THEORIES OF TIME AND THE ASYMMETRY INHUMAN ATTITUDES
Gal Yehezkel
AbstractAn important aspect of the debate between the A-theory and theB-theory of time relates to the supposed implications of each forsome of the most basic human attitudes and stances. The asymme-try in our attitudes towards past and future events in our life(pleasant and unpleasant), and towards the temporal limits of ourexistence, that is, toward birth and death, is supposedly considereddifferently by the two theories. I argue that our attitudes areneither justified nor discredited by anything which is in debatebetween the A-Theory and the B-theory, and therefore that neithertheory of time is supported by the asymmetry in our attitudes.
1
For about a hundred years, there has been a debate as to which oftwo rival theories of time, the A-theory and the B-theory, is true.Proponents of the A-theory of time (‘the tensed view’) claim thatpast, present and future are real properties, and that the changein these properties is what we refer to as the ‘flow of time’, whichis an objective feature of reality. Proponents of the B-theory oftime (‘the tenseless view’), on the other hand, claim that theseproperties are merely subjective, and so for them the ‘flow oftime’ is an illusion or rather a matter of perspective.
An important aspect of this debate is the theories’ respectivealleged implications for some of the most basic human attitudesand stances. These include our attitude towards pleasant andunpleasant events, such as pleasures and pains, and our attitudestowards the temporal limits of our existence, that is, birth anddeath. Normally, our attitude towards an event, whether pleasantor unpleasant, depends on whether this event is in the past or thefuture. Future unpleasant events make us anxious, while pastunpleasant events make us feel relieved. An asymmetry is dis-played in our different attitudes taken towards the temporal limits
of our existence. While we commonly celebrate birthdays, we tendto mourn on anniversaries of deaths.
Some philosophers argue that these asymmetries in our atti-tudes are justified by the A-theory, which reflects the commonsense way of thinking about time, and so they discredit theB-theory. For example, it is argued that the B-theory cannotaccount for the fact that we generally fear future pains but aregrateful for their passing, as well as the fact that death is conceivedas something tragic while birth is viewed as a happy occasion.1
Some B-theorists reject this claim, and argue that, contrary toappearances, the B-theory coheres with natural human attitudes.2
On the other hand, there are B-theorists who gladly embrace thealleged revolutionary implications of the B-theory, for example asa means to overcome the fear of death.3 These latter theoristsargue that the B-theory of time implies that the asymmetry in ourattitudes towards events in the past and in the future is irrational.However, all the parties involved in this debate share the beliefthat the A-theory and the B-theory of time have normative impli-cations for some of the most basic human attitudes and stances.4
In this paper, I argue that this belief is false.My claim is not that our attitudes are totally independent of our
conception of time. What I do argue is that contrary to what primafacie seems to be the case, our attitudes are neither justified nordiscredited by anything which is in debate between the A-Theoryand the B-theory of time. In section 2, I discuss the asymmetry inour attitudes towards pleasant and unpleasant events. In section 3,I discuss the asymmetry in our attitudes towards the temporallimits of our life, that is, birth and death. In both sections, I arguethat the asymmetry in our attitudes is not justified by the A-theoryof time, and that neither theory of time implies anything regard-ing what our attitudes should be.
1 See, for example, Arthur Prior, ‘Thank Goodness That’s Over,’ Philosophy 34 (1959),pp. 12–17.
2 See, for example, Murray MacBeath, ‘Mellor’s Emeritus Headache,’ Ratio 25 (1983),pp. 81–88; Hugh Mellor, Real Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
3 Robin Le Poidevin, Arguing for Atheism (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 145–6.4 It is also widely believed that the A-theory explains and justifies the asymmetry in our
attitudes. An exception, who is skeptical as to whether the A-theory can provide a rationalefor the asymmetry in our attitudes. See Brian Garrett, ‘ “Thank Goodness That’s Over”Revisited,’ The Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1988), pp. 201–205, at pp. 204–5. Unfortunately,Garrett did not attempt to substantiate this claim.
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Our attitude towards an event, be it pleasant or unpleasant,depends, inter alia, on whether this event is in the past or thefuture. For example, we normally fear what we believe will be afuture painful event, and so we feel relieved when it is over.Obviously, there are exceptions to this rule. There are instances inwhich we are equally bothered by past unpleasant events, whichcome back to haunt us.5 However, normally there is a clear asym-metry in our attitudes towards past and future events.
To begin with, we might ask whether this asymmetry reflects adisanalogy between our conception of the past and our concep-tion of the future, or whether it is merely an attribute of theterms we use to describe our attitudes. For example, it is some-times argued that ‘we do, in general, care more about the futurethan about the past.’6 However, such an attitude need not reflectany metaphysical difference in our conception of the past andthe future, but merely the fact that the notion of care is futureoriented. Similarly, there are terms which are oriented towardsthe past. For example, people can reminisce about past event,but never about future events, even if they are foreseen.However, in this case it seems that the asymmetry is explained bythe fact that the notion of reminiscing is past oriented and isindependent of any disanalogy in our conceptions of the pastand the future. For ‘reminisce’ is defined as an enjoyable recol-lection of past events. Similarly, it is possible to invent a term,say ‘preminisce,’ to describe an enjoyable foreseeing of futureevents. Surely the fact that one cannot ‘preminisce’ about pastevents does not indicate any asymmetry in our conceptions ofthe past and the future. Thus, it may be that the asymmetry tobe found in our attitudes merely reflects a disanalogy in theterms we use to describe them.
Obviously, there are terms which can be used to refer to bothpast and future events, and therefore are neither specifically past-nor future-oriented. However, due to the fact that these terms canbe used to refer to both past and future events, it is not clear that
5 Derek Parfit claims that our attitude towards past pains is one of complete indiffer-ence. See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 173.However, as Chris Belshaw rightly points out, as a general claim this is clearly false. SeeChris Belshaw, ‘Death, Pain and Time,’ Philosophical Studies 97 (2000), pp. 317–341, atp. 318.
there is an asymmetry in our attitudes. Anxiety, for example, canbe caused both by the thought of future events and by the memoryof past events. It might be argued that although anxiety can becaused by past events, the asymmetry still holds, for in many casesour anxiety is replaced by relief when the event which caused it isover. However, the reason for this relief is not necessarily impliedby the fact that the event is in the past, rather than in the future.The reasons for feeling relieved over past events are varied. Forexample, sometimes we fear the worst, and feel relieved when werealize that things were not as bad as we thought they would be.Sometimes we are happy that an unpleasant event is past, becausethe situation when it took place was more favourable than a laterone would have been, and so we think it would have been worse ifthe unpleasant event had occurred later. Furthermore, we mayfeel relieved that an unpleasant event is in the future if we believethat it will be easier for us to face this event in the future.
The previous considerations demonstrate the difficulty of sub-stantiating the claim for the asymmetry in our attitudes. Luckily,there are clear terms which are not oriented towards only the pastor only the future, and which clearly demonstrate an asymmetry inour attitudes. For example, our preference to be in a certainposition in time, relative to a certain event, reflects such an asym-metry. Here I am thinking of situations in which we prefer to beafter an unpleasant event rather than before it. ‘I wish it was over,’we say, before a visit to the dentist.
Our attitude towards pleasurable events is similarly asymmetric.We look forward to future pleasant events and wax nostalgic aboutpast pleasant events. Both feelings have something positive aboutthem. However, there is a sad feeling involved with nostalgia,which exactly reflects the negativity of the fact that a pleasantevent is in the past. This asymmetry is reflected by our preferenceto be before a pleasant event, rather than after this event.
The asymmetry in our attitudes towards pleasant events is amirror image of the asymmetry in our attitudes towards unpleas-ant events. While we typically prefer to be after an unpleasantevent, rather than before it, we typically prefer to be before apleasant event, rather than after it. This suggests that both casesdisplay a single asymmetry in our attitudes towards the past andthe future. For simplicity, I focus in what follows on our attitudetowards unpleasant events, and assume that the conclusionsI reach will apply equally to our attitudes towards pleasantevents.
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Having substantiated the claim for the existence of an asym-metry, I shall now turn to the connection between this asymme-try and the different theories of time. If it is indeed the casethat the A-theory is justified, while the B-theory underminesthe asymmetry in our attitudes, there must be a feature of theA-theory of time which justifies the asymmetry and which theB-theory rejects. The difference between the two theories is inhow they view the distinctions of past, present, and future. Whilethe A-theory claims that these distinctions denote objective fea-tures of reality, the B-theory argues that they are merely subjec-tive. If the asymmetry in our attitudes is justified by the A-theory,the justification for the asymmetry must therefore be found inthe implications of the A-theory’s distinction between past,present, and future.
How can the A-theory’s distinction between past, present andfuture justify the asymmetry of our attitudes? Several optionscome to mind:
1. An ontological asymmetry between past and future events2. The direction of the moving present3. The indeterminacy of future events
According to the first suggestion, there is an ontologicaldistinction between past, present, and future. The B-theory isforced to reject any ontological distinction between past, presentand future events due to its adherence to the subjectivity ofthese distinctions, and thus is forced to maintain that past,present, and future events are all real, or exist simpliciter (eternal-ism).7 A-theorists can endorse eternalism, because the distinctionsbetween past, present and future, even if considered objective,need not necessarily signify an ontological distinction (a ‘movingspotlight’ A-theory). Alternatively, they can maintain that thepresent is a unique moment in which future events, which are notreal (or ‘do not exist simpliciter’), become real (or exist simpliciter).A-theorists who adopt the latter option can still dispute the onto-logical status of the past. Some maintain that only present events
7 Theodore Sider, Four-Dimensionalism (Oxford: Clarendon, 2001), Chapter 2. Some-times the ontological distinction between past and future events is explained not in termsof ‘reality,’ but rather in the terms of ‘existence.’ This difference has no significance for thepresent discussion.
are real (presentism).8 Others argue that past and present eventsare equally real (the growing block theory).9
The first suggested justification for the asymmetry in our atti-tudes thus relies on the ‘growing block’ theory, according towhich future events are not real, while past events are real.According to this suggestion, the asymmetry in our attitudes isjustified by the ontological asymmetry between past and futureevent per se.
It is difficult however to see how this alleged ontological differ-ence between past and future events can in itself justify the asym-metry in our attitudes. For prima facie it is real events which shouldconcern us, rather than unreal events. If this is true, than weshould have been more concerned with past unpleasant events,rather than future unpleasant events, and given a choice, weshould have preferred to be before an unpleasant event, ratherthan after this event. Since this is not the case, the ontologicaldifference between past and future per se cannot justify the asym-metry in our attitudes.
The second suggested justification resorts to the asymmetry inthe direction of the ‘flow of time’ as an explanation for theasymmetry in our attitudes. According to the A-theory of time, the‘present’ moves from past to future. The difference betweenfuture and past events is that the present advances towards futureevents, while drawing away from past events.
How is this asymmetry between past and future events supposedto justify the asymmetry in our attitudes? The justification seemssimple. Future unpleasant events constantly move closer to thepresent, in which they become real and feel unpleasant, while pastevents recede from the present.10 Hence we should be moreworried about future unpleasant events than about past unpleas-ant events, and rather find ourselves after an unpleasant eventthan before it. Notice that this justification does not rely on anyontological difference between past and future. To the contrary,this justification implies presentism, that is, the idea that past andfuture events are equally unreal.
8 Dean Zimmerman, ‘The Privileged Present: Defending an “a-Theory” of Time,’ inContemporary Debates in Metaphysics, eds. Theodor Sider, John Hawthorne, and Dean Zim-merman (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2008), pp. 211–25.
9 Charlie Dunbar Broad, Scientific Thought (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul,1923), chapter 2.
10 This explanation is based on George Schlesinger, ‘How Time Flies,’ Mind 91 (1982),pp. 501–523, at 511.
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This suggestion seems promising. Take for an example aperson who considers past and future unpleasant events in his life.As long as he thinks of himself according to the B-theory of time,either as a temporally extended entity or as composed of indi-vidual temporal parts (according to the stage view), there is noreason for him to be more worried about future unpleasant eventsthan about past unpleasant events. They are both part of hishistory, and both equally real. According to presentism, on theother hand, the subject exists entirely in the present, and whilefuture unpleasant events are coming closer to the present, pastunpleasant events recede from the present. It therefore seemsthat he needs to be more worried about future unpleasant eventsthan past unpleasant events.
However, on close inspection this is again unclear. Why woulda subject be concerned about either the future or the past if theyare both unreal? If, on the other hand, it is rational to worry aboutunreal events, why should a subject worry more about futureunreal events than about past unreal events?
It could be argued that I am forgetting the most importantfeature of this justification: while future unpleasant events arecoming closer to the present in which they will become real, pastunpleasant events are receding from the present. However, I failto see how this can make any difference for the subject. Bothevents are part of the subject’s history, and if both are unavoidable(I shall consider the possibility that future events are indetermi-nate in what follows), I see no reason why one would prefer to beafter an unpleasant event rather than before it. It seems reason-able to want to be at a time later than an unpleasant event if thisimplies avoiding this event. However, if an unpleasant event isunavoidable, the only fact that changes if the subject is granted hiswish to be after the unpleasant event is that the present is after thisevent. The wish to be after an unpleasant event is strange, not onlydue to the fact that it would have been fulfilled anyway, but alsobecause the subject has absolutely nothing to gain from this wish,given that he still undergoes the experience of the unpleasantevent.
I believe that the failure to offer any substantial justification forthe asymmetry in our attitudes based on the flow of time stemsfrom the inability to offer any non-trivial account of the flow oftime. It is difficult to see what difference is made by the claim that‘future events are moving closer to reality,’ given that all that ismeant by this claim is that ‘in the future, future events will be
closer to the present.’ This is a mere truism, as evident by theanalogous claim, regarding the past, according to which ‘in thepast, past events were closer to the present.’ The attempt to justifythe asymmetry between past and future based on the flow of timeper se thus seems to collapse into triviality.11
This leads us to the third suggested justification for the asym-metry in our attitudes. According to this suggestion, the asymme-try between past and future events is saved from triviality by theindeterminacy of future events and the determinacy of pastevents. The question I now raise is whether the asymmetry inhuman attitudes is justified by the fact that past events are deter-minate, while future events are indeterminate.
The suggestion that the indeterminacy of the future justifiesthe asymmetry in our attitudes is not only intuitive, but also seemsto be supported by evolutionary considerations. It may seem thatevolution favours creatures which have negative feelings towardsunpleasant future events, for future events are indeterminate andnegative feelings can encourage the subject to try to prevent theseevents from ever happening. It is less beneficial to have negativefeelings towards past unpleasant events, for they are determinateand impossible to prevent.12 An asymmetry in our attitudestowards past and future unpleasant events is therefore expected,as this asymmetry increases our chances for survival.
Evolutionary considerations are tempting. Nevertheless, oneshould beware of succumbing to them too readily. The argumenthere relies on the premise that a worry about a future event is onlybeneficial if this event is indeterminate. However, this premise isclearly false. The source of this mistake lies in assuming that ifsomething is determinate, it is independent of previous events.However, this is wrong, as is evident from the logical possibility ofcausal determinism, according to which the future is causallydetermined by previous events. Hence, the claim that the future isdeterminate does not imply that the subject’s worries are useless,
11 See also Richard Taylor, ‘Spatial and Temporal Analogies and the Concept of Iden-tity,’ The Journal of Philosophy 52 (1955), pp. 599–612, at pp. 607–8.
12 Some distinguish, in this context, between determinacy and determinism. LePoidevin argues, for example, that even if the date of my death is fixed, it does not meanthat, by virtue of the present state of things, it is inevitable that I shall die on this date. SeeLe Poidevin, Arguing for Atheism, p. 141. However, as Mikel Burley rightly points out, thedistinction between determinacy and determinism is irrelevant to the present issue,because if the date of my death is determinate, then there is nothing anyone can do tomake it otherwise. See Mikel Burley, ‘Lucretius’ Symmetry Argument and the Determinacyof Death,’ The Philosophical Forum 38 (2007), pp. 327–341, at p. 337).
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for it can be that the future is also determined (at least partly) bythe subject’s worries. Thus, it is possible that my worries help todetermine a better future, and are therefore beneficial even if thefuture is determinate. The B-theory of time can therefore equallyresort to an evolutionary consideration for explaining and justify-ing the asymmetry in our attitudes, which relies on the premisethat negative attitudes towards future unpleasant events are gen-erally beneficial, and that it is relatively futile to adopt a negativeattitude towards past unpleasant events.13 The mere possibility ofthis consideration is enough to show that the asymmetry in ourattitudes can be explained and justified both by relying on thepremise that the future is determinate and by relying on thepremise that the future is indeterminate. It follows that the inde-terminacy of the future per se is insufficient for explaining andjustifying the asymmetry in our attitudes.
Then again, far from accounting for the asymmetry in ourattitudes, the indeterminacy of the future seems to undermine theclaim for the existence of this asymmetry. Recall that at the begin-ning of this section I discussed the possibility that the terms we useto describe our attitudes are often oriented towards either the pastor the future, and so are largely responsible for the seemingasymmetry. I also pointed out that our attitudes are determined byvarious factors, and that it is difficult to isolate the contribution ofthe temporal position of an event to the attitude any of us adopttowards this event. The claim for the asymmetry in our attitudeswas secured by the claim that, all things being equal, we wouldrather be after an unpleasant event rather than before it. Can theindeterminacy of the future justify this asymmetry?
The difficulty of justifying the asymmetry based on the indeter-minacy of the future lies in the fact that the indeterminacy of thefuture undermines the criterion for the existence of the asymme-try in our attitudes, which was introduced earlier. For this crite-rion relates to an event as determinate, while inquiring where onewould rather be in relation to this event. Hence, rather thanexplain the asymmetry in our attitudes, the indeterminacy of thefuture undermines the claim for the existence of this asymmetry.
Furthermore, the criterion which was used to support the claimfor the asymmetry in our attitudes seems to refute the claim thatthe indeterminacy of future events justifies the asymmetry in our
13 See, for example, James Maclaurin and Heather Dyke, ‘ “Thank Goodness That’sOver”: The Evolutionary Story.’ Ratio 15 (2002), pp. 276–292.
attitudes. For even if an unpleasant event is determinate, wewould rather be after this event than before it.
Finally, if the future is indeterminate, it seems possible that thesubject would like to be before the alleged unpleasant eventrather than after it, that is, to be in a position in which theunpleasant event is still not determinate. This is because of thepossibility that the unpleasant event would never occur. One mayrather be in a position in which an unpleasant event is indetermi-nate, in the sense that it might or might not happen, rather thanin a position in which it is determinate and unavoidable. Theindeterminacy of the future thus not only fails to justify the asym-metry in our attitudes, but actually seems to undermine the asym-metry it seeks to justify.
I therefore conclude that the A-theory of time does not offerany viable account for the asymmetry in our attitudes. The fea-tures of reality which are in dispute between the different theoriesof time are not the reason for the asymmetry in our attitudes, andhence, adopting the B-theory of time does not imply any changein our attitudes. The different theories of time are irrelevant forjustifying or discrediting the asymmetry in our attitudes towardspast and future unpleasant events.
3
Lucretius points out a puzzling asymmetry in our attitudes towardsour prenatal non-existence and our post-mortem non-existence.14
Each of these periods of time is one in which one does not exist.However, we typically have no negative attitudes towards our past(prenatal) non-existence, while we are anxious about our future(post-mortem) non-existence. The asymmetry in our attitudestowards our past non-existence and our future non-existence isreflected in our attitudes towards the temporal limit of human lifein the past and in the future, both our own and of other people.Normally, we view birth as a happy occasion, and death as a sadevent. The temporal limit of human life in the future, that is,death, is viewed negatively, not simply because of any unpleasant-ness which the event of dying may involve, but – over and aboveany such unpleasantness – because it marks the end of life (and
14 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, bk III, vv. 972–75, translated and quoted by RichardSorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum (London: Duckworth, 1983), p. 176.
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the beginning of our post-mortem non-existence). The temporallimit of human life in the past on the other hand, that is, birth, isviewed positively. Again, this is not because of any pleasantnesswhich is involved in this event, but simply because it is the begin-ning of life (and the end of our prenatal non-existence).
Admittedly, on rare occasions negative feelings are associatedwith birth while positive feelings are associated with death. Abirth into a life of suffering can be viewed negatively, while anend to a life of suffering can be viewed positively. However, inthese cases our attitudes are not determined by the birth or thedeath per se, but rather by the unpleasant events which occurin life. In these rare cases, the asymmetry in our attitudes isexplained by the asymmetry in our attitudes towards unpleasantevents in our life.
It is sometimes suggested that the asymmetry in our attitudestowards birth and death is explained and justified by the asymm-etry in our attitudes towards past and future pleasurable events.15
Anthony Brueckner and John Fischer, for instance, suggest thatdeath is bad because it deprives us of future pleasures, which wecare about, while prenatal non-existence is not bad, because itdeprives us of past pleasures, something we are indifferentabout.16 However, this suggestion relies on the false premise thatwe are indifferent to past pleasures. This is obviously false, becausewe usually prefer a pleasurable past to an unpleasant past.
Please note that I do not argue that there is no connectionbetween our attitude towards birth and death and our attitudetowards the pleasant events in life. There may be a close con-nection between our attitudes in both cases. However, I also donot assume that there is any such connection. In what follows Idiscuss the asymmetry in our attitudes towards birth and deathindependently of the asymmetry in our attitudes towards eventsin life.
Do the different theories of time imply anything about theasymmetry in our attitudes towards birth and death? Le Poidevinsuggests that the B-theory of time implies that our attitude towardsbirth and death should be symmetrical. Thus:
15 See, for example, Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 175.16 Anthony Brueckner and John Fischer, ‘Why is Death Bad?’ Philosophical Studies 50
. . . we need not be dismayed by the apparent transience ofeverything we value, for, if the passage of time is an illusion,such things are eternally real. And death is no longer thepassage into oblivion: it is simply one of the temporal limits ofour lives.17
Le Poidevin’s suggestion appears, prima facie, both promisingand comforting. However, on close inspection it is not so obviousthat it actually confronts our fear of death. Le Poidevin suggeststhat according to the B-theory of time, death is only the ‘temporallimit of life’ instead of a ‘passage into oblivion.’ To begin with,and as noted by Burley, the B-theory is not different in this respectfrom the growing block theory (Burley 2008, 265), or that of anA-theorist who endorses eternalism. Furthermore, a supporter ofthe A-theory of time obviously does not think of death as a‘passage into oblivion,’ since he does not think of death as apassage at all (death is the end), and so has no reason to reject thedescription of death as the ‘temporal limit of life,’ which is obvi-ously true even according to his conception of time.18
The main point of Le Poidevin’s suggestion is the claim that,according to the B-theory, things which seem transient are actu-ally eternally real. This claim is misleading, for it suggests that,according to the B-theory, once people are born they existforever, which is false. Burley, for example, interprets Le Poidevinas arguing that according to the B-theory of time there is a sensein which ‘a person’s life never really goes out of existence.’19
Again, this interpretation suggests that people never die, which isclearly false. The B-theory does suggest that past things exist or arereal in some atemporal sense, for it is committed to the claim thatthe distinctions between past, present and future are subjective,and therefore lack any ontological implications. Hence, theB-theory suggests that there is a sense in which things which donot exist now can be said to exist, or be real, simpliciter. Moreaccurately, the B-theorist would probably say that the distinctionbetween something’s existing now and its ‘having existed’ isnot an ontological distinction – it is merely a matter of human
17 Le Poidevin, Arguing for Atheism, pp. 145–6.18 Obviously, all the participants in this debate deny the possibility of an afterlife. This
is a reasonable assumption to make, especially given the fact that it is one of the basicassumptions of Lucretius’ argument.
19 Mikel Burley, ‘Should a B-Theoretic Atheist Fear Death,’ Ratio 21 (2008), pp. 260–272, at p. 262.
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experience – and that, to speak from an ontological standpoint,one should say that the thing in question exists simpliciter.However, this alone does not imply that there is no temporal limitto human life. What is puzzling is how the claim that things existsimpliciter can reassure anyone in the face of death.
There is an ongoing discussion as to whether the debatebetween eternalists and presentists is genuine or merely verbal.20
However, for my present purpose it is not necessary to go into thisdebate. Even if there is a legitimate atemporal sense in which itcan be said that past things exist, it hardly implies dismissal of ourfear of death. For why would anyone be content with the fact thatafter his death not only would it be true that he existed in the past,but further that he exists simpliciter? Furthermore, a presentist canalso introduce an atemporal notion of existence, such that x‘exists’ if and only if x existed, exists, or will exist. Given that livesare limited in time, why should anyone be more content with thethought that after his death he would still exist simpliciter ratherthan with the thought that he would still ‘exist’?
Death bothers us, I suggest, because it implies that our exist-ence is limited in time, and not because it implies that there willbe a time in which we would not exist simpliciter. If anyone whois bothered by death had a choice, he would surely choose tolive more, perhaps even to live forever, over a short life span of‘eternal’ existence simpliciter. Furthermore, if someone was guar-anteed not to die, he would not likely be bothered by the questionwhether or not he ‘eternally’ exists simpliciter. Death is viewednegatively because we desire to live longer and experience more.The ‘eternal life’ which the B-theory of time offers us is not asuitable answer for this desire.
The claim that the B-theory of time relieves us of our fear ofdeath implies that the A-theory, at least in its presentist version,which admittedly tends to reflect the intuitive way most peoplethink of time, somehow justifies our negative attitude towardsdeath. Perhaps we can therefore acquire an insight into the asym-metry in our attitudes towards birth and death if we could track itssource in the A-theory of time. The question is if, and how, the
20 The debate seems merely verbal in the sense that it appears that while presentistsprefer to use the term ‘exist,’ for instance in the sentence ‘only present things exist,’ asan abbreviation for ‘exist now,’ eternalists prefer to use this term as an abbreviationfor ‘existed, exist, or will exist.’ For supporters of the idea that this debate is genuinesee, for example, Thomas Crisp, ‘On Presentism and Triviality,’ in Oxford Studies in Meta-physics Vol. 1, ed. Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 15–20;Theodore Sider, ‘Quantifiers and Temporal Ontology,’ Mind 115 (2006), pp. 75–97.
A-theory of time can justify the asymmetry in our attitudes towardsbirth and death – why we celebrate birthdays but mourn atfunerals.
The justification seems to be simple. Time flows from the pastto the future, and therefore the temporal limit of our life in thepast marks a transition from non-existence to existence, while thelimit of our life in the future marks a transition from existence tonon-existence. Since we value our existence, the former is con-ceived as a positive event, while the latter is considered to be anegative event.
However, this suggested justification will not do. Even if onevalues existence over non-existence this does not in itself justifyseeing the transition from non-existence to existence as a goodthing, while the transition from existence to non-existence isviewed as a bad thing. For each transition has a good side (exist-ence), but also a bad side (non-existence). Why would one carewhich is the earlier and which is the later? If the child loves icecream but hates spinach, and knows that he must eat both(mother insists that he should eat the spinach if he wants to eatthe ice cream), then any preference he has regarding which to eatfirst is purely subjective.
Another possible justification for the asymmetry in our atti-tudes towards birth and death relates to the duration of life. Giventhat one usually wants to live longer, one is happy with the tran-sition from non-existence to existence, because this change marksthe beginning of life. One is sorry, on the other hand, about thetransition from existence to non-existence, because this changemarks the end of life. However, as correctly noted by Le Poidevin,if all one cares about is the duration of life, then surely one shouldbe sorry not only that death did not occur later, but also that birthdid not occur sooner (Le Poidevin 1996, 141).21 Furthermore, oneshould also be happy that death did not occur sooner, as well asthat birth did not occur later.
Le Poidevin suggests that the explanation for the asymmetry inour attitudes can be found in the determinacy of the past asopposed to the indeterminacy of the future. According to thissuggestion, there is no point in having negative feelings towardswhat is determinate, and hence the asymmetry in our attitudestowards the determinate limit of our existence in the past and theindeterminate limit of our existence in the future.
21 Le Poidevin, Arguing for Atheism, p. 141.
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We already saw that this alleged asymmetry is unable to accountfor the asymmetry in our attitudes towards unpleasant events. Canit, however, account for the asymmetry in our attitudes towardsthe limits of our existence in time?
Unfortunately, this suggestion also has its flaws. To begin with,it fails to explain the asymmetry in our attitudes. For, even if thedeterminacy of the past accounts for the fact that we do not adopta negative attitude towards birth, it fails to account for the fact thatwe adopt a positive attitude towards the temporal limit of ourexistence in the past. Moreover, this suggestion ignores the factthat for the parents, for example, there is a time in which the birth(as well as the death) of their child is in the future, and thereforeindeterminate. It also fails to address the fact that for the children,for example, there is a time in which the death of their parents (aswell as their birth) is in the past, and therefore determinate.However, in both cases the familiar positive attitude towards theearlier limit of life and the negative attitude towards the later limitof life remain unchanged.
Finally, it should be remembered that the B-theory of time canalso explain and justify our negative attitude towards futureevents, even if (according to this theory) they are determinate. Insection 2 above I suggest a B-theory account for worries aboutfuture unpleasant events. The same type of account can be givenfor our negative attitude towards the future limit of life. Althoughaccording to the B-theory of time the future is determinate, it canbe determined, at least partly, by the subject’s feelings, in sucha way that subjects who have a negative attitude towards deathhave a better chance to live longer and pass on their genes. Itseems reasonable to assume that negative feelings towards deathincrease the chances of survival, and therefore, that evolutionwould favour creatures that have negative attitudes towards death.Thus, the B-theory is no less consistent with our negative attitudestowards death than is the A-theory. Again we find that adoptingthe B-theory does not imply any change in our attitudes towardsbirth and death.
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I conclude from the above that the features of reality which are indispute between the different theories of time are not the reasonfor the asymmetry in our attitudes towards events in our life and
the temporal limits of our existence. Thus, the existence of thisasymmetry does not favour one theory over the other, and thedispute between the two theories will have to be settled on othergrounds.
Department of B.A. in Liberal Arts and SciencesThe Sapir Academic CollegeD.N. Hof Ashkelon 79165, Israel&Department of History, Philosophy and Judaic StudiesThe Open University of IsraelThe Dorothy de Rothschild CampusP. O. Box 808, Raanana 43107, [email protected]
THEORIES OF TIME AND THE ASYMMETRY IN HUMAN ATTITUDES 83
