thanthese, are apt to' operate as wellupon thosewhosupport as those who opposethe right side of aquestion. Were therenot even these inducementsto moderation,nothingcouldbe moreill-judgedthanthat intolerantspirit whichhas, at all times, char-acterizedpolitical parties. For in politics,as inreligion,it is equally absurd to aim at m_]ring

6 Alcx_LnderH_milton

proselytesby fireand sword. Heresiesin eithercanrarelybe curedby persecution.

And yet, howeverjust these sentimentswill beallowedto be,wehavealreadysufficientindicationsthat it willhappenin this as in all formercasesofgreat nationaldiscussion. A torrent of angry andmalignantpassionswillbe let loose. Tojudgefromthe conductof the oppositeparties, weshallbe ledto concludethat they willmutuallyhope to evincethe justness of their opinions,and to increasethenumber of their convertsby the loudnessof theirdeclamationsand the bitternessof their invectives.An enlightenedzealfor the energyand efficiencyofgovernmentwillbe stigmatizedas the offspringofatemper fond of despoticpower and hostile to theprinciplesof liberty. An over-scrupulousjealousyof dangerto the rightsof the people,whichis morecommonlythe fault of the head than of the heart,will be representedas mere pretenceand artifice,the stale bait for popularityat the expenseof thepublicgood. It willbe forgotten,on the oneb_and,that jealousyis the usualconcomitantof love,andthat the nobleenthusiasmof libertyis apt to be in-fectedwith a spirit of narrowand illiberaldistrust.Onthe other hand, it willbe eqlla1!yforgottenthatthe vigorof governmentis essentialto the securityofliberty; that, in the contemplationofa soundandwell-reformedjudgment,their interest can neverbe separated;and that a dangerousambitionmoreoftenlurks behindthe speciousrusk of zeal fortherights of the peoplethanundertheforbiddingappearanceof zeal forthe firmnessand efficiency

The Federalist 7

of government. History will teach us that theformerhas been founda muchmore certainroadto the introductionof despotismthan the latter,and that of those menwho have overturnedtheliberties of republics, the greatest number havebegun their careerby paying an obsequiouscourtto the people;commencingdemagogues,and endingtyrants.

In the courseofthe precedingobservations,I havehad an eye,my fellow-citizens,to puttingyou uponyour guard against all attempts, from whateverquarter, to influenceyour decisionin a matter ofthe utmostmomentto yourwelfare,by anyimpres-sions other than thosewhichmay result fromtheevidenceof truth. Youwill,no doubt,at the sametime, havecollectedfromthe generalscopeofthem,that theyproceedfroma sourcenotunfriendlyto thenew Constitution. Yes,my countrymen,I owntoyou that, after having given it an attentive con-sideration,I am clearlyof opinionit is yourinterestto adopt it. I am convincedthat this is the safestcourse for your liberty, your dignity, and yourhappiness. I affectnot reserveswhichI donot feel.I willnotamuseyouwith an appearanceofdelibera-tion whenI have decided. I franklyacknowledgeto you my convictions,and I willfreelylay beforeyou the reasonson whichthey are founded. Theconsciousnessofgoodintentionsdisdainsambiguity.I shallnot, however,multiplyprofessionson thishead. My motivesmust remain in the depositoryof my ownbreast. My argumentswill be opentoall, and may be judgedof by all. They shall at

8 AlexanderHamilton

leastbe offeredin a spiritwhichwillnot disgracethecauseoftruth.

I propose,in a seriesof papers,to discussthe fol-lowing interesting particulars:raTheutility of theUNION to your politicalprosperity---Theinsuffi-ciencyof the presentConfederationto preservethatUnion--Thenecessityof a governmentat leastequallyenergeticwith the oneproposed,to the attainmentofthisobject--Theconformityof the proposedConstitu-tion to thetrueprinciplesof republicangovernment--Its analogytoyourownStateconstitution--andlastly,The additionalsecuritywhichits adoptionwill affordto the preservationof thatspeciesof government,toliberty,and to property.

In the progressofthis discussionI shallendeavorto give a satisfactoryanswerto all the objectionswhichshallhavemade their appearance,that mayseemto haveany claimto yourattention.

It may perhaps be thought superfluousto offerarguments to prove the utility of the UNION, apoint, no doubt, deeplyengravedon the hearts ofthe greatbodyofthe peoplein everyState,and one,whichit tonybe imagined,hasno adversaries. Butthe fact is, that wealreadyhearit whisperedin theprivate circlesof those who opposethe new Con-stitution, that the thirteen States are of too greatextentfor any generalsystem,and that wemustofnecessityresortto separateconfederaciesof distinctportionsofthe whole.' Thisdoctrinewill,in allprob-

x The same idea, tracing the arguments _o their consequences, isheld out in several of the late publications against the new Constitu-tion._PUBLIUS.

The Federalist 9

ability,be graduallypropagated,till it has votariesenoughto countenancean openavowalof it. Fornothingcanbemoreevident,tothosewhoare abletotakean enlargedviewofthe subject,than the alter-native of an adoptionof the newConstitutionor adismembermentof the Union. It willthereforebeofuse to beginby examiningthe advantagesofthatUnion,the certainevils,and the probabledangers,to whicheveryState willbe exposedfromits disso-lution. This shallaccordinglyconstitute the sub-ject of mynext address.

PUBLIUS.

FortheIndependentJourr_l

THEFEDERALIST.No.II

0xY)

To thePeopleof theS_ateofNew York:Whenthe peopleof Americareflectthat they are

now calleduponto decidea question,which,in itsconsequences,mustproveoneofthe mostimportantthat ever engagedtheir attention, the propriety oftheir takinga very comprehensive,aswellas a veryserious,viewof it, willbe evident.

Nothing is more certain than the indispensablenecessityofgovernment,andit is equallyundeniable,that wheneverand howeverit is instituted, thepeoplemust cedeto it someof theirnatural rights,in order to vest it with requisitepowers. It is wellworthy ofconsiderationtherefore,whetherit wouldconducemoreto theinterestofthe peopleofAmerica

xo AlexanderHamilton

flaat they should,to all generalpurposes,be onenation,under onefederalgovernment,or that theyshould divide themselvesinto separate confedera-cies,andgiveto the headof eachthe samekind ofpowerswhichthey are advisedto placein one na-tionalgovernment.

It has until lately been a receivedand uncon-tradicted opinion,that the prosperityof the peopleof America dependedon their continuingfirmlyunited, and the wishes,prayers, and effortsof ourbestandwisestcitizenshavebeenconstantlydirectedto that object. But politiciansnow appear, whoinsistthat thisopinionis erroneous,andthat insteadof loo16ngfor safety and happinessin union, weought to seek it in a divisionof the States intodistinct confederaciesor sovereignties.Howeverextraordinarythis newdoctrinemay appear,it nev-erthelesshas its advocates;and certaincharacterswho were much opposedto it formerly,are atpresentofthe number. Whatevermaybe the argu-ments or inducementswhich have wrought thischangein the sentimentsand declarationsof thesegentlemen,it certainly wouldnot be wise in thepeopleat large to adopt these new politicaltenetswithoutbeingfullyconvincedthat they arefoundedin truth and soundpolicy.

It hasoftengivenmepleasureto observe,that in-dependentAmericawas not composedof detachedand distant territories,but that oneconnected,fer-tile, wide-spreadingcountry wasthe portionof ourwestern sonsof liberty. Providencehas in a par-titular manner blessedit with a variety of soils

The Federalist Ii

and productions,and wateredit with innumerablestreams,for the delightand accommodationof itsinhabitants.Asuccessionofnavigablewatersformsa kindof chainrounditsborders,as if to bindit to-gether; whilethe most nobleriversin the world,rtm_ingat convenientdistances,presentthemwithblghwaysfortheeasycommunicationoffriendlyaids,andthemutualtransportationandexchangeoftheirvariouscommodities.WithequalpleasureIhaveasoftentakennotice,

thatProvidencehasbeenpleasedtogivethisoneconnectedcountrytooneunitedpeople---apeopledescendedfromthesameancestors,speakingthesamelanguage,professingthesamereligion,at-tachedtothesameprinciplesofgovernment,verysimilarintheirmannersandcustoms,andwho,bytheirjointcounsels,arms,andefforts,fightingsideby sidethroughouta longandbloodywar,havenoblyestablishedgenerallibertyandindependence.Thiscountryandthispeopleseemtohavebeen

madeforeachother,andit appearsas if it wasthedesignof Providence,that an in_heritanceso properandconvenientfor a bandof brethren,unitedtoeach otherby the strongestties, shouldneverbesplitinto a numberof unsocial,jealous,and aliensovereignties.

Similarsentimentshavehithertoprevailedamongall ordersanddenominationsof menamongus. To_11generalpurposeswe haveuniformlybeen onepeople; each individualcitizeneverywhereenjoy-ing the samenationalrights,privileges,and protec-tion. Asa nationwehavemadepeaceandwar; as a

I2 AlexanderHamilton

nationwehavevanquishedourcommonenemies;asanationwehave formedalliances,andmade treaties,and enteredinto variouscompactsand conventionswith foreignstates.

A strongsenseofthe valueand blessingsofunioninducedthe people,at a very earlyperiod,to insti-tute a federalgovernmentto preserveandperpetual;eit. They formedit almost as soonas they had apoliticalexistence;nay, at a timewhentheirhabita-tionswereinflames,whenmanyoftheircitizenswerebleeding,and when the progressof hostility anddesolationleft little room for those calm and ma-ture inquiriesand reflectionswhichmust ever pre-cede the formation of a wise and well-balancedgovernmentfor a freepeople. It is not to be won-dered at, that a governmentinstitutedin timessoinauspicious,shouldonexperimentbe foundgreatlydeficientand inadequateto the purposeit was in-tendedto answer.

This intelligent people perceivedand regrettedthese defects. Still continuingno less attached tounionthan enamoredof liberty, they observedthedanger whichimmediately threatened the formerand moreremotelythe latter; and beingpersuadedthat amplesecurityforboth couldonlybe foundina nationalgovernmentmorewiselyframed,they,aswith one voice, convenedthe late conventionatPhiladelphia,to take that importantsubjectunderconsideration.

This convention,composedof menwhopossessedthe confidenceof the people,and many of whomhadbecomehighlydistinguishedbytheir patriotism,

The Federalist I3

virtue,andwisdom,intimeswhichtriedthemindsandheartsofmen,undertookthearduoustask.Inthe mild seasonof peace,withmindsunoccupiedbyother subjects,they passed many months in cool,uninterrupted,and daily consultation;and finally,without havingbeenawedby power,or influencedby any passions except love for their country,they presentedandrecommendedto the peopletheplan producedby their joint and very unanimouscouncils.

Admit, for so is the fact, that this plan is onlyrecommended,not imposed,yet let it be rememberedthat it isneitherrecommendedto blindapprobation,nor to blindreprobation; but to that sedate andcandidconsiderationwhichthe magnitudeand im-portanceof the subject demand,and whichit cer-tainlyoughtto receive. But this (aswasremarkedin the foregoingnumberofthis paper)is moreto bewishedthan expected,that it maybe so consideredand examined. Experienceon a former occasionteachesus not to be too sanguinein suchhopes. Itisnotyet forgottenthat well-groundedapprehensionsof imminentdangerinducedthe peopleof Americato form the memorableCongressof x774. Thatbody recommendedcertain measuresto their con-stituents, and the event provedtheir wisdom; yetit isfreshin our memorieshowsoonthe pressbeganto teem with pamphletsand weeklypapersagainstthosevery measures. Not onlymanyof the officersof government,whoobeyedthe dictatesof personalinterest, but others, from a mistakenestimate ofconsequences,or the undue influenceof former

x4 AlexanderHamilton

attachments,orwhoseambitionaimedatobjectswhichdidnotcorrespondwiththepublicgood,wereindefatigableintheireffortstopersuadethepeopletorejecttheadviceofthatpatrioticCongress.Many,indeed,weredeceivedanddeluded,butthegreatmajorityofthepeoplereasonedanddecidedjudiciously;andhappytheyareinreflectingthattheydidso.TheyconsideredthattheCongresswascomposed

ofmanywiseandexperiencedmen.That,beingconvenedfromdifferentpartsofthecountry,theybroughtwiththemandcommunicatedtoeachotheravarietyofusefulinfoi_Y_tion.That,inthecourseofthetimetheypassedtogetherininquiringintoanddiscussingthetrueinterestsoftheircountry,theymusthaveacquiredveryaccurateknowledgeonthathead.Thattheywereindividuallyinter-estedinthepubliclibertyandprosperity,andthere-forethatitwasnotlesstheirinclinationthantheirdutytorecommendonlysuchmeasuresas,afterthemostmaturedeliberation,theyreallythoughtpru-dentandadvisable.Theseandsinailarconsiderationstheninducedthe

peopletorelygreatlyonthejudgmentandintegrityoftheCongress;andtheytooktheiradvice,not-withstandingthevariousartsandendeavorsusedtodeterthemfromit.ButifthepeopleatlargehadreasontoconfideinthemenofthatCongress,fewofwhomhadbeenfullytriedorgenerallyknown,stillgreaterreasonhavetheynowtorespectthejudgmentandadviceoftheconvention,foritiswellknownthatsomeofthemostdistinguishedmembers

The Federalist _S

of that Congress,who have been sincetried andjustly approvedfor patriotismand abilities,andwhohavegrownold in acquiringpoliticalinforma-tion, were also membersof this conventionandcarriedinto it their acolmulatedknowledgeandexperience.

It is worthyofremarkthat notonlythe first,buteverysucceedingCongress,as wellas the late con-vention,have invariablyjoinedwiththe peopleinthinldng that the prosperityof Americadependedon its Union. To preserveand perpetuateit wasthe great objectof the peoplein formingthat con-vention,and it is also the great objectof the planwhich the conventionhas advisedthem to adopt.With what propriety, therefore,or for what goodpurposes,are attempts at this particular periodmadeby somemento depreciatethe importanceofthe Union? Or why is it suggestedthat three orfour confederacieswouldbe better than one? I ampersuaded in my own mind that the peoplehavealwaysthoughtrighton this subject,and that theiruniversaland uniformattachment to the cause ofthe Unionrestsongreat andweightyreasons,whichI shall endeavorto developand explain in someensuing papers. They who promote the idea ofsubstitutinga numberof distinct confederaciesinthe roomof theplanof the convention,seemclearlyto foreseethat the rejection of it wouldput thecontinuanceof the Unionin the utmostjeopardy.That certainlywouldbe the case, and I sincerelywish that it maybe as clearlyforeseenby everygoodcitizen,that wheneverthe dissolutionof the Union

I6 AlexanderHamilton

arrives,Americawillhavereasonto exclaim,in thewordsof the poet: "FAREWELL!ALONGFAREWELL

'_ TO ALL MY GREATNESS."PUBLIUS.

For tho Independent Journal

THE FEDERALIST. No. III

(JAY)

To thePeopleof theStateof New York:It is nota newobservationthat thepeopleof any

country(if,likethe Americans,intelligentand well-informed)seldomadopt and steadilypersevereformanyyearsin an erroneousopinionrespectingtheirinterests. That considerationnaturally tends tocreategreat respectforthe high opinionwhichthepeopleof Americahave so long and uniformlyen-tertained of the importanceof their continuingfirmlyunited underonefederalgovernment,vestedwith sufficientpowersfor all generaland nationalpurposes.

The more attentivelyI considerand investigatethereasonswhichappearto havegivenbirth to thisopinion,themoreI becomeconvincedthat they arecogentand conclusive.

Amongthemany objectsto whicha wiseand freepeoplefindit necessarytodirecttheirattention,thatof providingfortheir safety seemsto be the first.Thesafetyof thepeopledoubtlesshasrelationto agreat varietyof circmnstancesand considerations,

The Federalist 17

and consequentlyaffordsgreat latitudeto thosewhowishto defineit preciselyandcomprehensively.

At present I mean only to considerit as it re-spects security for the preservationof peace andtranqnillity,as wellas againstdangersfromforeignarmsand influence,as fromdangersof the likekindarising from domesticcauses. As the former ofthesecomesfirst in order, it is proper it shouldbethe first discussed. Let us thereforeproceed toexaminewhetherthe peopleare not right in theiropinion that a cordial Union, under an efficientnationalgovernment,affordsthemthe best securitythat canbe devisedagainsthostilitiesfromabroad.

Thenumberof warswhichhavehappenedor willhappenin the worldwill alwaysbe found to be inproportionto the numberand weightof the causes,whether realor pretended,whichprovokeor invitethem. If this remarkbe just, it becomesusefultoinquire whether so many lust causesof war arelikelyto be givenby UnitedAmericaasby disunitedAmerica; for if it shouldturn out that UnitedAmericawill probablygivethe fewest,then it willfollowthat in this respectthe Uniontendsmost topreservethe peoplein a state of peacewith othernations.

The _ustcausesof war, for the most part, ariseeither from violationsof treaties or from directviolence. Americahasalreadyformedtreatieswithno less than six foreignnations,and all of them,exceptPrussia,are maritime,and thereforeabletoannoy and injureus. She has alsoextensivecom-mercewith Portugal,Spain,and Britain,and, with

VOL*XI.--_.

x8 AlexanderHamilton

respectto the two latter,has, in addition,the cir-c_lmstanceof neighborhoodto attendto.

It is of highimportanceto the peaceof Americathat she observethe laws of nationstowardsallthese powers,and to me it appearsevidentthatthiswillbe moreperfectlyandpunctuallydonebyonenationalgovernmentthanit couldbe eitherbythirteenseparateStatesor by threeor fourdistinctconfederacies.

Becausewhenonce an efficientnationalgovern-mentis established,the bestmenin thecountrywillnot onlyconsentto serve,butalsowillgenerallybeappointedto manage it; for, althoughtown orcountry,or other contractedinfluence,may placemenin Stateassemblies,orsenates,orcourtsof jus-tice,or executivedepartments,yet moregeneralandextensivereputationfortalentsand otherqualifica-tionswillbenecessaryto recommendmento officesunder the national government, cspeciallyas itwillhave the widestfieldfor choice,and neverex-periencethat want of proper personswhichis notuncommonin some of the States. Hence, it willresultthat the administration,the politicalcounsels,and the judicialdecisionsof the national govern-ment willbe morewise,systematical,and judiciousthan those of individualStates, and consequentlymoresatisfactorywith respectto other nations,aswellasmoresalewith respectto us.

Because,underthe national government,treatiesandarticlesoftreaties,as wellas thelawsofnations,willalwaysbe expoundedin onesenseand executedin the samema:_er,mwhereasadjudicationson the

The Federalist '9

samepointsand questions,in thirteenStates,or inthreeor four confederacies,willnot alwaysaccordor be consistent; andthat, as wellfromthe varietyof independentcourts and judges appointed bydifferentand independentgovernments,as fromthedifferentlocal lawsand interestswhichmay affectand influencethem. Thewisdomofthe convention,in committingsuchquestionsto the jurisdictionandjudgment of courts appointed by and responsibleonly to one national government,cannot be toomuch commended.

Becausethe prospectof presentlossor advantagemay oftentempt the governingparty in oneor twoStates to swervefrom goodfaith and justice; butthosetemptations,not reachingtheotherStates,andconsequentlyhaving little or no influenceon the-national government,the temptationwillbe fruit-less,andgood faith and justicebe preserved. Thecaseof the treaty of peacewith Britain adds greatweightto this reasoning.

Because,evenif the governingparty in a Stateshouldbe disposedto resist suchtemptations,yet,as suchtemptationsmay, and commonlydo, resultfrom circumstancespeculiarto the State, and mayaffect a great numberof the i_habitants,the gov-erningparty may not alwaysbe able,if willing,topreventthe injusticemeditated,orto punishthe ag-gressors. But the nationalgovernment,not beingaffectedby those local circttmstauces,will neitherbe inducedto commit the Wrongthemselves,norwant power or inclinationto preventor punishitscommissionby others.

2o AlexanderHamilton

So far,therefore,as either designedor accidentalviolationsof treatiesand the lawsof nationsaffordlust causesof war,theyare lessto be apprehendedunderone generalgovernmentthan underseverallesserones, and in that respectthe formermostfavorsthe safetyof the people.

Asto thosejust causesof war whichproceedfromdirect and unlawfulviolence,it appears equallyclear to me that one good national governmentaffordsvastlymore securityagainstd_ugersofthatsortthan canbe derivedfromany otherquarter.

"Becausesuchviolencesare morefrequentlycausedby the passionsand interestsof a part than of thewhole;ofoneor twoStatesthanofthe Union. Nota singleIndianwar hasyet beenoccasionedby ag-gressionsof the present federal government,feebleas it is; but there are severalinstancesof Indianhostilitieshaving been provokedby the improperconduct of individual States, who, either unableor unwill_ugto restrainor punish offences,havegiven occasionto the slaughterof many innocentinhabitants.

The neighborhoodof Spanishand British terri-tories,borderingon someStates and not on others,naturallyconfinesthecausesofquarrelmoreimme-diatelyto the borderers. The borderingStates, ifany,willbe thosewho,underthe impulseof suddenirritation,and a quick senseof apparentinterest orinjury,will be most likely,by direct violence,toexcitewar with these nations; and nothingcan soeffect_l_!!yobviatethat dangerasa nationalgovern-ment,whosewisdomand prudencewill notbe di-

The Federalist 2I

minishedbythepassionswhichactuatethepartiesimmediatelyinterested.Butnotonlyfewerjustcausesofwarwillbegiven

bythenationalgovernment,butitwillalsobemoreintheirpowertoaccommodateandsettlethemamicably.Theywillbemoretemperateandcool,andinthatrespect,aswellasinothers,willbemoreincapacitytoactadvisedlythantheoffendingState.Theprideofstates,aswellasofmen,naturaUydis-posesthemtojustifyalltheiractions,andopposestheiracknowledging,correcting,orrepairingtheirerrorsandoffences.Thenationalgovernment,insuchcases,willnotbeaffectedbythispride,butwillproceedwithmoderationandcandortocon-sideranddecideonthemeansmostpropertoex-tricatethemfromthedifficultieswhichthreatenthem.Besides,itiswellknownthatacknowledgments,

explanations,andcompensationsareoftenacceptedassatisfactoryfroma strongunitednation,whichwouldberejectedasunsatisfactoryifofferedbyaStateorconfederacyoflittleconsiderationorpower.Intheyear1685,thestateofGenoahavingof-

fendedLouisXIV.,endeavoredtoappeasehim.HedemandedthattheyshouldsendtheirDoge,orchiefmagistrate,accompaniedbyfouroftheirsena-tors,toFrance,toaskhispardonandreceivehisterms.Theywereobligedtosubmittoitforthesakeofpeace.Wouldheonanyoccasioneitherhavedemandedorhavereceivedthelikehumilia-tionfrom Spain,or Britain, or any other powerfulnation? PUBLIUS.

22 AlexanderHamilton

For theIndependentJournal

THE FED]_I_ALIST.No. IV

(S.Y)

To thePeopleoftheStateol New York:Mylast paper assignedseveralreasonswhy the

safetyofthe peoplewouldbe best securedby unionagainst the danger it may be exposedto by lustcausesof war given to other nations; and thosereasonsshowthat such causeswouldnot only bemore rarely given,but wouldalso be more easilyaccommodated,by a national governmentthaneither by the State governmentsor the proposedlittle confederacies.

But the safety of the peopleof Americaagainstdaugersfromyoreignforcedependsnot onlyontheirforbearingto givelust causesofwar to other nations,but alsoon theirplacingand continuingthemselvesin sucha situationasnot to invitehostilityorinsult;for it neednot be observedthat there are pretendedas wellas just causesof war.

It is too true, howeverdisgracefulit may be tohuman nature, that nations in generalwill makewarwheneverthey have a prospectof getting anythingby it; nay, absolutemonarchswilloftenmakewarwhentheirnationsare to get nothingby it, butfor purposesand objectsmerely personal,such asa thirst for militaryglory,revengefor personalaf-fronts,ambition,or privatecompactsto aggrandi_or support their particular familiesor partisans.Theseand a variety of other motives,whichaffectonly the m_udof the sovereign,often lead him to

The Federalist a3

engagein warsnot sanctifiedby justiceor the voiceand interestsof his people. But, independentoftheseinducementsto war,whichare moreprevalentin absolutemonarchies,but whichwelldeserveourattention, there are others whichaffectnations asoften as kings; and someof them willon examina-tion be found to grow out of our relativesituationand circumstances.

WithFranceand with Britainweare rivalsin thefisheries,andcan supplytheir marketscheaperthanthey can themselves,notwithstandinganyeffortstoprevent it by bountieson their own or duties onforeignfish.

Withthemand withmostother Europeannationswe are rivalsin navigationand the carryingtrade;and we shall deceiveourselvesif we supposethatanyofthemwillrejoiceto seeit flourish;for, as ourcarryingtrade cannotincreasewithoutin somede-greediminishingtheirs,it is moretheirinterest,andwillbe moretheirpolicy,to restrainthan to promoteit.

In the trade to ChinaandIndia,weinterferewithmore than onenation,inasmuchas it enablesus topartake in advantageswhichthey had in a mannermonopolized,and as we thereby supply ourselveswith commoditieswhichwe used to purchasefromthem.

The extensionof our owncommercein our ownvesselscannotgivepleasureto anynationswhopos-sessterritorieson or nearthiscontinent,becausethecheapnessand excellenceof ourproductions,addedto the circumstanceof vicinity,and the enterprise

24 AlexanderHamilton

and addressof our merchantsand navigators,willgive us a greater share in the advantageswhichthoseterritoriesafford,than consistswiththe wishesor policyof their respectivesovereigns.

Spainthinksit convenientto shut the Mississippiagainstus on the oneside,and Britain excludesusfrom the Saint Lawrenceon the other; nor willeither of them permit the other waterswhicharebetweenthem and us to becomethe meansof mu-tual intercourseand traffic.

From these and such like considerations,whichmight, if consistentwith prudence,be more ampli-fiedand detailed,it is easyto seethat jealousiesandtmeasinessesmay gradu_Jlyslideinto the mindsandcabinetsof other nations, and that we are not toexpectthat they shouldregardour advancementinunion, in power and consequenceby land and bysea,with an eyeof indifferenceand composure.

ThepeopleofAmericaare awarethat inducementsto war mayariseout of thesecircumstances,as wellas fromothersnot so obviousat present,and thatwheneversuch inducementsmay find fit time andopportunityfor operation,pretencesto color andjustify them will not be wanting. Wisely, there-fore, do they considerunion and a goodnationalgovernmentas necessaryto put and keep them insucha situationas, insteadofinvitingwar,willtendto repressand discourageit. That situation con-sistsin the bestpossiblestate of defence,and neces-sarily dependson the government,the arms, andthe resourcesof the country.

As the safety of the wholeis the interestof the

The Federalist 25

whole,and cannotbe providedfor withoutgovern-ment, either one or more or many, let us inquirewhetheronegoodgovernmentis not,relativeto theobjectin question,morecompetentthanany othergivennumberwhatever.

Onegovernmentcancollectand avallitselfof thetalentsandexperienceoftheablestmen,in whateverpartof theUniontheymaybe found. It canmoveon uniformprinciplesof policy. It canharmonize,assimilate,and protectthe severalparts and mem-bers,andextendthebenefitofitsforesightandpre-cautionsto each. In the formationof treaties,itwillregardthe interestof thewhole,and the par-ticularinterestsof theparts asconnectedwiththatofthewhole. It canapplytheresourcesandpowerof thewholeto the defenceof any particularpart,and that moreeasilyand expeditiouslythan Stategovernmentsor separateconfederaciescanpossiblydo, forwantof concertand unityof system. It canplacethe nfilitiaunderone plan of discipline,and,by puttingtheirofficersin a properline of subordi-nationto theChiefMagistrate,will,as it were,con-solidatethem into one corps,and therebyrenderthemmoreefficientthan if dividedinto thirteenorintothreeor four distinctindependentcompanies.

Whatwouldthe nfilitiaof Britainbe if theEng-lish militiaobeyedthe governmentof England,ifthe Scotchmilitiaobeyedthegovernmentof Scot-land,andif theWelshmilitiaobeyedthegovernmentof Wales? Supposeaninvasion;wouldthosethreegovernments(if theyagreedat all) beable,withalltheirrespectiveforces,to operateagainsttheenemy

26 AlexanderHamilton

so effectuallyas the singlegovernmentof GreatBritainwould?

Wehaveheardmuchof the fleetsof Britain,andthe timemay come,if we arewise,whenthe fleetsof Americamay engageattention. But if onena-tionalgovernmenthadnot so regulatedthenaviga-tionofBritainas to makeit a nurseryforseamenmif onenationalgovernmenthadnot calledforthallthenationalmeansandmaterialsforformingfleets,theirprowessand theirthunderwouldneverhavebeencelebrated.Let Englandhave its navigationand fleet--letScotlandhave itsnavigationandfleet--let Waleshave its navigationand fleet--let Ire-landhaveitsnavigationand fleetmletthosefouroftheconstituentpartsof theBritishempirebe underfourindependentgovernments,and it is easyto per=ceivehowsoontheywouldeachdwindleinto com-parativeinsignificance.

Applythesefactsto ourowncase. LeaveAmer-icadividedintothirteenor,if youplease,into threeor four independentgovernments_whatarmiescould they raiseand pay--what fleets could theyeverhopeto have? If onewasattacked,wouldtheothersfly to its succor,and spendtheir bloodandmoneyin its defence? Wouldtherebe no dangerof theirbeingflatteredinto neuIralityby its spe-ciouspromises,or seducedby a too greatfondnessforpeaceto declinehazardingtheirtranq,illltyandpresentsafetyforthe sake of neighbors,of whomperhapsthey-havebeenjealous,and whoseimport-ancetheyarecontentto seediminished. Althoughsuchconductwouldnotbewise,it would,neverthe-

The Federalist 27

less,be natural. ThehistoryofthestatesofGreece,andofothercountries,aboutidswithsuchinstances,and it is not improbablethat whathas so oftenhappenedwould,undersimilarcircumstances,hap-pen again.

Butadmitthat theymightbewillingto helptheinvaded State or confederacy.How,and when,andin whatproportionshallaidsofmenandmoneybe afforded? Who shall commandthe allied ar-mies,and fromwhichof themshallhereceivehisorders? Whoshallsettlethetermsof peace,andincaseof disputeswhat umpireshalldecidebetweenthem_ndcompelacquiescence?Variousdifficultiesand inconvenienceswouldbe inseparablefromsucha situation;whereasonegovernment,watchingoverthe generaland commoninterests,and combiningand directingthepowersand resourcesofthewhole,wouldbe freefrom all theseembarrassments,andconducefarmoreto thesafetyof thepeople.

But whatevermay be our situation,whetherfirmlyunitedunder one nationalgovernment,orsplit into a numberof confederacies,certain it is,that foreignnationswill knowand viewit exactlyas it is; and they willact towardsus accordingly.If theyseethat ournationalgovernmentis efficientandwelladministered,ourtradeprudentlyregulated,ourmilitiaproperlyorganizedand disciplined,ourresourcesandfinancesdiscreetlymanaged,ourcreditre-established,ourpeoplefree,contented,andunited,they will be muchmoredisposedto cultivateourfriendshipthan provokeour resentment. If, onthe otherhand, theyfind us eitherdestituteof an

28 AlexanderHamilton

effectualgovernment(eachStatedoingrightorwrong,as to its rulersmay seemconvenient),or split intothree or four independentand probablydiscordantrepublicsor confederacies,one incliningto Britain,anotherto France,anda third to Spain,andperhapsplayedoffagainsteach other by the three, what apoor,pitifulfigurewillAmericamakein theireyes[Howliablewouldshebecomenotonly to their con-tempt, but to their outrage; and how soonwoulddear-boughtexperienceproclaimthat whena peopleor familysodivide,it neverfailsto be againstthem-selves.

PUBLIUS.

FortheIru_pendentJournal

_?HEFEDERALIST.No.VJ

OAY)

TothePeopleoftheStateofNew York:QueenAnne,in her letter of the zst July, x7o6,

to the ScotchParliament,makessomeobservationson the importanceof the Unionthen formingbe-_weenEnglandandScotland,whichmeritouratten-tion. I shall present the public with one or twoextractsfromit: "An entireand perfectunionwillbe the solidfoundationoflastingpeace: It willse-cureyourreligion,liberty,andproperty; removetheanimositiesamongstyourselves,and the jealousiesand differencesbetwixtour twokingdoms. It mustincreaseyour strength,riches, and trade; and bythis unionthewholeisland,beingjoinedin affection

The Federalist 29

and free from all apprehensions of different interest,will be enabledto resist all its enemies." "We mostearnestly recommend to you calmness and unanim-ity in this great and weighty affair, that the unionmay be brought to a happy conclusion, being theonly effectualway to secure our present and futurehappiness, and disappoint the designs of our andyour enemies, who will doubtless, on this occasion,use their utmost endeavorsto prevent or delay thisunion. ''

It was remarked in the preceding paper, thatweakness and divisions at home would invite dan-gers from abroad; and that nothing would tendmore to secure us from them than union, strength,and good government within ourselves. This sub-ject is copious and cannot easily be exhausted.

The history of Great Britain is the one with whichwe are in general the best acquainted, and it givesus many useful lessons. We may profit by their ex-periencewithout paying the price which it cost them.Although it seems obvious to commonsense that thepeople of such an island should be but one nation,yet we find that they were for ages divided intothree, and that those three were almost constantlyembroiled in quarrels and wars with one another.Notwithstanding their true interest with respect tothe continental nations was really the same, yet bythe arts and policy and practices of those nations,their mutual jealousies were perpetually kept in-flamed, and for a long series of years they were farmore inconvenient and troublesome than they wereuseful and assisting to each other.

30 AlexanderHamilton

Shouldthe peopleof Americadimdethemselvesintothree orfournations,wouldnot the samethinghappen? Wouldnot similarjealousiesarise,and bein hke manner cherished? Instead oftheir being"joinedin affection"andfreefromallapprehensionof different"interests," envy and jealousywouldsoonextinguishconfidenceand affection,and thepartial interestsof each confederacy,insteadofthegeneralinterestsof all America,wouldbe the onlyobjects of their pohcy and pursuits. Hence, likemost other borderingnations,they wouldalwaysbeeither involvedin disputesand war, or live in theconstant apprehensionofthem.

The most sanguineadvocatesfor three or fourconfederaciescannot reasonablysupposethat theywouldlong remain exactly on an equalfooting inpoint of strength,even if it was possibleto formthemsoat first; but, admittingthat to be practica-ble,yet what human contrivancecan securethecontinuance of such equality? Independentofthoselocal circumstanceswhichtendto beget andincreasepowerin one part and to impedeits pro-gressin another,we must advert to the effectsofthat superiorpohcy and goodmanagementwhichwouldprobablydistinguishthe governmentof oneabovethe rest,and by whichtheirrelativeequalityin strengthand considerationwouldbe destroyed.Por it cannotbe presumedthat the same degreeofsound pohcy, prudence,and foresightwould11nl-formlybe observedby eachof theseconfederaciesfora longsuccessionofyears.

Whenever,and from whatevercauses,it might

The Federalist 3_

happen,and happenit would,that any oneof thesenations or confederaciesshould rise on the scaleof politicalimportancemuch above the degree ofher neighbors,that momentwouldthose neighborsbeholdher with envy and with fear. Both thosepassionswouldlead them to countenance,if not topromote,whatevermight promiseto diminishherimportance; and would also restrain them frommeasurescalc_llatedto advanceor even to secureher prosperity. Muchtime wouldnot be necessaryto enableherto discerntheseunfriendlydispositions.Shewouldsoonbegin,not onlyto loseconfidenceinher neighbors,but also to feela dispositionequallyunfavorableto them. Distrust naturally createsdistrust, and by nothing is good-willand kind con-duct more speedilychangedthan by invidiousjeal-ousiesand uncandidimputations,whetherexpressedor implied.

TheNorth is generallythe regionof strength,andmanylocalcircumstancesrenderit probablethat themost Northernof the proposedconfederacieswould,at a periodnot very distant,be unquestionablymoreformidablethan any of the others. No soonerwouldthis becomeevident than the NorthernHivewouldexcite the same ideas and sensationsin themoresouthernparts of Americawhichit formerlydid in the southernparts of Europe. Nor doesitappearto bea rash conjecturethat its youngswarmsmightoftenbe temptedto gatherhoneyin the morebloomingfieldsandmilderair of theirluxuriousandmore delicateneighbors.

They who well considerthe history of similar

32 Alexander Hamilton

divisions and confederacieswill find abundan_reason to apprehendthat those in contemplationwouldin no othersensebe neighborsthan as theywouldbe borderers; that they wouldneitherlovenortrustoneanother,butonthe contrarywouldbea prey to discord,jealousy,and mutualinjuries; inshort,that they wouldplaceus exactlyin thesitua-tionsin whichsomenationsdoubtlesswishto seeus,viz.,1ormidableonlyto eachother.

From these considerationsit appears that thosegentlemenare greatly mistakenwho supposetha_alliancesoffensiveand defensivemight be formedbe_weenthese confederacies,and would producethat combinationand unionof wills,of arms,andofresources,whichwouldbe necessaryto put and keepthemin a formidablestateof defenceagainstforeignenemies.

When did the independent stat_s, into whichBritain and Spain were formerlydivided,combinein such alliance,or unite their forcesagainsta for-eign enemy? The proposed confederacieswill bedistinctnations. Eachof themwouldhave its com-mercewith foreignersto regulateby distincttreat-ies; and as their productionsand commoditiesaredifferentand properfor differentmarkets,so wouldthose treaties be essentiallydifferent. Differen_commercialconcernsmustcreatedifferentinterests,and of coursedifferentdegreesof politicalattach-ment to and connectionwith differentforeignna-tions. Henceit mightand probablywouldhappenthat the foreignnationwith whomthe Southerncon-federacymight be at war would be the one with

The Federalist 33

whomthe Northernconfederacywouldbe the mostdesirousof preservingpeace and friendship. Analliance so contrary to their immediate interestwouldnot thereforebe easy to form,nor, if formed,wouldit be observedand fulfilledwith perfectgoodfaith.

Nay, it is far more probablethat in America,asin Europe, neighboringnations, acting under theimpulseof opposite interests and un_endly pas-sions, would frequently be found t_ldng differentsides. Consideringour distance from Europe, itwould be more natural for these confederaciestoapprehenddangerfrom one anotherthan from dis-*antnations,andthereforethat eachofthem shouldbe moredesirousto guardagainstthe othersby theaid offoreignalliances,thanto guardagainstforeigndangersby alliancesbetweenthemselves. Andherelet us not forgethowmuchmoreeasyit is to receiveforeignfleetsinto our ports, and foreignarmiesintoour country,than it is to persuadeor compelthemto depart. How many conquestsdid the Romansand othersmakein the characterof allies,and whatinnovationsdid they under the samecharacter in-troduce into the governmentsof those whom theypretended to protect.

Let candidmenjudge,then, whetherthe divisionof Americainto any givennumber of independentsovereigntieswould tend to secureus against thehostilities and improper interference of foreignnations.

I>tlBI,IIJS.vok xI..--'_

34 AlexanderHamilton

Fora_ I.d_pe_ Jounml

THEFEDERALIST.No. VI

(HAMILTON)

To thePeopleof theStateofNew York:The three last mtmbersof this paper have been

dedicatedto an enumerationofthe dangersto whichwe shouldbe exposed,in a state of disunion,fromthe arms and arts of foreignnations. I shallnowproceedto delineatedangersof a differentand,per-haps, still more alarming lelnd-- those which willin all probabilityflowfrom dissensionsbetweentheStates themselves,and from domesticfactionsandconvulsions. These have been already in someinstancesslightly anticipated; but they deserveamoreparticular and more full investigation.

A man must be far gonein Utopianspeculationswhocan seriouslydoubt that, if these States shouldeitherbe whollydistmited,or only u_itedin partialconfederacies,the subdivisions into which theyrn_ghtbe thrown would have frequentand violentcontestswith each other. To presumea want ofmotivesfor such contests as an argument againsttheir existence,would be to forget that men areambitious,vindictive,and rapacious. To look fora continuationof harmonybetweena numberof in-dependent,unconnectedsovereigntiesin the sameneighborhood,would be to disregardthe uniformcourseof human events,and to set at defiancetheaccumulatedexperienceof ages.

The causesof hostility amongnations are innu-merable. Thereare somewhichhavea generaland

The Federalist 35

almostconstantoperationuponthe collectivebodiesofsociety. Ofthis descriptionare the loveof poweror the desire of pre-eminenceand dominion--thejealousy of power, or the desireof equality andsafety. There are others whichhave a more cir-cumscribedthough an equally operativeinfluencewithin their spheres. Such are the rivalshipsandcompetitionsof commercebetweencommercialna-tions. Andthere are others,not lessnumerousthaneither of the former,whichtake their originentirelyin private passions; in the attachments,enmities,interests,hopes,and fears of leadingindividualsinthe communitiesof whichthey are members. Menof this class,whetherthe favoritesof a"kingorof apeople,have in too manyinstancesabusedthe con-fidencethey possessed;and assumingthe pretext ofsome public motive,have not scrupled to sacrificethe national tranqu_llityto personaladvantageorpersonalgratification.

The celebrated Pericles,in compliancewith theresentmentOfa prostitute,' at the expenseof muchof the blood and treasureof his countrymen,at-tacked, vanquished,and destroyedthe city of theSamnians. The same man, stimulatedby privatepique against the Megarensians,"anothernation ofGreece,or to avoid a prosecutionwith whichhe wasthreatenedas an accomplicein a supposedtheft ofthe statuary Phiclias,3or to get rid of the accusationsprepared to be brought against him for dissipating

*Asp_a, videPlutarch'sLiie of Pwr@lvs._PvBx,xvs.Ib/d._PuBLIUS.

3 lb/d._PUBLIUS.

36 AlexanderHamilton

the fundsof the statein thepurclmseofpopularity,'or from a combinationof all these causes,wastheprimitiveauthorof that famousandfatalwar,dis-tiuguishedin theGrecmnannalsby thenameofthePe_p_s_n war;which,aftervariousvicissitudes,iuterm_sions,andrenewals,terminatedin theruinof theAtheniancommonwealth.

The ambitiouscardinal,whowasprimeministerto HenryVIII., perrmttinghis vanityto aspiretothe triplecrown,2entertainedhopesof succeedingintheacquisitionofthatsplendidprizebytheinfluenceof theEmperorCharlesV. Tosecurethe favorandinterestof thisenterprisingand powerfulmonarch,he precipitatedEnglandinto a war with France,contraryto the plainestdictatesof policy,and atthehazardof the safety and independence,as wellof thekingdomoverwhichhe presidedby hiscoun-sels,as of Europein general. Forif thereeverwasa sovere_nwhobidfairto rea_zetheprojectof uni-versalmonarchy,it wastheEmperorCharlesV., ofwhoseintriguesWolseywasat oncethem_strumentandthedupe.

The influencewhichthe bigotryof one female,3thepetulanceofanother,4and the cabalsofa third,3had in thecontemporarypolicy,ferments,andpaci-fications,ofa considerablepartofEurope,aretopics

xPlutarch'sLife of Pericles. Phidias was supposedto have stolensomepublicgold,with the connivanceof Pericles,for/_hee_belliah-mentof thestatueof Minerva._PUBLIUS.

2Wornby the pOpes.--PuBLIUS.Madamede Ma_ntenon._PuBLiUS.

4Duchessof Marlborough.mPusLius,.5Madamede Pompadour._PUBLiUS.

The Federalist 37

that havebeen toooften descanteduponnot to begenerallyknown.

To multiply examplesof the agencyof personalconsiderationsin the productionof gres:tnationalevents,eitherforeignor domestic,accordingto theirdirection,wouldbe an unnecessarywaste of time.Thosewhohavebut a superficialacquaintancewiththe sourcesfromwhich they are to be drawn,willthemselvesrecollect a variety of instances; andthose who have a tolerableknowledgeof humannaturewillnot standin needof suchlights,to formtheir opinioneitherof the realityor extent of thatagency. Perhaps,however,a reference,tendingtoillustratethe generalprinciple,may with proprietybe madeto a casewhichhas latelyhappenedamongourselves. If Shayshad not beena desperatedebtor,it is much to be doubted whetherMassachusettswouldhavebeenplungedinto a civilwar.

But notwithstandingthe concurringtestimonyofexperience,in this particular, there are still to befoundvisionaryor designingmen,whostandreadytoadvocatethe paradoxofperpetualpeacebetweentheStates,thoughdismemberedand alienatedfromeachother. Thegeniusof republics(saythey)is pacific;the spiritof commercehas a tendencyto softenthemannersof men,and to extinguishthoseinflammablehumorswhichhavesooftenkindledintowars. Com-mercialrepublics,likeours,willneverbe disposedtowaste themselvesin ruinouscontentionswith eachother. Theywillbegovernedbymutualinterest,andwillcultivatea spirit of mutualamity and concord.

Is it not (wemayask theseprojectorsin politics)

38 AlexanderHamilton

thetrueinterestofallnationstocultivatethesamebenevolentandphilosophicspirit?Ifthisbetheirtrueinterest,havetheyinfactpursuedit?Hasitnot,onthecontrary,invariablybeenfoundthatmomentarypassions,andirnruediateinterests,havea moreactiveandimperiouscontroloverhumanconductthangeneralorremoteconsiderationsofpolicy,utility,orjustice?Haverepublicsinprac-ticebeenlessaddictedtowarthanmonarchies?Arenottheformeradministeredbymenaswellasthelatter?Aretherenotaversions,predilections,rivalships,anddesiresofunjustacquisitions,thataffectnationsaswellaskings?Arenotpopularas-sembliesfrequentlysubjecttotheimpulsesofrage,resentment,jealousy,avarice,andofotherirregularandviolentpropensities?Isitnotwellknownthattheirdeterminationsareoftengovernedbyafewin-dividualsinwhomtheyplaceconfidence,andare,ofcourse,liabletobetincturedbythepassionsandviewsofthoseindividuals?Hascommercehithertodoneanyth_ugmorethanchangetheobjectsofwar?Isnottheloveofwealthasdomineeringandenter-prisingapassionasthatofpowerorglory?Havetherenotbeenasmanywarsfoundeduponcom-mercialmotivessincethathasbecometheprevailingsystemofnations,aswerebeforeoccasionedbythecupidityofterritoryordominion?Has notthespirit of commerce,in many instances,administerednewincentivesto the appetite,both for the oneandfor the other? Let experience,the least fallibleguideof humanopinions,be appealedto for an an-swerto theseinquiries.

The Federalist 39

Sparta,Athens,Rome,and Carthagewereall re-publics; two of them,Athensand Carthage,of thecommercialkind. Yet were they as often engagedin wars, offensiveand defensive,as the neighboringmonarchiesof the same times. Sparta was littlebetter than a well-regulatedcamp; and Romewasnever sated of carnageand conquest.

Carthage,though a commercialrepublic,wastheaggressorin the very war that endedin her destruc-tion. Hannibalhad carriedher armsintothe heartof Italy and to the gates of Rome,beforeScipio,inturn, gave him an overthrowin the territoriesofCarthage,and made a conquestof the common-wealth.

Venice,in later times,figuredmore than onceinwars of ambition,till, becomingan object to theother Italian states, PopeJulius II. foundmeanstoaccomplishthat formidableleague,' whichgave adeadlyblowto the powerandpride ofthis haughtyrepublic.

The provincesof Holland, till they were over-whelmedin debtsandtaxes,took a leadingand con-spicuouspart in the wars of Europe. They hadfurious contestswith Englandfor the dominionofthe sea, and wereamongthe most perseveringandmost implacableof the opponentsof LouisXIV.

In the governmentof Britain the representa-tives of the peoplecomposeone branchof the na-tionallegislature. Commercehas beenfor agesthe

TheLeagueof Cambray,comprehendingthe Emperor,the KingofFrance, theKingofAragon,andmostof theItalianprincesand states.---PUBLIUS.

40 AlexanderHamilton

predominantpursuitofthat country. Fewnations,nevertheless,havebeenmorefrequentlyengagedinwar;andthewarsinwhichthatkingdomhasbeenengagedhave,innumerousinstances,proceededfromthepeople.Therehavebeen,ifImaysoexpressit,almostas

manypopularasroyalwars.Thecriesofthenationandtheimportunitiesoftheirrepresentativeshave,uponvariousoccasions,draggedtheirmonarchsintowar,orcontinuedtheminit,contrarytotheirin-clinations,andsometimescontrarytotherealin-terestsofthestate.Inthatmemorablestruggleforsuperioritybetweenthe rival housesof AustriaandBourbon,whichso long kept Europe in a flame,itiswellknownthattheantipathiesoftheEnglishagainsttheFrench,secondingtheambition,orrathertheavarice,ofafavoriteleader,zprotractedthewarbeyondthelimitsmarkedoutby soundpolicy,andfora considerabletimeinoppositiontothe viewsof the court.

Thewarsof thesetwolast-mentionednationshavein a great measuregrownout of commercialcon-siderations,--thedesireof supplantingandthe fearof being supplanted,either in particular branchesof trafficor in the generaladvantagesof trade andnavigation2

:_he Dukeof Marlborough.--PuBLIUS.2In the text saidto havebeenrevisedby Hamiltonand Madison,

andadoptedby Mr.J. C.Hamilton,thefollowingadditionalsentencesoccurat this point: "and sometimeseven the moreculpabledesireof sharingin the commerceof othernationswithott_theirconsent._he last warbuttwobetweenBritainand Spainsprangfromthe at-temptsof theEnglishmerchantsto prosecutean illicittradewiththe

The Federalist 4x

Fromthis summaryof what has taken place inother countries,whosesituations have borne thenearestresemblancetoourown, whatreasoncanwehavetoconfideinthosereverieswhichwouldseduceusintoanexpectationofpeaceandcordialitybetweenthemembersofthepresentconfederacy,inastateofseparation? Havewenotalreadyseenenoughofthefallacyandextravaganceofthoseidletheorieswhichhaveamuseduswithpromisesofanexemptionfromtheimperfections,weaknesses,andevilsincidenttosocietyineveryshape?Isitnottimetoawakefromthedeceitfuldreamofagoldenage,andtoadoptasa practicalmaximforthedi-rectionofourpoliticalconductthatwe,aswellastheotherinhabitantsoftheglobe,areyetremotefromthehappyempireofperfectwisdomandperfectvirtue?Letthepointofextremedepressiontowhichour

nationaldignityandcredithavesunk,lettheincon-veniencesfelteverywherefroma laxandillad-ministrationofgovennnent,lettherevoltofapart

Spanishmain. _heseunjustifiablepracticeson theirpartproducedseverityon theparloftheSpaniardstowardsthesubjectsofGreatBritainwhichwerenotmorejustifiable,becausetheyexceededtheboundsofajustretaliationandwerechargeablewithinhumanityandcruelty.Mauy oftheEnglishwho weretakenon theSpanishcoastweresenttodigintheminesofPotosi;andby theusualprogressofaspiritofresentment,theinnocentwere,aftera while,confoundedwiththeguiltyinindiscriminatepunishment.Thecomplaintsofthemerchantskindleda violentflamethroughoutthenation,whichsoonafterbrokeoutin theHouseofCommons,and was ¢ommtmicatedfromthatbodytotheminis_vry.Lettersofreprisalweregranted,anda warensued,whichini_sconsequencesoverthrewallthealliancesthatbuttwentyyearsbeforehad beenformedwithsanguineexpecta-tionsofthemostbeneficialfruits."

42 Alexander Hamilton

of the State of North Carolina,the late menacingdisturbancesin Pennsylvania,and the actual in-surrections and rebellions in Massachusetts,de-clarc !

So far is the generalsenseof mankindfrom cor-respondingwith the tenets of those who endeavorto lull asleepour apprehensionsof discordand hos-tility betweenthe States,in the event of disunion,that it has fromlongobservationof the progressofsocietybecomea sort of axiomin politics,that vi-cinity,or nearnessof situation,constitutesnationsnatural enemies. An intelligent writer expresseshimselfon this subjectto this effect: " N_.mHBOR-INO_ATIONS[sayshe] are naturallyenemiesof eachother, unlesstheir commonweaknessforcesthem toleagueinaCONFEDERATIVEREPUBLIC,andtheircon-stitutionpreventsthe differencesthat neighborhoodoccasions,extinguishingthat secret jealousywhichdisposesallstatesto aggrandizethemselvesat the ex-pense of their neighbors."' This passage,at thesame time, points out the EVILand suggeststheREMEDY.

PUBLIUS.

For theIndependentJournal

THE FEDERALIST. No. VII

(HAMILTON)

To thePeopleof theStateo_New York:It is sometimesasked,with an air of seem]ugtri-

umph, what inducementscouldthe States have, ifzVidePrincipesdesNdgociationspar l'Abb_de Mably.--P_LIUS.

The Federalist 43

distmited,to makewar uponeachother? It wouldbe a full answerto this questionto say--preciselythesameinducementswhichhave,at differenttimes,delugedinbloodall thenationsin the world. But,unfortunatelyforus, the questionadmitsof a moreparticularanswer. Thereare causesof differenceswithin our immediatecontemplation,of the tend-encyof which,evenunderthe restraintsofa federalconstitution,we have had sufficientexperiencetoenableus to forma judgmentofwhat mightbe ex-pectedif thoserestraintswereremoved.

Territorialdisputeshave at all timesbeenfoundone of the most fertile sourcesof hostilityamongnations. Perhaps the greatestproportionof warsthat havedesolatedthe earth havesprungfromthisorigin. This cause would exist amongus in fullforce. We havea vast tract of unsettledterritorywithinthe boundariesof the UnitedStates. Therestill are discordantand undecidedclaimsbetweenseveralof them, and the dissolutionof the Unionwouldlay a foundationfor similarclaimsbetweenthemall. It is wellknownthat theyhaveheretoforehad seriousand animateddiscussionconcerningtherightsto thelandswhichwereungrantedat thetimeofthe Revolution,andwhichusuallywentunderthenameof crownlands. The Stateswithinthe limitsof whosecolonialgovernmentsthey werecomprisedhaveclaimedthemastheirproperty,the othershavecontendedthat therightsofthecrownin this articledevolvedupon the Union; especiallyas to all thatpartoftheWesternterritorywhich,eitherby actualpossession,or through the submissionof the Indian

44 AlexanderHamilton

proprietors,wassubjectedto the jurisdictionof the1dugof Great Britain,till it wasrelinquishedin thetreaty of peace. This,it has beensaid, was at allevents an acquisitionto the Confederacyby com-pact with a foreignpower. It hasbeenthe prudentpolicyof Congressto appease this controversy,byprevailingupon the States to make cessionsto theUnitedStatesfor the benefitofthe whole. Thishasbeensofar accomplishedas,undera continuationofthe Union,to afforda decidedprospectof an ami-cableterminationof the dispute. Adismembermentof the Confederacy,however,wouldrevivethis dis-pute, and wouldcreateotherson the same subject.At present,a largepart of the vacantWesternten-i-tory is, by cessionat least, if not by any anteriorright, the commonproperty of the Union. If thatwereat an end, the States whichmadethe cession,on a principleof federalcompromise,wouldbe apt,whenthe motiveofthe grant had ceased,to reclaimthe lands as a reversion. The other States wouldno doubtinsist on a proportion,by right of repre-sentation. Theirargumentwouldbe, that a grant,oncemade,couldnot be revoked; and that the jus-tice ofparticipatingin territoryacquiredor securedbythe jointeffortsof the Confederacy,remainedun-diminished. If, contrary to probability,it shouldbe admittedby all the States, that eachhad a rightto a shareofthis commonstock,therewouldstill bea difficultyto be surmounted,as to a properrule ofapportionment.Differentprincipleswouldbeset upby differentStates for this purpose; and as theywouldaffectthe oppositeinterestsofthe parties,they

The Federalist 45

mightnot easilybe susceptibleof a pacificadjust-ment.

In the widefieldof Westernterritory, therefore,weperceivean ampletheatreforhostilepretensions,without any umpireor commonjudge to interposebetweenthe contendingparties. Toreasonfromthepast to the future,we shall have goodgroundtoapprehend,that the swordwouldsometimesbe ap-pealedto as the arbiteroftheirdifferences.Thecir-cumstancesof the disputebetweenConnecticutandPennsylvania,respectingthe land at Wyoming,ad-monishus not to be sanguinein expectingan easyaccommodationof such differences.The articlesof confederationobligedthe parties to submitthematter to the decisionof a federalcourt. Thesub-missionwas made, and the court decidedin favorof Pennsylvania. But Connecticutgavestrong in-dicationsof dissatisfactionwith that determination;nor did sheappearto be entirelyresignedto it, till,by negotiationand management,somethinglike anequivalentwasfoundfor the lossshesupposedher-self to havesustained. Nothingheresaidisintendedto convey the slightest censureon the conductofthat State. Sheno doubt sincerelybelievedherselfto havebeeninjuredbythe decision;andStates,likeindividuals,acquiescewithgreatreluctancein deter-m_nationsto theirdisadvantage.

Thosewhohad an opportunityof seeingthe in-sideof'the transactionswhichattendedthe progressof the controversybetweenthis State and the dis-trict of Vermont,can vouchthe oppositionwe ex-perienced,as wellfromStatesnot interestedas from

46 AlexanderHamilton

those whichwere interestedin the claim; and canattest the dangerto whichthe peaceof the Con-federacymight have been exposed,had this Stateattempted to assert its rightsby force. Twomo-tives preponderatedin that opposition: one, ajealousyentertainedof our future power; and theother, the interestof certainindividualsofinfluencein the neighboringStates,whohad obtainedgrantsof lands under the actual governmentof that dis-trict. Even the States which brought forwardclaims,in contradictionto ours, seemedmoresolici-tousto dismemberthis State, than to establishtheirown pretensions. These were New Hampshire,Massachusetts,and Connecticut. NewJersey andRhodeIsland,uponalloccasions,discovereda warmzeal for the independenceof Vermont; and Mary-land, till alarmedby the appearanceofa connectionbetweenCanadaandthat State, entereddeeplyintothe same views. These being small States, sawwith an unfriendlyeye the perspectiveof ourgrow-ing greatness. In a reviewof thesetransactionswemay trace someof the causeswhichwouldbe likelyto embroilthe Stateswith eachother,if it shouldbetheir unpropitiousdestinyto becomedisunited.

The competitionsof commercewouldbe anotherfruitfulsourceofcontention. The Stateslessfavor-ably circumstancedwould be desirousof escapingfrom the disadvantagesof local situation, and ofsharingin the advantagesof their more fortunateneighbors. Each State, or separate confederacy,wouldpursue a systemof commercialpolicypecu-liar to itself. This would occasion distinctions,

The Federalist 47

preferences,and exclusions,whichwouldbegetdis-content. The habits of intercourse,on the basisofequalprivileges,to whichwehavebeenaccustomedsince the earliestsettlementof the country,wouldgivea keeneredgeto thosecausesofdiscontentthanthey wouldnaturally have independentof this cir-cumstance. We shouldbe ready to denominatein-juriesthosethingswhichwerein realitythejustifiableactso[ independentsovereigntiesconsultinga distinctinterest. The spirit of enterprise,whichcharacter-izes the commercialpart of America,has left nooccasionof displayingitselfunimproved. It is notat all probablethat this unbridledspirit wouldpaymuchrespectto thoseregulationsof trade by whichparticularStatesmightendeavorto secureexclusivebenefits to their own citizens. The infractionsoftheseregulations,on oneside,the effortsto preventand repelthem, on the other, wouldnaturallyleadto outrages,and theseto reprisalsandwars.

The opportunitieswhichsomeStates wouldhaveofrenderingotherstributaryto themby commercialregulationswouldbe impatientlysubmittedto bythe tributary States. Therelativesituationof NewYork, Connecticut,and New Jersey, would affordanexampleofthiskind. NewYork,fromthe neces-sitiesofrevenue,mustlay dutiesonherimportations.Agreat part ofthese dutiesmust be paid by the in-habitantsof the two other Statesin the capacityofconsumersof what we import. NewYork wouldneitherbe willingnorableto foregothis advantage.Her citizenswouldnot consentthat a duty paidbythem shouldbe remitted in favor of the citizensof

48 AlexanderHamilton

herneighbors;nor wouldit be practicable,if therewerenot this impedimentin the way,to distinguishthe customersin our own markets. Would Con=necticutand NewJerseylongsubmitto be taxed byNew York for her exclusivebenefit? Should webe longpermittedto remainin the quietand undis-turbed enjoymentof a metropolis,from the posses-sionof whichwe derivedan advantageso odioustoour neighbors,and, in their opinion,so oppressive?Shouldwebe able to preserveit againstthe incum-bent weightof Connecticuton the oneside,and theco-operatingpressureof NewJersey on the other?Theseare questionsthat temerityalonewillanswerin the affirmative.

The publicdebt of the Unionwouldbe a furthercause of collisionbetween the separate States orconfederacies. The apportionment,in the first in=stance, and the progressiveextinguishmentafter-ward, would be alike productiveof ill-humorandanimosity. Howwouldit be possibleto agreeupona rule of apportionmentsatisfactoryto all? Thereis scarcelyany that canbeproposedwhichis entirelyfree from real objections. These, as usual, wouldbe exaggeratedby the adverseinterestofthe parties.Thereare evendissimilarviewsamongthe States asto the generalprinciple of dischargingthe publicdebt. Someof them,eitherless impressedwith theimportanceof nationalcredit, or becausetheir citi-zenshave little, if any, [mmedi_teinterest in thequestion,feel an indifference,if not a repugno.nce,to the paymentof the domesticdebt at any rate.Thesewouldbe inclinedto magnifythe difficulties

The Federalist 49

ofa d_ribution. Othersofthem,a numerousbodyof whosecitizensare creditorsto the publicbeyondthe proportionof the State in the total amount ofthe national debt, would be strenuous for someequitableand effectiveprovision. The procrastina-tions of the formerwouldexcite the resentmentsofthe latter. The settlement of a rule would,in themeantime,be postponedby real differencesof opin-ionandaffecteddelays. Thecitizensofthe Statesin-terestedwouldclamor;foreignpowerswouldurgeforthe satisfactionof their just demands,and the peaceofthe Stateswouldbe hazardedto the doublecontin-gencyof external invasionand internal contention.

Supposethe difficultiesof agreeingupon a rulesurmounted, and the apportionmentmade. Stillthere is great room to supposethat the rule agreedupon would, upon experiment,be found to bearharder uponsome States than uponothers. Thosewhichwere sufferersby it wouldnaturally seek fora mitigation of the burden. The others would asnaturally be disinclinedto a revision,which waslikely to end in an increase of their own incum-brances. TheLrrefusal would be too plausible apretext to the compl__irtingStates to withholdtheircontributions,not to be embracedwith avidity; andthe non-complianceof these States with their en-gagementswould be a ground of bitter discussionand altercation. If even the rule adopted shouldin practice justify the equality of its principle,stilldelinquenciesin paymentsonthe part of someof theStateswouldresultfroma diversityof othercauses--the real deficiencyof resources;the mismanagement

VOL.XX._4.

50 AlexanderHamilton

of their finances;accidentaldisordersin the rn_n-agement of the government; and, in addition tothe rest, the reluctancewith whichmen commonlypart with moneyfor purposesthat have out-livedthe exigencieswhich producedthem, and interferewith the supply of immediatewants. Delinquen-cies, from whatever causes, would be productiveof complaints,recriminations,and quarrels. Thereis, perhaps,nothing morelikelyto disturb the tran-quillityof nations than their beingbound to mutualcontributionsfor any commonobjectthat doesnotyield an equal and coincidentbenefit. For it isan observation,as true as it is trite, that there isnothingmen differsoreadilyaboutas the paymentof money.

Laws in violation of private contracts, as theyamountto aggressionson the rightsof thoseStateswhosecitizens are injured by them, may be con-sideredas anotherprobablesourceof hostility. Weare not authorizedto expect that a more liberalormoreequitablespirit wouldpresideoverthe legisla-tions of the individual States hereafter, if unre-strained by any additional checks,than we haveheretoforeseen in too many instances disgracingtheir several codes. We have observed the dis-position to retaliation excited in Connecticut,inconsequenceof the enormitiesperpetrated by theLegislatureof Rhode Island; and we reasonablyinfer that, in similar cases under other circum-stances,a war, not of parchment,but of the sword,would chastise such atrocious breaches of moralobligationand social justice.

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The probabRityof incompatiblealliancesbetweenthe differentStates or confederaciesand differentforeignnations,and theeffectsofthissituationuponthe peace of the whole,have been sufficientlyun-folded in someprecedingpapers. From the viewtheyhaveexhibitedofthispartofthesubject,thisconclusionistobedrawn,thatAmerica,ifnotcon-nectedatall,oronlybythefeebletieofa simpleleague,offensiveanddefensive,would,bytheop-erationofsuchjarringalliances,begraduallyen-tangledina11theperniciouslabyrinthsofEuropeanpoliticsandwars;andbythedestructiveconten-tionsofthepartsintowhichshewasdivided,wouldbe likelytobecomea preytotheartificesandmachinationsofpowersequallytheenemiesofthem all. Divideet impera"must be the motto ofevery nation that either hates or fearsus.2

PUBLIUS.

FromtheNay YorkPacke_,Tuesday,November20,:[787

THE FEDERALIST. No.VIII

(.Am_Tos)

To thePeopleof theStateo[New York:Assumingit thereforeas an establishedtruth tha_

the severalStates,in caseof disunion,or suchcom-binationsof them as mighthappento be formedout

*Divideandcommand.--PuBLxus.zIn orderthat the whole subjectof these papersmay as soon as

possiblebe laidbeforethe public,it is proposedto publishthem fourtimes a week--on Tuesdayin the New YorkP_wkatand on Thursdayin theDaily Ad_rffser.--PuBLiVS.

52 AlexanderHamilton

of the wreckof the generalConfederacy,wouldbesubject to those vicissitudesof peace and war, offriendshipand enmitywith each other, whichhavefallento the lot ofall neighboringnationsnot unitedunder one government,let us enter into a concisedetailofsomeof the consequencesthat wouldattendsucha situation.

War between the States, in the first period oftheir separateexistence,wouldbe accompaniedwithmuchgreaterdistressesthan it commonlyis in thosecountrieswhereregularmilitaryestablishmentshavelong obtained. The disciplinedarmiesalwayskeptonfootonthe continentof Europe,thoughtheybeara malignantaspect to liberty and economy,have,notwithstanding,been productiveof the signalad-vantageof renderingsuddenconquestsimpractica-ble, and of preventingthat rapid desolationwhichusedto mark the progressof war prior to their in-troduction. The art of fortificationhas contributedto the same ends. The nations of Europeare en-circledwith chains of fortifiedplaces,which mu-tually obstruct invasion. Campaignsare wastedinreducingtwo or three frontiergarrisons,to gainad-mittanceinto an enemy'scountry. Similarimpedi-ments occurat every step, to exhaust the strengthand delay the progress of an invader. Formerly,an invadingarmywouldpenetrate into the heart ofa neighboringcountryalmostas soonas intelligenceof its approachcouldbe received; but nowa com-parativelysmall force of disciplinedtroops, actingon the defensive,with the aid of posts, is able toimpede,and finally to frustrate, the enterprisesof

The Federalist 53

onemuchmoreconsiderable. Thehistoryofwar,inthat quarter of the globe,is no longera history ofnations subdued and empires overturned, but oftowns taken and retaken; of battles that decidenothing; of retreats more beneficialthan victories;ofmuch effortand little acquisition.

In this country the scene would be altogetherreversed. The jealousyof military establishmentswouldpostponethemas longaspossible. Thewantof fortifications,leaving the frontiers of one Stateopen to another, would facilitate inroads. ThepopulousStateswould,with little difficulty,overruntheir less populousneighbors. Conquestswouldbeas easyto be madeas difficultto be retained. War,therefore,wouldbe desultoryandpredatory. PLUN-DE_and devastationever march in the train of ir-regulars. The calamitiesof individualswouldmakethe principalfigurein the eventswhichwouldchar-acterizeour militaryexploits.

Thispictureis not too highlywrought; though,Iconfess,it wouldnot longremaina just one. Safetyfrom external dangeris the most powerfuldirectorofnationalconduct. Eventhe ardent loveoflibertywill, after a time, give way to its dictates. Theviolent destructionof lifeand property incidenttowar, the continualeffort and alarm attendant on astate of continualdanger,will compelnations themost attached to liberty to resort for repose andsecurity to institutionswhichhave a tendency todestroytheir civil and politicalfights. To be moresafe, they at length becomewillingto run the riskof being less free.

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The insta'tutionschieflyalludedto are STANDINGARMIESand the correspondentappendagesof mili-tary establishments. Standingarmies,it is said,arenot providedagainst in the new Constitution; andit is thereforeinferredthat they mayexistunderit."Theirexistence,however,fromthe very terms oftheproposition,is,at most,problematicalanduncertain.2But standingarmies,it may be replied,must inevit-ably result from a dissolutionof the Confederacy.Frequent war and constant apprehension,whichrequirea state of as constant preparation,willin-falliblyproduce them. The weakerStates or con-federacieswouldfirsthave recourseto them, to putthemselvesupon an equahtywith their more potentneighbors. They wouldendeavorto supplythe in-feriorityof poplflationandresourcesby a moreregu-lar and effectivesystem of defence,by disciplinedtroops, and by fortifications. They would,at thesametime, be necessitatedto strengthenthe execu-tive arm of government,in doingwhichtheir con-stitutions would acquire a progressive directiontowardsmonarchy. It is ofthe nature of war to in-creasethe executiveat the expenseof the legislativeauthority.

The expedientswhichhave beenmentionedwouldsoongivethe States or confederaciesthat madeuse

' This objectionwill be fully examinedin its properplace,and itwillbe shownthat the onlynaturalprecautionwhichcouldhavebeentaken onthis subjecthas beentaken; and a muchbetterone thanisto be foundin any constitution that has been heretofore framedinAmerica,most of which containno guard at all on this subject.-PuBLiUS.

• In the revisedtext: ",Thisinference,from the veryform of theproposition,is, at best,problematicalanduncertain."

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of them a superiorityover their neighbors. Smallstates, or states of less natural strength, undervigorousgovernments,and with the assistanceofdisciplinedarmies,haveoften triumphedover largestates, or states of greater natural strength, whichhave been destitute of these advantages. Neitherthe pride nor the safety of the more importantStates or confederacieswouldpermit them long tosubmitto this mortifyingand adventitioussuperior-ity. They wouldquicldyresortto meanssimilartothoseby which it had been effected,to reinstatethemselvesin their lost pre-eminence. Thus weshould,in a little time, seeestablishedin everypartofthis countrythe szme enginesof despotismwhichhave been the scourgeof the Old World. This, atleast,wouldbe the natural courseofthings; and ourreasoningswillbe the morelikelyto be just, in pro-portionas they are accommodatedto this standard.

These are not vague inferencesdrawnfrom sup-posedor speculativedefectsin a Constitution,thewholepower of whichis lodgedin the hands of apeople,or their representativesand delegates,butthey are solidconclusions,drawnfrom the naturaland necessaryprogressof humanaffairs.

It may,perhaps,be asked,byway of objectiontothis, why did not standingarmiesspringup out ofthe contentionswhichsooftendistractedtheancientrepublicsof Greece? Differentanswers,equallysat-isfactory,may be given to this question. Thein-dustrioushabits of the peopleof the presentday,absorbed in the pursuits of gain, and devotedtothe improvementsof agricultureand commerce,are

56 AlexanderHamilton

incompatiblewiththe conditionofanationofsoldiers,whichwasthe true conditionof the peopleof thoserepublics. The meansof revenue,whichhavebeensogreatlymultipliedby the increaseofgoldand sil-ver and of the arts of industry, and the scienceoffinance,whichis the offspringofmodemtimes,con-curringwith the habits of nations, have producedan entirerevolutionin the systemof war, and haverendereddisciplinedarmies,distinct from the bodyof the citizens,the inseparablecompo:nlonsof fre-quent hostility.

There is a wide difference,also, betweenmilitaryestablishmentsin a country seldomexposedby itssituationto internal invasions,and in one which isoften subject to them, and always apprehensiveofthem. The rulers of the formercan haveno goodpretext,if they are evensoinclined,to keepon footarmiesso numerousas must of necessitybe main-tainedin the latter. Thesearmiesbeing,in the firstcase, rarely,if at all, calledinto activityfor interiordefence,the peopleare in nodangerof beingbrokento military subordination. The laws are not ac-customedto relaxations,in favorof militaryexigen-cies; the civil state rem_:insin full vigor,neithercorrupted,norconfoundedwith the principlesorpro-pensitiesof the other state. The smallnessof thearmy rendersthe natural strength ofthe communityan over-m0:tchfor it; and the citizens,nothabituatedto lookup to the militarypowerforprotection,or tosubmit to its oppressions,neither love nor fear thesoldiery; they view them with a spirit of jealousacquiescencein a necessaryevil, and stand ready

The Federalist 57

to resist a powerwhich they supposemay be ex-erted to the prejudiceof their rights. The armyundersuchcircumstancesmayusefullyaidthe magis-trate to suppressa smallfaction,or an occasiormlmob, or insurrection;but it will be unableto en-forceencroachmentsagainstthe unitedeffortsofthegreatbodyofthe people.

In a country in the predicamentlast described,the contrary of all this happens. The perpetualmenacingsof danger oblige the governmentto bealwayspreparedto repelit; its armiesmust be nu-merousenoughfor instant defence. The continualnecessityfor their servicesenhancesthe importanceof the soldier,and proportionablydegradesthe con-dition of the citizen. The military state becomeselevatedabovethe civil. The inhabitantsof terri-tories, often the theatre of war, are unavoidablysubjectedto frequent infringementson their rights,which serve to weakentheir senseof thoserights;and by degreesthe peopleare brought to considerthe soldiery not only as their protectors,but astheir superiors. Thetransitionfromthis dispositionto that of consideringthem masters,is neither re-motenor difficult;but it is very difficultto prevailupon a peopleunder such impressions,to make abold or effectual resistance to usurpations sup-ported by the militarypower.

The kingdom of Grea_Britain falls within thefirstdescription. Aninsularsitu_ution,anda power-ful marine, guardingit in a great measureagainstthe possibilityof foreign invasion, supersedethenecessityof a m_merousarmy within the kingdom.

58 AlexanderHamilton

A sufficientforce to m_ltehead against a suddendescent,till the militiacouldhave timeto rallyandembody,is all that has beendeemedrequisite. Nomotiveof nationalpolicyhas demanded,nor wouldpublic opinionhave tolerated, a larger numberoftroopsuponits domesticestablishment. Therehasbeen,for a long time past, little roomfor the opera-tionofthe other causes,whichhavebeenenumeratedas the consequencesof internalwar. This peculiarfelicityofsituationhas,in a greatdegree,contributedto preservethe liberty whichthat country to thisday enjoys, in spite of the prevalentvenality andcorruption. If, on the contrary, Britain had beensituated on the continent,and had beencompelled,as shewouldhavebeen, by that situation,to makeher military establishments at home coextensivewith thoseof the other great powersof Europe,she,likethem,wouldin all probabilitybe, at this day, avictimto the absolutepowerof a singleman. 'T ispossible,though not easy, that the peopleof thatisland may be enslavedfrom other causes; but itcannotbe by the prowessof an army soinconsider-able as that whichhas beenusuallykept up withinthe kingdom.

If we are wise enoughto preservethe Unionwemayfor ages enjoy an advantage similarto that ofan insulated situation. Europe is at a great dis-tance from us. Her coloniesin our vicinity willbe likelyto continuetoo much disproportionedinstrengthto be ableto giveus any dangerousannoy-ance. Extensive_n]lltaryestablishmentscannot,inthis position,be necessaryto our security. But if

The Federalist 59

weshouldbe disunited,andthe integralparts shouldeitherremain separated,or,whichis most probable,should be thrown together into two or three con-federacies,weshouldbe, in a shortcourseoftime, inthe predicamentof the continentalpowersof Eu-rope our libertieswouldbe a prey to the meansofdefendingourselvesagainst the ambitionand jeal-ousy of each other.

This is an idea not superficialor futile, but solidand weighty. It deservesthe mostseriousandma-ture considerationof everyprudent andhonestmanof whateverparty. If such men will make a firmand solemnpause, and meditate dispassionatelyonthe importanceof this interestingidea; if they willcontemplateit in all its attitudes,and trace it to allits consequences,they willnot hesitateto part withtrivial objectionsto a Constitution,the rejectionofwhichwouldin all probabilityput a finalperiodtothe Union. The airyphantomsthat flit beforethedistemperedimaginationsof someof its adversarieswould quickly give place to the more substantialformsof dangers,real, certain,and formidable.

PUBLIUS.

For theIndependentJournal

THE FEDERALIST. No. IX

(HAMILTON)

To thePeopleof theStateof New York:A firmUnionwillbe ofthe utmostmomentto the

peaceand libertyof the States,as a barrieragainst

6o AlexanderHamilton

domesticfactionand insurrection. It is impossibleto read the history of the petty republicsof Greeceand Italy without feelingsensationsof horror anddisgust at the distractionswith which they werecontinuallyagitated, and at the rapid successionofrevolutionsby whichthey were kept in a state ofperpetualvibrationbetweenthe extremesoftyrannyand anarchy. If they exhibit occasionalcalms,these only serve as short-lived contrasts to thefuriousstormsthat are to succeed. If nowandthenintervals of felicityopen to view,we beholdthemwith a mixture of regret,arisingfrom the reflectionthat the pleasingscenesbeforeus are soonto beoverwhelmedby the tempestuouswavesof seditionand party rage. If momentaryrays of glorybreakforth from the gloom,whilethey dazzleus with atransient and fleetingbrilhancy,they at the sametimeadmonishus to lamentthat the vicesof govern-ment should pervert the directionand tarnish thelustre of those bright talents and exalted endow-ments for which the favored soils that producedthemhavebeensojustly celebrated.

From the disordersthat disfigurethe annals ofthose republicsthe advocates of despotism havedrawn arguments,not only against the forms ofrepublicangovernment,but against the very prin-ciplesof civil liberty. They have decried all freegovernmentas inconsistentwiththe orderof society,and have indulgedthemselvesin maliciousexulta-tion over its friends and partisans. Happily formankind,sLxtpendousfabricsreared on the basis ofliberty,whichhaveflourishedforages,have, in a few

The Federalist 6t

gloriousinstances,refuted their gloomysophisms.And, I trust, Americawillbe the broad and solidfoundationof other edifices,not less magnificent,which will be equally permanent monuments oftheir errors.

But it is not to be deniedthat the portraits theyhave sketched of republicangovernmentwere toojust copiesof the originalsfrom which they weretaken. If it had beenfound impracticableto havedevisedmodelsof a more perfect structure,the en-lightenedfriendsto libertywouldhavebeenobligedto abandonthe causeof that speciesof governmentas indefensible. The scienceof politics,however,likemost other sciences,has receivedgreatimprove-ment. Theefficacyofvariousprinciplesis nowwellunderstood,whichwere either not knownat all, orimperfectlyknown to the ancients. The regulardistributionof powerinto distinctdepartments;theintroductionof legislativebalancesand checks; theinstitution of courts composedof judges holdingtheir officesduring good behavior; the representa-tion of the people in the legislatureby deputiesoftheirownelection: these are whollynewdiscoveries,or have made their principalprogresstowardsper-fectionin moderntimes. Theyare means,and pow-erful means,by whichthe excellencesof republicangovernmentmay be retained and its imperfectionslessenedor avoided. To this catalogueof circum-stancesthat tend to the ameliorationofpopular sys-tems of civil government,I shallventure, howevernovelit mayappear to some,to add onemore,on aprinciplewhichhasbeenmadethe foundationof an

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objectiontothenewConstitution;ImeantheEN-LARGEMENToftheORBITwithinwhichsuchsystemsaretorevolve,eitherinrespecttothedimensionsofa singleState,ortotheconsolidationofseveralsmallerStatesintoonegreatConfederacy.Thelatteristhatwhichimmediatelyconcernstheob-jectunderconsideration.Itwill,however,beofusetoexaminetheprincipleinitsapplicationtoa singleState,whichshallbeattendedtoinanotherplace.

TheutilityofaConfederacy,aswelltosuppressfactionandtoguardtheinternaltranqlfi11_tyofStates,astoincreasetheirexternalforceandsecur-ity,isinrealitynotanewidea.Ithasbeenprac-tiseduponindifferentcountriesandages,andhasreceivedthesanctionofthemostapprovedwritersonthesubjectsofpolitics.Theopponentsoftheplanproposedhave,withgreatassiduity,citedandcirculatedtheobservationsofMontesquieuonthenecessityofacontractedterritoryfora republicangovernment.Buttheyseemnottohavebeenapprisedofthesentimentsofthatgreatman ex-pressedinanotherpartofhiswork,nortohavead-vertedtotheconsequencesoftheprincipletowhichtheysubscribewithsuchreadyacquiescence.When Montesquieurecommendsa smallextent

forrepublics,thestandardshehadinviewwereofdimensionsfarshortofthelimitsofalmosteveryone of these States. Neither Virginia,Massachu-setts, Pennsylvania,NewYork, North Carolina,norGeorgiacan by any means be comparedwith themodelsfrom which he reasonedand to whichthe

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terms ofhisdescriptionapply. If wethereforetakehis ideas on this point as the criterionof truth, weshall be driven to the alternative either of tak-ing refugeat once in the arms of monarchy,or ofsplittingourselvesinto an infinityof little, jealous,clashing,tumultuouscommonwealths,the wretchednurseriesof unceasingdiscord,and the miserableobjectsof universalpity or contempt. Someofthewriterswhohavecomeforwardon the othersideofthequestionseemto havebeenawareofthe dilemma;and haveevenbeenbold enoughto hint at the divi-sionof the largerStates as a desirablething. Suchan infatuated policy, such a desperate expedient,might,by the multiplicationof petty offices,answerthe viewsof men whopossessnot qualificationstoextend their influencebeyondthe narrowcirclesofpersonalintrigue,but it could never promote thegreatnessor happinessof the peopleof America.

Referringthe examinationof the principleitselfto anotherplace,as has been alreadymentioned,itwillbe sufficientto remarkherethat, in the senseofthe authorwhohas been most emphaticallyquoteduponthe occasion,it wouldonlydictate a reductionofthe size of the moreconsiderable_MB_RSoftheUnion,but wouldnot militateagainsttheir beingallcomprehendedin oneconfederategovernment. Andthis is the true question,in the discussionof whichweaxeat present interested.

So far are the suggestionsof Montesquieufromstanding in oppositionto a generalUnion of theStates, that he explicitlytreats of a CONFEDERATEI_PU_LICaSthe expedientfor extendingthe sphere

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of populargovernment,and reconcilingthe advan-tages ofmonarchywith thoseof republicanism.

"It is very probable" (sayshe ") "that ma_ldndwouldhavebeenobligedat length to live constantlyunderthe govenunentof a singleperson,had theynot contriveda kind of constitutionthat has all theinternal advantagesof a republican,togetherwiththe externalforceof a monarchical,government. Imeana CONFEDERATEREPUBLIC."Thisform of governmentis a conventionby

whichseveralsmallerstatesagreeto becomemembersof a largerone,whichthey intend to form. It is akindofassemblageof societiesthat constitutea newone,capableof increasing,by meansof newassocia-tions,till they arrive to sucha degreeof poweras tobeableto providefor the securityofthe unitedbody.

"A republicofthis kind,ableto withstandan ex-ternalforce,maysupport itselfwithout any internalcorruptions. The form of this societyprevents allmannerof inconveniences.

"If a singlemembershouldattempt to usurp thesupremeauthority,he couldnot be supposedto havean equalauthorityand credit in all the confederatestates. Were he to have too great influenceoverone,this wouldalarmthe rest. Werehe to subduea part, that whichwouldstill remainfreemightop-posehimwith forcesindependentof thosewhichhehad usurped,and overpowerhimbeforehe couldbesettled in his usurpation.

"Shoulda popularinsurrectionhappen in oneofthe confederatestates,the othersare ableto quellit.

*Spirito_Laws,vol.i.,bookix.,chap.i.--PUBLXUS.

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Shouldabusescreepintoonepart, theyare reformedby thosethat remainsound. The state may be de-stroyedon oneside,and not on the other; the con-federacymay be dissolved,and the confederatespreservetheir sovereignty.

"As this governmentJscomposedof smallrepub-lics, it enjoys the internal happinessof each; andwith respectto its externalsituation,it is possessed,by meansofthe association,of all the advantagesoflarge monarchies."

I have thoughtit properto quote at length theseinterestingpassages,becausetheycontaina luminousabridgmentof the principalargumentsin favor ofthe Union,and must effectuallyremovethe falseimpressionswhicha misapplicationof other partsof the workwascalculatedto make. Theyhave, atthe sametime,an intimateconnectionwiththe moreimmediatedesignofthispaper; whichis,to illustratethe tendencyof the Unionto repressdomesticfac-tion and insurrection.

A distinction,moresubtlethan accurate,hasbeenraised betweena confederacyand a consolidationofthe States. The essentialcharacteristicof the firstis said to be, the restrictionof its authorityto themembersin theircollectivecapacities,withoutreach-ing to the individualsof whomthey are composed.It is contendedthat the national councilought tohaveno concernwith any objectof internaladmin-istration. An exact equality of suffragebetweenthe membershas alsobeen insistedupon as a lead-ing feature of a confederategovernment. Thesepositions are, in the main, arbitrary; they are

VOW.x_._$.

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supportedneitherby principlenorprecedent. It hasindeedhappened,that governmentsofthiskindhavegenerallyoperatedin the mannerwhichthe distinc-tion, takennoticeof,supposesto be inherentin theirnature; but therehave beenin most of themexten-siveexceptionsto the practice,whichserveto prove,as far as examplewillgo, that there is no absoluterule on the subject. And it will be clearlyshown,in the courseof thisinvestigation,that as far as theprinciplecontendedfor has prevailed,it has beenthe causeof incurabledisorderand imbecilityin thegovernment.

Thedefinitionofa confederaterepublicseemssimplyto be "an assemblageof societies,"or an associationof two or more states into one state. The extent,modifications,and objectsof the federal authority,are mere matters of discretion. So long as theseparateorganizationof the membersbe not abol-ished; so long as it exists,by a constitutionalne-cessity,for local purposes;though it shouldbe inperfect subordinationto the generalauthority ofthe union,it would still be, in fact and in theory,an associationof states, or a confederacy. Theproposed Constitution,so far from implyinganabolition of the State governments,makes themconstituentparts of the nationalsovereignty,by al-lowingthema directrepresentationin the Senate,andleavesin theirpossessioncertainexclusiveand veryimportantportionsof sovereignpower. This fullycorresponds,in every rational import of the terms,withthe ideaof a federalgovernment.

In the Lycian confederacy,which consistedof

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twenty-threeCITIESor republics,the largestwereen-titled to threevotesin the cOMMONCOUNCIL,thoseofthe middleclass to two,andthe smallestto one. TheCOMMONCOUNCILhad the appointmentof all thejudges and magistratesof the respectiveCITIES.This wascertainlythe mostdelicatespeciesof inter-ferencein their internaladministration;for if therebe any thingthat seemsexclusivelyappropriatedtothe localjurisdictions,it is the appointmentof theirown officers. Yet Montesquieu,speaking of thisassociation,says: " WereI to give a modelof anexcellentConfederateRepublic,it wouldbe that ofLycia." Thusweperceivethat the distinctionsin.sisted upon were not within the contemplationofthis enlightenedcivil_n.n;andweshallbe led to con-clude,that theyare thenovelrefinementsofan erro-neous theory.

PUBLIUS.

Frorath_New YorkPacket,Friday, November23, x787

THE FEDERALIST. No. X

(MADISON)

To thePeopleoftheStateofNew York:Amongthe numerousadvantagespromisedby a

well-constructedUnion, none deservesto be moreaccuratelydevelopedthan its tendencyto breakandcontrolthe violenceoffaction. The friendof popu-lar governmentsneverfindshimselfsomuchalarmedfor their character and fate, as when he contem-platestheir propensityto this dangerousvice. He

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willnot fail,therefore,to seta duevalueon anyplanwhich,wa'thoutviolatingthe principlesto whichheis attached, providesa propercure for it. The in-stability, injustice, and confusionintroduced intothe publiccouncils,have, in truth, been the mortaldiseasesunder which popular governmentshaveeverywhereperished; as they continueto be thefavorite and fruitful topics from which the adver-sariesto libertyderivetheirmost speciousdeclama-tions. The valuable improvementsmade by the_Americanconstitutionson the popularmodels,bothancient and modern,carmotcertainly be too muchadmired; but it would be an unwarrantablepar=tiality, to contendthat they have as effectuallyob-viated the danger on this side, as was wishedandexpected. Complaintsare everywhereheard fromour most considerateand virtuous citizens,equallythe friendsofpublicand private faith, and ofpublicand personalliberty, that our governmentsare toounstable,that the publicgoodis disregardedin theconflictsof rival parties, and that measuresare toooften decided,not accordingto the rules of justiceand the rights of the minorparty, but by the supe-riorforceofan interestedand overbearingmajority.Howeveranxiouslywe may wish that these com-plaints had no foundation,the evidenceof knownfactswillnot permitus to denythat theyare in somedegreetrue. It will be found,indeed,on a candidreviewof our situation, that someof the distressesunderwhichwelaborhavebeenerroneouslychargedon the operationof our governments;but it willbefound,at the same time, that other causeswillnot

The Federalist 69

aloneaccountfor manyof ourheaviestmisfortunes;and, particularly,for that prevailingand increasingdistrustofpublicengagements,andalarmforprivaterights,whichare echoedfrom oneend of the conti-nent to the other. These must be chiefly,if notwholly,effectsofthe unsteadinessand injusticewithwhich a factiousspirit has tainted our public ad-ministrations.

By a faction,I understand a number of citizens,whetheramountingto a majorityor minorityof thewhole,whoare united and actuated by somecom-mon impulseof passion,or of interest, adverse tothe rights ofother citizens,or to the permanentandaggregateinterestsof the community.

Thereare two methodsof curingthe mischiefsoffaction: the one,by removingits causes; the other,by controllingits effects.

There are again two methods of removingthecausesoffaction: the one,by destroyingthe libertywhichis essentialto its existence;the other,by giv-ingto everycitizenthe sameopinions,the samepas-sions,and the sameinterests.

It couldnever be moretruly saidthan of the firstremedy,that it wasworsethanthe disease. Libertyis to factionwhat air is to fire,an alimentwithoutwhichit instantly expires. But it couldnot be lessfollyto abolishliberty, whichis essentialto politicallife,becauseit nourishesfaction,than it wouldbe towish the annihilationof air, whichis essential toanimallife, becauseit impartsto fireits destructiveagency.

The secondexpedientis as impracticableas the

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firstwouldbeunwise. Aslongas the reasonofmancontinuesfallible,and he is at liberty to exerciseit,differentopinionswill be formed. As long as theconnectionsubsistsbetweenhis reasonand his self-love,hisopinionsand his passionswillhavea recip-rocal influenceon each other; and the formerwillbe objectsto whichthelatter willattach themselves.The diversityin the facultiesofmen,fromwhichtherightsofproperlyoriginate,isnot lessan insuperableobstacleto a uniformityof interests. The protec-tion of these faculties is the first object of gov-ernment. From the protection of different andunequal facultiesof acquiringproperly,the posses-sionofdifferentdegreesandkindsof propertyimme-diatelyresults; and from the influenceof theseonthe sentimentsand viewsof the respectiveproprie-tors, ensuesa divisionof the societyinto differentinterests and parties.

The latent causesof factionare thus sownin thenatureofman; andweseethem everywherebroughtinto differentdegreesof activity, accordingto thedifferentcircumstancesof civil society. A zeal fordifferent opinionsconcerningreligion, concerninggovernment,and manyother points,as wellof spec-ulation as of practice; an attachment to differentleadersambitiouslycontendingforpre-eminenceandpower; or to persons of other descriptionswhosefortuneshave been interesting to the human pas-sions,la_ve,in turn, dividedmankind into parties,inflamedthemwith mutual animosity,and renderedthem muchmore disposedto vex and oppresseachother than to co-operatefor their common good.

The Federalist 7I

So strongis this propensityof manldndto fall intomutualanimosities,thatwhereno substantialocca-sionpresentsitself,the most frivolousand fancifuldistinctionshave beensufficientto kindletheirun-friendlypassionsand excitetheir mostviolentcon-flicts. But the most commonand durablesourceof factionshasbeenthevariousand unequaldistri-butionofproperty. Thosewhohold and thosewhoare withoutpropertyhave everformeddistinct in-terests in society. Those who are creditors,andthosewho are debtors,fall undera like discrimina-tion. Alandedinterest,a manufacturinginterest,amercantileinterest,a moneyedinterest,with manylesser interests,grow up of necessityin civilizednations,anddividethem intodifferentclasses,actu-ated by differentsentimentsand views. The regu-lation of these variousand interfering interestsforms the principal task of modern legislation,and involves the spirit of party and faction inthe necessaryand ordinaryoperationsof the gov-ernment.

No man is allowedto be a judgein his owncause,becausehis interestwould certainlybias his judg-ment, and, not improbably,corrupt his integrity.With equal,nay withgreaterreason,a bodyof menare unfit to be both judgesand parties at the sametime; yet whataremanyof the mostimportantactsof legislation,but so many judicialdeterminations,not indeed concerningthe rights of singlepersons,but coneerningtherights"oflargebodiesof citizens?And what are the different classes of legislatorsbut advocatesand partiesto the causeswhichthey

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determine? Is a law proposed concerningprivatedebts? It is a questionto whichthe creditorsareparties on one side and the debtors on the other.Justice ought to hold the balance between them.Yet the parties are, and must be, themselvesthejudges; and the most numerousparty, or, in otherwords,the most powerfulfaction must be expectedto prevail. Shall domesticmanufacturesbe en-couraged,and in what degree,by restrictionsonforeignmanufactures?are questionswhichwouldbedifferentlydecidedby the landed and the manu-facturingclasses,and probably by neither with asoleregardto justiceand the publicgood. The ap-portionmentof taxes on the variousdescriptionsofproperty is an act whichseemsto requirethe mostexactimpartiality; yet thereis, perhaps,no legisla-tive act in whichgreater opportunityand tempta-tion are given to a predominantparty to trampleon the rules of justice. Every shilli,lgwith whichthey overburdenthe inferiornumber, is a shillingsavedto their ownpockets.

It is in vainto say that enlightenedstatesmenwillbe ableto adjust theseclashinginterests,and renderthem all subservientto the public good. Enlight-ened statesmen will not always be at the helm.Nor,in manycases,can suchan adjustmentbe madeat all without taking into viewindirect and remoteconsiderations,which will rarely prevail over theimmediateinterest whichoneparty may find in dis-regardingthe rights of another or the goodof thewhole.

Theinferenceto whichweare broughtis,that the

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causesof factioncannotbe removed,and that reliefis only to be soughtin the meansof controllingitse_eats.

If a factionconsistsof lessthan a majority,reliefis suppliedby therepublicanprinciple,whichenablesthe majorityto defeat its sinisterviewsby regularvote. It may clogthe administration,it may con-vulsethe society; but it willbe unable to executeand maskits violenceunder the formsof the Con-stitution. Whena majorityis includedin a faction,the formof populargovernment,on the other hand,enablesit to sacrificeto its rulingpassionor interestboth the publicgoodandthe rightsofother citizens.To securethe publicgoodand private rightsagainstthe dangerof sucha faction,and at the sametimeto preserve the spirit and the form of populargovernment,is then the great object to whichourinquiriesare directed. Let me add that it is thegreat desideratumby whichthis formofgovernmentcan be rescuedfromthe opprobriumunderwhichithas so long labored,and be recommendedto theesteemand adoptionof mankind.

By what meansis this object attainable? Evi-dently by oneof two only. Either the existenceofthe same passionor interest in a majority at thesametime must be prevented,or the majority,hav-ing suchcoexistentpassionor interest,must be ren-dered,by their number and local situation,unableto concertand carry into effectschemesof oppres-sion. If the impulseand the opportunity be suf-fered to coincide,we wellknow that neither moralnor religiousmotivescanbe reliedonas an adequate

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control. Theyare not found to be such on the in-justice and violenceof individuals,and lose theirefficacyin proportionto the number combinedto-gether, that is, in proportionas their efficacybe-comesneedful.

Fromthisviewofthe subjectit may be concludedthat a pure democracy,by whichI mean a societyconsistingof a smallnumberof citizens,whoassem-ble and administerthe governmentin person, canadmit of no cure for the mischiefsof faction. Acommonpassion or interest will, in almost everycase,befeltby a majorityof the whole; a communi-cation and concert result from the form of gov-ernmentitself; and there is nothing to check theinducementsto sacrificethe weakerparty or an ob-noxiousindividual. Hence it is that such demo-cracieshave ever beenspectaclesof turbulenceandcontention;haveeverbeenfound incompatiblewithpersonal security or the rights of property; andhave in generalbeen as short in their livesas theyhave beenviolent in their deaths. Theoreticpoli-ticians,whohave patronizedthis speciesof govern-ment, have erroneouslysupposedthat by reducingmankind to a perfect equality in their politicalrights, they would,at the same time, be perfectlyequalizedand assimilatedin their possessions,theiropinions,and their passions.

A republic,by which I mean a government inwhich the schemeof representation takes place,opensa differentprospect,and promisesthe cureforwhichwe are seeking. Let us examinethe pointsin whichit variesfrompure democracy,and weshall

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comprehendboth the nature of the cure and theefficacywhichit must derivefromthe Union.

The two great points of differencebetweena de-mocracyand a republicare: first,the delegationofthe government,in the latter, to a smallnumber ofcitizenselectedby the rest; secondly,the greaternumber of citizens,and greater sphereof country,over whichthe latter maybe extended.

Theeffectofthefirstdifferenceis,ontheonehand,to refineand enlargethe public views,by passingthem throughthe mediumof a chosenbody of citi-zens, whosewisdommay best discernthe true in-terest of their country, and whosepatriotismandlove of justicewill be least likelyto sacrificeit totemporaryor partial considerations. Undersuch areg_!ation,it maywellhappenthat the publicvoice,pronouncedby the representativesofthepeople,willbe more consonantto the publicgoodthan if pro-nouncedby the peoplethemselves,convenedfor thepurpose. On the other hand, the effect may beinverted. Men of factious tempers,of local preju-dices, or of sinister designs,may, by intrigue, bycorruption, or by other means, first obtain thesuffrages,and then betray the interests, of thepeople. The question resulting is, whether smallor extensive republicsare more favorable to theelectionof properguardiansof the publicweal; andit is clearlydecidedin favor of the latter by twoobviousconsiderations:

In the first place, it is to be remarkedthat, how-eversmall the republicmay be, the representativesmustbe raisedto a certainnumber,in orderto guard

76 AlexanderHamilton

againstthe cabalsof a few; andthat, howeverlargeit maybe,they mustbe limitedto a certainnumber,in order to guard against the confusionof a multi-rude. Hence,the mlmberof representativesin thetwo casesnot being in proportion to that of thetwo constituents,and being proportionallygreaterin the small republic,it followsthat, if the propor-tion offit charactersbe not lessin the largethan inthe smallrepublic,the formerwillpresenta greateroption,and consequentlya greater probabilityof afit choice.

In the next place, as each representativewillbechosenby a greater number of citizensin the largethan in the small republic,it will be more difficultforunworthycandidatesto practisewith successtheviciousarts by whichelectionsare toooften carried;and the suffragesofthe peoplebeingmore free,willbe morelikelyto centrein menwhopossessthe mostattractive merit and the most diffusiveand estab-lishedcharacters.

It mustbe confessedthat in this, as in most othercases,there is a mean, on both sides of whichin-convenienceswillbe foundto lie. Byenlargingtoomuchthe nl_mberof electors,you renderthe repre-sentative too little acquaintedwith all their localcircumstancesandlesserinterests; as by reducingittoo much,yourenderhim undulyattached to these,and too little fit to comprehendand pursue greatandnationalobjects. ThefederalConstitutionformsa happycombinationin this respect; the great andaggregateinterestsbeing referred to the national,the localand particularto the State legislatures.

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Theotherpointof differenceis, thegreaternum-ber of citizensand extentof territorywhichmay bebroughtwithinthe compassof republicanthan ofdemocraticgovernment;and it is thiscircumstanceprincipallywhichrendersfactiouscombinationslesstobedreadedintheformerthaninthelatter.Thesmallerthesociety,thefewerprobablywillbethedistinctpartiesandinterestscomposingit;thefewerthedistinctpartiesandinterests,themorefre-quentlywillamajoritybefoundofthesameparty;andthesmallerthenumberofindividualscompos-ingamajority,andthesmallerthecompasswithinwhichtheyareplaced,themoreeasilywilltheyconcertandexecutetheirplansofoppression.Bx-tendthesphere,andyoutakeinagreatervarietyofpartiesandinterests;youmakeitlessprobablethatamajorityofthewholewillhaveacommonmotivetoinvadetherightsofothercitizens;orifsuchacommonmotiveexists,itwillbemoredifficultforallwhofeelittodiscovertheirownstrength,andtoactinunisonwitheachother.Besidesotherim-pediments,itmayberemarkedthat,wherethereisa consciousnessofunjustordishonorablepurposes,communicationisalwayscheckedby distrustinproportionto thenumberwhoseconcurrenceisnecessary.Hence,itclearlyappears,thatthesameadvan-

tagewhicharepublichasoverademocracy,incon-trollingtheeffectsoffaction,isenjoyedbyalargeoverasmallrepublic,--isenjoyedbytheUnionovertheStatescomposingit.Doestheadvantagecon-sistinthesubstitutionofrepresentativeswhose

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enlightenedviewsand virtuous sentimentsrenderthem superiorto localprejudicesand to schemesofinjustice? Itwill notbe deniedthat the representa-tionofthe Unionwillbe most likelytopossesstheserequisiteendowments. Doesit consistin the greatersecurity affordedby a greater variety of parties,againstthe eventof anyoneparty beingable to out-number and oppress the rest? In an equal degreedoesthe increasedvarietyofpartiescomprisedwithinthe Union,increasethis security? Doesit, in fine,consistin the greater obstaclesopposedto the con-cert and accomplishmentof the secretwishesof anunjust and interested majority? Here, again, theextent of the Uniongivesit the most palpablead-vantage.

The influenceof factious leaders may kindle aflamewithin their particular States,but willbe un-able to spread a general conflagrationthrough theother States. A rel_ious sect may degenerateintoa politicalfactionin a part of the Confederacy;butthe variety of sects dispersedover the entire faceof it must securethe national councilsagainst anydangerfrom that source. A ragefor paper money,for an abolitionof debts, for an equal divisionofproperty, or for any other improperor wickedpro-ject, willbe less apt to pervadethe wholebody ofthe Union than a particular memberof it; in thesameproportionas sucha malady is morelikelytotaint a particularcounty or district, than an entireState.

In the extent and properstructure of the Union,therefore, we behold a republicanremedy for the

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diseasesmostincidenttorepublicangovernment.Andaccordingtothedegreeofpleasureandpridewefeelinbeingrepublicans,oughttobeourzealincherishingthespiritandsupportingthecharacterofFederalists.

PUBLIUS.

For the Indepvnd_nfJournal

THE FEDERALIST. No. XI

(.A_ILTON)

To thePeopleo_theStateofNew York:The importance of the Union, in a commercial

light, is one of those points about which there isleast room to entertain a differenceof opinion,andwhichhas, in fact, commandedthe mostgeneralas-sent of men who have any acquaintancewith thesubject. Thisappliesas wellto our intercoursewithforeigncountriesas with eachother.

Thereare appearancesto authorizea suppositionthat the adventurousspirit,whichdistinguishesthecommercialcharacter of America,has already ex-cited uneasy sensationsin severalof the maritimepowers"ofEurope. They seem to be apprehensiveof our too great interferencein that c_g trade,which is the support of their navigation and thefoundationof their naval strength. Thoseof themwhich have coloniesin Americalook forward towhat this country is capable of becoming, withpainful solicitude. They foresee the dangers thatmay threaten their Americandominionsfrom the

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neighborhoodof States,whichhave all the disposi-tions,and wouldpossessall the means,requisitetothe creationof a powerfulmarine. Impressionsofthiskind willnaturallyindicatethe policyoffoster-ingdivisionsamongus, and of deprivingus, as faras possible,of an ACTIVECOMMERCEin our ownbot-toms. This wouldanswerthe threefoldpurposeofpreventingour interferencein their navigation,ofmonopolizingtheprofitsofourtrade, andofclippingthe wingsby whichwe might soar to a dangerousgreatness. Did not prudenceforbid the detail, itwouldnotbe diffi_culttotrace,by facts,theworkingsof this policyto the cabinetsof ministers.

If wecontinueunited,wemay counteracta policyso lmfriendlyto ourprosperityin a variety ofways.By prohibitoryregulations,extending,at the sametime,throughoutthe States,we may obligeforeigncountriestobid againsteachother,for theprivilegesof our markets. This assertion will not appearchimericalto thosewho are able to appreciatetheimportanceofthe marketsofthreemillionsofpeople--increasingin rapid progression,for themost par_exclusivelyaddictedto agriculture,and likelyfromlocal circumstancesto remain so--to any manufac-turing nation; and the immensedifferencetherewouldbe to the trade and navigationof such a na-tion, betweena direct communicationin its ownships,and an indirectconveyanceofitsproductsandreturns,to andfromAmerica,in the shipsofanothercountry. Suppose,for instance,we had a govern-mentin America,capableofexcludingGreatBritain(withwhomwe have at presentno treaty of coin-

The Federalist 8i

meree)fromall ourports; whatwouldbe theprob-ableoperationofthisstepuponherpolitics? Wouldit not enableus to negotiate,with the fairestpros-pectofsuccess,forcommercialprivilegesofthemostvaluableandextensivekind,in the dominionsofthatkingdom? Whenthese questionshavebeenasked,uponother occasions,theyhavereceiveda plausible,but not a solidor satisfactoryanswer. It hasbeensaidthat prohibitionson our part wouldproducenochangein the system of Britain,becauseshe couldprosecuteher trade with us throughthe mediumofthe Dutch,whowouldbe her immediatecustomersand paymastersfor thosearticleswhichwerewantedfor the supplyof our markets. But wouldnot hernavigationbe materiallyinjuredby the loss of theimportant advantage of being her own carrier inthat trade? Would not the principal part of itsprofitsbe interceptedby the Dutch, as a compensa-tion for their agencyandrisk? Wouldnot the merecircumstanceof freight occasiona considerablede-duction? Would not so circuitousan intercoursefacilitate the competitionsof other nations, by en-hancing the price of British commoditiesin ourmarkets, and by transferringto other hands themanagementof this interestingbranchof the Britishcorrm_eree?

A mature considerationof the objectssuggestedby these questionswilljustifya belief that the realdisadvantagesto Britainfromsucha state ofthings,conspiringwith the prepossessionsof a great part ofthe nation in favor of the Americantrade, and ofthe importunitiesof the West India islands,would

VOL.XL--6.

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producea relaxationinherpresentsystem,andwouldlet us intothe enjoymentofprivilegesinthemarketsofthoseislandsandelsewhere,fromwhichourtradewouldderive the most substantialbenefits. Sucha point gainedfromthe Britishgovernment,andwhichcouldnot be expectedwithoutan equivalentinexemptionsandimmunitiesin ourmarkets,wouldbe likely to havea correspondenteffecton the con-ductof othernations,whowouldnot be inclinedtoseethemselvesaltogethersupplantedin our trade.

A furtherresourcefor influencingthe conductofEuropeannationstowardus, in this respect,wouldarise from the establishmentof a federalnavy.Therecan be no doubtthat thecontinuanceof theUnionunderan efficientgovernment,wouldput itin ourpower,at a periodnot verydistant,to createa navywhich,if it could not vie withthose of thegreatmaritimepowers,wouldat leastbe of respect-ableweightif thrownintothe scaleof eitheroftwocontendingparties. Thiswouldbe morepeculiarlythecasein relationto operationsintheWestIndies.A fewshipsof the line,sentopportunelyto there-inforcementof eitherside,wouldoftenbe sufficiontto decidethe fate of a campaign,on the event ofwhichinterestsof thegreatestmagnitudeweresus-pended. Our positionis, in this respect,a mostcommandingone. And if to this considerationweadd that of the usefulnessof suppliesfrom thiscountry,in theprosecutionofmilitaryoperationsintheWestIndies,it will readilybe perceivedthat asituationso favorablewould enableus to bargainwithgreatadvantageforcommercialprivileges. A

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pricewouldbe set not onlyuponour friendship,butuponour neutrality. By a steadyadherenceto theUnion,wemayhope,erelong,to becomethe arbiterof Europe in America,and to be able to inclinethebalanceof Europeancompetitionsin this part of theworldas our interestmay dictate.

But in the reverseof this eligiblesituation,weshalldiscoverthat the rivalshipsof the parts wouldmakethem checksuponeachother,and wouldfrus-trate all the temptingadvantageswhichnature haskindly placedwithin our reach. In a state so in-significantour commercewould be a prey to thewanton interrneddliugsof all nations at war witheach other; who, havingnothing to fear from us,would with little scrupleor remorse supply theirwants by depredationson our property as often asit fell in their way. The rights of neutralitywillonly be respected when they are defendedby anadequatepower. A nation,despicableby its weak-ness,forfeitseventhe privilegeofbeingneutral.

Under a vigorousnational government,the nat-ural strength and resourcesof the country,directedto a commoninterest, wouldbaffleall the combina-tions of Europeanjealousy to restrain our growth.This situationwouldeventake awaythe motive tosuch combinations,by inducingan impracticabilityofsuccess. An activecommerce,an extensivenavi-gation, and a flourishingmarine would then betheoffspringof moral and physicalnecessity. Wemight defy the little arts of the little politicianstocontrol or vary the irresistible and unchangeablecourseof nature.

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Butina stateofdisunion,thesecombinationsmightexistandmightoperatewithsuccess.Itwouldbeinthepowerofthemaritimenations,availingthemselvesofouruniversalimpotence,toprescribetheconditionsofourpoliticalexistence;andastheyhavea commoninterestinbeingourcarriers,andstillmoreinpreventingourbecomingtheirs,theywouldinallprobabilitycombinetoem-barrassournavigationinsuchamanneraswouldineffectdestroyit,andconfineustoa PASSIVECOM-MERCE.We shouldthenbecompelledtocontentourselveswiththefirstpriceofourcommodities,andtoseetheprofitsofourtradesnatchedfromustoenrichourenemiesandpersecutors.Thatun-equalledspiritofenterprise,whichsignalizesthegeniusoftheAmericanmerchantsandnavigators,and whichis in itself an inexhaustiblemine of na-tionalwealth,wouldbe stifledand lost, and povertyanddisgracewouldoverspreada countrywhich,withwisdom,mightmakeherselfthe admirationandenvyof the world.

Thereare rights of great momentto the trade ofAmericawhichare rights of the UnionmIalludetothe fisheries,to the navigationof the Westernlakes,and to that of the Mississippi.The dissolutionofthe Confederacywouldgiveroomfor delicateques-tionsconcerningthe future existenceof theserights;whichthe interest of more powerfulpartners wouldhardly fail to solveto our disadvantage. The dis-positionof Spainwith regardto the Mississippineedsno comment. France and Britain are concernedwith us in the fisheries,and viewthemas of the ut-

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most momentto their navigation. They, of course,wouldhardlyremainlongindifferentto that decidedmastery, of which experiencehas shownus to bepossessedin this valuablebranch of traffic,and bywhichweare ableto undersellthosenationsin theirown markets. What more natural than that theyshould be disposedto excludefrom the lists suchdangerouscompetitors?

This branch of trade ought not to be consideredas a partial benefit. Allthe navigatingStates may,hi differentdegrees,advantageouslyparticipate init, and under circttrnstancesof a greater extensionof mercantilecapital,wouldnot be unlikelyto doit._Asa nursery of seamen,it now is, or, when timeshallhave more nearly assimilatedthe principlesofnavigation in the several States, will become,auniversalresource. Tothe establishmentofa navy,it must be indispensable.

To this great national object, a NAVY,unionwillcontribute hi variousways. Every institutionwillgrowand flourishin proportionto the quantity andextent of the means concentredtowards its forma-tion and support. A navy of the UnitedStates, asit would embracethe resourcesof all, is an objectfar less remote than a navy of any singleState orpartial confederacy,whichwouldonly embracetheresourcesof a singlepart. It happens,indeed,thatdifferentportions of confederatedAmericapossesseach somepeculiaradvantage for this essentiales-tablishment. The more southernStates furnish ingreater abundance certain kinds of naval stores--tar, pitch, and turpentine. Their wood for the

86 AlexanderHamilton

constructionofshipsisalsoofa moresolidandlastingtexture. The differencein the durationofthe shipsof whichthe navy mightbe composed,if chieflycon-structed of Southernwood,wouldbe of signalim-portance,eitherin the viewof navalstrength or ofnational economy. Someof the Southernand ofthe MiddleStatesyielda greater plenty ofiron, andof better quality. Seamenmust chieflybe drawnfrom the Northern hive. The necessity of navalprotectionto external or maritime commercedoesnot require a particularelucidation,no more thanthe conducivenessof that speciesof commerceto theprosperityof a navy.

An unrestrained intercoursebetween the Statesthemselveswilladvancethe trade of eachby an in-terchangeof their respectiveproductions,not onlyfor the supply of reciprocalwants at home,but forexportationto foreignmarkets. The veins of com-mercein every part will be replenished,and willacquireadditionalmotionand vigorfrom a freecir-culation of the commoditiesof every part. Com-mercial enterprise will have much greater scope,from the diversity in the productionsof differentStates. When the staple of one fails from a badharvestor unproductivecrop, it can call to its aidthe staple of another. The variety, not less thanthe value, of products for exportation contributesto the activityofforeigncommerce. It canbe con-ducteduponmuchbetter terms with a largenumberof materialsof a givenvaluethan with a sma.llnum-ber of materialsof the samevalue; arisingfromthecompetitionsof trade and from the fluctuationsof

The Federalist 87

markets. Particular articles may be in great de-mand at certain periods,and unsalableat others;but if there be a variety of articles,it can scarcelyhappenthatthey shouldall be at one time in thelatter predicament,and on this accountthe opera-tions of the merchantwouldbe less liable to anyconsiderableobstructionor stagnation. The specu-lative trader willat onceperceivethe forceof theseobservations,and willacknowledgethat the aggre-gate balanceof the commerceof the UnitedStateswouldbid fair to be muchmorefavorablethan thatof the thirteen Stateswithout unionor with partialunions.

It mayperhapsbe repliedto this, that whethertheStates are united or disunited,there wouldstill bean intimateintercoursebetweenthem whichwouldanswerthe sameends; but this intercoursewouldbefettered, interrupted,and narrowedby a multiplic-ity of causes,whichin the courseof these papershave beenamplydetailed. A unity ofcommercial,as wellas political,interests,can only result fromaunity ofgovernment.

Thereare other pointsof viewin whichthis sub-ject might be placed, of a str_l_ingand animatingkind. But they wouldlead us too far into the re-gions of futurity, and would involve topics notproper for a newspaperdiscussion. I shallbrieflyobserve,that our situationinvitesand our interestsprompt us to aim at an ascendant in the systemof Americanaffairs. The worldmay politically,aswellas "geographically,be dividedinto four parts,each havinga distinct set of interests. Unhappily

+

88 AlexanderHamilton

for the other three,Europe,by her arms andby hernegotiations,by force and by fraud,has, in differ-ent degrees,extendedher dominionover them all.Africa,Asia,and America,havesuccessivelyfeltherdomination. The superiority she has long main-tained has tempted her to plume herself as theMistressof the World,and to considerthe rest ofnaa_kindascreatedforher benefit. Menadmiredasprofoundphilosophershave, in direct terms,attri-buted to her inhabitantsa physicalsuperiority,andhave gravely asserted that all animals,and withthem the human species,degeneratein America--that evendogsceaseto bark after havingbreathedawhilein our atmosphere,x Pacts have too longsupportedthese arrogant pretensionsof the Euro-peans. It belongsto us to vindicatethe honor ofthehumanrace,and to teach that assumingbrother,moderation. Union will enableus to do it. Dis-unionwilladdanothervictimtohistriumphs.LetAmericansdisdaintobe the instnnnentsofEuropeangreatness! Let the thirteen States, boundtogetherin a strictand indissolubleUnion,concurin erectingonegreat Americansystem,superiorto the controlof all transatlanticforce or influence,and able todictatethe terms of the connectionbetweenthe oldand the newworld!

PUBLIUS.x Rec_erche$ _.$lo$op_glues $u7"/e$ Atn_r_a_*C$._PUBLIU_;.

The Federalist 89

FromtileNew YorkPacket,Tuesday,November27,x787

THE FEDERALIST. No.XlI

(HAMILTON)

To thePeopleoftheStateofNew York:Theeffectsof Unionuponthe commercialprosper-

it¥ of the Stateshave been sufficientlydelineated.Its tendencyto promotethe interestsofrevenuewillbe the subjectof ourpresentinquiry.

Theprosperityof commerceis nowperceivedandacknowledgedby allenlightenedstatesmento be themostusefulas wellas the mostproductivesourceofnational wealth, and has accordinglybecomea pri-mary objectof their politicalcares. Bymultiplyingthe meansof gratification,by promotingthe intro-ductionandcirculationofthepreciousmetals,thosedarlingobjectsof human avariceand enterprise,itservesto vivify and invigoratethe channelsof in-dustry,and to rna_ethemflowwithgreateractivityand copiousness. The assiduousmerchant, the la-borioushusbandman,the active mechanic,and theindustriousmanufacturer,--allorders of men, lookforwardwith eagerexpectationandgrowingalacrityto this pleasing reward of their toils. The often-agitated question between agriculture and com-mercehas, from indubitableexperience,receivedadecisionwhichhas silencedthe rivalshipthat oncesubsistedbetweenthem,andhasproved,to the satis-faction of their friends,that their interestsare inti-matelyblendedand interwoven. It hasbeenfoundin various countries that, in proportion as com-mercehas flourished,land has risen in value. And

9° AlexanderHamilton

howcouldithavehappenedotherwise?Couldthatwhichprocuresafreerventfortheproductsoftheearth,whichfurnishesnewincitementstothecul-tivationofland,whichisthemostpowerfulinstru-mentinincreasingthequantityofmoneyinastate---couldthat,infine,whichisthefaithfulhandmaidoflaborandindustry,ineveryshape,failtoaugmentthatarticle,whichistheprolificparentoffarthegreatestpartoftheobjectsuponwhichtheyareexerted?Itisastonishingthatsosimplea truthshouldeverhavehadanadversary;anditisone,amongamultitudeofproofs,howaptaspiritofillinformedjealousy,oroftoogreatabstractionandrefinement,istoleadmenastrayfromtheplainesttruthsofreasonandconviction.Theabilityofacountrytopaytaxesmustalways

beproportioned,ina greatdegree,tothequantityofmoneyincirculation,andtotheceleritywithwhichitcirculates.Commerce,contributingtoboththeseobjects,mustofnecessityrenderthepay-mentoftaxeseasier,andfacilitatetherequisitesup-pliestothetreasury.ThehereditarydominionsoftheEmperorofGermanycontaina greatextentoffertile,cultivated,andpopulousterritory,a largeproportionofwhichissituatedinmildandluxuriantclimates.InsomepartsofthisterritoryaretobefoundthebestgoldandsilverminesinEurope.And yet,fromthewantofthefosteringinfluenceofcommerce,thatmonarchcanboastbutslenderrevenues.Hehasseveraltimesbeencompelledtooweobligationstothepecuniarysuccorsofothernationsforthepreservationofhisessentialinter-

The Federalist 91

ests,and is unable,upon the strength of hisownre-sources,to sustaina longor continuedwar.

But it is not £d this aspect of the subject alonethat Unionwillbe seento conduceto the purposeofrevenue. Thereare other pointsof view,in whichits influencewill appear more immediateand deci-sive. It is evident from the state of the country,from the habits of the people,from the experiencewehavehad onthe point itself,that it isimpractica-ble to raise any very considerablesums by directtaxation. Tax laws have in vain been multiplied;new methodsto enforcethe collectionhave in vainbeen tried; the public expectationhas been uni-formlydisappointed,and the treasuriesof the Stateshave remainedempty. The popularsystem of ad-ministrationinherentin the nature of populargov-ernment,coincidingwith the real scarcityof moneyincident to a languidand mutilated state of trade,has hitherto defeatedevery experimentfor exten-sivecollections,andhasat lengthtaughtthe differentlegislaturesthe follyofattemptingthem.

Nopersonacquaintedwithwhat happensin othercountrieswillbe surprisedat thiscircumstance. Inso opulenta nation as that of Britain,wheredirecttaxes from superior wealth must be much moretolerable,and, from the vigor of the government,much more practicable,than in America,far thegreatestpart ofthe nationalrevenueis derivedfromtaxes of the indirectkind, from imposts,and fromexcises. Duties on importedarticles form a largebranchof this latter description.

In America,it is evidentthat wemust a longtime

92 AlexanderHamilton

dependforthemeansofrevenuechieflyonsuchduties.In most parts of it, excisesmust be co_finedwithina narrowcompass. The geniusof the peoplewillillbrookthe inquisitiveand peremptoryspirit of exciselaws. Thepocketsofthe farmers,onthe otherhand,willreluctantlyyieldbut scantysupplies,in the un-welcomeshape of impositionson their housesandlands; and personalpropertyis too precariousandinvisiblea fund to be laid hold of in any other waythan by the imperceptibleagencyof taxes on con-sumption.

If these remarkshave any foundation,that stateof thingswhichwill best enableus to improveandextendsovaluablea resourcemust be best adaptedto our politicalwelfare. And it cannotadmit of aseriousdoubt, that this state of thingsmust rest onthebasisofa generalUnion. Asfaras thiswouldbeconduciveto the interestsofcommerce,sofar it musttendto the extensionoftherevenueto be drawnfromthat source. As far as it wouldcontributeto ren-dering regulationsfor the collectionof the dutiesmoresimpleand efficacious,sofar it must servetoanswerthe purposesof makingthe samerate of du-tiesmoreproductive,andofputtingit intothe powerof the government to increase the rate withoutprejudiceto trade.

Therelativesituationof theseStates; the numberofriverswithwhichthey areintersected,andofbaysthat washtheirshores;the facilityofcommunicationin everydirection;the affinityoflanguageand man-ners; the familiarhabits of intercourse;--all theseare circumstancesthat wouldconspireto renderan

The Federalist 93

]lllcittradebetweenthema matter oflittled_fficulty,and wouldinsurefrequentevasionsof the commer-cial regulationsof eachother. The separateStatesor confederacieswould be necessitatedby mutualjealousyto avoid the temptationsto that kind oftradeby thelownessoftheir duties. The temperofourgovernments,fora longtime to come,wouldnotpermit those rigorous precautions by which theEuropeannationsguard the avenuesinto their re-spectivecountries,as wellby landas by water; andwhich,even there, are found insufficientobstaclesto the adventurousstratagemsof avarice.

In France,thereis an army ofpatrols(as they arecalled) constantly employedto secure their fiscalregulationsagainstthe inroadsof the dealersin con-traband trade. Mr. Neckarcomputesthe numberof these patrols at upwards of twenty thousand.This showsthe immensedifficultyin preventingthatspeciesof traffic,wherethereis an inland communi-cation,andplacesin a stronglightthe disadvantageswith whichthe collectionof dutiesin this countrywould be encumbered,if by disunionthe Statesshouldbe placedin a situation,withrespectto eachother, resemblingthat of France with respect toher neighbors. The arbitraryand vexatiouspowerswithwhichthe patrolsare necessarilyarmed,wouldbe intolerablein a freecountry.

If, on the contrary,therebe but onegovernmen_pervad__ngall the States,therewillbe,as to the prin-cipalpart ofourcommerce,but oNgSlDBto guard--the ATLANTICCOAST.Vesselsarrivingdirectlyfromforeigncountries,ladenwith valuablecargoes,would

94 .AlexanderHamilton

rarelychooseto hazardthemselvesto the compheatedand criticalperils whichwouldattend attempts tounladepriorto their cominginto port. They wouldhave to dread both the dangersof the coast,and ofdetection,as wellafter as beforetheir arrivalat theplacesof their final destination. An ordinary de-greeof vigilancewouldbe competentto the preven-tion of any materialinfractionsupon the rights ofthe revenue. A few armedvessels,judiciouslysta-tioned at the entrances of our ports, might at asmallexpensebe madeusefulsentinelsof the laws.Andthegovernmenthavingthe sameinterestto pro-videagainstviolationseverywhere,the co-operationof its measuresin each State wouldhavea powerfultendency to render them effectual. Here also weshouldpreserve,by Union,an advantagewhichna-ture holds out to us, and which would be relin-quishedby separation. The UnitedStates lieat agreat distancefrom Europe,and at a considerabledistancefromall otherplaceswithwhichtheywouldhave extensiveconnectionsof foreigntrade. Thepassagefrom them to us, in a few hours, or in asinglenight, as betweenthe coasts of France andBritain,and of other neighboringnations,wouldbeimpracticable. Thisis a prodigioussecurityagains_a direct contrabandwith foreigncountries; but acircuitouscontraband to one State, through themediumof another,would be both easy and safe.The differencebetweena direct importation fromabroad, and an indirect importation through thechannelof a neighboringState, in smallparcels,ac-cordingto timeand opportunity,withthe additional

The Federalist 95

facilitiesofinlandcommunication,mustbepalpabletoeverymanofdiscernment.Itisthereforeevident,thatonenationalgovern-

mentwouldbeable,atmuchlessexpense,toex-tendthedutieson imports,beyondcomparison,furtherthanwouldbepracticabletotheStatessepa-rately,ortoanypartialconfederacies.Hitherto,Ibelieve,itmaysafelybeasserted,thatthesedutieshavenotuponanaverageexceededinanyStatethreepercent.InFrancetheyareestimatedtobeaboutfifteenpercent.,andinBritaintheyexceedthisproportion.I Thereseemstobenothingtob_adertheirbeingincreascdinthiscountrytoatleasttrebletheirpresentamount.Thesinglear-ticleofardentspirits,underfederalregulation,mightbemadetofurnisha considerablerevenue.UponaratiototheimportationintothisState,thewholequantityimportedintotheUnitedStatesmaybeestimatedatfourmillionsofgallons;which,atashillingpergallon,wouldproducetwohundredthousandpounds.Thatarticlewouldwellbearthisrateofduty;andifitshouldtendtodiminishtheconsumptionofit,suchaneffectwouldbeequallyfavorabletotheagriculture,totheeconomy,tothemorals,andtothehealthofthesociety.Thereis,perhaps,nothingsomuchasubjectofnationalex-travaganceasthesespirits.Whatwillbetheconsequence,ifwearenotable

toavailourselvesoftheresourceinquestioninitsfullextent?A nationcannotlongexistwithoutreve-nues.Destituteofthisessentialsupport,itmust

: I_my memory be right they amount to twenty per cent.--PusLiUS.

96 AlexanderHamilton

resignits independence,and sink into the degradedconditionof a province. This is an extremity towhichno governmentwillof choiceaccede. Reve-nue, therefore,must be had at all events. In thiscountry, K the principal part be not drawn fromcommerce,it must fallwith oppressiveweightuponland. It has been already intimated that excises,in their true signification,are too little in unisonwith the feelingsofthe people,to admitof greatusebeingmade of that modeof taxation; nor, indeed,in the States wherealmost the soleemploymentisagriculture,are the objects proper for excisesuffi-cientlynumerousto permit very ample collectionsin that way. Personalestate (as has been beforeremarked),from the difficultyin tracingit, cannotbe subjected to large contributions,by any othermeansthan by taxes on consumption. In populouscities, it may be enoughthe subject of conjecture,to occasionthe oppressionof individuals,withoutmuch aggregatebenefit to the State; but beyondthesecircles,it must, in a great measure,escapetheeyeandthe hand ofthe tax-gatherer. Asthe neces-sitiesof the State, nevertheless,must be satisfiedinsomemode or other, the defectof other resourcesmust throwtheprincipalweightofpublicburdensonthe possessorsof land. And as, on the other hand,the wantsof the governmentcan never obtain anadequatesupply,unlessall the sourcesofrevenueareopento its demands,the financesofthe commtmity,under such embarrassments,cannot be put into asituationconsistentwith its respectabilityor its se-curity. Thus we shall not evenhave the consola-

The Federalist 97

tionsofa fulltreasury,to atonefor theoppressionofthatvaluableclassofthe citizenswhoare employedinthecultivationofthesoft.Butpubhcandpri-vatedistresswillkeeppacewitheachotheringloomyconcert;anduniteLudeploringtheinfatua-tionofthosecounselswhichledtodisunion.

PUBLIUS.

ForttwIndependentJournal

THE FEDERALIST.No.XIII

(.AMILTo_)To the.Peopleof theStateof New York:

As connectedwith the subject of revenue, wemaywith proprietyconsiderthat ofeconomy. Themoneysavedfrom one objectmay be usefullyap-pliedto another, and there willbe so muchthe lessto be drawnfromthe pocketsofthe people. If theStates are united under one government,there willbe but onenational civillist to support; if they aredividedinto several confederacies,there willbe asmany differentnational civillists to be providedforwand eachof them,as to the principaldepartments,coextensivewith that whichwouldbe necessaryfora governmentof the whole. The entireseparationof the Statesintothirteenunconnectedsovereigntiesisa projecttooextravagantandtoorepletewithdangertohavemanyadvocates.Theideasofmenwhospec11]ateuponthedismembermentoftheem-pireseemgenerallyturned towardsthreeconfedera-cies--oneconsistingofthefourNorthern,anotherofthefourMiddle,andathirdofthefiveSouthern

¥OL.xl.--_.

98 AlexanderHamilton

States. Thereis little probabilitythat there wouldbe a greater number. Accordingto this distribu-tion, eachconfederacywouldcomprisean extent ofterritory larger than that of the l_ingdomof GreatBritain. Nowell-informedmanwillsupposethat theaffairsof sucha confederacycan be properlyregu-lated by a government less comprehensivein itsorgansor institutionsthan that whichhasbeenpro-posedby the convention. Whenthe dimensionsofa Stateattain to a certainmagnitude,it requiresthesameenergyof governmentand the same formsofadministrationwhich are requisite in one of muchgreater extent. This idea admits not of precisedemonstration,becausethere is no ruleby whichwecanmeasurethe momentumofcivilpowernecessaryto the governmentof any givennumberof individ-uals; but whenwe considerthat the islandof Brit-ain,nearly commensuratewith eachof the supposedconfederacies,containsabout eight millionsof peo-ple,andwhenwereflectuponthe degreeofauthorityrequiredto direct the passionsof so largea societyto the publicgood,weshall seeno reason to doubtthat the likeportionof powerwouldbe sufficienttoperformthe same task in a societyfar more numer-ous. Civilpower,properly organizedand exerted,is capableofd_ffusingits forceto a very greatextent;andcan,in a mannerreproduceitselfin every partofa greatempireby a judiciousarrangementof sub-ordinateinstitutions.

Thesuppositionthat eachconfederacyinto whichthe States wouldbe likely to be dividedwould re-quire a governmentnot lesscomprehensivethan the

The Federalist 99

oneproposed,willbe strengthenedby anothersup-position,moreprobablethan that whichpresentsuswith three confederaciesas the alternativeto a gen-eral Union. If weattend carefullyto geographicaland commercialconsiderations,in conjunctionwiththe habitsand prejudicesof the differentStates,weshallbe led to concludethat in caseof disuniontheywillmostnaturallyleaguethemselvesundertwogov-ernments. The four Eastern States, from all thecausesthat formthe linksofnationalsympathyandconnection, may with certainty be expected tounite. NewYork, situated as she is, would neverbe unwiseenough to opposea feeble and unsup-portedflankto theweightofthat confederacy.Thereare other obviousreasons that would facilitateheraccessionto it. NewJersey is too smalla State tothink of being a frontier, in oppositionto this stillmore powerfulcombination; nor do there appearto be any obstaclesto her admissioninto it. EvenPennsylvaniawould have strong inducementstojoin the Northernleague. An active foreigncom-merce,on the basisofherownnavigation,is hertruepolicy,and coincideswith the opinionsand disposi-tions of her citizens. The more SouthernStates,from various circumstances,may not think them-selves much interested in the encouragementofnavigation. Theymayprefera systemwhichwouldgivetmlimitedscopeto allnations to be the carriersaswellasthe purchasersoftheircommodities.Penn-sylvaniamaynot chooseto confotmdher interestsina connectionsoadverseto her policy. Asshemustat all events be a frontier, she may deemit most

too Alexander Hamilton

consistentwith her safety to haveher exposedsideturned towardsthe weakerpower of the Southern,rather than towards the stronger power of theNorthern, Confederacy.This would give her thefairestchanceto avoidbeingthe PlandersofAmer-ica. Whatevermay be the determinationof Penn-sylvania,if the NorthernConfederacyincludesNewJersey,there is no likelihoodof morethan one con-federacyto the southof that State.

Nothingcanbe moreevidentthanthat thethirteenStateswillbe able to supporta nationalgovernmentbetter than one half, or one third, or any numberlessthan the whole. Thisreflectionmust havegreatweightin obviatingthat objectionto the proposedplan,whichis foundedon the principleof expense,an objection,however,which,whenwecometo takeanearerviewofit, willappearin everylightto standon mistakenground.

If, in additionto the considerationof a pluralityof civil lists, we take into viewthe numberof per-sons who must necessarilybe employedto guardthe inlandcommunicationbetweenthe differentcon-federaciesagainstillicit trade,and whoin time willinfalliblyspringup out ofthe necessitiesofrevenue;and if wealsotake into viewthe militaryestablish-ments whichit has been shownwouldunavoidablyresultfromthe jealousiesand conflictsof the severalnationsinto whichthe States wouldbe divided,weshallclearlydiscoverthat a separationwouldbe notlessinjuriousto the economy,than to the tranquil-fity, commerce,revenue,and libertyof everypart.

PUBLIUS.

The Federalist iot

From theNew YorkPacket,Friday,November3o,x787

THE FEDERALIST. No. XIV

(_ADISON)

TOthePeopleof theStateofNew York:We have seen the necessityof the Union,as our

bulwarkagainstforeigndanger, as the conservatorof peaceamongourselves,as the guardian of ourcommerceand other commoninterests, as the onlysubstitute for those military establishmentswhichhave subvertedthe libertiesof the OldWorld,andas the properantidote for the diseasesof faction,whichhave proved fatal to other popular govern-ments,and of whichalarmingsymptomshave beenbetrayedby ourown. Allth,_tremains,withinthisbranchofour inquiries,is to take noticeofan objec-tion that may be drawn from the great extent ofcountrywhichthe Unionembraces. Afewobserva-tions on this subjectwill be the moreproper,as itis perceivedthat the adversariesof the new Con-stitution are ava'flingthemselvesof the prevailingprejudice with regard to the practicablesphereofrepublican administration,in order to supply,byimaginary difficulties,the want of those solidob-jectionswhichthey endeavorin vainto find.

The error whichlimits republicangovernmenttoa narrow district has been unfoldedand refutedinprecedingpapers. I remarkhereonlythat it seemsto oweits riseandprevalencechieflyto the confound-ing of a republicwith a democracy,applyingto theformerreasoningsdrawnfromthe nature ofthe lat-ter. The true distinctionbetweenthese formswas

Io2 AlexanderHamilton

alsoadvertedto ona formeroccasion. It is, that ina democracy,the peoplemeetand exercisethe gov-ernmentin person; in a republic,theyassembleandadministerit by theirrepresentativesandagents. Ademocracy,consequently,willbe confinedto a smallspot. A republic may be extended over a largeregion.

Tothisaccidentalsourceoftheerrormaybe addedthe artificeof somecelebratedauthors,whosewri-tingshave had a great sharein formingthe mod-em standardof politicalopinions. Beingsubjectseitherofan absoluteor limitedmonarchy,theyhaveendeavoredto heighten the advantages,or palliatethe evilsof thoseforms,by placingin comparisonthevicesand defectsoftherepublican,and by citingas specimensof the latter theturbulentdemocraciesof ancient Greeceand modernItaly. Under theconfusionof names, it has been an easy task totransferto a republicobservationsapplicableto ademocracyonly; and amongothers,the observa-tion that it can never be establishedbut amongasmallnumberof people,livingwithina smallcom-pass of territory.

Sucha fallacymay have beenthe lessperceived,as most of the popular governmentsof antiquitywereof the democraticspecies;and evenin modernEurope,to whichwe owethe great principleof re-presentation,no exampleis seen of a governmentwholly popular, and founded,at the same time,whollyon that principle. If Europehas the meritof discoveringthis great mechanicalpowerin gov-ernment,by the simpleagencyof whichthe willof

The Federalist IO3

the largestpoliticalbodymaybe concentred,and itsforce directedto any objectwhichthe publicgoodrequires,Americacan claimthe merit of makingthediscoverythe basis of unmixed and extensivere-publics. It is only to be lamentedthat any of hercitizensshouldwishto depriveher of the additionalmerit of displayingits full efficacyin the establish-ment of the comprehensivesystem now under herconsideration.

As the natural limit of a democracyis that dis-tance from the centralpoint whichwilljust permitthe most remote citizens to assembleas often astheir public functionsdemand,and will includenogreaternumberthan can join in thosefunctions; sothe natural limitof a republicis that distancefromthe centre whichwillbarely allowthe representa-tives to meet as often as maybe necessaryfor theadministrationofpublicaffairs. Canit be said thatthe limitsofthe UnitedStatesexceedthis distance?It willnot be saidby thosewho recollectthat theAtlanticcoast is the longestside of the Urdon,thatduring the term of thirteen years, the representa-tives of the States have been almost continuallyassembled,and that the membersfrom the mostdistant States are not chargeablewith greaterinter-missionsof attendancethan thosefromthe Statesinthe neighborhoodof Congress.

That wemayformajuster estimatewith regardtothis interestingsubject,let us resort to the actualdimensionsof the Union. The limits,as fixed bythe treaty of peace,are: on the eastthe Atlantic,onthe south the latitude of thirty-one degrees,on the

Io4 AlexanderHamilton

west the Mississippi,and on the northan irregularline running in some instancesbeyond the forty-fifth degree,in others fallingas low as the forty-second. Thesouthernshoreof LakeErie liesbelowthat latitude. Computingthe distancebetweenthethirty-first and forty-fifth degrees,it amounts toninehundredandseventy-threecommonmiles;com-puting it from thirty-one to forty-two degrees,toseven hundred and sixty-four miles and a half.Takingthe mean'for the distance,the amount willbe eight hundred and sixty-eightmiles and threefourths. The mean distance from the Atlantic tothe Mississippidoesnot probablyexceedsevenhun-dred and fifty miles. On a comparisonof this ex-tent with that of several countriesin Europe,thepracticability of rendering our system commen-surateto it appearsto be demonstrable. It is not agreat deallargerthan Germany,wherea diet repre-sentingthe wholeempire is continuallyassembled;or than Poland before the late dismemberment,whereanother national diet was the depositaryofthe supremepower. Passingby Franceand Spain,wefindthat in Great Britain,inferioras it maybe insize, the representativesof the northern extremityof the island have as far to travel to the nationalcouncilas willbe requiredof those of the most re-moteparts of the Union.

Favorableasthisviewof the subjectmaybe, someobservationsremainwhichwillplaceit in a lightstillmore satisfactory.

In the firstplaceit is to be rememberedthat thegeneralgovernmentis not to be chargedwith the

The Federalist m5

wholepowerofmakingandadministeringlaws. Itsjurisdictionis limitedto certainenumeratedobjects,whichconcernall the membersof the republic,butwhichare not to be attainedby the separateprovi-sions of any. The subordinategovernments,whichcan extendtheircareto allthoseother objectswhichcan be separatelyprovidedfor, willretain theirdueauthority and activity. Were it proposedby theplan of the Conventionto abolishthe governmentsof the particularStates,its adversarieswouldhavesome ground for *heir objection; though it wouldnot be difficultto showthat if they wereabolishedthe generalgovernmentwouldbe compelled,by theprincipleof self-preservation,to reinstate them intheir properjurisdiction.

A secondobservationto be made is that the im-mediate object of the federal Constitutionis tosecurethe union of the thirteen primitive States,which we know to be practicable; and to add tothem such other States as may arise in their ownbosoms,or in theirneighborhoods,whichwe cannotdoubt to be equallypracticable. Thearrangementsthat maybe necessaryfor thoseanglesand fractionsof our territorywhichlie on our northwesternfron-tier, mustbe left to thosewhomfurther discoveriesand experiencewillrendermoreequalto the task.

Letit be remarked,in the thirdplace,that the in-tercoursethroughoutthe Union will be facilitatedby new improvements. Roads will everywherebeshortened,and kept in better order; accommoda-tionsfor travellerswillbe multipliedandmeliorated;an inten'ornavigationon our eastern side will be

Io6 AlexanderHamilton

openedthroughout,or nearlythroughout,the wholeextent of the thirteenStates. The communicationbetween the Western and Atlantic districts, andbetweendifferentparts of each, will be renderedmoreand moreeasy by those numerouscanalswithwhichthe beneficenceof nature has intersectedourcountry,and whichart findsit so little difficulttoconnectand complete.

Afourthandstill moreimportantconsiderationis,that as almosteveryState will,ononesideor other,be a frontier, and will thus find, in a regardto itssafety, an inducementto make somesacrificesforthe sake of the general protection; so the Stateswhichlie at the greatestdistancefromthe heart ofthe Union,and which,of course,may partake leastof the ordinarycirculationof its benefits,willbe atthe same time immediatelycontiguousto foreignnations, and willconsequentlystand, on particularoccasions,in greatest need of its strength and re-sources. It maybe inconvenientforGeorgia,or theStates formingour westernor northeasternborders,to sendtheir representativesto the seat of govern-ment; but they would find it more so to strugglealoneagainstan invadingenemy,or evento supportalonethe wholeexpenseof those precautionswhichmay be dictatedby the neighborhoodof continualdanger. If they should derive less benefit, there-fore,fromthe Unionin somerespectsthan the lessdistant States,they willderivegreater benefitfromit in otherrespects,and thus the properequilibriumwillbe maintainedthroughout.

I submit to you, my fellow-citizens,these con-

The Federalist Io7

siderations,in full confidencethat the good sensewhichhas sooften markedyour decisionswillallowthemtheir dueweightand effect; and that you willnever sufferdifficulties,howeverformidablein ap-pearance,or howeverfashionablethe error on whichthey may be founded,to driveyou intothe gloomyand periloussceneinto whichthe advocatesfor dis-unionwouldconductyou.Hearkennottotheun-naturalvoicewhichtellsyouthatthepeopleofAmerica,knittogetherastheyarebysomanycordsofaffection,cannolongerlivetogetherasmembersofthesamefamily;cannolongercontinuethemutualguardiansoftheirmutualhappiness;cannolongerbe fellow-citizensofonegreat,respectable,andflourishingempire.Hearkennottothevoicewhichpetulantlytellsyouthattheformofgovernmentrecommendedforyouradoptionisa noveltyinthepoliticalworld;thatithasneveryethada placeinthetheoriesofthewildestprojectors;thatitrashlyattemptswhatitisimpossibletoaccomplish.No,my countrymen,shutyourearsagainstthisun-hallowedlanguage.Shutyourheartsagainstthepoisonwhichitconveys;thekindredbloodwhichflowsintheveinsofAmericancitizens,themingledbloodwhichtheyhaveshedindefenceoftheirsacredrights,consecratetheirUnion,andexcitehorrorattheideaoftheirbecomingaliens,rivals,enemies.And ifnoveltiesaretobeshunned,be-lieveme,themostalarmingofallnovelties,themostwildofallprojects,themostrashofallattempts,isthatofrendingusinpieces,inordertopreserveourlibertiesandpromoteourhappiness.Butwhyis

Io8 AlexanderHamilton

the experimentof an extendedrepublicto be re=jeered,merelybecauseit maycomprisewhat isnew?Is it not the gloryof the peopleof America,that,whilsttheyhavepaida decentregardtothe opinionsof formertimes and other nations, they have notsuffereda blindvenerationforantiquity,for custom,or for names, to overrulethe suggestionsof theirown good sense,the knowledgeof their ownsitua-tion, and the lessonsof their ownexperience? Tothis manly spirit, posteritywillbe indebtedfor thepossession,and the world for the example,of thenumerousinnovationsdisplayed on the Americantheatre, in favorof private rightsand publichappi-ness. Had no important step been taken by theleaders of the Revolution for which a precedentcouldnot be discovered,no governmentestablishedof whichan exactmodel did not presentitself, thepeopleof the United States might,a%this moment,havebeennumberedamongthe melancholyvictimsofmisguidedcouncils,mustat besthavebeenlabor-hagunder the weightof someof thoseformswhichhave crushedthe liberties of the rest of mmaldnd.Happily for America, happily, we trust, for thewholehuman race, they pursued a new and morenoblecourse. Theyaccomplisheda revolutionwhichhasnoparallelin the annalsofhumansociety. Theyreared the fabrics of governmentswhich have nomodelon the face of the globe. They formedthedesignof a great Confederacy,whichit is incumbenton their successorsto improveand perpetuate. Iftheir worksbetray imperfections,wewonderat thefewnessofthem. If theyerredmostin thestructure

The Federalist Io9

of the Union,this wasthe workmostdh_fic_tto beexecuted;thisistheworkwhichhasbeennewmodelledbytheactofyourconvention,anditisthatactonwhichyouarenowtodeliberateandtodecide.

PUBLIUS.

Forthe,IndependvntJournal

THE FEDERALIST.No. XV

(axm_roN)

To thePeopleo]theStateo]New York:In the courseof the precedingpapers,I haveen-

deavored,my fellow-citizens,to placebeforeyou, ina clear and convincinglight, the importance ofUnion to your political safety and happiness. Ihave unfoldedto you a complicationof dangerstowhich you would be exposed,should you permitthat sacredknot whichbindsthe peopleof Americatogether to be severedor dissolvedby ambition orby avarice,by jealousyor by misrepresentation. Inthe sequelofthe inquirythroughwhichI proposetoaccompanyyou, the truths intended to be incul-cated will receivefurther confirmationfrom factsand arguments hitherto unnoticed. If the roadoverwhichyou willstillhave to passshouldin someplacesappearto you tediousor irksome,you willre-collectthat you are in quest of informationon asubject the most momentouswhichcan engagetheattention of a free people, that the field throughwhichyou have to travel is in itself spacious,and

Ixo !UexanderHamilton

that the difficultiesof the journeyhave been un-necessarilyincreasedby the mazeswithwhichsoph-istayhasbesettheway. It willbemyaimto removethe obstaclesfrom yourprogressin as compendiousa manner as it can be done, without sacrificingutility to despatch.

In pursuanceof the planwhichI have laid downfor the discussionof the subject,the point next inorder to be examinedis the "insufficiencyof thepresent Confederationto the preservationof theUnion." It mayperhapsbe askedwhat needthereis ofreasoningor proofto illustratea positionwhichis not either controvertedor doubted,to whichtheunderstandingsand feelingsof all classesof menassentand whichin substance is admitted by theopponentsas wellas by the friendsof the newCon-stitution. It must in truth be acknowledgedthat,howeverthese may differin other respects,they ingeneral appear to harmonizein this sentiment,atleast,that there are materialimperfectionsin ourna-tionalsystem,and that somethingis necessaryto bedoneto rescueus fromimpendinganarchy. Thefactsthat support this opinion are no longerobjectsofspeculation. Theyhaveforcedthemselvesuponthesensibilityof thepeopleat large,and haveat lengthextortedfromthose,whosemistakenpolicyhashadtheprincipalsharein precipitatingtheextremityatwhichwe are arrived,a reluctant confessionof the .realityof those defectsin the schemeof our federalgovernment,whichhave beenlongpointedout andregrettedby the intelligentfriendsof the Union.

We may indeed with propriety be said to have

The Federalist Ii_

reachedalmostthelast stageofnationalhllmHiation.Thereis scarcelyany thing that canwoundthe prideor degradethe characterof an independentnationwhich we do not experience. Are there engage-ments to the performanceof whichwe are held byevery tie respectableamongmen? Theseare thesubjectsof constant and unblushingviolation. Dowe owedebtsto foreignersand to ourowncitizenscontractedin a time of imminentperil for the pre-servationof ourpoliticalexistence? These remainwithout any proper or satisfactoryprovision fortheir discharge. Have we valuableterritoriesandimportantpostsin the possessionof a foreignpowerwhich,by expressstipulations,ought long since tohavebeensurrendered? Theseare still retained,tothe prejudiceof our interests,not lessthan of ourrights. Are we in a conditionto resentor to repelthe aggression? Wehaveneither troops,nor treas-ury, nor government,z Are weevenin a conditionto remonstratewith dignity? Thejust imputationsonourownfaith,inrespectto the sametreaty, oughtfirst to be removed. Areweentitledby nature andcompactto a free participationin the navigationofthe Mississippi?Spainexcludesusfromit. Is pub-liccreditan indispensableresourcein time ofpublicdanger? We seemto have abandonedits cause asdesperate and irretrievable. Is commerceof im-portanceto nationalwealth? Oursis at the lowestpoint of declension. Is respectabilityin the eyesofforeignpowersa safeguardagainstforeignencroach-ments? The imbecility of our government even

z "I meanfor the UniO_I."_PUBLIUS.

Ix2 AlexanderHamilton

forbids them to treat with us. Our ambassadorsabroadare the merepageantsof mimicsovereignty.Is a violentand unnatural decreasein the valueoflanda symptomof national distress? The price ofimprovedlandin most parts ofthe countryis muchlowerthan can be accountedfor by the quantity ofwaste land at market, and can only be fully ex-plained by that want of private and public con-fidence,whichis so alarminglyprevalentamongallranks, and which has a direct tendency to de-preciateproperty of every kind. Is private creditthe friendand patron of industry? That most use-ful kind whichrelates to borrowingand lendingisreducedwithin the narrowestlimits, and this stillmore from an opinion of insecuritythan from thescarcityof money. To shortenan enumerationofparticulars which can afford neither pleasurenorinstruction,it _ay in generalbe demanded,whatindicationis there ofnationaldisorder,poverty,andinsignificancethat couldbefalla communityso pe-culiarlyblessedwith natural advantagesas weare,whichdoesnot foi:ma part of the dark catalogueofour publicmisfortunes?

Thisis the melancholysituationto whichwehavebeen brought by those very roaximsand counselswhichwouldnow deter us from adoptingthe pro-posed Constitution; and which,not content withhavingconductedus to the brinkofa precipice,seemresolvedto plungeus into the abyss that awaitsusbelow. Here, my countrymen,impelledby everymotivethat oughtto influencean enlightenedpeople,let us makea firm stand for our safety, our tran-

The Federalist I_3

q_llity, our dignity,our reputation. Let us at lastbreak the fatal charmwhichhas toolongseducedusfromthe paths offelicityand prosperity.

It is true,as hasbeenbeforeobserved,that facts,too stubbornto be resisted,have produceda speciesof generalassent to the abstract propositionthatthere exist materialdefectsin our nationalsystem;but the usefulnessof the concession,on the part ofthe old adversariesof federalmeasures,is destroyedby a strenuousoppositionto a remedy,upon theonly principlesthat can giveit a chanceof success.Whiletheyadmitthat the governmentofthe UnitedStates is destitute of energy,they contendagainstconferringupon it thosepowerswhichare requisiteto supply that energy. They seem still to aim atthings repugnant and irreconcilable; at an aug-mentation of federal authority, without a diminu-tion of Stateauthority; at sovereigntyin the Union,and completeindependencein the members. Theystill, in fine,seemto cherishwith blinddevotionthepoliticalmonster of an imperiumin imperio. Thisrendersa full d_splayofthe principaldefectsof theConfederationnecessary,in order to showthat theevilswe experiencedo not proceedfrom minute orpartial imperfections,but from fundamentalerrorsin the structure of the building,whichcannot beamendedotherwisethan by an alterationin the firstprinciplesand mainpillarsofthe fabric.

The great and radicalvicein the constructionofthe existing Confederationis in the principle ofLEGISLATIONfor STATESor GOVERNMENTS,in their CORPORATEor COLLECTIVECAPA-

vol,. xa.---8.

114 AlexanderHamilton

CITIES, and as contradistingulshedfrom the IN-DIVIDUALSof which they consist. Thoughthisprincipledoesnot run through all the powersdele-gated to the Union, yet it pervadesand governsthose on which the efficacyof the rest depends•Except as to the rule of apportionment,the UnitedStates has an indefinitediscretionto ma_erequisi-tions for men and money; but they have no au-thority to raise either,by regulationsextendingtothe individual citizens of America. The conse-quence of this is, that though in theory theirresolutionsconcerningthose objects are laws, con-stitutionallybindingon the membersof the Union,yet in practicetheyare mererecommendationswhichthe Statesobserveor disregardat their option.

It is a singularinstanceof the capriciousnessofthe hllmanmind, that after all the admonitionswehavehad fromexperienceonthis head, thereshouldstill be foundmenwho object to the new Constitu-tion, for deviatingfrom a principlewhichhas beenfoundthe bane of the old,and whichis in itselfevi-dentlyincompatiblewiththe ideaof GOV_.R_M_NT;aprinciple,in short,which,if it is to be executedat all,must substitutethe violent and sanguinaryagencyofthe swordto the mildinfluenceofthe magistracy.

There is nothing absurd or Impracticablem theideaof a leagueor alliancebetweenindependentna-tionsfor certaindefinedpurposespreciselystated ina treaty regulatingall the detailsof time, place,cir-cumstance,and quantity; leavingnothingto futurediscretion;and dependingfor its executionon thegood faith of the parties. Compactsof this _ind

The Federalist I I5

existamongall civilizednations,subjectto the usualvicissitudesofpeaceand war,ofobservanceandnon-observance,as the interestsor passionsof the con-tracting powersdictate. In the early part of thepresent century there was an epidemicalrage inEuropefor this speciesof compacts,fromwhichthepohticiansofthe timesfondlyhopedforbenefitswhichwereneverrealized. With a viewto establishingtheequilibriumof power and the peace of that partof the world,all the resourcesof negotiationwereexhausted,and triple and quadrupleallianceswereformed; but they werescarcelyformedbeforetheywere broken, giving an instructive but afflictinglessonto manldnd, how little dependenceis to beplaced on treaties which have no other sanctionthan the obligationsofgoodfaith,and whichopposegeneral considerationsof peace and justice to theimpulseof any immediateinterestor passion.

If the particular States in this country are dis-posedto stand in a similarrelationto eachother,andto drop the project of a general DISCRETIONARYSUPERINTENDENCE,the schemewouldindeedbe per-nicious,and wouldentail upon us all the mischiefswhichhave been enumeratedunder the first head;but it wouldhave the merit of being,at least, con-sistent and practicable. Abandoningall viewsto-wardsa confederategovernment,thiswouldbringusto a simple allianceoffensiveand defensive; andwouldplaceus in a situationto be alternatefriendsand enemiesof each other, as our mutual jealousiesand rivalships,nourishedby the intriguesof foreignnations,shouldprescribeto us.

1i6 AlexanderHamilton

ButKweare unwilliugto be placedin thisperiloussituation; Kwe still willadhere to the designof anationalgovernment,or,whichis the samething,ofa superintendingpower,underthe directionofa com-moncouncil,wemustresolveto incorporateinto ourplan those ingredientswhichmay be consideredasforming the characteristic differencebetween aleagueand a government; we must extendthe au-thorityof the Unionto the personsofthe citizens,--the only properobjectsof government.

Governmentimplies the power of making laws.It isessentialto the ideaofa law,that it be attendedwith a sanction; or, in other words,a penalty orpunishmentfor disobedience. If there be no pen-alty annexed to disobedience,the resolutions orcommandswhich pretend to be laws will, in fact,amountto nothingmorethan adviceorrecommenda-tion. This penalty, whateverit may be, can onlybeinflictedin two ways: by the agencyof the courtsandministersof justice,orby militaryforce; by theCOERCIONof the magistracy,or by the COgRCIONofarms. The first kind can evidently apply only tomen; the last kind must of necessity,be employedagainst bodiespolitic, or communities,or States.It is evidentthat there is no processof a court bywhichthe observanceof the laws can, in the lastresort, be enforced. Sentencesmay be denouncedagainstthem forviolationsof their duty; but thesesentencescan only be carried into executionby thesword. In an associationwhere the general au-thority is confinedto the collectivebodies of thecommunitiesthat composeit, every breach of the

The Federalist i 17

lawsmust involvea state ofwar; and militaryexe-cution must becomethe only instrument of civilobedience. Sucha state of thingscan certainlynotdeserve the name of government,nor would anyprudent man chooseto commithishappinessto it.

Therewasa timewhenweweretold that breaches,by the States, of the regulationsof the federalau-thority were not to be expected; that a senseofcommoninterest wouldpresideover the conductofthe respectivemembers,and wouldbegeta fullcom-pliancewith all the constitutionalrequisitionsof theUnion. This language,at the present day, wouldappear as wildas a great part of what wenowhearfrom the same quarter will be thought, when weshallhavereceived further lessonsfrom that bestoracle of wisdom,experience. It at all times be-trayed an ignoranceof the true springsby whichhuman conductis actuated, and beliedthe originalinducementsto the establishmentof civil power.Why has governmentbeen instituted at all? Be-cause the passionsof men will not conformto thedictates of reasonand justice, without constraint.Has it beenfoundthat bodiesof menact with morerectitude or greater disinterestednessthan individ-uals? The contrary of this has been inferred byall accurateobserversof the conductof mankind;and the inferenceis foundeduponobviousreasons.Regard to reputation has a less active influence,when the infamy of a bad action is to be dividedamonga number,than whenit is to fall singlyuponone. A spirit of faction,whichis apt to mingleitspoisonin the deliberationsof all bodiesof men,will

II8 AlexanderHamilton

often hurrythepersonsofwhomthey are composedintoimproprietiesandexcesses,forwhichthey wouldblush in a privatecapacity.

In additionto all this, there is, in the nature ofsovereignpower,an impatienceof control,that dis-posesthosewhoare investedwith the exerciseof it,to lookwithan evileyeuponallexternalattemptstorestrainor directits operations. Fromthis spirit ithappens,that in every politicalassociationwhichisformedupon the principleof uniting in a commoninterest a number of lessersovereignties,there willbe founda kind of eccentrictendency in the sub-ordinateor inferiororbs,by the operationof whichtherewillbe a perpetualeffortin eachto flyofffromthe commoncentre. This tendency is not difficultto be accountedfor. It has its originin the loveofpower. Power controlled or abridged is almostalwaysthe rival and enemyof that powerby whichit is controlledor abridged. Thissimplepropositionwill teach us, how little reason there is to expect,that the personsintrusted with the administrationof the affairsof the particular membersof a con-federacywillat all timesbeready,withperfectgood-humor, and an unbiassedregard to the publicweal,to executethe resolutionsor decreesof the generalauthority. Thereverseofthis resultsfromthe con-stitutionof humannature.

If, therefore, the measures of the Confederacycannotbeexecutedwithouttheinterventionoftheparticular administrations,there will be little pro-spect oftheirbeingexecutedat all. Therulersoftherespectivemembers,whether they have a constitu-

The Federalist i 19

tionalright to do it or not, willundertaketo judgeof the proprietyof the measuresthemselves. Theywill considerthe conformityof the thing proposedor required to their immediateinterests or aims;the momentaryconveniencesor inconveniencesthatwould attend its adoption. All this will be done;and in a spirit of interestedand suspiciousscrutiny,without that knowledgeof national circumstancesand reasonsof state, which is essential to a rightjudgment,and with that strongpredilectionin favoroflocalobjects,whichcanhardly fail to misleadthedecision. The same processmust be repeated ineverymemberofwhichthe bodyisconstituted; andthe executionof the plans,framedby the councilsofthe whole,will always fluctuate on the discretionof the ill-informedand prejudicedopinionof everypart. Thosewhohave beenconversantin the pro-ceedingsof popular assemblies;whohave seenhowdifficultit. often is, wherethere is no exteriorpres-sure of circumstances,to bring _hemto harmoniousresolutionson important points, will readily con-ceivehowimpossibleit must be to inducea numberof suchassemblies,deliberatingat a distancefromeach other, at differenttimes, and under differentimpressions,longto coSperatein the sameviewsandpursuits.

In our case, the concurrenceof thirteen distinctsovereignwillsis requisite,underthe Confederation,to thecompleteexecutionofeveryimportantmeas-urethat proceedsfromthe Union. It hashappenedas was to havebeenforeseen. The measuresof theUnionhavenot beenexecuted;the delinquenciesof

12o AlexanderHamilton

the States have, step by step, matured themselvesto an extreme,whichhas, at length, arrestedall thewheelsofthe nation_algovernment,andbroughtthemto an awfulstand. Congressat this time scarcelypossessthe means of keepingup the formsof ad-ministration,till the States can have time to agreeupon a more substantialsubstitute for the presentshadow of a federal government. Things did notcome to this desperate extremity at once. Thecauseswhichhave been specifiedproducedat firstonly unequaland disproportionatedegreesof com-pliance with the requisitionsof the Union. Thegreater deficienciesof some States furnished thepretext of exampleand the temptation of interestto the complying,or to the least delinquentStates.Why should we do more in proportion than thosewhoare embarkedwith us in the samepoliticalvoy-age? Why should we consent to bear more thanour proper share of the commonburden? Thesewere suggestionswhichhumanselfishnesscouldnotwithstand, and which even speculative men, wholooked forwardto remote consequences,couldnot,without hesitation, combat. Each State, fieldingto the persuasive voice of immedi,te interest orconvenience,has successivelywithdrawn its sup-port, till the frail and tottering edificeseemsreadyto fall upon our heads,and to crushus beneath itsruins.

PUBLIUS.

The Federalist 121

Fromthe New YorkPacket,Tuesday,Decemb_"4, x787

THE FEDERALIST. No. XVI

(_Am_TON)

TOthePeopleoftheStateofNew York.:The tendency of the principle of legislationfor

States,or communities,in their politicalcapacities,as it has been exemplifiedby the experimentwehave made of it, is equally attested by the eventswhich have befallenall other governmentsof theconfederatekind, of whichwehave any account,inexact proportionto its prevalencein those systems.The confirmationsofthis fact willbe worthyof a dis-tinct and particular examination. I shall contentmyselfwith barely observinghere, that of all theconfederaciesof antiquity,whichhistoryhashandeddownto us, the Lycianand Achmanleagues,as faras there remain vestigesof them, appear to havebeen most flee from the fetters of that mistakenprinciple,and were accordinglythose which havebest deserved,and have most liberallyreceived,theapplaudingsuffragesof politicalwriters.

This exceptionableprinciplemay, as tTulyas em-phatically,be styled the parent of anarchy: It hasbeenseen that delinquenciesin the membersof theUnionare its natural and necessaryoffspring; andthat wheneverthey happen, the only constitutionalremedy is force,and the immediateeffectof the useof it, civilwar.

It remainsto inquirehowfar so odiousan engineof government,in its applicationto us, wouldevenbe capableofansweringits end. If there shouldnot

I22 AlexanderHamilton

be a largearmy constantlyat the disposalof thenationalgovernmentit wouldeithernot be able toemployforceat all,or, whenthis couldbe done,itwouldamount to a war betweenparts of the Con-federacyconcerningthe infractionsof a league,inwhich the strongest combinationwould be mostlikelyto prevail,whether it consistedof thosewhosupportedor of those whoresisted the generalau-thority. It would rarely happen that the delin-quencyto be redressedwouldbe confinedto a singlemember,and if there weremore than onewho hadneglectedtheir duty, similarityof situation wouldinducethem to unite for commondefence. Inde-pendentof this motive of sympathy,if a largeandinfluentialState shouldhappento be the aggressingmember, it would commonlyhave weight enoughwith its neighborsto winover someof them as asso-ciates to its cause. Speciousargumentsof dangerto the commonliberty could easily be contrived;plausibleexcusesfor the deficienciesof the partycould,without difficulty,be inventedto alarm theapprehensions,inflamethe passions,and conciliatethe good-will,evenof those States whichwerenotchargeablewith any violationor omissionof duty.This wouldbe the more likely to 'take place,as thedelinquenciesof the larger membersmight be ex-pectedsometimesto proceedfroman ambitiouspre-meditationin theirrulers,with a viewto getting ridofallexternalcontrolupontheir designsof personalaggrandizement;the better to effectwhichit is pre-sumable they wouldtamperbeforehandwith lead-ingindividualsin the adjacentStates. If associates

The Federalist _23

couldnotbefoundathome,recoursewouldbehadtotheaidofforeignpowers,whowouldseldombedisinclinedtoencouragingthedissensionsofaCon-federacy,fromthefirmunionofwhichtheyhadsomuchtofear.Whentheswordisoncedrawn,thepassionsofmenobservenoboundsofmoderation.Thesuggestionsofwoundedpride,theinstigationsofirritatedresentment,wouldbeapttocarrytheStatesagainstwhichthearmsoftheUnionwereexerted,toanyextremesnecessarytoavengetheaffrontortoavoidthedisgraceofsubmission.ThefirstwarofthiskindwouldprobablyterminateinadissolutionoftheUnion.Thismaybeconsideredastheviolentdeathofthe

Confederacy.Itsmorenaturaldeathiswhatwenowseemtobeonthepointofexperiencing,ifthefederalsystembenotspeedilyrenovatedinamoresubstantialform.Itisnotprobable,consideringthegeniusofthiscountry,thatthecomplyingStateswouldoftenbeinclinedtosupporttheauthorityoftheUnionbyengagingina waragainstthenon-complyingStates.Theywouldalwaysbe morereadytopursuethemildercourseofputtingthem-selvesuponanequalfootingwiththedelinquentmembersbyanimitationoftheirexample.Andtheguiltofallwouldthusbecomethesecurityofall.Ourpastexperiencehasexhibitedtheopera-tionofthisspiritinitsfulllight.Therewould,infact,be aninsuperabledifficultyinascertainingwhenforcecouldwithproprietybeemployed.Inthearticleofpecuniarycontribution,whichwouldbethemostusualsourceofdelinquency,itwould

124 AlexanderHamilton

often be impossibleto decide whetherit had pro-ceededfrom disinclinationor inabihty. The pre-tence of the latter wouldalwaysbe at hand. Andthe casemust be very flagrantin which its fallacycouldbe detectedwith sufficientcertainty to justifythe harsh expedientof compulsion. It is easy tosee that this problemalone, as often as it shouldoccur,wouldopen a wide field for the exerciseoffactiousviews,of partiality, and of oppression,inthe majority that happenedto prevail in the na-tional council.

It seemsto require no pains to prove that theStates ought not to prefer a national Constitutionwhichcouldonly be kept in motionby the instru-mentality of a large army continually on foot toexecute the ordinaryrequisitionsor decreesof thegovernment. And yet this is the plain alternativeinvolvedby those whowish to deny it the powerof extendingits operationsto individuals. Suchascheme,ifpracticableat all,would instantly degen-erate intoa militarydespotism;but it will be foundin everylight impracticable. The resourcesof theUnionwouldnot be equal to the maintenanceof anarmy considerableenough to confine the largerStates within the limits of their duty; nor wouldthe means ever be furnished of forming such anarmy in the first instance. Whoeverconsidersthepopulousnessand strength of severalof these Statessinglyat the present juncture,and looksforwardtowhat theywillbecome,evenat the distanceof halfa century,willat oncedismissas idle and visionaryany schemewhichaims at regulating their move-

The Federalist 125

meritsby lawsto operateuponthem in their collect-ive capacities,and to be executed by a coercionapplicableto themin the same capacities. A pro-ject of this kind is little less romantic than themonster-tamingspirit which is attributed to thefabulousheroesand demi-godsof antiquity.

Evenin thoseconfederacieswhichhavebeencom-posedofmemberssmallerthan manyofourcounties,the principleof legislationfor sovereignStates,sup-ported by militarycoercion,has never beenfoundeffectual. It has rarely been attempted to be em-ployed, but against the weakermembers; and inmost instancesattemptsto coercethe refractoryanddisobedienthave been the signalsof bloody wars,in whichonehalf of the confederacyhas displayedits bannersagainstthe other half.

The result of these observationsto an intelligentmind must be clearlythis, that if it be possibleatany rate to constructa federalgovernmentcapableof regulatingthe commonconcernsand preservingthe generaltranqui11ity,it must be founded,as tothe objectscommittedto its care,upon the reverseof the principlecontendedfor by the opponentsofthe proposedConstitution. It must carryits agencyto the persons of the citizens. It must stand inneedof no intermediatelegislations;but must itselfbe empoweredto employthe arm of the ordinarymagistrate to execute its own resolutions. Themajesty of the national authority must be mani-fested throughthe mediumof the courtsof justice.The governmentof the Union, like that of eachState, must be able to addressitselfimmediatelyto

I26 AlexanderHamilton

the hopesand fears of individuals; and to attrac_to its supportthosepassionswhichhave the strong-est influenceupon the human heart. It must, inshort, possessall the means,and have a right toresort to all the methods, of executingthe powerswith whichit is intrusted, that are possessedandexercised by the governmentsof the partic,flarStates.

To thisreasoningit mayperhapsbe objected,thatif any State shouldbe disaffectedto the authorityof the Union,it couldat any time obstructthe exe-cutionof its laws,and bringthe matter to the sameissueof force,with the necessityof whichthe oppo-site schemeis reproached.

The plausibi_tyof this objectionwill vanish themomentwe advert to the essentialdifferencebe-tween a mere NON-COMPLI_C_and a DIRECTandACTIVERESIST_C_. If the interpositionof theState legislaturesbe necessaryto give effectto ameasureof the Union,they have only NoTTOACt",or to ACTEVASIVELY,and the measureis defeated.Thisneglectofduty maybe disguisedunderaffectedbut unsubstantialprovisions,so as not to appear,and of coursenot to exciteany alarm in the peoplefor the safetyof the Constitution. The State lead-ers may even make a merit of their surreptitiousinvasionsof it on the ground of some temporaryconvenience,exemption,or advantage.

But if the executionof the laws of the nationalgovernmentshouldnot require the interventionofthe State legislatures,if they were to pass intoimmediateoperationupon the citizensthemselves,

The Federalist t27

the particular governmentscould not interrupttheir progresswithoutan openand violentexertionof an unconstitutionalpower. No omissionsnorevasionswould answerthe end. They would beobligedto act, andin such a manneras wouldleaveno doubt that they had encroachedon the nationalrights. An experimentof this nature wouldalwaysbe hazardousin the face of a constitutionin anydegreecompetentto its owndefence,andof a peopleenlightenedenough to distinguishbetweena legalexerciseand an illegalusurpationofauthority. Thesuccessof it would require not merely a factiousmajority in the legislature,but the concurrenceofthe courtsof justice and of the body of the people.If the judges were not embarkedin a conspiracywith the legislature, they would pronounce theresolutionsof such a majority to be contraryto thesupremelawof the land,unconstitutional,and void.If the peoplewerenot taintedwith the spiritof theirStaterepresentatives,they,as the natural guardiansof the Constitution,would throwtheir weightintothe national scaleand giveit a decidedpreponder-ancy in the contest. Attempts of this kind wouldnot often be made with levity or rashness,becausethey could seldombe made without danger to theauthors, unlessin casesof a tyrannicalexerciseofthe federal authority.

If oppositionto the national governmentshouldarise from the disorderlyconduct of refractory orseditiousindividuals,it could be overcomeby thesame meanswhich are daily employedagainst thesameevilunderthe State governments. Themagis-

I28 AlexanderHamilton

tracy, beingequallythe ministersof the lawof theland, fromwhateversourceit mightemanate,woulddoubtlessbe as ready to guard the national as thelocal regulationsfrom the inroadsof private licen-tiousness. As to those partial commotionsand in-surreations,whichsometimesdisquietsociety,fromthe intrigues of an inconsiderablefaction, or fromsuddenor occasionalill-humorsthat do not infectthe great body of the community,the generalgov-ernment could commandmore extensiveresourcesfor the suppressionof disturbancesof that ldndthan wouldbe in the powerof any singlemember.Andas to thosemortal feudswhich,in certain con-junctures, spread a conflagrationthrough a wholenation, or through a very large proportion of it,proceedingeither fromweightycausesof discontentgiven by the governmentor from the contagionofsome violent pop_l!_R:rparoxysm, they do not fallwithin any ordinary rules of calculation. Whenthey happen,they commonlyamountto revolutionsand dismembermentsofempire. Noformofgovern-ment can alwayseither avoid or controlthem. Itis in vainto hopeto guardagainsteventstoo mightyfor humanforesightor precaution,and it wouldbeidle to object to a governmentbecauseit couldnotperformimpossibilities.

PUBLIUS.

The Federalist x29

For theIndependentJournal

THE FEDERALIST. No. XVII

(HAMILTON)

To thePeopleo_theStateo_New York:An objection, of a nature different from that

whichhas been stated and answered,in my lastaddress,may perhapsbe likewiseurgedagainsttheprincipleof legislationfor the individualcitizensofAmerica. It may be said that it would tend torender the governmentof the Union too powerful,and to enableit to absorbthoseresiduaryauthori-ties, whichit mightbe judgedproperto leavewiththe States for localpurposes. Allowingthe utmostlatitude to the loveof powerwhichany reasonableman can require,I confessI am at a lossto discoverwhat temptationthe personsintrustedwith the ad-ministration of the general governmentcould everfeel to divest the States of the authorities of thatdescription. The regulationof the mere domesticpoliceof a State appears to me to hold out slenderallurementsto ambition. Commerce,finance,ne-gotiation, and war seem to comprehendall theobjects whichhave charms for minds governedbythat passion; and all the powersnecessaryto thoseobjects ought, in the first instance, to be lodgedin the nationaldepository. The administrationofprivate justice betweenthe citizensof the sameState, the supervisionof agricultureand of otherconcernsof a similarnature,all those things, inshort,whichareproperto be providedforby locallegislation,canneverbe desirablecaresof a general

VOL.Xl.--9.

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jurisdiction. It is thereforeimprobablethat thereshouldexista dispositionin the federalcouncilstousurp the powerswith whichthey are connected;becausethe attempt to exercisethosepowerswouldbe as troublesomeas it wouldbe nugatory; and thepossessionof them,forthat reason,wouldcontributenothingto the dignity, to the importance,or to thesplendorof the national government.

But let it be admitted, for argument'ssake,tha_mere wantonnessand lust of dominationwouldbesufficientto beget that disposition;still it may besafelyaffirmed,that the senseofthe constituentbodyof the national representatives,or, in other words,the peopleof the severalStates, wouldcontroltheindulgenceof so extravagant an appetite. It willalwaysbe far more easy for the State governmentsto encroachupon the national authorities,than forthe nationalgovernmentto encroachuponthe Stateauthorities. The proof of this proposition turnsuponthe greater degreeof influencewhichthe Stategovernments,if they administertheir affairswithuprightness and prudence, will generallypossessoverthe people; a circumstancewhichat the sametime teaches us that there is an inherent and in-trinsic we_:lcuessin all federal constitutions; andthat too much pains cannot be taken in their or=ganization,to givethem all the forcewhichis corn=patiblewith the principlesof liberty.

The superiorityof influencein favor of the par=ticular governmentswould result partly from thediffusiveconstructionof the national government,but chieflyfromthe nature of the objectsto which

The Federalist 131

thea_tentionof theState administrationswouldbedirected.

It is a knownfactinhumannature,that its affec-tionsare commonlyweakin proportionto"the dis-tance or diffusivenessof the object. Upon thesameprinciplethat a manis moreattachedto hisfamily than to his neighborhood,to his neighbor-hoodthan to thecommunityat large,thepeopleofeach Statewould be apt to feel a strongerbiastowardstheirlocal governmentsthan towardsthegovernmentof the Union;unlessthe forceof thatprincipleshouldbe destroyedby a muchbetterad-ministrationofthe latter.

Thisstrongpropensityof thehumanheart wouldfind powerfulauxiliariesin the objects of Stateregulation.

Thevarietyof moreminuteinterests,whichwillnecessarilyfall under the superintendenceof thelocal administrations,and whichwillformso manyrivuletsof influence,runningthrougheverypart ofthe society,cannot be particularized,without in-volving a detail too tediousand uninterestingtocompensateforthe instructionit mightafford.

There is one transcendentadvantagebelongingto the provinceof the State governments,whichalone sufficesto placethe matter in a clear andsatisfactorylight,--I mean the ordinary adminis-tration of criminaland civil justice. This, of allothers, is the most powerful,most universal,andmost attractive source of popular obedienceandattachment. It is that which,beingthe immediateand visibleguardianof lifeand property,havingits

I32 AlexanderHamilton

benefitsand its terrors in constant activity beforethe publiceye,regulatingall thosepersonalinterestsand familiarconcernsto whichthe sensibilityof in-dividualsis more immediatelyawake,contributes,more than any other circumstance,to impressinguponthe mindsof the people,affection,esteem,andreverence towards the government. This greatcementof society,which will diffuseitself almostwhollythrough the channelsof the particular gov-ernments,independentof all other causesof influ-ence,wouldinsurethem so decidedan empireovertheir respectivecitizens as to render them at alltimes a complete counterpoise,and, not unfre-quently,dangerousrivals to the powerof the Union.

Theoperationsofthe nationalgovernment,on theother hand, falling less immediatelyunder the ob-servationof the mass of the citizens,the benefitsderived from it will chiefly be perceivedand at--tended to by speculativemen. Relating to moregeneralinterests,they willbe lessapt to comehometo the feelingsof the people; and, in proportion,less likelyto inspirean habitual senseof obligation,and an activesentimentof attachment.

The reasoningon this head has beenabundantlyexemplifiedby the experienceof all federalconstitu-tionswith whichweare acquainted,and ofallotherswhichhavebornethe least analogyto them.

Though the ancient feudal systems were not,strictly speaking,confederacies,yet they partook ofthe natureof that speciesofassociation. Therewasa commonhead, chieftain,or sovereign,whoseau-thority extendedoverthe wholenation; and a hum-

The Federalist I33

bet of subordinatevassals,or feudatories,whohadlarge portionsof land allottedto them, and numer-oustrains of inferiorvassalsor retainers,who occu-pied and cultivatedthat land upon the tenure offealty or obedienceto the persons of whom theyheldit. Each principalvassalwasa kind of sover-eign within his particular demesnes. The conse=queiacesof this situationwerea continualoppositionto the authorityof the sovereign,and frequentwarsbetweenthe great baronsor chieffeudatoriesthem-selves. The power of the head of the nation wascommonlytoo weak, either to preservethe pubhcpeace,or to protect the peopleagainst the oppres-sionsof theirimmediatelords. Thisperiodof Euro-peanaffairsis emphaticallystyledby historians,thetimes of feudal anarchy.

When the sovereignhappened to be a man ofvigorousandwarliketemperandof superiorabilities,he would acquire a personalweightand influence,whichanswered,for the time, the purposesof a moreregu!arauthority. But in general,the powerofthebaronstriumphedoverthatoftheprince;andinmanyinstanceshisdominionwasentirelythrownoff,andthegreatfiefswereerectedintoindependentprincipalitiesorStates.Inthoseinstancesinwhichthemonarchfmallyprevailedoverhisvassals,hissuccesswaschieflyowingtothetyrannyofthosevassalsovertheirdependents.The barons,ornobles,equallytheenemiesofthesovereignandtheoppressorsofthecommonpeople,weredreadedanddetestedbyboth;tillmutualdangerandmutualinteresteffectedaunionbetweenthemfataltothe

I34 AlexanderHamilton

power of the aristocracy. Had the nobles, by aconduct of clemencyand justice, preserved thefidelityanddevotionoftheir retainersandfollowers,the contests between them and the prince mustalmostalwayshaveendedin their favor,and in theabridgmentor subversionofthe royal authority.

This is not an assertionfoundedmerelyin specu-lation or conjecture. Amongother illustrationsofits truth whichmightbe cited,Scotlandwillfurnisha cogent example. The spirit of clanshipwhichwas,at an early day, introducedinto that kingdom,uniting the nobles and their dependents by tiesequivalentto those of kindred, rendered the aris-tocracy a constantovermatchfor the powerof themonarch,till the incorporationwith Eng!andsub-dued its fierceand ungovernablespirit, and reducedit within thoserules of subordinationwhicha morerational and more energeticsystem of civil polityhad previouslyestablishedin the latter _vgdom.

The separategovernmentsin a confederacymayaptly be comparedwith the feudalbaronies; withthis advantagein their favor, that fromthe reasonsalready explained,they will generallypossesstheconfidenceand good-willof the people,and with soimportanta support,willbe able effectuallyto op-poseall encroachmentsof the national government.It willbe well if they are not able to counteractitslegitimateand necessaryauthority. The points ofsimilitudeconsistin the rivalshipof power,applic-able to both, and in the CONC_.NT_TIONof largeportionsof the strength of the comm_mityinto par-ticular DEPOSITS,in one caseat the disposalof indi-

The Federalist z35

viduals,in theothercaseat thedisposalofpohtiealbodies.

A concisereviewofthe eventsthat haveattendedconfederategovernmentswillfurtherillustratethisimportantdoctrine; an inattentionto whichhasbeen the greatsourceof our politicalmistakes,andhasgivenour jealousya directionto thewrongside.This reviewshallformthe subjectof someensuingpapers.

PUBLIUS.

Forth8I.clepe.d_tJo_rr_

THEFEDERALIST.No. XVIII

(HAMILTONAND MADISON)

To thePeopleo_theStateo_New York:Amongthe confederaciesof antiquity, the most

considerablewasthat of the Grecianrepublics,asso-ciatedunderthe Amphictyoniccouncil.Fromthebestaccountstransmittedof thi_celebratedinstitu-%ion,itborea veryinstructiveanalogyto thepresentConfederationof theAmericanStates.

The membersretainedthe characterof inde-pendentandsovereignstates,andhad equalvotesinthe federalcouncil. Thiscouncilhad a generalau-thorityto proposeand resolvewhateverit judgednecessaryforthecommonwelfareof Greece;to de-clareandcarryon war; to decide,in the last resort,all controversiesbetweenthe members;to fine theaggressingparty; to employthewholeforceof theconfederacyagainstthe disobedient;to admitnew

I36 AlexanderHamilton

members. The Amphictyonswerethe guardiansofreligion,and of the immenserichesbelongingto thetempleofDelphos,wheretheyhad the rightof juris-dictionin controversiesbetweenthe inhabitantsandthosewhocameto consultthe oracle. Asa furtherprovisionfor the efficacyof the federalpowers,theytook an oath mutually to defendand protect theunited cities,to punishthe violatorsofthisoath, andto inflictvengeanceon sacrilegiousdespoilersof thetemple.

In theory, and upon paper, this apparatus ofpowersseemsamply sufficientfor all general pur-poses. In severalmaterial instances,they exceedthe powersenumeratedin the articlesof confedera-tion. The Amphictyonshad in their hands thesuperstitionof the times, one of the principalen-ginesby which governmentwas then maintained;theyhad a declaredauthorityto usecoercionagainstrefractorycities,and werebound by oath to exertthis authorityon the necessaryoccasions.

Very different,nevertheless,was the experimentfrom the theory. The powers,like those of thepresent Congress,were administeredby deputiesappointed wholly by the cities in their politicalcapacities; and exercisedover them in the samecapacities. Hencethe weakness,the disorders,andfinally the destruction of the confederacy. Themorepowerfulmembers,insteadofbeingkept in aweand subordination,tyrannizedsuccessivelyover allthe rest. Athens, as we learn from Demosthenes,wasthe arbiterof Greeceseventy-threeyears. TheLaceclmmoniansnext governedit twenty-nineyears;

The Federalist 137

ata subsequentperiod,afterthebattleofLeuctra,theThebanshadtheirturnofdomination.Ithappenedbuttoooften,accordingtoPlutarch,

thatthedeputiesofthestrongestcitiesawedandcorruptedthoseoftheweaker;andthatjudgmentwentinfavorofthemostpowerfulparty.

Even in the midst of defensiveand dangerouswarswith Persia and Macedon,the membersneveracted in concert,and were,moreor fewerof them,eternallythe dupesor the hirelingsof the commonenemy. The intervalsof foreignwar werefilledupby domesticvicissitudes,convulsions,and carnage.

After the conclusionof the war with Xerxes, itappears that the Lacedmmoniansrequired that anumber of the cities should be turned out of theconfederacyfor the unfaithfulpart they had acted.The Athenians, finding that the Lacedmmonianswouldlose fewerpartisansby such a measurethanthemselves,and wouldbecomemastersofthe publicdeliberations,vigorouslyopposedand defeatedtheattempt. This piece of history provesat once theinefficiencyof the union,the ambitionand jealousyof its most powerfulmembers,and the dependentand degraded conditionof the rest. The smallermembers,though entitled by the theory of theirsystemto revolvein equalprideandmajestyaroundthe commoncentre, had become,in fact, satellitesof the orbsofprimarymagnitude.

Had the Greeks,says the Abb6 Milot, been aswiseas they werecourageous,theywouldhavebeenadmonishedby experienceof the necessity of acloserunion,and wouldhave availedthemselvesof

x38 AlexanderHamilton

the peacewhichfollowedtheir successagainstthePersianarms, to estabhshsuch a reformation. In-stead of this obviouspolicy,AthensandSparta, in-flatedwith the victoriesand the glory they hadacquired,becamefirstrivalsandthenenemies;anddid eachother infinitelymore mischiefthan theyhad sufferedfromXerxes. Theirmutualjealousies,fears,hatreds,andinjuriesendedin the celebratedPeloponnesianwar; whichitself endedin the r_inandslaveryoftheAthenianswhohad begunit.

As a weakgovernment,whennot at war,is everagitatedby internaldissensions,so theseneverfailto bring on fresh calamitiesfrom abroad. ThePhocianshaving ploughedup. some consecratedgroundbelongingto the temple of Apollo, theAmphictyoniccouncil,accordingto the supersti-tion of the age, imposeda fineon the sacrilegiousoffenders. The Phocians,beingabettedby Athensand Sparta,refusedto submitto the decree. TheThebans,with othersof the cities, undertooktomaintaintheauthorityof the ._nphictyons,and toavenge the violated god. The latter, being theweakerparty, invited the assistanceof Philip ofMacedon,who had secretlyfosteredthe contest.Philipgladlyseizedtheopportunityof executingthedesignshe had long plannedagainst the libertiesof Greece. By his intrigues and bribes he wonover to his intereststhe popularleadersof severalcities; by their influenceand votes, gained ad-missionintothe Amphictyoniccouncil;and by hisartsand his arms,madehimselfmasterof thecon-federacy.

The Federalist I39

Suchwerethe consequencesofthe fallaciousprin-ciple on which this interestingestablishmentwasfounded. Had Greece,saysa judiciousobserveronher fate, been united by a stricter confederation,and perseveredin her union,shewouldneverhavewornthe chainsof Macedon;andmighthaveproveda barrier to the vast projectsof Rome.

The Achaeanleague,as it is called,was anothersocietyof Grecianrepublics,whichsuppliesus withvaluable instruction.

The Union here was far more intimate, and itsorganizationmuch wiser,than in the precedingin-stance. It willaccordinglyappear,that thoughnotexemptfrom a similarcatastrophe,it by no meansequallydeservedit.

The cities composingthis leagueretained theirmunicipaljttrisdiction,appointedtheir ownofficers,and enjoyed a perfect equality. The senate, inwhichthey were represented,had the soleand ex-clusive right of peace and war; of sendingandreceiving ambassadors; of entering into treatiesand alliances;of appointinga chiefmagistrateorprmtor, as he was called, who commandedtheirarmies,and who,with the adviceand consentoftenof the senators,not only administeredthe govern-ment in the recessof the senate, but had a greatshare in its deliberations,when assembled. Ac-cordingto the primitiveconstitution,thereweretwoprmtorsassociatedin the administration; but ontrial a singleonewaspreferred.

It appears that the cities had all the same lawsand customs,the same weightsand measures,and

I4o AlexanderHamilton

the samemoney. But howfar this effectproceededfrom the authority of the federal councilis left inuncertainty. It is said only that the citieswereina mannercompelledto receivethe same laws andusages. When Lacedmmonwas brought into theleagueby Philopc_xnen,it was attended with anabolitionof the institutionsand lawsof Lycurgus,and an adoption of those of the Achmans. TheAmphictyonicconfederacy,of whichshe had beena member,lefther in the full exerciseofher govern-ment and her legislation. This circumstancealoneprovesa verymaterialdifferencein the geniusof thetwosystems.

It is much to be regretted that such imperfectmonumentsremain of this curiouspoliticalfabric.Couldits interiorstructureandregularoperationbeascertained,it is probablethat morelight wouldbethrownby it on the scienceof federalgovernment,than by any of the like experimentswith whichweare acquainted.

Oneimportant fact seems to be witnessedby allthe historianswho take notice of Achmanaffairs.It is,that as wellafter the renovationof the leagueby Aratus, as beforeits dissolutionby the arts ofMacedon,there was infimtelymore of moderationand justicein the administrationof its government,and lessof violenceand seditionin the people,thanwere to be found in any of the cities exercisingsinglyalltheprerogativesofsovereignty. TheAbb6Mably,in his observationson Greece,says that thepop,_]o.rgovernment,whichwassotempestuouselse-where,causedno disordersin the membersof the

The Federalist I4I

A_n republic,becauseit wastheretemperedby thegeneralauthorityandlawsoftheconfederacy.

Weare not to concludetoo hastily,however,thatfaction didnot, in a certaindegree,agitate the par-ticular cities; much less that a due subordinationand harmonyreignedin the generalsystem. Thecontraryis sufficientlydisplayedin the vicissitudesand fate of the republic.

Whilst the Amphictyonicconfederacyremained,that of the Achmans,whichcomprehendedthe lessimportant cities only, made little figure on thetheatre of Greece. When the former became avictim to Macedon,the latter was spared by thepolicyof Philip and Alexander. Underthe succes-sors of these princes, however,a differentpolicyprevailed. The arts of division were practisedamongthe Achmans. Eachcity was seducedinto aseparateinterest; the union was dissolved. Someof the cities fell under the tyranny of Macedoniangarrisons; others under that of usurpersspringingout of their ownconfusions. Shameand oppressionerelongawakenedtheir loveofliberty. Afew citiesreunited. Their examplewas followedby others,as opportunitieswere found of cutting off theirtyrants. The league soon embraced almost thewhole Peloponnesus. Macedonsaw its progress;but washinderedby internal dissensionsfromstop-ping it. All Greece caught the enthusiasm andseemedready to unite in oneconfederacy,whenthejealousyand envy in Sparta and Athens, of therisinggloryof the Achmans,threw a fatal damp onthe enterprise. The dreadofthe Macedonianpower

_42 AlexanderHamilton

inducedthe leagueto courbthe allianceofthe Icingsof Egyptand Syria,who,as successorsofAlexander,wererivalsofthe kingof Macedon. Thispolicywasdefeatedby Cleomenes,king of Sparta,whowasledby his ambitionto make an unprovokedattack onhis neighbors,the Ach_ans,and who,as an enemyto Macedon,had interest enoughwith the Egyptianand Syrian princesto effect a breach of their en-gagementswith the league. TheAchseanswerenowreducedto the dilemmaof submittingto Cleomenes,or of supplicatingthe aid ofMacedon,its formerop-pressor. The latter expedientwas adopted. Thecontests of the Greeksalways affordeda pleasingopportunity to that powerfulneighbor of inter-meddling in their affairs. A Macedonianarmyquicklyappeared. Cleomeneswasvanquished. TheAchaeanssoon experienced,as often happens,tha_a victoriousand powerfulally is but another nameforamaster. All that theirmostabject comphancescouldobtain fromhim was a tolerationof the exer-cise of their laws. Philip, who was now on thethrone ofMacedon,soonprovokedby his tyrannies,freshcombinationsamongthe Greeks.TheAchseans,thoughweakenedby internal dissensionsandby therevoltof Messene,oneof its members,being joinedby the _IEtoliansand Athenians,erectedthe stand-ard ofopposition. Findingthemselves,thoughthussupported,unequal to the undertaking, they oncemorehad recourseto the dangerousexpedientof in-troducingthe succorofforeignarms. TheRomans,to whomthe invitationwasmade,eagerlyembracedi_. Philip was conquered; Macedonsubdued. A

TheFcdera_t I43

new crisisensuedto the league. Dissensionsbrokeout amongits members. These the Romans fos-tered. Callicratesandotherpopularleadersbecamemercenaryinstrumentsfor inveiglingtheir country-men. The more effectuallyto nourishdiscordanddisorderthe Romans had, to the astonishmentofthosewho confidedin their sincerity,already pro-claimeduniversalliberty' throughoutGreece. Withthe same insidiousviews, they now seduced themembersfrom the league,by representingto theirpride the violation it committedon their sover-eignty. By these arts this union, the last hope ofGreece,the last hope of ancient liberty, was tornintopieces; and such imbecilityand distractionin-troduced,that the arms of Romefound little diffi-culty in completingthe _1_ whichtheir arts hadcommenced. The Achmanswerecut to pieces,andAchaialoadedwith chains,underwhichit is groan-ing at this hour.

I have thought it no_superfluousto givethe out-linesof this importantportionof history; both be-causeit teachesmorethan onelesson,and because,as a supplementto the outlinesof the Achseancon-stitution, it emphaticallyillustratesthe tendencyoffederalbodiesrather to anarchyamongthe members,thau to tyranny in the head.

PUBLIUS.zThis was but another namemorespeciousforthe independence

of the memberson the federalhead.--PusLius.

*44 AlexanderHamilton

For thel.d_p_d_atJournal

THE FEDERALIST. No.XIX

(HAMILTON AND MADISON)

To thePeopleof theStateo_New York:Theexamplesof ancientconfederacies,citedin my

last paper, havenot exhaustedthe sourceofexperi-mentalinstructiononthis subject. Thereare exist-inginstitutions,foundedonasimilarprinciple,whichmeritparticularconsideration. The firstwhichpre-sents itselfis the Germanicbody.

In the early ages of Christianity,Germanywasoccupiedby seven distinct nations, who had nocommonchief. The Franks, one of the number,having conqueredthe Gauls, establishedthe king-dom whichhas taken its namefrom them. In theninth century Charlemagne,its warlike monarch,carriedhis victoriousarms in every direction; andGermanybecamea part of hisvast dominions. Onthe dismemberment,which took place under hissons,this part was erectedintoa separateand inde-pendent empire. Charlemagneand his immediatedescendantspossessedthe reality,as wellas the en-signsand dignity of imperialpower. But the prin-cipalvassals,whosefiefshad becomehereditary,andwho composedthe national diets which Charle-magne had not abolished,graduallythrew off theyokeand advancedto sovereignjurisdictionand in-dependence.The forceof imperialsovereigntywasinsufficientto restrain such powerfuldependants;or to preservethe unity and tranquillityof the em-pire. The most furiousprivate wars, accompanied

The Federalist I45

with everyspeciesof calamity,were carried on be-tween the differentprinces and states. The im-perial authority,unabletomaintainthepublicorder,declinedbydegreestillitwasalmostextinctintheanarchy,whichagitatedthelongintervalbe-tweenthedeathofthelastemperoroftheSuabian,andtheaccessionofthefirstemperoroftheAus-trianlines.Intheeleventhcenturytheemperorsenjoyedfullsovereignty:Inthefifteenththeyhadlittlemorethanthesymbolsanddecorationsofpower.

Out of this feudal system,whichhas itselfmanyofthe importantfeaturesofa confederacy,hasgrownthe federal systemwhichconstitutesthe Germanicempire. Its powersare vestedin a diet representingthe componentmembersof the confederacy;in theemperor, who is the executivemagistrate, with anegativeon the decreesof the diet; and in the im-perial chamberand the auliccouncil,two judiciarytribunals havingsupremejurisdictionin controver-sies which concernthe empire, or which happenamongits members.

The diet possessesthe generalpowerof legislatingfor the empire; ofmakingwar andpeace; contract-Lugalliances; assessingquotasoftroopsandmoney;constructingfortressess;regulatingcoin; admittingnewmembers; and subjectingdisobedientmembersto the ban of the empire,by whichthe party is de-gradedfromhis sovereignrights and his possessionsforfeited. Themembersof the confederacyare ex-presslyrestrictedfromenteringinto compactspreju-dicialto the empire; fromimposingtollsand duties

VOL. XI ._lO.

I46 AlexanderHamilton

on theirmutualintercourse,withoutthe consentofthe emperorand diet; from alteringthe value ofmoney; fromdoing injusticeto one another; orfromaffordingassistanceor retreatto disturbersofthepublicpeace. Andthebanis denouncedagainstsuchas shallviolateanyof theserestrictions.Themembersofthe diet,as such,aresubjectin allcasesto be judgedby theemperoranddiet, and in theirprivate capacitiesby the auliccouncilandimperialchamber.

The prerogativesof the emperorare numerous.Themostimportantofthemare: hisexclusiverightto make propositionsto the diet; to negativeitsresolutions;to nameambassadors;to conferdig-nitiesandtitles; to fillvacantelectorates;to founduniversities;to grantprivilegesnot injuriousto thestatesof the empire;to receiveand apply thepub-licrevenues;and generallyto watchoverthepublicsafety. In certaincases,theelectorsforma councilto him. In qualityof emperor,he possessesnoterritorywithintheempire,norreceivesany revenuefor his support. But his revenueand dominions,in otherqualities,constitutehim one of the mostpowerfulprincesinEurope.Fromsucha paradeofconstitutionalpowers,in

therepresentativesandheadofthisconfederacy,thenaturalsuppositionwouldbe,thatitmustformanexceptiontothegeneralcharacterwhichbelongsto its kindred systems. Nothingwouldbe furtherfrom the reality. The fundamental principle onwhichit rests, that the empire is a communityofsovereigns,that the diet is a representationof soy-

The Federalist x47

ereigns,and _botthe laws areaddressedto sover-eigns,rendersthe empirea nervelessbody,incapableof regulatingits ownmembers,insecureagainstex-ternald_a_ngers,and agitatedwith unceasingfer-mentationsin its ownbowels.

Thehistoryof Germanyis a historyof warsbe=tweenthe emperorand the princesand states; ofwarsamongthe princesand states themselves;ofthe licentiousnessof thestrong,and theoppressionof the weak; of foreignintrusions,and foreignin-trigues; of requisitionsof men and money disre-garded,or partiallycompliedwith; of attempts toenforcethem,altogetherabortive,orattendedwithslaughterand desolation,involvingthe innocentwith the guilty; of generalimbecility,confusion,and misery.

In the sixteenthcentury,the emperor,with onepart of the empireon his side, was seen engagedagainstthe otherprincesandstates. In oneof theconflicts,theemperorhimselfwasputto flight,andvery nearbeingmade prisonerby the electorofSaxony. The late king of Prussiawas morethanonce pitted against his imperialsovereign; andcommonlyproved an overmatchfor h_m. Con=troversiesand warsamongthemembersthemselveshavebeenso common,that the Germanannalsarecrowdedwiththebloodypageswhichdescribethem.Previousto the peaceof Westphalia,Germanywasdesolatedby a warofthirty years,in whichtheem-peror,withonehalfof theempire,wason one side,and Sweden,with the otherhalf, on the oppositeside. Peacewasat lengthnegotiated,anddictated

_48 AlexanderHamilton

by foreignpowers; and the articlesof it, to whichforeignpowersare parties,madea fundamentalpartof the Germanicconstitution.

If the nation happens,on any emergency,to bemore united by the necessityof self-defence,itssituation is still deplorable. Militarypreparationsmust be precededby so many tediousdiscussions,arising from the jealousies,pride, separateviews,and clashingpretensionsof sovereignbodies, thatbefore the diet can settle the arrangements,*.heenemyare in the field; and beforethe federaltroopsare readyto takeit, areretiringintowinterquarters.

Thesmallbodyofnationaltroops,whichhasbeenjudgednecessaryin timeofpeace,is defectivelykeptup, badly paid, infectedwith local prejudices,andsupported by irregular and disproportionatecon-L-ributionsto the treasury.

The impossibilityof maintainingorder and dis-pensingjusticeamongthese sovereignsubjects,pro-duced the experimentof dividingthe empire intonineor ten circlesor districts; ofgivingtheman in-terior organization,and of chargingthem with themilitary executionof the laws against delinquentand contumaciousmembers. This experimenthasonly served to demonstratemore fully the radicalviceofthe constitution. Eachcircleisthe miniaturepicture of the deformitiesof this politicalmonster.They either fail to execute their commissions,orthey do it with all the devastationand carnageofcivilwar. Sometimeswholecirclesare defaulters;andthen theyincreasethe mischiefwhichthey wereinstitutedto remedy.

The Federalist I49

We may form somejudgment of tiffs schemeofmi!itarycoercionfroma samplegivenby Thuanus.In Donawerth,a freeand imperialcity ofthe c_cleof Suabia, the Abb_ de St. Croixenjoyedcertainirnrnunitieswhichhad beenreservedto him. In theexerciseofthese,on somepublicoccasions,outrageswere committedon himby the peopleof the city.The consequencewas that the city was put underthe ban of the empire, and the Duke of Bavaria,though director of another circle,obtained an ap-pointment to enforceit. He soonappearedbeforethe city with a corps of ten thousand troops, andfindingit a fit occasion,as he had secretlyintendedfrom the beginning,to revive an antiquatedclaim,on the pretext that his ancestorshad sufferedtheplaceto be dismemberedfromhis territory,zhe tookpossessionofit in hisownname,disarmed,andpun-ishedthe inhabitants,and reaunexedthe city to hisdomains.

It may be asked,perhaps,what has so longkeptthis disjointed machine from falling entirely topieces? The answeris obvious: The weaknessofmost of the members,who are unwillingto exposethemselvesto the mercy of foreignpowers; theweaknessof most of the principalmembers,com-pared with the formidablepowersall around them;the vast weight and influencewhich the emperorderivesfromhis separateand hereditarydominions;and the interest he feelsin preservinga systemwith

• Pfeffel,NomvelAbr_g.Gkronol.de l'Hist., etc.,d'Alleraagne,saysthe pretex_wasto indemnifyhimselffor the expenseofthe expedition._PuBLIUS.

I5o AlexanderHamilton

whichhisfamilypride is connected,and whichcon-stituteshimthefirstprincein Europe;--thesecausessupport a feebleand precariousUnion; whilst therepellent quality, incidentto the nature of sover-eignty, and which time continually strengthens,preventsany reformwhatever,foundedon a properconsolidation. Noris it to be imagined,if this ob-stacle could be surmounted,that the neighboringpowerswouldsuffera revolutionto takeplace,whichwouldgiveto the empirethe forceand preeminenceto whichit is entitled. Foreignnationshave longconsideredthemselvesas interestedin the changesmadeby events in this constitution;and have, onvariousoccasions,betrayed their policyof perpetu-ating its anarchyand wealcuess.

If more directexampleswerewanting,Poland,asa governmentover local sovereigns,mightnot im-properlybe taken notice of. Nor couldany proofmorestrikingbe givenof the calamitiesflowingfromsuch institutions. Equally unfit for self-govern-ment and self-defence,it has longbeenat the mercyof its powerfulneighbors; whohave lately had themercyto disburdenit of onethird of its peopleandterritories.

Theconnectionamongthe Swisscantonsscarcelyamountsto a confederacy;though it is sometimescited as an instanceof the stability of suchinstitu-tions.

They have no common treasury; no commontroopsevenin war; no commoncoin; no commonjudicatory; nor any other commonmark of sover-eignty.

The Federalist 15I

Theyare kept togetherby the peculiarityof theirtopographicalposition; by their individualweak-ness and insignificancy;by the fear of powerfulneighbors,to oneof whichthey were formerlysub-jeer; by the few sourcesof contentionamong apeople of such simpleand homogeneousmanners;by theirjointinterestin theirdependentpossessions;by the mutual aid they stand in need of, for sup-pressing insurrectionsand rebellions,ma aid ex-presslystipulated,and often requiredand afforded;and by the necessityof someregularand permanentprovision for accommodatingdisputes among thecantons. The provision is, that the parties atvariance shall each choosefourjudges out of theneutral cantons, who, in ease of disagreement,choosean umpire. This tribunal,underan oath ofimpartiality,pronouncesdefinitivesentence,whichallthe cantonsare boundto enforce. The competencyof this regulationmay be estimatedby a clauseintheirtreatyof _683,with VictorAmadeusofSavoy;in whichhe obligeshimselfto interposeas mediatorin disputesbetweenthecantons,and toemployforce,if necessary,againstthe contumaciousparty.

Sofar as the peculiarityoftheir casewilladmit ofcomparisonwith that of the UnitedStates,it servesto confirmthe principleintendedto be established.Whateverefficacythe unionmay havehad in ordi-nary cases,it appears that the momenta cause ofdifferencesprangup, capableof trying its strength,it failed. The controversieson the subject of re-ligion,whichin three instanceshavekindledviolentand bloodycontests,may be said, in fact, to have

x52 AlexanderHamilton

severed the league. The Protestantand Catholiccantonshave sincehad theirseparatediets, whereall themost importantconcernsare adjusted,andwhichhaveleft thegeneraldietlittle otherbusinessthanto take careof thecommonbailages.

Thatseparationhad anotherconsequence,whichmerits attention. It producedoppositeallianceswith foreignpowers:of Berne,at the head of theProtestantassociation,with the UnitedProvinces;and of Luzerne,at the headof the Catholicassocia-tion, with France.

PUBLIUS.

FromtheNewYorkPacket,Tuesday,Decemberxx,x787

THE FEDERALIST.No.XX

(HAMILTONXN1)_DZSON)

To thePeopleoftheStateofNew York:The United Netherlandsare a confederacyof re-

publics,or rather of aristocraciesof a very remark-able texture, yet confirmingall the lessonsderivedfromthosewhichwehavealreadyreviewed.

The lmion is composedof seven coequal andsovereignstates, and each state or provinceis acompositionof equaland independentcities. In allimportantcases,notonlythe provincesbut the citiesmust beunanimous.

The sovereigntyof the Unionis representedbythe States-General,consistingusuallyof _.boutfiftydeputiesappointedby the provinces. They hold

The Federalist _53

_heirseats,somefor life,someforsix, three,andoneyears; fromtwoprovincesthey continuein appoint-ment duringpleasure.

The States-Generalhave authority to enter intotreaties and alliances; to make war and peace; toraise armiesand equip fleets; to ascertain quotasand demandcontributions. In all thesecases,how-ever,unanimityandthe sanctionoftheirconstituentsare requisite. They have authority to appointandreceiveambassadors; to execute treaties and alli-ancesalreadyformed; to providefor the collectionof duties on imports and exports; to regulate themint, with a saving to the provincial rights; togovernas sovereignsthe dependentterritories. Theprovincesare restrained, unless with the generalconsent, from entering into foreigntreaties; fromestablishingimpostsinjuriousto others,or chargingtheir neighborswith higher duties than their ownsubjects. A councilof state,a chamberofaccounts,with five collegesof admiralty,aid and fortify thefederal administration.

The executive magistrate of the union is thestadtholder,who is nowan hereditaryprince. Hisprincipalweight and influencein the republicarederivedfrom this independenttitle; fromhis greatpatrimonialestates; from his family connectionswith someof the chiefpotentates of Europe; and,morethan all,perhaps,fromhisbeingstadtholderinthe severalprovinces,as wellas for the union; inwhichprovincialqualityhe has the appointmentoftown magistrates under certain regulations, exe-cutes provincialdecrees,presideswhenhe pleasesin

I54 AlexanderHamilton

the provincialtTibunals,and has throughou_thepower of pardon.

As stadtholder of the union, he ho:$,however,considerableprerogatives.

In his politicalcapacityhe hasauthorityto settledisputesbetweenthe provinces,whenothermethodsfail; to assist at the deliberationsof the States-General,and at theirparticularconferences;to giveaudiencestoforeignambassadors,and tokeepagentsforhis particularaffairsat foreigncourts.

In his militarycapacityhe commandsthe federaltroops,providesfor garrisons,and in generalregu-latesmilitaryaffairs; disposesof all appointments,fromcolonelsto ensigns,andofthe governmentsandpostsoffortifiedtowns.

In hismarble capacityhe is admiral-general,andsuperintendsand directs every thing relative tonaval forcesand other naval affairs; presidesin theadmiraltiesin person or by proxy; appoints lieu-tenant-admiralsand other officers;and establishescouncilsof war, whosesentencesare not executedtillhe approvesthem.

His revenue, exclusive of his private income,amounts to three hundred thousand florins. Thestandingarmy whichhe commandsconsistsof abou_forty thousandmen.

Suchis the nature of the celebratedBelgiccon-federacy,as delineatedon parchment. Whatarethecharacterswhichpracticehas stampeduponit? Im-becilityinthe government;discordamongtheprov-inces; foreigninfluenceand indignities;a precariousexistencein peace,and peculiarcalamitiesfromwar.

The Federalist I55

ItwaslongagoremarkedbyGrotius,thatnothingbutthehatredofhiscountrymentothehouseofAustriakeptthemfrombeingruinedbythevicesoftheirconstitution.TheunionofUtrecht,saysanotherrespectable

writer,reposesanauthorityintheStates-General,seeminglysufficienttosecureharmony,butthejealousyineachprovincerendersthepracticeverydifferentfromthetheory.Thesameinstrument,saysanother,obligeseach

provincetolevycertaincontributions;butthisarticlenevercould,andprobablyneverwill,beexe-cuted;becausetheinlandprovinces,whohavelittlecommerce,cannotpayanequalquota.Inmattersofcontribution,itisthepracticeto

waivethearticlesoftheconstitution.Thedangerofdelayobligestheconsentingprovincestofurnishtheirquotas,withoutwaitingfortheothers;andthentoobtainreimbursementfromtheothers,bydeputations,whicharefrequent,orotherwise,astheycan.ThegreatwealthandinfluenceoftheprovinceofHollandenablehertoeffectboththesepurposes.Ithasmorethanoncehappened,thatthede-

ficiencieshadtobeultimatelycollectedatthepointofthebayonet;athingpracticable,thoughdreadful,inaconfederacywhereoneofthemembersexceedsinforcealltherest,andwhereseveralofthemaretoosmalltomeditateresistance;bututterlyim-practicableinonecomposedofmembers,severalofwhichareequaltoeachotherinstrengthandre-sources,andequalsinglytoavigorousandpersever-ingdefence.

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Foreignministers,says Sir WilliamTemple,whowashimselfa foreignminister,eludematters takenadreferendum,by tamperingwith the provincesandcities. In I726,the treaty of Hanoverwasdelayedby these means a wholeyear. Instancesof a likenature are numerousand notorious.

In critical emergencies,the States-Generalareoften compelled to overleaptheir constitutionalbounds. In i688,they concludeda treaty ofthem-selves at the risk of their heads. The treaty ofWestphalia,in _648,by which their independencewas formallyand finallyrecognized,was concludedwithout the consent of Zealand. Even as recentlyas the last treaty of peace with Great Britain, theconstitutionalprincipleof unanimity was departedfrom. A weak constitution must necessarilyter-minatein dissolution,for want ofproperpowers,orthe usurpation of powers requisite for the publicsafety. Whetherthe usurpation,whenoncebegun,willstop at the salutarypoint, or go forwardto thedangerousextreme,must dependonthe contingenciesof the moment. Tyrannyhasperhapsoftenergrownoutoftheassumptionsofpower,calledfor,onpressingexigencies,bya defectiveconstitution,than outofthefull exerciseof the largestconstitutionalauthorities.

Notwithstandingthe calamitiesproducedby thestadtholdership,it has been supposedthat withouthis influencein the individualprovinces,the causesof anarchymanifest in the confederacywouldlongagohavedissolvedit. "Undersucha government,"saysthe Abb6Mably,"the Unioncouldneverhavesubsisted,if the provinceshad not a spring within

The Federalist i 57

themselves,capable of quickeningtheir tardiness,and compellingthemto the sameway of thinking.This springis the stadtholder." It is remarkedbySir WilliamTemple,"that in the intermissionsofthe stadtholdership,Holland,by her richesand herauthority, whichdrewthe others into a sort of de-pendence,suppliedthe place."

Theseare not the only circumstanceswhichhavecontrolledthe tendencyto anarchyand dissolution.The surroundingpowersimposean absoluteneces-sity of unionto a certaindegree,at the same timethat they nourishby their intrigues the constitu-tional viceswhichkeepthe republicin somedegreealwaysat their mercy.

The true patriots have long bewailedthe fataltendencyofthese vices,andhavemadeno lessthanfour regular experimentsby extraordinaryassem-blies,convenedfor the specialpurpose,to apply aremedy. As many times has their laudable zealfoundit impossibleto unitethepubliccouncilsin re-formingthe known,the acknowledged,the fatal evilsof the existing constitution. Let us pause, myfellow-citizens,for one moment,over this melan-cholyand monitorylessonof history; and with thetear that dropsfor the calamitiesbrought on man-Kindby their adverseopinionsand selfishpassions,let our gratitude minglean ejaculationto Heaven,for the propitiousconcordwhichhas distinguishedthe consultationsfor our politicalhappiness.

A design was also conceivedof establishingageneral tax to be administeredby the federal au-t&ority. This alsohad its adversariesand failed.

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This unhappy people seem to be now sufferingfrom popular convulsions,from dissensionsamongthe states, and from the actualinvasionof foreignarms, the crisisof their destiny. All nationshavetheir eyes fixed on the awfulspectacle. The firstwish prompted by humanity is, that this severetrialmay issuein sucha revolutionof theirgovern-ment as willestablishtheirunion,and renderit theparentof tranqui!lity,freedom,and happiness: Thenext, that the asylum under which,we trust, theenjoymentof theseblessingswillspeedilybe securedin this country,may receiveand consolethem forthe catastropheof their own.

I make no apologyfor having dweltso long onthe contemplationof these federalprecedents. Ex-perienceis the oracle of truth; and where its re-sponsesare unequivocal,they ought to be conclusiveand sacred. The important truth, which it un-equivocallypronouncesin the present ease,is thata sovereigntyover sovereigns,a governmentovergovernments,a legislationfor communities,as eon-tradistinguishedfromindividuals,as it is a solecismin theory,so in practiceit is subversiveof the orderand ends of civil polity,by substitutingv/o/enceinplaceof/aw,or the destructivecoercionof the swordin place of the mild and salutary ¢oerc/onof themagistracy.

PUBLIUS.

The Federalist x59

For theIndependentJournal

THE FEDERALIST. No. XXI

(HAMILTON)

To thePeopleof theStateofNew York:Having in the three last numberstaken a sum-

mary review of the principal circumstancesandevents whichhave depictedthe geniusand fate ofother confederategovernments,I shallnowproceedin the enumerationof the most importantof thosedefectswhichhave hitherto disappointedourhopesfrom the system establishedamongourselves. Toforma safeand satisfactoryjudgmentof the properremedy,it is absolutelynecessarythat weshouldbewell acquaintedwith the extent and malignity ofthe disease.

The next most palpable defec¢of the subsistingConfederation,is the total wantof a SANCTIONto itslaws. The United States, as nowcomposed,havenopowersto exactobedience,orpunishdisobedienceto their resolutions,eitherby pecuniarymulcts,by asuspensionor divestiture of privileges,or by anyother constitutional mode. There is no expressdelegationof authority to them to use forceagainstdelinquentmembers; and if sucha right shouldbeascribed to the federal head, as resultingfrom thenature of the socialcompactbetweenthe States, itmust be by inferenceand construction,in the faceof that part of the secondarticle,by whichit is de-clared, "that each State shall retain every power,jurisdiction,andright, not expresslydelegatedto theUnited States in Congressassembled." There is,

x6o AlexanderHamilton

doubtless,a strqlciugabsurdityin supposingthat arightofthiskinddoesnotexist,butwearereducedto the dilemmaeitherof embracingthat supposi-tion,preposterousasit mayseem,orofcontraveningor explainingawaya provision,whichhas beenof/ate a repeatedthemeof the eulogiesof thosewhoopposethenewConstitution;andthewantofwhich,in thatplan,hasbeenthesubjectofmuchplausibleanimadversion,and severecriticism.If weareun-willingto impairthe forceofthisapplaudedprovi-sion,weshahbeobligedtoconclude,thattheUnitedStatesaffordthe extraordinaryspectacleof a gov-ernmentdestituteevenof the shadowof constitu-tionalpowerto enforcethe executionof its ownlaws. It willappear,from the specimenswhichhavebeencited,that the AmericanConfederacy,in this particular,standsdiscriminatedfromeveryotherinstitutionof a similarkind, and exhibitsanewand unexampledphenomenonin the pohticalworld.

Thewantof a mutualguarantyofthe Stategov-ernmentsisanothercapitalimperfectionin the fed-eralplan. Thereisnothingofthiskinddeclaredinthe articlesthat composeit; and to implya tacitguarantyfromconsiderationsofutility,wouldbe astillmoreflagrantdeparturefromthe clausewhichhasbeenmentioned,than to implya tacitpowerofcoercionfromthe likeconsiderations.Thewantofa guaranty,thoughit mightin its consequencesen-dangertheUnion,doesnot so immediatelyattackits existenceasthewantofa constitutionalsanctionto its laws.

The Federalist i6t

Withouta guarantytheassistancetobederivedfromtheUnioninrepellingthosedomesticdangerswhichmaysometimesthreatentheexistenceoftheStateconstitutions,mustberenounced.Usurpa-tionmay rearitscrestineachState,andtrampleuponthelibertiesofthepeople,whilethenationalgovernmentcouldlegallydonothingmorethanbe-holditsencroachrnentswithindignationandregret.A successfulfactionmay erecta tyrannyontheruinsoforderandlaw,whilenosuccorcouldcon-stitutionallybeaffordedbytheUniontothefriendsandsupportersofthegovernment.Thetempestu-oussituationfromwhichMassachusettshasscarcelyemerged,evincesthatdangersofthiskindarenotmerelyspeculative.Who candeterminewhatmighthavebeentheissueofherlateconvulsions,ifthemalcontentshadbeenheadedbya CmsarorbyaCromwell?Who canpredictwhateffecta despot-isrn,establishedinMassachusetts,wouldhaveuponthelibertiesofNewHampshireorRhodeIsland,ofConnecticutorNewYork?The inordinateprideofStateimportancehas

suggestedtosomemindsanobjectiontotheprin-cipleofaguarantyinthefederalgovernment,asin-volvingan officiousinterferenceinthedomesticconcernsofthemembers.A scrupleofthiskindwoulddepriveusofoneoftheprincipaladvantagestobeexpectedfromunion,andcanonlyflowfromamisapprehensionofthenatureoftheprovisionit-self.ItcouldbenoimpedimenttoreformsoftheStateconstitutionsbyamajorityofthepeopleinalegalandpeaceablemode.Thisrightwouldremain

VOI_XI--xx.

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undiminished. The guaranty could only operateagainstchangesto be effectedby violence. Towardsthe preventionsof calamitiesof this kind, toomanycheckscannot be provided. The peace of societyand the stabilityof governmentdependabsolutelyon the efficacyof the precautionsadoptedon thishead. Where the wholepowerof the governmentis in the hands of the people,there is the less pre-tence for the use of violentremediesin partial oroccasionaldistempersof the State. The naturalcure for an ill-administration,in a popular or re-presentativeconstitution, is a change of men. Aguaranty by the national authority would be asmuch levelledagainst the usurpationsof rulers asagainst the ferments and outrages of faction andseditionin the community.

The principleof regulatingthe contributionsofthe Statesto the commontreasuryby QUOTASis an-other fundamentalerror in the Confederation. Itsrepugnancyto an adequatesupply of the nationalexigencieshas been already pointed out, and hassufficientlyappearedfrom the trial whichhas beenmadeofit. I speakof it nowsolelywith a viewtoequality amongthe States. Thosewho have beenaccustomedto contemplatethe circumstanceswhichproduce and constitute national wealth, must besatisfiedthat there is no commonstandard or ba-rometerbywhichthe degreesofit canbe ascertained.Neitherthe valueof lands, nor the numbersof thepeople,which have been successivelyproposed asthe rule of State contributions,has any pretensionto beinga just representative. If we comparethe

The Federalist x63

wealthoftheUnitedNetherlandswiththatofRus-siaorGermany,orevenofFrance,andifweatthesametimecomparethetotalvalueofthelandsandtheaggregatepopulationofthatcontracteddistrictwiththetotalvalueofthelandsandtheaggregatepopulationoftheimmenseregionsofeitherofthethreelast-mentionedcountries,weshallatoncedis-coverthatthereisnocomparisonbetweenthepro-portionofeitherofthesetwoobjectsandthatoftherelativewealthofthosenations.IfthelikeparallelweretoberunbetweenseveraloftheAmericanStates, it wouldfurnisha like result. Let Virginiabe contrasted with North Carolina,Pennsylvaniawith Connecticut,or Marylandwith New Jersey,and we shallbe convincedthat the respectiveabili-ties of thoseStates,in relationto revenue,bearlittleor no analogyto their comparativestock in landsor to their comparativepopulation. The positionmay be equallyillustratedby a similarprocessbe-tweenthe countiesofthe sameState. No manwhois acquaintedwith the State of NewYorkwilldoubtthat the active wealth of King's County bears amuch greater proportion to that of Montgomerythan it wouldappearto be if weshouldtake eitherthe total value of the lands or the total number ofthe peopleas a criterion!

The wealth of nations dependsupon an infinitevariety of causes. Situation,soil, climate,the na-ture of the productions,the nature of the govern-ment, the genius of the citizens, the degree ofinformationthey possess,the state of commerce,ofarts, of industry,--these circumstancesand many

I64 AlexanderHamilton

more,too complex,minute, or adventitiousto ad-mit of a particular specification,occasion differ-ences hardly conceivablein the relative opulenceandrichesof differentcountries. The consequenceclearlyis that there can be no commonmeasureofnationalwealth, and, of course,no general or sta-tionary rule by whichthe ability of a state to paytaxes can be determined. The attempt, therefore,to regulate the contributionsof the members ofa confederacyby any such rule, cannot fail tobe productiveof glaring ineqlla.lityand extremeoppression.

This inequa!_tywould of itself be sufficientinAmerica to work the eventual destruction of theUnion,if any mode of enforcinga compliancewithits requisitions could be devised. The sufferingStateswouldnot long consentto remainassociatedupona principlewhichdistributesthe publicburdenswith so tmeql_2!a hand, and whichwas calculated

impoverishandoppressthe citizensofsomeStates,whilethoseof otherswould scarcelybe consciousofthe sma.l!proportion of the weight they were re-quiredto sustain. This,however,is an evilinsep-arablefromthe principleofquotasandrequisitions.

There is no method of steeringclear of this in-convenience,but by authorizingthe national gov-ernmentto raise its own revenuesin its ownway.Imposts, excises,and, in general,ail duties uponarticlesof consumption,may be comparedto afluid,whichwill,in time, findits level with the meansofpayingthem. Theamountto be contributedbyeachcit/zenwillin a degreebe at hisownoption,and can

The Federalist _65

be reg_lateflby an attention to his resources. Therich may be extravagant,the poor can be frugal;and private oppressionmay always be avoidedbya judiciousselectionof objectsproper for suchim-positions. If inequalitiesshouldarisein someStatesfrom duties on particular objects, these will, in allprobability,be counterbalancedby proportionalin-equalitiesin other States, fromthe duties on otherobjects. In the course of time and things, anequilibrium,as far as it is attainable in so com-plicated a subject, will be establishedeverywhere.Or, if inequalities should still exist, they wouldneither be so great in their degree,so uniform intheir operation,nor soodiousin their appearance,asthose whichwouldnecessarilyspring from quotas,upon any scalethat can possiblybe devised.

It is a signaladvantageof taxeson articlesof con-sumption,that they contain in their ownnature asecurityagainst excess. They prescribetheir ownlimit; whichcannot be exceededwithout defeatingthe end proposed,--that is, an extensionof the re-venue. Whenappliedto thisobject,the sayingis asjust as it is witty, that, "in politicalarithmetic,twoand two do not alwaysmake four." If duties aretoo high, they lessenthe consumption; the collec-tion is eluded; and the product to the treasury isnot sogreat as whenthey are confinedwithinproperand moderatebounds. This formsa completebar-rier against any material oppressionof the citizensby taxes of this class,and is itself a natural l_mita-tion of the powerof imposingthem.

Impositionsof this Mud usually fall under the

I66 AlexanderHamilton

denominationof indirecttaxes,and mustfor a longtime constitutethe chiefpart of the revenueraisedin this country. Thoseof the direct kind, whichprincipallyrelate to land and buildings,may admitofa ruleofapportionment. Either thevalueofland,orthenumberofthe people,mayserveasa standard.The state of agricultureand the populousnessof acountry have been consideredas nearly connectedwith each other. And, as a rule, for the purposeintended,numbers, in the view of simplicityandcertainty, are entitled to a preference. In everycountryit is a herculeantask to obtain a valuationof the land; in a country imperfectlysettled andprogressivein improvement,the difficultiesare in-creased almost to impracticability. The expenseof an accuratevaluationis, in all situations,a for-midableobjection. In a branch of taxation whereno limitsto the discretionof the governmentare tobe found in the nature of things, the establishmentof a fixedrule, not incompatiblewith the end,maybe attendedwith fewerinconveniencesthan to leavethat discretionaltogetherat large.

PUBLIUS.

FromtheNewYorkPacket,Friday,Dec_b_rz4,x787

THE FEDERALIST.No. XXII

(HA,-,ILTO_)

To thePeopleoftheStateofNew York:In additionto the defectsalready enumeratedin

the existingfederalsystem,there are others of not

The Federalist I67

less importance,whichconcurin renderingit alto-gether unfit for the administrationof the affairsofthe Union.

The want of a powerto regulatecommerceis byall partiesallowedto be of the number. Theutilityof sucha powerhasbeenanticipatedunderthe firstheadof our inquiries; and for this reason,as wellasfrom the universalconvictionentertaineduponthesubject,little needbe addedin this place. It is in-deed evident, on the most superficialview, thatthere is no object,either as it respectsthe interestsof trade or finance,that more stronglydemandsafederalsuperintendence. Thewant ofit has alreadyoperated as a bar to the formation of beneficialtreatieswith foreignpowers,andhasgivenoccasionsof dissatisfactionbetween the States. No nationacquaintedwith the nature of ourpoliticalassocia-tion would be unwiseenough to enter into stipu-lations with the United States, by which theyconcededprivilegesofanyimportanceto them,whiletheywereapprisedthat the engagementson the partof the Unionmight at any momentbe violatedbyits members,and whilethey foundfrom experiencethat they might enjoy every advantage they de-siredin ourmarkets,without grantingus anyreturnbut such as their momentary conveniencemightsuggest. It is not, therefore,to be wonderedat thatMr. Jenkinson,in usheringinto the Houseof Com-monsa bill for regulatingthe temporaryintercoursebetweenthe two countries,shouldprefaceits intro-ductionby a declarationthat similar provisionsinformerbillshad beenfoundto answereverypurpose

I68 Alexander Hamilton

to the commerceof Great Britain,and that it wouldbe prudent to persist in the plan until it shouldap-pear whether the Americangovernmentwas likelyor not to acquiregreater consistency,x

SeveralStates haveendeavored,by separatepro-hibitions, restrictions, and exclusions,to influencethe conductof that kingdomin this particular,butthe want of concert,arisingfromthe want of a gen-eral authority and from clashing and dissimilarviews in the State, has hitherto frustrated everyexperimentof the kind, and willcontinueto do soas long as the same obstacles to a uniformityofmeasurescontinueto exist.

The interfering and unneighborlyregulationsofsomeStates,contrary to the true spirit of theUnion,have, in differentinstances,givenjust causeof um-brageand complaintto others, and it is to be fearedthat examplesof this nature, if not restrained by anational control,would be multipliedand extendedtillthey becamenot lessserioussourcesof animosityand discordthan injuriousimpedimentsto the in-tercoursebetween the different parts of the Con-federacy. "The commerceof the Germanempire•is in continualtrammelsfromthe multiplicityof theduties which the several princes and states exactuponthe merchandisespassingthrough their terri-tories,by means of which the fine streams andnavigablerivers with whichGermanyis so happilywateredare renderedalmostuseless." Thoughthe

•This,as nearlyas I canrecollect,was the senseof his speechonintroducingthe last bilL--PUBLIUS.

]_ncyclopedia,article"Empire."--PuBLIUS.

The Federalist I69

geniusofthe peopleof thiscountrymightneverper-mit this descriptionto be strictly applicableto us,yet we may reasonablyexpect, from the gradualconflictsof State regulations,that the citizens ofeach would at length come to be consideredandtreated by the othersin no better light than that offoreignersand aliens.

Thepowerof raisingarmies,by the most obviousconstructionof the articlesof the Confederation,ismerely a power of making requisitionsupon theStates for quotas of men. This practice, in thecourseof the late war, was foundrepletewith ob-structionsto a vigorousandto an economicalsystemof defence. It gavebirth to a competitionbetweenthe States whichcreateda kind of auctionfor men.In order to furnish the quotas requiredof them,they outbideachother till bountiesgrewto an enor-mous and insupportablesize. The hope of a stillfurther increase afforded an inducementto thosewho were disposedto serve to procrastinate theirenlistment,and disinclinedthem from engagingforany considerableperiods. Hence,slowand scantylevies of men, in the most criticalemergenciesofouraffairs; short enlistmentsat an unparalleledex-pense; continualfluctuationsin the troops, ruinousto their disciplineand subjectingthe public safetyfrequentlyto the perilouscrisisofa disbandedarmy.Hence,also,those oppressiveexpedientsfor raisingmen whichwere upon severaloccasionspractised,and which nothing but the enthusiasmof libertywouldhave inducedthe peopleto endure.

This method of raising troops is not more un-

t7o AlexanderHamilton

friendlyto economyand vigorthan it is to an equaldistribution of the burden. The States near theseat of war, influencedby motivesof self-preserva-tion,madeeffortsto furnishtheir quotas,whichevenexceededtheir abilities; while those at a distancefromdangerwere,for the mostpart, as remissas theotherswerediligent,in theirexertions. Theimmedi-atepressureof this inequalitywasnot in this case,asin that of the contributionsof money,alleviatedbythe hopeof afinalliquidation. TheStateswhichdidnot pay their proportionsof moneymight at leastbe chargedwith their deficiencies;but no accountcouldbe formedof the deficienciesin the suppliesofmen. Weshallnot, however,seemuchreasonto re-gret the want of this hope, whenwe considerhowlittle prospect there is, that the most delinquentStates will ever be able to make compensationfortheir pecuniaryfailures. The systemof quotasandrequisitions,whetherit be appliedto menor money,is,in everyview,a systemofimbecilityin the Union,and ofinequalityand injusticeamongthe members.

The right of equal suffrageamongthe States isanother exceptionablepart of the Confederation.Every idea of proportionand every rule of fair re-presentationconspiresto condemna principle,whichgivesto RhodeIslandan equalweightin the scaleofpowerwith Massachusetts,or Connecticut,or NewYork; and to Delawarean equal voicein the na-tionaldeliberationswith Pennsylvania,or Virginia,or North Carolina. Its operation contradicts thefundamental maxim of republican government,whichrequiresthat the senseof the majorityshould

The Federalist 17I

prevail. Sophistrymay reply, that sovereignsareequal,and that a majorityofthe votesof the Stateswill be a majority of confederatedAmerica. Butthis kind of logicallegerdemainwill never counter-act the plain suggestionsof justice and common-sense. It may happenthat this majority of Statesis a smallminorityofthe peopleof Americai; andtwo thirds of the peopleof Americacouldnot longbe persuaded,upon the credit of artificialdistinc-tions and syllogisticsubtleties,to submit their in-tereststo the managementand disposalof onethird.ThelargerStateswouldafter a whilerevoltfromtheidea of receivingthe law from the smaller. Toacquiescein such a privationof their due import-anee in the politicalscale,wouldbe not merelytobe insensibleto the loveofpower,but evento sacri-ficethe desireof equality. It is neitherrational toexpect the first, nor just to require the last. Thesmaller States, consideringhow peculiarly theirsafety and welfaredependon union,ought readilyto renouncea pretensionwhich,if not relinquished,wouldprovefatal to its duration.

It may be objected to this, that not seven butnineStates,or two thirdsofthe wholenumber,mustconsent to the most important resolutions; and itmay be thence inferred, that nine States wouldalways comprehenda majority of the Union. Butthis does not obviate the improprietyof an equalvote betweenStatesof the mostunequaldimensions

1 xNew Hampshire,Rhode Island, NewJersey, Delaware, Georgia,r SouthCarolina,and Marylandareamajorityof the wholenumberoft_aeStates,butthey donotcontainone thirdof the people.--PusLiUS.

*72 AlexanderHamilton

and populousness;nor is the inferenceaccurate inpoint of fact; for we can enumeratenine Stateswhichcontainless than a majority of the people';and it is constitutionallypossiblethat these ninemay give the vote. Besides,there are matters ofconsiderablemoment determinableby a bare ma-jority; andthereare others,concerningwhichdoubtshave been entertained, which, if interpreted infavor of the sufficiencyof a vote of seven States,would extend its operationto interestsof the firstmagnitude. In additionto this, it is to be observedthat there is a probabilityof an increasein the num-ber of States, and no provisionfor a proportionalaugmentationof the ratio of votes.

But this is not all: what at first sightmayseemaremedy,is, in reality,a poison. Togivea rn_noritya negativeupon the majority (whichis alwaysthecase wheremore than a majority is requisite to adecision),is, in its tendency,to subjectthe senseofthe greaternumber to that of the lesser. Congress,fromthe non-attendanceof a few States,have beenfrequentlyin the situationof a Polishdiet, whereasingleVOTShas been sufficientto put a stop to alltheir movements. A sixtieth part of the Union,whichisaboutthe proportionofDelawareandRhodeIsland,hasseveraltimesbeenableto opposeanentirebar to its operations. This is one of those refine-ments which,in practice, has an effectthe reverseof what is expectedfrom it in theory. The neces-sity of unanimityin public bodies,or of something

xAdd NewYork and Connecticutto the foregoingseven,and theywill be less than a majority.--PuBLIoS.

The Federalist I73

approachingtowards it, has been foundedupon asuppositionthat it would contr{buteto security.Butitsrealoperationistoembarrasstheadrninis-tration,todestroytheenergyofthegovernment,andtosubstitutethepleasure,caprice,orartificesofaninsigrnfi"cant,turbulent,orcorruptjunto,totheregulardeliberationsanddecisionsofarespect-ablemajority.Inthoseemergenciesofanation,inwhichthegoodnessorbadness,theweaknessorstrengthofitsgovernment,isofthegreatestim-portance,thereiscommonlyanecessityforaction.Thepublicbusinessmust,insomewayorother,goforward.Ifapertinaciousminoritycancontroltheopinionofa majority,respectingthebestmodeofconductingit,themajority,inorderthatsomethingmay bedone,mustconformtotheviewsoftheminority;andthusthesenseofthesmallernumberwilloverrulethatofthegreater,andgiveatonetothenationalproceedings.Hence,tediousdelays;continualnegotiationandintrigue;contemptiblecompromisesofthepublicgood.Andyet,insucha system,itisevenhappywhensuchcompromisescantakeplace:foruponsomeoccasionsthingswillnotadmitofaccommodation;andthenthemeasuresofgovernmentmustbeinjuriouslysuspended,orfatallydefeated.Itisoften,bytheimpracticabilityofobtainingtheconcurrenceofthenecessarynum-berofvotes,keptinastateofinaction.Itssitua-tionmustalwayssavorofwealcness,sometimesborderuponanarchy.Itisnotdifficulttodiscover,thataprincipleof

thisMud givesgreaterscopetoforeigncorruption,

174 AlexanderHamilton

aswellastodomesticfaction,thonthatwhichper-mitsthesenseofthemajoritytodecide;thoughthecontraryofthishasbeenpres_!rned.Themis-takehasproceededfromnotattendingwithduecaretothemischiefsthatmay beoccasionedbyobstructingtheprogressofgovernmentatcertaincriticalseasons.Whentheconcurrenceofa largenumberisrequiredbytheConstitutiontothedoingofanynationalact,weareapttorestsatisfiedthatall is safe, becausenothing improperwill be likelyto be done; but weforget how much goodmay beprevented,and howmuch ill may be produced,bythe powerofhinderingthe doingwhatmay beneces-sary, and ofkeepingaffairsin the sameunfavorableposture in whichthey may happento stand at par-ticularperiods.

Suppose,for instance,wewereengagedin a war,in conjunctionwith one foreignnation, against an-other. Supposethe necessityof our situation de-mandedpeace,and the interest or ambitionof ourallyled himto seekthe prosecutionof the war, withviewsthat mightjustifyus in makingseparateterms.In sucha state of things, thisally of ourswouldevi-dently find it-much easier, by his bribes and in-trigues, to tie up the hands of governmentfrommakingpeace,wheretwo thirds ofall the voteswererequisiteto that object, than wherea simplemajor-ity wouldsuffice. In the first case,he wouldhaveto corrupta smallernumber; in the last, a greatern,lmber. Upon the same principle, it would bemuch easierfora foreignpowerwith whichwe wereat war to perplexour councilsand embarrassour

The Federalist x75

exertions. And, in a commercialview,we may besubjectedto shnilarinconveniences.Anation,withwhichwe might have a treaty of commerce,couldwith much greater facility prevent our forming aconnectionwith her competitor in trade, thoughsuch a connectionshould be ever so beneficialtoourselves.

Evilsof this descriptionoughtnot to be regardedas imaginary. One of the weak sidesof republics,amongtheirnumerousadvantages,isthattheyaffordtooeasyaninlettoforeigncorruption.Anhereditarymonarch,thoughoftendisposedtosacri-ficehissubjectstohisambition,hassogreataper-sonalinterestinthegovernmentandintheexternalgloryofthenation,thatitisnoteasyforaforeignpowertogivehimanequivalentforwhathewouldsacrificebytreacherytothestate.Theworldhasaccordinglybeenwitnesstofewexamplesofthisspeciesofroyalprostitution,thoughtherehavebeenabundantspecimensofeveryotherkind.Inrepublics,personselevatedfromthemassof

the community,by the suffragesof their fellow-citizens, to stations of great pre-eminenceandpower,may find compensationsfor betraying theirtrust, which,to any but mindsanhnatedand guidedbysuperiorvirtue,may appearto exceedthe propor-tion of interestthey have in the commonstock,andto overbalancethe obligationsof duty. Henceit isthat history furnishesus with so many mortifyingexamplesof the prevalencyof foreigncorruptioninrepublican governments. How much this contri-buted to the ruinof the ancientcommonwealthshas

*76 AlexanderHamikon

beenalreadydelineated.ItiswellknownthatthedeputiesoftheUnitedProvinceshave,invariousinstances,beenpurel-msedbytheemissariesoftheneighboringkingdoms. TheEarlofChesterfield(ifmymemoryservesmeright), in a letter to his court,intimatesthat his successin an importantnegotia-tion must dependon his obtaining a major's com-missionfor one of those deputies. And in Swedenthe parties were alternatelybought by France andEngland in so barefacedand notorious a mannerthat it exciteduniversaldisgustin the nation, andwasa principalcausethat the mostl__mitedmonarchin Europe,in a singleday,without tumult, violence,or opposition,becameone of the most absoluteanduncontrolled.

A circumstancewhichcrownsthe defectsof theConfederationremains yet to be mentioned,rathewant of a judiciary power. Lawsare a dead letterwithout courts to expound and define their truemeaningand operation. Thetreaties of the UnitedStates,to have any forceat all, must be consideredas part of the lawofthe land. Their true import,asfar as respectsindividuals,must, like all other laws,be ascertainedby judicialdeterminations. To pro-duce,uniformityin these determinations,they oughtto be submitted,in the last resort, to one SUPRE_TmBUNAL.And this tribunal oughtto be institutedunder the same authority whichforms the treatiesthemselves. These ingredientsare both indispen-sable. If there is in each State a court of finaljurisdiction,there may be as many differentfinaldeterminationsonthe samepoint as there arecourts.

The Federalist I77

Thereare endlessdiversitiesin the opinionsof men.Weoften seenot onlyd_fferentcourtsbut the judgesof the same court differingfrom each other. Toavoid the confusionwhichwouldunavoidablyresultfrom the contradictorydecisionsof a number of in-dependentjudicatories,all nations have found itnecessaryto establishone court paramountto therest, possessinga generalsuperintendence,and au-thorizedto settle and declarein the lastresorta uni-formrule of civiljustice.

This is the more necessarywhere the frame ofthe governmentis so compoundedthat the laws ofthe wholeare in dangerof beingcontravenedbythelaws of the parts. In this case, if the parti_11_rtribunalsare investedwith a rightof ultimatejuris-diction,besides the contradictionsto be expectedfrom differenceof opinion,there will be much tofearfromthe biasof localviewsandprejudices,andfromthe interferenceoflocalregulations. As oftenas suchan interferencewas to happen,there wouldbe reason to apprehendthat the provisionsof theparticular laws might be preferredto those of thegenerallaws; fornothingis more natural to meninofficethan to lookwith peculiardeferencetowardsthat authority to whichthey owetheir officialexist-ence. The treaties of the United States,under thepresentConstitution,are liable to the infractionsofthirteen differentlegislatures,and as many d_er-ent courts of final jurisdiction,acting under theauthorityof thoselegislatures. Thefaith, the repu-tation, the peaceof the wholeUnion,are thus con-tinually at the mercyofthe prejudices,the passions,

VOL.XI._I2.

I78 AlexanderHamilton

and the interests of every memberof which it iscomposed. Is it possiblethat foreignnations caneither respect or confidein sucha government? Isit possiblethat the peopleof Americawill longerconsent to trust their honor,their happiness,theirsafety,onso precariousa foundation?

In this reviewof the Confederation,I have con-fined myself to the exhibitionof its most materialdefects; passingover those imperfectionsin its de-tails by which even a great part of the power in-tended to be conferredupon it has been in a greatmeasurerenderedabortive. It must be by this timeevidentto allmenofreflection,whocandivestthem-selvesofthe prepossessionsofpreconceivedopinions,that it is a systemsoradicallyviciousand unsound,as to admit not of amendmentbut by an entirechangein its leadingfeaturesand characters.

The organizationof Congressis itself utterly im-properfor the exerciseof those powerswhich arenecessaryto be depositedin the Union. A singleassemblymaybe a properreceptacleofthoseslender,or rather fettered, authorities, which have beenheretoforedelegated to the federalhead; but itwouldbe inconsistentwith all the principlesofgoodgovenmlent, to intrust it with those additionalpowerswhich,eventhe moderateand morerationaladversaries of the proposed Constitution admit,oughttoresidein theUnitedStates. Ifthatplanshouldnotbeadopted,andifthenecessityoftheUnionshouldbeabletowithstandtheambitiousaimsofthosemen who may indulgemagnificentschemesofpersonalaggTandiz_mentfromitsdisso-

The Federalist *79

lution,theprobabilitywouldbe,thatweshouldrunintotheprojectofconferringsupplementarypowersuponCongress,astheyarenowconstituted;andeitherthemachine,fromtheintrinsicfeeblenessofitsstructure,willmoulderinto pieces,in spiteofourill-judgedeffortsto prop it; or, by successiveaug-mentations of its force and energy, as necessitymight prompt, we shall finally accumulate, in asinglebody,all the most important prerogativesofsovereignty,and thus entail upon ourposterity oneof the most execrableforms of governmentthathumaninfatuationevercontrived. Thusweshouldcreatein realitythat very tyrannywhichthe adver-saries of the new Constitutioneither are, or affectto be, solicitousto avert.

It has not a little contributedto the infirmitiesofthe existing federal system, that it never had aratificationby the PmOpLB.Restingon no betterfoundationthan the consent of the severallegisla-tures, it has beenexposedto frequentand intricatequestionsconcerningthe validity of its powers,andhas, in someinstances,givenbirth to the enormousdoctrineof a right of legislativerepeal. Owingitsratificationto the law of a State, it has been con-tendedthat the so:meauthoritymightrepeal the lawby whichit was ratified. Howevergross a heresyit may be to maintain that a party to a compazthas a right to revoke that compact,the doctrineit-selfhas had respectableadvocates. The possibilityof a questionof this nature proves the necessityof laying the foundationsof our national govern-ment deeperthan in the mere sanctionof delegated

i8o AlexanderHamilton

authority. Thefabricof Americanempireoughttorest on the solid basis of THECONSENTOFT_EPEOPLE.The streams of national power ought toflowknmed_atelyfrom that pure, originalfountainof all legitimateauthorii_y.

PUBLIUS.

FromtheNewYorkPacket,Tuesday,DecemberxS,x787THEFEDERALIST.No.XXIII

(HAMILTON)

To thePeopleoytheStateofNew York:The necessityof a Constitution,at least equally

energeticwith the oneproposed,to the preservationof the Union, is the point at the examinationofwhichwe are now arrived.

Thisinquirywillnaturallydivideitselfinto threebranches--the objects to be provided for by thefederal government,the quantity of power neces-sary to the accomplishmentof those objects, thepersonsupon whom that power ought to operate.Its distributionand organizationwillmoreproperlyclaimour attentionunder the succeedinghead.

The principalpurposesto be answeredby unionare these the commondefenceof the members;thepreservationof thepublicpeace,as wellagainstinternalconvulsionsas externalattacks; the regu-lationof commercewithothernationsand betweenthe States; the superintendenceof ourintercourse,politicalandcommercial,with foreigncountries.

The authoritiesessentialto the commondefenceare these: to raisearmies;to buildandequipfleets;

The Federalist x81

to prescriberules for the governmentof both; todirect their operations; to provide for their sup-port. Thesepowersought to existwithout limita-tion, becauseit is impossibleto foreseeor definetheextentand varietyof nationalexigencies,or the cor-respondentextentand varietyo_themeanswhichmaybenecessaryto satisfythem. The circttrnstancesthatendangerthe safetyof nationsare infinite,and forthis reasonno constitutionalshacklescan wiselybeimposedonthe powerto whichthe careof it is com-mitted. This powerought to be co-extensivewithall the possiblecombinationsof suchcircumstances;and ought to be under the directionof the samecouncilswhich are appointed to preside over thecommondefence.

This is oneofthosetruths which,to a correctandunprejudicedmind, carries its own evidencealongwith it; and maybe obscured,but cannotbe madeplainer by argument or reasoning. It rests uponaxiomsas simpleas they are universal; the meansought to be proportionedto the end; the persons,fromwhoseagencythe attainmentof any end is ex-pected,oughtto possessthe meansby whichit is tobe attained.

Whetherthere ought to be a federalgovernmentintrusted with the care of the commondefence,is aquestionin the first instance,open for discussion;but the moment it is decidedin the affirmative,it will follow,that that government ought to beclothed with all the powers requisite to completeexecutionof its trust. And unlessit can be shownthat the circttmstanceswhichmay affectthe public

i82 AlexanderHamilton

safetyare reduciblewith{_certain determinatelim-its;unlessthe contraryofthis positioncan be fairlyand rationallydisputed, it must be admitted,as anecessaryconsequence,that there can be no limita-tion of that authority whichis to provide for thedefenceand protection of the community,in anymatter essentialto its efficacymthatis, in any mat-ter essentialto the _ormation,direction,or supportoftheNATIONALFORCES.

Defectiveas the present Confederationhas beenproved to be, this principleappears to have beenfullyrecognizedby the framers of it; though theyhavenot made properor adequateprovisionfor itsexercise. Congresshave an unlimiteddiscretiontomake requisitionsof men and money; to governthe army andnavy; to directtheir operations. Astheir requisitionsare made constitutionallybindingupon the States, who are in fact under the mostsolemnobl£gationsto furnishthe suppliesrequiredofthem,the intentionevidentlywas,that the UnitedStatesshouldcommandwhateverresourceswerebythemjudgedrequisiteto the "commondefenceandgeneralwelfare." It was presumedthat a senseoftheir true interests,and a regard to the dictates ofgoodfaith,wouldbe foundsufficientpledgesfor thepunctualperformanceof the duty of the memberstothe federalhead.

The experimenthas, however,demonstratedthatthis expectationwas ill-foundedand illusory; andthe observations,madeunder the last head, will, Iimagine,havesufficedto convincethe impartialanddiscerning,that thereis an absolutenecessityforan

The Federalist I83

entirechangein the firstprinciplesof the system;that if we are in earnestaboutgivh_ the Unionenergyand duration,we must abandonthe vainprojectof legislatinguponthe Statesin their col-lectivecapacities;we mustextendthe lawsof thefederalgovernmentto the individualcitizens ofAmerica;wemustdiscardthe fallaciousschemeofquotas and requisitions,as equally impracticableand unjust. The result from all this is that theUnionoughtto be investedwith full powerto levytroops; to build and equip fleets; and to raise therevenueswhichwill be required for the formationand supportofan army and navy, in the customaryand ordinarymodespractisedin othergovernments.

If the circumstancesofour countryare suchas todemanda compoundinstead of a simple,a con-federateinstead of a sole, government,the essen-tial point whichwill remainto be adjustedwill beto discriminatethe OBJBCTS,as far as it canbe done,whichshall appertain to the differentprovincesordepartmentsof power; allowingto each the mostampleauthority for fulfillingthe objects committedto its charge. Shall the Union be constitutedtheguardianof the commonsafety? Are fleetsand ar-miesand revenuesnecessaryto this purpose? Thegovernmentof the Unionmustbe empoweredto passall laws,and to makeall regulationswhichhavere-lationto them. The same must be the case in re-spect to commerce,and to every other matter towhich its jurisdictionis permitted to extend. Isthe administrationof justicebetweenthe citizensofthe sameState the proper department of the local

I84 AlexanderHamilton

governments? Thesemustpossessallthe authoritieswhichare connectedwiththis object,andwitheveryotherthatmay be allottedto theirparticularcogni-zanceand direction. Not to conferin each caseadegreeof powercommensurateto the end,wouldbeto violatethe most obviousrules of prudenceandpropriety,and improvidentlyto trust the great in-terests of the nation to hands which are disabledfrommanagingthem with vigorand success.

Whoso likelyto makesuitableprovisionsfor thepublicdefence,as that bodyto whichthe guardian-ship of the publicsafety is confided;which,as thecentreof information,will best understandthe ex-tent and urgencyof the dangersthat threaten; asthe representativeof the WHOLe,willfeelitselfmostdeeplyinterestedin the preservationof every part;which,from the responsibilityimplied in the dutyassignedto it, willbe most sensiblyimpressedwiththe necessityof proper exertions; and which,bythe extensionofits authority throughoutthe States,can alone establish uniformityand concert in theplans and measuresby whichthe commonsafety isto besecured? Is therenota manifestinconsistencyin devolvingupon the federalgovernmentthe careof thegeneraldefence,andleavingin the State gov-ernmentsthe effectivepowersby whichit is to beprovidedfor? Is not a wantof co-operationthe in-fallibleconsequenceof such a system? And willnot weak-uess,disorder, an undue distribution ofthe burdensand calamitiesof war, an unnecessaryand intolerableincreaseof expense,be its naturalandinevitableconcomitants? Havewe nothadun-

The Federalist i85

equivocalexperienceofits effectsin the courseoftherevolutionwhichwehave just accomplished?

Everyviewwemaytake ofthe subject,as candidinquirersafter truth, willserveto convinceus, thatit is both unwiseand dangerousto denythe federalgovernmentan unconfinedauthority,as to all thoseobjectswhichare intrusted to its management. Itwillindeeddeservethe most vigilantand carefulat-tention of the people,to seethat it be modelledinsucha manneras to admitof its beingsafelyvestedwith the requisitepowers. If any plan whichhasbeen,or maybe, offeredto our consideration,shouldnot, upon a dispassionateinspection,be found toanswerthis description,it oughtto be rejected. Agovernment,the constitutionof which renders itunfit to be trusted with all the powerswhicha freepeopleoughtto delegateto any government,wouldbean unsafeand improperdepositaryof the NATIONALII_TSl_ESTS.WhereverTHESEcan with proprietybeconfided,the coincidentpowersmay safelyaccom-panythem. Thisis the true resultofall just reason-hagupon the subject. And the adversariesof theplan promulgatedby the conventionought to haveconfinedthemselvesto showing,that the internalstructure of the proposedgovernmentwas such asto renderit unworthyofthe confidenceofthe people.Theyoughtnot to havewanderedinto inflammatorydeclamationsand unmeaningcavils about the ex-tent of the powers. The POWERSare not too ex-tensivefor the OBJECTSof federaladministration,or,in other words,for the managementofourNATIONALINTERESTS,nor can any satisfactoryargument be

x86 AlexanderHamilton

framed to showthat they are chargeablewith suchan excess. If it be true, as has beeninsinuatedbysomeof the writerson the other side, that the diffi=culty arisesfrom the nature of the th_ng,and thatthe extentof the countrywillnot permitus to forma government in which such ample powers cansafelybe reposed,it wouldprovethat we oughttocontract our views,and resort to the expedientofseparateconfederacies,whichwillmovewithinmorepracticablespheres. For the absurdity must con-tinuallystare us in the faceof confidingto agovern-ment the direction of the most essentialnationalinterests,without dating to trust to it the author-ities whichare indispensableto their proper andefficientmanagement. Let us not attempt to recon-cile contradictions,but firmly embrace a rationalalternative.

I trust, however,that the impracticabilityof onegeneralsystemcannotbe shown. I am greatlymis-taken, if any thing ofweighthas yet beenadvancedof this tendency; and I flatter myself,that the ob-servationswhichhave been made in the courseofthese papershaveservedto placethe reverseof thatpositionin as cleara light as any matter still in thewombof time and experiencecan be susceptibleof.This, at all events,must be evident, that the verydifficultyitself,drawnfromthe extentofthe country,is the strongestargument in favor of an energeticgovernment;for any other can certainlynever pre-servethe Unionof so large an empire. If we em-brace the tenets of those who opposethe adoptionof the proposedConstitution,as the standardof our

The Federalist _87

politicalcreed,wecannotfailto verifythegloomydoctrineswhichpredictthe impracticabilityof anationalsystempervadingtheentirelimitsof thepresentConfederacy.

PUBLIUS.

THE FEDERALIST. No.XXIV

(HA.IL_OS)

Tothe.Peopleo_theStateo_NewYork,:Tothepowersproposedtobeconferreduponthe

federalgovernment,in respectto thecreationanddirectionofthenationalforces,I havemetwithbutone specificobjection,which,if I understanditright,is this,--thatproperprovisionhasnot beenmadeagainstthe existenceof standingarmiesintimeof peace,an objectionwhich,I shallnowen-deavorto show,restson weakand unsubstantialfoundations.

It hasindeedbeenbroughtforwardin themostvagueandgeneralform,supportedonlyby boldassertions,withoutthe appearanceof arg_lment;withouteventhe sanctionof theoreticalopinions;incontradictiontothepracticeofotherfreenations,andtothegeneralsenseofAmerica,asexpressedinmostof theexistingconstitutions.Theproprietyof thisremarkwillappear,the momentit is recol-lectedthatthe objectionunderconsiderationturnsupona supposednecessityofrestrainingtheLBGm-LATIVEauthority Ofthe nation,in the articleof

188 AlexanderHamilton

rn_litaryestablishments;a principleunheardof, ex-cept in one or two of our Stateconstitutions,andrejectedin all the rest.

A stranger to our politics,whowas to read ournewspapersat the present juncture,without havingpreviouslyinspectedthe plan reported by the con-vention, would be naturally led to one of twoconclusions:either that it containeda positive in-junction,that standingarmiesshould be kept up intimeof peace; or that it vested in the SXSCUTIVEthe wholepowerof levyingtroops, without subject-ing his discretion,in any shape, to the control ofthe legislature.

If he cameafterwardsto peruse the planitself,hewouldbe surprisedto discover,that neitherthe onenor the other wasthe case; that the wholepowerofraisingarmieswas lodgedin the Legislature,not intheExecutive;that thislegislaturewasto be a popu-lar body, consistingof the representativesof thepeopleperiodicallyelected; and that insteadof theprovisionhe had supposedin favorof standingar-mies,therewasto be found,in respectto thisobject,an important qualificationeven of the legislativediscretion,in that clause whichforbidsthe appro-priationofmoneyfor the supportofan army foranylongerperiodthan two years--a precautionwhich,upon a nearer viewof it, will appearto be a greatand real securityagainst the keepingup of troopswithoutevidentnecessity.

Disappointedin hisfirstsurmise,the personI havesupposedwouldbe apt to pursue his conjecturesalittle further. He wouldnaturally say to himself,

The Federalist I89

it is impossiblethat all this vehementand patheticdeclamationcanbe without somecolorablepretext.It must needsbe that thispeople,so jealousof theirliberties,have, in all the precedingmodelsof theconstitutionswhichthey have established,insertedthe most preciseandrigidprecautionsonthis point,the omissionof which,in the new plan,has givenbirth to all this apprehensionand clamor.

If, underthis impression,he proceededto pass inreview the several State constitutions,how greatwouldbe hisdisappointmentto findthat twoonlyofthem' containedan interdictionof standing armiesin time of peace; that the other elevenhad eitherobserveda profoundsilenceon the subject,or hadin expressterms admitted the right of the Legis-latureto authorizetheir existence.

Still,however,he wouldbe persuadedthat theremustbe someplausiblefoundationfor the cryraisedon this head. He wouldnever be able to imagine,whileanysourceofinformationremainedunexplored,

xThisstatement of the matteris taken fromthe printedcollectionof State Constitutions. Pennsylvaniaand North Carolinaare thetwo whichcontain the interdiction in these words: "As standingarmiesin time of peacearedangerousto liberty,THEYOUGHTNOTtobekept up." This is,in truth,rathera CAUTZOSthana PROHI_XTION.New Hampshire,Massachusetts,Delaware,and Marylandhave, ineachof theirbillsof rights,a clauseto this effect: "Standingarmiesare dangerousto liberty,and oughtnot to beraisedor kep_up WITH-OUTTHE CONSENT OF THE LEGISLATURE"; which is a formal admissionof the authorityof the Legislature. NewYorkhas nobillsof rights,and herconstitutionsays no_a wordaboutthe matter. No billsofrightsappearannexedto the constitutionsof the otherStates, exceptthe foregoing,and their constitutionsareequallysilent. I am told,however,that oneor two Stateshavebillsof rightswhichdo notap-pear in this collection; but that thosealsorecognizethe righ_of thelegislativeauthorityin this respect.--PuBLiUS.

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that it wasnothingmorethan an experimentuponthe public credulity,dictated either by a deliber-ate intentionto deceive,or by the overflowingsofa zeal too intemperateto be ingenuous. It wouldprobablyoccurto him, that he wouldbe likelytofindthe precautionshe wasin searchofin the primi-tive compactbetweenthe States. Here, at length,he would expect to meet with a solution of theenigma. No doubt, he would observeto himself,the existingConfederationmust contain the mostexplicitprovisionsagainst military establishmentsin timeof peace; and a departurefromthis model,in a favorite point, has occasionedthe discontentwhichappearsto influencethesepoliticalchampions.

If he shouldnow apply himselfto a carefulandcriticalsurveyof the articles of Confederation,hisastonishment would not only be increased, butwouldacquirea mixtureof indignation,at the un-expecteddiscovery,that these articles, instead ofcontainingthe prohibitionhe lookedfor,andthoughthey had, with jealous circumspection,restrictedthe authority of the State legislaturesin this par-ticular,had not imposeda singlerestraint on th_:tof the UnitedStates. If he happenedto be a manof quicksensibility,or ardent temper,he couldnowno longerrefrain from regardingthese clamorsasthe dishonestartificesof a sinisterand unprincipledoppositionto a plan whichoughtat least to receivea fairandcandidexaminationfromallsincereloversoftheircountry! Howelse,he wouldsay, couldtheauthors of them have been tempted to vent suchloudcensuresuponthat plan,about a pointin which

The Federalist _91

it seemsto haveconformeditselfto the generalsenseof Americaas declaredin its differentformsof gov-ernment,and in whichit hasevensuperaddeda newand powerfulguardunknownto any of them? If,on the contrary,he happenedto be a man of calmand dispassionatefeelings,he wouldindulgea sighfor the frailtyof human nature, and would lament,that in a matter so interestingto the happinessofmillions,the true merits of the questionshouldbeperplexedandentangledby expedientssounfriendlyto an impartial and right determination. Evensucha man couldhardly forbearremarking,that aconductofthis kind has toomuchthe appearanceofan intentionto misleadthe peopleby alarmingtheirpassions,rather than to convincethembyargumentsaddressedto their understandings.

But howeverlittle this objectionmay be counte-nanced,evenby precedentsamongourselves,it maybe satisfactoryto take a nearerviewof its intrinsicmerits. Prom a close examinationit will appearthat restraintsupon the discretionof the legislaturein respect to military establishmentsin time ofpeace,wouldbe improperto be imposed,and if im-posed,from the necessitiesof society,wouldbe un-likelyto be observed.

Thougha wideoceanseparatesthe UnitedStatesfrom Europe, yet there are various considerationsthat warn us against an excessof confidenceor se-curity. On one side of us, and stretchingfar intoour rear, are growingsettlementssubjectto the do-minionof Britain. On the other side,and extend-ingto meet the Britishsettlements,are coloniesand

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establishmentssubject to the dominionof Spain.This situation and the vicinity of the West IndleIslands,belongingto these two powers,create be-tweenthem, in respectto theirAmericanpossessionsand in relationto us, a commoninterest. Thesav-age tribes on our Western frontier ought to be re-gardedas our natural enemies,their natural allies,becausethey havemostto fear fromus, andmosttohope from them. The improvementsin the art ofnavigationhave,as to the facilityof communication,rendereddistant nations, in a great measure,neigh-bors. Britain and Spain are among the principalmaritimepowersof Europe. A future concert ofviewsbetween these nations ought not to be re-garded as improbable. The increasingremotenessof consanguinityis every day diminishingthe forceof the familycompact betweenFrance and Spain.And politicianshave ever with great reason con-sidered the ties of blood as feebleand precariousli_]_sof politicalconnection. These circumstancescombined,admonishus not to be too sanguineinconsideringourselvesas entirelyout of the reachofdanger.

Previous to the Revolution,and ever since thepeace,there hasbeen a constantnecessityfor keel>ing small garrisons on our Western frontier. Nopersoncan doubt that these willcontinueto be in-dispensable,if it shouldonly be against the ravagesand depredationsof the Indians. Thesegarrisonsmust eitherbe furnishedby occasionaldetachmentsfromthe militia,or bypermanentcorpsin the payofthe government. Thefirst is impracticable; and if

The Federalist z93

practicable,wouldbe pernicious. Themilitiawouldnot long,if at all, submitto be draggedfrom theiroccupationsand familiesto performthat most dis-agreeableduty in timesof profoundpeace. And ifthey couldbe prevaileduponor compelledto do it,the increasedexpenseof a frequentrotationof serv-ice, and the lossof labor and disconcertionof theindustriouspursuitsof individuals,wouldformcon-clusiveobjectionsto the scheme. It wouldbe asburdensomeand injuriousto the public as ruinousto privatecitizens. Thelatter resourceofpermanentcorps in the pay of the governmentamounts to astandingarmyin time ofpeace; a smallone,indeed,but not the lessreal forbeingsmall. Here is a sim-ple view of the subject, that showsus at once theimproprietyof a constitutionalinterdictionof suchestablishments,and the necessity of leaving thematter to the discretionand prudenceof the legis-lature.

In proportion to our increasein strength, it isprobable,nay, it may be said certain, that Britainand Spainwould augmenttheir military establish-ments in our neighborhood. If we should not bewillingto be exposed,in a naked and defencelesscondition,to their insults and encroachments,weshould find it expedient to increase our frontiergarrisonsin someratio to the force by whichourWesternsettlementsmightbe annoyed. Thereare,and willbe, particularposts,the possessionofwhichwill includethe commandof largedistrictsof terri-tory,andfacilitatefutureinvasionsofthe remainder.It may be added that someof those posts will be

VOI..:_U._X3.

I94 AlexanderHamilton

keysto the trade with the Indian nations. Cananyman think it wouldbe wiseto leavesuchposts in asituationto be at any instant seizedby oneor theother of two neighboringand formidablepowers?To act th_ part would be to desert all the usualmaximsof prudenceand policy.

If wemeanto be a commercialpeople,or eventobe secureonour Atlanticside,wemust endeavor,assoonas possible,to have a navy. To this purposethere must be dock-yardsand arsenals; and for thedefenceof these, fortifications,and probablygarri-sons. When a nation has becomeso powerfulbysea that it can protect its dock-yardsby its fleets,this supersedesthe necessity of garrisonsfor thatpurpose; but where naval establishmentsare intheir infancy,moderategarrisonswill, in all likeli-hood, be found an indispensablesecurity agains_descents for the destruction of the arsenals anddock-yards,and sometimesof the fleetitself.

PUBLIUS.

FromtheNewYorkPack.a,Friday,December2x,x787_'HEFEDERALIS_?.No.XXV

(H_LTON)

To thePeopleof theStateofNew York:It mayperhapsbe urgedthat the objectsenumer-

ated in the precedingnumber oughtto be providedforby the State governments,under the directionof the Union. But this would be, in reality, aninversionof the primary principleof our politicalassociation,as it wouldin practicetransfer the care

The Federalist i95

of the commondefencefromthe federalhead to theindividualmembers: a project oppressiveto someStates, dangerousto all, and baneful to the Con-federacy.

TheterritoriesofBritain,Spain,andofthe Indiannations in our neighborhooddo not borderon par=ticular States,but encirclethe UnionfromMainetoGeorgia. The danger, though in differentdegrees,is thereforecornrnon. And the meansof guardingagainstit ought, in likemanner,to be the objectsofcommoncouncilsand of a commontreasury. Ithappensthat someStates, fromlocal situation, aremore directly exposed. NewYork is of this class.Upon the plan of separate provisions,New Yorkwouldhave to sustainthe wholeweightofthe estab-lishmentsrequisiteto her immediatesafety,and tothe mediateor ultimateprotectionofher neighbors.This wouldneither be equitableas it respectedNewYork nor safe as it respected the other States.Variousinconvenienceswouldattend sucha system.The States,to whoselot it might fall to supportthenecessaryestablishments,wouldbe as little able asw_]llug,for a considerabletime to come,to bear theburden of competent provisions. The security ofall wouldthus be subjectedto the parsimony,im-providence,or inabilityof a part. If the resourcesof such part becomingmore abundant and exten-sive, its provisionsshould be proportionallyen-larged, the other States would quickly take thealarmat seeingthe wholemilitaryforceofthe Unionin the hands of two or three of its members,andthose probablyamongstthe most powerful. They

I96 Alexander Hamilton

would each chooseto have somecounterpoise,andpretencescouldeasilybe contrived. In this situa-tion, militaryestabhshments,nourishedby mutualjealousy,wouldbe apt to swellbeyondtheir naturalor propersize; andbeingat the separatedisposalofthe members,theywouldbe enginesfor the abridg-ment or demolitionof the nationalauthority.

Reasons have been already given to induce asuppositionthat the State governmentswill toonaturally be prone to a rivalship with that oftheUnion,the foundationof whichwillbe the love ofpower; and that in any contestbetweenthe federalheadand oneof its membersthe peoplewillbe mostapt to unite with their local government. If, inaddition to this immenseadvantage, the ambitionofthe membersshouldbe stimulatedby the separateand independent possessionof m_lltaryforces, itwouldaffordtoo strong a temptation and too greata facility to them to mM_eenterprisesupon, andfinallyto subvert,the constitutionalauthorityoftheUnion. Onthe otherhand, the libertyof the peoplewouldbe lesssafein this state ofthingsthan in thatwhichleft the national forcesin the hands of thenational government. As far as an army may beconsideredas a dangerousweaponof power,it hadbetter be in those hands of which the people aremost1H_elyto be jealousthan in thoseofwhichtheyare least lil_elyto be jealous. For it is a truth,whichthe experienceof ageshas attested, that thepeopleare alwaysmost in dangerwhenthe meansofinjuringtheir rights are in the possessionof thoseof whomthey entertain the least suspicion.

The Federalist x97

The framersof the existingConfederation,fullyawareof the dangerto the Unionfromthe separat_possessionof militaryforcesby the States,have, inexpressterms,prohibitedthem from having eithershipsor troops,unlesswith the consentof Congress.The truth is, that the existenceof a federalgovern-ment and military establishmentsunder State au-thorityare not lessat variancewitheachotherthana duesupplyofthe federaltreasuryand the systemof quotasand requisitions.

Thereare otherlightsbesidesthosealreadytakennoticeof, in which the improprietyof restraintsonthe discretionof the national legislaturewill beequally manifest. The design of the objection,whichhas been mentioned,is to precludestandingarmiesin timeof peace,thoughwehaveneverbeeninformedhowfarit isdesignedtheprohibitionshouldextend: whether to raising armies as well as tokeepingthemup in a season of tranq_11ityor not.If it be confinedto the latter it willhaveno precisesignification,and it willbe ineffectualfor the pur-pose intended. When armiesare onceraised whatshallbe denominated"keepingthem up," contraryto the senseof the Constitution? What time shallbe requisiteto ascertainthe violation? Shall it bea week,a month,a year? Or shallwesay theymaybe continuedas longas the dangerwhichoccasionedtheir being raised continues? This would be toadmit that they might be kept up in timeo_peace,against threatening or impending danger, whichwouldbe at onceto deviatefromthe literalmeaningof the prohibition,and to introduce an extensive

I98 AlexanderHamilton

latitude of construction. Who shall judge of thecontin_!_:nceofthe danger? Thismust undoubtedlybe submittedto the national government,and thematter wouldthen be broughtto this issue,that thenational government, to provide against appre-hended danger, might in the first instance raisetroops, and might afterwards keep them on footas longas they supposedthe peaceor safety of thecomm_nltywas in any degreeof jeopardy. It iseasy to perceivethat a discretion so latitudlnaryas this would afford ample room for eluding theforceofthe provision.

Thesupposedutility ofa provisionofthiskind canonlybe foundedon the supposedprobability,or atleast possibility,of a combinationbetweenthe exec-utive and the legislative,in some schemeof usur-pation. Shouldthis at any time happen, howeasywould it be to fabricate pretencesof approachingdanger! Indl.n hostilities,instigated by Spain orBritain,wouldalwaysbe at hand. Provocationstoproducethe desiredappearancesmightevenbe givento someforeignpower,and appeasedagainby timelyconcessions.If we can reasonablypre_lrnesuch acombinationto havebeenformed,andthat the enter-priseis warrantedby a sufficientprospectof success,the army,whenonceraised,fromwhatevercause,oronwhateverpretext,maybe appliedto the executionof the project.

If, to obviatethis consequence,it should be re-solvedto extend the prohibitionto the raisingofarmies in time of peace, the United States wouldthen exhibitthe most extraordinaryspectaclewhich

The Federalist I99

the worldhas yet seen,--that of a nation incapaci-tated by its Constitutionto preparefor defence,be-foreit wasactuallyinvaded. Asthe ceremonyof aformal denunciationof war has of late fallen intodisuse,the presenceof an enemywithin our terri-toriesmustbe waitedfor, as the legalwarrant to thegovernmentto beginits leviesofmenfor the protec-tion ofthe State. Wemust receivethe blow,beforewecouldevenprepareto return it. Allthat kind ofpolicy by whichnations anticipatedistant danger,and meet the gathering storm, must be abstainedfrom, as contrary to the genuinemaximsof a freegovernment. We must expose our property andliberty to the mercy of foreigninvaders,and invitethemby ourweaknessto seizethe nakedanddefence-less prey, becauseweare afraid that rulers,createdby ourchoice,dependentonourwill,mightendangerthat liberty,by an abuseof the meansnecessarytoits preservation.

Here I expectwe shallbe told that the militiaofthe countryis its natural bulwark,and wouldbe atall timesequal to the national defence. This doc-trine, in substance,had like to have lost us our in-dependence. It cost millionsto the United Statesthat might have been saved. The facts which,from our own experience,forbida relianceof thiskind, are too recent to permitus to be the dupesofsuch a suggestion. The steady operationsof waragainst a regularand disciplinedarmy can only besuccessfullyconductedby a forceof the samekind.Considerationsof economy,not less than of stabil-ity and vigor,confirmthis position. The American

2oo AlexanderHamilton

militia,inthecourseofthelatewar,have,bytheirvaloronnumerousoccasions,erectedeternalmonu-mentstotheirfame;butthebravestofthemfeelandknowthatthelibertyoftheircountrycouldnothavebeenestablishedbytheireffortsalone,howevergreatandvaluabletheywere.War,likemostotherthings,isasciencetobeacquiredandperfectedbydiligence,byperseverance,bytime,andbypractice.Allviolentpolicy,asitiscontrarytothenatural

andexperiencedcourseofhumanaffairs,defeatsit-self.Pennsylvania,atthisinstant,affordsanexo_rnpleofthetruthofthisremark.TheBillofRightsofthatStatedeclaresthatstandingarmiesaredan-geroustoliberty,andoughtnottobekeptupintimeofpeace.Pennsylvania,nevertheless,inatimeofprofoundpeace,fromtheexistenceofpartialdisordersinoneortwoofhercounties,hasresolvedtoraiseabodyoftroops;andina11probabilitywillkeepthemupaslongasthereisanyappearanceofdangertothepublicpeace.TheconductofMassa-chusettsaffordsalessononthesamesubject,thoughondifferentground.ThatState(withoutwaitingforthesanctionofCongress,asthearticlesoftheConfederationrequire)wascompelledtoraisetroopstoquella domesticinsurrection,andstillkeepsacorpsinpaytopreventa revivalofthespiritofrevolt.TheparticularconstitutionofMassachu-settsopposednoobstacletothemeasure;buttheinstanceisstillofusetoinstructusthatcasesarelikelytooccurunderourgovernment,aswellasunderthoseofothernations,whichwillsometimesrenderamilitaryforceintimeofpeaceessentialto

The Federalist 2oi

the securityof the society,and that it is thereforeimproper in this respect to control the legislativediscretion. It alsoteaches us, in its applicationtothe United States,how little the rights of a feeblegovernmentare likelyto be respected,even by itsown constituents. And it teaches us, in additionto the rest, how unequalparchmentprovisionsareto a strugglewith publicnecessity.

It wasa fundamentalmaximof the Lacedmmo,i_ncommonwealth,that the post of admiralshouldnotbe conferredtwiceon the sameperson. The Pelo-pormesianconfederates,having suffered a severedefeat at sea from the Athenians,demanded Ly-sander, whohad beforeservedwith successin thatcapacity, to command the combinedfleets: TheLacedmmonians,to gratifytheir allies,and yet pre-servethe semblanceof an adherenceto their ancientinstitutions,had recourseto the flimsysubterfugeof investingLysanderwith the real power of ad-miral,underthe nominaltitle of vice-admiral. Thisinstance is selectedfrom among a multitude thatmight be cited to confirmthe truth already ad-vancedandillustratedby domesticexz_mples;whichis,that nationspaylittle regardto rulesandmaximscalculatedin their very nature to run counterto thenecessitiesof society. Wisepoliticianswillbe cau-tiousaboutfetteringthegovernmentwithrestrictionsthat cannot be observed,becausethey know thatevery breach of the fundamentallaws, though dic-tated by necessity,impairs that sacred reverencewhichoughtto be maintainedin the breast ofrulerstowards the constitutionof a country,and formsa

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precedentfor otherbreacheswherethe sameplea ofnecessitydoesnot exist at all, or is less urgent andpalpable.

PUBLIUS.

Fort_ Inde/mu/_Journa/• HE FEDERALIST. No. XXVI

(.Am,ToN)

To thePeopleof theS_ateof New York:It was a thing hardly to be expected that in a

poplllarrevolutionthe mindsof men shouldstop atthat happymeanwhichmarksthe salutaryboundarybetweenPOWERand PRIVILEGE,and combinestheenergyof governmentwith the securityof privaterights. Afailurein this delicateandimportantpointis the great sourceof the inconvenienceswe experi-ence,and ifweare not cautiousto avoida repetitionof the error, in our future attempts to rectify andameliorateour system, we may travel from onechimericalproject to another; we may try changeafter change; but we shallnever be likelyto makeany material changefor the better.

The idea of restraining the legislativeauthority,in the meansof providingfor the national defence,is oneof thoserefinementswhichowetheir origintoa zealfor libertymoreardent than enlightened. Wehaveseen,however,that it hasnot had thus far anextensive prevalency; that even in this country,where it made its first appearance,Pennsylvaniaand North Carolinaare the only two States bywhichit has been in any degreepatroni_l; and

The Federalist 203

that all the othershave refusedto giveit the leastcountenance;wiselyjudgingthat confidencemust beplaced somewhere;that the necessityof doingit,is impliedin the very act of delegatingpower; andthat it is better to hazard the abuse of that confi-dence than to embarrass the governmentand en-dangerthe publicsafetyby impoliticrestrictionsonthe legislative authority. The opponents of theproposedConstitutioncombat, in this respect, thegeneraldecisionof America; and instead of beingtaught by experiencethe proprietyofcorrectinganyextremesinto whichwe may have heretoforerun,they appeardisposedto conductus into others stillmore dangerous,and more extravagant. As if thetone ofgovernmenthad beenfoundtoo high,or toorigid, the doctrinesthey teach are calculatedto in-duceus to depressor to relaxit, by expedientswhich,upon other occasions,have beencondemnedor for-borne. It may be affirmedwithoutthe imputationof invective,that if the principlesthey inculcate,onvariouspoints, couldsofar obtain as to becomethepopular creed,they wouldutterly unfit the peopleof this countryfor any speciesof governmentwhat-ever. But a dangerof this kind is not to be appre-hended. The citizens of Americahave too muchdiscernmentto be arguedinto anarchy. And I ammuch mistaken, if experiencehas not wrought adeepand solemnconvictionin the publicmind,thatgreater energy of government is essential to thewelfareand prosperityof the community.

It maynot be amissin this placeconciselyto re-mark the originandprogressof the idea,whichaims

2o4 AlexanderHamilton

at the exclusionof militaryestablishmentsin timeof peace. Though in speculative minds it mo:yarise from a contemplationof the nature and ten-dencyof such institutions, fortifiedby the eventsthat havehappenedin other agesand countries,yetas a national sentiment,it must be traced to thosehabits of thinldngwhichwederivefromthe nationfromwhomthe inhabitants of these States have ingeneralsprung.

In England,for a long time after the NormanConquest,the authority of the monarchwasalmostunlimited. Inroads were graduallymadeupon theprerogative,in favor of liberty, firstby the barons,and afterwardsby the people,till the greatest partof its most formidablepretensionsbecameextinct.But it was not till the revolution in _688,whichelevatedthe PrinceofOrangeto the throne ofGreatBritain, that English liberty was completely tri-umphant. As incident to the undefinedpower ofmakingwar, an acknowledgedprerogative of thecrown,CharlesII. had, by his ownauthority, kepton foot in time of peace a body of 5,oooregulartroops. And this number James II. increased to3o,ooo;whowerepaid out of his civillist. At therevolution,to abolishthe exerciseofsodangerousanauthority,it becamean article of the Billof Rightsthenframed,that "the raisingorkeepinga standingarmy within the kingdomin time of peace,unlesswiththeconsentofParliament,wasagainstlaw."

In that kingdom,whenthe pulse oflibertywas atits highestpitch, no securityagainst the dangerofstanding armies was thought requisite,beyond a

The Federalist 2o5

prohibitionof their beingraised or kept up by themere authority of the executivemagistrate. Thepatriots, who effectedthat memorablerevolution,were too temperate,too well-informed,to think ofany restraint on the legislativediscretion. Theywere aware that a certain number of troops forguards and garrisonswere indispensable;tha_ nopreciseboundscouldbe set to the nationalexigen-cies;that apowerequalto everypossiblecontingencymust exist somewherein the government:and thatwhentheyreferredthe exerciseof that powerto thejudgmentof the legislature,they had arrivedat theultimatepoint of precautionwhichwasreconcilablewiththe safetyof the community.

Fromthe samesource,the peopleof Americamaybe said to havederivedan hereditaryimpressionofdangerto liberty, from standingarmiesin time ofpeace. Thecircumstancesofa revolutionquickenedthe publicsensibility,on everypoint connectedwiththe securityofpopularrights,and in someinstancesraised the warmth of our zeal beyond the degreewhich consistedwith the due temperature of thebodypolitic. Theattempts of two of the States torestrict the authorityof the legislaturein the articleof military establishments,are of the number ofthese instances. The principleswhichhad taughtus to be jealousof the powerof an hereditarymon-arch wereby an injudiciousexcessextendedto therepresentativesofthe peoplein their popularassem-blies. Even in someof the States,wherethis errorwas not adopted, we find unnecessarydeclarationsthat standingarmies ought not to be kept up, in

206 AlexanderH_m_!ton

time of peace, WITHOUTTHE CONSENT OF THE LEGIS-LATURE. I call them unnecessary,because thereasonwhichhad introduceda similarprovisionintothe EnglishBill of Rights is not applicableto anyof the State constitutions. The power of raisingarmiesat all, under those constitutions,can by noconstructionbe deemed to reside anywhere else,than in the legislaturesthemselves; and it wassuperfluous,if not absurd,to declarethat a mattershouldnot be done without the consentof a body,whichalonehad the powerofdoingit. Accordingly,in someof thoseconstitutions,and amongothers,inthat of this State of New York, whichhas beenjustly celebrated,both in Europe and America,asone of the best of the formsof governmentestab-lishedin this country, there is a total silenceuponthe subject.

It is remarkable,that evenin the two Stateswhichseemto have meditated an interdictionof militaryestablishmentsin time of peace,the modeofexpres-sionmadeuse of is rather cautionaryths:uprohibi-tory. It is not said, that standing armiesshallrwtbekeptup, but that they oughtnot to be kept up, intime of peace. This ambiguity of terms appearstohavebeenthe result of a conflictbetweenjealousyand conviction; between the desire of excludingsuchestablishmentsat all events,and the persuasionthat an absolute exclusionwould be unwise andunsafe.

Canit be doubtedthat sucha provision,wheneverthe situationof publicaffairswasunderstoodto re-quire a depa_urefrom it, wouldbe interpretedby

The Federalist 207

the legislatureinto a mereadmonition,and wouldbe madeto yieldto the necessitiesorsupposedneces-sitiesof the State? Let the fact alreadymentioned,with respectto Pennsylvania,decide. What then(itmay be asked)is the useofsucha provision,if itceaseto operatethe momentthere is an inclinationto disregardit?

Let us examinewhetherthere be any comparison,hi point ofefficacy,betweenthe provisionalludedtoandthat whichis containedin the newConstitution,for restrainingthe appropriationsof moneyformili-tary purposesto the period of two years. Theformer,by aimingat toomuch,is calculatedto effectnothing; the latter, by steeringclearof an impru-dentextreme,and bybeingperfectlycompatiblewitha properprovisionfor the exigenciesof the nation,willhavea salutaryand powerfuloperation.

Thelegislatureof the UnitedStateswillbe obligedby this provision,onceat least in every two years,to deliberateuponthe proprietyofkeepinga militaryforce on foot; to cometo a new resolutionon thepoint; and to declaretheir senseofthe matter, by aformalvote in the face of their constituents. Theyarenot at libertyto vest in the executivedepartmentpermanentfundsfor the supportofan army,if theywereevenincautiousenoughto be willingto reposein it so impropera confidence.Asthespirit ofparty,in differentdegrees,must be expectedto infectallpoliticalbodies,there willbe, no doubt,personsinthe nationallegislaturew_ll_ugenoughto arraignthemeasuresand criminatethe viewsof the majority.Theprovisionfor the supportof a militaryforcewill

208 AlexanderHamilton

alwaysbe a favorable topic for declamation. Asoftenasthe questioncomesforward,the publicatten-tion willbe rousedand attracted to the subject,bythe party in opposition;and if the majority shouldbe really disposedto exceedthe proper limits, thecommunitywill be warned of the danger,and willhave an opportunity of taking measuresto guardagainst it. Independentof parties in the nationallegislatureitself,as oftenas the periodof discussionarrived,the State legislatures,whowillalwaysbenotonly vigilant but suspiciousand jealousguardiansof the rights of the citizensagainst encroachmentsfromthe federal government,will constantlyhavetheir attention awaketo the conductof the nationalrulers,and will be ready enough,if any thing im-properappears,to sound the alarm to the people,and not only to be the voice, but, if necessary,theARMof their discontent.

Schemesto subvert the libertiesof a great com-munity requiretime to mature them for execution.Anarmy,so largeas seriouslyto menacethoseliber-ties,couldonlybe formedby progressiveaugmenta-tions; whichwouldsuppose,not merelya temporarycombinationbetweenthe legislatureand executive,but a continuedconspiracyfor a seriesof time. Isit probablethat such a combinationwouldexist atall? Is it probablethat it wouldbe perseveredin,and transmitted along through all the successivevariationsin a representativebody, whichbiennialelectionswouldnaturally producein both houses?Is it presumable,that everyman,the instant he tookhis seat in the national Senate or Houseof Repre-

The Federalist 3o9

sentatives,would commencea traitor to his con-stituentsand to his country? Can it be supposedthat therewouldnot be foundoneman, discerningenoughto detectso atrociousa conspiracy,or boldor honestenoughto apprisehisconstituentsoftheirdanger? If suchpresumptionscan fairlybe made,there oughtat once to be an end of all delegatedauthority. The peopleshouldresolve to recall allthe powersthey haveheretoforeparted without oftheir own hands,and to divide themselvesinto asmanyStatesas thereare counties,in orderthat theymaybe abletomanagetheirownconcernsinperson.

If suchsuppositionscouldevenbe reasonablymade,stilltheconcealmentofthe design,forany duration,wouldbe impracticable.It wouldbe announced,bythe verycircumstanceof augmentingthe army to sogreatanextentintimeofprofoundpeace.W2aatcolorablereasoncouldbeassigned,inacountrysosituated,forsuchvastaugmentationsofthemilitaryforce? Itisimpossiblethatthepeoplecouldbelongdeceived;andthedestructionoftheproject,andoftheprojectors,wouldquicklyfollowthediscovery.Ithasbeensaidthattheprovisionwhichlimits

theappropriationofmoneyforthesupportofanarmytotheperiodoftwoyearswouldbeunavailing,becausetheExecutive,whenoncepossessedofaforcelargeenoughtoawethepeopleintosubmission,wouldfindresourcesinthatveryforcesufficienttoenablehimtodispensewithsuppliesfromtheactsofthelegislature.Butthequestionagainrecurs,uponwhatpretencecouldhebeputinpossessionofaforceofthatmagnitudeintimeofpeace?Ifwe

VOL.XI._X4.

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supposeit to have been created in consequenceofsomedomesticinsurrectionor foreignwar, then itbecomesa casenot withinthe principlesof the ob-jection; for this is levelledagainst the power ofkeepingup troops in time of peace. Pew personswillbe sovisionaryas seriouslyto contendthat mili-tary forcesoughtnot to be raisedto quella rebellionor resistan invasion; and if the defenceofthe com-munity under such circumstancesshould make itnecessaryto havean armysonumerousasto hazardits liberty,this is oneof thosecalamitiesfor whichthere is neither preventativenor cure. It cannotbe providedagainstby any possibleform ofgovern-ment; it might even result from a simpleleagueoffensiveand defensive,if it shouldeverbenecessaryfor the confederatesor alliesto form an army forcommondefence.

But it is an evilinfinitelyless likelyto attend usin a unitedthan in a disunitedstate; nay, it maybesafelyassertedthat it is an evil altogetherunlikelyto attend us in the latter situation. It is not easyto conceivea possibilitythat dangerssoformidablecan assail the wholeUnion,as to demanda forceconsiderableenough to place our liberties in theleast jeopardy, especiallyff we take into our viewthe aid to be derivedfrom the militia,whichoughtalwaysto be counteduponas a valuableand power-ful auxiliary. But in a state of disunion (as hasbeenfullyshownin anotherplace),the contraryofthis suppositionwould becomenot only probable,but almostunavoidable.

PUBLIUS.

The Federalist 2II

FromtheNew York Packet,Tuesday,December25,x787

THE FEDERALIST. No. XXVII

(HAMILTON)

To thePeopleof theStateofNew York:It hasbeenurged,in differentshapes,that a Con-

stitutionof the kind proposedby the conventioncannotoperatewithoutthe aid ofa militaryforcetoexecute its laws. This, however,llke most otherthingsthathave beenallegedon that side,restsonmeregeneralassertion,unsupportedby any preciseor intelligibledesignationof the reasonsuponwhichit is founded. As far as I havebeen able to divinethe latent meaning of the objectors,it seemstooriginatein a presuppositionthat the peoplewiUbedisinclinedtothe exerciseoffederalauthorityin anymatter of an internalnature. Waivingany excep-tion that might be taken to the inaccuracyor in-explicitnessof the distinctionbetweeninternal andexternal,let us inquirewhatgroundthere is to pre-supposethat disinclinationin the people. Unlesswe presumeat the sametimethat the powersof thegeneralgovernmentwillbe worseadmim'steredthanthoseof the Stategovernment,there seemsto be noroomfor the presumptionofiLl-will,disaffection,oroppositionin the people. I believeit may be laiddown as a general rule that their confidenceinand obedienceto a governmentwill commonlybeproportionedto the goodnessor badnessof its ad-ministration. It must be admitted that there areexceptionsto thisrule;but theseexceptionsdependsoentirelyon accidentalcauses,thattheycannotbe

212 AlexanderHamilton

consideredas having any relation to the intrinsicmeritsor demeritsof a constitution. Thesecan onlybe judgedof by generalprinciplesand maxims.' Variousreasonshavebeensuggested,in the course

of these papers, to induce a probabilitythat thegeneralgovernmentwillbe better administeredthanthe particulargovernments: the principalof whichreasonsare that the extensionof the spheresof elec-tion will present a greater option, or latitude ofchoice, to the people; that through the mediumof the State legislatures--whichare selectbodiesofmen,and whichare to appointthe membersof thenationalSenate--there is reasonto expectthat thisbranch will generallybe composedwith peculiarcareand judgment; that these circumstancesprom-ise greater knowledgeand more extensiveinforma-tion in the national councils,and that they willbeless apt to be tainted by the spirit of faction,andmoreout of the reachof thoseoccasional_-humors,or temporaryprejudicesand propensities,which,insmallersocieties,frequentlycontaminatethe publiccouncils,beget injustice and oppressionof a partof the community,and engender schemeswhich,thoughthey gratifya momentaryinclinationor de-sire, terminate in general distress, dissatisfaction,and disgust. Several additional reasons of con-siderableforce,to fortifythat probability,willoccurwhenwe cometo survey,with a more criticaleye,the interiorstructureof the edificewhichweare in-vited to erect. It willbe sufficienthere to remark,that until satisfactoryreasonscan be assignedtojustify an opinion,that the federal govern__rnentis

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likely to be administeredin such a manneras torenderit odiousor contemptibleto the people,therecan be no reasonablefoundationfor the suppositionthat the lawsofthe Unionwillmeetwithanygreaterobstructionfromthem,or willstand in needof anyother methodsto enforcetheir execution,than thelawsof the particularmembers.

The hope of impunity is a strong incitementtosedition; the dreadof punishment,a proportionablystrong discouragementto it. Will not the govern-ment of the Union,which, if possessedof a duedegreeof power,can call to its aid the collectiveresourcesof the wholeConfederacy,be more likelyto repress the formersentimentand to inspirethelatter,than that of a singleState, whichcan onlycommandthe resourceswithinitself? A turbulentfactionin a State may easily supposeitselfable tacontendwith the friendsto the governmentin thatState; but it can hardly be so infatuatedas to im-agineitselfa matchfor the combinedeffortsof theUnion. If thisreflectionbejust, thereis lessdangerof resistancefromirregularcombinationsofindivid-uals to the authority of the Confederacythan tothat of a singlemember.

I will,in this place,hazardan observation,whichwillnot be the less just becauseto someit may ap-pearnew; whichis, that the morethe operationsofthe nationalauthority are intermingledin the ordi-nary exerciseof government,the more the citizensare accustomedto meet with it in the commonoc-currencesoftheirpoliticallife,the moreit isfamiliar-izedto their sight and to their feelings,the further

2I4 AlexanderHamilton

itentersintothoseobjectswhichtouchthemostsensiblechordsandputinmotionthemostactivespringsofthehumanheart,thegreaterwillbetheprobabilitythatitwillconcq1_atetherespectandat-tachrnentofthecommunity.Manisverymuchacreatureofhabit.A thingthatrarelystrikeshissenseswillgenerallyhavebutlittleinfluenceuponhismind.A governmentcontinuallyata distanceandoutofsightcanhardlybeexpectedtointerestthesensationsofthepeople.Theinferenceis,thattheauthorityoftheUnion,andtheaffectionsofthecitizenstowardsit,willbestrengthened,ratherthanweakened,byitsextensiontowhatarecalledmattersofinternalconcern;andwillhavelessoccasiontorecurtoforce,inproportiontothefamiliarityandcomprehensivenessofitsagency.Themoreitcir-culatesthroughthosechannelsandcurrentsinwhichthepassionsofma_1_ndnaturallyflow,thelesswillitrequiretheaidoftheviolentandperilousexpe-clientsofcompulsion.Onething,atallevents,mustbeevident,thata

governmentliketheoneproposedwouldbidmuchfairertoavoidthenecessityofusingforce,thanthatspeciesofleaguecontendedforbymostofitsoppo-nents;theauthorityofwhichshouldonlyoperateupontheStatesintheirpoliticalorcollectivecapa-cities.Ithasbeenshownthatinsucha Confeder-acytherecanbenosanctionforthelawsbutforce;thatfrequentdelinquenciesinthemembersarethenatural offspringof the very frameof the govern-ment; and that as often as these happen, they canonly be redressed,if at all,by war and violence.

The Federalist 2_5

Theplan reportedby theconvention,by extend-ingtheauthorityofthefederalheadtotheindividualcitizensof theseveralStates,willenablethegovern-mentto employtheordinarymagistracyof each,intheexecutionofitslaws. It is easyto perceivetha$this willtendto destroy,in the commonapprehen-sion,all distinctionbetweenthe sourcesfromwhichthey mightproceed;and willgive the federalgov-ernmentthe sameadvantagefor securinga dueobedienceto its authoritywhich is enjoyedby thegovernmentofeachState,inadditionto theinfluenceon publicopinion whichwill result fromthe im-portantconsiderationof its havingpowerto call toits assistanceand supportthe resourcesof the wholeUnion. It merits particularattention in this place,that the lawsofthe Confederacy,asto the enumeratedand legitimateobjectsofits jurisdiction,willbecomethe SUPREMELAWof the land; to the observanceofwhichallofficers,legislative,executive,and judicial,in each State, will be boundby the sanctity of anoath. Thus the legislatures,courts, and magis-

trates, of the respectivemembers,will be incorpo-rated intothe operationsof thenationalgovernmentas far as its iust andconstitutionalauthorityextends;and will be rendered auxiliaryto the enforcementof its laws.• Anyman whowillpursue,by his ownreflections,the consequencesof this situation, willperceivethat thereis goodgroundto calculateupona regularandpeaceableexecutionof the lawsof the

tThesophistrywhichhas beenemployed,to showthat this willtendto the destructionofthe Stategovernments,will,in its properplace,befullydetected.mPvB_ius.

216 AlexanderHamilton

Union,if its powersare administeredwitha com-monshareof prudence.If wewillarbitrarilysup-posethecontrary,wemay deduceany inferenceswepleasefromthe supposition;for it is certainlypossi-ble, by an injudiciousexerciseof the authoritiesofthe best governmentthat ever was, or ever can beinstituted, to provoke and precipitatethe peopleinto the wildest excesses. But though the adver-sariesof the proposedConstitutionshou/dpresumethat the nationalrulers wouldbe insensibleto themotivesof publicgood,or to the obligationsofduty,I wouldstillask themhowtheinterestsofambition,or the viewsof encroachment,can be promotedbysuch a conduct?

PUBLIUS.

FortlmIndepe_wZen_Journc_THEFEDERALIST.No. XXVIII

To thePeopleo]theStateo]New York:That there may happen cases in which the na-

tionalgovernmentmay be necessitatedto resort toforce, cannot be denied. Our own experiencehascorroboratedthe lessons taught by the examplesof othernations; that emergenciesof this sort willsometimesarise in all societies,howeverconstituted;that seditions and insurrections are, unhappily,maKadiesas inseparablefrom the body politic astumorsand eruptionsfrom the naturalbody; thatthe ideaofgoverningat all timesby the simpleforceof law (whichwehave been told is the only admis-

The Federalist 217

sible principleof republicangovernment),has noplace but in the reveriesof those politicaldoctorswhosesagacitydisdainsthe admonitionsof experi-mental instruction.

Should such emergenciesat any time happenunder the national government,there couldbe noremedybut force. Themeansto be employedmustbe proportionedto the extent ofthe mischief. If itshouldbe a slight commotionin a smallpart of aState, the militiaof the residuewouldbe adequateto its suppression;and the natural presumptionisthat they wouldbe ready to dotheir duty. An in-surrection,whatever may be its immediatecause,eventually endangersall government. Regard tothe publicpeace, if not to the rights of the Union,would engagethe citizens to whom the contagionhad not communicateditself to opposethe insur-gents; and if the general government should befound in practice conduciveto the prosperity andfelicity of the people, it were irrational to believethat they wouldbe disinclinedto its support.

If, on the contrary, the insurrectionshould pei-vadea wholeState,or a principalpart ofit, the em-ploymentof a differentkind of forcemight becomeunavoidable. It appearsthat Massachusettsfounditnecessaryto raise troopsforrepressingthe disorderswithinthat State;that Pennsylvania,fromthe mereapprehensionof commotionsamonga part of hercitizens,has thought properto haverecourseto thesamemeasure. Supposethe State ofNewYork hadbeen inclined to re-establishher lost jurisdictionover the inhabitants of Vermont,could she have

218 AlexanderHamilton

hopedforsuccessinsuchanenterprisefromtheeffortsofthemilitiaalone?Wouldshenothavebeencompelledtoraiseandtomaintaina moreregularforcefortheexecutionofherdesign?Ifitmustthenbeadmittedthatthenecessityofrecurringtoaforcedifferentfromthemilitia,incasesofthisextraordinarynature,isapplicabletotheStategov-ernmentsthemselves,why shouldthepossibility,thatthenationalgovernmentmightbeunderalikenecessity,insimilarextremities,bemadeanobjec-tiontoitsexistence?IsitnotsurprisingthatmenwhodeclareanattachmenttotheUnionintheab-stract,shouldurgeasanobjectiontotheproposedConstitutionwhatapplieswithtenfoldweighttotheplanforwhichtheycontend;andwhat,asfarasithasanyfoundationintruth,isaninevitableconsequenceofcivilsocietyuponanenlargedscale?Who wouldnotpreferthatpossibilitytotheun-ceasingagitationsandfrequentrevolutionswhicharethecontinualscourgesofpettyrepublics?Letuspursuethisexaminationinanotherlight.

Suppose,inlieuofonegeneralsystem,two,orthree,orevenfourConfederaciesweretobeformed,wouldnotthesamedifficultyopposeitselftotheoperationsofeitheroftheseConfederacies?Wouldnoteachofthembeexposedtothesamecasualties;andwhenthesehappened,beobligedtohaverecoursetothesameexpedientsforupholdingitsauthoritywhichareobjectedtoina governmentforalltheStates?Wouldthemilitia,inthissupposition,bemorereadyormoreabletosupportthefederalau-thoritythaninthecaseofa generalunion?All

The Federalist 219

candidandinte_gentmenmust,upondueconsidera-tion,acknowledgethat the principleof the objectionis equallyapplicableto eitherofthe two cases;andthat whether we have one governmentfor all theStates,or differentgovernmentsfor differentparcelsof them,or evenif there shouldbe an entiresepara-tion of the States,' there might sometimesbe anecessityto makeuse of a force constituteddiffer-ently from the militia,to preservethe peaceofthecommunityand to maintain the just authority ofthe laws against those violent invasionsof themwhichamountto insurrectionsand rebellions.

Independentof all other reasoningsuponthe sub-ject, it is a full answerto those whorequirea moreperemptoryprovisionagainstmilitaryestablishmentsin time of peace,to say that the wholepoweroftheproposedgovernmentis to be in the hands of therepresentativesof the people. Thisis the essential,and, after all, onlyefficacioussecurityfor the rightsand privilegesof the people,whichis attainable incivilsociety.2

If the representativesof the peoplebetray theirconstituents,thereis thenno resourceleft but in theexertionof that originalright of self-defencewhichis paramount to all positiveformsof government,and whichagainst the usurpationsof the nationalrulers,may be exerted with infinitelybetter pros-pect of successthan againstthoseofthe rulersof anindividualstate. In a single state, if the persons

z In the revisedtext, "or if there shouldbe as many ttuconnectedgovernmentsas there are States."

2 Its fullefficacywillbe examinedhereafter.--PuB_uS.

2_o AlexanderHamilton

intrustedwith supremepowerbecomeusurpers,thedifferentparcels,subdivisions,or districts of whichit consists,havingno distinct governmentin each,cantake no regularmeasuresfordefence. The citi-zensmust rush tumultuouslyto arms,without con-cert, without system, without resource; except intheir courageand despair. The usurpers, clothedwiththe formsoflegalauthority,cantoo oftencrushthe oppositionin embryo. The smallerthe extentof the territory, the more difficultwill it be for thepeopleto forma regularor systematicplan of oppo-sition,and the more easy willit be to defeat theirearly efforts. Intelligencecan be morespeedilyob-_:ined of their preparationsand movements,andthe military forcein the possessionof the usurperscan be morerapidlydirectedagainstthe part wherethe oppositionhas begun. In this situation theremust be a peculiarcoincidenceof circumstancestoinsuresuccessto the popular resistance.

The obstaclesto usurpation and the facilitiesofresistanceincreasewith the increasedextent of thestate, providedthe citizensunderstand their rightsand are disposedto defend them. The naturalstrengthofthe peoplein a largecommunity,in pro-portionto the artificialstrength of the government,is greater than in a small, and of course morecompetentto a struggle with the attempts of thegovernmentto establish a tyranny. But in a con-federacythe people,without exaggeration,may besaid to be entirely the masters of their own fate.Powerbeingalmost alwaysthe rival of power,thegeneralgovernmentwillat all times stand ready to

The Federalist 221

checkthe usurpationsof the state governments,andthese will have the same dispositiontowards thegeneral government. The people, by throwingthemselvesinto either scale,will infalliblymake itpreponderate. If their rightsare invadedby either,they canmakeuseof the otheras the instrumentofredress. Howwisewillit be in them by cherishingthe unionto preserveto themselvesan advantagewhichcan neverbe too highlyprized[

It maysafelybe receivedas an axiom in our po-litical system,that the State governmentswill, inall possiblecontingencies,afford completesecurityagainst invasionsof the public liberty by the na-tionalauthority. Projects of usurpationcannot bemaskedunderpretencesso l_l_elyto escapethe pene-tration of selectbodiesof men,as of the peopleatlarge. The legislatureswill have better means ofinformation. They can discoverthe danger at adistance; and possessingall the organs of civilpower,and the confidenceof the people,they can atonceadopt a regular plan of opposition,in whichthey cancombineall the resourcesofthe community.They can readily communicatewith each other intJaedifferentStates,and unite their commonforcesfor the protectionoftheir commonliberty.

Thegreatextent of the countryis a further secur-ity. Wehavealreadyexperiencedits utility againstthe attacks of a foreignpower. Andit wouldhavepreciselythe same effectagainst the enterprisesofambitious rulers in the national councils. If thefederal army shouldbe able to quell the resistanceofoneState, the distant Stateswouldhave it in their

222 AlexanderHamilton

powerto makeheadwith freshforces. The advan- t

tages obtainedin one placemust be abandonedtosubduethe oppositionin others; and the momentthe part whichhad beenreducedto submissionwasleft to itself, its effortswouldbe renewed,and itsresistancerevive.

Weshouldrecollectthat the extent ofthe militaryforce must, at all events, be regulatedby the re-sourcesof the country. For a longtime to come,i_willnot be possibleto maintain a large army; andas the meansof doingthis increase,the populationand natural strength of the communitywill pro-portionablyincrease. When will the time arrivethat the federalgovernmentcanraiseand maintainan army capable of erecting a despotismover thegreat bodyofthe peopleofan immenseempire,whoare in a situation,throughthe mediumof their Stategovernments,to take measuresfor their own de-fence,with all the celerity,regularity,and systemofindependentnations? The apprehensionmay beconsideredasa disease,forwhichthere canbe foundno curein the resourcesof argumentand reasoning.

PUBLIUS.

From theDaily Adverliser,Thursday,Jar_uaryzo, x788THE FEDEKALIST. No. XXIX s

(,_Am_TOS)

To thePeopleof theStateof New York:The powerof regulatingthe militia, and of com-

mandingits servicesin times of insurrectionandx_?hisessayappeared as No. XXXV.in the originalpublicationin

the newspapers,and is thereforeheremisplacedchronologically. /m

The Federalist 223

invasionare naturalincidentsto the dutiesof super-intendingthe commondefence,andofwatchingoverthe internal peaceof the Confederacy.

It requiresno skillin the scienceof warto discernthat uniformityin the organizationand disciplineof the militia would be attended with the mostbeneficialeffects,wheneverthey werecalledintoser-vice for the public defence. It would enablethemto dischargethe dutiesof the campand of the fieldwith mutualintelligenceand concert--anadvantageof peculiarmoment in the operationsof an army;and it wouldfit them much sooner to acquire thedegree of proficiencyin military functions whichwouldbe essentialto their usefulness. This desire-able uniformitycan only be accomplishedby con-tidingthe regulationof the militia to the directionof the nationalauthority. It is, therefore,with themost evident propriety, that the plan of the con-ventionproposesto empowerthe Union"to providefor organizing,arming,and discipliningthe militia,and for governingsuchpart of themas maybe em-ployedin the serviceof the UnitedStates,reservingto theStatesrespectivelytheappointmentof theofficers,and the authorityof trainingthemilitia accordingtothe disciplineprescribedby Congress."

Ofthe differentgroundswhichhavebeentaken inoppositionto the plan of the convention,there isnonethat was so little to have been expected,oris sountenablein itself,as the onefrom whichthis

_hefirs_editionof i788, however,it is printed asNo. XXIX., whichgives it its properplaceaccordingto subject, and for_ reasontheorderof the first editionhas been followed.

_24 AlexanderHan_'lton

particular provisionhas been attacked. If a well-regulatedmilitiabethe most natural defenceofa freecountry,it ought certainlyto be under the reg_lo:-tion and at the disposalof that body whichis con-stituted the guardian of the national security. Ifstandingarmiesare dangerousto liberty, an effica-ciouspowerover the militia, in the body to whosecarethe protectionofthe State is committed,ought,as far as possible,to take awaythe inducementandthe pretext to suchunfriendlyinstitutions. If thefederal governmentcan commandthe aid of themilitiainthoseemergencieswhichcallfor the militaryarm in support of the civil magistrate, it can thebetter dispensewith the employmentof a differentkind offorce. If it cannotavailitselfofthe former,it willbe obligedto recur to the latter. To renderan army unnecessary,willbe a morecertainmethodof preventingits existenceth0:ua thousand pro-hibitionsupon paper.

In orderto cast an odiumuponthe powerof call-ingforththe militiato executethe lawsofthe Union,it has beenremarkedthat there is nowhereany pro-visionin the proposedConstitutionforcallingout thePosse COMITATUS,to assist the magistrate in theexecutionof his duty; whenceit has beeninferred,that militaryforcewasintendedto be his onlyaux-_llary. There is a striking incoherencein the ob-jectionswhichhave appeared, and sometimesevenfromthe same quarter, not much calculatedto in-spirea veryfavorableopinionofthe sincerityor fairdealingoftheir authors. Thesamepersonswhotellus in onebreath, that the powersof the federalgov=

The Federalist _25

eminentwillbe despoticand unlimited,informus inthe next, that it hasnot authoritysufficienteventocall out the POSSECOMITATUS.The latter, fortu-nately, is as much short of the truth as the formerexceedsit. It wouldbe as absurdto doubt, that arightto passalllawsnecessaryandt_roperto executeits declaredpowers,wouldincludethat of requiringthe assistanceofthe citizensto the officerswhomaybe intrusted with the executionof thoselaws,as itwouldbe tobelieve,that a rightto enactlawsneces-saryand proper for the impositionandcollectionoftaxes would involve that of varying the rules ofdescentand ofthe alienationof l_ndedproperty,orof abolishingthe trial by juryin casesrelatingto it.It being thereforeevidentthat the suppositionof awant of powerto requirethe aid of the Posse COMI-TATUSis entirely destitute of color, it will follow,that the conclusionwhichhas been drawnfrom it,.in its applicationto the authorityofthe federalgov-ermnentover the militia, is as uncandidas it is il-logical. What reasoncouldthere be to infer, thatforcewas intendedto be the soleinstrumentof au-thority,merelybecausethere is a powerto makeuseof it whennecessary? What shallwetlfink of themotiveswhichcouldinduce menof senseto reasonin th_manner? Howshall we prevent a conflictbetweencharityand judgment?

By a curiousrefinementuponthe spirit of repub-licau jealousy, we are even taught to apprehend¢taugerfrom the militia itself, in the hands of thefederalgovernment. It is observedthat selectcorps•n_:ybe formed,composedof the youngand ardent,

VOL.XI._X_

226 AlexanderHamilton

who may be renderedsubservientto the viewsofarbitrarypower. Whatplan for the regulationofthemilitiamaybe pursuedby thenationalgovern-ment,is impossibleto beforeseen. Butso farfromviewingthematterin the samelightwiththosewhoobjectto selectcorpsas dangerous,werethe Con-stitutionratified,andwereI todelivermysentimentsto a memberof thefederallegislaturefromthisStateon the subjectof a rn_!itiaestablishment,I shouldholdto him,in substance,the followingdiscourse:

"The projectof discipliningall themilitiaof theUnitedStatesis as futileas it wouldbeinjurious,ifit werecapableof beingcarriedinto execution. Atolerableexpertnessin military movementsis abusinessthat requirestime andpractice. It is nota day, or even a week, that willsufficefor the at-tainmentofit. To obligethegreatbodyof theyeo-nmm3r,and of theotherclassesof the citizens,to beunderarmsforthepurposeofgoingthroughmilitaryexercisesand evolutions,as oftenas mightbeneces-saryto acquirethedegreeof perfectionwhichwouldentitle them to the characterof a well-regulatedm_tia,wouldbe a realgrievanceto the people,anda seriouspublicinconvenienceand loss. It wouldforman a._uualdeductionfromthe productivelaborofthe country,to an amountwhich,calculatinguponthe presentnumbersof the people, wouldnot fallfar shortof the wholeexpenseof the civilestablish-mentsof all the States. To attempt a thingwhichwouldabridgethe massof laborand industry to soconsiderable'an extent, wouldbe unwise: and theexperiment,if made, couldnot succeed,becauseit

!

The Federalist 227

wouldnot longbe endured. Littlemorecan reason-ablybe aimedat, withrespectto the peopleat large,than to have them properlyarmed and equipped;and in orderto seethat this be not neglected,it willbe necessaryto assemblethem onceor twicein thecourseof a year.

"But thoughthe schemeof discipliningthe wholenation must be abandonedas mischievousor im-practicable; yet it is a matter of the utmost impor-tance that a well-digestedplan should,as soonaspossible,be adoptedfor the properestablishmentofthe mihtia. Theattentionof the governmentoughtparticularly to be directed to the formation of aselect corps of moderate extent, upon such prin-ciplesas will really fit them for servicein case ofneed. By thus circumscribingthe plan, it will bepossibleto have an excellentbody of well-trainedmilitia,ready to take the fieldwheneverthe defenceofthe Stateshallrequireit. Thiswillnot onlylessenthe call for military establishments,but if circum-stancesshouldat any time obligethe governmenttoforman armyof anymagnitudethat army canneverbe formidableto the liberties of the people whilethere is a largebody of citizens,little, if at all, in-feriorto themin disciplineand the useofarms,whostand ready to defendtheir ownrights and thoseoftheir fellow-citizens.This appears to me the onlysubstitutethat can be devisedfor a standingarmy,and the best possiblesecurityagainstit, if it shouldexist."

Thus differentlyfromthe adversariesof the pro-posedConstitutionshouldI reasononthe samesub-

228 AlexanderHamilton

ject, deducingarg_mentsof safety from the verysourceswhichtheyrepresentas fraughtwithdangerand perdition. But how the nationallegislaturemay reasonon the point,is a t.hiugwhichneithertheynorI canforesee.

Thereis somethingso far-fetchedandso extrava-gant in the idea ofda_gertolibertyfromthe militia,that oneis at a losswhetherto treat it withgravityor with raillery; whether to considerit as a meretrial of ski1!,like the paradoxesof rhetoricians;as adisingenuousartificeto instilprejudicesat any price;or as the serious offspringof politicalfanaticism.Where,in the name of common-sense,are our fearsto end if we may not trust our sons, our brothers,our neighbors,our fellow-citizens?What shadowof dangercan therebe frommenwhoare dailymin-glingwiththerest of theircountrymen,andwhopar-ticipatewiththemin the samefeelings,sentiments,habits, and interests? What reasonablecauseofapprehensioncan be inferredfroma powerin theUnionto prescriberegulationsfor the militia,andtocommandits serviceswhen necessary,while theparticularStatesare to have the soleand exclusiveappointmentof theoff/_cers? If it werepossibleseri-ouslyto indulgea jealousyof the militiauponanyconceivableestablishmen_underthe federalgovern-ment,the circumstanceof the officersbeingin theappointmentof the Statesought at once to extin-guishit. Therecan be no doubtthat thiscircum-stancewillalwayssecureto them a preponderatinginfluenceoverthe militia.

In readingmany of the publicationsagainst the

The Federalist 229

Constitution,a man is apt to imaginethat he isperusingsome ill-writtentale or romance,which,instead of naturaland agreeableimages,exhibitsto the mind nothing but frightful and distortedshapes--

"Gorgons,hydras,andchimerasdire";

discoloringand disfiguringwhateverit represents,and transformingevery thing it touches into amonster.

Asampleof this is to be observedin the exagger-ated and improbablesuggestionswhichhave takenplace respectingthe power of callingfor the ser-vicesof the militia. That of NewHampshireis tobe marchedto Georgia,of Georgiato New Hamp-shire,of NewYork to Kentucky,and of Kentuckyto Lake Champlain. Nay, the debts due to theFrenchand Dutcharetobepaid in militiamenin-stead of louis d'ors and ducats. At one momentthereis to be a largearmy to lay prostratethe liber-ties of the people; at anothermomentthe militiaofVirginiaare to be draggedfromtheir homesfiveorsix hundredmiles, to tame the republicancontu-macyof Massachusetts;and that of Massachusettsis to be transportedan equaldistanceto subduetherefractoryhaughtinessof the aristocraticVirginians.Do the personswho rave at this rate imaginethattheir art or their eloquencecan imposeany conceitsor absurditiesupon the peopleof America for in-fallibletruths?

If there shouldbe an army to be made useof asthe engineof despotism,what need of the militia?If thereshouldbenoarmy,whitherwouldthe militia,

23o AlexanderHamilton

irritatedby beingcalleduponto undertakea distantand hopelessexpedition,for the purposeof rivetingthe chainsof slaveryupon a part of their country-men, directtheir course,but to the seat of the ty-rants, who had meditated so foolishas well as sowickeda project, to crush them in their imaginedintrenchmentsof power,and to makethem an ex-ampleof the just vengeanceof an abused and in-censedpeople? Is this the way in whichusurpersstride to dominionovera numerousand enlightenednation? Do they beginby excitingthe detestationof the very instruments of their intendedusurpa-tions? Do they usually commencetheir careerbywantonand disgustfulacts of power,calipered toanswerno end, but to draw upon themselvesuni-versal hatred and execration? Aresuppositionsofthis sort the soberadmonitionsofdiscerningpatriotsto a discerningpeople? Or are theythe inflamma.tory ravingsof incendiariesor distemperedenthu-siasts? If we were even to supposethe nationalrulers actuated by the most ungovernableambi-tion,it is impossibleto believethat they wouldem-ploy such preposterousmeans to accomplishtheirdesigns.

In timesof insurrection,or invasion,it wouldbenaturaland proper that the m_l_tiaof a neighboringState shouldbe marchedinto another, to resist acommonenemy,or to guardthe republicagainsttheviolenceof factionor sedition. This was frequentlythe case,in respectto the firstobject,in the courseof the latewar; andthis mutt_a!succoris,indeed,aprincipalend of our political association. If the

The Federalist 231

power of affordingit be placedunder the directionof the Union,therewillbe no dangerof a supineandlistlessinattentionto the dangersof a neighbor,tillits near approachhad superaddedthe incitementsofself-preservationtothetoo feebleimpulsesofdutyand sympathy.

PUBLIUS.

Fro_ t/_ NewYorkP_/_e_,Frlday,December58, XTS7

THE FEDERALIST. No. XXX

(HA_ILTOS)

.TothePeopleo_theStateo_New York:It hasbeenalreadyobservedthat the federalgov-

ernmentoughtto possessthe powerofprovidingforthe supportofthe nationalforces; in whichproposi-tion was intended to be includedthe expense ofraisingtroops,of buildingand equippingfleets,andall other expensesin any wiseconnectedwith mili-tary arrangementsand operations. But these arenot the onlyobjectsto whichthe jurisdictionof theUnion,in respect to revenue,must necessarilybeempoweredto extend. It must embracea provi-sionfor the supportof the nationalcivillist; for thepayment of the national debts contracted,or tha_may be contracted; and, in general,for all thosematters whichwillcall for disbursementsout of thenational treasury. The conclusionis, that theremustbe interwoven,in the frameofthe government,a generalpoweroftaxation,in oneshapeor another.

Moneyis, with propriety,consideredas the vitalp"rincipleof thebody politic; as that whichsustains

232 AlexanderHamilton

its lifeandmotion,and enablesit to performits mostessential functions. A completepower, therefore,to procurea regular and adequatesupply of it, asfar as the resourcesof the commtmitywill permit,may be regardedas an indispensableingredientinevery constitution. From a deficiencyin this par-ticular,oneoftwoevilsmustensue: eitherthe peoplemust be subjectedto continualplunder,as"a substi-tute fora more eligiblemodeofsupplyingthe publicwants, or the government must sink into a fatalatrophy, and, in a short courseof time, perish.

In the Ottomanor Turkishempire,the sovereign,thoughin other respectsabsolutemaster ofthe livesand fortunesof his subjects,has no right to imposea newtax. The consequenceis that he permitsthebashaws or governorsof provinces to pillage thepeoplewithout mercy; and, in turn, squeezesout ofthemthe stunsof whichhe stands in need, to satisfyhisownexigenciesand thoseof the state. In Amer-ica,from a like cause,the governmentof the Unionhas gradually dwindledinto a state of decay, ap-proachingnearly to annihilation. Who can doubt,that the happinessof the people in both countrieswouldbe promotedby competentauthoritiesin theproper hands, to provide the revenueswhich thenecessitiesof the public might require?

The present Confederation,feeble as it is, in-tendedto repose in the United States an _ml_hnitedpowerof providingfor the pecuniarywants of theUnion. But proceedingupon an erroneous prin-ciple,it hasbeendone in such a manneras entirelyto havefrustrated the intention. Congress,by the

The Federalist 23a

articleswhichcomposethatcompact(ashasalreadybeenstated),areauthorizedtoascertainandcallforanystunsofmoneynecessary,intheirjudgment,totheserviceoftheUnitedStates;andtheirrequisi-tions,ifconformabletotheruleofapportionment,areineveryconstitutionalsenseobligatoryupontheStates.Thesehavenorighttoquestionthepro-prietyofthedemand;nodiscretionbeyondthatofdevisingthewaysandmeansoffurnishingthesumsdemanded.Butthoughthisbestrictlyandtrulythecase;thoughtheassumptionofsucha rightwouldbeaninfringementofthearticlesofUnion;thoughitmayseldomorneverhavebeenavowedlyclahned,yetinpracticeithasbeenconstantlyexer-cised,andwouldcontinuetobeso,aslongastherevenuesoftheConfederacyshouldremaindepend-enton theintermedLateagencyofitsmembers.Whattheconsequencesofthissystemhavebeen,iswithintheknowledgeofeveryman theleastcon-versantinourpublicaffa{rs,andhasbeenamply_foldedindifferentpartsoftheseinquiries.Itisthiswhichhaschieflycontributedtoreduceustoasittmtion,whichaffordsamplecausebothofmorti-ficationtoourselves,andoftriumphtoourenemies.Whatremedycantherebeforthissituation,but

inachangeofthesystemwhichhasproducedit--inachangeofthefallaciousanddelusivesystemofquotasandrequisitions?Whatsubstitutecantherebe imaginedfor this4gnisfatuusin finance,but thatof permittingthe national governmentto raise itsown revenuesby the ordinarymethods of t__x_a,tionauthorized in every well-ordered constitution of

234 AlexanderHamilton

civil government? Ingenious men mA.ydec!aimwith plausibilityon any subject; but no humanin-genuitycanpointout any other expedientto rescueus from the inconveniencesand embarrassmentsnaturallyresultingfrom defective suppliesof thepublic treasury.

The more intelligentadversariesof the newCon-stitutionadmit the forceof this reasoning;but theyqualify their admissionby a distinction betweenwhat they call internaland externaltaxation. Theformertheywouldreserveto the State governments;the latter, whichthey explain into commercialim-posts, or rather duties on imported articles, theydeclarethemselveswillingto concedeto the federalhead. This distinction,however,wouldviolatethern_ximof goodsenseand soundpolicy,whichdic-tates that every POWERoughtto be in proportiontoits OBJECT;andwouldstill leavethe generalgovern-ment in a kind oftutelageto the State governments,inconsistentwith every idea of vigor or efficiency.Who can pretend that commercialimposts are, orwouldbe, aloneeql!a!to the presentand future exi-genciesofthe Union? Takinginto the accounttheexistingdebt, foreignand domestic,upon any planof extinguishmentwhich a man moderately im-pressedwith the importanceof public justice andpublic credit couldapprove, in addition to the es-tablishmentswhichall partieswillacknowledgeto benecessary,wecouldnotreasonablyflatterourselves,th_:tthis resourcealone, upon the most improvedscale,wouldeven sufficefor its presentnecessities.Its future necessitiesadmit not of calol!ationor

The Federalist 235

limitation; and uponthe principle,more than onceadvertedto, the powerofmakingprovisionfor themas they arise ought to be equally unconfined. Ibelieveit may be regardedas a positionwarrantedby the history of mankind,that, in the usualpro=gressof things,the necessitiesof a nation,in everystageof its existence,will be _oundat leastequaltoits resources.

To say that deficienciesmay be providedfor byrequisitionsupon the States, is on the onehand toacknowledgethat this system cannot be dependedupon, and on the other hand to dependuponit foreverythingbeyonda certainlimit. Thosewhohavecarefullyattended to its vices and deformitiesasthey havebeenexhibitedby experienceordelineatedin the courseof these papers,must feel invinciblerepugnancyto trusting the nationalinterestsin anydegree to its operation. Its inevitabletendency,wheneverit is broughtinto activity,must be to en-feeblethe Union,and sowthe seedsof discordandcontentionbetweenthe federalhead and its mem-bers, andbetweenthe membersthemselves. Canitbe expected that the deficiencieswould be bettersuppliedin this mode than the total wants of theUnion have heretoforebeen suppliedin the samemode? It oughtto be recollectedthat if lesswillberequiredfromthe States,theywillhave propdrtion-ably less means to answer the demand. If theopinionsof those who contend for the distinctionwhichhas been mentionedwere to be receivedasevidenceof truth, onewouldbe led to concludethatthere was some known point in the economyof

236 AlexanderHamilton

nationalaffairsat whichit wouldbe safeto stopandto say: Thusfarthe endsof publichappinesswillbepromotedby supplyingthewantsofgovernment,and all beyondthis is unworthyof our careoranxiety. How is it possiblethat a governmenthalf suppliedand alwaysnecessitous,can fulfilthepurposesofits institution,canprovideforthe secur-ity, advancethe prosperity,or supportthe reputa-tionofthecommonwealth?Howcanit everpossesseither energyor stability,dignity or credit,con-fidenceat home or respectabilityabroad? Howcan its administrationbe anyt_ elsethana suc-cessionof expedientstemporizing,impotent,dis-graceful? Howwillit be ableto avoida frequentsacrificeof its engagementsto immediatenecessity?Howcan it undertakeor executeanyliberalor en-largedplansof publicgood?

Letus attendto whatwouldbe theeffectsofth_ssituationin the veryfirstwar in whichwe shouldhappento be engaged. Wewillpresume,forargu-ment'ssake,that the revenuearish3gfromthe im-post dutiesanswersthepurposesof a provisionforthe publicdebtandofa peaceestablishmentfortheUnion. Thus circumstanced,a war breaks out.What wouldbe theprobableconductof thegovern-mentin suchan emergency? Taughtby experiencethat properdependencecouldnot be placedon thesuccessof requisitions,unableby its ownauthorityto lay holdof flesh resources,and urged by con-siderationsof national danger,would it not bedrivento the expedientof divertingthe funds al-readyappropriatedfromtheirproperobjectsto the

The Federalist _'37

defenceof the State? It is not easy to see how astepof thiskind couldbe avoided; and if it shouldbe taken, it is evidentthat it wouldprove the de-struction of publiccredit at the very momentth_:tit was becomingessentialto the public safety. Toimaginethat at suchacrisiscreditmightbe dispensedwith, wouldbe the extremeof infatuation. In themodernsystemofwar,nationsthe most wealthyareobligedto haverecourseto largeloans. A countryso little opulentas oursmust feelthis necessityin amuch stronger degree. But who would lend to agovernmentthat prefacedits overturesforborrow-ing by an act whichdemonstratedthat no reliancecouldbe placedonthe steadinessof its measuresforpaying? The loans it m_ghtbe able to procurewouldbe aslimitedin their extentas burdensomeintheir conditions. They would be made upon thesame principles that usurers commonlylend tobankrupt and fraudulent debtors,mwitha sparinghand at enormouspremiums.

It mayperhapsbe imaginedthat, fromthe scanti-nessof the resourcesof the country,the necessityofdivertingthe establishedfundsin the casesupposedwouldexist,thoughthe nationalgovernmentshouldpossess an unrestrained power of taxation. Buttwo considerationswillserve to quiet all apprehen-sion on this head: one is, that weare sure the re-sourcesof the community,in their full extent, willbe broughtinto activityfor the benefitofthe Union;the other is, that whatever deficienciesthere maybe, can withoutdifficultybe suppliedby loans.

The power of creating new funds upon new oh-

•38 AlexanderHAmilton

jeersoftaxation,by its ownauthority,wouldenablethe national governmentto borrow as far as itsnecessitiesmightrequire. Foreigners,as wellas thecitizensof America, could then reasonablyreposeconfidencein its engagements;but to dependupona governmentthat must itselfdependuponthirteenother governmentsfor the meansoffulfillingits con-tracts, whenonceits situationis clearlyunderstood,wouldrequirea degreeof credulitynot oftento bemet with in the pecuniarytransactionsof ma_ldnd,and little reconcilablewith the usualsharp-sighted-ness of avarice.

Reflectionsof th_skind may have triflingweightwith men who hope to see realizedin Americathehalcyonscenesof the poeticor fabulousage; but tothosewhobelieveweare likelyto experiencea com-monportionof the vicissitudesand calamitieswhichhave fallen to the lot of other nations,they mustappear entitled to serious attention. Such menmust beholdthe actual situation of their countrywith painful solicitude, and deprecate the evilswhich ambitionor revengemight, with too muchfacility, inflictuponit.

PUBLIUS.

Fromtit,NewYorkPacket,Tuesday,Januaryx, x'188

THEFEDERALIST.No.XXXI

(HAm,TO_)

To thePeopleo_theStateo_New York:In disquisitionsof every kind, there are certain

primary truths, or first principles,upon whichall

The Federalist 239

subsequentreasoningsmustdepend. Thesecontainan intern_R_!evidencewhich,antecedentto all re-flectionor combination,commandsthe assentofthem_ud. Whereit producesnot this effect,it mustproceedeither from some defector disorderin theorgansof perception,or fromthe influenceof somestrong interest, or passion,or prejudice. Of th_r_ture are the maximsin geometry,that "the wholeis greaterthan its part; thingsequalto the sameareequal to oneanother; twostraightlinescannoten-closea space; and all right anglesare equalto eachother." Ofthe samenature aretheseothermaximsin ethicsand politics,that there cannotbe an effectwithout a cause; that the means oughtto be pro-portionedto the end; that everypoweroughtto becommensuratewith its object; that there oughttobe no !_mltationof a powerdestinedto effecta pur-pose whichis itself incapable of limitation. Andthere are other truths in the two latter scienceswhich,if they cannot pretend to rank in the classof axioms,are yet such directinferencesfrom them,and so obviousin themselves,and so agreeabletothe natural andunsophisticateddictatesofcommon-sense, that they challengethe assent of a soundand unbiasedmind, with a degreeof forceand con-victionalmost equallyirresistible.

The objectsof geometricalinquiryare soentirelyabstracted from those pursuits whichstir up andput in motion the unruly passionsof the hum_:nheart, that rnan_d, without difficulty,adopt notonly the more simpletheoremsof the science,buteventhose abstruseparadoxeswhich,howeverthey

240 AlexanderHamilton

may appear susceptibleof demonstx-aGon,are atvariance with the natural conceptionswhich themind, without the aid of philosophy,wouldbe ledto entertainuponthe subject. TheINFINITEDIVISI-BILITYof mat-t_r,or, in other words, the INFINITEdivisibilityof a FINITEthing,extendingevento theminutest atom, is a point agreedamonggeometri-cians,though not lessincomprehensibleto common-sensethan any ofthosemysteriesin religion,againstwhichthe batteries of infidelityhave beensoindus-triouslylevelled.

But in the sciencesof morals and politics,menare foundfar lesstractable. To a certaindegree,itis right and useful that this should be the case.Caution and investigationare a necessaryarmoragainsterror and imposition. But thisuntractable-ness may be carried too far, and may degenerateintoobstinacy,perverseness,ordisingenuity.Thoughit cannotbe pretended that the principlesof moraland politicalknowledgehave, in general,the samedegreeof certainty with those of the mathematics,yet they have much better c]airasin this respectthan, to judgefrom the conductofmen in partiol|arsituations, we should be disposed to allow them.The obscurityis much oftener in the passionsandprejudicesofthe reasonerthan in the subject. Men,upon too many occasions,do not give their ownunderstandingsfair play; but, fielding to someun-towardbias,they entanglethemselvesin wordsandconfoundthemselvesin subtleties.

Howelsecouldit happen (if weadmit the objec-tzrs to be sincerein their opposition),that positions

The Federalist 241

so clear as thosewhichmanifest the necessityof ageneralpowerof taxationin the governmentof theUnion,should have to encounter any adversariesamongmenofdiscernment? Thoughthesepositionshavebeen elsewhereft_y stated, they will perhapsnot be improperlyrecapitulatedin this place,as in-troductory to an examinationof what may havebeen offeredby way of objection to them. Theyare in substanceas follows:

A governmentought to contain in itself everypowerrequisiteto the full accomplishmentof theobjectscommittedto its care,and to the completeexecutionof the trusts for whichit is responsible,freefrom every other control but a regard to thepublicgoodand to the senseof the people.

As the duties of superintendingthe national de-fence and of securing the public peace againstforeignor domestic violence involve a provisionfor casualtiesand dangers to which no possiblelimits can be assigned,the power of rn_Hngthatprovisionought to knowno other bounds tl_:ntheexigenciesof the nationand the resourcesof thecommunity.

As revenueis the essentialengineby whichthemeansof answeringthe nationalexigenciesmustbeprocured,the power of procuringthat article in itsfull extent must necessarilybe comprehendedinthat of providingfor thoseexigencies.

As theory and practice conspire to prove thatthe powerof procuringrevenueis unavailingwhenexercisedover the States in their collectivecapaci-ties, the federalgovernmentmust of necessitybe

TOI..ILlZ6.

_'42 AlexanderHamilton

investedwithanunqualifiedpoweroftaxationintheordinarymodes.

Did not experienceevincethe contrary,it wouldbe naturalto concludethat the proprietyof a gen-eral power of taxationin the nationalgovernmentmightsafelybe permittedto rest on the evidenceofthesepropositions,unassistedby any additionalar-gumentsor illustrations. But wefind, in fact,thatthe antagonistsof the proposedConstitution,so farfromacquiescingin their justnessor truth, seem tomaketheir principaland mostzealouseffortagainstthis part of the plan. It may thereforebe satis-factoryto analyzethe argumentswith which theycombatit.

Thoseofthemwhichhavebeenmostlaboredwiththat view,seemin substanceto amountto this: "Itis not true,becausetheexigenciesof theUnionmaynot be susceptibleof limitation,that its poweroflayingtaxesoughtto beunconfined. Revenueis asrequisiteto thepurposesofthe localadministrationsas to thoseof theUnion;and the formerareat leastof equalimportancewiththe latterto the happinessofthe people. It is, therefore,as necessarythat theState governmentsshouldbe ableto commandthemeansofsupplyingtheirwants,as that the nationalgovernmentshould possessthe like faculty in re-spect to the wantsof the Union. But an indefinitepowerof taxation in the lattermight, and probablywouldin time, deprivethe ]ormerof the means ofprovidingfor their ownnecessities;and wouldsub-ject thementirelyto the mercyof the nationallegis-lature. As the lawsof the Unionare to becomethe

The Federalist 243

supremelaw of the land, as it is to have powertopass all laws that may be NECESSARYfor carryinginto executionthe authoritieswith whichit is pro-posedto vest it, the nationalgovernmentmight atany time abolishthe taxesimposedforState objectsupon the pretenceof an interferencewith its own.It mightallegea necessityof doingthis in ordertogive efficacyto the national revenues. And thusall the resourcesof taxation might by degreesbe-comethe subjectsof federalmonopoly,to the entireexclusionanddestructionofthe Stategovernments."

This mode of reasoningappears sometimestoturn upon the suppositionof usurpationin the na-tional government; at other times it seemsto bedesignedonly as a deductionfromthe constitutionaloperationof its intendedpowers. It is only in thelatter light that it can be admittedto haveanypre-tensionsto fairness. The momentwe launch intoconjecturesabout the usurpationsof the federalgovernment,we get into an unfathomableabyss,andfairlyput ourselvesout ofthe reachofallreason-ing. Imaginationmay range at pleasuretill it getsbewilderedamidst the labyrinthsof an enchantedcastle,and knowsnot on whichside to turn to ex-tricate itselffrom the perplexitiesinto whichit hassorashly adventured. Whatevermay be the limitsor modificationsof the powersof the Union,it iseasy to imaginean endlesstrain of possibledangers;and by indulgingan excessof jealousyand timidity,wemaybringourselvesto a state of absolutescepti-cism and irresolution. I repeat here what I haveobserved in substance in another place, that all

244 AlexanderHamilton

observationsfoundeduponthe dangerof usurpationoughttobe referredto thecompositionandstructureof the government,not to the nature or extent ofits powers. The State governments,by their origi-nal constitutions,are investedwith completesov-ereignty. In what doesour securityconsistagainstusurpation from that qllarter? Doubtlessin themannerof their formation,and in a due dependenceofthosewhoare toadministerthemuponthe people.If the proposedconstructionof the federalgovern-ment be found,uponan impartialexarnJ_nationof it,to be suchas to afford,to a properextent, the samespeciesof security,all apprehensionsonthe scoreofusurpationoughtto be discarded.

It shouldnot be forgotten that a dispositioninthe State governmentsto encroachuponthe rightsof the Unionis quite as probableas a dispositioninthe Unionto encroachupon the rights of the Stategovernments. What sidewouldbe likelyto prevailin sucha conflict,must dependon the meanswhichthe contendingparties couldemploytowards insur-ing success. As in republics strength is alwaysonthe sideof the people,and as there are weightyrea-sons to inducea beliefthat the State governmentswillcommonlypossessmost influenceoverthem, thenaturalconclusionis that suchcontestswillbe mostapt to end to the disadvantageof the Union; andthat there is greaterprobability of encroachmentsby the membersupon the federalhead, than by thefederalheadupon the members. But it is evidentthat all conjecturesof this kind must be extremelyvagueand fallible:and that it is by far the safest

The Federalist 245

courseto lay them altogetheraside, and to confineourattentionwhollyto thenatureand extentofthepowersas they are delineatedin the Constitution.Every thing beyondthis must be left to the pru-denceandfirmnessof thepeople;who,as theywillholdthescalesin theirownhands,it is to behoped,will alwaystake careto preservetheconstitutionalequilibriumbetweenthe generalandthe Stategov-ernments. Uponthis ground,whichis evidentlythe trueone,it will not be difficultto obviatetheobjectionswhich havebeenmade to an indefinitepowerof taxationin theUnitedStates.

PUBLIUS.

FromtheDailyAdvertiser,Thursday,January3,*788

THE FEDERALIST. No.XXXll

(HAMILTON)

To thePeopleoftheStateof New York:AlthoughI am of opinionthat there wouldbe no

real dangerof the consequenceswhichseem to beapprehendedto the State governmentsfroma powerin the Unionto controlthem in the leviesof money,becauseI am persuadedthat the senseof the people,the extremehazard of provokingthe resentmentsof the State governments,and a convictionof theutility and necessityof local administrationsforlocalpurposes,wouldbe a completebarrieragainsttheoppressiveuseof sucha power;yet I amwillinghereto allow,in its fullextent, the justnessof thereasoningwhichrequiresthat the individualStatesshouldpossessan independentand uncontrollable

u46 AlexanderHamilton

authorityto raisetheirownrevenuesfor the supplyof theirownwants. Andmakfingthisconcession,I_arm that (with the sole exceptionof duties onimportsand exports)theywould,undertheplanofthe convention,retainthatauthorityinthemostab-soluteand unqualifiedsense; and that an attempton the part of the nationalgovernmentto abridgethemin theexerciseofit, wouldbea violentassump-tion of power,unwarrantedby any articleorclauseof its Constitution.

An entire consolidationof the States into onecompletenationalsovereigntywouldimplyan entiresubordinationof the parts; and whateverpowersmightremaininthem,wouldbealtogetherdependenton thegeneralwill. Butastheplanof the conven-tion aims only at a partialunionor consolidation,the State governmentswouldclearlyretainall therights of sovereigntywhichthey beforehad, andwhichwere not, by that act, exclusivelydelegatedto the UnitedStates. This exclusivedelegation,orratherthis alienation,of State sovereignty,wouldonlyexistin threecases: wherethe Constitutioninexpresstermsgrantedan exclusiveauthorityto theUnion;whereit grantedin one instancean author-ity tothe Union,andin anotherprohibitedtheStatesfromexercisingthe like authority; and whereitgrantedanauthorityto the Union,to whicha similarauthorityin the States would be absolutelyandtotally contradictoryand repugnanL I use theseterms to distinguishthis last case from anotherwhichmightappearto resembleit, butwhichwould,in fact, be essentiMlydifferent;I meanwherethe

The Federalist 247

exerciseof a concurrentjurisdictionmight be pro-ductiveof occasionalinterferencesin the policyofany branch of administration,but wouldnot implyany direct contradictionor repugnancyin point ofconstitutionalauthority. These three casesof ex-clusivejurisdictionin the federalgove_ment maybe exemplifiedby the followinginstances: The lastclausebut onein the eighthsectionofthe first articleprovidesexpresslythat Congressshallexercise"ex-clusivelegislation"over the district to be appro-priatedas the seat of government. This answerstothe first case. The first clauseof the same sectionempowersCongress"to lay and collecttaxes,duties,imposts,and excises"; and the secondclauseof thetenth sectionof the same articledeclaresthat, "noStateshall,withoutthe consentof Congress,lay anyimpostsordutiesonimportsorexports,exceptfor thepurposeof executingits inspectionlaws." Hencewouldresult an exclusivepowerin the Unionto layduties on importsand exports,with theparticularexceptionmentioned; but this poweris abridgedbyanotherclause,whichdeclaresthat no tax or dutyshallbe laid on articlesexportedfromany State; inconsequenceof whichqualification,it now only ex-tendsto the dutieson imports. This answersto thesecondcase. The third willbe foundin that clausewhichdeclaresthat Congressshall have power "toestablishanImll_OR_RULEofnaturalizationthrough-out the United States." Thismust necessarilybeexclusive;becauseif eachState had powerto pre-scribea DISTINCT RULE,there couldnot be a UNI-I_ORMRULE.

248 AlexanderHamilton

A casewhichm8¥perhapsbethoughtto resemblethe latter, but which is in fact. widely different,affectsthe questionimmediatelyunderconsidera-tion. I mean the powerof imposingtaxes on allarticlesother than exportsand imports. This, Icontend,is manifestlya concurrentand coequalauthorityin the UnitedStates and in the individualStates. There is plainlyno expressionin the grant-ing clausewhichmo:kesthat powerexclusivein theUnion. There is no independentclauseor sentencewhich prohibits the States from exercisingit. Sofar is this frombeingthe case,that a plalnandcon-clusivearg_rnentto the contraryis to be deducedfrom the restraint laid upon the States in relationto duties on importsand exports. This restrictionimpliesan admissionthat-,if it-werenot-insertec_theStateswouldpossessthe powerit excludes;and it-implies a further admission,that-as to all othertaxes, the authority of the States r_mains undi-minished. In anyother view it-wouldbe both un-necessaryand dangerous; it would be unnecessary,becauseif the grant to the Unionof the poweroflayingsuchdutiesimpliedtheexclusionof the States,oreven theirsubordinationin this particular,therecouldbe no needof sucha restriction;it wouldbedangerous,becausethe introductionof it leads di-rectlyto the conclusionwhichhasbeenmentioned,and which,if the reasoningof the objectorsbe just,could not have been intended; I mean that theStates,-inall casesto whichthe restrictiondid not-apply, wouldhave a concurrentpowerof taxationwiththe Union. Therestrictioninquestion_:mounts

The Federalist 249

whatlawyerscalla NEGATIVEPREGNANT---thatiS,a negationof onething,andan affirnmnceofanother;a negationof the authority of the States to imposetaxes on importsand exports,and an affm_mceoftheir authority to imposethem on all other articles.It wouldbe mere sophistry to argue that it wasmeant to excludethem absolutelyfrom the imposi-tion of taxes of the formerk{nd,and to leavethemat liberty to lay others subjectto tlmcontrolof thenational legislature. The restrainingor prohibitoryclause only says, that they shall not, withouttheconsento_Congress,lay suchduties; and if we areto understandthis in the senselast mentioned,theConstitution would then be made to introduce aformalprovisionfor the sake of a very absurd con-Clusion;whichis,that the States,withtheconsentofthe national legislature,might tax imports and ex-ports; and that they might tax every other article,unlesscontrolledby the samebody. If this wastheintention,why not leave it, in the first instance,towhat is allegedto be the natural operationof theoriginalclause,conferringa generalpowerof taxa-tion uponthe Union? It is evidentthat this couldnot havebeenthe intention,andthat it willnot beara constructionof the l_iud.

As to a suppositionof repugnancybetween thepowerof taxation in the States and in the Union,i_cannot be supportedin that sensewhichwould berequisiteto work an exclusionof the States. It is,indeed,possiblethat a tax mightbe laid on a par-ticular article by a State whichmight render it in-expedientthat thus a further tax shouldbe laid on

250 AlexanderHamilton

the same article by the Union; but it would notimplya constitutionalinability to imposea furthertax. The quantity of the imposition,the expedi-encyor inexpediencyof an increaseon either side,would be mutnw:l!yquestions of prudence; butthere wouldbe involvedno direct contradictionofpower. The particularpohcyofthe nationaland ofthe Statesystemsoffinancemightnowand thennotexactly coincide,and might require reciprocalfor-bearances. It is not, however,a merepossibilityofinconveniencein the exerciseof powers,but an im-mediateconstitutionalrepugnancythat can by im-plicationalienateand exting_h a pre6x_tingrightof sovereignty.

The necessityof a concurrentjurisdictionin cer-tain casesresults from the divisionof the sovereignpower; and the rule that all authorities,of whichthe States are not explicitlydivestedin favor of theUnion,remainwith themin full vigor,is not a theo-retical consequenceof that division,but is clearlyadmitted by the whole tenor of the instrumentwhichcontainsthe articlesof the proposedConstitu-tion. We there find that, notwithstanding theaffirmativegrants of generalauthorities,there hasbeen the most pointed care in those caseswhereitwasdeemedimproperthat the likeauthoritiesshouldresidein the States, to insert negative clausespro-hibiting the exerciseof them by the States. Thetenth sectionof the first article consistsaltogetherof suchprovisions. This circumstanceis a clearin-dication of the sense of the convention,and fur-nishesa rule ofinterpretationout of the body ofthe

The Federalist 25x

act, whichjustifies the position I have advancedand refuteseveryhypothesisto the contrary.

PUBLIUS.

FromtheDailyAdveraser,January3,x788

_HE FEDERALIST.No. XXXlII

(_xmLroN)

To thePeopleoftheStateof New York:Theresidueof the argumentagainstthe provisions

of the Constitutionin respect to taxation is in-grafted uponthe followingclause." The last clauseof the eighth sectionof the first article of the planunder considerationauthorizesthe national legis-lature "to make all laws which shall be necessaryand properfor carryinginto executionthepowersbythat Constitutionvested in the governmentof theUnited States, or in any department or officerthereof"; and the secondclauseof the sixth articledeclares,"that the Constitutionand the lawsof theUnited States made in pursuancethereof,and thetreatiesmadeby their authorityshallbe the supreme/awofthe land,any thing in the constitutionor lawsof any State to the contrarynotwlthstanding."

Thesetwo clauseshave been the sourceof muchvirulentinvectiveand petulantdeclamationagainstthe proposed constitution. They have been heldup to the peoplein all the exaggeratedcolorsofmisrepresentationas the perniciousenginesby which

xThiswasthepointat whichNo.XXXI.oftheoriginalnewspaperessayswasdivided,andthisopeningsentenceappearedftrs_intheMcLeaneditionofx788.

25_ AlexanderHamilton

taheirlocal governmentswere to be destroyedandtheir libertiesexterminated;as the hideousmonsterwhosedevouringjaws wouldspare neither sex norage,nor high nor low,nor sacrednor profane; andyet, strangeas it may appear,after all this clamor,to those who may not have happened to contem-plate them in the same light, it may be affirmedwith perfect confidencethat the constitutionalOlO_eration of the intendedgovernmentwouldbe pre-cisely the same, if these clauses were entirelyobliterated,as if they wererepeatedin everyarticle.Theyareonlydeclaratoryofa truth whichwouldhaveresulted by necessaryand unavoidableimplicationffromthe very act of constitutinga federalgovern-ment, and vesting it with certain specifiedpowers.This is so clear a proposition,that moderationitselfcan scarcelylisten to the railingswhichhave beenso copiouslyvented against this part of the plan,withoutemotionsthat disturb its equanimity.

What is a power, but the ability or faculty ofdoinga thing? What is the ability to do a thing,but the powerof employingthe meansnecessarytoits execution? What is a LEOISLATIVSpower,but apower of making LAWS?What are the means toexecutea LEOISLATIVEpower,but LAWS? What isthe power of laying and collectingtaxes, but alegislativepower,or a power of making laws,to layand collecttaxes? What are the propermeansofexecutingsuch a power, but necessaryand properlaws?

This simpletrain of inquiry furnishesus at oncewith a test by whichto judge of the true nature of

The Federalist 253

the clause complainedof. It conductsus to thispalpabletruth, that a powerto lay and collecttaxesmust be a powerto passall lawsnecessaryandproperfor the executionof that power; and what doestheunfortunate and calumniatedprovisionin questiondo more than declarethe same truth, to wit, thatthe nationallegislature,to whomthe poweroflayingand collectingtaxes had been previouslygiven,might,in the executionof that power,passall lawsnecessaryand properto carry it into effect? I haveappliedthese observationsthus particularly to thepowerof taxation,becauseit is the immediatesub-ject under consideration,andbecauseit is the mostimportant of the authorities proposedto be con-ferred upon the Union. But the sameprocesswillleadto the sameresult,in relationto allotherpowersdeclaredin the Constitution. And it is expresslytoexecutethese powersthat the sweepingclause,as ithas been affectedlycalled,authorizesthe nationallegislatureto pass all necessaryand properlaws. Ifthere is any thing exceptionable,it must be soughtfor in the specificpowersupon which this generaldecla_ation is predicated. The declarationitself,though it may be chargeablewith tautologyor re-dun6_ncy,is at least perfectlyharmless.

But s_sPIcIo_may ask, Why then wasit intro-duced? Theansweris, that it couldonlyhavebeendone for greater caution, and to guard against allcavillingrefinementsin those whomighthereafterfeel a dispositionto curtailandevadethe legitimateauthorities of the Union. The Conventionprob-ably foresaw,what it has been a principalaim of

254 AlexanderHamilton

these papers to inculcate,that the d_:ugerwhichmostthreatensour politicalwelfareis _t the Stategovernmentswill finallysap the foundationsof theUnion; and might thereforethink it necessary,insocardinala point, to leavenothingto construction.Whatevermay have beenthe inducementto it, thewisdomof the precautionis evident from the crywhichhas been raised against it; as that very crybetrays a dispositionto questionthe great and es-sentialtruth whichit is manifestlythe objectofthatprovisionto declare.

But it may be againasked,Whois to judge ofthenecessityand t_royrietyof the laws to be passedforexecutingthe powersof the Union? I answer,first,that this question arises as welland as fully uponthe simplegrant of those powersas upon the de-claratoryclause; and I answer,in the secondplace,that the nationalgovernment,llkeevery other,mustjudge,in the first instance,of the properexerciseofits powers,and its constituentsin the last. If thefederalgovernmentshouldoverpassthe just boundsof its authority and make a tyrannical use of itspowers,the people,whosecreatureit is,must appealto the stand_.rdthey have formed, and take suchmeasuresto redressthe injury doneto the Constitu-tion as the ex£gencymay suggestand prudencejus-tify. The propriety of a law, in a constitutionallight, must alwaysbe determinedby the nature ofthe powersupon whichit is founded. Suppose,bysome forcedconstructionsof its authority (which,indeed, cannot easily be imagined), the Federallegislatureshouldattempt to vary the lawof descent

The Federalist 255

in anyState,wouldit-not be evidentthat, in makingsuch an attempt, it had exceededits jurisdiction,and infringedupon that of the State? Suppose,again,that uponthe pretenceofan interferencewithits revenues,it shouldundertaketo abrogatea land-tax imposedby the authorityof a State; woulditnot be equallyevidentthat this was an invasionofthat concurrentjurisdictionin respectto thisspeciesoftax,whichits Constitutionplainlysupposesto existin the State governments? If there ever shouldbea doubt on this head,the credit of it willbe entirelydue to those reasonerswho, in the imprudent zealof their animosityto the plan of the convention,have laboredto envelopit in a cloud calculatedtoobscurethe plainestand simplest,truths.

But it is said that the lawsof the Unionare to bethe supremelaw of the land. But what inferencecan be drawnfromthis, or what wouldthey amountto, if they were not to be supreme? It is evidentthey would amount to nothing. A LAW,by theverymeaningof the term, includessupremacy. Itis a rule whichthose to whomit is prescribedareboundto observe. This resultsfromevery politicalassociation. If individualsenter into a state ofsociety,the lawsofthat societymust be the supremeregulatorof their conduct. If a numberof politicalsocietiesenter into a largerpoliticalsociety,the lawswhichthe latter mayenact, pursuantto the powersintrusted to it by its constitution,must necessarilybe supremeover thosesocieties,and the individualsofwhomthey are composed. It wouldotherwisebea mere treaty, dependenton the goodfaith of the

256 AlexanderH_milton

parties,andnot a government,whichis only an-otherwordfor POLITICALPOWER AND SUPREMACY.But it willnotfollowfromtbJ_doctrinethatactsofthe largersocietywtficharenotpursuantto its con-stitutionalpowers,but which are invasionsof theresiduary authoritiesof the smaller societies,willbecomethe supremelaw of the land. Thesewillbemerely acts of usurpation,and will deserveto betreatedas such. Henceweperceivethat theclausewhich declaresthe supremacyof the laws of theUnion,like the one wehave just beforeconsidered,only declaresa truth, whichflowsimmediatelyandnecessarilyfrom the _nstitutionof a federalgovern-ment. It will not, I presume,have escapedobser-vation, that it expresslyconfinesthis supremacytolaws made pursuant to the Constitution;which Imentionmerely as an instanceof cautionin theconvention;since that limitationwouldhavebeento be understood,thoughit had not beenexpressed.

Thougha law,therefore,layinga tax forthe useofthe UnitedStateswouldbe supremein its nature,and couldnot legallybe opposedor controlled,yeta law forabrogatingor preventingthe collectionofa tax laidby theauthorityoftheState(unlessuponimportsand exports),wouldnotbethe supremelawof the land, but a usurpationof powernot grantedby the Constitution.As far as an improperaccu-mulationof taxes on the same object might tendto renderthe collectiondifficultor precarious,thiswouldbe a mutualinconvenience,not arisingfroma superiorityor defectof poweron eitherside,butfroman injudiciousexerciseof powerby oneor the

The Federalist 257

other,in a m_er equallydisadvantageousto both.It is to be hoped and presumed, however, thatmutual interestwoulddictatea concert in this re-spectwhichwouldavoidanymaterialinconvenience.The inferencefrom the wholeis, that the individualStateswould,under the proposedConstitution,re-tain an independentand uncontrollableauthority toraise revenueto anyextentof whichtheyrnay standin need,by everykind of taxation,exceptdutiesonimports and exports. It willbe shownin the nextpaper that this CONCURRENTJURISDICTIONin thearticleof taxationwas the onlyadmissiblesubsti-tute for an entiresubordination,in respectto thisbranchof power,of the Stateauthorityto that ofthe Union.

PUBLIUS.

PromtheNewYorkPacket,Friday,January4, *788

THEFEDERALIST.No.XXXIV

(HAMILTON)

To thePeopleo_theStateofNe_vYork:I flatter myselfit has been clearlyshown in my

last number that the particular States, under theproposed Constitution,would have COEQUALau-thority with the Union in the article of revenue,exceptas to dutieson imports. Ast.hisleavesopento the Statesfar the greatestpar_of the resourcesof the community,there can be no colorfor theassertionthat they would not possess means asabundantas couldbe desiredforthesupplyof theirown wants, independentof all externalcontrol.

VOL.XL_Iy,

258 AlexanderHamilton

That the field is sufficientlywide will more fullyappearwhenwe cometo advert to the inconsider-ableshareofthe publicexpensesforwhichit willfallto the lot of the Stategovernmentsto provide.

To argue upon abstract principlesthat this co-ordinateauthoritycannotexist,is to set up supposi-tion and theory againstfact and reality. Howeverproper such reasoningsmight be to show that athing oughtnot to exist, they are whollyto be re-jected when they are made use of to provethat itdoesnot exist contraryto the evidenceof the factitself. It is wellknownthat in the Romanrepublicthe legislativeauthority, in the last resort, residedfor ages in two differentpolitical bodies_not asbranchesof the samelegislature,but as distinctandindependentlegislatures,in eachof whichan oppo-siteinterestprevailed: in onethe patrician; in theother, the plebeian. Manyargumentsmight havebeen adduced to prove the unfitnessof two suchseemingly contradictory authorities, each havingpowerto annulor repealthe acts of the other. Buta man would have been regarded as frantic whoshould have attempted at Rome to disprovetheirexistence. It will be readily understood that Ialludeto the COMITIACENTURIATAand the COMITIATmBUTA.Theformer,in whichthe peoplevotedbycenturies,wassoarrangedas to givea superioritytothe patricianinterest; in the latter, in whichnum-bers prevailed,the plebeianinterest had an entirepredominancy. And yet these two legislaturesco-existed for ages, and the Romanrepublicattainedto the utmostheightof humangreatne.ss.

The Federalist 259

In the caseparticularlyunderconsideration,thereis no suchcontradictionas appears in the examplecited; there is no poweron either sideto annul theacts of the other. And in practice there is littlereason to apprehendany inconvenience;because,in a shortcourseoftime,the wantsofthe Stateswillnaturally reduce themselveswithin a very narrowcompass;and in the interim,the UnitedStates will,ha all probability, find it convenient to abstainwholly from those objects to whichthe particularStateswouldbe inclinedto resort.

To form a more precise judgment of the truemerits of this question,it willbe wellto advert tothe proportionbetweenthe objectsthat willrequirea federalprovisionin respectto revenue,and thosewhichwillrequire a State provision. We shalldis-cover that the formerare altogetheru_nliruited,andthat the latter are circumscribedwithin very mod-erate bounds. In pursuing this inquiry, we mustbearin mind that we are not to confineourviewtothe presentperiod, but to look forwardto remotefuturity. Constitutionsof civilgovernmentare notto be framedupon a calculationof existingexigen-cies,but upona combinationof thesewith the prob-able exigenciesof ages,accordingto the natural andtried courseof human affairs. Nothing,therefore,can be morefallaciousthan to inferthe extentofanypower,proper to be lodgedin the national govern-ment, froman estimateof its immediatenecessities.There oughtto be a CAPACITYto providefor futurecontingenciesas they mayhappen; and as these arei111rnitablein their nature, it is impossiblesafelyto

260 AlexanderHamilton

l_m_tthatcapacity. It is true,perhaps,thata com-putationm_ghtbe m_dewithsufficientaccuracytoanswerthe purposeof the quantityof revenuere-quisiteto dischargethe subsistingengagementsofthe Union, and to m-_tain those establishmentswhich,forsometime to come,wouldsufficein timeof peace. But wouldit be wise,or would it notrather be the extremeof folly,to stop at th_ point,and to leavethe governmentintrusted with the careof the national defencein a state of absolute in-capacityto providefor the protectionof the com-munityags:_nstfutureinvasionsof the publicpeace,by foreignwar or domesticconvulsions? If, on thecontrary,we oughtto exceedthis point, wherecanwe stop, short of an indefinitepower of providingforemergenciesas theymay arise? Thoughit is easyto assert, in generalterms, the possibilityoffo_a rationaljudgmentof a dueprovisionagainstprob-able dangers,yet wemaysafelycha!!engethose who_:_e the assertionto bring forwardtheir data, and_y a_rm that they wouldbe foundas vagueanduncertainas any that couldbe producedto establishthe probableduration of the world. Observationsconfinedto the mere prospectsof internal attackscandeservenoweight; thougheventhesewilladmitof no satisfactorycalculation:but if wemean to bea commercialpeople, it must form a part of ourpolicyto be able oneday to defendthat commerce.The suppor_of a navy and of naval warswouldin-volve contingenciesthat must b_me all the effortsof politicalarithmetic.

Admittingthat we ought to try the novel and

The Federalist 26i

absurdexperimentin pohticsoftying up thehandsof governmentfrom offensivewar foundeduponreasonsof state,yet certainlywe oughtnot to dis-able it fromguardingthe communityagain._ttheambitionor enmity of othernations. A cloudhasbeen for some time hangingover the Europeanworld. If it shouldbreakforth into a storm,whocaninsureus that in its progressa part of its furywouldnot be spentuponus? No reasonablemanwouldhastilypronouncethat weareentirelyout ofits reach. Orif thecombustiblematerialsthatnowseemto be collectingshouldbe dissipatedwithoutcomingto matttrity,or if a flameshouldbe kindledwithoutextendingto us, whatsecuritycan wehavethat our tranquillitywill long remain undisturbedfromsomeother causeor fromsomeother quarter?Letus recollectthatpeaceor warwillnot alwaysbeleft to our option; that howevermoderateor un-ambitiouswe may be, we cannotcount upon themoderation,or hope to extinguishthe ambitionofothers. Who could have imaginedat the conclu-sionof thelast war that Franceand Britain,weariedand exhaustedas they both were, would so soonhave lookedwith so hostile an aspectupon eachother? To judge from the history of mankind,weshall be compelledto concludethat the fiery anddestructive passionsof war reign in the humanbreastwith muchmorepowerfulswaythan the mildand beneficentsentimentsof peace; and that tomodel our political systems upon speculationsoflasting tranquillity,is to calculateon the weakerspringsof the humancharacter.

252 AlexanderHamilton

What are the chiefsourcesof expense in everygovernment?What_a<soccasionedthat enormousaccumulationof debts with whichseveralof theEuropeannations are oppressed?The answerplainlyis, warsand rebellions;thesupportof thoseinstitutionswhichare necessaryto guard the bodypolitic againstthese two most mortaldiseasesofsociety. The expensesarisingfromthose institu-tionswhicharerelativeto themeredomesticpohceof a state,to thesupportof its legislative,executive,andjudicialdepartments,withtheirdifferentappen-dages,and to theencouragementof agricultureandmanufactures(whichwillcomprehendalmostall theobjects of state expenditure),are insignificantincomparisonwith those whichrelateto thenationaldefence.

In the kingdomof GreatBritain,whereall theostentatiousapparatusof monarchyis to be pro-vided for,not abovea fifteenthpart of the annualincomeof the nationis appropriatedto the classofexpenseslastmentioned;theotherfourteenfifteenthsare absorbedin thepaymentof the interestof debtscontractedfor carryingon the warsin whichthatcountryhas beenengaged,and in the maintenanceof fleetsand armies. If, on theonehand,it shouldbe observedthattheexpensesincurredin theprose-cutionof the ambitiousenterprisesand vaingloriouspursuitsof a monarchyarenota properstandardbywhichto judgeof thosewhichmightbenecessaryina republic,it ought,on the otherhand, to be re=markedthatthereshouldbeas greata disproportionbetweentheprofusionandextravaganceofa wealthy

The Federalist 263

kingdom in its domesticadministration,and thefrugalityand economywhichin that particular be-come the modest simph'cityof republicangovern-ment. If we balancea proper deductionfrom oneside againstthat whichit is supposedought to bemade from the other, the proportionmo:ystill beconsideredas holdinggood.

But let us advert to the largedebtwhichwehaveourselvescontractedin a singlewar, and let us onlycalculateon a commonshare of the events whichdisturb the peaceof nations,and weshall instantlyperceive,without the aid of any elaborateillustra-tion, that there must alwaysbe an immensedispro-portion between the objects of federal and stateexpenditures. It is true that severalof the States,separately,are encumberedwith considerabledebts,whichare an excrescenceof the late war. But thiscannot happen again, if the proposedsystem beadopted; and whenthese debtsare discharged,theonlycall for revenueof any consequence,whichtheState governmentswillcontinueto experience,willbe for the meresupportoftheir respectivecivillists;to which, if we add all contingencies,the totalamount in every State ought to fall considerablyshort oftwo hundredthousandpounds.

In framinga governmentfor posterityas wellasourselves,we ought, in those provisionswhicharedesignedtobepermanent,tocalculo:te,notontem-porary,butonpermanentcausesofexpense.Ifthispr]nclplebeajustone,ourattentionwouldbedirectedtoaprovisioninfavoroftheStategovern-mentsforan annualstunofabouttwohundred

264 AlexanderHamilton

thousandpounds;whilethe exigenciesof the Unioncouldbe susceptibleof no limits,evenin _-tion. In this viewof the subject,by whatlogiccanit be maintainedthat the localgovernmentsoughttocommand,in perpetuity, an EXCLUSIV_sourceofrevenueforany sum beyondthe extent of two hun-dred thousand pounds? To extend its power fur-ther, in ex.clusionof the authority of the Union,would be to take the resourcesof the communityout of those handswhichstoodin needof them forthe publicwelfare,in order to put them into otherhandswhichcould haveno just or properoccasionfor them.

Suppose,then, the conventionhad been incliuedto proceeduponthe principleof a repartitionof theobjectsof revenue,betweenthe Unionand its mem-bers, in t:_roportionto their comparativenecessities;what parti_l_:r fund couldhave been sele_ forthe useofthe States,that wouldnot eitherhavebeentoo much or too little--too little for their present,too muchfor their fUturewants? As to the line ofseparationbetweenexternaland internal taxes, thiswouldleaveto the States, at a roughcomputation,the comm_:ndof two tl_irdsof the resourcesof thecommunityto defrayfrom a tenth to a twentiethpart ofits expenses;and to the Union,onethird ofthe resourcesofthe community,to defrayfromninetenthsto nineteentwentiethsof its expenses. If wedesert this boundaryand content ourselves withleavingto the States an exclusivepower of taxinghousesand lands, there wouldstill be a great dis-proportionbetween the means and the end; the

The Federalist 265

possessionof onethirdof the resourcesof thecom-mtmitytosupply,atmost,one tenthof itswants. Ifanyfundcouldhavebeenselectedandappropriated,equalto and not greaterthan the object,it wouldhavebeeninadequateto thedischargeofthe existingdebtsof theparticularStates,and wouldhave leftthem dependenton the Unionfor a provisionfor

purpose.Theprecedingtrainof observationwilljustifythe

positionwhichhas beenelsewherelaid down,that"A CONCURRENTJURmDICTmNin the articleoftaxa-tion wasthe onlyadmissiblesubstituteforan entiresubordination,in respectto this branchof power,of State authority to that of the Union." Anyseparationof theobjectsof revenuethat couldhavebeenfallenupon,wouldhaveamountedto a sacrificeofthegreatiNTERESTSofthe Unionto thePOWERofthe individualStates. The conventionthoughttheconcurrentjurisdictionpreferableto thatsubordina-tion; andit is evidentthat it hasat leastthemeritof reconcilingan indefiniteconstitutionalpower oftaxation in the Federal governmentwith an ade-quate and independentpowerin the States to pro-vide for their ownnecessities. There rem_:iua fewother lights, in which this important subject oftaxationwillclaima further consideration.

PUBLIUS.

266 AlexanderHamilton

For theIndependentJournal

THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXV

(HAMILTON)

To thePeopleoftheStateofNew York:Beforeweproceedto examineanyotherobjections

to anindefinitepoweroftaxationin the Union,I shallmakeonegeneralremark; whichis,that if the juris-dictionofthe nationalgovernment,in the articleofrevenue,should be restrictedto particularobjects,it wouldnaturallyoccasionan undue proportionofthe publicburdensto fall uponthose objects. Twoevilswouldspringfrom this source: the oppressionof particularbranchesof industry; and an unequaldistributionof the t_zxes,as wello_mongthe severalStates as amongthe citizensof the same State.

Suppose,as has been contendedfor, the federalpowerof taxation wereto be confi,_edto duties onimports,it is evidentthat the government,forwantof being able to commandother resources,wouldfrequentlybe tempted to extend these duties%oaninjuriousexcess. There are persons who hnaginethat they canneverbe carriedto toogreata length;sincethe h_gherthey are, the moreit is allegedtheywilltend to discouragean extravagantconstunption,to producea favorablebalanceof trade,and to pro-motedomesticmanufactures. Butall extremesareperniciousin variousways. Exorbitantdutiesonimportedarticleswouldbeget a generalspirit ofsmuggling;whichis alwaysprejudicialto the fairtrader, and eventuallyto the revenueitself: theytend to renderotherclassesofthe eommuniWlxibu-

The Federalist 26_

tary, in an improperdegree,to the manufacturingclasses,to whomtheygivea prematuremonopolyofthe mo:rkets:they sometimesforceindustryout ofits more natural channelsinto others in whichitflowswithlessadvantage; andin the last place,theyoppressthe merchant,whois often obligedto paythem himselfwithout any retributionfromthe con-sumer. When the demandis equal to the quantityof goodsat market,the consumergenerallypays theduty; but when the marketshappen to be over-stocked,a greatproportionfallsupon the merchant,and sometimesnot only exhausts his profits, butbr_ks in upon his capital. I am apt to think thata divisionof the duty, betweenthe sellerand thebuyer, more often happens than is commonlyim-agined. It is not alwayspossibleto raisethe priceofa commodityin exactproportionto everyadditionalimpositionlaid upon it. The merchant, especiallyin a countryof srna!!commercialcapital, is oftenundera necessityof keepingpricesdownin ordertoa more expeditioussale.

The maximthat the consumeris the payer, is somuch oftener true than the reverseof the proposi-tion,that it is far moreequitablethat the duties onimports shouldgo into a commonstock,than thatthey shouldredoundto the exclusivebenefitof theimportingStates. Butit is not sogenerallytrue asto renderit equitable,that thosedutiesshouldformthe onlynationalfund. Whenthey are paid by themerchantthey operateasan additionaltax upontheimportingState,whosecitizenspay their proportionofthem in the characterofconsumers. In thisview

_268 AlexanderHam!|ton

they areproductiveof inequs!ityamongtheStates;whichinequalitywouldbe increasexlwith the in-creasedextent of the duties. The confinementofthe nationalrevenuestothisspeciesofimpostswouldbe attendedwith inequality,froma differentcause,betweenthe manufacturingand the non-manufac-turing States. The States which can go farthesttowardsthe supplyof theirownwa_ts,by their ownmanufactures,will not, accordingto their numbersorwealth,consumesogreata proportionofimportedarticlesas those Stateswhichare not in the samefavorablesituation. Theywouldnot, therefore,int_is modealonecontributeto thepublictreasuryina ratio to their abilities. Tomake them do thisitis necessarythat recoursebe had to excises, theproperobjectsofwhicharepartic11]_rkindsofn_nu-factures. NewYork is moredeeply interestedinthese considerationsthan such of her citizensascontendforlimitingthe powerof the Unionto ex-ternaltaxationmay be awareof. NewYorkis animporting State, and is not likely speedilyto be,to any greatextent,=a man_ State. Shewould,of course,sufferin a doublelight fromre-strainingthe jurisdictionof the Unionto commer-cial imposts.

So far as these observationstend to inculcateadangerof the importduties being extendedto aninjuriousextreme it may be observed,conformably

• to a remarkmade in anotherpartof these papers,

=In therevisedtext, "andfroma greaterdisproportionbetweenherpopulationandterritoryis _,_1_1yspeedilyto be,to anygreatextznt."

The Federalist 269

that the interestof the revenueitself wouldbe a_,mcientT;ard againstsuchan extreme. I readilyadmitthat thiswouldbe the case,as longas otherresourceswere open; but if the avenuesto themwereclosed,HOPS,stimulatedby necessity,wouldbegetexperiments,fortifiedby rigorousprecautionsandadditionalpenalties,which,for a time, wouldhavethe intendedeffect,till therehad beenleisureto contriveexpedientsto eludethesenew precau-tions. Thefirstsuccesswouldbe apt to inspirefalseopinions,whichit might requirea long courseofsubsequentexperienceto correct. Necessity,espe-cially in politics,oftenoccasionsfalse hopes, falsereasonings,and a systemof measurescorrespond-inglyerroneous.But evenif this supposedexcessshouldnot bea consequenceofthe lhnltationof thefederalpowerof _ation, the inequalitiesspokenofwould still ensue, though not in the samedegree,fromthe other causesthat havebeennoticed. Letus nowreturn to the exarninationofobjections.

Onewhich,ifwemayjudgefromthe frequencyofits repetition,seemsmos_to be reliedon,is, thattheHouseof Representativesis not sufficientlynumer-ous for the receptionof all the 6_erent classesofcitizens,in orderto combinethe interestsandfeelingsof every part of the community,and to producea due sympathybetweenthe representativebodyandits constituents. This argumentpresentsitselfunder a very speciousand seducingform; and iswencalculatedto layhold of the prejudicesof thoseto whomit is addressed. But when we come todissec_it withattention,itwillappearto be madeup

27o AlexanderHamilton

of nothingbut fair-soundingwords. The object i_seemsto aim at is, in the first place, impracticable,and in the sensein whichit is contendedfor, is un-necessary. I reservefor another place the discus-sion of the questionwhichrelates to the sufficiencyof the representativebody in respect to numbers,and shall content myselfwith examininghere theparticv!_ruse whichhas been made of a contrarysupposition,in referenceto the immediatesubjec_of our inquiries.

The idea of an actual representationof all classesof the people,by personsof eachclass,is altogethervisionary. Unlessit wereexpresslyprovidedin theConstitution,that each differentoccupationshouldsend one or more members,the thing would nevertake place in practice. Mechanicsand manufac-turers willalwaysbe inclined,with few exceptions,to give their votes to merchants, in preferencetopersons of their ownprofessionsor trades. Thosediscerningcitizensarewellawarethat the mechanicand manufacturingarts furnish the materials ofmercantileenterpriseand industry. Manyof them,indeed,are immediatelyconnectedwith the opera-tions of COmmerce. They know that the merchan_is their natural patron and friend; and they areaware,that howevergreatthe confidencethey m_:yjustly feel in their own good sense,their interestscan be more effectuallypromotedby the merchantthan by themselves. They are sensiblethat theirhabits in life have not been such as to give themthose acquiredendowments,without which, in adeliberativeassembly,the greatestnatural abilities

The Federalist 271

areforthemostpartuseless;andthattheinfluenceand weight,and superioracquirementsof themer-chants renderthemmoreequalto a contestwithany spiritwhichmighthappento infuseitself intothepubliccouncils,unfriendlyto the manufacturingand tradinginterests. These considerations,andmanyothersthat mightbe mentioned,prove,andexperienceconfirmsit, that artisans and manu-facturerswillcommonlybe disposedto bestowtheirvotesuponmerchantsandthosewhomtheyrecom-mend. We must thereforeconsidermerchantsasthenaturalrepresentativesof all these classesof thecommunity.

With regardto the learnedprofessions,little needbe observed;theytrulyformno distinctinterestinsociety,and accordingto theirsituationand talents,willbe indiscriminatelytheobjectsoftheconfidenceand choiceof eachother,and of otherpartsof thecommunity.

Nothingremainsbut the landed interest; andthis, in a politicalview,and particularlyin relationto taxes, I take to be perfectlyunited,from thewealthiestlandlorddownto thepooresttenant. Notax canbelaid onlandwhichwillnot affectthepro-prietorof millionsof acresas wellas the proprietorof a singleacre. Every landholderwill thereforehave a commoninterestto keepthe taxes on landaslowaspossible;andcommoninterestmay alwaysbe reckoneduponas the surest bondof sympathy.Butifweevencouldsupposea distinctionofinterestbetweenthe opulentlandholderand the middlingfarmer,whatreasonis thereto conclude,that the

272 AlexanderHamilton

first wouldstanda better chanceof beingdeputedto thenationallegislaturethanthelast? Hwetakefactas ourguide,andlook intoourownsenateandassembly,we shallfindthatmoderateproprietorsofland prevailin both; noris this lessthe casein thesenate,whichconsistsof a smallernumber,than inthe assembly,whichis composedof a greaternum-ber. Wherethe q,_l_ficationsofthe electorsarethesame,whetherthey haveto choosea sm_11ora largenumber,the{rvotes _11 fall uponthose in whomthey have most confidence;whetherthese happento bemenof largefortunes,orofmoderateproperty,orof no propertyat all.

It is saidto benecessary,thatallclassesofcitizensshouldhave someof their own numberin the re-presentativebody, in orderthat their feelingsandinterestsmay bethe betterunderstoodandattendedto. But we haveseenthat this willnever happenunderany arrangementthat leavesthe votesof thepeoplefree. Wherethisisthecase,therepresentativebody,withtoofewexceptionstohaveanyinfluenceon the spiritof thegovernment,willbe composedoflandholders,merchants,and menof the learnedpro-fessions. But whereis the dangerthat theinterestsand feelingsof the di_erent classesof citizenswillnot be understoodor attendedto by these threedescriptionsof men? W_11not the landholderknowandfeelwhateverwillpromoteorinsuretheinterestoflandedproperty? Andw_ he not, from1_ owninterestin that spemesof property,be m,_c{entlyproneto resisteveryattemptto prejudiceorencum-berit? Will not the merchantunderstandandbe

The Federalist 273

disposedto cultivate,as faras may be proper,theinterestsof the mechanicand manufacturingarts,to whichhiscommerceis sonearly8lliedP Will notthe man of the learnedprofession,who will feel aneutrality to the rivalshipsbetweenthe differentbranchesofindustry,be likelyto proveanimpartialarbiterbetween,them,readyto promoteeither,sofaras it shallappearto himconduciveto the generalinterestsof the society?

If we take into the accountthe momentaryhu-morsor dispositionswhichmay happento prevailin particularparts of the society,and to whichawiseadministrationwillneverbe inattentive,is thernauwhosesituationleadsto extensiveinquiryandinformationless likely to be a competentjudgeoftheirnature,extent,andfoundationthanonewhoseobservationdoesnot travelbeyondthe circleof hisneighborsand acquaintances?Is it not naturalthat a manwho is a candidateforthe favorof thepeople, and who is dependenton the suffragesofhis fellow-citizensfor the continuanceof his publichonors,shouldtake careto informhimselfof theirdispositionsand inclinations,and shouldbe w_11_ugto allowthemtheirproperdegreeof influenceuponhis conduct? This dependence,and the necessityof beingboundhimself,and his posterity,by thelawsto whichhe giveshis assent,are the true,andtheyarethestrongchordsof sympathybetweentherepresentativeandthe constituent.

Thereis no part of the administrationof govern-ment that requiresextensiveinformationand athoroughknowledgeof the principlesof political

VOl,.Xl.--X8.

274 AlexanderHamilton

economy,somuch asthe businessoftaxation. Theman whounderstandsthose principlesbest willbeleast likelyto resort to oppressiveexpedients,or tosacrificeany particularclass of citizensto the pro-curement of revenue. It might be demonstratedthat the most productive system of finance willalwaysbe the least burdensome. There can be nodoubt that in order to a judiciousexerciseof thepowerof taxation, it is necessarythat the personinwhosehands it is should be acquaintedwith thegeneralgenius,habits, and modesof th/nkingof thepeopleat large,andwiththe resourcesofthe country.And this is all that can be reasonablymeant by aknowledgeofthe interestsandfeelingsof the people.In any other sense the propositionhas either nomeaning,or an absurd one. And in that sense leteveryconsideratecitizenjudgeforhimselfwheretherequisitequalificationis most likelyto be found.

PUBLIUS.

FromtheNewYorkPacket,Tuesday,January8, z788

THEFEDERALIST.No. XXXVI

(HAMILTON)

To thePeopleof the Stateof New York:We have seenthat the result of the observations,

to whichthe foregoingnumberhas beenprincipallydevoted,is, that from the natural operation of thedifferentinterests and viewsof the various classesof the community,whether the representation ofthe peoplebe more or lessnumerous,it willconsist

The Federalist 275.

almostentirelyof proprietorsof land,of merchants,and of membersof the learnedprofessions,whowilltrulyrepresentallthosedifferentinterestsandviews.If it should be objected that we have seen otherdescriptionsofmenin the locallegislatures,I answerthat it is admittedthere are exceptionsto the rule,but not in sufficientnumberto influencethe generalcomplexionor characterof the government. Thereare strongmindsin every walk of life that willrisesuperiorto the disadvantagesof situation,and willcommandthe tribute due to their merit, not onlyfrom the classesto whichthey particularlybelong,but fromthe societyin general. The dooroughttobe equallyopento all; and I trust,for the creditofhuman nature, that we shall see examplesof suchvigorousplants flouri_shingin the soil of federal aswellas of Statelegislation;but occasionalinstancesof this sort willnot render the reasoning,foundeduponthe generalcourseof things,less conclusive.

Thesubjectmightbe placedin severalotherlightsthat wouldall lead to the sameresult; and in par-ticularit mightbe asked,Whatgreateraffinityorrelationof interestcan be conceivedbetweenthecarpenterand blacksmith,and the linen manufac-turerorstocking-weaver,thanbetweenthe merchantand either of them? It is notoriousthat there areoften as great rivalshipsbetweend_fferentbranchesof the mechanicor manufacturingarts as there arebetween any of the departmentsof labor and in-dustry; sothat, unlessthe representativebodywereto be far more numerousthan would be consist-ent with any idea of regv_la_tyor wisdomin its

_76 AlexanderHa_m__ilton

deliberations,it is ira_possiblethat whatseemsto bethe spiritof the objectionwe have been consideringshouldever be realizedin practice. But I forbearto dwellany longeron a matter whichhas hithertoworntoo loosea garbto admitevenof an accurateinspectionof its realshapeor tendency.

Thereis anotherobjectionof a somewhatmoreprecisenaturethat claimsourattention. It hasbeenasserted that a power of internal taxation in thenational legislaturecould never be exercisedwithadvantage, as well from the want of a sl_fficientknowledgeof local circumstances,as from an inter-ferencebetween the revenue laws of the Unionand of the parti_,!_:rStates. The suppositionof awantof properknowledgeseem_to be entirelydesti-tuteoffoundation. If any questionisdependingin aStatelegislaturerespectingoneofthe counties,whichdemandsa knowledgeof localdeta_!s,how is it ac-quired? No doubt from the information of themembersofthe county. Cannotthe llkelrnowledgebe obtainedin the nationallegislaturefrom the re-presentatives of each State? And is it not to bepresumedthat the men who willgenerallybe sentthere will be possessedof the necessarydegree ofintelligenceto be able to communicateflint infor-mation? Is the knowledgeof local circtunstances,as appliedto taxation, a minute topographicalac-quaintancewith all the mountains,rivers, streams,highways,and by-paths in each State; or is it ageneral acquaintancewith its situation and re-sources,with the state of its agriculture,commerce,manufactures,with the nature of its products and

The Federalist 277

consumptions,withthe differentdegreesand kindsof its wealth,property,and industry?

Nations in general, even under governmentsofthe morepopularkind,usuallycommitthe adminis-traeionof their financesto singlemen or to boardscomposedof a few individuals,whodigestand pre-pare, in the first instance,the plans of taxation,whichare afterwardspassed into laws by the au-thority of the sovereignor legislature.

Inquisitiveand enlightenedstatesmenare deemedeverywherebestqualifiedto ma_e a judiciousselec-tion of the objects proper for revenue; which is aclearindication,as far as the senseof mankindcanhaveweightin the question,of the speciesof ]chow-ledgeoflocalcircumstancesrequisiteto the purposesof taxation.

The taxes intended to be comprisedunder thegeneraldenominationof internaltaxes maybe sub-dividedinto those of the directand thoseof the in-directkind. Thoughthe objectionbe madeto both,yet the reasoninguponit seern_to be confinedto theformer branch. And indeed,as to the latter, bywhich must be understood duties and excisesonarticlesof consl_rnption,one is at a lossto conceivewhat can be the nature of the difficultiesappre-hended. Theknowledgerelatingto them mustevi-dently be of a kind that will either be suggestedby the natureof the articleitself,or can easilybeprocuredfrom any well-informedman,especi0:llyofthe mercantileclass. The circumstancesthat maydistinguishits situationin one State from its situa-tion in anothermust be few,simple,and easy to be

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comprehended. The principaltl_ng to be attendedto, wouldbe to avoidthose articleswhichhad beenpreviouslyappropriatedto the use of a particulazState; and there couldbe no difficultyin ascertain-ing the revenuesystemof each. This couldalwaysbe knownfrom the respectivecodesof laws,as wellas from the infomnationof the membersfrom theseveralStates.

The objection,whenappliedto realpropertyor tohousesand lands, appearstohave,atfirstsight,morefoundation,buteveninthisviewitwillnotbear a close examination. Land-taxesare com-monlylaid in one of two modes,either by a_t_lvaluations,permanent or periodical,or by occmsio_l assessments,at the discretion,or accordingtothe best judgment,of certainofficerswhoseduty itis to makethem. In eithercase, the EXECUTIONofthe business,whichalonerequiresthe knowledgeoflocaldet_i!s,must be devolvedupondiscreetpersonsin the character of commissionersor assessors,electedby the peopleor appointedby the govern-mentfor the purpose. Allthat the lawcan do mustbe to namethe personsor to prescribethe manneroftheir electionor appointment,to fix their numbersand qualificationsand to draw the generaloutlinesof their powersand duties. And what is there inall this that cannot as wellbe performedby the na-tional legislatureas by a State legislature? The at-tentionofeithercan onlyreachto generalprinciples;local details, as already observed,must be referred_othosewhoare to executethe plan.: But there is a simplepoint of view in whichthis

The Federalist 279

mattermaybeplacedthatmustbealtogethersatis-factory.Thenationallegislaturecanroa.keuseofthe system o_ each State within that State. Themethodoflayingandcollectingthis speciesof taxesin each State can, in all its parts, be adoptedandemployedby the federalgovernment.

Let it be recollectedthat the proportionof thesetaxes isnot to beleft to the discretionofthenationallegi._lature,but is to be determinedby the numbersof each State, as describedin the secondsectionofthe first article. An actl_l censusor enumerationof the peoplemust furnishthe rule,a circummtancewhich effectuallyshuts the door to partiality oroppression. The abuse of this powerof taxationseemsto have beenprovidedagainst with guardedcircumspection.In additionto the precautionjustmentioned,thereis a provisionthat "all duties,im-posts, and excisesshallbe UNIFOR_tthroughouttheUnitedStates."

It has been very properlyobservedby differentspeakersandwritersonthe sideofthe Constitution,that if the exerciseof the powerof internaltaxationby the Unionshould be discoveredon experimentto be really inconvenient,the federalgovernmentmay thenforbeartheuse ofit, and haverecoursetorequisitionsin its stead. By wayof answerto this,ithasbeentriumphantlyasked,Why notinthefirstinstanceomitthatambiguouspower,andrelyuponthelatterresource?Two solidanswersmay begiven.Thefirstis,thattheexerciseofthatpower,ifconvenient,willbepreferable,becauseitwillbemoreeffectual;anditisimpossibletoprovein

280 AlexanderHamilton

theory, or otherwisethan by the expe_ment,thatit cannot be advantageouslyexercised. The con-trary, indeed,appears most probable. The secondansweris, that the existenceof sucha powerin theConstitutionwill have a strong influencein givingefficacyto requisitions. Whenthe Statesknowthatthe Unioncan apply itselfwithout their agency,itwillbe a powerfulmotivefor exertionon their part.

As to the interferenceof the revenuelaws of theUnion, and of its members,we have already seenthat there can be no clashingor repugnancyof au-thority. Thelawscannot,therefore,in a legalsense,interfere with each other; and it is far from im-possibleto avoid an interferenceevenin the policyof their differentsystema. ,ameffecV___:!expedientfor this purposewillbe, mutually to abstain fromthose objects whicheither side may have firsthadrecourseto. As neither can controlthe other, eachwill have an obviousand sensibleinterest in thisreciprocalforbearance. And wherethere is an im-mediatecommoninterest,wemay safelycountuponits operation. When the particm!oxdebts of theStatesare doneaway,and their expensescometo belimitedwithintheir natural compass,the possibilityalmostofinterferencewillvanish. Asmallland-taxwillanswerthe purposeof the States, and willbetheir most simpleand most fit resource.

Manyspectreshavebeenraisedout of this powerof internaltaxation, to excite the apprehensionsofthe people: double sets of revenue officers,a du-plicationof their burdensby doubletaxations, andthe frightful forms of odiousand oppressivepoll-

The Federalist 28x

tmxes,have been playedoffwith all the ingeniousdexterityof politicallegerdernalu.Astothefirstpoint,therearetwocasesinwhich

therecanbenoroomfordoublesetsofofficers:one,wherether_htofhnposingthetaxisexclusivelyvestedintheUnion,whichappliestothedutiesonhnports;theother,wheretheobjecthasnotfallenunderanyStateregulationorprovisionwhichmaybeapplicabletoavarietyofobjects.Inothercases,theprobabilityisthattheUnitedStateswilleitherwhollyabstainfromtheobjectspreoccupiedforlocalpurposes,orwillmakeuseoftheStateofficersandStateregulationsforcollectingtheadditionalhnposition.Thiswillbestanswertheviewsofrevenue,becauseitwillsaveexpenseinthecollec-tion,andwillbestavoidanyoccasionofdisgusttotheStategovernments'andtothepeople.Atallevents,hereisapracticableexpedientforavoidLngsuchaninconvenience;andnothingmorecanberequiredthantoshowthatevilspredicteddonotnecessarilyresultfromthe plan.

As to anyargumentderivedfroma supposedsys-tem ofinfluence,it is a sufficientanswerto saythatit oughtnot to be presumed;but the suppositionis susceptibleof a morepreciseanswer. If suchaspiritshouldinfest the councilsof the Union,the

• mostcertainroadto the accomplishmentof its aimwouldbe to employthe State officersas muchaspossible,and to attachthem to the Unionby anaccumulationof their emohunents. This wouldserveto turnthe tide of State influenceinto thechannelsof the nationalgovernment,instead of

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making federal influenceflow in an opposite andadverse current. But all suppositionsof this kindare invidious,and ought to be banishedfrom theconsiderationofthe greatquestionbeforethe people.They can answerno other e_d than to cast a mistover the truth.

As to the suggestionof doubletaxation, the an-swer is plain. The wants of the Union are to besuppliedin one way or another; if to be done bythe authority of the federalgovernment,it will notbe to be doneby that ofthe Stategovernment. Thequantity oftaxes to be paidby the communitymustbe the same in either case; with this advantage,ifthe provisionis to be madeby the Union--that thecapitalresourceof commercialimposts,whichis themost convenient branch of revenue, can be pru-dently improvedto a much greater extent underfederal than under State regulation,and of coursewillrenderit less necessaryto recur to more incon-venient methods; and with this further advantage,thatasfarastheremaybeanyrealdifficultyintheexerciseof the power of internal taxation, it willimposea dispositionto greater care in the choiceand arrangementof the means; and must naturallytend to makeit a fixedpointof policyin the nationaladministrationto go as far as may be practicableinmnl_iugthe luxury of the rich tributary to the pub-lic trea_nSz,in order to dimlulsh the necessityofthose impositionswhichmight createdissatisfactionin the poorerand most numerousclassesof thoso-ciety. Happyit is whenthe interest whichthe gov-ernmenthasinthepreservationof its own power,

The Federalist 283

coinddeswith a properdistributionof the publicburdens,andtends to guardthe least wealthypartof thecommunityfromoppression!

As to poll-taxes,I, withoutscruple,confessmydisapprobationof them; and thoughtheyhave pre-vailedfroman earlyperiodin thoseStates• whichhave uniformlybeen the most tenaciousof theirrights,I shouldlamentto seethemintroducedintopracticeunderthe nationalgovernment. Butdoesit followbecausethereis a powerto lay them,thatthey will actually be laid? Every State in theUnionhas powerto imposetaxes of this kind; andyet in severalofthemtheyare unknownin practice.Are the State governmentsto be stigmatizedastyrannies,becausetheypossessthispower? If theyarenot,withwhatproprietycanthe like powerjus-tify sucha chargeagainstthenationalgovernment,or evenbeurgedas anobstacleto its adoption? Aslittle friendlyas I am to the speciesof imposition,I stillfeel a thoroughconvictionthat thepowerofhavLugrecourseto it oughtto exist in the federalgovernment.Therearecertainemergenciesof na-tions, in which expedients,that in the ordinarystateof ttfingsoughtto be forborne,becomeessen-tial to thepublicweal. Andthe government,fromthe possibilityof such emergencies,oughtever tohave the optionof m_Jdnguse of them. Therealscarcityof objects kuthis country,which may beconsideredas productivesourcesof revenue,is areasonpeculiarto itself,for not abridgingthe dis-cretionof the national councils in tl_i_respect.

x_he NewEnglandStates.--PuBLIUS,

284 AlexanderHamilton

Theremay exist certaincriticaland tempestuousconjuncturesof the State, in whicha poll-taxm__.ybecomean inestimableresource. And as I knownothingto exemptthi_ portionof the globefromthe commonc_!_:rnitiesthat have befallenotherpartsof it, I acknowledgemy aversionto everypro-ject that is calculatedto disarmthe governmentofa singleweapon,whichin any possiblecontingencymightbe usefullyemployedfor the generaldefenceand security.

I havenowgonethroughthe ex_rn_uationof suchof the powersproposedto be vestedin the UnitedStates,whichrn_y be consideredas havingan im-mediaterelationto the energyof the government;and have endeavoredto answerthe principalob-jectionswhichhave been madeto them. I havepassedoverin silencethoseminorauthorities,whichareeithertoo inconsiderableto havebeen thoughtworthyof the hostilitiesof the opponentsof theConstitution,or of too rn_uifestproprietyto admitof controversy.Thern_ssof judiciarypower,how-ever, might have clnirnedan investigationunderthishead,had it notbeenfor the considerationthatits organizationand its extent _y be more ad-vantageouslyconsideredin connection. Thi_ hasdeterrnluedme to referi_ to the branchof our in-quiriesuponwhichweshall next enter.

PUBLIUS.

The Federalist 285

From theDailyAdt_rtiser,Friday, January zx, z788

THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXVII

(MADISON)

To thePeopleo_theStateo_New York:In reviewingthe defectsof theexistingConfedera-

tion, and showingthat they cannotbe suppliedbya governmentof less energy than that beforethepublic,severalof the most importantprinciplesofthe latter fell of courseunder consideration. Butasthe ultimat_objectofthese papersis to determineclearlyand fullythe meritsof this Constitution,andthe expediencyof adoptingit, our plaxlearmotbecompletewithouttnHnga morecriticalandthoroughsurvey of the workof the convention,without ex-aminingit on all its sides,comparingit in all itsparts, andcalculatingits probableeffects.

That this remn.lvtingtask may be executedunderimpressionsconduciveto a justand fairresult, somereflectionsmust in this place be indulged,whichcandorpreviouslysuggests.

It is a misfortxme,inseparablefromhumanaffairs,that public measuresare rarely investigatedwiththat spiritof moderationwhichis essentialto a justestimateof their real tendencyto advanceor ob-structthe publicgood; and that thisspiritis moreapt to bediminishedthanpromoted,by thoseocca-sionswhichrequirean unusualexerciseof it. Tothosewhohavebeenled by experienceto attendtothis consideration,it couldnot appearsurprising,that the act of the convention,whichrecommendsso manyimportantchangesandinnovations,which

286 AlexanderHami|ton

maybe viewedin somanylightsand relations,andwhichtouches_hespringsof so many passionsandinterests, should find or excite dispositionsun-friendly,both ononesideandon theother,to a fairdiscussionand accuratejudgmentof its merits. Insome,it has been too evidentfrom their own pub-lications,that they havescannedthe proposedCon-stitution,not only witha predispositionto censure,but with a predeterminationto condemn; as thelanguageheld by others betrays an oppositepre-determination or bias, which must render theiropinionsalso of littlemomentin the question. Inplacing, however,these different characterson alevelwith respectto the weightof their opinions,Iwishnot to insinuatethat there may not be a ma-terial differencein the purityof their intentions.It is but justto rem_rkin favorof the latterdescrip-tion, that as our situationis universallyadmittedto bepectth'arlycritical,andto requireindispensablythat somethingshouldbe done for our relief,thepredeterminedpatronof what has been actuallydone mayhave takenhis biasfromthe weightofthese considerations,as well as fromconsiderationsofa sinisternature. Thepredeterminedadversary,on the otherhand, can havebeengovernedby novenialmotivewhatever. Theintentionsof the firstmaybe upright,as they may on the contrarybeculpable. Theviewsof the last cannotbe upright,andmustbe culpable. Butthe truthis, thatthesepapersare not addressedto personsfallingundereitherof thesecharacters. They solicitthe atten-tionof thoseonly,whoadd to a sincerezealfor the

The Federalist 287

happinessof theircountry,a temperfavorableto ajust estimateof themeansof promotingit.

Personsof this characterwill proceedto an ex-aminationof theplansubmittedby the convention,not onlywithouta dispositionto findorto magnifyfaults; but willseetheproprietyof reflecting,thata faultlessplan was not to be expected. Norwillthey barelymake allowancesfor the errorswhichmay be chargeableon the fallibilityto whichtheconvention,as a bodyof men,wereliable; butwillkeep in mind, that they themselvesalso are butmen,and oughtnot to assumean infallibilityin re-judgingthe fallibleopinionsof others.

Withequalreadinesswillit beperceived,that be-sidestheseinducementsto candor,manyallowancesought to be made for the difficultiesinherentinthe very natureof the undert_Mngreferredto theconvention.

The novelty of the underta]_ugimmediatelystrikesus. It has beenshownin thecourseofthesepapers,thattheexistingConfederationis foundedonprincipleswhichare fallacious;that we mustcon-sequentlychangethis firstfoundation,and with itthe superstructurerestingupon it. It has beenshown,that theotherconfederacieswhichcouldbeconsultedas precedentshave beenvitiatedby thesameerroneousprinciples,and canthereforefurnishno other light than that of beacons,whichgivewarningof the courseto be shunned,withoutpoint-ing outthatwhichoughtto bepursued. Themostthat the conventioncoulddo in such a situation,was to avoid the errors suggestedby the past

_88 AlexanderHamilton

experienceofother countries,as wellas of our own;and to providea convenientmodeofrectifyingtheirownerrors,as future experiencemay unfoldthem.

Amongthe difficultiesencounteredby the con-vent-ion,a very important one must have lain incombiningthe requisitestability and energyin gov-ennnent,with the inviolableattention dueto libertyandtothe republicanform.Withoutsubstantiallyaccomplishingthispartoftheirundertaking,theywouldhaveveryimperfectlyfx_1filledtheobjectoftheirappointment,ortheexpectationofthepublic;yetthatitcouldnotbeeasilyaccomplished,willbedeniedbynoonewhoisunwillingtobetrayhisig-noranceof the subject. Energy in governmentisessentialtothatsecurity against external andin-ternal do_nger,andtothatpromptandsalutaryexecutionof the laws whichenter into the very de-finition of good government. Stability in govern-ment is essential to national character and to theadvantagesanuexedto it, as wellas to that reposeand confidencein the minds of the people,whichare amongthe chiefblessingsof civil society. Anirregularand mutable legislationis notmore an evilin itselfthan it is odiousto the people; and it maybe pronouncedwith assurance that the people ofthis country,enlightenedas they are with regard tothe nature, and interested,as the greatbodyof themare, in the effects of good government,willneverbe satisfied till some remedy be applied to thevicissitudesand uncertainties which chm'a_the Stateadministrations. On comparing,however,these valuableingredientswith the vital principles

The Federalist 289

of liberty,wemustperceiveat oncethe d_fl_cultyofminglingthem togetherin their due proportions.The geniusof republicanlibertyseemsto demandon one side, not only that all powershouldbe de-

: rived fromthe people,but that thoseintrustedwithit shouldbe kept in dependenceon the people,by ashort durationoftheirappointments;andthat evenduringthis short periodthe trust shouldbe placednot in a few,but a numberof hands. Stability,onthe contrary,requiresthat the hands in whichpoweris lodgedshould continuefor a length of time thesame. A frequentchangeof men willresultfrom afrequentreturn of elections;and a frequentchangeof measuresfrom a frequentchangeof men: whilstenergy in governmentrequires not only a certaindurationof power, but the executionof it by asingle hand.

How far the conventionmay have succeededinthis part oftheir work,willbetter appear ona moreaccurateview of it. From the cursory view heretaken, it must clearlyappear to have been an ar-duouspart.

Not less arduous must have been the task ofmarking the proper line of partition between theauthorityof the generaland that of the State gov-ernments. Everyman willbe sensibleof this diffi-culty, in proportionas he has been accustomedtocontemplateand discriminateobjectsextensiveandcomplicatedin their nature. The faculties of themind itselfhave never yet been distinguishedanddefined,withsatisfactoryprecision,by all the effortsof the most acute and metaphysicalphilosophers.

VOL,_U._XO.

29° AlexanderHamilton

Sense,perception,judgment,desire,volition,mem-ory, imagination,are foundto be separatedby suchdelicate shades and minute gradations that theirboundarieshave eluded the most subtle investiga-tions, and remain a pregnant sourceof ingeniousdisquisitionand controversy. The boundariesbe-tweenthegreat kingdomsof nature, and, stillmore,betweenthe variousprovinces,and lesserportions,into whichthey are subdivided,affordanother illus-tration of the same important truth. The mostsagaciousand laboriousnaturalistshavenever yetsucceededin tracingwith certaintythe line whichseparates the district of vegetablelife from theneighboringregionof unorganizedmatter,or whichmarksthe terminationof the formerand the com-mencementof the animalempire. A still greaterobscurityliesin the distinctivecharactersby whichthe objects in each of these greatdepartmentsofnaturehave beenarrangedand assorted.

Whenwepassfrom the worksof nature, in whichall the delineationsare perfectly accurate, and ap-pear to be otherwiseonly from the imperfectionofthe eye whichsurveysthem, to the institutionsofmort,in whichthe obscurityarises as wellfrom theobject itself as from the organ by whichit is con-templated, we must perceivethe necessityof mod-eratingstillfurther our expectationsand hopesfromthe effortsof humansagacity. Experiencehas in-structedus that no skill in the scienceof govern-ment has yet been able to discriminateand define,withsufficientcertainty, its three great provinces--.thelegislative,executive,and judiciary; or even the

The Federalist 29I

privileges and powers of the different legislativebranches. Questionsdaffy occur in the courseofpractice,whichprovethe obscuritywhichreignsinthesesubjects,andwhichpuzzlethe greatestadepts ,inpoliticalscience.Theexperienceofages,withthecontinuedand

combinedlaborsofthemostenlightenedlegislatorsand jurists, has been equally unsuccessfulin de-lineatingthe severalobjectsand limits of differentcodesoflawsand differenttribunalsofjustice. Thepreciseextent of the commonlaw, and the statutelaw,the maritimelaw,the ecclesiasticallaw,the lawof corporations,and other locallaws and customs,remainsstill to be clearly and finally establishedin Great Britain, where accuracyin such subjectshas been more industriouslypursuedthan in anyother part of the world. The jurisdictionof herseveralcourts, generaland local,of law, of equity,of admiralty,etc., is not less a sourceof frequentand intricate discussions,sufficientlydenoting theindeterminatelimitsby whichthey are respectivelycircmnscribed. All new laws, though pennedwiththe greatesttechnicalsld11,andpassedonthe fullestand most mature deliberation,are consideredasmore or less obscure and equivocal,until theirmeaningbe liquidated and ascertainedby a seriesofparticulardiscussionsand adjudications. Besidesthe obscurityarisingfromthe complexityof objects,and the imperfectionof the human faculties, themediumthrough whichthe conceptionsof men areconveyedto eachother addsa freshembarrassment.The use of wordsis to expressideas. Perspicuity,

292 AlexanderHamilton

therefore,requiresnot only that the ideas shouldbe distinctlyformed,but that they shouldbe ex-pressedby wordsdistinctlyand exclusivelyappro-priateto them. But no languageis so copiousasto supplywordsandphrasesforeverycomplexidea,or so correctas not to includemsny equivocallydenotingdifferentideas. Hence it must happenthat howeveraccuratelyobjectsmay be discrimi-nated in themselves,and howeveraccurately"thediscriminationmay be considered,the definitionofthem may berenderedinaccurateby the inaccuracyof the termsin whichit is delivered. Andthisun-avoidableinaccxtracymustbegreaterorless,accord-ing to the complexityand novelty of the objectsdefined. When the Almightyhimselfcondescendsto addressmankind in their own language, hismeaning,luminousas it must be, is renderedd_mand doubtfulby the cloudymediumthroughwhichit is communicated.

Here,then, are threesourcesof vague and incor-rectdefinitions:indistinctnessof the object,imper-fectionof the organof conception,inadequatenessof thevehicleof ideas. Anyoneof these mustpro-duce a certaindegreeof obscurity. The conven-tion,in delineatingthe boundarybetweenthefederalandState jurisdictions,musthave experiencedthefulleffectof themall.

Tothe dlmcultiesalreadymentionedmaybeaddedthe interferingpretensionsof the largerandsmallerStates. We cannoterrin supposingthatthe formerwouldcontendfora participationin the government,fully proportionedto theirsuperiorwealth and ira-

The Federalist 293

portance; and that the latter would not be lesstenaciousofthe equalityat presentenjoyedby them.We may wellsupposethat neitherside would en-tirdy yieldto the other,and consequentlythat thestrugglecouldbe terminatedonly by compromise.It is extremelyprobable,also, that aftertheratioof representationhadbeenadjusted,thisverycom-promisemust have produceda freshstrugglebe-tweenthe sameparties,to give sucha turnto theorganizationof thegovernment,and to thedistribu-tion of itspowers,as wouldincreasethe importanceof the branches,in formingwhich they had re-spectivelyobtainedthe greatestshareof influence.Therearefeaturesin the Constitutionwhichwarranteachof these suppositions;and as far as eitherofthem is wellfounded,it showsthat the conventionmust have been compelledto sacrificetheoreticalproprietyto the forceof extraneousconsiderations.

Norcouldit havebeenthe largeandsmallStatesonly,whichwouldmarshalthemselvesin oppositionto each other on variouspoints. Othercombina-tions, resultingfrom a differenceof local positionandpolicy,musthave createdadditionaldifficulties.As everyState may be dividedinto differentdis-tricts, and its citizensinto differentclasses,whichgivebirthtocontendinginterestsandlocaljealousies,so the differentpartsof the UnitedStatesaredis-tinguishedfromeachotherby a varietyof circum-stances,whichproducea like effecton a largerscale.Andalthoughthis varietyof interests,forreasonssufficientlyexplainedin a formerpaper,may havea salutaryinfluenceon the administrationof the

_94 AlexanderHamilton

governmentwhen formed,yet every one must besensibleof the contraryinfluence,whichmusthavebeenexperiencedin the task of formingit.

Wouldit be wonderfulif, under the pressureofall thesedifficulties,the conventionshouldhavebeenforcedintosomedeviationsfromthat artificialstruc-ture and regularsymmetrywhichan abstractviewof the subject might lead an ingenioustheorist tobestowon a Constitutionplannedin his closetor inhis imagination? The real wonderis that so manydifficultiesshould have been surmounted,and sur-mouhtedwith a unanimityalmostas unprecedentedas it must have been unexpected. It is impossibleforanymanof candorto reflectonthis circumstancewithout partaking of the astonishment. It is _m-possiblefor the man of piousreflectionnot to per-ceive in it a fingerof that Almightyhand whichhasbeensofrequentlyand signallyextended to ourreliefin the criticalstagesofthe revolution.

Wehad occasion,in a formerpaper, to take noticeof the repeated trials whichhave been unsuccess-fullymadein the UnitedNetherlandsfor reformingthe banefuland notoriousvicesof theirconstitution.Thehistory of almostall the great councilsandcon-sultationsheld amongmanl_udfor reconcilingtheirdiscordantopinions,assuagingtheir mutual jealous-ies, and adjusting their respective interests, is ahistory of factions, contentions, and disappoint-ments,andmaybe classedamongthe mostdark anddegradedpictureswhichdisplay the infirmitiesanddepravitiesof the human character. If, in a fewscattered instances,a brighter aspect is presented,

The Federalist 295

they serveonlyas exceptionsto admonishus of thegeneraltruth; and by their lustre to darken thegloomof the adverseprospectto whichtheyare con-trasted. In revolvingthe causesfrom whichtheseexceptionsresult, and applyingthem to the par-ticular instancesbeforeus, weare necessarilyled totwo important conclusions. The first is, that theconventionmust have enjoyed,in a very singulardegree,an exemptionfromthe pestilentialinfluenceof party animosities--thediseasemost incidenttodeliberativebodies, and most apt to contaminatetheir proceedings. The second conclusionis thatall the deputationscomposingthe conventionweresatisfactorilyaccommodatedby the finalact, orwereinducedto accedeto it by a deepconvictionof thenecessityof sacrificingprivate opinionsand partialinterests to the public good,and by a despair ofseeingthis necessityd_minishedby delaysor by newexperiments.

PUBLIUS.

FromtlmNewY_.k Packet,Tuesday,JanuaryxS,i788

_?HEFEDERALIST.No.XXXVIII

(_msos)

To thePeopleoftheStateofNew York:It is nota little remarkablethat in everycasere-

ported by ancienthistory,in whichgovernmenthasbeenestablishedwith deliberationand consent,thetask of framingit has not been committedto anassemblyof men,but has been performedby some

296 AlexanderHamilton

individualcitizen of pre-em_uentwisdomand ap-provedintegrity.

Minos,we learn,was theprimitivefounderof thegovernmentof Crete,as Zaleucuswasof thatof theLocrians. Theseusfirst,and afterh_mDracoandSolon,institutedthe governmentof Athens. Ly-curguswasthe lawgiverof Sparta. Thefoundationof the originalgovernmentof Rome was laid byRomulus,and the workcompletedby two of hiselectivesuccessors,NumaandTullusHostilius. Ontheabolitionof royaltythe consularadministrationwas substitutedby Brutus,who steppedforwardwith a projectforsuch a reform,which,he alleged,had been prepared by Servius Tullius, and towhichb_saddressobtainedthe assentandratificationofthesenateandpeople. Thisremarkis applicableto confederategovernmentsalso. Amphictyon,wearetold,wasthe authorofthatwhichborehisname.The Achaeanleague receivedits first birth fromAch_us,and its secondfromAratus.

Whatdegreeof agencythese reputedlawgiversm_ghthave in their respectiveestablishments,orhow far they mightbe clothedwith the legitimateauthorityof thepeople,cannotin everyinstancebeascertained.In some,however,the proceedingwasstrictlyreg_jl_r.Dracoappearsto have been in-trustedby the peopleofAthenswith indefinitepow-ersto reformits governmentand laws. AndSolon,accordingto Plutarch,was in a mannercompelled,by the universalsuffrageof his fellow-citizens,totake uponh_mthe soleand absolutepowerof new-modellingthe constitution. Theproceedin_sunder

The Federalist 297

Lycurguswerelessregular; but as far as the advo-cates for a regularreformcouldprevail, they allturned their eyestowardsthe singleeffortsof thatcelebratedpatriot and sage, instead of seekingtobringabout a revolutionby the interventionof adeliberativebody of citizens.

Whencecould it have proceededthat a people,jealousas the Greekswereoftheir liberty,shouldsofar abandon the rules of cautionas to place theirdestinyin the hands of a singlecitizen? Whencecouldit haveproceeded,that theAthenians,apeoplewhowouldnot sufferan army to be commandedbyfewerthan ten generals,and whorequiredno otherproofofdangerto their libertiesthan the illustriousmerit of a fellow-citizen,shouldConsiderone illus-trious citizenas a more eligibledepositaryof thefortunesof themselvesand their posterity, than aselectbodyofcitizens,fromwhosecommondelibera-tions more wisdom,as wellas more safety, mighthave been expected? These questionscannot befully answered,withoutsupposingthat the fears ofdiscordand disunionamonga numberof counsellorsexceededthe apprehensionof treachery or inca-pacity in a singleindividual. History informsus,likewise,of the difficultieswith which these cele-brated refot]_iershad to contend,as wellas the ex-pedientswhichtheywereobligedto employin orderto carrytheir reformsinto effect. Solon,whoseemsto have indulgeda more temporizingpolicy, con-fessedthat he had notgivento his countrymenthegovernmentbest suitedto theirhappiness,but mosttolerableto their prejudices. And Lycurgus,more

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truetohis object,wasunderthe necessityofmixinga portionof violencewith the authorityof supersti-tion,and of securinghis finalsuccessby a voluntaryrenunciation,firstofhiscountry,and thenof hislife.If theselessonsteachus,on onehand, to admiretheimprovementmadeby Americaonthe ancientmodeof preparingand establishingregularplansof gov-ernment,they servenot less, on the other, to ad-monishusof the hazards and difficultiesincidenttosuchexperiments,andofthegreatimprudenceofunnecessarilymultiplyingthem.

Is it an unreasonableconjecture,that the errorswhichmaybecontainedin theplanofthe conventionare such as have resultedrather from the defectofantecedentexperienceon this complicatedand diffi-cult subject,than fromawant of accuracyor careinthe investigationof it; and, consequently,such aswillnotbeascertaineduntil an actualtrial shallhavepointedthemout? Thisconjectureisrenderedprob-able,not only by many considerationsof a generalnature, but by the particular case of the Articlesof Confederation. It is observablethat amongthenumerousobjectionsand amendmentssuggestedbythe several States, when these articles were sub-mitted for their ratification,not oneis foundwhichalludesto the greatand radicalerrorwhichon actualtrial has discovereditself. And if we except theobservationswhich New Jersey was led to mo:ke,rather by her local situation, than by her peculiarforesight, it may be questionedwhether a singlesuggestionwas of s-fficientmomentto justify a re-vision of the system. There is abundant reason,

The Federalist 299

nevertheless,tosupposethatimmaterialastheseobjectionswere,theywouldhavebeenadheredtowitha verydangerousinflexibility,insomeStates,hadnota zealfortheiropinionsandsupposedin-terestsbeenstifledbythemorepowerfulsentimentofself-preservation.OneState,wemayremember,persistedforseveralyearsinrefusingherconcur-rence,althoughtheenemyremainedthewholepe-riodatourgates,orratherintheverybowelsofourcountry.Norwasherpliancyintheendeffectedbya lessmotive,thanthefearofbeingchargeablewithprotractingthepubliccalamities,andendan-geringtheeventofthecontest.Everycandidreaderwillmaketheproperreflectionsontheseim-portantfacts.A patientwho findshisdisorderdailygrowing

worse,andthatanefficaciousremedycannolongerbedelayedwithoutextremedanger,aftercoollyre-volvinghissituation,andthecharactersofdifferentphysicians,selectsandcallsinsuchofthemashejudgesmostcapableofadministeringrelief,andbestentitledtohisconfidence.Thephysiciansat-tend;thecaseofthepatientiscarefullyexamined;aconsultationisheld;theyareunanimouslyagreedthatthesymptomsarecritical,butthatthecase,withproperandtimelyrelief,sofarfrombeingdesperate,may bemadetoissueinanimprove-mentofhisconstitution.Theyareequallyunani-mousinprescribingtheremedy,by whichthishappyeffectistobeproduced.Theprescriptionisnosoonermadeknown,however,thananumberofpersonsinterpose,and,withoutdenyingthereality

3oo AlexanderHamilton

or dangerof thedisorder,assurethe patientthattheprescriptionwillbe poisonto his constitution,andforbidhim,underpainofcertaindeath,to makeuseof it. Mightnot the patientreasonablydemand,beforehe venturedto followthis advice, that theauthorsof it shouldat leastagreeamongthemselveson someotherremedyto besubstituted? Andif hefound themdifferingas muchfrom oneanotherasfromh_sfirstcounsellors,wouldhenotactprudentlyintryingtheexperimentunanimouslyrecommendedbythe latter,ratherthanbehearkeningto thosewhocouldneitherdenythenecessityof a speedyremedy,noragreein proposingone?

Sucha patientand in sucha situationis Americaat thismoment. Shehas beensensibleof hermal-ady. She has obtained a regnllarand unanimousadvicefrommen ofher owndeliberatechoice. Andshe is warnedby othersagainstfollowingthis adviceunder pain of the most fatal consequences. Do themonitorsdeny the reality of her danger? No. Dothey denythe necessityofsomespeedyand powerfulremedy? No. Are they agreed, are any two ofthem agreed,in their objectionsto the remedypro-posed,or in the properoneto be substituted? Letthem speak for themselves. This one tells us thatthe proposedConstitutionought to be rejected, be-causeit is not a confederationof the States, but agovernmentover individuals. Anotheradmits thatit ought to bea governmentover individuMsto acertain extent,but by no meansto the extentpro-posed. Athird doesnot object to the governmentover individuals,or to the extent proposed,but to

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thewantofabillofrights. A fourthconcursin theabsolutenecessityof a bill of rights,but contendsthat it oughtto be declaratory,notof the personalrightsofindividuals,butofthe rightsreservedtotheStatesintheirpoliticalcapacity.Afifthis ofopinionthata billofrightsof anysortwouldbe superfluousandmisplaced,andthat theplan wouldbeunexcep-tionablebut for the fatal powerof regulatingthetimesand placesof election. Anobjectorin a largeStateexclaimsloudlyagainsttheunreasonableequal-ity of representationin the Senate. An objectorina smallState is equallyloudagainst the dangerousinequalityin the Houseof Representatives. Fromthis quarter, we are alarmed with the amazingexpense,from the numberof personswho are toadminister the new government. From anotherquarter, and sometimesfrom the same quarter,onanother occasion,the cry is that the Congresswillbe but a shadowof a representation,and that thegovernmentwould be far less objectionableif thenumberand the expenseweredoubled. A patriotin a State that doesnot import or export,discernsinsuperableobjectionsagainst the power of directtaxation. The patriotic adversary in a State ofgreat exports and imports,is not less dissatisfiedthat the wholeburdenof taxesmay be thrown onconsumption. This politiciandiscoversin the Con-stitutiona direct and irresistibletendencyto mon-archy; that is equallysureit willendin aristocracy.Anotheris puzzledto say whichof these shapesitwill ultimatelyassume,but sees dearly it must beoneor otherof them; whilsta fourthis not wanting,

3o2 AlexanderHamilton

who with no less confidenceaffirmsthat the Con-stitutionis so far from havinga bias towardseitherof these dangers, that the weighton that side willnot be sufficientto keep it upright and finn againstits oppositepropensities. With another classof ad-versariesto the Constitutionthe langv_:geis thatthelegislative,executive,and judiciarydepartmentsareintermixedin sucha manneras to contradictall theideas of regulargovernmentand all the requisiteprecautionsin favor of liberty. Whilst this objec-tion circulates in vague and general expressions,there are but a few who lend their sanctionto it.Let each one comeforwardwith his particularex-planation, and scarce any two are exactly agreeduponthe subject. In the eyes of one the junctionof the Senatewith the Presidentin the responsiblefunctionof appointingto offices,instead of vestingthis executivepower in the Executivealone,is theviciouspart of the organization. To another, theexclusionof the House of Representatives,whosenumbersalonecould be a due securityagainstcor-ruption and partiality in the exerciseof such apower,is equallyobnoxious. With another,the ad-missionof the President into any share of a powerwhichmust everbe a dangerousenginein the handsof the executive magistrate, is an unpardonableviolationof the maximsof republicanjealousy. Nopart of the arrangement,accordingto some,is moreinadmissiblethan the trial of impeachmentsby theSenate,which is alternately a memberboth of thelegislativeand executive departments, when thispower so evidently belongedto the judiciaryde-

The Federalist 3o3

partment. "We concurfully,"replyothers, "in theobjectionto this part of the plan,but wecan neveragree that a referenceof impeachmentsto the ju-diciary authority would be an amendment of theerror. Our principal dislike to the organizationarisesfrom the extensivepowersalready lodgedinthat department." Even among the zealouspa-trons of a councilof state the most irreconcilablevarianceis discoveredconcerningthe modein whichit ought to be constituted. The demandof onegentlemanis, that the councilshould consistof asmallnumberto be appointedby the mostnumerousbranch of the legislature. Anotherwouldprefer alarger number, and considersit as a fundamentalconditionthat the appointmentshouldbe madebythe Presidenthimself.

As it can giveno umbrageto the writers againstthe plan of the federalConstitution,let us suppose,that as they are the most zealous,so they are alsothe most sagacious,ofthose whothink the late con-vention were unequal to the task assignedthem,andthat a wiserand better planmightandoughttobe substituted. Let us further supposethat theircountryshouldconcur,both in thisfavorableopinionof their merits,and in their unfavorableopinionofthe convention; and shouldaccordinglyproceedtoform them into a second convention,with fullpowers,and for the expresspurposeof revisingandremouldingthe workof the first. Were the experi-ment to be seriouslymade,though it requiredsomeeffortto viewit seriouslyevenin fiction,I leaveit tobe decidedby the sampleof opinionsjust exhibited,

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whether,withall their enndtyto theirpredecessors,they would,in any onepoint,depart sowidelyfromtheir example,as in the discord and ferment thatwould mark their own deliberations;and whetherthe Constitution,nowbeforethe public,wouldnotstand as fair a chancefor immortality,as Lycurgusgaveto that of Sparta, by rna_Jngits changeto de-pend on his own return from exileand death, if itwereto be immediatelyadopted, and wereto con-tinuein force,notuntila B_TTSR,but untilANOTHBRshouldbe agreeduponby this newassemblyof law-givers.

It is a matter both of wonder and regret, thatthose whoraiseso many objectionsagainst the newConstitutionshouldnever call to mind the defectsof that whichis to be exchangedfor it. It is notnecessarythat the former should be perfect: it issufficientthat the latter is moreimperfect. Nomanwouldrefuseto givebrassforsilveror gold,becausethe latter had somealloyin it. No man wouldre-fuseto quit a shattered and totteringhabitationfora firmand commodiousbuilding,becausethe latterhad not a porch to it, or becausesomeof the roomsmightbe a little larger or smaller,or the ceilingalittle higher or lower than his fancy would haveplanned them. But waiving illustrations of thissort, is it not manifest that most of the capitalob-jectiousurgedagainst the newsystem lie with ten=foldweightagainstthe existingConfederation?Isan indefinitepowerto raisemoneydangerousin thehandsof the federalgovernment? The presentCon-gress can make requisitionsto any amount they

The Federalist 3o5

please,and the States are constitutionallyboundtofurnishthem; they can emit billsof credit as longas they will pay for the paper; they can borrow,both abroadandat home,as longasa sh_ll_ugwillbelent. Is an indefinitepower to raise troops dan-gerous? The Confederationgives to Congressthatpoweralso; and they have alreadybegunto makeuseofit. Is it improperand unsafeto intermixthedifferentpowersof governmentin the samebodyofmen? Congress,a singlebody of men,are the soledepositaryof all the federalpowers. Is it particu-larly dangerousto givethe keysofthe treasury,andthe commandof the army, into the same hands?The Confederationplacesthemboth in the handsofCongress. Is a bill of rights essential to liberty?The Confederationhas no bill of rights. Is it anobjectionagainst the new Constitution,that it em-powers the Senate, with the concurrenceof theExecutive,to maketreatieswhichare to be the lawsof the land? The existingCongress,without anysuch control,can make treaties which they them-selveshave declared,and most of the States haverecognized,to be the supremelaw of the land. Isthe importation of slaves permitted by the newConstitutionfor twenty years? By the old it ispermittedforever.

I shallbe told, that howeverdangerousthis mix-ture ofpowersmaybe in theory,it is renderedharm-lessby the dependenceof Congressonthe States forthe meansofcarryingtheminto practice; that how=everlargethe massofpowersmaybe, iris in fact alifelessmass. Then, say I, in the first place, that

VOL.XL--e.%

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the Confederationis chargeablewith the stillgreaterfollyof declaringcertain powersin the federalgov-ernmentto be absolutelynecessary,and at the sametime renderingthem absolutelynugatory; and, inthenextplace,thatiftheUnionistocontinue,andnobettergovernmentbesubstituted,effectivepow-ersmusteitherbegrantedto,orassumedby,theexistingCongress;in eitherofwhichevents,the con-trast just stated willhold good. But this is not all.Out of this lifelessmass has already grown an ex-crescentpower,whichtendsto realizeall the dangersthat can be apprehendedfrom a defectiveconstruc-tion of the supremegovernmentof the Union. It isnowno longera point of speculationandhope, thatthe Western territory is a mine of vast wealth tothe United States; and although it is not of sucha nature as to extricate them from their presentdistresses,or, for sometime to come,to yield anyre_sr suppliesfor the publicexpenses,yet must ithereafterbe able, under proper management,bothto effecta gradual dischargeof the domesticdebt,and to furnish,for a certain period, liberaltributesto the federaltreasury. A very largeproportionoft_hisfundhasbeenalreadysurrenderedby individualStates; and it may with reasonbe expectedthat theremaining States will not persist in withholdingsimilar proofsof their equity and generosity. Wemay calculate, therefore, that a rich and fertilecountry,of an area equal to the inhabitedextent ofthe UnitedStates,willsoonbecomea nationalstock.Congresshave assumedthe administration of thisstock. They have begun to render it productive.

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Congresshave undertaken to do more: they haveproceededto form new States, to erect temporarygovernments,to appoint officersfor them, and toprescribethe conditionson whichsuch States shallbe admittedinto theConfederacy. Allthishasbeendone; and done without the leastcolorof constitu-tionalauthority. Yet no blamehasbeenwhispered;no alarmhasbeensounded. A GREATand INDEPEN-DENTfund of revenueis passinginto the handsof aSINGLEBODYof men, whocan _ISE TROOPSto anINDEFINITENUMBER,andappropriatemoneytotheirsupport for an INDEFINITEPERIODOFTIME.Andyet there are men, whohave not only been silentspectatorsofthisprospect,but whoareadvocatesforthe systemwhichexhibitsit; and, at the sametime,urge against the new system the objectionswhichwehaveheard. Wouldthey not act withmorecon-sistency,in urging the establishmentof the latter,as no lessnecessaryto guard the Unionagainstthefuture powersand resourcesof a body constructedlike the existingCongress,than to save it from thedangers threatened by the present impotency ofthat Assembly?

I meannot, by any t_ug heresaid,to throwcen-sure on the measureswhichhave beenpursuedbyCongress. I am sensiblethey couldnot have doneotherwise. Thepublicinterest,the necessityof thecase, imposedupon them the task of overleapingtheirconstitutionallimits.Butisnotthefactanalarmingproofof the dangerresultingfroma gov-ernment whichdoesnotpossess regularpowerscommensurateto its objects? A dissolutionor

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usurpationis the dr_ dilemmato whichit iscontinuallyexposed.

PUBLIUS.

FortheIndependentJourna/THEFEDERALIST.No. XXXIX

(_isoN)TothePeopleoftheStateofNewYork:

TheLastpaperhavingconcludedthe observationswhichweremeantto introducea candidsurveyofthe planof governmentreportedby the convention,wenowproceedto the executionof that partof ourundertaking.

The first questionthat offersitself is, whetherthe generalformand aspect of the governmentbestrictly republican. It is evident that no otherform wouldbe reconcilablewith the geniusof thepeopleof America;with the fundamentalprinciplesofthe Revolution;orwiththathonorabledetermina-tion whichanimatesevery votary of freedom,torestall our politicalexperimentson the capacityofrnnn_.d for self-government. If the plan of theconvention,therefore,be foundto departfromtherepublicancharacter,its advocatesmust abandonit asno longerdefensible.

What,then, are the distinctivecharactersof therepublicanform? Werean answerto this questionto be sought.,not by recurringto principles,but inthe applicationof the term by politicalwriters,tothe constitutionsof differentStates,no satisfactoryone wouldever be found. Holland,in which no

The Federalist 309

particleof the supremeauthorityis derivedfromthepeople,haspassedalmostuniversallyunderthedenominationof a republic. The same title hasbeenbestowedonVenice,whereabsolutepoweroverthe greatbodyof thepeopleis exercised,in themostabsolutemanner,by a small body of hereditarynobles. Poland,whichis a mixtureof aristocracyand of monarchyin their worstforms,has been_ified with the same appellation.The govern-ment of England,whichhas onerepublieaubranchonly,combinedwith an hereditaryaristocracyandmonarchy,has, with equal impropriety,been fre-quently placedon the list of republics. These ex-amples,whichare nearlyas dissimilarto eachotheras to a genuinerepublic, show the extreme iuaeocuracywith whichthe termhas been used in po-liticaldisquisitions.

If weresortfor a criterionto the differentprin-cipleson whichd_gerentformsof governmentareestablished,we may definea republicto be, or atleastmaybestowthatnameon,a governmentwhichderivesall its powersdirectlyorindirectlyfromthegreat body of the people,and is administeredbypersonsholdingtheir officesduringpleasure,for a_mitedperiod,or duringgoodbehavior. It is es-sent/alto sucha governmentthat it bederivedfromthe great body of the society,not froman incon-siderableproportion,or a favoredclassof it; other-wisea handfulof tyrannicalnobles,exercisingtheiroppressionsby a delegationof their powers,mightaspireto the rankofrepublicans,and claimfortheirgovernmentthe honorabletitle of republic. It is

3Io AlexanderHa_m_Iton

su_t forsucha governmentthatthepersonsad-min_ter_n_it be appointed,eitherdirectlyor in-directly,by the people; and that they hold theirappointmentsby either of the tenuresjust specified;otherwiseeverygovernmentin the United States,as wellas every other populargovernmentthat hasbeen or can be well organized or well executed,would be degradedfrom the republicancharacter.Accordingto the constitutionof every State in theUnion,someor other of the officersof governmentare appointedindirectly only by the people. Ac-cordingto mostof them, the chiefm_ugistratehimselfis so appointed. And accordingto one, this modeof appointmentis extendedto oneof the co6rdiuatebranches of the legislature. Accordingto all theconstitutions,also, the tenureof the highestofficesis extended to a definite period, and in many in-stances, both within the legislativeand executivedepartments,to a periodofyears. Accordingto theprovisionsof mostofthe constitutions,again,as wellas accordingto the most respectableand receivedopinionsonthe subject,the membersofthe judiciarydepartment are to retain their officesby the firmtenureof good behavior.

On comparingthe Constitutionplannedby theconventionwith the standard here fixed, we per-ceiveat once that it is, in the most rigidsense,con-formableto it. The Houseof Representatives,1_1_ethat of onebranch at least of all the State legisla-tures, is electedimmediatelyby the great body ofthe people. The Senate,like the presentCongress,and the Senateof Maryland,derivesits appointment

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indirectlyfromthe people. The Presidentis in-directlyderivedfromthe choiceof the people,ac-cordingto theexampleinmostoftheStates. Eventhe judges,withall otherofficersof the Union,will,as in theseveralStates,be thechoice,thougha re-mote choice,of the peoplethemselves. The dura-tion of the appointmentsis equallyconformabletothe republicanstandard,and to themodelof Stateconstitutions.The House of Representativesisperiodicallyelective,as in all the States; and forthe periodof two years,as in the Stateof SouthCarolina.The Senateis elective,forthe periodofsix years; whichis but one year morethan theperiodoftheSenateofMaryland,andbuttwomorethanthatoftheSenatesofNewYorkandVirghfia.ThePresidentistocontinueinofficefortheperiodoffouryears;asinNew YorkandDelawarethechiefmagistrateiselectedforthreeyears,andinSouthCarolinafortwoyears.IntheotherStatestheelectionisannual.InseveraloftheStates,however,noconstitutionalprovisionismadeforthehnpeachmentofthechiefmagistrate.AndinDela-wareandV[rgh_aheisnotimpeachabletilloutofoffice.ThePresidentoftheUnitedStatesisim-peachableatanytimeduringhiscontinuanceinoffice.Thetenurebywhichthejudgesaretoholdtheirplaces,is,asitunquestionablyoughttobe,thatofgoodbehavior.Thetenureoftheminis-terialofficesgenerally,willbe a subjectoflegalregu-lation,conformablyto the reasonofthe caseandtheexampleof the State constitutions.

Couldany furtherproofbe requiredof the repub-

! •

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lican complexionof this system, the most decisiveone mightbe found in its absoluteprohibitionoftitles of nobility,both under the federaland theStategovernments;and in its expressguarantyofthe republicanformto eachof the latter.

"But it was not _lfficient,"say the adversariesoftheproposedConstitution,"for theconventiontoadhereto the republicanform. Theyought,withequalcare, to havepreservedthe ]ederalform,whichregards the Union as a Confederacyof sovereignstates; instead of which, they have framed a na-tionalgovernment,which regards the Union as aconsolidationof the States." And it is asked bywhat authority this bold andradical innovationwasundertaken? The handle whichhas been made ofthis objectionrequiresthat it shouldbe e_:rnluedwith someprecision.

Without inquiringinto the accuracy of the dis-tinction on which the objectionis founded,it willbe necessaryto a just estimate of its force, first,to ascertainthe real character of the governmentin question;secondly,to inquirehow far the con-vention were authorizedto proposesucha govern-ment; and thirdly,how far the duty they owed totheir country could supply any defect of re_!arauthority.

First.rainorder to ascertainthe real characterofthe government,it maybe consideredin relationtothe foundationon which it is to be established;to the sources from which its ordinary powersare to be drawn; to the operationof thosepowers;to the _t of them; and to the authority by

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whichfuture changesin the governmentare to beintroduced.

On examiaingthe first relation,it appears,on onehand, that the Constitutionis to be founded onthe assentand ratificationof the peopleofAmerica,given by deputieselectedfor the specialpurpose;but, on the other,that this assentand ratificationisto be givenby the people,not as individualscom-posing one entire nation, but as composingthedistinct and independentStates to which they re-spectivelybelong. It is to be the assentandratifica-tion of the severalStates,derivedfromthe supremeauthority in eachState,--the authorityof the peoplethemselves. The act, therefore, establishing theConstitution,willnot be a national,but a federalact.

That it willbe a federalandnot a nationalact, asthese terms are understoodby the objectors; theact of the people,as formingso many independentStates, not as formingone aggregatenation, is ob-vious from this singleconsideration,that it is toresult neitherfrom the decisionof a majorityof thepeopleof the Union,nor from that of a _a]orityofthe States. It must result fromthe unanimousas-sent of the several States that are parties to it,_ffering no otherwisefrom their ordinary assentthan in its being expressed,not by the legislativeauthority, but by that of the people themselves.Were the people regarded in this transaction asformingonenation, the will of the majority of thewholepeopleof the United States would bind theminority, in the same manner as the majority ineach State must bind the minority; and the willof

3_4 .AlexanderHamilton

the majoritymust be determinedeither by a com-parisonofthe individualvotes,orby consideringthewillof the majorityof the Statesas evidenceof thewillofa majorityof the peopleof the UnitedStates.Neither of these rules has been adopted. EachState,in ratifyingthe Constitution,is consideredasa sovereignbody,independentofall others,andonlyto be boundby itsownvoluntaryact. In thisrela-tion, then, thenewConstitutionwill,if established,be a _ederal,and not a nationalconstitution.

Thenext relationis, to the sourcesfromwhichtheordinary powersof governmentare to be derived.The Houseof Representativeswillderiveits powersfrom the peopleof America;and the peoplewillberepresentedin the sameproportion,and on the sameprinciple,as they arein the legislatureof a particularState. So far the governmentis national,not [ed-eral. The Senate,on the other hand, will deriveitspowersfrom the States, as politicaland coequalso-cieties; and these will be representedon the prin-cipleof equality in the Senate,as they noware inthe existing Congress. So far the governmentis_ederal,not national. The executivepowerwill bederivedfrom avery compoundsource. Theimmedi-ate electionof the Presidentis to be madeby theStates in their political characters. The votes al-lotted to them are in a compoundratio, whichcon-sidersthem partly as distinct and coequalsocieties,partlyasunequalmembersofthe samesociety. Theeventualelection,again,isto bemadeby thatbranchof the legislaturewhich consistsof the nationalre-presentatives;but in this parti_11_ract theyareto

The Federalist 315

be thrown into the form of individualdelegations,from so many distinct and coequalbodiespolitic.From th_s aspect of the government,it appears tobe of a mixedcharacter,presentingat least as manyfederalas r_ationalfeatures.

The dlfferencebetween a federal and nationalgovernment,as it relates to the operationof thegovernment,is supposedto consist in this, that inthe formerthe powersoperateonthe politicalbodiescomposingthe Confederacy,in theirpoliticalcapac-ities; in the latter, on the individualcitizenscom-posingthe nation,in theirindividualcapacities. Ontrying the Constitutionby this criterion, it fallsunderthe national,not the ]ederalcharacter; thoughperhaps not so completelyas has beenunderstood.In severalcases,and particularlyin the trial of con-troversiesto whichStates maybe parties,they mustbe viewedand proceededagainstin their collectiveand political capacitiesonly. So far the nationalcountenanceof the governmenton this side seemsto be disfiguredby a few federalfeatures. But thisblemishis perhaps unavoidablein any plan; andthe operation of the governmenton the people,intheir individualcapacities,in its ordinaryand mostessentialproceedings,may, on the whole,designateit, in this relation,a nationalgovernment.

But if the governmentbe nationalwith regardtothe operationof its powers, it changes its aspectagainwhenwecontemplateit in relationto the e_-tent of its powers. The idea of a national govern-ment involvesin it, not only an authorityover theindividualcitizens,but an indefinitesupremacyover

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all pemonsand things, sofar as they are objectsoflawfulgovernment.Amonga peopleconsolidatedinto onenation,this supremacyis completelyvested

the natioual legislature. Among communitiesunitedforparticularpurposes,it is vestedpartlyinthegeneralandpartly in themunicipallegislatures.In the formercase,all localauthoritiesaresubordi-nate to the supreme;and may be controlled,di-rected,or abolishedby it at pleasure. In the latter,the local or municipalauthoritiesform distinctandindependentportio_ of the supremacy,no moresubject,within their respectivespheres,to the gen-eralauthority, thanthe generalauthorityis subjectto them, within its own sphere. In this relation,then,theproposedgovernmentcannotbe deemedanat/ona/one;sinceits jurisdictionextendsto certainenumeratedobjectsonly, andleavesto the severalStatesa residuaryand inviolablesovereigntyoverallother objects. It is true that in controversiesrelat-ingto the boundarybetweenthetwojurisdictions,thetribunalwhichis ultimatelyto decide,is to be estab-lishedunder the generalgovernment. But thisdoesnot changethe principleof the case. Thedecisionisto be impartiallymade, accordingto therulesof theConstitution;andallthe u_,al andmosteffectualpre-cautionsare takento securethis impartiality.Somesuchtribunalis clearlyessentialto preventanappealtothe swordandadissolutionof thecompact;andthatit oughtto be establishedunder the general ratherthan underthe localgovernments,or, to speakmoreproperly,that it couldbe safelyestablishedunderthefirst alone,is a positionnot likely to be combated.

The Federalist 3I7

If wetry the Constitutionby its last relationtotheauthorityby whichamendmentsareto bemade,we findit neitherwhollynationalnorwhollyfederal.Were it whollynational,the supremeand ultimateauthoritywouldresidein the majorityof the peopleof the Union; and this authority would be com-petentat all times,like that of a majorityof everynationalsociety,to alter or aboli._hits establishedgovernment. Were it whollyfederal,on the otherhand, the concurrenceof each State in the Unionwouldbe essentialto everyalterationthat wouldbebinding on all. The modeprovidedby the plan ofthe conventionis not foundedon either of theseprinciples. In requiringmorethanamajority,andparticularlyin computingthe proportionby States,not by citizens,it departsfromthe nationaland ad-vancestowardsthe federalcharacter; in renderingthe concttrrenceof less than the wholenumberofStatessufficient,it losesagainthe federaland par-takes ofthe nationalcharacter.

The proposedConstitution,therefore,is, in strict-ness,neither a national nor a federal Constitution,but a compositionof both. In its foundation,it isfederal,not national;in the sourcesfromwhichtheordinarypowersof the governmentare drawn,it ispartly federaland partly national; in the operationof thesepowers,it is national, not federal; in theextent of them, again, it is federal,not national;and,finally,in the authoritativemodeof introducingamendments,it_is neitherwhollyfederalnor whollynational.

: PUBLIUS.

318 AlexanderHamilton

FromtheNew YorkPack_t,FrM.ay,January x8,xTSS

THE FEDERALISW.No. XL

(MADISON)

To thePeopleof theStateoI New York:The secondpointto be examinedis, whetherthe

conventionwere authorizedto frameand proposethis mixed Constitution.

Thepowersof theconventionought,in strictness,to be determinedby an inspectionof the commis-sionsgivento the membersby theirrespectivecon-stituents. As all of these, however,had reference,

either to the recommendationfromthe meetingatAnnapolis,in September,1785,orto thatfromCon-gress,in February,_787,it willbe sufficientto recurto these particularacts.

TheactfromAnnapolisrecommendsthe "appoint-ment ofcommissionersto take into considerationthesituationof the United States; to devisesuch1ur-therprovisionsas shallappearto them necessarytorenderthe Constitutionof the federalgovernmentadequatetotheexigenciesof the Union; and to reportsuchan actforthatpurpose,to the UnitedStatesinCongressassembled,as whenagreedto by them,andafterwardsconfirmedby the legislatureof everyState, w_ effectuallyprovidefor the same."

The recommendatoryact of Congressis in thewordsfollowing: "Whereas, there is provisioninthe articlesof Confederationand perpetualUnion,for rn_Lug alterationstherein,by the assent of aCongressofthe UnitedStates, andof the legislaturesof the severalStates; and whereasexperiencehath

The Federalist 319

evinced,that there are defectsin the presentCon-federation;as a meanto remedywhich,severalofthe States, and particularlythe Stateof New York,by expressinstructionsto their delegatesin Con-gress,have suggesteda conventionfor the purposesexpressedin the followingresolution; andsuch con-ventionappearingto be the most probablemean ofestablishingin these States a firm nationalgovern-merit:

"Resolved,--Thatin the opinionof Congressit isexpedient,that on the secondMondayof Maynex_a conventionof delegates,who shallhave beenap-pointedbythe severalStates,beheldat Philadelphia,for the soleandexpresspurposeofrevisingthearticleso_Confederation,and reportingto Congressand theseveral legislaturessuch alterationsand provisionstherein,as shall, when agreed to in Congress,andconfirmedby the States,render the federalConsti-tution adequateto the exigenciesof governmentandthe preservationo_the Union."

From these two acts, it appears, _st, that theobjectof the conventionwas to establish,in theseStates,a firmnationalgovernment;2d,that this gov-ernmentwas to be such as wouldbe adequateto theexigencieso_governmentand the preservationo_ theUnion; 3d, that these purposeswereto be effectedby alterationsand provisionsin the articlesof Con-_ederation,as it is expressedin the act of Congress,orby such_urtherprovisionsasshouldappearnecessary,as it stands in the recommendatoryact from Anna-polis; 4th, that the alterationsand provisionswereto be reported to Congress,and to the States, in

$20 AlexanderHamilton

ordertobeagreedtobytheformerandconfirmedbythelatter.Fromacomparisonandfairconstructionofthese

severalmodesofexpression,istobededucedtheauthorityunderwhichtheconventionacted.Theywereto framea _l governnmnt,adequateto theexig_s of g_ern_nt, and of the Un_; and toreducethe articlesof Confederationinto such formas to accomplishthese purposes. There are tworulesof construction,dictatedby plainreason,aswell as foundedon legal axioms. The one is, thateverypartof the expressionought,ff possible,to beallowedsome meaning,and be made to conspiretosome commonend. The other is, that where theseveralparts cannotbe made to coincide,the lessimportant should give way to the more importantpart; the means should be sacrificedto the end,rather than the end to the means.

Suppose,then, that the expressionsdefiningtheauthority of the conventionwere irreconcilablyatvariancewitheachother; that a nat/onalandadequategovernmentcouldnot possibly,in the judgmentoftheconvention,be effectedby alterationsand provisionsin the articleso_Confederation;whichpart of thedefinitionought to have been embraced,and whichrejected? Which was the more important, whichthe lessimportantpart ? Whichthe end; whichthemeans? Let the most scrupulousexpositorsof dele-gated powers; let the most inveterate objectorsagainstthose exercisedby the convention,answerthese questions. Let them declare,whether it wasof most importanceto the happinessof the people

The Federalist 32I

of America,that the articlesof Confederationshouldbe disregarded,and an adequate government beprovided,and the Unionpreserved;or that an ade-quate governmentshould beomitted,and the arti-cles of Confederationpreserved. Let them declare,whether the preservationof these articleswas theend, for securingwhicha reformof the governmentwas to be introducedas the means; or whethertheestablishmentof a government,adequateto the na-tional happiness,wasthe end at whichthese arti-cles themselvesoriginallyaimed,and to whichtheyought,as insufficientmeans,to havebeensacrificed.

But is it necessaryto supposethat these expres-sions are absolutely irreconcilableto each other;that no alterationsor provisionsin thearticlesof theConfederationcouldpossiblymouldthem into a na-tional and adequate government;into sucha gov-ernmentas has beenproposedby the convention?

No stress,it is presumed,will,in this case,be laidon the title; a changeofthat couldneverbe deemedan exerciseof magrantedpower. Alterationsin thebody of the instrument are expresslyauthorized.Newprovisionsthereinare alsoexpresslyauthorized.Here then is a powerto changethe title; to insertnewarticles; to alter oldones. Mustit of necessitybe admittedthat this powerisinfringed,solongas apart of the old articlesremain? Thosewhomain-rain the affirmativeought at least to mark theboundary betweenauthorizedand usurpedirmova-_ions; between that degree of change which lieswithin the compassof alterationsand _urtherpro-visions,andthat whichamountsto a transmutationof

VOL.Xl..-,_x.

322 AlexanderHamilton

thegovernment.WillitbesaidthatthealterationsoughtnottohavetouchedthesubstanceoftheConfederation?TheStateswouldneverhaveap-pointeda conventionwithsomuchsolemnity,nordescribeditsobjectswithsomuchlatitude,ifsomesubstant_lreformhadnotbeenincontemplation.Willitbesaidthatthefu_a_,_Za!primiplesoftheConfederationwerenotwithinthepurviewoftheconvention,andoughtnottohavebeenvaried?Iask,Whataretheseprinciples?Do theyrequirethat,intheestablishmentoftheConstitution,theStatesshouldberegardedasdistinctandinde-pendentsovereigns?TheyaresoregardedbytheConstitutionproposed.Dotheyrequirethatthemembersofthegovernmentshouldderivetheirap-pointmentfromthelegislatures,notfromthepeopleoftheStates? Onebranchofthenewgovernmentistobeappointedbytheselegislatures;andundertheConfederation,the delegatesto Congressmay all beappointed immediatelyby the people,and in twoStates_are actuallyso appointed. Do they requirethat the powersof the governmentshould act onthe States,andnot immediatelyon individuals? Insomeinstances,as hasbeenshown,the powersofthenewgovernmentwillact on the States in their col-lectivecharacters. In someinstances,also,thoseofthe existinggovernmentact immediatelyon indi-viduals. In casesof captures;ofpiracy;ofthe post-office;of coins,weights,andmeasures;of trade withthe Indians; ofclaimsunder grantsoflandby differ-eat States; and, aboveall, in the caseof trials by

zConnecticutandl_ode Island.--PuBLIUS.

The Federalist 323

courts-martialinthearmyandnavy,by whichdeathmaybeinflictedwithouttheinterventionofajury,or evenofa civilmagistrate;--in all thesecasesthepowersoftheConfederationoperateimmediatelyon the personsand interestsof individualcitizens.Do these fundamentalprinciplesrequire,particu-larly,that no tax shouldbe leviedwithouttheinter-mediateagencyof the States? The Confederationitselfauthorizesa directtax, to a certainextent,onthe post-office.Thepowerof coinagehas been soconstruedby Congressas to levy a tribute im-mediatelyfromthatsourcealso. Butpretermittingthese instances,was it not an acknowledgedobjectof the conventionand theuniversalexpectationofthe people,that the regulationof tradeshouldbesubmittedto thegeneralgovernmentin sucha formas wouldrenderit an immediatesourceof generalrevenue? Had not Congress repeatedly recom-mendedthis measureas not inconsistentwith thefundamentalprinciplesof the Confederation?HadnoteveryStatebutone; had notNewYorkherself,so farcompliedwiththeplanofCongressasto recog-nizetheprincipleofthe innovation? Dotheseprin-ciples,in fine,requirethatthepowersof thegeneralgovernmentshouldbelimited,and that, beyondthislimit,the Statesshouldbe leftin possessionoftheirsovereigntyand independence? We haveseenthatin the newgovernment,as in the old, the generalpowersare limited; andthat the States,in all un-enumeratedcases,areleft in the enjoymentof theirsovereignandindependentjurisdiction.

Thetruthis, that the greatprinciplesof the Con-

324 AlexanderHamilton

stit-utionproposedby theconventionmaybe con-sideredlessasabsolutelynew,thanas theexpansionofprincipleswhicharefoundin the articlesofCon-federation.Themisforttmeunderthelattersystemhasbeen,thattheseprinciplesaresofeebleandcon-finedas to justifyall the chargesof inefficiencywhichhavebeenurgedagainstit, andtorequireadegreeofenlargementwhichgivestothenewsystemtheaspectofanentiretransformationoftheold.

In oneparticularit is admittedthat theconven-tionhavedepartedfromthetenoroftheircomrnls-sion. Insteadof reportinga plan requiringtheconfirmationo[ the legislaturesofalltheStates,theyhavereportedaplanwhichis to beconfirmedbythepeople,andmaybecarriedintoeffectbynineStatesonly. It is worthyof remarkthat thisobjection,thoughthe mostplausible,hasbeenthe leasturgedinthepublicationswhichhaveswarmedagainsttheconvention.Theforbearancecanonly havepro-ceededfroman irresistibleconvictionof the ab-surdityofsubjectingthefateoftwelveStatesto theperversenessorcorruptionofa thirteenth;fromtheexo_rnpleof inflexibleoppositiongivenby a majorityofonesixtiethofthepeopleofAmericato ameasureapprovedand calledfor by the voiceof twelveStates,comprisingfifty-ninesixtiethsofthepeoplcanexamplestillfreshin thememoryand indigna-tionof everycitizenwhohasfelt forthe woundedhonorandprosperityof his country.As thisob-jection,therefore,hasbeenin a mannerwaivedbythosewhohavecriti_sedthepowersoftheconven-tion,I dismissit withoutfurtherobservation.

The Federalist 325

The third point to be inquired into is, how farconsiderationsof duty arisingout of the caseitselfcouldhavesuppliedany defectof regularauthority.

In the precedinginquiriesthe powersof the con-ventionhavebeenanalyzedand tried with the samerigor,and by the samerules,as if they had beenrealandfinalpowersfor the establishmentof a Constitu-tion for the UnitedStates. We have seenin whatmannerthey havebornethe trial evenon that sup-position. It istime nowto recollectthat the powerswere merely advisory and recommendatory;thatthey weresomeantby the States,and sounderstoodby the convention;andthat the latter haveaccord-inglyplannedand proposeda Constitutionwhichisto be of no more consequencethan the paper onwhichit is written, unless it be stampedwith theapprobationofthoseto whomit is addressed. Thisreflectionplacesthe subjectin a point of viewalto-gether different,and will enableus to judge withproprietyof the coursetakenby the convention.

Let us viewthe groundon whichthe conventionstood. It may be collectedfromtheir proceedings,that they were deeply and unanimouslyimpressedwith the crisis,whichhad led their countryalmostwith one voiceto make so singularand solemnanexperimentfor correctingthe errorsof a systembywhichthis crisishad beenproduced; that they wereno lessdeeplyandunanimouslyconvincedthat sucha reformas theyhaveproposedwasabsolutelyneces-sary to effectthe purposesof their appointment. Itcouldnotbeunknowntothemthatthehopesandexpectationsofthegreatbodyofcitizens,throughout

326 AlexanderHamilton

this great empire, were turnedwith the keenestanxietyto the eventof theirdeliberations. Theyhad everyreasonto believethat the contrarysenti-ments agitated the minds and bosoms of everyexternaland internalfoe to the libertyand pro-sperityof theUnitedStates. Theyhadseenin theoriginand progressof the experiment,the alacritywithwhichtheproposition,madeby a singleState(Virginia),towardsa partial amendmentof theConfederation,had beenattendedto and promoted.Theyhad seenthelibertyassumedby a veryfewdepu-ties from a veryfew States, convenedat Annapolis,of recommendinga great and critical object,whollyforeignto their commission,not only justifiedby thepublic opinion,but actually carried into effectbytwelve out of the thirteen States. They had seen,in a variety of instances,assumptionsby Congress,not only of recommendatory,but of operative,powers, warranted, in the public estimation, byoccasionsandobjectsinfinitelylessurgentthan thoseby whichtheir conductwasto be governed. Theymust have reflected,that in all great changes ofestablishedgovernments,formsoughtto givewaytosubstance; that a rigid adherencein such casestothe former,wouldrendernominaland nugatorythetranscendent and precious right of the people to"abolish or alter their governments as to themshall seem most lil_elyto effect their safety andhappiness,"' since it is impossiblefor the peoplespontaneouslyand universallyto move in concerttowards their object; and it is thereforeessential

zDeclarationofIndependence.--PuBLIvs.

The Federalist 327

that such changesbe instituted by some informaland unauthorizedpropositions,madeby somepatri-otic and respectablecitizenor number of citizens.They must have recollectedthat it was by this ir-regular and assumedprivilegeof proposingto thepeopleplansfor their safety andhappiness,that theStates were first united against the danger withwhichtheywerethreatenedby their ancientgovern-ment; that committeesand congresseswereformedfor concentratingtheir effortsand defendingtheirfights; and that conventionswere electedin theseveralStatesfor establishingthe constitutionsunderwhichthey arenowgoverned;norcouldit havebeenforgotten that no little ill-timedscruples,no zealfor adheringto ordinaryforms,wereanywhereseen,except in those whowishedto indulge,under thesemasks, their secret enmity to the substancecon-tended for. Theymust havebornein mind,that asthe plan to be framedand proposedwasto be sub-mitted to thepeoplethemselves,the disapprobationofthis supremeauthoritywoulddestroyit forever; itsapprobationblot out antecedenterrorsand irregu-larities. It mightevenhaveoccurredto them, thatwherea dispositionto cavil prevailed,their neglectto executethe degreeof powervestedin them,andstill more their recommendationof any measurewhatever,not warrantedby their comrn_.qsion,wouldnot less excite animadversion,than a recommenda-tion at onceof a measurefullycommensurateto thenational exigencies.

Had the convention,under all these impressions,and in the midst of all these considerations,instead

328 AlexanderHamilton

ofexercisinga manlyconfidencein theircountry,bywhoseconfidencethey had beenso peculiarlydis-tinguished,andof pointingouta systemcapable,intheirjudgment,of securingits happiness,takenthecoldandsullenresolutionof disappointingits ardenthopes,of sacrificingsubstanceto forms,of com-mittingthe dearestinterestsof their countryto theuncertaintiesof delayand thehazardof events,letme ask theman whocanraisehis mind to one ele-vatedconception,whocanawakenin hisbosomonepatrioticemotion,what judgmentought to havebeen pronouncedby the impartialworld,by thefriendsof mankind,by everyvirtuouscitizen,ontheconductandcharacterofthis assembly? Orif therebea manwhosepropensityto conderrmissusceptibleof no control,let me thenask whatsentencehe hasin reservefor the twelveStates,who usurpedthe,powerof sendingdeputiesto the convention,a bodyutterly 11nkmownto their constitutions;for Con-gress,who recommendedthe appointmentof thisbody, equallylmlcnownto the Confederation;andforthe Stateof NewYork,in particular,whichfirsturged and then compliedwith this unauthorizedinterposition?

But that theobjectorsmay be disarmedof everypretext, it shallbe grantedfora momentthat theconventionwere neitherauthorizedby their com-mission,norjustifiedby circumstancesin proposinga Constitutionfortheircountry:does it followthatthe Constitutionought,forthat reasonalone,to berejected? If, accordingto the nobleprecept,it belawfulto acceptgoodadviceeven froman enemy,

The Federalist 329

shall we set the ignobleexampleof refusingsuchadviceevenwhenit is offeredby ourfriends? Theprudentinquiry,in all cases,oughtsurelyto be,no_somuchFromwhomtheadvicecomes,as whethertheadvicebe good.

The sum of what has been hereadvancedandprovedis,that thechargeagainsttheconventionofexceedingtheirpowers,exceptin oneinstancelittleurgedby the objectors,has no foundationto sup-portit; thatif theyhadexceededtheirpowers,theywere not onlywarranted,butrequired,as the con-fidentialservantsof theircountry,by the circum-stancesin whichthey wereplaced,to exercisethelibertywhichtheyassumed;andthatfinally,if theyhadviolatedboth theirpowersand theirobligations,in proposinga Constitution,this oughtneverthelessto beembraced,if it be calculatedto accomplishtheviewsandhappinessofthepeopleofAmerica. Howfar this characteris due to the Constitution,is thesubjec$underinvestigation.

PUBLIUS.

Fort_ IndependentJournalTHEFEDERALIST.No.XLI

(_ADxSOS)To thePeopleoFtheStateoFNew York:

The Constitutionproposed by the conventionmaybeconsideredundertwogeneralpointsof view.The _IRSTrelatesto the sumor quantityof powerwhichi_ vests in the government,includingthe re-straintsimposedonthe States. Thes_co_-D,to the

330 AlexanderHamilton

particularstructure of the government,and the dis-tributionof this power amongits severalbranches.

Underthe firstviewof the subject,twoimportantquestionsarise: i. Whetherany part of the powerstransferredto the generalgovernmentbe unneces-sary or improper? 2. Whether the entire mass ofthem be dangerousto the portionof jurisdictionleftin the severalStates?

Is the aggregatepowerof the generalgovernmentgreater than oughtto havebeenvestedin it? Thisis the firstquestion.

It cannot have escapedthose whohave attendedwith candorto the argumentsemployedagainsttheextensivepowersof the government,that the au-thors of them have very little consideredhow farthese powerswere necessarymeans of atta_Jug anecessaryend. They have chosen rather to dwellon the inconvenienceswhichmust be unavoidablyblendedwith all political advantages; and on thepossibleabuses which must be incident to everypowerortrust, ofwhicha beneficialusecanbe made.This methodof handlingthe subject cannot imposeon the good sense of the people of America. Itmaydisplay the subtlety of the writer; it may opena boundlessfieldfor rhetoric and declamation; itmay inflamethe passionsofthe untbi_lciug,andmayconfirmthe prejudicesof the misthinking: but coolandcandidpeoplewillat oncereflect,that the purestof human blessingsmust have a portion of alloyinthem; that the choicemust alwaysbe made, if notof the lesserevil, at least of the OREATgR,not thePERFECT,good; and that in every politicalinstitu-

The Federalist 33I

fion, a powerto advancethe public happinessin-volvesa discretionwhich may be misappliedandabused. They will see, therefore,that in all caseswherepoweris to be conferred,the point first to bedecidedis, whethersucha powerbe necessaryto thepublicgood; asthe next willbe,in caseofan affirma-tive decision,toguardas effectuallyaspossibleagainsta perversionof the power to the public detriment.

That wemayforma correctjudgmentonthis sub-ject, it willbe proper to reviewthe severalpowersconferredon the governmentof the Union; and thatthis may be the more convenientlydone they maybe reduced into differentclassesas they relate tothe followingdifferentobjects: i. Securityagainstforeigndanger; 2.Regulationofthe intercoursewithforeignnations; 3. Maintenanceof harmony andproperintercourseamongthe States; 4. Certainmis-cellaneousobjectsof generalutility; 5. Restraint ofthe Statesfromcertaininjuriousacts; 6. Provisionsfor givingdue efficacyto all these powers.

The powersfallingwithinthe firstclassare thoseof decladugwar and grantingletters of marque; ofprovidingarmiesandfleets; ofregulatingand callingforth the militia; of levyingand borrowingmoney.

, Securityagainstforeigndangeris oneofthe primi-tive objectsof civil society. It is an avowedandessentialobjectofthe AmericanUnion. Thepowersrequisiteforattainingit mustbe effectuallyconfidedt_ the federalcouncils.

Is the powerof declaringwarnecessary? Nomanwillanswerthis questionin the negative. It wouldbe superfluous,therefore,to enterinto a proofof the

332 AlexanderHamilton

affirmative. Theexiting Confederationestablishesthis powerin themostampleform.

Is thepowerofraisingarmiesandequippingfleetsnecessary? Thisis involvedin the foregoingpower.It is involvedin the powerof self-defence.

But wasit necessaryto givean INDEFINITEPOWERof raisingTROOPS,as wellas providiugfleets; andofmaintainingbothin PEACE,as wellas in war?

The answer to these questionshas been too faranticipatedin another place to admit an extensivediscussionofthemin thisplace. Theanswerindeedseemsto be soobviousand conclusiveas scarcelytojustifysuch a discussionin any place. With whatcolorof propriety could the force necessaryfor de-fencebe lirrdtedby thosewhocannotlimit the forceof offence? If a federal Constitutioncould chainthe ambitionor set bounds to the exertionsof allothernations,then indeedmightit prudentlychainthe discretionofits owngovernment,and setboundsto the exertionsfor its ownsafety.

Howcoulda readinessforwar in time of peacebesafelyprohibited,unless we could prohibit, in likemanner, the preparations and establishmentsofevery hostile nation? The meansof security canonly be regulatedby the means and the dangerofattack. They will, in fact, be ever determinedbytheserules,andby no others. It is in vainto opposeconstitutionalbarriersto the impulseofself-preserva-tion. It is worse than in vain; becauseit plantsin the Constitutionitself necessaryusurpationsofpower, everyprecedentof which is a germ of un-necessaryand multipliedrepetitions. If one nation

The Fedcra_t 833

maintminsconstantlya disciplinedarmy, ready forthe serviceofambitionorrevenge,it obligesthemostpacificnationswho may be within the reachof itsenterprisesto take correspondingprecautions. Thefifteenthcenturywastheunhappyepochofmilitaryestablishmentsinthetimeofpeace.Theywerein-troducedbyCharlesVII.ofFrance.AllEuropehasfollowed,orbeenforcedinto,theexample.Hadtheexamplenotbeenfollowedby othernations,a11Europemustlongagohavewornthechainsofauni-versalmonarch.WereeverynationexceptFrancenowtodisbanditspeaceestablishments,thesame

. event might follow. The veteran legionsof Romewerean overmatchfor the undisciplinedvalorof allother nations, and renderedher the mistressof theworld.

Not the less true is it, that the libertiesof Romeprovedthe finalvictimto hermilitarytriumphs; andthat the liberties of Europe, as far as they everexisted,have, with few exceptions,been the priceof her military establishments. A standing force,therefore,is a dangerous,at the same time that itmay be a necessary,provision. On the smallestscale it has its inconveniences.On an extensivescaleits consequencesmay be fatal. On any scaleit is an objectof laudablecircumspectionand pre-caution. Awisenation will combineall these con-siderations; and,whilst it doesnot rashlyprecludeitselffrom anyresourcewhichmaybecomeessentialto its safety,willexertall its prudencein diminish_gboth the necessityandthe dangerof resortingto onewhichmay be inauspiciousto its liberties.

334 AlexanderHamilton

Theclearestmarksof this prudencearestampedon the proposedConstitution.The Unionitself,whichit cementsandsecures,destroyseverypretextforamilitaryestablishmentwhichcouldbedanger-ous.Americaunited,witha handfulof troops,orwithouta singlesoldier,exhibitsa moreforbiddingpostureto foreignambitionthan Americadisunited,witha hundredthousandveteransreadyforcombat.Itwasremerked,ona formeroccasion,that the wantof this pretexthad savedthe libertiesof onenationin Europe. Beingrenderedby herinsulo_rsituationand her maritimeresourcesimpregnableto the ar-mies of her neighbors,the rulersof Great Britainhaveneverbeenable,by realorartificialdangers,tocheat the publicinto an extensivepeaceestablish-ment. The distanceof the UnitedStatesfromthepowerfulnationsof the worldgivesthemthe samehappy security. A dangerousestablishmentcanneverbenecessaryorplausible,so long as theycon-tinuea unitedpeople. Butlet it never,for a mo-ment,be forgotten,that they are indebtedfor thisadvantageto the Unionalone. Themomentof itsdissolutionwillbe the date of a neworderofthings.The fears of the weaker,or the ambitionof thestrongerStates,or Confederacies,willset the sameexamplein theNew,as CharlesVII. didin the OldWorld. The examplewillbefollowedherefromthesame motiveswhichproduceduniversalimitationthere. Insteadof derivingfromour situationthepreciousadvantagewhichGreatBritainhasderivedfrom hers,the face of Americawill be but a copyof thatof thecontinentof Europe. It willpresent

The Federalist 335

liberty everywherecrushed betweenstanding ar-mies and perpetual taxes. The forgunesof dis-unitedAmericawill be even moredisastrousthanthose of Europe. The sourcesof evil in the latterareconfinedto herownlimits. No superiorpowersof anotherquarterof the globeintrigueamongherrival nations,inflametheirmutual animosities,andrenderthem the instrumentsof foreignambition,jealousy,and revenge. In America the miseriesspringingfromherinternal jealousies,contentions,and wars,wouldforma part only of herlot. Aplentifuladdition of evilswouldhave their sourcein that relationin which Europe stands to thisquarterof theearth,and whichno otherquarterofthe earthbearsto Europe.

Thispictareof theconsequencesof disunioncan-not be too highlycolored,or too oftenexhibited.Every manwho lovespeace,everyman wholoveshis country,everyman wholovesliberty,oughttohave it everbeforeh_ eyes,that he may cherishinhisheart a due attachmentto theUnionof America,and be ableto set a duevalueon themeansof pre-serving it.

Next to the effectualestablishmentof the Union,the best possibleprecaution against danger fromstandingarmiesis a limitationof the termfor whichrevenuemaybeappropriatedto theirsupport. Thisprecautionthe Constitutionhasprndentlyadded. Iwill not repeat here the observationswhich I flat-ter myselfhaveplacedthissubjectina justandsatisfactorylight.Butitmaynotbeimpropertotakenoticeofanargumentagainstthispartofthe

336 AlexanderHamilton

Constitution,whichhasbeendrawnfromthepolicyandpracticeofGreatBritain.Itissaidthatthecontinuanceofanarmyinthatkingdomrequiresanannualvoteofthelegislature;whereastheAmericanConstitutionhaslengthenedthiscriticalperiodtotwoyears.Thisistheforminwhichthecomparisonisusuallystatedtothepubhc:butisitajustform?Isitafaircomparison?DoestheBritishConstitu-tionrestrainthepar!_o:mentarydiscretiontooneyear? Does the Americanimposeon the Congressappropriationsfortwo years? On the contrary,itcannot be u_own to the authors of the fallacythemselves,that the British Constitutionfixes nolimit whatever to the discretionof the legislature,and that the Americanties downthe legislaturetotwo years,as the longestadmissibleterm.

Had the argumentfromthe Britishexamplebeentruly stated, it wouldhavestoodthus: The termforwhich suppliesmay be appropriated to the armyestabhshment,thoughtml'_m_tedby the BritishCon-stitution,has nevertheless,in practice,been limitedby parliamentarydiscretionto a singleyear. Now,if in Great Britain,wherethe Houseof Commonsiselectedfor sevenyears; wheresogreat a proportionof the membersare electedby so smalla proportionof the people; wherethe electorsare so corruptedby the representatives,and the representativessocorrupted by the Crown,the representativebodycan possessa power to m_l_eappropriationsto thearmy for an indefiniteterm, without desiring, orwithout daring,to extend the term beyonda singleyear, ought not suspicionherself to blush, in pre-

The Federalist 337

tendingthat therepresentativesoftheUnitedStates,elected_gEELYby the WHOLEBODYof the people,everySECONDYEAR,cannotbe safelyintrustedwiththe discretionover such appropriations,expresslybruitedto the shortperiodof TWOYEARS?

A bad causeseldomfails to betray itself. Of thistruth, the managementof the opposition to thefederal governmentis an unvaried exemplification.But amongall the blunderswhichhave been com-mitted, none is more striking than the attempt toe,l_t on that side the prudentjealousyentertainedby the people,of standingarmies. The attempthasawakenedfullythe publicattention to that import-ant subject; and has led to investigationswhichmustterminatein a thoroughand universalconvic-tion, not only that the Constitutionhas provided_hemost effectualguards againstdangerfrom thatquarter, but that nothing short of a Constitutionfullyadequateto the national defenceand the pre-servationof the Union,can save Americafrom asm_:nystandingarmiesas it may be split into Statesor Confederacies,and from sucha progressiveaug-mentationof these establishmentsin each, as willrender them as burdensometo the propertiesandominousto the libertiesofthe people,as any estab-lishmentthat can becomenecessary,undera unitedand efficientgovernment,must be tolerableto theformerand safeto the latter.

Thepalpablenecessityofthe powerto provideandmaintaina navyhas protectedthat part of the Con-stitutionagainsta spiritof censure,whichhassparedfew other parts. It must, indeed, be numbered

voz,. XI.'--'8_.

338 AlexanderHami_!ton

amongthegreatestblessingsof America,thatasherUnionwillbetheonlysourceofhermaritimestrength,so this will be a principalsourceof her securityagainstdangerfrom abroad. In this respectoursituationbearsanotherlikenessto the insularadvan-tageof Great Britain. The batteries most capableof repellingforeignenterpriseson our safety, arehappilysuch as can never be turnedby a perfidiousgovernmentagainstour liberties.

The inhabitantsof the Atlanticfrontierare all ofthem deeply interestedin this provisionfor navalprotection,and if they have hitherto beensufferedto sleepquietlyin their beds; if their propertyhasremainedsafe against the predatory spirit of licen-tious adventurers; if their maritimetownshavenotyet beencompelledto ransomthemselvesfrom theterrorsofa conflagration,byyieldingto the exactionsof daring and sudden invaders, these instances ofgoodfortuneare not to be ascribedto the capacityof the existing governmentfor the protection ofthosefrom whomit claimsallegiance,but to causesthat are fugitiveand fallacious. If weexcept per-haps Virginiaand Maryland,which are peculiarlyvulnerableon their eastern frontiers, no part ofthe Unionoughtto feel moreanxietyon this subjectthan NewYork. Her sea-coastis extensive. Averyimportant district of the State is an island. TheState itself is penetratedby a large navigableriverfor more than fifty leagues. The great emporiumofits commerce,the great reservoirofits wealth,liesevery momentat the mercy of events, and mayalmost be regarded as a hostage for ignominious

The Federalist 339

complianceswith the dictates of a foreignenemy,or evenwith the rapaciousdemandsof pirates andbarbarians. Shoulda war be the result of the pre-carioussituationof Europeanaffairs,and all the un-ruly passionsattendingit be let looseon the ocean,our escapefrom insultsand depredations,not onlyon that element,but everypart of the other border-ing on it, willbe truly miraculous. In the presentconditionof America,the States more immediatelyexposedto these calamitieshave nothing to hopefrom the phantom of a generalgovernmentwhichnowexists; and if their singleresourceswere equalto the task of fortifying themselvesagainst thedanger,the object to be protectedwouldbe almostconsumedby the meansof protectingthem.

The power of re_!_atingand callingforth themilitiahas been alreadysufficientlyvindicatedandexplained.

Thepoweroflevyingandborrowingmoney,beingthe sinewof that whichis to be exertedin the na-tional defence,is properly thrown into the sameclasswith it. This power,also,has been examinedalreadywith much attention, andhas, I trust, beenclearlyshownto be necessary,both in the extentandformgivento it by the Constitution. I willaddressone additionalreflectiononly to thosewhocontendthat thepoweroughtto havebeenrestrainedto ex-ternal taxationwby which they mean, taxes onarticles importedfrom other countries. It cannotbe doubtedthat this willalwaysbe a valuablesourceof revenue; that for a considerabletime it must bea principalsource; that at th_s moment it is an

340 AlexanderHamilton

essential one. But we may form very mistakenideas on this subject, if we do not call to mind inour calculations,that the extent of revenuedrawnfrom foreigncommercemust vary with the varia-tions,both in the extent and the kind of imports;andthat thesevariationsdonot correspondwith theprogressof population,whichmust be the generalmeasureofthe publicwants. Aslongas agriculturecontinuesthe solefieldof labor, the importationofmanufacturesmust increaseas the consumersmul=tiply. Assoonas domesticmanufacturesare begunby the hands not calledfor by agriculture,the im-ported manufactureswilldecreaseasthenumbersof people increase. In a more remote stage, theimports rosy consist in a considerablepart of rawmaterials,whichwill be wrought into articles forexportation,and will, therefore,requirerather theencouragementof bounties,than to be loadedwithdiscouraging duties. A system of government,meant for duration, ought to contemplate theserevolutions,and be able to accommodateitself tothem.

Some,who have not deniedthe necessityof thepowerof taxation, have groundeda very fierceat-tack against the Constitution,on the languageinwhichit is defined. It has beenurgedand echoed,that the power"to lay and collecttaxes,duties,im-posts,and excises,to pay the debts,andprovideforthe common defence and general welfare of theUnited States," amounts to an unlirni_d commis-sion to exerciseevery powerwhichmay be allegedto be necessaryfor the commondefenceor general

The Federalist 34I

welfare. No strongerproofcouldbe given of thedistressunder whichthesewriterslabor for objec-tions,than their stoopingto sucha misconstruction.

Had no other enumerationor definitionof thepowersof the Congressbeenfoundin the Constitu-tion, thav the generalexpressionsjust cited,the au-thors ofthe objectionmighthavehad somecolorforit; though it would have been difficultto find areasonfor so awkwarda formof describingan au-thority to legislatein all possiblecases. Apowertodestroy the freedomof the press,the trial by jury,or even to regulatethe courseof descents,or theformsof conveyances,mustbe very singularlyex-pressedby the terms"to raisemoneyfor thegeneralwelfare."

But what color can the objectionhave, when aspecificationof the objects alluded to by thesegeneralterms immediatelyfollows,and is not evenseparatedby a longerpause than a semicolon? Ifthe differentparts of the sameinstrumentoughttobe so expounded,as to givemeaningto everypartwhichwill bear it, shall onepart of the same sen-tence be excludedaltogetherfrom a share in themeaning; andshallthe moredoubtfulandindefiniteterms be retained in theirfullextent, and the clearand preciseexpressionsbe deniedany significationwhatsoever? Forwhat purposecouldthe enumera-tionof particularpowersbe inserted,_ftheseand allotherswere meant to be includedin the precedinggeneralpower? Nothingis more natural nor com-mon than first to use a generalphrase, and then toexplainand qualifyit by a recital of partic_ll,rs.

342 AlexanderHamilton

But the ideaof an enumerationof particularswhichneitherexplainnor qualifythegeneralmeaning,andcanhavenoothereffectthantoconfoundandmis-lead,is an absurdity,which,as we are reducedtothe dilemmaof chargingeitheron the authorsoftheobjectionor on the authors of the Constitution,wemust takethe libertyof supposing,had not its originwith the latter.

The objectionhere is the more extraordinary,asit appearsthat the languageusedby the conventionis a copy from the articlesof Confederation. Theobjectsof the Unionamongthe States,as describedin articlethird, are, "their commondefence,securityof their liberties,and mutual and generalwelfare."The terms of article eighth are still more identical:"All chargesofwar and all other expensesthat shallbe incurredfor the commondefenceor generalwel-fare, and allowedby the UnitedStates in Congress,shallbe defrayedout ofa commontreasury,"etc. As'nnilarlanguageagainoccursin articleninth. Con-strue eitherofthese articlesby the ruleswhichwouldjustifythe constructionput onthe newConstitution,and they vest in the existingCongressa power tolegislatein all caseswhatsoever. But what wouldhave been thought of that assembly,if, attachingthemselvesto these general expressions,and dis-regarding the specificationswhich ascertain andlimit their import, they had exercisedan unlimi-ted power of providingfor the common defenceand general welfare? I appeal to the objectorsthemselves,whether they would in that casehaveemployedthe samereasoningin just'fficationof Con-

The Federalist 343

gress as they nowmakeuse of against the conven-tion. Howdimcultit is forerror to escapeits owncondemnation!

PUBLIUS.

FromtheNew York Packet,Tuesday,January 22,x788

_HE FEDERALIST. No. XLII

(HAmSOS)

To thePeopleoftheStateof New York:Thesecondclassof powers,lodgedin the general

government,consistof those which regulatetheintercoursewith foreignnations, to wit: to maketreaties; to send and receiveambassadors,otherpublicministers,and consttls; to defineandpunishpiraciesandfeloniescommittedonthe highseas,andoffencesagainst the law of nations; to regulateforeigncommerce,includinga power to prohibit,after the year x8o8,the importationof slaves,andto lay an intermediatedutyof ten dollarsperhead,as a discouragementto suchimportations.

Thisclassof powersformsan obviousand essen-tial branchofthe federaladministration. If weareto be one nation m any respect,it clearlyoughttobe in respectto othernations.

Thepowersto maketreatiesand to sendand re-ceiveambassadors,speaktheirownpropriety.Bothof themare comprisedin the articlesof Confedera-tion, with this differenceonly, that the formerisdisembarrassed,by the plan of the convention,ofan exception,underwhichtreatiesmight be sub-stantiallyfrustratedby regulationsof the States;

344 AlexanderHamilton

andthat a powerof appointingandreceiving"otherpublicm_nistersand consuls,"is expresslyandveryproperlyadded to the formerprovisionconcern-ing ambassadors.The term ambassador,if takenstrictly,as seemsto berequiredby the secondofthearticlesof Confederation,comprehendsthe highestgradeonly of publicministers,and excludesthegradeswhichthe UnitedStateswill be most likelyto prefer,whereforeignembassiesmaybe necessary.And underno latitudeof constructionwillthe termcomprehendconsuls. Yet it has been found ex-pedient,and has beenthe practiceof Congress,toemploythe inferiorgradesof publicministers,andto sendand receiveconsuls.

It is true,that wheretreatiesof commercestipu-late for the mutual appointmentof consuls,whosefunctionsareconnectedwithcommerce,the admis-sion of foreignconsulsmayfall within the powerof maltingcommercialtreaties; and that wherenosuchtreaties exist,themi._sionof Americanconsulsinto foreigncountriesmayperhapsbe coveredunderthe authority,givenby the ninth articleof the Con-federation,to appoint all such civil officersas maybe necessaryfor managingthe generalaffairsof theUnitedStates. But theadmissionofconsulsinto theUnited States, whereno previoustreaty has stipu-lated it, seemsto have been nowhereprovidedfor.Asupplyof the omissionis oneofthelesserinstancesin whichthe conventionhave improvedonthemodelbeforethem. But the most minute provisionsbe-comeimportantwhenthey tend to obviate the ne-cessity or the pretext for gradual and unobserved

The Federalist 345

usurpationsof power. A fist of the easesin whichCongresshavebeen betrayed,or forcedby the de-fects of the Confederation,into violationsof theirchartered authorities, would not a little surprisethose who have paid no attentionto the subject;and wouldbe no inconsiderablearg_mentin favorof the new Constitution,whichseemsto have pro-videdno lessstudiouslyfor the lesser,than the moreobviousand stri_ug defectsofthe old.

The power to define and punish piracies andfeloniescommittedon the high seas, and offencesagalngtthe lawof nations,belongswith equalpro-priety to the general government,and is a stillgreaterimprovementon the articlesof Confedera-tion. These articles contain no provisionfor thecaseof offencesagainstthe lawofnations; and con-sequentlyleave it in the powerof any indiscreetmember to embroil the Confederacywith foreignnations. The provisionof thefederalarticleson thesu_ect of piraciesand feloniesextends no furtherthan to the estabhshmentof courts for the trialof theseoffences. The definitionof piraciesmight,perhaps, without inconveniency,be left to thelaw of nations; though a legislativedefinitionofthem is found in most municipalcodes. A defini-tionoffeloniesonthe highseasis evidentlyrequisite.Felonyis a term of loosesignification,even in thecommonlaw of England; and of variousimport inthe statute law of that kingdom. But neither thecommonnor the statute lawof that, or of anyothernation, ought to be a standard for the proceedingsofthis, unlesspreviouslymadeits ownby legislative

346 AlexanderHamilton

adoption. The me._njngof the term, as definedinthe codesof the severalStates,wouldbe as irnprac-ticable as the formerwouldbe a dishonorableandillegitimateguide. It is not preciselythe same inany two of the States; and varies in each withevery revisionof its criminallaws. For the sakeof certaintyand uniformity,therefore,the powerofdefiningfeloniesin this case was in every respectnecessaryand proper.

The regulationof foreigncommerce,havingfallenwithinseveralviewswhichhave beentaken of thissubject,has beentoo fully discussedto need addi-tionalproofshereof its beingproperlysubmittedtothe federal administration.

It weredoubtlessto be wished,that the powerofprohibitingthe importationof slaveshad not beenpostponeduntil the year i8o8,or rather that it hadbeensufferedto have immediateoperation. But itis not difficultto account,eitherfor this restrictionon the general government,or for the mauner inwhichthe wholeclauseis expressed. It oughtto beconsideredas a great point gainedin favor of hu-manity,that a periodoftwentyyearsmayterm.jnateforever, within these States, a trafficwhichhas solong and so loudly upbraided the barbarism ofmodern policy; that within that period, it willre-ceivea considerablediscouragementfromthe federalgovernment,and may be totally abolished,by aconcurrenceof the few States which continuetheunnatural traffic,in the prohibitoryexamplewhichhas beengivenby sogreat a majorityofthe Union.Happy wouldit be for the _lnfortlmateAfricans,if j

The Federalist 347

an equalprospectlay beforethemofbeingredeemedfromthe oppressionsoftheirEuropeanbrethren!

Attemptshave been madeto pervert this clauseinto an objectionagainst the Constitution,by re-presentingit on one sideas a criminaltolerationofan illicitpractice,and on anotheras calculatedtoprevent voluntaryand beneficialemigrationsfromEuropeto America. I mentionthese misconstruc-tions, not with a viewto givethem an answer,for,they deservenone,but as specimensof the mannerand spirit in whichsomehave thoughtfit to conduct*theiroppositionto the proposedgovernment.

The powersincludedin the third class are thosewhich provide for the harmony and proper inter-courseamongthe States.

Underthis head mightbe includedthe particularrestraints imposedon the authority of the States,and certainpowersof the judicialdepartment; butthe formerare reservedfor a distinct class,and thelatter willbe particularlyexaminedwhenwe arrive

: at the structureandorganizationofthe government.I shall co_finemyself to a cursoryreviewof the

_ remaining powerscomprehendedunder this thirddescription,to wit" to regulate commerceamong

• the several States and the Indian tribes; to coinmoney, regulate the value thereof,and of foreign

• coin; to providefor the punishmentof counterfeit-ing the current coin and securitiesof the United

: States', to fixthe standardof weightsandmeasures;to establisha uniformrule of naturalization,and

_i uniformlawsof bankruptcy; to prescribethe man-i net in whichthe public acts, records,and judicial

348 AlexanderHamilton

proceedingsof each Stateshallbe proved,and theeffectthey shall have in otherStates; and to es-tablishpost-officesandpost-roads.

The defectof powerin the existingConfederacyto regulatethecommercebetweenits severalmem-bers, is in the numberof those which have beenclearlypointedout by experience.To the proofsand remarkswhichformerpapershavebroughtintoviewon this subject,it maybe addedthatwithoutthissupplementalprovision,the greatandessentialpowerof regulatingforeigncommercewouldhavebeen incompleteand ineffectual. A verymaterialobject of this powerwas the relief of the Stateswhichimportand exportthroughotherStates,fromthe impropercontributionsleviedon them by thelatter. Werethese at libertyto regulatethe tradebetweenState and State,it must be foreseenthatwayswouldbe foundout to loadthe articlesof im-port and export,duringthe passagethroughtheirjurisdiction,with duties which would fall on them_l_ersof the latter and the con_lmersof theformer. We may be assuredby past experience,that sucha practicewouldbe introducedby futurecontrivances;and both by that and a commonknowledgeof humanaffairs,that it wouldnourishunceasinganhnosities,and not improbablytermi-nate in seriousinterruptionsof the publictranquil-lity. Tothosewhodonotviewthe questionthroughthe mediumof passionor of interest,the desireofthe commercialStates to collect,in any form,anindirectrevenuefromtheiruncommercialneighbors,must appearnot less impoliticthan it is unfair;

The Federalist 349

s_ce it wouldstimulatethe injuredparty, by re-sentmentas wellas interest,to resortto less con-venientchannelsfor theirforeigntrade. But themildvoiceof reason,pleadingthe causeof an en-largedand permanentinterest, is but too oftendrowned,beforepubhcbodiesaswellas individuels,by the clamorsof an impatientavidity for imme-d{ateand immoderategain.

Thenecessityof a superintendingauthorityoverthe reciprocaltradeof confederatedStates,hasbeenillustratedby otherexamplesaswellas ourown. InSwitzerland,wherethe Unionis soveryslight,eachcantonis obligedto allowto merchandisesa passagethroughits jurisdictioninto othercantons,withoutan augmentationof the tolls. In Germanyit is alaw of the empire,thatthe princesand statesshallnot lay tollsor customson bridges,rivers,or pas-sages,withouttheconsentof the emperorand thediet; thoughit appearsfroma quotationin an ante-cedentpaper,that the practicein this,as in manyother_nstancesin that confederacy,hasnotfollowedthelaw,and hasproducedtherethemischiefswhichhavebeenforeseenhere. Amongtherestraintsim-posedby the Unionof the Netherlandson its mem-bers,one is, that they shallnot establishimpostsdisadvantageousto their neighbors,without thegenera/perm{_sion.

Theregulationofcommercewiththe Indiantribesis veryproperlyunfetteredfromtwo limitationsinthe articlesof Confederation,whichrenderthe pro-vision obscureand contradictory.The power isthererestrainedto Indians,not membersof any of

35o AlexanderHamilton

the States,and is notto violateor inf_'ngethe legis-lativerightofany Statewithinits ownlimits. Whatdescriptionof Indiansare to be deemedmembersofa State, is not yet settled, and has beena questionof frequentperplexityand contentionin the federalcouncils. And howthe trade with Indians,thoughnot members of a State, yet residing within itslegislativejurisdiction,can be regulatedby an ex-ternal authority, without so far intruding on theinternal rights of legislation,is absolutely incom-prehensible. Thisis not the onlycasein whichthearticles of Confederationhave inconsideratelyen-deavoredto accomplishimpossibilities;to reconcilea partial sovereigntyin the Union,with completesovere_ntyin the States; to subverta mathematicalaxiom,by tarringawaya part, and lettingthe wholeremain.

Allthat needbe remarkedon the powerto coinmoney, regulate the value thereof, and of foreigncoin,is, that by providingfor this last case,the Con-stitution has supplied a material omissionin thearticles of Confederation. The authority of theexistingCongressis restrained to the regulationofcoin struckby their own authority, or that of therespectiveStates. It must be seen at oncethat theproposeduniformityin the valueof the current coinmightbe destroyedby subjectingthatof foreigncointo the differentregulationsof the differentStates.

The punishmentof counterfeitingthe public se-curities,as wellas the currentcoin, is submittedof,courseto that authoritywhichis to securethe valueof both.

The Federalist 35I

Theregulationof weightsandmeasuresis trans-ferredfromthe articlesof Confederation,and isfoundedon like considerationswith the precedingpowerofregulatingcoin.

Thedissimilarityin therulesof naturalizationhaslongbeenremarkedas a faultin oursystem,andaslayinga foundationfor intricateand delicateques-tions. In the fourtharticleof the Confederation,itis declared"that the_reeinhabitantsof eachoftheseStates,paupers,vagabonds,and fugitivesfromjus-tice excepted,shallbe entitledto all privilegesandimmunitiesoffreecitizensin the severalStates; andthepeople,of each State shall,in everyother,enjoyall the privilegesoftradeand commerce,"etc. Thereis a confusionoflanguagehere,whichis remerkable.Whythe terms freeinhabitantsare usedin onepar_of the article,freecitizensin another,and peopleinanother; or whatwasmeantby superaddingto "allprivilegesand immunitiesof flee citizens,""all theprivilegesof trade and commerce,"cannoteasilybedetermiued. It seemsto be a constructionscarcelyavoidable,however,that thosewhocomeunderthedenominationof_reeinhabitantsof a State,althoughnotcitizensof suchState,are entitled,in everyotherState, to all the privilegesof freecitizensof thelatter; that is, to greaterprivilegesthan they maybe entitledto in their ownState: so that it m_:ybein the powerof a particular State, or rather everyStateis laidundera necessity,not onlyto confertherights of citizenshipin other Statesuponany whomit ___:yadmit to suchrightswithin itself,but uponanywhomit may allowto becomeinhabitantswithin

352 AlexanderHamilton

its jurisdiction.But werean expositionofthe term"inhabitants"to be admittedwhichwouldco_finethe stipulatedprivilegesto citizensalone,the diM-culty is diminishedonly, not removed. The veryimproperpowerwouldstillbe retainedby eachState,of naturalizingaliensin everyotherState. In oneState, residencefor a shortterm confirmsall therights of citizenship:in another,qualificationsofgreaterimportancearerequired.Analien,therefore,legallyincapacitatedfor certainrightsin the latter,tony,by previousresidenceonlyin the former,eludehi_ incapacity; and thus the law of one Statebepreposterouslyrenderedparamountto the law ofanother,within the jurisdictionof the other. Weoweit tomerecasualty,that veryseriousembarrass-mentson this subjecthave beenhitherto escaped.By the laws of severalStates,certaindescriptionsof aliens,who had renderedthemselvesobnoxious,werelaidunderinterdictsinconsistentnot onlywiththe rightsof citizenshipbut with the privilegeofresidence. Whatwouldhavebeentheconsequence,if suchpersons,by residenceor otherwise,had ac-quired the characterof citizensunder the laws ofanotherState,andthen assertedtheir rightsassuch,both to residenceand citizenship,within the Stateproscribingthem? Whateverthe legalconsequencesmight have been, other consequenceswouldprob-ablyhave resulted,of too seriousa nature not tobe provided against. The new Constitutionhasaccordingly,with great propriety,made provisionagainst them, and all others proceedingfrom thedefectof the Confederationon this head,by author-

The Federalist 353

izingthe generalgovernmentto establisha uniformrule ofnaturalizationthroughoutthe UnitedStates.

The powerof establishinguniformlaws of bank-ruptcy is so intimately connectedwith the regula-tion of commerce,and willpreventso many fraudswherethe parties or their propertymay lieor be re-movedinto differentStates, that the expediencyofit seemsnot likelyto be drawninto question.

Thepowerofprescribingby generallaws,the man-ner in whichthe public acts, records,and judicialproceedingsof each State shallbe proved,and theeffectthey shallhave in other States, is an evidentand valuableimprovementon the clauserelating tothis subject in the articlesof Confederation.Themeaningof the latter is extremelyindeterminate,and can be of little importanceunder any inter-pretationwhichit will bear. The power here es-tablished may be rendered a very convenientinstrumentof justice,and be particularlybeneficialonthe bordersofcont_ous States,wherethe effectsliableto justicemaybe suddenlyand secretlytrans-lated, in any stage of the process,withina foreignjurisdiction.

The power of establisl_ngpost-roadsmust, ineveryview,be a harmlesspower,and may,perhaps,by judicious management,become productive ofgreat publicconveniency. Nothingwhichtends tofacilitatethe intercoursebetweenthe States can bedeemedunworthyof the public care.

PUBLIUS.voL._u.--s_

354 Alexander_Hamilton

FortheIndependentJournal

THEFEDERALIST.No. XLIII

(MADISON)

To thePeopleo_theStateof New York:The [ourthclass comprisesthe followingmiscel-

laneouspowers:_. A power "to promotethe progressof science

and usefularts, by securing,for a limitedtime, toauthorsand inventors,the exclusiveright to theirrespectivewritingsand discoveries."

The utility of th_spower will scarcelybe ques-tioned. Thecopyrightof authorshasbeensolemnlyadjudged,in GreatBritain,to be a rightof commonlaw. The right to useful inventions seems withequalreasonto belongto the inventors. Thepublicgoodfullycoincidesin both caseswiththe cla£m_qofindividuals. The States cannot separatelym_:keeffecOmlprovisionfor either of the cases,and mos_of them have anticipatedthe decisionof this point,by lawspassedat the instanceof Congress.

3. "To exerciseexclusivelegislation,in all caseswhatsoever,over such district (not exceedingtenmilessquare)as may,by cessionof particularStatesand the acceptanceof Congress,becomethe seat ofthe governmentof the UnitedStates; and to exer-ciselike authorityoverall placespurchasedby theconsentof the legislaturesof the Statesin whichthesameshallbe, for the erectionof forts,mngazines,arsenals,dock-yards,andotherneedfulbuildings."

Theindispensablenecessityof completeauthorityat the seatof government,carriesits ownevidence

The Federalist 355

with it. It is a powerexercisedby everylegislatureof the Union,I mightsayof the world,by virtue ofits general supremacy. Without it, not only thepublicauthoritymightbe insultedand its proceed-ings interruptedwith impunity; but a dependenceof the membersof the generalgovernmenton theState comprehendingthe seat of the government,for protectionin the exerciseof their duty, mightbringon the nationalcouncilsan imputationof aweor influence,equallydishonorableto the governmentanddissatisfactoryto the othermembersof the Con-federacy. This considerationhas the more weight,as the gradualaccumulationofpublicimprovementsat the stationaryresidenceof the governmentwouldbe both too great a publicpledgeto be left in thehandsof a singleState, and wouldcreateso menyobstaclesto a removalof the government,as stillfurtherto abridgeits necessaryindependence. Theextent of this federal districtis sufficientlycir_lrn-scribedto satisfyevery jealousyof an oppositena-ture. And as it is to be appropriatedto this usewiththe consentof the Statecedingit; as the Statewillno doubtprovidein the compactfor the rightsand the consentof the citizensinhabitingit; as theinhabitantswill find _:_cient inducementsof in-terest to becomewillingparties to the cession;asthey willhave had theirvoicein the electionof thegovernmentwhichisto exerciseauthorityoverthem;as a municipallegislaturefor localpurposes,derivedfrom their ownsuffrages,will of coursebe allowedthem; and as the authorityof the legislatureoftheState,and of the inhabitantsof the cededpart ofit,

356 AlexanderHami|ton

to concurinthecession,willbederivedfromthewholepeopleof the State,in theiradoptionoftheConstitu-tion,everyimaginableobjectionseemsto beobviated.

Thenecessityof a likeauthorityoverforts,maga-zines,etc.,establishedby the generalgovernment,isnot less evident. The publicmoneyexpendedonsuch places,and the publicpropertydepositedinthem, requirethat they shouldbe exemptfromtheauthorityof the particularState. Norwouldit beproperfor the placeson whichthe securityof theentire Unionmay depend, to be in any degreedependenton a partic_!a_rmemberof it. All ob-jectionsandscruplesare herealso obviated,by re-quiringthe concurrenceof the Statesconcerned,ineverysuchestablishment.

3- "To declaretheptml.shmentof treason,butnoattainderof treasonshallworkcorruptionof blood,or forfeiture,except duringthe life of the personattainted."

Astreasonmay be committedagainstthe UnitedStates,the authorityof the UnitedStatesoughttobe enabledto punishit. But as new-fangledandartificialtreasonshave been the great enginesbywhichviolentfactions,the naturaloffspringof freegovernment,have usuallywreakedtheir alternatemalignityon eachother,the conventionhave,withgreatjudgment,opposeda barrierto thi.qpeculiardanger,by insertinga constitutionaldefinitionofthecrime,fixingthe proofnecessaryforconvictionofit,and restrainingthe Congress,even in punishingit,from extendingtheconsequencesofguiltbeyondthepersonof its author.

The Federalist 357

4. "To admitnewStatesintotheUnion;but nonew State shall be formedor erectedwithinthejurisdictionof any otherState; nor any State beformedby the junctionof two or moreStates,orparts of States,withoutthe consentof the legis-laturesof the Statesconcerned,as wellas of theCongress."

In the articlesof Confederation,no provisionisfoundon thisimportantsubject. Canadawasto beadmittedof right,on herjoiningin themeasuresofthe UnitedStates; and theothercolonies,by whichwereevidentlymeantthe otherBritishcolonies,atthe discretionof nineStates. Theeventualestab-lishmentof new States seemsto have been over-lookedby the compilersof that instrument.Wehave seenthe inconvenienceof this omission,andthe assumptionof powerinto whichCongresshavebeenled by it. Withgreatpropriety,therefore,hasthe new systemsuppliedthe defect. The generalprecaution,that no new States shall be formed,withoutthe concurrenceof the federalauthority,and that of the States concerned,is consonanttothe principleswhichoughtto governsuch transac-tions. The partic_l!arprecautionagainst the erec-tion of new States, by the partitionof a Statewithout its consent,quiets the jealousyof thelargerStates; as that of the smalleris quietedby

: a likeprecaution,againsta junctionof Stateswith-out their consent.

5. "To disposeof and ms_e all needfulrulesandregulationsrespectingthe territory or other pro-pertybelongingto the UnitedStates,witha proviso,

358 AlexanderHamilton

that nothingin the Constitutionshall be so con-strued as to prejudice any claims of the UnitedStates,or of any particularState."

This is a powerof very greatimportance,andre-quiredby considerationssimilarto thosewhichshowthe proprietyof the former. The provisoannexedis proper in itself,and wasprobablyrenderedabso-lutely necessaryby jealousiesand questions con-cerningthe Westernterritorysufficientlyknowntothe public.

6. "To guaranteeto every Statein the Unionarepublicanform of government;to protecteachofthem against invasion; and on applicationof thelegislature,or of the executive(whenthe legislaturecannotbe convened),againstdomesticviolence."

In a confederacyfoundedonrepublicanprinciples,and composedof republicanmembers,the superin-tending governmentought clearly to possessau-thority to defendthe systemagainstaristocraticormonarchicalinnovations. The more intimate thenatureof sucha unionmaybe, the greater interesthave the membersin the political institutionsofeachother; and the greaterright to insist that theformsof governmentunderwhichthe compactwasentered into should be substantiallymaintained.But a right impliesa remedy; andwhereelsecouldthe remedybe deposited,than whereit is depositedby the Constitution? Governmentsof dissimilarprinciplesand formshave been foundless adaptedto a federalcoalitionofanysort,than thoseofa kin-dred nature. "As the confederaterepublicof Ger-many," saysMontesquieu,"consistsoffreecitiesand

The Federalist 359

petty states, subjectto differentprinces,experienceshowsus that it is moreimperfectthan thatof Hol-land and Switzerland." "Greecewasundone,"headds, "as soonas the kingof MacedonobtainedaseatamongtheAmphictyons."In the lattercase,no doubt,thedisproportionateforce,as wellas themonarchicalform,of the new confederate,had itsshareof influenceon the events. It may possiblybeasked,whatneedtherecouldbeof sucha precau-tion, andwhetherit may not becomea pretextforalterationsin the Stategovernments,withouttheconcurrenceof the Statesthemselves. Theseques-tions admitof readyanswers. If the interpositionof thegeneralgovernmentshouldnotbeneeded,theprovisionforsuchan eventwillbe a harmlesssuper-fluity onlyin the Constitution.But who can saywhat experimentsmay be producedby the capriceof particularStates,by the ambitionof enterprisingleaders,or by the intriguesand influenceof foreignpowers? Tothe secondquestionitmaybeanswered,that if the generalgovernmentshouldinterposebyvirtueof this constitutionalauthority,it willbe, ofcourse,boundto pursue the authority. But theauthorityextendsnofurtherthanto a g_ranty of arepublicanform of government,which supposesapreexistinggovernmentof the formwhichis to beguaranteed.As long, therefore,as the existingre-publicanformsare.continuedby theStates,theyareguaranteedby the federalConstitution.WhenevertheStatesmaychooseto substituteotherrepublicanforms,theyhave a rightto do so, andto claimthefederalguarantyforthe latter. Theonlyrestriction

360 AlexanderHamilton

imposedon them is, that they shall not exchangerepublicanfor anti-republicanConstitutions; a re-strictionwhich,it is presumed,willhardly be con-sideredas a grievance.

A protectionagainstinvasionis due from everysocietyto the partscomposingit. The latitude ofthe expressionhereusedseemsto secureeachState,not onlyagainstforeignhostility,but againstarnbi-tious or vindictiveenterprisesof its more powerfulneighbors. Thehistory,both ofancientandmodemconfederacies,proves that the weakermembersofthe unionoughtnot to be insensibleto the policyofth_s article.

Protectionagainstdomesticviolenceis addedwitheq,_a!propriety. It has been remarked,thn:tevenamongthe Swisscantons,which,properlyspe_ldug,are notunder onegovernment,provisionis madeforthis object; and the history of that leagueinformsus that mut_l_a!aidis frequentlyclaimedand afforded;and as well by the most democratic,as the othercantons. A recent and well-knownevent amongourselveshaswarnedus to be preparedfor emergen-ciesof a likenature.

At firstview,it mightseemnot to squarewith therepublicantheory, to suppose, either that a ma-jorityhavenottheright, or that a minoritywillhavethe force, to subvert a government; and conse-quently, that the federalinterpositioncan neverberequired, but when it would be improper. Buttheoreticreasoning,in this as in most other cases,must be qua!iftedby the lessonsof practice. Whymay not illicit combinations,for purposes of rio-

The Federalist 36I

lence,be formedaswellby a majorityof a State,es-peciallya _mallState,as by a majorityof a county,ora districtof thesameState; andif the authorityof the State ought,in the lattercase, to protectthe localmagistracy,oughtnot the federalauthor-ity, in the former,to supportthe State authority?Besides,therearecertainpartsof theStateconstitu-tionswhichareso interwovenwith the federalCon-stitution,thata violentblowcannotbegivento theonev_'thoutcommunicatingthewoundto theother.Insurrectionsin a Statewillrarelyinducea federalinterposition,unlessthenumberconcernedin thembearsomeproportionto the friendsof government.It willbemuchbetterthattheviolencein suchcasesshouldbe repressedby the superintendingpower,than that the majority shouldbe left to maintaintheircauseby a bloodyandobstinatecontest. Theexistenceof a rightto interpose,willgenerallypre-ventthenecessityof exertingit.

Is it truethat forceandrightare necessarilyonthe samesidein republicangovernments?Mayno_the minorparty possesssucha superiorityof pecu-niaryresources,of militarytalentsand experience,or of secret succorsfromforeignpowers,as willrenderit superioralso in an appealto the sword?Maynot a morecompactandadvantageouspositionturnthe scaleon the sameside, againsta superiornumbersosituatedas to belesscapableof a promptandcollectedexertionofits strength? Nothingcan

; be morechimericalthanto imaginethat in a trialofactualforce,victorymay be calculatedby the ruleswhichprevailin a censusofthe inhabitants,orwhich

362 AlexanderHamilton

determinethe event of an election! May it nothappen,in fine,that the minorityof CITIZENSmaybecomea majorityof PERSONS,by the accessionofalienresidents,of a casualconcourseof adventurers,or of thosewhomthe constitutionof the Statehasnot admittedto the rightsof suffrage?I take nonoticeof an _unhappyspeciesof populationabound-Lugin someof the States,who, duringthe calmofregulargovernment,aresunkbelowthelevelofmen;butwho,in the tempestuousscenesof civilviolence,may emergeinto the humancharacter,andgive asuperiorityofstrengthto any partywithwhichtheymay associatethemselves.

In caseswhereit may be doubtfldon whichsidejustice lies, what betterumpirescouldbe desiredby twoviolentfactions,flyingto armsand tearinga Stateto pieces,than the representativesof con-federateStates,notheatedby the localflame? Tothe impartialityof judges, they would unite theaffectionof friends. Happy would it be if sucharemedyfor its infirmitiescould be enjoyedby allfree governments; if a project equally effectualcould be establishedfor the univer_:!peace ofmn.nk/nd[

Shouldit beasked,what is to bethe redressforaninsurrectionpervadingall theStates,andcomprisinga superiorityof the entireforce,thoughnot a consti-tutionalright? the answermustbe, that sucha case,as it wouldbe without the compassof humunreme-dies, so it is fortunatelynot within the compassofhumanprobability; and that it is a sufficientrecom-mendation of the federal Constitution,that it di-

The Federalist 363

minishestherisk of a calamityforwhichno possibleconstitutioncan providea cure.

Amongthe advantagesof a confederaterepublic: enumeratedby Montesquieu,an important one is,

"that shoulda popular insurrectionhappenin oneofthe States,the othersare ableto quellit. Shouldabuses creep into one part, they are reformedbythosethatremainsound."7."Toconsideralldebtscontracted,andengage-

: mentsenteredinto,beforetheadoptionofthisCon-_ stitution, as beingno less valid againstthe United

States, under this Constitution, than under theConfederation."

This can onlybe consideredas a declaratorypro-position; and may havebeeninserted,amongotherreasons,for the satisfactionof the foreigncreditorsof the UnitedStates,whocannotbe strangersto thepretended doctrine, that a changein the politicalformofcivilsocietyhas the magicaleffectof dissolv-ing its moral obligations.

Amongthe lessercriticismswhichhavebeenexer-cisedonthe Constitution,it has beenremarkedthatthe validityof engagementsoughtto havebeen as-serted in favor of the United States, as well asagainst them; and in the spirit which usuallycharacterizeslittle critics, the omissionhas beentransformedand magnifiedinto a plot against the

: nationalrights. The authorsof this discoverymay: betold,whatfewothersneedto be informedof, that

as engagementsare in their nature reciprocal,anassertionof their validity on one side, necessarilyinvolvesa validityonthe other side; andthat asthe

354 AlexanderHamilton

articleis merely declaratory,the establishmentoftheprinciplein onecaseis sufficientforevery case.They may be furthertold, that every constitutionmust limit its precautionsto dangersthatare notaltogetherimaginary;andthat no realdangercanexistthatthegovernmentwouldDARE,with,orevenwithout,thisconstitutionaldeclarationbeforeit, toremitthe debtsjustlydueto thepublic,on the pre-text herecondemned.

8. "To provideforamendmentsto beratifiedbythreefourthsof the States,undertwo exceptionsonly."Thatusefulalterationswillbesuggestedbyex-

perience,couldnotbutbeforeseen.Itwasrequi-site,therefore,thata modeforintroducingthemshouldbeprovided.Themodepreferredbytheconventionseemstobestampedwitheverymarkofpropriety.Itguardsequallyagainstthatex-tremefacility,whichwouldrendertheConstitutiontoomutable;andthatextremedifficulty,whichmightperpetuateitsdiscoveredfaults.It,more-over,eqlmHyenablesthegeneralandtheStategov-ernmentstooriginatetheamendmentoferrors,astheymaybepointedoutbytheexperienceononeside,orontheother.Theexceptioninfavoroftheequalityofsul_ageintheSenate,wasprobablymeantasa palladh_mtotheresidum7 sovereignt_oftheStates,impliedandsecuredbythatprincipleofrepresentationinonebranchofthelegislature;andwasprobablyinsistedonbytheStatespar-ticularlyattachedtothatequality.The otherexceptionmusthavebeenadmittedonthe_=me

The Federalist 365

considerationswhichproducedtheprivilegedefendedbyit.

9-"The ratification of the conventionsof nineStates shall be sufficientfor the establishmentofthis Constitutionbetweenthe States, ratifying thesame."

This article speaksfor itself. The expressau-thority ofthe peoplealone couldgivedue validityto the Constitution. To have required the unani-mousratificationof the thirteenStates,wouldhave"subjectedthe essentialinterestsof the wholeto thecapriceor corruptionofa singlemember. It wouldhavemarkeda want of foresightin the convention,which our own experiencewould have renderedinexcusable.

Two questionsof a very delicatenature presentthemselveson this occasion: i. On what principlethe Confederation,whichstandsin the solemnformof a compactamongthe States, canbe supersededwithoutthe unanimousconsentof the partiesto it?2. What relation is to subsistbetweenthe nine ormore States ratifyingthe Constitution,and the re-mainingfew whodo not becomepartiesto it?

Thefirstquestionisansweredat onceby recurringto the absolutenecessityof the case; to the greatprincipleof seN-preservation;to the transcendentlaw of nature and of nature's God,whichdeclaresthat the safety and happiness of society are theobjectsat which all politicalinstitutionsa_m,andto which all such institutionsmust be sacrificed.PERHAPS,alSO,an answer may be foundwithoutsearchingbeyondthe principlesofthe compactitse/f.

366 AlexanderHamilton

It has been heretoforenotedamongthe defectsoftheConfederation,that in manyof theStatesit hadreceivedno highersanctionthan a merelegislativeratification. Theprincipleof reciprocalityseemstorequirethatits obligationonthe other Statesshouldbe reducedto the samestandard. A compactbe-tweenindependentsovereigns,foundedon ordinaryactsoflegislativeauthority,canpretendto nohighervaliditythan a leagueortreatybetweenthe parties.It isan establisheddoctrineonthesubjectoftreaties,that all the articlesaremutuallyconditionsof eachother; that a breachofanyonearticleis a breachofthewholetreaty; andthat a breach,committedbyeitherofthe parties,absolvesthe others,andauthor-izesthem,if they please,to pronouncethe compactviolatedandvoid. Shouldit unhappilybenecessaryto appealto thesedelicatetruths fora justificationfor dispensingwiththe consentof parti_11_rStatesto a dissolutionof the federalpact,willnot the com-p_ partiesfindit a difficulttask to answertheMULTIPLmDand IMPORTANTinfractionswith whichthey may be confronted? Thetimehas beenwhenit was incumbenton us all to veil the ideas whichthis paragraphexhibits. The sceneis nowchanged,and with it the part whichthe samemotivesdictate.

The secondquestionis not lessdelicate; and theflatteringprospectof its beingmerelyhypotheticalforbidsan over-curiousdiscussionof it. It is oneofthosecaseswhichmustbeleftto provideforitself.In general,it may be observed,that althoughnopoliticalrelationcan subsistbetweenthe assentingand dissentingStates, yet the moral re!ationswill

The Federalist 367

remain uncancelled. The claims of justice, bothon one sideand on the other, willbe in force,andmustbe fulfilled;the rightsof humanitymustinallcasesbe duly and mutuallyrespected; whilstcon-siderationsof a commoninterest,and, aboveall, theremembranceofthe endearingsceneswhicharepast,and the anticipationof a speedytriumphover theobstaclesto reunion,will, it is hoped,not urge invail2 MODERATIONon one side, and PRUDENCEonthe other.

PUBLIUS.

From theNew YorkPacket,Fr_ay, January 25,x788

WHEFEDERALIST. No. XLIV

(_xmsoN)

TOthe Peopleo_theStateo_New York:A fifth class of provisionsin favor of the federal

authorityconsistsof the followingrestrictionson theauthorityof the severalStates.

x. "No State shallenter intoany treaty,alliance,or confederation; grant letters of marque and re-prisal; coinmoney; emit billsof credit; makeanything but gold and silvera legaltender in paymentof debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex-post-yactolaw,or lawimpairingthe obligationofcontracts;orgrant any title of nobility."

The prohibitionagainst treaties, alliances,andconfederationsmakesa part of the existingarticlesof Union;andforreasonswhichneednoexpIanation,is copiedintothe newConstitution. Theprohibitionof lettersofmarqueisanotherpartofthe oldsystem,

368 AlexanderHamilton

but is somewhatextendedin the new. Accordingto theformer,lettersof marquecouldbe grantedbythe Statesaftera declarationof war; accordingtothe latter,theselicensesmust be obtained,as wellduringwaras previousto its declaration,fromthegovernmentof the UnitedStates. Thisalterationisfullyjustifiedby theadvantageof uniformityin allpointswhichrelateto foreignpowers;and of im-mediateresponsibilityto thenationin all thoseforwhoseconductthe nationitselfis to beresponsible.

Therightof coh_ money,whichis heretakenfromtheStates,wasleftin their handsby the Con-federation,as a concurrentrightwith that of Con-gress,underan exceptionin favorof the exclusiveright of Congressto reg_!_tethe alloy and value.In this instance,a/so, the newprovisionis an im-provementon the old. Whilstthe alloyand valuedependedonthe generalauthority,a right of coinagein the particularStates couldhave no other effectthan to multiplyexpensivemints and diversifytheforms and weightsof the circulatingpieces. Thelatter inconveniencydefeatsone purposefor whichthe power was originallysubmitted to the federalhead; and as far as the formermight preventan in-convenientremittance of gold and silver to thecentral mint for recohmge,the end can be as wellattainedbylocalmintsestablishedunderthe generalauthority.

The extensionof the prohibitionto billsof creditmust givepleasureto everycitizen,in proportiontohis love of justice and his knowledgeof the truespriugsofpublicprosperity. ThelosswhichAmerica

The Federalist 369

has sustained since the peace, from the pestilenteffectsof paper moneyon the necessaryconfidencebetweenman and man,on the necessaryconfidencein the public councils,on the industry and moralsof the people,and on the character of republicangovernment,constitutesan enormousdebt againstthe States chargeablewith this unadvisedmeasure,which must long remain unsatisfied;or rather anaccumulationof guilt, which can be expiated nootherwisethan by a voluntarysacrificeon the altarof justice, of the powerwhichhas beenthe instru-ment of it. In addition to these persuasivecon-siderations,it maybeobserved,that the samereasonswhichshowthe necessityof denyingto the Statesthe powerofregulatingcoin,provewith equal forcethat they oughtnot to be at liberty to substitute apaper medium in the place of coin. Had everyState a right to regulatethe valueofits coin,theremightbe as manydifferentcurrenciesas States,andthus the intercourseamongthemwouldbe impeded;retrospectivealterationsin its valuemightbe made,and thus the citizensof other Statesbe injured,andanimositiesbe kindledamongthe Statesthemselves.The subjectsofforeignpowersmight sufferfromthesame cause,andhencethe Unionbe discreditedandembroiledby the indiscretionof a singlemember.Nooneof these mischiefsis lessincidentto a powerin the Statesto emitpaper money,than to coingoldor silver. The powerto make any thing but goldand silvera tenderin paymentofdebts,is withdrawnfrom the States, on the same principlewith that ofissuinga paper currency.

VOL.XI._,

370 AlexanderHamilton

Billsof attainder, ex-post-]actolaws,andlawsim-pairingthe obligationof contracts, are contrarytothe first principlesof the social compact,and toeveryprincipleofsoundlegislation. Thetwoformerare expressly prohibited by the declarationspre-fixed to some of the State constitutions,and allof them are prohibitedby the spirit and scopeofthesefundamentalcharters. Ourownexperiencehastaught us, nevertheless, that additional fencesagainst these dangers ought not to be omitted.Veryproperly,therefore,have the conventionaddedthis constitutionalbulwarkin favor of personalse-curityand private rights; and I am much deceivedif they have not, in sodoing,as faithfullyconsultedthe genuinesentimentsas the undoubtedinterestsoftheir constituents. Thesoberpeopleof Americaarewearyof the fluctuatingpolicywhichhas directedthe publiccouncils. Theyhaveseenwithregret andindignationthat suddenchangesand legislativein-terferences,in casesaffectingpersonalrights,becomejobs in the hands of enterprising and influentialspeculators,and snaresto the more-industriousandless-informedpart of the community. They haveseen,too, that one legislativeinterferenceis but thefirst link of a longchainof repetitions,every subse-quent interferencebeing naturallyproducedby theeffectsof the preceding. They very rightly infer,therefore, that some thorough reform is wanting,whichwillbanish speculationson public measures,inspirea generalprudenceand industry,and givearegularcourseto the businessof society. The pro-hibitionwithrespectto titles of nobility is copied

The Federalist 37t

from the articles of Confederation,and needsnocomment.

2. "No State shall, without the consentof theCongress,lay any impostsor dutieson imports orexports, except what may be absolutely neces-sary for executing its inspectionlaws, and thenet produce of all duties and impostslaid by anyState on imports or exports, shall be for the useof the treasury of the United States; and all suchlaws shall be subject to the revision and con-trol of the Congress. No State shall,without theconsentof Congress,lay any dutyon tonnage,keeptroops or ships of war in timeof peace,enter intoany agreementor compact with another State, orwith a foreignpower,or engagein war unlessactu-ally invaded, or in such imminentdanger as willnot admitof delay."

The restrainton the powerof the Statesover im-ports and exportsis enforcedby all the argumentswhichprovethe necessityof submittingthe regula-tion of trade to the federalcouncils. It is needless,therefore,to remarkfurtheron thishead, than thatthe mannerin whichthe restraintis qualifiedseemswell calculatedat once to secure to the States areasonablediscretionin providingfor the conven-iencyoftheirimportsandexports,andto the UnitedStates a reasonablecheckagainstthe abuse of thisdiscretion. Theremainingparticularsof this clausefall within reasoningswhichare either so obvious,or havebeen sofully developed,that they may bepassedoverwithoutremark.

The sixth and last class consistsof the several

372 AlexanderHamilton

powersand prov_ionsby whiche_c_ey is givenall therest.

x. Of these the first is, the "power to make alllawswhichshallbenecessaryand properforcarryinginto executionthe foregoingpowers,and all otherpowersvested by th_._Constitutionin the govern-ment of the UnitedStates,or in any departmentorofficerthereof."

Fewparts of the Constitutionhavebeen assailedwith moreintemperancethan this; yet on a fair in-vestigationof it, no part can appear more com-pletelyinvulnerable. Withoutthe substanceof tb_spower,thewholeConstitutionwouldbe adeadletter.Thosewhoobject to the article,therefore,as a partof the Constitution,can onlymean that the _ormofthe provision is improper. But have they con-sidered whether a better form could have beensubstituted?

Thereare four other poss_le methodswhichtheConstitutionmight have taken on this subject.They might h_ve copiedthe secondarticleof theexisting Confederation,which would have pro-hibited the exercise of any power not expresslydelegated; they might have attempted a positiveenumerationof the powerscomprehendedunderthegeneralterms "necessaryand proper"; they mighthave attempteda negativeenllmerationof them,byspecifyingthe powers excepted from the generaldefinition;they might have been altogether silenton the subject, leavingthese necessaryand properpowersto constructionand inference.

Had the conventiontaken the first method of

The Federalist 373

adopting the second article of Confederation,it isevidentthat the newCongresswouldbe continuallyexposed,as their predecessorshave been, to thealternativeof construingthe term "expressly"withso much rigor,as to disarmthe governmentof allreal authoritywhatever,orwith somuchlatitudeasto destroyaltogetherthe forceofthe restriction. Itwouldbe easyto show,if it werenecessary,that noimportant power,delegatedby the articlesof Con-federation,hasbeenor can be executedby Congress,without recurringmore or less to the doctrineofconstructionorimplication. Asthe powersdelegatedunderthenewsystemaremoreextensive,the govern-ment whichis to administerit wouldfind itselfstillmoredistressedwiththe alternativeofbetrayingthepublic interests by doingnothing, or of violatingthe Constitutionby exercisingpowersindispensablynecessaryand proper, but, at the same time, notexpresslygranted.

Had the conventionattempted a positiveenum-erationof the powersnecessaryandproperforcarry-ingtheir otherpowersintoeffect,the attemptwouldhave involveda completedigest of laws on everysubject to which the Constitutionrelates; accom-modatedtoo,not onlyto the existingstate ofthings,but to all the possiblechangeswhichfuturity mayproduce; for in everynew applicationof a generalpower,the particularpowers,whicharethe meansofattainingthe objectofthe generalpower,must alwaysnecessarilyvary with that object, and be oftenproperlyvariedwhilstthe objectremainsthe same.

Had they attemptedto enumeratethe particular

374 AlexanderHamilton

powersormeansnotnecessaryor properforcarryingthe generalpowersinto execution,the task wouldhavebeenno lesschimerical;andwouldhavebeenliableto thisfurtherobjection,thateverydefectinthe enumerationwouldhave beenequivalentto apositivegrantof authority. If, to avoidthisconse-quence,they had attempteda partialenumerationof the exceptions,and describedthe residueby thegeneralterms,not necessaryorproper,it must havehappenedthat the enumerationwouldcomprehendafewof the exceptedpowersonly; that these wouldbe such as wouldbe least likely to be assumedortolerated,becausethe enumerationwouldof courseselect such as would be least necessaryor proper;and that the unnecessaryand improperpowersin-cluded in the residuum, would be less forciblyexceptedthan if no partialenumerationhad beenmade.

Had the Constitutionbeen silenton this head,therecanbeno doubtthatall theparticularpowersrequisiteas meansof executingthe generalpowerswouldhaveresultedto thegovernment,by unavoid-able implication. No axiomis moreclearlyestab-lishedin law,or in reason,than that wherevertheendis required,themeansareauthorized;wherevera generalpowerto doa thingis given,everyparticu-lar powernecessaryfor doingit is included. Hadthis last method,therefore,been pursuedby theconvention,everyobjectionnowurgedagainsttheirplan would remainin all its plausibility; and therealinconveniencywouldbe incurredofnot removinga pretext whichmay be seizedon criticaloccasions

The Federalist 375

fordrawingintoquestionthe essentialpowersof theUnion.

If it be askedwhat is to be the consequence,incasethe Congressshallmisconstruethispart of theConstitution,and exercisepowersnot warrantedbyitstruemeaning,I answer,thesameasif theyshouldmisconstrueor enlargeany other powervested inthem; as if the generalpowerhad beenreducedtoparticulars,and anyoneoftheseweretobe violated;the same,in short,as if the State legislaturesshouldviolate their respectiveconstitutionalauthorities.In the first instance,the successof the usurpationwilldependon the executiveand judiciary depart-ments,whichare to expoundand giveeffectto thelegislativeacts; andin the lastresorta remedymustbe obtainedfrom the people,who can,by the elec-tion ofmorefaithfulrepresentatives,annulthe actsof the usurpers. The truth is, that this ultimateredressmay be more confidedin againstunconsti-tutionalacts of the federalthan of the State legis-latures,for this pl_:_nreason,that as every such actofthe formerwillbe an invasionofthe rightsof thelatter, thesewillbe everreadyto mark the innova-tion, to soundthe alarm to the people,and to exerttheir localinfluencein effectinga changeof federalrepresentatives. Therebeing no suchintermediatebodybetweenthe State legislaturesand the peopleinterested in watchingthe conductof the former,violationsof the State constitutionsare morel_elyto remainunnoticedand unredressed.

2. "This Constitutionand the lawsof the UnitedStates whichshall be made in pursuancethereof,

376 AlexanderHamilton

andalltreatiesmade,orwhichshallbemade,undertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates,sba!1bethesu-premelawof the land,and the judgesin everyStateshall be bound thereby,any thing in the constitu-tion or laws of any State to the contrarynotwith-standing."

The indiscreetzealof the adversariesto the Con-stitution has betrayed them into an attack on thispart of it also, without whichit would have beenevidently and radically defective. To be fullysensibleof this,weneedonly supposefor a momentthat the supremacyof the State constitutionshadbeenleft completeby a savingclausein theirfavor.

In the firstplace,as theseconstitutionsinvesttheState legislatureswith absolutesovereignty,in allcasesnot exceptedby the existingarticlesof Con-federation,all the authoritiescontainedin the pro-posed Constitution, so far as they exceed thoseenumeratedin the Confederation,wouldhave beenannulled,and the new Congresswould have beenreducedto the same impotent conditionwith theirpredecessors.

In the next place,as the constitutionsof someofthe States donot evenexpresslyand fullyrecognizethe existingpowersof the Confederacy,an expresssavingofthe supremacyofthe formerwould,in suchStates,havebroughtinto questioneverypowercon-tainedin the proposedConstitution.

In the third place, as the constitutionsof theStatesdiffermuchfromeachother, it mighthappenthat a treaty or national law, of great and equalimportanceto the States,wouldinterferewith some

The Federalist 377

and not with other constitutions,a_idwouldconse-quentlybe validin someof the States,at the sametime that it wouldhavenoeffectin others.

In flue,the worldwouldhave seen, for the firsttime, a systemof governmentfoundedon an inver-sionofthe fundamentalprinciplesofallgovernment;it wouldhaveseenthe authorityofthe wholesocietyeverywheresubordinateto the authorityofthe parts;it wouldhave seen a monster,in whichthe headwasunderthe directionofthe members.

3- "The Senatorsand Representatives,and themembersof the severalState legislatures,and allexecutiveand judicialofficers,both of the UnitedStates and the severalStates, shall be bound byoath or affirmationto supportthis Constitution."

It has beenaskedwhyit was thought necessary,that the State magistracyshouldbe boundto sup-port the federalConstitution,and unnecessarythata l_keoath shouldbe imposedon the officersof theUnitedStates,in favorof the State constitutions.

Severalreasonsmightbe assignedfor the distinc-tion. I content myselfwith one,whichis obviousandconclusive. Themembersofthe federalgovern-ment will have no agencyin carrying the Stateconstitutionsinto effect. Themembersand officersofthe Stategovernments,onthe contrary,willhavean essentialagencyin givingeffectto the federalConstitution. The electionof the President andSenatewilldepend,in all cases,onthe legislaturesofthe severalStates. Andthe electionofthe HouseofRepresentativeswill equally depend on the sameauthority in the first instance; and will,probably,

378 AlexanderHamilton

foreverbe conductedby the officers,madaccordingto the laws,of the States.

4. Amongthe provisionsforgivingefficacyto thefederalpowersmight be added those whichbelongto the executiveand judiciarydepartments: but asthese are reservedforparticular examinationin an-other place,I pass themover in this.

We have nowreviewed,in detail, all the articlescomposingthe sum or quantity of powerdelegatedby the proposedConstitutionto the federalgovern-ment,andare broughtto thisundeniableconclusion,that nopart of the poweris unnecessaryor improperforaccomplishingthe necessaryobjectsofthe Union.The question, therefore, whether this amount ofpower shall be granted or not, resolvesitself intoanotherquestion,whetheror not a governmentcom-mensurateto the exigenciesof the Union shall beestablished; or, in other words,whetherthe Unionitselfshallbe preserved. PUBLIUS.

For theIndependontJcnzrnal

_HE FEDERALIST. No. XI_V

(_msoN)

To thePeopleof theStateof New York:Having shownthat no one of the powers tron_

ferred to the federalgovernmentis unnecessaryorimproper,the next question to be consideredis,whetherthe wholemassofthem willbe dangeroustothe portionof authority left in the severalStates.

The adversariesto the plan of the convention,

The Federalist 379

insteadof consideringin the firstplacewhat degreeof powerwas absolutelynecessaryfor the purposesof the federal government,have exhaustedthem-selvesin a secondaryinquiry into the possiblecon-sequencesof the proposeddegreeof powerto thegovernmentsof the particular States. But if theUnion,ashasbeenshown,be essentialto the securityof the peopleof Americaagainstforeigndanger; ifit be essentialto their securityagainstcontentionsandwarsamongthe differentStates; if itbe essentialto guard them againstthoseviolentand oppressivefactionswhichembitterthe blessingsof liberty,andagainst those military establishmentswhich mustgraduallypoisonits veryfountain; if, in a word,theUnionbe essentialto the happinessof the peopleofAmerica,is it not preposterous,to urge as an objec-tion to a government,without whichthe objectsofthe Unioncannot be attained, that such a govern-ment may derogatefrom the importanceof thegovernmentsof the individualStates? Was, then,the AmericanRevolutioneffected,was the Ameri-canConfederacyformed,was the preciousblood ofthousandsspilt,andthehard-earnedsubstanceofrn_l-lionslavished,notthatthepeopleofAmericashouldenjoypeace,liberty,andsafety,butthatthegov-ernmentsoftheindividualStates,thatparticularmunicipalestablishments,__ght enjoya certainex-tent of power,and be arrayedwith certaindignitiesand atiributes of sovereignty? We have heard ofthe impious doctrinein the Old World, that thepeopleweremadeforkings,notkingsforthepeople.Is the same doctrineto be revivedin the New,in

380 AlexanderHamilton

anothershape---thatthe solidhappinessofthe peopleisto be sacrificedto the viewsofpoliticalinstitutionsofa differentform? It is too earlyforpoliticianstopresumeon our forgettingthat the publicgood,thereal welfareof the great bodyof the people,is thesupremeobject to be pursued; and that no form ofgovernmentwhatever has any other valuethan asit maybe fitted for the attainmentof this object..Were the plan of the conventionadverse to thepublichappiness,myvoicewouldbe,Rejectthe plan.Were the Union itself inconsistentwith the publichappiness,it wouldbe, Abolishthe Union. In likemanner,as far as the sovereigntyof the States can-not be reconciledto the happinessof the people,thevoiceof everygoodcitizenmust be, Let the formerbe sacrificedto the latter. How far the sacr_ce isnecessary,hasbeenshown. Howfar the unsacrificedresiduewillbe endangered,is the questionbeforeus.

Several important considerations have beentouched in the courseof these papers, which dis-countenancethe suppositionthat the operationofthe federalgovernmentwillby degreesprovefatalto the State governments. The more I revolvethesubject, the more fully I am persuaded that thebalance is much more l_kelyto be disturbed bythe preponderancyof the last than of the first scale.

We have seen,in all the examplesof ancientandmodern confederacies,the strongest tendencycon-tinually betraying itselfin the members,to despoilthe generalgovernmentofits authorities,witha veryineffectualcapacity in the latter to defend itselfagainst the encroachments. Although,in most of

The Federalist 38I

these examples,the systemhas been so dissim_lorfrom that under considerationas greatlyto weakenanyinferenceconcerningthe latterfromthefate oftheformer,yet,as the States willretain,underthe pro-posedConstitution,a very extensiveportionof act-ive sovereignty,theinferenceoughtnot to bewhollydisregarded. In the Achmanleagueit is probablethat the federalhead had a degreeand speciesofpower,whichgave it a considerablelikenessto thegovernmentframedby the convention. TheLycianConfederacy,as far as its principlesand form aretransmitted,musthavebornea stillgreateranalogyto it. Yet hi_torydoesnot informus that either

: of them ever degenerated,or tended to degenerate,intooneconsolidatedgovernment. Onthecontrary,weknowthat the ruinofoneofthemproceededfromthe incapacityofthe federalauthorityto preventthedissensions,and finallythe disunion,of the subor-dinate authorities. These cases are the moreworthy of our attention, as the externalcausesbywhichthe componentparts were pressedtogetherwere much more numerousand powerfulthan inour case; and consequentlyless powerfulligamentswithin wouldbe mafficientto bind the membersto

! the head, and to eachother.In the feudalsystem,wehave seena similarpro-

pensity exemplified. Notwithstandingthe want ofpropersympathyin everyinstancebetweenthe localsovereignsand the people,andthe sympathyin someinstances between the general sovereignand thelatter, it usuallyhappenedthat the localsovereignsprevailedin the rivalshipfor encroachments. Had

382 AlexanderHamilton

no external dangersenforcedinternalharmonyandsubordination,and particularly,hadthe local sov-ereignspossessedthe affectionsof the people, thegreatkingdomsin Europewouldat this time consistof as many independent princes as there wereformerlyfeudatorybarons.

TheState governmentswillhave the advantageofthe Federalgovernment,whetherwecomparethemin respectto the imme61atedependenceofthe oneonthe other; to the weightof personalinfluencewhicheach side will possess; to the powersrespectivelyvestedin them; to the predilectionandprobablesup-portof the people; to the dispositionand facultyofresistingandfrustratingthe measuresof eachother.

The State governmentsmay be regardedas con-stituent and essentialparts of the federal govern-ment; whilst the latter is nowiseessentialto theoperation or organizationof the former. Withoutthe interventionof the State legislatures,the Presi-dent of the United States cannot be electedat all.They must in all caseshave a great share in his ap-pointment,and will,perhaps,in mostcases,ofthem-selves determine it. The Senate will be electedabsolutelyand exclusivelyby the State legislatures.Even the Houseof Representatives,though drawnimmediatelyfrom the people, will be chosen verymuchunderthe influenceofthat classofmen,whoseinfluenceover the peopleobtains for themselvesanelectioninto the State legislatures. Thus, each ofthe principal branches of the federal governmentwilloweits existencemoreor lessto the favoroftheState governments,and must consequentlyfeel a

The Federalist 383

dependence,whichis muchmorelikely to begetadispositiontoo obseqmousthan too overbearingtowardsthem. On the otherside,the componentparts of the State governmentswill in no instancebe indebted for their appointmentto the directagencyof the federalgovernment,and very little, ifat all, to the localinfluenceof its members.

The number of individualsemployedunder theConstitutionof the United States will be muchsmallerthan the number employedunder the par-ticular States. There will consequentlybe less ofpersonalinfluenceon the sideof the formerthan ofthe latter. The membersof the legislative,execu-tive, and judiciarydepartmentsof thirteenandmoreStates, the justices of peace, officersof militia,

i ministerialofficersof justice, with all the county,corporation,and townofficers,for threero_11_onsandmore of people,intermixed,and having particularacquaintancewith every classand circleof people,must exceed,beyondallproportion,both in numberandinfluence,thoseof everydescriptionwhowillbeemployedin the administrationofthe federalsystem.Comparethe membersofthe threegreatdepartmentsof the thirteen States, excludingfromthe judiciarydepartmentthe justicesof peace,with the membersof the correspondingdepartmentsof the singlegov-ernmentof the Union; comparethe militiaofficersof three m_11ionsof people with the military andmarineofficersof any establishmentwhichis withinthe compassof probability,or, I may add,of possi-

:_ bility,andin this viewalone,wemaypronouncethe: advantage of the States to be decisive. If the

384 AlexanderHamilton

federalgovernmentis to havecollectorsof revenue,the State governmentswill have theirsalso. Andas those ofthe formerwillbe principallyon the sea-coast, and not very numerous,whilst those of thelatter willbe spread over the face of the country,and will be very numerous,the advantage in thi_viewalsolieson the sameside. It is true, that theConfederacyis to possess,and may exercise, thepowerof collectinginternalas wellas externaltaxesthroughoutthe States; but it is probablethat thispower will not be resorted to, except for supple-mentalpurposesofrevenue; that an optionwillthenbe given to the States to supply their quotas byprevious collectionsof their own; and th_attheeventualcollection,under the kmmediateauthorityofthe Union,willgenerallybe madeby the officers,and accordingto the rules,appointedby the severalStates. Indeed it is extremelyprobable, that inotherinstances,particularlyin the organizationofthejudicialpower,the officersofthe Stateswillbe clothedwith the correspondentauthority of the Union.Shouldit happen, however,that separatecollectorsof internal revenueshouldbe appointedunder thefederalgovernment,the influenceof the wholenum-ber would not bear a comparisonwith that of themultitude of State officersin the opposite scale.Within every district to which a federal collectorwouldbe allotted,therewouldnot be lessthan thirtyor forty, or evenmore,officersof differentdescrip-tions, and ma, y of them persons of c_racter andweight,whoseinfluencewouldlie on the sideof theState.

The Federalist 385

ThepowersdelegatedbytheproposedConstitutionto the federal governmentare few and defined.Thosewhichareto remainin the State governmentsare numerousand indefinite. The formerwill beexercisedprincipallyon external objects, as war,peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; withwhichlast the powerof taxationwill, for the mostpart, be connected. The powers reservedto theseveralStateswill extendto all the objectswhich,in the ordinarycourseof affairs,concernthe lives,liberties,and propertiesof the people,and the in-ternal order, improvement,and prosperityof theState.

The operationsof the federalgovernmentwillbe: most extensiveand important in timesof war and

d_:nger;those of the State governments,in timesofpeace and security. As the former periods willprobablybear a smallproportionto the latter, theStategovernmentswillhereenjoyanotheradvantageover the federalgovernment. The more adequate,indeed,the federal powersmay be renderedto thenationaldefence,the lessfrequentwillbe thosescenesof dangerwhichmight favortheir ascendancyoverthe governmentsof the partiollar States.

Ifthe newConstitutionbe examinedwithaccuracyandcandor,it willbefoundthat the changewhichitproposesconsistsmuchless in the additionofN_wPOWERSto the Union,than in the invigorationof itsOmGINALPOWERS.The regulationof commerce,itis true, is a new power; but that seemsto be anadditionwhichfewoppose,andfromwhichnoappre-hensionsare entertained. The powers relating to

VOL.XI..'..._S.

386 AlexanderHAmi!ton

warandpeace,armiesandfleets,_eatiesandfinance,with the other more considerablepowers,are allvested in the existh_ Congressby the articlesofConfederation.The proposedchangedoesnot en-large these powers; it only substitutesa moreeffectualmodeof administeringthem. Thechangere!atingto taxationmay be regardedas the mostimportant;and yet the presentCongresshaveascompleteauthorityto _gUIRB of the States inodefinitesuppliesof moneyfor the_mon defenceand generalwelfare,as the future Congresswillhave torequirethem of individ._!dtizens; and thelatter willbe no moreboundthan the Statesthem-selveshave been, to pay the quotas respectivelytaxedonthem. Hadthe Statescompliedpunctuallywith the articlesof Confederation,or could theircompliance_ve beenenforcedbyas peaceablemeansas maybeusedwithsuccesstowardssinglepersons,ourpast experienceis veryfarfromcountenancingan opinion,that the State governmentswouldhavelost theirconstitutionalpowers,andhavegradu_!!yundergonean entire consolidatio_ To maintainthatsuchan eventwouldhaveensuec_wouldbe tosay at once,thatthee_tence of the State govern-mentsisincompatiblewithanysys_m whateverthataccom_shes_heessenO_!_ of theUnion.

PUBLIUS.

END OF VOL.XI.