Document of The World Bank Report No: 32227-BO IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (PPFI-Q1800 PPFI-Q1801 IDA-33780) ON A LEARNING AND INNOVATION CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF US$3.0 MILLION TO THE REPUBLIC OF BOLIVIA FOR A HYDROCARBON SECTOR SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT October 28, 2005 Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure Department Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela Country Management Unit Latin America and the Caribbean Region Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized
HYDROCARBON SECTOR SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENTCAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT
October 28, 2005
Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure Department Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela Country Management UnitLatin America and the Caribbean Region
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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective April 2005)
Currency Unit = Bolivianos Bolivianos 1.00 = US$ 0.123
US$ = 8.08 Bolivianos
FISCAL YEARJanuary 1 - December 31
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
CAS Country Assistance StrategyCBH Bolivian Chamber of HydrocarbonsCCTI Consejo de Coordinacion Tecnico Interinstitucional
(Inter-institutional Technical Coordinating Council)CDF Comprehensive Development FrameworkCIDOB Confederacion Indigena del Oriente, Chaco y Amazonia Boliviana
(Indigenous Confederation of the Bolivian Eastern, Chaco and Amazonian Regions)CRPC (El Consejo Regional de Participacion y Consulta (Regional Council for Participation and Consultation)CTR Consejo Tecnico Regional (Regional Technical Council)DO Development ObjectiveDMA Direccion de Medio-Ambiente –(Directorate of Environmental Management)EIA Environmental Impact AssessmentFOBOMADE Foro Boliviano de Medio Ambientey Desarrollo Economico
(Bolivian Forum for Environment and Economic Development)IDB Inter-American Development BankLIDEMA Liga de Defensa del Medio Ambiente (Environmental Defense League)LIL Learning and Innovation LoanM&E Monitoring and EvaluationNGO Non Governmental OrganizationOSCA Oficina de Seguimiento y Control Ambiental (Office of Environmental Monitoring and Control)PIP Project Implementation PlanPPF Project Preparation FacilityQAG Quality Assurance GroupSERNAP Servicio Nacional de Areas Protegidas (National Service of Protected Areas)TOR Terms of ReferenceUCSP Unidad de Coordinaci6n y Seguimiento del Proyecto (Project Coordination and Monitoring Unit)UMA Unidad de Medio-Ambiente (Environmental Management Unit of VMEH)VMEH Vice Ministry of Energy and Hydrocarbons (now Ministry of Hydrocarbons)YPFB Bolivian National Oil Company
Vice President: Pamela CoxCountry Director Marcelo GiugaleSector Manager Sue Goldmark
Task Team Leader/Task Manager: Eleodoro Mayorga-Alba
BOLIVIAEnvironmental Management Capacity Building Pilot Project of the Hydrocarbon Sector
CONTENTS
Page No.1. Project Data 12. Principal Performance Ratings 13. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 24. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 65. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 116. Sustainability 127. Bank and Borrower Performance 138. Lessons Learned 169. Partner Comments 1810. Additional Information 18Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 20Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 22Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 25Annex 4. Bank Inputs 26Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 28Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 29Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 30Annex 8. Borrower's Evaluation Report 31
Project ID: P065902 Project Name: Environmental Management Capacity Building Pilot Project of the Hydrocarbon Sector
Team Leader: Eleodoro O. Mayorga Alba TL Unit: COCPOICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: October 28, 2005
1. Project DataName: Environmental Management Capacity Building
Pilot Project of the Hydrocarbon SectorL/C/TF Number: PPFI-Q1800;
PPFI-Q1801; IDA-33780Country/Department: BOLIVIA Region: Latin America and the
Caribbean Region
Sector/subsector: Central government administration (54%); Oil and gas (42%); Other social services (4%)
Theme: Other environment and natural resources management (P)
KEY DATES Original Revised/ActualPCD: 05/04/1999 Effective: 01/02/2000 04/02/2001
Borrower/Implementing Agency: GOVERNMENT OF BOLIVIA/VICE MINISTRY OF ENERGY & HYDROCARBONS (VMEH)
Other Partners:
STAFF Current At AppraisalVice President: Pamela Cox David de FerrantiCountry Director: Marcelo Giugale Isabel GuerreroSector Manager: Peter A. Van Der Veen Danny LeipzigerTeam Leader at ICR: Eleodoro O. Mayorga- Alba Philippe J. DurandICR Primary Author: Eleodoro O. Mayorga- Alba; Sati
3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry
3.1 Original Objective:
The development objective (DO) of the US$5.8 million Hydrocarbon Sector Social and Environmental Management Capacity Building Project (funded by a Learning and Innovation Loan (Credit) - {LIL} in the amount of US$4.8 million) was to improve the management of the social and environmental impacts of the hydrocarbon sector, particularly of exploration, production and transport activities. To achieve this objective, the project aimed to institutionalize systematic procedures for consultation and participation, as well as mechanisms and dispositions for increased compliance by oil companies, an evaluation and monitoring system that was both financially and institutionally sustainable, and a system which would allow for the flow of accessible, transparent and timely information between all stakeholders.
Specifically, the project’s sub-objectives were to: (a) strengthen the capacity of institutions and communities involved in or affected by hydrocarbon sector activities to participate in the regulation and mitigation of social and environmental impacts; (b) improve stakeholder access to relevant information in a timely manner; (c) improve the capacity of the Vice Ministry of Energy and Hydrocarbons (VMEH) for on-site monitoring, evaluation, and reporting; (d) through field studies in problem areas, increase knowledge of the extent of problems in the development and implementation of Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) and increase compliance with EIAs and application of best practices by oil companies; (e) analyze and develop mechanisms for financial sustainability of social and environment management; (f) review and make compatible existing regulations and develop new regulations when necessary; and (g) develop and pilot a participatory, institutional framework that would facilitate the processes described above.
The DO was clear and important to the country’s economic and social development. It was also timely and appropriate to the needs of the Borrower, considering that the 1997 reform and capitalization of the hydrocarbon sector in Bolivia, coupled with the access to the huge Brazilian natural gas demand had intensified private sector investments in exploration/production and construction of pipelines. After the reform, private oil companies were investing more than US$800 million per year, on average. This represented more than ten times what YPFB, the Bolivian National Oil Company, had invested prior to its capitalization. There were 17 oil companies active in exploration and production activities with a drilling program of about 19 exploration wells a year. The 600 Km Bolivian section of the Bolivia-Brazil natural gas pipeline was inaugurated on February 19, 1999 and gas export to Brazil began on July 1, 1999. Private companies Shell and Enron were constructing a branch of the Bolivia-Brazil pipeline to Cuiaba in Brazil. Hydrocarbon sector activities at that time were occurring in five prefectures, nine indigenous people community areas, and nine protected areas and resulted in significant social and environmental impacts.
Experiences in the sector demonstrated that there was a strong need for improved socio-environmental management of hydrocarbon exploration, production and transportation activities. With limited human, technical and financial resources, the government entities could provide only slow or inadequate response in many of the ongoing cases. The quality of private investments in the hydrocarbon sector, which were vital to the sustainable economic growth of Bolivia, could only be maintained over the long term if actions were taken to address the lack of : (i) compliance with the social and environmental regulation requirements; (ii) coordination and agreement between national, regional and local government agencies on respective roles; (iii) financial sustainabilitv of the social and environmental management of the hydrocarbon sector; (iv) expertise, experience and validity of local consultants to support regulation and mitigation activities; (v) credible consultation processes by oil companies and clear mechanisms for social compensation; (vi) systematic processes of participation and information sharing among stakeholders; and (vii) a
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socio-environmental management strategy to resolve problems. The project aimed to address these issues by applying a process of learning and innovation.
As a LIL, the project design was not targetting immediate and specific objectives. Instead, it aimed to apply a process of learning and innovation through pilot studies and analysis, information sharing, inter-institutional coordination, and training to facilitate the consultation and development of mechanisms for the institutionalization of stakeholder capacity to prevent, regulate and mitigate social and environmental impacts of the hydrocarbon sector. In addition, the project aimed to test an inter-institutional structure that would allow for the participation of relevant stakeholders from the government, industry, and civil society at the national and local levels to ensure representative stakeholder participation in project implementation activities. As this process was to be applied for the first time in Bolivia, it required flexibility and adjustment as the project progressed.
Though the project was not mentioned as one of the key lending operations under the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Bolivia, it was discussed in the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) and was expected to contribute to the Opportunity Pillar by contributing to: (a) increasing and maintaining physical productive infrastructure and the capacity of the public and private sectors to manage it; and (b) strengthening the regulatory framework and promoting private participation. The project was expected to specifically contribute to strengthening the key performance indicators of the CAS and CDF in terms of mainstreaming environmental and social safeguard compliance in infrastructure projects.
The project was very demanding for the Borrower because: (i) strong commitment from the government was missing and the project faced serious counterpart funding problems throughout the implementation period; (ii) lot of time and attention was required from VMEH staff beyond their normal activities, especially in terms of preparing for CCTI (Consejo de Coordinacion Tecnico Interinstitucional -Inter-institutional Technical Coordinating Council) meetings, bringing together five regions of CRPCs (El Consejo Regional de Participacion y Consulta (former CTRs - Consejo Tecnico Regional -Regional Technical Council), setting up the OSCA (Oficina de Seguimiento y Control Ambiental- Office of Environmental Monitoring and Control) office in Santa Cruz, and preparing its strategy, procedures, and schedules; (iii) the method of functioning of CCTI, made the implementation very challenging. It was entrusted with the responsibilities such as approving the Terms of References (TORs) for consultants, and evaluating the studies, and it was essential to have a consensus within the CCTI representatives at each stage of the decision making process for proceeding with further actions. However, since CCTI consisted of representatives with divergent opinions, criteria, and agendas, the implementation was rendered very challenging and highly demanding. This difficult situation also made the Bank’s supervision very demanding.
The project was complex because of the participatory approach which involved several stakeholders consisting of local, regional and national governments, different sectors within the government, several regional and national institutions, private oil companies, Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and civil society including indigenous communities. Further, as mentioned above, the consensus expected at CCTI and CRPC levels made the project more complex.
3.2 Revised Objective:
The objective was not revised.
3.3 Original Components:
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The project consisted of four components, all related to achieving the project’s objectives. The implementation structure at VMEH was very strong. For example, DMA
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(Direccion de Medio-Ambiente – Directorate of Environmental Management) had sufficient technical capacity, and UCSP (Unidad de Coordinacion y Seguimiento del Proyecto -Project Coordination and Monitoring Unit) had adequate administrative capacity for successful implementation of these components.
1/ DMA was formerly known as UMA -Unidad de Medio-Ambiente -Environmental Management Unit of VMEH
The following is a description of each one of the project’s components.
(1.i) Technical assistance for the regulation and mitigation of social and environmentalimpacts of hydrocarbon activities entailed contracting specialized consultants (Environmentalist, Social Scientist, Anthropologist, Ecologist, Petroleum Engineer, Agronomist, etc.) in the DMA in La Paz and the OSCA in Santa Cruz de la Sierra (Red de Monitoreo) to ensure adequate prevention, regulation and mitigation and in accordance with current regulations with TORs agreed upon with the Bank.
(1.ii) Training of government agency staff, civil society organizations, locally affected communities and local consultants consisted of tailoring and testing training programs for participants of different levels of knowledge and experience in social and environmental areas, focusing primarily on the aspects of regulation and mitigation. Specific training programs were to be designed and planned with the inputs from the CCTI in consultation with the CRPCs and local participants. Programs were tailored to specific audiences (experts from the industry and government agencies, civil society institutions (green NGOs), indigenous and non-indigenous communities and local consultants). All relevant stakeholders were expected to provide their input into these programs (training scope, content, and methodology) and assess the success of these programs.
(1.iii) Inter-institutional Coordination consisted of establishing the CCTI and the CRPCs and implementing a series of workshops and seminars to facilitate the consultation and participation process in several areas: (i) the compatibilization of regulations and operational procedures; (ii) the definition of mechanisms for consultation and collaboration on specific social and environmental impact mitigation plans; (iii) the definition of an accessible, transparent and timely information system; (iv) the definition of the content and requirements for the training process; and (v) the development of sustainable financing mechanisms for carrying out regulation and mitigation.
(1.iv) Consultation Workshops with Stakeholders consisted of workshops that were to be carried out, under terms agreed upon by CCTI and CRPCs in consultation with other stakeholders for: (i) consultation, feedback and collaboration on the specific studies, on their objectives, findings and recommendations; (ii) planning, reviewing, and testing of processes to integrate stakeholders in decision-making and regulation and mitigation activities; and (iii) on other matters adeemed necessary by agreement between CCTI and CRPCs.
Component 2: Logistics and Communication (US$0.3 million)
This component consisted of the acquisition of essential equipment (vehicles, portable laboratories,
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computers, etc.) to facilitate the on-site regulation and mitigation work of government agencies, contributing to information sharing among all stakeholders. In addition, an information system/web-site was to be implemented. This system aimed to make use of the information base being developed under Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) Credit 598 within the framework of the study Plan de Accion Ambiental Sector Hidrocarburos which was being carried under the supervision of the DMA and complemented the management information system which was being completed by consultants for VMEH under a Japanese Grant Fund.
Component 3: Information Baseline and Studies (US$1.7 million)
This component formed a critical input to the institutional strengthening component and to the required updating of the related environmental and social regulations. It consisted of various studies, which included: (i) analysis and development of a mechanism for the sustainable financing of an improved social and environmental regulatory framework; (ii) analysis and development of a strategy for the dissemination of public information and systematic mechanisms for consultation and participation; (iii) analysis and development of a proposal for compatibilized regulations, procedures, roles and functions; (iv) analysis and design of strategies, mechanisms, manuals and procedures for social and environmental regulation and mitigation; (v) analysis of social and environmental practices of oil companies and development of best practice guidelines; (vi) carrying out of seven specific case studies, to be carried out by independent reviewers with participation from diverse actors involved in the sector that are based on present and past experiences in the hydrocarbon sector to identify social and environmental impacts and assess regulatory response; and (vii) assessment of hydrocarbon sector contingency plans.
Component 4: Administration, Coordination and Monitoring (US$1.2 million)
This component provided for: (i) the creation of UCSP, which would be responsible for the coordination and monitoring of the administrative progress of the project, (ii) external consultants which, in addition to stakeholders, would provide an independent annual evaluation of progress achieved in relation to verifiable performance indicators; and (iii) external audits.
3.4 Revised Components:
The debate on the new Hydrocarbon Law and, in general, the protests over the private companies’ gas investments and projects came in 2003, late in this project’s life. In light of these developments, an additional component was created towards the end of the project for conducting studies and financing consulting work to support the preparation of the new Hydrocarbon Law, and to help the government in the development of a consultation - information process and in the passage of a revised legal framework. It was basically an appendix – an addition made with a minor relation to the main project objectives and scope.
3.5 Quality at Entry:
The project's overall quality at entry received a ‘Satisfactory’ rating from the Quality Assurance Group (QAG). In arriving at this judgment, QAG underscored the innovative approach taken, the importance of the issue being addressed, the high quality of social and environmental work done by the preparation team, and the prospect of generating important and widely-useful ideas about improving governance in the hydrocarbon sector.
A Satisfactory rating was assigned by QAG to the Bank Inputs and Processes, and five of the eight quality
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dimensions, namely, Strategic Relevance and Approach; Fiduciary Aspects; Policy and Institutional Aspects; Implementation Arrangements; and Risk Assessment and Management. Of the remaining three quality dimensions, a Highly Satisfactory rating was given to the Poverty and Social Aspects and to the Environmental Aspects. In this context, QAG remarked that the treatment of indigenous people was particularly noteworthy. A Marginally Satisfactory rating was given to the technical, financial and economic aspects. According to QAG, major shortcomings included the failure to pay adequate attention to phasing of activities and follow-up beyond the project period, and inadequate economic rationale underpinning the project.
As mentioned earlier, the project objective was consistent with the CDF and the government priorities and met the critical needs of the hydrocarbon sector. Since DMA had the technical capacity, and UCSP the administrative capacity, the quality of project design was adequate to meet the project’s DO. During preparation of the project, major risk factors were considered and incorporated into the project design. As mentioned in Section 7.1, numerous local groups and green NGOs were consulted as part of project identification and preparation. The ICR views these aspects as satisfactory
On the other hand, the project design was fraught with the following two major drawbacks:
i) Even though the concept of CCTI and CRPCs was an innovative mechanism of the project, and the participation of its members in the selection of consultants and evaluation of studies was important, decision level and functioning of CCTI should have been designed in a more simplified and less bureaucratic manner. CCTI should not have been vested with so much decision-making power at each stage of the participatory process, such as for example, approving the TORs, selecting the consulting firms, and approving by consensus, each of the draft and final reports and studies. In other words, the role of CCTI could have been confined at a consultative level for making recommendations in these processes. In hindsight, DMA should have been given the final decision-making authority. This was all the more important especially for Bolivia, where there was no participatory culture in decision-making processes, and also considering that many of the institutions which participated in CCTI had their own divergent views and agenda, and different interests and expectations. As a result, it was difficult to arrive at consensual decisions, which delayed implementation.
ii) The project design should have tried to obtain a more significant participation of the Vice Ministry of Environment under the Ministry of Sustainable Development. Since all the environmental activities for which the assistance was provided were mainly in the hands of the VMEH, and the Vice Ministry of Environment, which was a “competent environmental authority”, was not a key actor in the project, there was an obvious lack of commitment on the part of this Ministry.
In light of these major shortcomings, the overall quality at entry is rated unsatisfactory.
4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs
4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective:
Unsatisfactory. The project was well conceived with a clear objective and an innovative approach. It was relevant and responsive to address the country’s needs at a crucial time. As mentioned in the text below, the project created an indirect impact on several fronts related to hydrocarbon sector. However, its direct
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impact was unsatisfactory because it suffered from several factors such as political instability, social conflict, lack of consensus in CCTI and CRPCs, absence of government commitment, government’s financial austerity measures, lack of coordination within the Ministry of Economic Development and institutional rivalry, and lack of cooperation between VMEH and the Ministry of Sustainable Development.
In this context, it is worth pointing out that, if the Bank is to embark on a project such as this in Bolivia or any other country in the region, it is important to take timely and appropriate remedial measures to avoid encountering above-mentioned adverse factors.
The details of the project’s outcome are as follows:
(a) Strengthening the capacity of institutions and communities involved in or affected by hydrocarbon sector activities to participate in the regulation and mitigation of social and environmental impacts.
The project was not successful in achieving this objective. However, as an indirect impact, it succeeded in opening the hydrocarbon sector to institutions and communities affected by this sector, and initiating communications channels, and making them aware of the activities going on in the sector. In particular the indigenous peoples organizations of the Amazonian region that live near the oil operations and that received a parallel training program through an ESMAP project have made significant progress in their undertstanding of the sector. As such, many members in the groups and communities at the grass root level, who were never aware of hydrocarbon laws, have come to know more about the new Hydrocarbon Law, and the basics of hydrocarbon activities, and aware of the benefits and risks of the sector.
(b) Improving stakeholder access to relevant information in a timely manner.
This objective is still to be fully achieved. On one hand, the project helped in strengthening public consultation on EIA, with the assistance of project-financed social scientists in La Paz and Santa Cruz, and the participation of the public at grassroots level. On the other hand, even though a website has been designed, it has not become operational and is not yet a realistic mechanism for the Bolivian situation. For example, many stakeholders don’t have access to the Internet, and even if they have, many of them are not aware of this website. As a result, in spite of improved access to information in a passive manner during EIA process, it is still difficult to get details if someone needs them. The project indeed required in addition to the Internet site, an adequate aggressive communication effort.
(c) Improving the capacity of VMEH for on-site monitoring, evaluation, and reporting.
An office of OSCA was established at Santa Cruz, a cohesive group consisting of highly qualified technical staff was recruited, and all relevant equipment were purchased exclusively for performing its functions such as on-site monitoring, evaluation, and reporting. All procedures, and adequate plans were made, and their activities and functions were planned well in advance of commencing its operations. The capacity of VMEH was thus strengthened during project implementation, and the project was instrumental in creating a strong presence in the field and making an impact on private oil companies, local and regional governments, and local communities. However, this capacity is no longer sustainable, because all the people who were capable of performing these functions at VMEH left the Ministry by the end of the project after finishing their contracts. Further, the fiscal austerity measures did not allow for including the OSCA personnel and related expenses in the last national budgets.
(d) Through field studies in problem areas, increasing knowledge of the extent of problems in the
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development and implementation of EIAs and increasing compliance with EIAs and application of best practices by oil companies.
The following three consultant studies were completed:
(i) Development and design of Methodologies and instruments for the evaluation and control of the social-environmental impact(ii) Evaluation of Environmental Regulations(iii) Development of a Best Environmental Practices Guide and an Action Plan for Contingencies in the Hydrocarbons SectorAnalyzing and developing mechanisms for financial sustainability of social and environmental management.
Due to lack of counterpart funding this study was not completed.
Reviewing and making compatible existing regulations and developing new regulations when necessary.
This activity consisted of three phases. Under the first phase of a diagnostic study, existing regulations were reviewed. The second phase provided for a number of studies aiming at collecting best practices and methodologies from more advance environmental regulatory systems and adapting them to Bolivia’s industry; some of these studies were completed. Finally the third phase which aimed to develop new regulations could not be initiated due to the government’s financial austerity measures.
(g) Developing and piloting a participatory, institutional framework that would facilitate the processes described above.
TORs for this ‘Communication Strategy’ were prepared together with CCTI, but this study was not completed.
4.2 Outputs by components:
Component 1: Institutional Strengthening.
(1.i) Technical assistance for the regulation and mitigation of the social and environmental impacts of hydrocarbon activities.
At the VMEH office in La Paz, two social scientists, one agronomist, and one economist were contracted, and at the OSCA office in Santa Cruz, one environmentalist, one social scientist, one chemical engineer, one civil engineer, and one geologist were contracted.
In order to improve their functions on environmental control and management, DMA and OSCA developed a strategic plan which consisted of the following activities: (i) Annual Plan of Activities; (ii) Quarterly chronogram of activities; (iii) Manual of Operations, which included: (a) Procedures of pre-inspection, inspection and post-inspection; (b) Formats for inspection acts; (c) Formats for inspection information; (d) Protocols of sampling and measurement; (e) Measuring standard by activity, considering the stage of execution of the project, which are applied as a uniform parameter of control to all the activities, works or projects (AOPs) inspected.
In 2002 the services of an international consultant was contracted to revise the procedures, mechanisms and
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instruments previously developed by the OSCA.
(1.ii) Training of government agency staff, civil society organizations, locally affected communities and local consultants.
This activity was not conducted at all.
(1.iii) Inter-institutional Coordination.
CCTI and CRPCs were established and a total of 17 workshops and seminars were conducted from 2001 to 2004, to facilitate the consultation and participation process.
Achievement of this component is marginally satisfactory.
Component 2: Logistics and Communication
Essential equipment, including vehicles, portable laboratories, and computers to facilitate the on-site regulation and mitigation work of government agencies were acquired.
The information system was not implemented. Even though a website has been developed, it is not yet operational because of hardware problems.
Achievement of this component is marginally satisfactory
Component 3: Information Baseline and Studies
Strategic studies: This consisted of: (i) a diagnosis of the environmental impacts generated by the activities of the sector; and (ii) two Guides: one Guide for the elaboration of the studies of Evaluation of Environmental Impact within the framework of the socio-environmental management; and the other Guide for participation and consultation process.
Guide of Best Practices in Environment and a plan of action for contingencies for the Hydrocarbons Sector: This included:
• 10 guides of Best Good Practices on subjects such as transport, exploration and exploratory perforation, operation, road construction and rating of areas, installation and handling of camping, environmental monitoring, transport and installation of equipment and presence of personnel.• A diagnosis and analysis of the capacity of the industry and the public institutions for the attention of contingencies. • A plan of contingencies
Strategy of Communication: This consultancy could not be concluded, since the products presented/displayed by the contracted company, did not fulfill the TORs.
Regional case studies: Case studies on the CRPCs of Parapitigüasu, Amazonía Beni - La Paz, Amboró Block – Chiquitano, and Amazon were not completed.
Also see Section 4.1 (e)
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Achievement of this component is unsatisfactory.
Component 4: Administration, Coordination and Monitoring
UCSP was created, and external consultants and external auditors were financed by the project.
Achievement of this component was unsatisfactory.
Component 5: Comparative Analysis Study
Three international experts completed this study which consisted of: (i) evaluating the conditions for investment in the hydrocarbon sector in Bolivia; and (ii) a comparative analysis of the countries in the region that compete with Bolivia for attracting investors.
Achievement of this component was satisfactory
4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return:
Not applicable
4.4 Financial rate of return:
Not applicable
4.5 Institutional development impact:
Negligible. The project helped VMEH in incorporating the concept of socio-environmental management as part of its responsibility and in enhancing its scope of activities related to monitoring and controlling the industry. For example, it became better equipped to handle environment-related accidents, contingencies, and complaints in a fast and dynamic manner. The project also helped in initiating dialogues on environmental issues between private companies and civil society. With the creation of the OSCA in Santa Cruz, and as a result of its field presence for three years, the public and affected communities are now aware of the role of the government in the management of hydrocarbon sector, especially on environmental management. The project also made oil companies realize that the government could be monitoring their activities and that they would need to comply with the environmental regulations of the country.
The project exposed the different stakeholders to many topics which were new to the country. For example, prior to the project, social and environmental methodologies, and consultation and compensation issues had never been openly discussed in Bolivia. It also helped in strengthening the capability of the people who were involved in the implementation of the project and improving their knowledge on hydrocarbon sector issues.
The Ministry of Sustainable Development benefited during the execution of the project, not only for the experience it gained, but also for the help it received from a stronger VMEH on technical matters in managing environmental issues. The Diagnostic Study and the proposed modification of environmental norms would be beneficial to this Ministry because many of the problems and issues identified in the Diagnostic Study are related to it as well as to VMEH.
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However, the temporary closing of the OSCA and the drastic reduction of the DMA personnel would make the institutional development impact of the project negligible.
5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome
5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency:
Social conflicts. During the entire project period, many times CCTI and CRPC meetings had to be cancelled not only because the access to the sites selected for the meetings was blocked, but also because the local participants of the meetings themselves were the ones blockading. In addition, in 2003 Bolivia had two social disturbances with very strong political impacts, the first one on February, with several human casualties, that destabilized the government and triggered the replacement of all Ministers. The second one in October, much stronger and with more human casualties, resulted in the departure of President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada.
Lack of consensus in CCTI and CRPCs. Many of the institutions which participated in CCTI had divergent views, agendas, interests and expectations, and they were also at different levels of understanding of hydrocarbon sector issues. As a result of this diversity, there was inordinate delay on the part of CCTI in arriving at consensual decisions in the approval of TORs for consultants, evaluation of consulting firms, and evaluation of studies. In addition, there was a lack of communication between the representatives of CCTI and their respective institutions, which prevented a proper dissemination of information.
Similarly, the members of CRPCs were also at different wavelengths in their views and agenda, and many of them did not clearly understand the objectives of the project, and they also lacked the proper knowledge of hydrocarbon sector and environmental laws. Consequently, as in the case of CCTI, it was very difficult to achieve consensual decisions.
However, the groups represented in the CCTI - and CRPs did not oppose the private gas projects; instead, they were basically concerned with the improvement of the environmental and social regulations. The groups that had led the protests were not intrinsically represented in these committees.
5.2 Factors generally subject to government control:
(i) Political instability. During the three and half years of the project, the President of the country changed four times, and there were eight different Ministers of Hydrocarbons. Especially in 2003, over six months, when the CCTI and CRPCs were fully operational and the project was entering a critical phase, the President changed twice and the Minister of Hydrocarbon changed four times. The frequent change of Minister created instability in the sector and also on project implementation. Each time a new Minister was appointed, he had to be appraised of the project and in many cases they did not have the time, interest, and commitment to get involved with the project. In general, they were preoccupied with other higher priority matters such as the proposed new Hydrocarbons Law or the increase of prices in industrial markets and its impact in Bolivia, and other connected issues that afflicted the government as a whole. Further, there were also frequent changes in personnel in the Ministry along with the change of Ministers, as each Minister brought a new team along with him.
(ii) Because of the political situation, the project became effective only on April 2, 2001, after a delay of ten months the project’s closing date was extended three times for a total of 16 months. Because of the frequent change of the President, administration, and the Minister of Hydrocarbons, and based on their
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renewed commitment and agreement to provide the required counterpart funding, the first extension was given for a period of nine months from December 2003 to September 2004. The second extension was given for another three months to December 2004, for providing technical assistance to review the proposed new Hydrocarbon Law. The justification for the third extension for a period of four months to April 2005 was for completing the existing project activities, including the work on a new Hydrocarbon Law.
(iii) Absence of government commitment. The absence of political will and commitment at a critical stage of the project hampered the implementation and outcome. For example, serious counterpart funding problems encountered during implementation was a reflection of the lack of political support for the project.
The total counterpart funding for the project as of December 31, 2004 was only US$274,120 (27.4%) instead of the originally agreed amount of US$1 million. This amount consisted of US$141252 in 2002, US$84250 in 2003, and US$38608 in 2004. As a result, for example, it was not possible to maintain a minimal capacity to monitor the environmental and social impacts or to complete all the studies and stakeholders consultations neither for developing a new socio-environmental regulatory framework nor to design and implement a training program for the main actors. In addition, because of the lack of budget resources the VMEH was not able to preserve the project benefits.
(iv) The government’s financial austerity measures in 2004 were another key factor which contributed to the delay of budget approval, and also forced a significant salary level reduction, which triggered the leaving of some key personnel.
(v) Lack of internal coordination. The Economic Development Ministry had a total lack of internal coordination with the Vice-Ministry of Public Investment & External Financing and the Vice-Ministry of Budget, which were in charge of approving the project’s counterpart funding and budget. As a consequence, only for two years the project had the counterpart approval and during the whole lifetime the yearly budget approval was delayed for months. The worst case was in 2004, when the budget was approved only in August, and the project was to be closed in September and the project staff had to work without salaries until then.
(vi) Institutional rivalry and lack of cooperation between VMEH and the Ministry of Sustainable Development. The struggle of the Ministry of Sustainable Development with VMEH to have the project under its control also affected the project implementation.
5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:
Lack of coordination between UCSP and DMA. The project started with a lack of coordination between UCSP and DMA. Even though the coordination was significantly improved afterwards, the mistakes done during that period remained until the end of the project. Key issues like the preparation of the TORs for the strategic studies, the selection processes and other long term decisions were established during this period.
5.4 Costs and financing:
The total cost of the project was US$3.27 million compared with the PAD estimate of US$5.8 million. The lower project cost was mainly due to cancellation of many of the project activities. The Bank financed US$3.00 million (92.5%), and the government contributed US$0.27 million equivalent in local costs (7.5%).
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6. Sustainability
6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating:
Unlikely. The overall sustainability of the project is rated as unlikely, in light of the government failure to provide sufficient financial resources in the national budget for the Hydrocarbon Sector.
OSCA: In order to sustain the field presence of OSCA, the government in the budget for the year 2005 has allowed the recruiting of two inspectors who will be posted in Santa Cruz for field inspections. They will be reporting directly to the Director of DMA. The framework already established under the project for conducting on-site monitoring, evaluation, and reporting will be useful for its future functioning. It is expected that in the next annual budgets these funds will be kept. However, in the event of a relaunching of investments in this sector, two inspectors will not be sufficient to cope with the basic monitoring tasks. CCTI and CRPCs are not sustainable as they were already closed during the project’s second extension period. The government had decided by that time to close the program of studies and also not to proceed with a new regulatory framework, and under these circumstances, CCTI and CRPCs were no longer needed.
The Strategic Studies that were completed are being revised so that based on them, the sector environmental regulations can be strengthened. It is considered feasible that in 2005, the Guides for Best Practices and the Methodologies and Instruments could be validated through Supreme Decrees, as part of the updating of the regulatory framework in accordance with the new Hydrocarbon Law.
6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations:
See Section 6.1
Further, the main aspect is the budgetary decisions. In the new Hydrocarbon Law, there is an article providing for the deposit by the project developers of 0.5% of capital costs to the Ministry of Sustainable Development. These funds that should be shared with the sector authorities, in particular with the DMA of the Ministry of Hydrocarbons should allow better monitoring of environmental and social impacts. It is expected that the regulation of this article of the law and the required authorization be made in an expeditious way.
7. Bank and Borrower Performance
Bank7.1 Lending:
Satisfactory. The Bank's performance in the identification, preparation, and appraisal of the project was satisfactory. The identification process focused on identifying the critical issues in the hydrocarbon sector and the project aimed to address these issues through an innovative approach. During preparation, there were commendable efforts by the Bank to secure the agreement of the government, civil society, and the oil industry to work together in mitigating the social and environmental impact of the country's rapid development of its petroleum resources.
Numerous local groups and green NGOs were consulted as part of project identification and preparation. The Environmental Dialogues, a conference between the Bank and stakeholders (national, regional and local government agencies, oil companies, indigenous people organization representatives and non
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governmental organizations), was organized in Santa Cruz in April 1999 to specifically discuss hydrocarbon sector issues. The identification and preparation missions also met separately with the National Chamber of Hydrocarbons which represents all oil companies working in Bolivia, the Confederacion Indigena del Oriente, Chaco y Amazonia Boliviana (Indigenous Confederation of the Bolivian Eastern, Chaco and Amazon Regions - CIDOB), Capitania Indigena del Alto y Bajo Isozo (Indigenous Group representing the Upper and Lower Isozo - CABI), the Liga de Defensa del Medio Ambiente (Environmental Defense League - LIDEMA), the Foro Boliviano de Medio Ambiente y Desarrollo Economico (Bolivian Forum for the Environment and Economic Development -FOBOMADE), and Tropico.
During the preparation mission, project team members also met with consultants, the Servicio Nacional de Areas Protegidas (National Service for Protected Areas - SERNAP), and representatives from the municipal, prefecture and national level governments who have experience in evaluation and monitoring of hydrocarbon operations. Additionally, three stakeholder workshops were held throughout project preparation with over 40 different participants, including the above mentioned groups as well as participants from the Superintendencia Forestal, GeoPlus, Conservation International - Bolivia, the World Wildlife Fund - Bolivia, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Proyecto KAA-IYA, among others. Project issues were also discussed during a meeting between local and international environmental NGOs and the Bank's Vice President for Latin America and the Caribbean.
The Financial Management Specialist for Bolivia conducted a review in the UCSP of the accounting, controls over disbursements and resources, planning and budgeting as well as the level of administrative staff.
7.2 Supervision:
7.2 Supervision:
Satisfactory. QAG conducted a Quality of Supervision Assessment, which covered the first two years of implementation (FY01 and FY02). Overall, it rated the quality of supervision for this project as Satisfactory. QAG panel rated highly the experience and skill mix of the supervision team. It commented that “mission frequency, resource allocation and collaboration with field staff were generally sound, and the Aide Memoirs revealed a clear analysis and understanding of the different issues impeding implementation”
The ICR also rates the Bank's performance during the implementation of the project as Satisfactory. Sufficient budget and staff resources were allocated, and the project was adequately supervised and closely monitored. Over the four years of project implementation, there were seven supervision missions, with an average of about two missions per year. Aide-Memoires, which were regularly prepared, identified different implementation problems, and discussed them with the government and the implementing agencies. For example, the serious concern in regard to the 'lack of commitment' from VMEH was clearly shared by both the Bank’s Sector Manager and Sector Leader, and communicated to the government. Consequently, the Bank reached an agreement with the key sectoral ministry on an action plan in October 2001, aimed at turning around implementation.
QAG had remarked that in the first two years of implementation, “there appeared to be a lack of vigorous follow-up by the Bank in the period following this Action Plan with top policy makers in government, seeking specific solutions to the weak commitment of VMEH. There was limited impact and effectiveness
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of Bank actions at high levels of government in addressing the issues of ownership and weak sectoral leadership in the key sectoral ministry”. However, the ICR team is of the view that during the whole project period, the Bank had tried its best to address these issues, but continuous change of administration and the Minister of Hydrocarbons made it difficult for the Bank to follow-up on the Action Plan agreed with the previous administration and the Minister of Hydrocarbons, and the task team had to start its efforts all over again each time. Inspite of this limitation, the Bank had effectively built coalitions of support among key stakeholders, including the industry and civil society.
The Project Status Report (PSR) ratings on performance of the project in terms of achievement of DO and implementation were realistic. The Bank supervision team identified and timely advised the government on the need to develop a consultation process and to contract international expertise to prepare the new Hydrocarbon Law. Fiduciary aspects in the area of procurement and financial management were strong, as was attention to environmental aspects of the project.
The Bank’s client relationship was very cordial and productive. Supervision teams included specialists in energy economics, petroleum engineering, social science, environment, financial management, and procurement. External consultants were used for specific aspects of project components.
7.3 Overall Bank performance:
Satisfactory. Overall, the Bank performance was satisfactory during project preparation, appraisal and implementation.
Borrower7.4 Preparation:
Satisfactory. The Borrower's performance in the preparation of the project was satisfactory. The Borrower was committed to the objectives of the project. A number of essential project activities were initiated under the Project Preparation Facility (PPF), which represented noteworthy moves towards achieving the DO. DMA was staffed with the necessary technical consultants and field monitoring activities were carried out. UCSP was fully staffed and had in place the necessary arrangements to initiate project activities, such as the contracting of studies, training and other technical assistance. A financial management system, acceptable to the Bank was established in the UCSP and it became operational before the end of the year 2000, including production of adequate project management reports. The participation and consultation process was implemented through the establishment of the CCTI which met to discuss the contents of the project and its internal regulations.
7.5 Government implementation performance:
Unsatisfactory. Government implementation performance was unsatisfactory. It must be noted that the project was implemented at a critical time, when the government was more preoccupied with many overwhelming tasks, such as the new Hydrocarbon Law, conducting a referendum, and dealing with social unrest. This was not a propitious time for the government to focus on improving the country’s environmental management through a participatory process. Consequently, the project was only of secondary importance and the government did not maintain its commitment during implementation. This is demonstrated by: (i) huge deficit in providing the counterpart funding, which amounted to only 27.4% of the agreed amount; and (ii) frequent change of Minister/Vice-Minister of Hydrocarbons. Another problem encountered by the project was the lukewarm ownership of the project at the Ministerial level at VMEH during much of implementation period.
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7.6 Implementing Agency:
Satisfactory. The performance of DMA, which was the responsible entity for monitoring and evaluation of social and environmental impacts in the hydrocarbon sector, and also for providing technical guidance, was satisfactory. It put together a well-knit team consisting of qualified and competent technical staff, which performed technical supervisions very thoroughly and guided OSCA on technical matters. The contracted staffs of the DMA, as well as the OSCA and UCSP were so dedicated that many of them even went to the extent of continuing to work even when they were not paid their salaries for about nine months.
The performance of UCSP which provided administrative support for the project and was responsible for procurement and disbursement operations was satisfactory. Except in the initial stages of implementation, it operated in close coordination with the DMA. It prepared detailed work on project cost, and time schedule on the activities of components. A Project ImplementationPlan (PIP) was also prepared in detail. Its quality of financial management and procurement administration was satisfactory. UCSP was well organized and effective in dealing with procurement, disbursement, progress reports, and in maintaining proper records of the project. It was receptive to the Bank’s advice, and collaborated well with the Bank during implementation.
7.7 Overall Borrower performance:
Unsatisfactory. Although the technical and administrative agencies were properly set-up and were committed to the project objectives, the lack of political will at the Ministerial level made the overall performance of the Borrower unsatisfactory.
8. Lessons Learned
Country/Government-related:
• For Bolivia’s economic development, it is essential to explore and develop its oil and gas resources. At the same time, it is equally important to address environmental and social problems associated with the exploration, production, and commercialization of these resources. In light of the basic infrastructure and mechanism laid out by the project, it will be important for the country to make use of them in order to address these issues/problems.
• The project had a good vision with innovative ideas. It was instrumental in developing a new awareness in Bolivia on social, environmental, and cultural issues, especially in the field of the hydrocarbon sector. Unfortunately, due to the prevailing political and social situation, the government’s absence of political will and commitment, and the complicated CCTI and CRPCs participatory mechanisms this vision could not be fully materialized.
• It is important for VMEH to improve its communication and coordination with the Ministry of Sustainable Development, especially in light of the latter’s responsibility for enforcing sanctions and environmental standards on the industry.
Project-related:
• The project demonstrated that with proper support, it is possible to create appropriate mechanisms for environmental management. It also showed that oil companies, national and local governments, and
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communities can work together for improving environmental management.
• The project helped to identify important issues in the hydrocarbon sector. During implementation, stakeholders overcame their prejudices, and were able to build a commom platform to build consensus on these issues.
• Good coordination and active involvement among the participants are very important for a project such as this, where several stakeholders were involved.
• This LIL project, although rated unsatisfactory for its implementation, is leaving very important lessons for the government, stakeholders, and the Bank. The project has laid a good foundation for future projects. It will be useful to review the lessons learned, factors which affected the implementation, and the outcome and outputs of the project.
CCTI and CRPC-related:
• Local communities should be given more importance than their national federation in the future projects for activities such as monitoring and evaluation. For example, considering that CRPCs are involved at the grass root level, they should be given the primary importance. By bringing oil companies, local communities, local and regional governments together to discuss their needs and common problems, it is possible to create better links with the local, regional, and national authorities. On the other hand, on matters such as passing new laws and regulations, the role of national federation is very important.
• Only those NGOs which genuinely represent civil society should be included as members of institutions such as CCTI and CRPC. Even then, their role should be more as facilitators rather than as decision makers.
• The concept of CRPCs and CCTI was a good idea. However, in practice, they did not work out well. Instead of becoming a forum for consultation and consensual decisions, they became places for making different kinds of demands from the participants. The decision to contract “advisors” for certain institutions did not improve their commitment to the project objectives.
• One of the better ways to train indigenous people on environmental management will be to provide them work in a regional organization such as OSCA, which would give them the opportunity to gain hands-on work experience in this area. This method may also give them an opportunity to appreciate the government’s points of view and look at the government more as a partner rather than as an enemy.
• It is important for the government to give good support to indigenous people at the grass root level in order to ensure their long-term sustainable development, even after the oil companies leave their territories once they complete the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbon resources.
Bank-related:
• Government Commitment. The Bank should launch a project such as this in Bolivia or any other country in the region, only after getting a firm commitment from the government to the project.
Active participation of the Bank’s specialists on environment and social science during the implementation of the project is very important, especially when the project is going through difficult times.
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9. Partner Comments
(a) Borrower/implementing agency:
See Annex 8
(b) Cofinanciers:
N/A
(c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector):
N/A
10. Additional Information
A. The Bank’s ICR Team consisted of the following members:
Eleodoro Mayorga-Alba Task Team LeaderSati Achath Consultant
B. List of Task Team Leaders of the project in chronological order:
(i) Chakib Khalil (ii) Philippe Durand(iii) Eleodoro Mayorga-Alba
C. Persons interviewed for the preparation of the ICR:
Philippe Durand Lead Energy SpecialistLourdes Linares Financial Management Specialist
Mario Cadia Secretary General, VMEH Paulo Uzin Director, DMAAdolfo Viscarra Acting Coordinator/Director, UCSP Ernesto Mealla Ex- Director, DMACarlos Portecarrero Ministry of MunicipalitiesMaría del Carmel Hidalgo Ministry of MunicipalitiesJosé Coello SERNAPBerlinha Paiva SERNAPJenny Gruenberger Perez LEDEMATeresa Flores LEDEMAJosé Lorini LEDEMAIsabel Ortuno Ibanez Legal Advisor, DGMASergio Nana Orellana Manager, DGMAVerónica Lopez Ex-Consultant, VMEHArmando Viruez CBHBrigette de Herrera TRANSREDES SANelson Vaca TRANSREDES SAKatia Vega Legal Counsel, CIACO
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Jaime González CIDOBMarcelo Ona Legal Advisor, MACA Marianela Curri Ex-Vice Minister of Sustainable DevelopmentMónica Castro Ex-Consultant, VMEH
Improvement in the presence of UMA in field monitoring. Percentage of Category I projects visited. Cat. I refers to the level of Integrated Environmental Impact Assessment that includes detailed analysis.
In 2004, OSCA performed 22 inspections, consisting of 19 planned inspections and 3 inspections to incidents or local requirements
Improvement in the presence of UMA in field monitoring. Percentage of Category II projects visited. Cat. II refers to the level of Environmental Impact Assessment according to the incidence of factors.
Lacking operational funds, the UMA has not been able to supervise any project in 2004
Improvement in the presence of UMA in field monitoring. Percentage of Category III projects visited. Cat III refers to the level that requires mitigation measures and an Environmental Monitoring Action Plan for specific aspects.
Lacking operational funds, the UMA has not been able to supervise any project in 2004.
Improvement in the presence of UMA in field monitoring. Percentage of complaints addressed.
20% some improvement on desk procedures. Lacking operational funds, the UMA has not been able during 2004 to receive and respond to complaints
Increased number of projects are in compliance with EIA standards.
25% - There has been no supervision to identify a higher compliance record during 2004
Dissemination of EIAs for hydrocarbon projects by UMA through a website and the LaPaz and Santa Cruz offices.
The website is operational, but lacking funds it has not been updated
CCTI and CTRs function effectively.
Both CCTI and CTRs has not function effectively; no payment was made to the proposed advisors for much of 2004. Since October 1004 both
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comittees have been desactivated
Output Indicators:
Indicator Projected in SAR/PAD Actual/Latest EstimateRecommendations for a framework to make compatible rules and regulations for improved social and environmental management of the hydrocarbon sector result from study, analysis and discussion with CCTI/CTRs and other stakeholders.
The strategic studies that will provide the basis for the changes in the regulations were not executed. No discussion of new regulations took place in the CCTI or CTRs.
Preparation of a proposed mechanism for financial and institutional sustainability social and environmental managementof hydrocarbon sector . TORs for the analysis approved by the CCTI, study initiated and recommendations agreed upon with all stakeholder
The TORs for this study were discussed at the CCTI but this study was not executed
Completion and dissemination of case studies with participation by multiple stakeholders from government and civil society.
0% - The TORs were discussed but the case studies themselves were not executed.
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Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing
Annex 2a
Project Costs by Components (in US$ million equivalent)
Project Component Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest Estimate Percentage of Appraisal
Institutional Strengthening 2.38 1.67
70.1
Logistics and Communication 0.29 0.24
82.7
Information Base and Studies 1.53 0.58
37.9
Coordination and Monitoring 1.10 0.78
70.9
Total Baseline Cost 5.30 3.00 56.6
Physical Contingencies
0.25
Price Contingencies 0.25
Total Project Costs 5.80 3.27 56.3
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Annex 2b Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (In US$ million equivalent)* Expenditure Categories
Procurement Method Appraisal Estimate
Procurement Method Actual/Latest Estimate
ICB NCB Other NBF Total ICB
NCB Other NBF Total
1 Works 2 Goods 0.30
(0.25) 0.10 0.40
(0.25) 0.27 0.27
3 Services 5.40 (4.55)
5.40 (4.55)
3.00 (3.00)
3.00 (3.00)
4 Misc. Total 0.30
(0.25) 5.40
(4.55) 0.10 5.80
(4.80) 0.27 3.00
(3.00) 3.27
(3.00)
* Note: NBF = Not Bank Financed (includes elements provided under parallel cofinancing procedures, consultants under trust funds, any reserved procurement and any other miscellaneous items). The procurement arrangements for items listed under “Other” and details of the items listed as NBF need to be explained in footnotes to the table.
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Annex 2c Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Component Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest Estimate Percentage of Appraisal
Bank Govern-
ment
Co-financier
Bank Govern-ment
Co-financier
Bank Govern- ment
Co-financier
Institutional Strengthening
2.13
0.47
1.40
0.27
65.7 57.4
Logistics and Communication
0.28
0.04
0.24
85.7
Information Base and Studies
1.48
0.20
0.58
39.1
Coordination and Monitoring
0.91
0.29
0.78
85.7
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Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits
N/A
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Annex 4. Bank Inputs
(a) Missions:Stage of Project Cycle Performance Rating No. of Persons and Specialty
SAP no longer provides information on staff weeks.
(b) Staff:
Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest EstimateNo. Staff weeks US$ ('000)
Supervision NA 292.6ICR NA 20.0Total NA 312.6
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Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components(H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable)
RatingMacro policies H SU M N NASector Policies H SU M N NAPhysical H SU M N NAFinancial H SU M N NAInstitutional Development H SU M N NAEnvironmental H SU M N NA
SocialPoverty Reduction H SU M N NAGender H SU M N NAOther (Please specify) H SU M N NA
Private sector development H SU M N NAPublic sector management H SU M N NAOther (Please specify) H SU M N NA
Lending HS S U HUSupervision HS S U HUOverall HS S U HU
6.2 Borrower performance Rating
Preparation HS S U HUGovernment implementation performance HS S U HUImplementation agency performance HS S U HUOverall HS S U HU
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Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents
1. Aide Memoires, Back-to-Office Reports, and Project Status Reports
2. Project Progress Reports
3. Borrower's Evaluation Report dated, March 2005
4. Project Appraisal Document for Bolivia for a Hydrocarbon Sector Social and Environmental Management Capacity Building Project, dated May 30, 20000 (Report No. 20389-BO)
5.Consultant Report: Analysis of the Hydrocarbon Law of the Republic of Bolivia
6. Consultant Report: Fiscal and Administrative Regime of Hydrocarbon Sector of Bolivia
El objetivo del proyecto, era desarrollar metodologías e instrumentos de evaluación, monitoreo y seguimiento de impactos a través de procedimientos participativos de control y seguimiento socio ambiental, con la finalidad de coadyuvar en la aplicabilidad de la normativa ambiental vigente, mejorar los estándares ambientales y socio ambientales y generar espacios de consulta y participación de los diferentes actores; incrementando de esta forma seguridad y calidad de las inversiones.Específicamente, el proyecto debería : (a) Fortalecer la capacidad de las instituciones y comunidades involucradas o afectadas por las actividades del sector hidrocarburos para que participen en la regulación y mitigación del impacto ambiental y social; (b) mejorar el acceso de los actores a información relevante de manera oportuna (c) mejorar la capacidad del VMEH para la evaluación, elaboración de informes y el monitoreo en sitio; (d) a través de estudios de campo en áreas problemáticas, incrementar el conocimiento sobre el alcance de problemas en el desarrollo y la implementación de evaluaciones petroleras de mejores practicas; (e) analizar y desarrollar mecanismos para la Sostenibilidad financiera del manejo ambiental y social; (f) revisar las regulaciones existentes, compatibilizar desarrollando regulaciones nuevas; (g) desarrollar y llevar adelante un marco institucional, participativo para facilitar el proceso descrito arriba.
COMPONENTES ORIGINALES:
Componente N.1: Fortalecimiento Institucional
Destinado a incrementar las capacidades e institucionalizar el proceso de consulta con las partes interesadas. Este componente incluyó, los siguientes sub - componentes:
Asistencia Técnica para al regulación y mitigación de los impactos socio ambientales de las actividades Hidrocarburíferas. (US$ 1.3 Millones)
Talleres de Consulta con los Involucrados.(US$ 0.3 millones)
Componente N.2: Logística y Comunicación – US$ 0.3 millones
Este componente consistió en la adquisición de los equipos esenciales (vehículos, laboratorios portátiles, computadoras, etc.) para facilitar la evaluación y el seguimiento in-situ, así como el uso compartido de la información con las partes interesadas. En adición, un sistema de información a través de web-site seria implementado. Este sistema podría utilizar la información básica que esta siendo desarrollada del estudio denominado Plan de Acción Ambiental del Sector Hidrocarburos (PAASH), que es llevado a cabo con la supervisión de la UMA del VMEH y ser complementado con el Sistema de Información Gerencial del VMEH. (Ver Anexo N.5 Cronograma de Actividades Componente 2 de Logística y Comunicación)
Componente N.3: Información Básica y Estudios – US$ 1.7 millones – Línea de Base y Estudios
Este componente se constituyó en un insumo al componente de fortalecimiento institucional y consiste en varios estudios.
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Componente N.4: Administración, Coordinación y Seguimiento - US$ 1.2 millones
1. Este componente previo : i) la creación de la Unidad de Coordinación y Seguimiento de Proyecto (UCSP), responsable de la coordinación y monitoreo general del proyecto: ii) evaluación externa, en adición a la realizada por los involucrados, previendo una evaluación independiente del progreso alcanzado con relación a los indicadores de desempeño, iii) auditorias externas. (ver Anexo N.8 Componente N.4 Administración, Coordinación y seguimiento).
COMPONENTES REVISADOS
Ante la coyuntura del sector hidrocarburos en Bolivia durante la gestión 2004, el Gobierno Central, requirió adquirir información que permita la toma de decisiones con relación a la normativa hidrocarburífera aplicable a las empresas transnacionales que operan o están dispuestas a operar en Bolivia. También requirió saber sobre las ventajas comparativas y competitivas con respecto a otros países.
Por lo cual, con el objetivo de contar con una opinión independiente del mas alto nivel, con elementos de comparación sobre las reformas institucionales, legales e impositivos que Bolivia esta realizando y poder compararlos con otros países productores de petróleo y gas el prestatario propuso un nuevo componente al organismo financiador, el cual, durante la misión de agosto del 2004 confirmó su no objeción para que se financie con fondos del proyecto esta nueva actividad tendiente a obtener opiniones de tres expertos internacionales con respecto al borrador de la nueva ley de hidrocarburos.
Los consultores elaboraron un análisis comparativo de la “Ley de Hidrocarburos” a fin de evaluar las condiciones para inversión en el sector hidrocarburífero de Bolivia, realizaron un estudio comparativo de los países que compiten con Bolivia en atraer inversionistas, preferentemente países de Sudamérica.
La opinión de los consultores se basó en el análisis comparativo e incluyó tópicos tales como:
a) Impuestos: donde se contemplan el destino de los mismos; si los royalties deberían ser aplicados por áreas de producción, análisis sobre los ingresos impositivos, impuestos ejecutivos, impuestos en cascada, compensaciones impositivas relacionadas con los precios de los productos finales para consumo interno, royalties por exploración, explotación o reservas y consumo específico.
b) Institucional: Relacionado con la normativa legal sobre las relaciones entre el país y los inversionistas, las áreas otorgadas en concesión para exploración, explotación y áreas con reservas. Tipos de contratos para concesiones, si deben ser gratuitos u onerosos, joint ventures y legislación laboral.
c) Estabilidad Jurídica: La apreciación de los inversionistas sobre la efectiva aplicación de la ley y cómo los cambios políticos y sociales pueden afectarla. También debe incluir un análisis de las leyes sobre relaciones laborales, la estabilidad de las leyes impositivas, contratos con posibles inversionistas e independencia de los reguladores de precios y de la autoridad estatal y política.
Fue recomendable que los consultores no solamente comparen los marcos propuestos para Bolivia, sino también que trabajen en una serie de recomendaciones específicas para favorecer el desarrollo del sector hidrocarburífero en Bolivia a mediando y largo plazo, a fin de maximizar el cobro de impuestos por el estado.
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El análisis comparativo se basó en la documentación que la República de Bolivia, a través del Ministerio de Minería e Hidrocarburos y el Ministerio de Desarrollo Económico, envió a los consultores por una persona previamente autorizada. La información sobre otros países se obtuvo por los consultores a través de otras fuentes como entrevistas, formales o informales, con los operadores privados en Bolivia u otros inversionistas.
A fin de obtener una contribución real para la toma de decisiones en relación al cobro de impuestos, el análisis incluyó los efectos que los cambios en las leyes impositivas ocasionaron en la estabilidad fiscal en Bolivia.
Los consultores asistieron a reuniones en La Paz, Bolivia, durante la segunda semana del mes de Diciembre de 2004, donde informaron sobre los resultados obtenidos del análisis y el trabajo preparado. A esta reunión también asistieron los miembros del Gobierno, YPFB, Poder Legislativo, sociedad civil y ejecutivos del Banco Mundial.
Los consultores emitieron un documento final sobre las conclusiones de su trabajo con recomendaciones o propuestas para estudios adicionales, relacionados a la toma de decisiones sobre los inversionistas según términos de referencia.
4.1 CUMPLIMIENTO DEL OBJETIVO GENERAL
Se han desarrollado metodologías e instrumentos de evaluación, monitoreo y seguimiento de impactos a través de procedimientos participativos de control y seguimiento socio ambiental, con la finalidad de coadyuvar en la aplicabilidad de la normativa ambiental vigente. Se ha logrado mejorar los estándares ambientales y socio ambientales y generar espacios de consulta y participación de los diferentes actores; incrementando de esta forma seguridad y calidad de las inversiones.
Específicamente, durante el desarrollo del proyecto: (a) se ha logrado fortalecer la capacidad de las instituciones y comunidades involucradas o afectadas por las actividades del sector hidrocarburos para que participen en la regulación y mitigación del impacto ambiental y social; (b) se ha logrado mejorar el acceso de los actores a información relevante de manera oportuna (c) se ha logrado mejorar la capacidad del VMH para la evaluación, elaboración de informes y el monitoreo en sitio; (d) a través de estudios de campo en áreas problemáticas, se ha logrado incrementar el conocimiento sobre el alcance de problemas en el desarrollo y la implementación de evaluaciones petroleras de mejores practicas; (e) no se ha logrado analizar y desarrollar mecanismos para la sostenibilidad financiera del manejo ambiental y social; (f) se ha logrado revisar las regulaciones existentes, pero no se ha logrado compatibilizar, ni se han desarrollado regulaciones nuevas; (g) se ha logrado desarrollar y llevar adelante un marco institucional, participativo, pero el mismo ha significado un obstáculo al desarrollo del proyecto.
CUMPLIMIENTO POR COMPONENTES
Componente Institucional
Resultados
Para el desarrollo de sus funciones, la DMA-OSCA cuenta con los siguientes instrumentos de planificación y operativos:
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Plan Estratégico de Seguimiento y Control Ambiental.Plan Anual de Actividades.Cronogramas trimestrales de actividades.Manual de Operaciones, que incluye:
Ø Procedimientos de pre-inspección; inspección y post-inspección.Ø Formatos para actas de inspección.Ø Formatos para informes de inspección.Ø Protocolos de muestreo y medición.Ø Medidas estándar por actividad, considerando la etapa de ejecución del proyecto, las cuales son aplicadas como un parámetro uniforme de control a todas las actividades, obras o proyectos (AOPs) inspeccionados.
Conclusiones del Componente 1
En este Componente se ha cumplido satisfactoriamente con los indicadores de desempeño e impacto desarrollados bajo la supervisión del Banco Mundial para el sistema de seguimiento y control ambiental de la DMA para las gestiones 2001, 2002, 2003 y 2004.
Cabe señalar que el enfoque de contar con una oficina que se dedique exclusivamente al seguimiento y control ambiental, ha hecho con que la retroalimentación emergente de estas actividades hacia la prevención, haya sido muy limitada.
No se han podido lograr los recursos para mantener dicha oficina con las dimensiones que tuvo durante la ejecución del proyecto.
Sin embargo, la presencia en campo lograda por la OSCA ha marcado un hito muy significativo en lo que hace a la Gestión Ambiental, tanto a nivel del sector hidrocarburos, como en el resto de los sectores. Por una parte, se ha logrado concienciar a las empresas que ahora saben que sus acciones son verificadas in-situ. Por otra parte, se ha logrado establecer cierto marco de confianza en las instancias estatales para la población, la cual se siente escuchada y atendida en caso de denuncias.
Componente de Flexiblidad
Para lograr el componente de flexibilidad el Proyecto LIL, se planteo como meta conformar y consolidar instancias organizativas que contribuyan desde sus ámbitos de competencias, de sus experiencias y conocimientos a la realización de los estudios estratégicos. Dentro del marco del Proyecto LIL, se conformo dos instancias organizativas:
• Consejo Técnico Interinstitucional (CCTI).Dicho Consejo, se caracterizó por ser una instancia de carácter nacional, de consulta y participación, con capacidad de de decisión en los componentes de de capacitación y estudios estratégicos del Proyecto.
• El Consejo Regional de Participación y Consulta (CRPCS). Es un espacio de carácter regional que posibilita a los representantes de la sociedad civil organizada, instituciones públicas a nivel regional y empresas petroleras proponer, analizar y consultar en las actividades del Proyecto LIL.
Estudios Estratégicos
• Diseño y elaboración de metodologías e instrumentos de evaluación y control del impacto socio
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ambiental generado por las actividades del Sector Hidrocarburos.
Resultados
o El Viceministerio cuenta con:Un diagnóstico de los impactos socio ambientales generados por las actividades del sector.Dos guías: Guía de elaboración para la elaboración de los estudios de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental en el marco de la Gestión Socio Ambiental Sectorial y Guía para la Participación y Consulta.
o Está aun pendiente el desarrollo de:Instrumentos, metodologías y procedimientos para la elaboración de los estudios de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental en el marco de la Gestión Socio Ambiental Sectorial.
• Elaboración de Guías de Buenas Prácticas socio ambientales y de un plan de acción para contingencias para el Sector Hidrocarburos.
Resultados:o El Viceministerio cuenta con:§ 10 guías de Buenas Prácticas en temas relativos Transporte, Exploración y Perforación Exploratoria, Explotación, Construcción de Caminos y Habilitación de de Áreas, Instalación y Manejo de Campamentos, Monitoreo Ambiental, Transporte e Instalación de Equipo y Presencia de Personal, Restauración, Exploración: Prospección Sísmica y Refinación.§ Un diagnóstico y análisis de la capacidad de respuesta de la industria y de las instituciones públicas para la atención de contingencias.§ Un Plan de contingencias
• Estrategia de Comunicación.
Resultados:o Dicha consultoría no pudo ser concluida, puesto que los productos presentados por la empresa contratada, no cumplió con los requerimientos técnicos establecidos en los TDRs y en la propuesta técnica presentada por la empresa TIRONI Y ASOCIADOS.
• Estudios de Caso Regionales:
Como parte de la participación de los CRPCs y dentro del marco del Proyecto de aprendizaje e innovación. Estas instancias regionales, propusieron realizar algunos estudios de caso regionales con problemáticas relacionadas a la Gestión Ambiental Sectorial.
Estos estudios de caso a ser desarrollados servirían en una primera instancia a los estudios estratégicos del Proyecto y posteriormente serían trabajados como lecciones aprendidas o guías de buenas prácticas.
Los Objetivos y los Estudios de Caso por CRPC, son los siguientes:• CRPC Parapitigüasu
Resultados:Para el desarrollo de este estudio, se realizó la convocatoria para la expresión de
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interés, se seleccionó con los representantes del CRPC mencionado a los consultores que enviaron sus expresiones. Posteriormente y por problemas externos al proyecto no se pudo realizar a la apertura de los sobres.
• CRPC Amazonía Beni – La Paz
Resultados: Para el desarrollo de este estudio, se realizó la convocatoria para la expresión de interés, se seleccionó con los representantes del CRPC mencionado a los consultores que enviaron sus expresiones. Posteriormente y por problemas externos al proyecto no se pudo realizar a la apertura de los sobres.
• CRPC Bloque Amboró – ChiquitanoResultados:Para el desarrollo de este estudio, se realizó la convocatoria para la expresión de interés, se seleccionó con los representantes del CRPC mencionado a los consultores que enviaron sus expresiones. Posteriormente y por problemas externos al proyecto no se pudo realizar a la apertura de los sobres.
• CRPC Cabeceras del Amazonas
Resultados: Para el desarrollo de este estudio, se realizó la convocatoria para la expresión de interés, se seleccionó con los representantes del CRPC mencionado a los consultores que enviaron sus expresiones. Posteriormente y por problemas externos al proyecto no se pudo realizar a la apertura de los sobres.
Componente de Capacitación
Resultados:Se cuenta con las necesidades de capacitación por grados de complejidad, tipos de población y por temas relativos a la gestión ambiental sectorial de los diferentes actores metas del Proyecto LIL.• No pudo continuarse con el desarrollo de este componente inicialmente debido a la falta de inscripción del presupuesto y posteriormente debido a la falta de tiempo una vez que el mismo fue inscrito.
5. FACTORES QUE AFECTARON LA IMPLEMENTACIÓN Y RESULTADOS
5.1 FACTORES FUERA DE CONTROL DE LA UNIDAD DE IMPLEMENTACIÓN
El Proyecto LIL ha permitido consolidar la creación de una oficina de control y seguimiento ambiental OSCA en la ciudad de Santa Cruz, con facultades y atribuciones que la Ley de Medio Ambiente les otorga, también se realizaron los estudios estratégicos que permitieron revisar la normativa existente y hacerla mas participativa. Sin embargo, los acontecimientos acaecidos en el país en la gestión 2003 como el cambio de gobierno y por ende los constantes cambios de autoridades en el sector durante la ultima gestión, situación que retrasaba el avance del proyecto, por cuanto, cada uno de las autoridades debía interiorizarse de los objetivos que perseguía el proyecto para darle continuidad; concluyendo que dichas autoridades tenían otras prioridades emergentes en el sector como por ejemplo la Ley de Hidrocarburos y otros temas conexos que afligían al gobierno en su conjunto.
De la misma forma, es importante señalar que el “modus operandi” del CCTI con respecto a la internalización del proyecto en sus respectivas instituciones no logró el suficiente acercamiento con sus autoridades ni la difusión requerida para compartir criterios de opinión y avance en los diferentes estamentos de sus estructuras gubernamentales; situación que repercutió en el relacionamiento y
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cumplimiento de objetivos con respecto a los CRPCs como ser la participación social a través de las sociedad civil y entidades públicas y privadas.
Estos hechos, desencadenarón un retraso extremo en el normal desenvolvimiento de cumplimiento de objetivos originales al cierre del crédito, logrando parcialmente el cumplimiento de objetivos que alcanzan aproximadamente a un 52% de lo previsto.
5.2 FACTORES GENERALMENTE BAJO EL CONTROL DE GOBIERNO
Uno de los factores influyentes para que los resultados trazados a lo largo de la implementación del gobierno se haya visto perjudicado fue el retraso en la inscripción del presupuesto tanto de recursos externos como de contrapartida por falta de voluntad política durante la ultima etapa del proyecto, así como también a lo largo de su desarrollo, debido a la falta de recursos de contrapartida que fueron comprometidos por el prestatario, siendo una de las dificultades mas importantes en el desarrollo normal del proyecto para resolver oportunamente acciones emergentes. Esta falta de recursos para gastos operativos fue teniendo una incidencia muy seria en el funcionamiento de la Dirección de Medio Ambiente, y de la Unidad de Coordinación y Seguimiento del Proyecto, y en la ejecución de actividades de monitoreo por parte de la OSCA.
En términos monetarios podemos señalar que hasta diciembre del año 2004 el prestatario, desembolso alrededor de $us. 280.000.- equivalente solo al 28% del monto comprometido.
La gestión 2004 se caracterizó por ser un período conflictivo, por cuanto, las actividades programadas del proyecto según el plan de implementación se vieron retrasadas por la aplicación del Decreto de Austeridad, repercutiendo en un considerable retraso en el pago a consultores, servicios y estudios contratados en razón de que el Proyecto no fue registrado en el Presupuesto Nacional. Esto hizo imposible cumplir con las metas del plan de implementación acordado junto con la extensión de la fecha de cierre a septiembre 2004. En estas condiciones y tomando en consideración las dificultades políticas por las que atravesó el país en el pasado inmediato. El gobierno decidió terminar el Proyecto a la fecha de cierre establecida, consciente de que los objetivos planteados solo se cumplieron en un 52% según los indicadores.
Durante el mes de Agosto del año 2004; se procedió con la inscripción del presupuesto pero únicamente los recursos externos, vale decir, un monto equivalente a 976.748 US$ y se efectivizó por parte del Ministerio de Minería e Hidrocarburos el reintegro de los gastos inelegibles, pendientes desde la gestión 2002. Añadiendo además una nuevo componente dentro del proyecto, la asistencia técnica para la nueva ley sectorial por US$75.000, monto que se financió con recursos externos sin que esto cambie el monto total original del convenio de crédito.
Por lo expuesto anteriormente, podemos señalar que la voluntad política del Prestatario no fue suficiente para coadyuvar con el desarrollo del proyecto, pero básicamente las deficiencias y problemas señalados se debieron a factores sociales, económicos y políticos, como también externos, por los que atravezó el país los cuales afectaron todo el sistema fiscal y económico.
5.3 FACTORES BAJO EL CONTROL DE LA UNIDAD DE IMPLEMENTACIÓN
Durante la ultima etapa del proyecto, se tuvo que mantener una estructura administrativa disminuida por la renuncia del Director de la UCSP, sin que se haya logrado tener un reemplazo inmediato ni mucho menos una designación formal en forma interina, es decir, la dubitación por parte del Ejecutivo hizo que no se completara la acefalía presentada teniendo en determinados momentos hasta dos responsables a cargo del
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proyecto nominados verbalmente; situación que provocó desfaces en la toma de decisiones, ya que a partir de este suceso se creó una pesada burocracia dentro del mismo proyecto y el ente ejecutor que retrasaron las soluciones a los problemas planteados, ocasionando, en la OSCA la renuncia de consultores entre los cuales se encontraba el Coordinador.
5.4 COSTO Y FINANCIAMIENTO
El 20 de junio de 2001, se suscribió el Convenio Subsidiario entre la República de Bolivia representada por el Ministerio de Hacienda y el Ministerio de Desarrollo Económico (actualmente, Ministerio de Minería e Hidrocarburos), mediante el cual, la República de Bolivia transfirió al Viceministerio de Energía e Hidrocarburos, actual Ministerio de Minería e Hidrocarburos la totalidad de los recursos provenientes del Contrato de Crédito de Fomento AIF N° 3378-BO. Las condiciones financieras establecen, que el crédito debe ser pagado por la República de Bolivia en cuotas semestrales pagaderas el 15 de junio y 15 de diciembre, empezando el 15 de junio 2010 con vencimiento final el 15 de diciembre de 2039. Cada cuota, incluyendo la cuota pagadera el 15 de diciembre de 2019 será del uno por ciento (1%) del monto principal y cada pago posterior será del dos por ciento (2%) de dicho monto principal.
Mediante la firma del Contrato Subsidiario, se transfirieron los recursos por DEG´s 3.700.000 (equivalentes a US$.4.800.000), destinados a financiar parcialmente el Proyecto en las siguientes categorías de inversión:
EquivalenteCategorías de inversión DEG´s a US$ % de financiamiento
Bienes 180.000 230.000 100% de gastos en elextranjero y 85% de gastoslocales.
Servicios de consultoría 1.880.000 2.480.000 100%Capacitación y Coordinación 880.000 1.160.000 100%Reembolso del anticipo para lapreparación del Proyecto
350.000 450.000 -
No asignado 410.000 480.000 -
Totales 3.700.000 4.800.000
El LIL es un proyecto piloto y la recuperación plena del costo no es un objetivo del proyecto. Sin embargo, la Sostenibilidad fiscal fue una consideración importante en el diseño de este proyecto. A pesar de que el VHE se comprometió a mejorar el marco institucional para la gestión ambiental y social del sector hidrocarburos, en la actualidad, en general el nivel actual de gastos públicos para el medio ambiente es bajo.
La Unidad de Coordinación y Seguimiento del Proyecto LIL realizó la ejecución presupuestaria tanto de los recursos con fuente AIF como de los recursos de contraparte que recibía como transferencia de la Entidad Ejecutoria para cubrir los gastos recurrentes durante la vigencia del Proyecto.
Los pagos se hicieron efectivos a través de firmas autorizadas y cruzadas entre el Director y el Gerente
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Administrativo de la UCSP y alternativamente la firma de un funcionario del VMEH en caso de ausencia de una de las anteriores firmas. Dichos pagos se realizan previa verificación de que los mismos correspondían a un concepto enmarcado dentro el Proyecto.
La ejecución de fondos por categorías durante la vigencia del proyecto hasta Diciembre del 2004, tiene la siguiente composición en dólares americanos que alcanza a un 64% del monto asignado.
CATEGORIAS ASIGNADO EJECUTADOBienes 230.000 230.000Servicios de Consultoría 2.480.000 2.167.479Capacitación y Coordinación 1.160.000 311.680PPF 450.000 364.805No Asignado 480.000
T O T A L 4.800.000 3.073.964
La ejecución precedida, contempla en la categoría 2 actividades de consultoría requeridas de último momento como ser la contratación de expertos para la revisión de la nueva Ley de Hidrocarburos. Los recursos de contraparte comprometidos por la Entidad Ejecutora, se hicieron efectivos parcialmente por las dificultades señaladas en párrafos anteriores donde se alcanza a un 28% del comprometido. 6. SOSTENIBILIDAD 6.1 RACIONALIDAD PARA LA CALIFICACIÓN
En cuento al componente de fortalecimiento institucional, las coyunturas política y ambiental del país están siendo enfocadas hacia la descentralización, lo que limita significativamente los recursos para fortalecer instancias centralizadas del gobierno tal como es la OSCA. En este sentido es muy difícil lograr dar continuidad al enfoque con que se planteó dicha oficina, sin embargo, se están haciendo esfuerzos significativos para poder mantener la presencia en campo lograda, para lo cual se contará con dos inspectores durante la gestión 2005.
En cuanto al componente de flexibilidad, se han logrado establecer ciertos canales de comunicación con otros representantes del gobierno central, de gobiernos locales y regionales, así como de la sociedad civil, canales que se está tratando de mantener y fortalecer.
Los Estudios Estratégicos que se han llevado a cabo están siendo revisados para que en base a los mismos, se logren fortalecer las normas ambientales sectoriales vigentes, se considera factible que durante la gestión 2005, tanto las Guías de Buenas Prácticas como las Metodologías e Instrumentos, podrán ser validadas mediante Decretos Supremos.
En cuanto al componente de Capacitación, si bien no pudo ejecutarse a través del proyecto, las lecciones aprendidas por cada institución, pueden constituirse en una buena base para ejecutar componentes de Capacitación individualmente. Es el caso del VRNMA, que en su Plan Plurianual está contemplando ejecutar una capacitación a diferentes niveles estatales y de la sociedad civil.EVALUACIÓN GENERAL DE LA PERFORMANCEPRESTATARIO
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6.2 PREPARACIÓN
La reforma de 1997 y la capitalización del sector de hidrocarburos en Bolivia, junto con la demanda enorme del gas natural de mercado Brasileño intensificaron las inversiones del sector privado en exploración/producción y la construcción de gasoductos. En promedio, las empresas petroleras privadas estaban invirtiendo en esa época mas de US$ 800 millones por año. Eso representaba mas de diez veces de lo que YPFB invirtió antes de ser capitalizada. En ese momento, había diecisiete empresas petroleras activas en el ámbito de exploración y producción con un programa de perforaciones que alcanza aproximadamente a diecinueve pozos de exploración por año. La sección boliviana de 600 Km del gasoducto para gas natural entre Bolivia –Brasil fue inaugurada el 19 de febrero de 1999 y las exploraciones de gas a Brasil empezaron el 1 de julio de 1999 . Las empresas privadas Shell y Enron están construyendo un ramal del gasoducto Bolivia – Brasil hasta Cuiaba en Brasil. En la actualidad, hay actividades del sector de hidrocarburos en cinco prefecturas, nueve áreas comunales de pueblos indígenas y nueve áreas protegidas. El impacto ambiental y social resultante era considerable.
Las experiencias recientes en el sector demostraron que existe una fuerte necesidad de un manejo socio ambiental mejorado de las actividades referentes a la exploración, producto y transporte de hidrocarburos. Con recursos humanos, técnicos y financieros limitados, las entidades del gobierno han respondido lenta o inadecuadamente en muchos casos. La calidad de las inversiones en el sector privado, que son de vital importancia para el crecimiento económico sostenible de Bolivia, solo se podían mantener a lo largo si se tomaban medidas para encarar los siguientes temas:• Falta de cumplimiento con los requerimientos reguladores sociales y ambientales y responsabilidad ambientales no mitigadas.• Falta de coordinación y acuerdos entre las agencias gubernamentales nacionales, regionales y locales sobre sus roles respectivos.• Falta de Sostenibilidad financiera del manejo ambiental y social del sector de hidrocarburos. • Falta de experiencia técnica, experiencia y validez de los consultores locales para apoyar actividades de regulación y mitigación.• Falta de un proceso confiable de consulta por las empresas petroleras y mecanismos claros para la compensación social.• Falta de procesos sistemáticos de participación e intercambio de información entre los actores.• Falta de una estrategia de gestión socio – ambiental para resolver problemas.
Además de los mencionados, un tema central a ser considerado es el relacionado a las lecciones aprendidas dentro el proyecto sobre las competencias institucionales de acuerdo con lo interpretado en base a las leyes existentes; es decir, disposiciones como la Ley Orgánica de Municipalidades que otorga competencia a los gobierno municipales para la preservación del medio ambiente, el control de contaminación, y el mantenimiento de un equilibrio ecológico, por otro lado, la Ley de Medio Ambiente Establece que el Ministerio de Energía e Hidrocarburos, en coordinación con el Viceministerio de Recursos Naturales y Medio Ambiente, elabore las normas especificas y pertinentes y conforme a Art 28 ambos siguen a cargo del control, el monitoreo y la regulación de impactos ambientales, planes de mitigación y protección. Como resultado, no hubo un mecanismo concreto sobre las competencias de diferentes niveles gubernamentales que permita una relación de trabajo entre todos los actores.
El proyecto aplicó un proceso de aprendizaje e innovación mediante estudios y análisis, el intercambio de información, coordinación Interinstitucional, y capacitación para facilitar la consulta y el desarrollo de mecanismos para la institucionalización de la capacidad de actores para prevenir, regular y mitigar impactos ambientales y sociales del sector hidrocarburos. Además, el Proyecto probó una estructura
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Interinstitucional que permitió la participación de los actores mas relevantes del gobierno y la sociedad civil a nivel nacional y local para garantizar la participación de actores representativos en actividades de implementación del proyecto. En vista de que fue la primera vez que este proceso se aplica en Bolivia, se necesitó mayor flexibilidad y ajustes en el transcurso del Proyecto.
6.3 DESEMPEÑO DE LA IMPLEMENTACIÓN POR PARTE DEL GOBIERNO
• A la fecha, el énfasis del proyecto se ha concentrado en desarrollar capacidades dentro de la Dirección de Medio Ambiente y del Consejo de Coordinación Técnico Interinstitucional en La Paz y de la OSCA en Santa Cruz. Así también, se ha desarrollado según el cronograma de implementación los estudios estratégicos y la participación de la sociedad civil en el proyecto por medio de los CRPC, entidades regionales que han quedado en la incertidumbre sobre el desarrollo del proyecto luego de haber conformado grupos representativos de sus lugares de origen.
• El concepto de participación y consulta publica fue el primero en Bolivia dentro de este proyecto, uno de los objetivos de la consulta y participación publica del proyecto fue promover la creación de relaciones y desarrollar confianza entre los participantes del proyecto. Pero si bien se ha tenido éxito a nivel del CCTI, no se ha logrado un éxito absoluto en el nivel de los CRPC. Esta confianza creada entre los participantes debería considerarse como beneficiosa para el proyecto y esencial para la comunicación y participación en el proceso.
6.4 LA AGENDA DE IMPLEMENTACIÓN
El proyecto incialmente durante la gestión 1999 tenía programado mas de cuarenta actividades divididas en cuatro componentes, según el siguiente detalle:
• Fortalecimiento institucional; Logística y Comunicación; Información Básica y Estudios; Administración, Coordinación y seguimiento
La responsabilidad para el desarrollo de los componentes del Proyecto Piloto de Aprendizaje e Innovación denominado “Fortalecimiento de la Capacidad de Gestión Socio Ambiental en el Sector Hidrocarburos”, recayó sobre el organismo cabeza de sector, el Viceministerio de Energía e Hidrocarburos (VMEH), que dependía en ese entonces del Ministerio de Desarrollo Económico (MDE). El VMEH coordinó las relaciones y los aportes con todas las partes involucradas en la temática socio - ambiental del sector hidrocarburos. La responsabilidad especifica del VMEH era desarrollar los componentes señalados y sub – componentes, como también, otros denominados componentes de flexibilidad a través de la consulta y participación conjuntamente con otras entidades de gobierno y la sociedad civil.
A la conclusión del mencionado proyecto, se puede decir, que solo se pudo finalizar con un 52% en términos del número de actividades desarrolladas, pero lo que son términos cualitativos podemos evaluar que de lo planificado se pudo finalizar con un porcentaje mayor, debido a los distintos factores que se señalan adelante; básicamente, el componente 1, refiérase a Asistencia técnica para regulación y mitigación de impactos ambientales y cuyo objetivo principal fue destinado a incrementar las capacidades e institucionalizar el proceso de consulta con las partes interesadas fue concluida en un 85%, debido a que se complementó de gran manera cronograma establecido a principios del proyecto.
Se creó el Consejo de Coordinación Técnico Interinstitucional, durante la gestión 2000, con el objetivo de Establecer un espacio de discusión, análisis e intercambio técnico sobre la capacitación, información, los
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procedimientos de consulta y participación, el alcance de los TOR y resultados de los estudios, para poder desarrollarlos en forma concertada en el marco del proyecto, para contribuir mediante la participación de la sociedad civil en propuestas de políticas y estrategias para el desarrollo de metodologías y procedimientos en el sector hidrocarburos relativos a la gestión socio - ambiental.
Una de la funciones del CCTI era viabilizar la participación efectiva de los sectores involucrados en el monitoreo en el marco de la normativa vigente, que permita acortar las distancias entre las políticas, leyes, normas y puesta en práctica de los estudios previstos en el proyecto con aportes técnicos en el diseño y aplicación de sistemas de monitoreo y evaluación de los impactos socio - ambientales generados por las actividades del sector hidrocarburos, estableciendo directrices y estrategias para el proceso de consulta y participación de los sectores involucrados en el marco del proyecto.
A principios de la gestión 2001, se conformó los Consejos de Consulta Técnico Regionales con el objetivo de: • Permitir la consulta y participación de los diferentes actores regionales en el marco del proyecto.• Aportar con insumos al CCTI.• Desarrollar mecanismos de retroalimentación de información.• Participar aportando técnicamente a los componentes de flexibilidad del proyecto: estudios, información, comunicación y capacitación.• Facilitar la comunicación y coordinación con organismos de base en el marco de los componentes flexibles del proyecto.
De la misma forma y sobre la base del componente 1, se hizo efectiva las contrataciones de consultores para la red de monitoreo según lo programado, desarrollandoa a su vez capacitación y talleres respectivos con los consultores del Proyecto y la participación de las entidades involucradas, como el CIDOB (Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia) y la Cámara Boliviana de Hidrocarburos y el resto de las entidades participantes del CCTI, complementado esta etapa según lo planificado en el cronograma de implementación (PIP).
Respecto al Componente 2, Logística y Comunicación, el Proyecto alcanzó todos sus objetivos, vale decir en un 100%, en la adquisición de bienes tanto de equipos de computación, vehículos, materiales de laboratorio y en las actividades de comunicación y difusión como fueron el dote de cartillas de información distribuidas por el CCTI.
El componente 3 producto del análisis y observaciones por parte de los miembros del CCTI, se vió en la necesidad de fusionar los estudios inicialmente planificados en cinco grandes estudios estratégicos y dos complementarios cuyas denominaciones se señalan a continuación :
• Diseño y elaboración de Metodologias e instrumentos para la evaluación y control del impacto socio ambiental generado • Compatibilización y Complementación de la Normativa Ambiental y Normas conexas relacionadas con la gestión Ambiental del SH• Elaboración de guías de buenas practicas ambientales y de un plan de Acción para contingencias para el SH.• Estrategias de Comunicación• Sostenibilidad institucional y financiera• Diseño e implementación del Programa de Capacitación • Análisis de la Normativa Ambiental
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De los estudios señalados, no se pudieron concluir en su totalidad debido a factores diversos, sin embargo, las consultorías finalizadas a satisfacción del prestatario fueron:
• Diseño y elaboración de Metodologias e instrumentos para la evaluación y control del impacto socio ambiental generado realizado por la Firma ABT Associates y concluido en a finales de la gestión 2004 a satisfacción del prestatario. • Análisis de la Normativa ambiental realizado por la firma IFC/PCA, concluido a finales de la gestión 2004 a satisfacción del prestatario.• Elaboración de guías de buenas practicas ambientales y de un plan de Acción para contingencias para el SH, estudio realizado por la firma ABT Associates, concluido a finales de la gestión 2004 a satisfacción del prestatario
Respecto al Componente 4, Administración, Coordinación y seguimiento del proyecto, podemos decir que se concluyó acorde a las contingencias de los planificado, para lo cuál podemos señalar el cumplimiento de las actividades internas como también la contrataciones de las Auditorias Financieras, Adquisiciones y Contrataciones y Evaluaciones Externas, sin salvedades, siendo el seguimiento del proyecto por parte de la UCSP favorable.
Por lo antecedido, se destaca que el desarrollo del proyecto en términos cualitativos fue favorable en la medida de las posibilidades en las que se desarrolló, siendo que este atravesó durante su ultima etapa mucho percances debido a las dificultades socio políticas y económicas del país.
6.4.1 EVALUACIÓN GENERAL DEL DESEMPEÑO DEL PRESTATARIO
De acuerdo a lo descrito anteriormente, podemos concluir que el prestatario intentó colaborar mucho al desarrollo del proyecto, pero lamentablemente, debido a la inexperiencia del gobierno central para coordinar con diferentes estamentos de la sociedad donde adicionalmente sobrevinieron muchos problemas de índole social que ocasionaron posteriormente constantes cambios de Ministros del sector y otros factores señalados anteriormente, que repercutieron en el desarrollo del proyecto no pudiendo concluir con los objetivos trazados.
7. LECCIONES APRENDIDAS
Durante la ultima reunión sostenida con los miembros del Consejo de Coordinación Técnico Interinstitucional CCTI, creado en el marco del Proyecto LIL a objeto de contribuir mediante la participación de la sociedad civil en propuestas de políticas y estrategias para el desarrollo de Metodologias y procedimientos en el sector hidrocarburos relativos a las gestiones socio - ambiental y coadyuvar con aportes técnicos en el diseño y aplicación de sistemas de monitoreo y evaluación de los impactos socio-ambientales generados por las actividades del sector hidrocarburos para viavilizar la participación efectiva de los sectores involucrados en el monitoreo en el marco de la normativa vigente se recopiló la siguiente opinión en el marco de las lecciones aprendidas del Proyecto :
Del Diseño del Proyecto: Entidades del gobierno central, realzaron que el proyecto lil no funciona con instituciones públicas sino mas bien con redes sociales inclusive con la participación del sector privado, debido a los constantes cambios de autoridades político-sociales cambian constantemente criterios al interior de cada institución.
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Una de las fallas para el incumplimiento total de los objetivos del proyecto, es tal vez el diseño, ya que los mecanismos de participación no son suficientes, muchas veces se llegaron a la improvisación, tal vez el tipo de proyecto era muy complejo para el tratamiento local, habría sido mejor empezar en el programa de capacitación, y no en la normativa, así obtener una participación mas democrática, no se puede cambiar esta figura pero para futuros proyectos se puede abrir los programas de capacitación, para lograr una participación mas efectiva.
De la ejecución del proyecto: Se logró a nivel institucional que se reconozca al proyecto y se dé la importancia que merece, hoy en día podemos observar resultados de participación y consulta a objeto de mejorar el seguimiento y control ambiental del sector hidrocarburífero. Sin embargo existen deficiencias que el sector las advierte porque las necesidades persisten todavía. Hoy en día queda un camino por recorrer y el MMH tiene un reto al margen de cualquier crédito, consolidar al CCTI para así conformar el marco del el fortalecimiento del sector.
De la participación del ente ejecutor: Este Proyecto nace como una gestión socio ambiental, en la construcción del gasoducto al Brazil. Queda mucho por hacer a los problemas que surgen de aquí en adelante, cada uno de estos deben ser tratados por las entidades del CCTI tratando de llegar a ciertos acercamientos, la posibilidad de establecer procesos ordenados. El sector petrolero es considerado no solo como negocio si no como tema social. El potencial que tenemos en base a los avances logrados con este proyecto y otras experiencias es altamente relevante.
Ha sido interesante el desafío que se podía hacer como país, en aprendizaje de tolerancia entre instituciones, este desafío debe continuar con el propósito de crear un nuevo CCTI para el fortalecimiento del sector.
Después de la implementación del proyecto se ha cumplido de manera positiva en realzar aportes políticos y técnicos en el desarrollo del componente de los Estudios Estratégicos y los estudios de Caso, hasta el avance registrado.
El proyecto LIL no ha podido cumplir, al no generar capacidades de entrenamiento y capacitación en la gestión socio ambiental sectorial, colocando a la CIDOB en una situación de seria desventaja respecto a las actividades que se desarrollan las empresas petroleras al interior de las Tierras Comunitarias de Origen.
El Proyecto LIL no se ha consolidado, al no generar directrices y recursos de Sostenibilidad que asegure la participación directa de las entidades en la gestión socio ambiental del sector hidrocarburos, coartando en los hechos, su derecho de participar en mejores condiciones institucionales para hacer frente a los atropellos que generan las actividades petroleras en sus territorios.
El Ministerio de Hidrocarburos debe encontrar mecanismos alternativos para garantizar a los pueblos indígenas su participación directa en la gestión socio ambiental del sector hidrocarburos a fin de evitar una radicalización de las medidas de presión de las organizaciones indígenas, en el control de ingreso de las empresas petroleras en los territorios autónomos de los pueblos indígenas.
