Hip hop as a social movement: The case of Medellín, Colombia.

Theresa Mary Bean

Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of

Masters of Arts by Research

The University of Leeds

School of Languages, Cultures and Societies

September 2014

1

The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given

where reference has been made to the work of others.

This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation

from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement

© 2014 The University of Leeds and Theresa Bean

The right of Theresa Bean to be identified as Author of this work has been asserted by him in

accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Dr. Thea Pitman and Dr. Gregorio Alonso of the School of Languages, Cultures

and Societies for their excellent guidance and dedication through my Masters.

I am also grateful to my father, Dr. Kevin Bean for his support. He has been a constant source of

encouragement. I would also like to thank my family and partner for their support.

Finally, this thesis would not have been possible without the assistance of hip hop artists in Medellín.

Their dedication, passion and determination inspired me to undertake this research project. I am

grateful for their time and generosity in sharing their experiences with me. To this end, I would like to

dedicate this thesis to the hoppers of Medellín and in particular to the memory of M.C. Chelo.

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Abstract

This thesis argues that hip hop culture has emerged as a form of social protest and a tool for social

change in the Colombian city of Medellín. Given this, the author contends that in Medellín hip hop

can be classed as a social movement. Examining Political Opportunities and cultural perspectives, the

thesis will argue that Armstrong and Bernstein’s multi-actor model provides a suitable framework to

account for the evolution of the movement. This model will be utilised to explore the genesis of the

movement, with a focus on the role of violent illicit actors, the state and civic society in the 1990s.

Furthermore, charting the evolution of the movement also advances the case for considering emotions

and culture as significant factors for mobilization. The thesis will examine why hip hop culture is a

suitable form of resistance and social transformation, focusing on male youth and violence prevention.

The author suggests that hip hop provides an appropriate alternative culture as it mirrors values in

accordance with established local versions of masculinity.

The second part of the thesis seeks to explore the trajectories of the movement with a view to assess

its social, cultural and political impact. To this end, three case studies will be presented, charting the

development of three hip hop organizations in Medellín. The thesis will argue that the hip hop

movement’s impact on the political arena has been transformative and incorporative. Examining the

trajectory of the movement, also brings the author to propose that the movement can be considered as

a citizens’ rights movement.

The thesis concludes by suggesting that the production of art as a form of social mobilization should

be further explored as it will facilitate our understanding of social movements operating in oppressive

contexts.

Keywords: hip hop, social movements, Medellín, social change, mobilization, protest, youth

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CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS P.2

LIST OF MAPS AND IMAGES P.5

INTRODUCTION P.7-21

CHAPTER 1: GRAFFITI, GANGS WITH GUNS AND THE STATE: BEYOND THE STATE CENTRIC APPROACH

P22-33

CHAPTER 2: ‘HIP HOP IS MY ART, HIP HOP IS MY LIFE’ P.34-52

CHAPTER 3: MEASURING IMPACT: FRAMEWORKS AND ISSUES P.53-55

CHAPTER 4: ASSESSING OUTCOMES: HIP HOP MOVEMENTS IN THE ‘TRANSFORMED MEDELLÍN P.56-82

CASE STUDY 1: JEIHHCO/LA RED ELITE/C15 P.58-65

CASE STUDY 2: CREW PELIGROSOS P.66-73

CASE STUDY 3: CULTURA Y LIBERTAD P.74-76

CHAPTER 5: A FRAGMENTED MOVEMENT: DIVERSE TRAJECTORIES AND OUTCOMES. P.83-89

CONCLUSION: ART AS PROTEST P.90-93

BIBLIOGRAPHY P.94- 115

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LISTS OF MAPS AND FIGURES

MAP 1 MEDELLÍN BY COMUNAS P.6

FIGURE 1. GRAPH-MURDER RATES 1987-2012 P.29

FIGURE 2. GRAFFITI IN COMUNA 1 P.40

FIGURE 3: GRAFFITI IN MEDELLÍN BY COMUNAS P.41

FIGURE 4: MC BATTLE IN COMUNA 13 P.47

FIGURE 5: CREW PELIGROSOS G-SHOCK WATCH P.70

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MAP 1 MEDELLÍN, BY COMUNA: SOURCE ALCALDÍA DE MEDELLÍN.

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INTRODUCTION

‘HIP HOP ES UN MOVIMIENTO SOCIAL, UN MOVIMIENTO POLÍTICO.’(TEDX TIGRE, 2014)

‘NO ES SOLAMENTE UN MOVIMIENTO DE ARTE…, ES UN MOVIMIENTO POLÍTICO QUE ESTÁ PROPONIENDO

DE UNA FORMA DIFERENTE LA CONSTRUCCIÓN DE UN PAÍS Y UNA CIUDAD QUE LOS JÓVENES ESTÁN

SOÑANDO.’(CAMINANTE, J, 2010)

Hip hop culture, punctuated by the four elements of rapping, break dancing, djing and graffiti,

emerged in the poorer areas of the Colombian city of Medellín in the late 1980s/early 1990s and was

seen by many of its activists as a platform for promoting peace, tolerance, social justice and political

consciousness. The movement has been variously defined by cultural studies scholars as simply a

counter cultural expression, whilst others have stressed that it is a form of collective social action. For

example, The Hip Hop Declaration of Peace, a UN sponsored initiative that outlines the code of

conduct and aims of hip hop culture (Malone and Martinez Jr 2010: 542), explicitly mentions the

movement’s commitment to social change by arguing that:

‘Hiphoppas are encouraged to eliminate poverty, speak out against injustice and shape a more

caring society and a more peaceful world. Hip Hop Kulture supports a dialogue and action

that heals divisions in society, addresses the legitimate concerns of humankind and advances

the cause of peace.’(Jackson 2012)

Similar themes are present in the opening quotations to this chapter from hip hop artists in Medellín

and support Craig. S. Watkins’ suggestion that hip hop is a unique social movement expressing hopes

of social transformation. However his reading is not unproblematic and he recognizes the differences

between hip hop and other forms of collective action by stressing that:

‘... this particular movement takes place on the field of popular culture, a site not immediately

discerned as political, or capable of producing social change. Second, hip hop is invigorated

by the creative labor of a constituency not ordinarily regarded as interested in effecting social

change: youth.’(Watkins 1998: 65)

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Following Watkins’ contention, the hip hop movement in Medellín provides an interesting and

challenging case study for scholars of social movements. Given these unusual characteristics of hip

hop culture, the central question that this thesis seeks to address is how well contemporary social

movement theory interprets the emergence and impact of hip hop movements and how it can be

applied to understand its forms in Medellín, Colombia.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE STATE: ONE SIZE FITS ALL?

On the surface, hip hop culture does not present itself as an obvious social movement for several

reasons. Firstly, as Watkins states, it is cultural, not overtly political, and thus it does not seek to

influence nor make demands on the state. Consequently, hip hop movements do not engage in typical

conventional forms of dissent such as demonstrations or petitions. Therefore, hip hop can be simply

understood as expressions of a counter culture to mainstream codes of dress, language, music, and

lifestyle. Secondly, hip hop culture appeals to children and young people, a demographic often

associated with dissent as a fashion rather than concerned with affecting social change over a

sustained period of time. Indeed, much of the vast body of literature on contemporary social

movements (to be understood here as post 1960s movements) would question hip hop culture as a

social movement given these features.

One dominant strand in social movement literature emphasizes political opportunity and argues that

the state is a precursor to the mobilization of social movements. These readings suggest that the

emergence of a movement, its form and repertoires for dissent is determined by the expansion of

opportunities within institutional political structures (Tarrow 2011:160). Responding to structural

changes, civic society mobilizes and through interactions with the state creates new political

opportunities. Such a hypothesis has led Political Opportunity scholars to interpret social movements

as largely concerned with affecting institutional political spheres. Following this approach would

make it difficult to understand hip hop culture as a social movement, given that its manifestations take

place in the cultural sphere.

Because of the dominance of this state-centric theory of collective mobilization, little attention had

been paid to the importance of the cultural sphere, expressed through counterculture and identity, as a

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form of social dissent and agent of social change. When Political Opportunity theorists have

acknowledged culture, its significance has always been explained as part of a wider set of structural

factors. Borrowing anthropological definitions, culture can be regarded as a ‘particular way of life

which expressed certain values and meanings not only in art and learning, but also in institutions and

ordinary behaviour. The analysis of culture, from such a definition, is the clarification of the meanings

and values implicit and explicit in a particular way of life, a particular culture’ (Williams 1961; 57).

However, from the 1980s, the cultural or constructionist perspective has sought to address the

limitations of Political Opportunity theories. Departing from the emphasis that movements emerged

largely due to the expansion of political opportunities, culture, identity and emotions were

increasingly advanced as significant factors in understanding the emergence, form, and impact of

social movements (Jasper 1997, 2004, 2009, Earl 2004, Goodwin 2004, 2009, Gould 2004, 2009,

Polletta 2004, 2009). This view of culture as a form of social dissent and change emerged as an

attempt to account for the wave of collective action and new types of social movement witnessed in

Europe and the US since the 1960s, such as the 1968 French student riots, the Mexican student

protests, the Prague Spring, the civil rights and anti-Vietnam war protest movements in the USA, and

the rise of gay rights organizations. As Veltmeyer has noted, the key characteristics of these diverse

movements were their concern with gaining ideological autonomy from traditional institutional

political instruments such as political parties and trade unions, with a focus on the rights of particular

social groups in specific localities rather than a broader collective of people articulating the same

material needs (Veltmeyer 2000:116-117).

In the 1990s, given the diverse aims and behaviours of new social movements, new social movement

literature classified the movements into two sub categories: cultural and political new social

movements. New ‘cultural’ social movements were characterised by non-negotiable principles where

a fixed doctrine results in the refusal to engage with agents in the state polity. Similarly, new cultural

social movements do not seek to influence the political sphere, electing rather to transform political

culture through everyday actions. Movements such as the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo in Argentina,

have been defined as a new cultural movement given their refusal to negotiate or engage with the

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government (Ellner 1994:71). Indeed, such a definition could also be applied to the hip hop movement

because it too takes place on a site of popular culture and is expressed in daily actions. In contrast, the

new ‘political’ social movements, such as anti-abortion, environmental and anti-nuclear movements,

are regarded as flexible and pragmatic. They participate in the institutional political arena (albeit with

a degree of autonomy from political parties) with a view to winning concessions as part of a wider

path to either gradual or radical change (Ellner, 1994:71).

However, some aspects of this new ‘cultural’ social movement theory have been challenged (Ellner

1994). In choosing to circumvent the state, so-called ‘cultural’ movements are indeed making a

politically calculated decision, thus demonstrating a degree of politically determined behaviour

(Ellner 1994). This critique of new cultural social movements raises interesting questions: if electing

to articulate dissent through everyday actions is a conscious strategy on the part of the movement,

what factors influence social actors to make such choices? Furthermore, in taking this direction how

far do social movements simply reflect the social context from which they emerge?

Despite its limitations, new cultural movement theory made an important contribution to the notion of

expanding parameters to carve a new political terrain in civic society (Gamson 1998:57-77, Melucci

& Lyyra 1998: 203-227). As Melucci and Lyyra (1998:214) emphasise, social movements are seeking

to influence social order, thus collective action can be autonomous from political institutions and

expressed in everyday life. Furthermore, Snow supports this widening conceptualisation of social

movements by defining them as ‘collective challenges to systems or structures of authority,’ including

challenges that are not ‘manifestly political,’ or efforts aimed at affecting ‘various levels of social life’

(including the individual), and that come in various forms other than conventional social movement

organizations’ (see Haenfler, R, Johnson, B & Jones, E, 2012:3). Therefore Snow acknowledges that

dissent and change may be manifest in the cultural sphere and that consequently such a definition

lends itself to the view of the hip hop movement as a social movement.

Challenging the cultural status quo, even one that is relatively independent of the state, through

cultural defiance is essentially a political act if our understanding of the ‘political’ extends beyond

traditional channels of institutional politics. Depending upon the socio-political context, apparently

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mundane or apolitical daily tasks can become channels for dissent and social change processes. As

Stephen Duncombe remarks, in this way ‘cultural resistance’ creates a free space to frame new

meanings, networks, identities, visions, communities and organizations (Duncombe 2002:5-8). Thus,

this ‘cultural resistance’ can be regarded as a political act, an expression of dissent in the face of

dominant culture and a means of producing social change (Duncombe 2002: 8). Addressing these

concepts of the political through culture will facilitate our understanding of how hip hop culture can

be a force for social dissent and change.

Moreover, applying Duncombe’s notion of cultural resistance may facilitate our understanding of

‘non-political’ movements in non-democratic contexts. For example, in dictatorial and totalitarian

regimes where possibilities for overt political actions may be limited, unfeasible or non-existent,

apparently non-political acts may be framed as political. Goodwin and Jasper, support such a

contention, observing that in repressive contexts, political action’… may take other forms, such as

complaining, jokes and gossip.’ (2004: 14). Thus, if we apply this interpretation more liberally, a

counter culture, such as hip hop can be seen as a form of social dissent and a political act in cases

such as that of Medellín.

Cultural codes can also influence a person’s decision to participate in collective mobilization. In times

of social, cultural and political upheaval, or what Jasper refers to as ‘moral shock’ (Jasper 1997), the

decision to become involved in forms of mobilization may be influenced by culture, identity and

emotions, rather than by merely strategic motivations (Polletta 2004:103, Gould 2004:164). Whilst

emotions can be employed as part of a wider recruitment and funding strategy, they are also part of a

cognitive interpretation of a social reality and thus, feelings can influence people’s decisions to

mobilize. (Gould 2004:160-163). Therefore culture and emotions play a pivotal role in how social

actors understand the external world and consequently how they may respond to it. This clearly

demonstrates the case for examining structural factors and culture and emotions as a set of dynamics

that can influence mobilization. Understanding how civic agents respond culturally and emotionally to

external structures and agents, and in turn how external actors, such as the state, interpret collective

behaviour will enhance our understanding of the multi-layered conditions that initiate and sustain

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mobilization. Thus, having surveyed the current literature, it is clear that whilst Political Opportunity

theory may not regard hip hop culture in Medellín as a social movement, constructionist approaches

and this understanding of emotional capital help us to frame hip hop as a counterculture and thus a

form of social protest.

The limitations of political opportunity structure approaches arise primarily from its focus on western

post-industrial societies and rights based movements (Inglehart 1977, Davis 1999, Armstrong and

Bernstein 2008). Indeed, Tarrow, a significant contributor to Political Opportunity theory, has

acknowledged that this perspective has focussed on liberal democratic polities and societies and may

reflect endemic assumptions about the nature of democracy and the state (2011:28). Furthermore, this

narrow application tends to neglect the role of non-state actors in accounting for the evolution and

forms of social movements (Goodwin and Jasper 2004:10-11, Armstrong and Bernstein 2008).

Therefore, can such theories account for social movements operating in a very different political and

social context in which democratic stability and security are still fundamental concerns?

In a context like Colombia, where political power has operated outside the liberal democratic

‘normative consensus’, other non-state actors may play a pivotal role in accounting for the emergence,

and behaviour of a movement (Armstrong and Bernstein, 2008). Thus uncritically applying these

perspectives, with their assumptions of historically constituted and stable state authority, may not

adequately explain the state’s role in the mobilization of such movements in Latin America. Likewise,

whilst dissent might be directed overtly at the state and is thus confrontational by nature, such a bald

description could present an unduly oversimplified understanding of political culture in Latin

America. This is because Political Opportunity theory assumes that the state is or is perceived to be

the cause of dissent. For example, through the introduction of legislation or a failure to legislate which

may give rise to social action. In this reading it thus follows that social movements overtly direct their

dissent at the state as the state is perceived to have the capacity and/or the responsibility to address

their grievances. However, as Polletta (2004) underscores, culture is an important feature in the

formation and evolution of political structures and opportunities for mobilization within civil society.

She suggests that we need to give ‘more careful attention to the cultural traditions, ideological

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principles, institutional memories and political taboos that structure the behaviour of both political

elites and challengers’ (2004:103).

If this observation is conceptualised, then political cultures distinct to those of Western Europe and

the USA may produce different attitudes, expectations and knowledge of the state. Almond and

Verba’s (1989) work on civic culture noted that the maintenance of democracy hinges on a blend of

roles undertaken by citizens: civil society, they suggest, takes on three distinct roles; parochial,

subject and participant. The parochial role is concerned with family and community life and does not

involve political institutions. In the subject role civil society receives and accepts outputs from the

state polity, whilst as a participant it is actively involved in the political decision- making process.

However, in societies with a legacy of a corrupt, absent or failed states, this conceptualization of civic

culture will not be easily applicable. Arguably during the decades of internal conflicts in Colombia, in

varying degrees, citizens have not (fully) performed the role of the subject or the participant. Thus, in

this context civic culture may result in pejorative or indifferent views of the state. Indeed, recent

events may create knowledge, attitudes, and expectations that generate a new set of civic norms

regarding the roles of citizens and the state. The result might be that the community, however it is

defined, rather than the state could be seen as responsible for or capable of addressing grave social

problems. This suggests that Colombia has an alternative civic culture very different to those

described in Almond and Verba’s study of civic culture and democracy in five countries and accepted

as representative of stable developed democracies. Thus, a limited legacy of positive state

intervention, a weakened/corrupt state apparatus, or citizens’ perceptions of the state as an ineffective

avenue for social change will affect attitudes, beliefs and actions related to the state. Holding such

perceptions and attitudes towards the state may affect how social movements elect to articulate their

dissent and whom they may target. Therefore, the civic culture of a country ought to be considered not

only to account for how and why a social movement emerges but also to understand its repertoires for

mobilization and collective action.

Tarrow has addressed these issues by noting that in repressive contexts apparently apolitical objects,

such as dress, music and graffiti can become symbols of contention (2011:10, 103). Whilst such an

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alteration is welcomed, I would contend that reducing elements of hip hop culture, such as music and

graffiti to mere symbols of protest is ultimately flawed as I hope to demonstrate in Chapter 2. In his

revised Power in Movement (2011) Tarrow recognises that emotions, culture and identity can be

significant in determining and consolidating collective action (2011:141-156). However, whilst he

believes that culture and emotions need to be understood within the structural context in which they

operate, by focusing on the opportunities and constraints he avoids an unduly deterministic

assessment (156). Heeding Tarrow’s warning, in Chapter one I thus seek to synthesise cultural and

structural approaches.

New social movement theory, like Political Opportunity theory, has tended to study currents in the

democratic West. The defining feature of this departure was a shift from class based social

movements, such as Trade Unions to rights based movements (Cohen 1985, Della Porta & Dani

2006).Thus, new social movements are regarded as products of post-industrial societies in which

social movements are characterised by class or material demands have ebbed into issues and rights

based or post material values (Inglehart 1977).

This focus on movements in post-industrial democracies, poses some interesting questions for the

study of a social movement in Colombia. How can new social movement theory interpret a social

movement in an emerging country, characterised by fragile democratic institutions evidenced by

continuing internal conflicts?

Despite, the reservations of the new social movement approaches in developing country context, the

theory is not redundant. The conceptualisation of counterculture as a political act and producer of

social change gives credence to hip hop as a form of social protest. Equally, although Political

Opportunity theory may struggle to explain the emergence of a cultural movement in an unstable

democracy, this is not to suggest that the state is inconsequential to the study of hip hop culture in

Medellín.

On the contrary, recent interactions with the state, such as participation in government programmes or

consultations, may aid our understanding of the impact and trajectory of the hip hop movement.

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Indeed, examining these interactions will enable us to understand how the movement and the state

have evolved since the 1990s.

SHAPING THE TERRAIN: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA

Returning to Watkin’s observation that hip hop is a unique social movement prompts us to reflect

upon social protest and transformation in the region. To test this assumption it is necessary to survey

social movements in Latin America, focusing in particular on interactions between these currents,

state structures and institutional politics.

The region provides a rich source for the study of social movements. During and since the erosion of

military dictatorships Latin America has born witness to an array of social movements. Currents have

emerged in diverse political contexts, with disparate aims and degrees of impact. Consequently, there

is a wide body of literature on social movements which explores these movements from a wide range

of theoretical frameworks. Despite this diversity, the study of both old and new social movements in

the region shares several common features. Firstly, many social movements in Latin America, like

their European and North American counterparts, have regarded the state as a legitimate target for

dissent. Secondly, many currents regard the state as a viable channel for social and political change.

Thirdly, the role of the state/institutional politics and political elites has been key in setting the

conditions in which these social movements emerged.

In contrast to cultural manifestation of the hip hop movement, many existing currents in the region

have been classified as ‘old’ social movements. Henry Veltmeyer (2000: 124) considers the

emergence of social movements in Latin America in the 1990s and 2000s as both a response to the

failure of neo-liberal policies and an emerging form of ethnic politics. This rejection of neo-liberalism

resulted in the new wave of contemporary leftist politics in Argentina Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru,

Uruguay and Venezuela. These countries provide convincing, if varying, examples of class based

movements in Latin America which differ from the new social movement paradigm.

By charting the trajectories of these contemporary ‘old’ social movements two significant themes

emerge. Firstly, these movements underscore how the nature of collective mobilization is ultimately

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shaped by the broader political terrain and state structure. Secondly, they illustrate how social

movements can have a significant impact and shape the formal political arena. The Rural Landless

Workers Movement (MST) in Brazil is a notable example. The movement successfully influenced the

political agenda and was also a factor to the electoral success of Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva in 2002.

Similarly, Evo Morales, a former coca famer and trade union leader has become a dominating figure

in Bolivian politics. Morales played a key mediating role in negotiations between the state and social

movements which prevented political upheaval in Bolivia, and successfully incorporated these

movements into his political project and presidential campaign. These are but two examples that

demonstrate a much wider nexus between the state and social movements throughout Latin America.

Similarly the work of Raul Zibechi (2012) also frames the emergence of leftist movements in the

region as a response to failed neo- liberal policy. The global financial crisis and resulting austerity led

to the mobilization of the Piqueteros in Argentina and Zapatistas in Mexico, expressing demands for

the expropriation of land and hostility to the status quo indicative of class based movements.

However, in contrast to the Rural Landless Workers Movement (MST) and trade unions in Bolivia ,

the Piqueteros and Zapatistas have rejected incorporation by the state. Instead the Piqueteros and

Zapatistas elected to circumvent institutional politics by creating alternative spaces for mobilization

and attempting to create autonomous social realities. Thus, these examples illustrate the diverse

strategies ‘old’ movements have employed in responding to similar socio-economic and political

conditions in different parts of Latin America.

However, Latin America has also produced ‘new social movements’. These movements usually

mobilize to advance the interests of particular social groups, often in a specific locality. In contrast to

old social movements, they are more independent of political parties and take on a spontaneous

character. Examples of such new social movements in the region include the Chilean Student

Movement in 2011 that mobilized to protest against privatized education and demand reform of the

education system (Salinas and Fraser 2012). Similarly, in Argentina, the LGBT rights movement

mobilized to demand rights for its constituents, making considerable political ground notably in gay

marriage legislation and anti-discrimination laws (Brown; 2002).

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Whilst both new and old social movements have diverse modus operandi, goals, trajectory and

outcomes, the state is a common target. As the previous examples demonstrate, new social

movements like old social movements have largely directed their dissent at the state. Equally,

regardless of whether the presence of social movements is an indication of stable liberal democracies

or repressive regimes, the state plays an important role in ‘facilitating’ mobilization and shaping the

forms of contentious politics. Motta, for example, suggests that the flourishing of social movements in

the region reflects a relatively healthy from of democracy (Motta 2009). In contrast, Hellman regards

the emergence of new social movements as the response to the repression of democracy, citing

movements in Chile, Brazil and Mexico as cases in point (Hellman 1992: 52).

Whilst the presence of hip hop organizations in Medellín could be seen as a response to state

repression and illicit actor violence and would thus support Hellman’s observations, in the wider

context of Latin America, the hip hop movement in Medellín appears to be somewhat of an anomaly.

This view is based on two observations. Firstly the state was not fundamental to the genesis of the

movement. Secondly, the movement in Medellín does not overtly target the state nor does it make

demands on the state. However, such anomalies can be explained. According to Goodwin and Jasper

(2004) counter culture movements, such as hip hop movements, by their very nature are not

concerned with targeting the state. Therefore, if hip hop currents are counter culture movements, then

we would assume that other hip hop movements in the region would not engage in institutional

politics.

Hip hop movements in Bolivia and Cuba would appear to contradict this assumption. The visible

political nature of the hip hop movement in El Alto, Bolivia has been interpreted as a political current.

Critical of neo-liberal policies and concerned with indigenous and social struggles the movement has

targeted the state (Martinez and Malone 2010:545, Tarifa; 2012; 397-415). Similarly, Tickner’s study

of hip hop in Cuba emphasizes how the movement emerged as a protest against racial discrimination

and inequality, issues that allegedly did not exist under the Castro regime. Given this orientation, hip

hop was interpreted as an attack on the Castro system. Consequently, the state responded by

attempting to co-opt the movement through the creation of the Ministry of Rap in 2002 (Tickner

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2008: 142,150). The hip hop movements in Bolivia and Cuba thus provide examples of apparent

counter culture movements that have responded to and have targeted the state. This observation not

only challenges Watkins’s contention that hip hop is not overtly political, it also demonstrates how

hip hop culture in Medellín, differs from other hip hop movements in the region. Therefore, in order

to understand why the hip hop movement in Medellín is at variance to its counterparts in the region, it

is necessary to account for the local conditions in which the movement emerged.

Having addressed some of the key issues related to social movement literature, this thesis will

combine a variety of current social movement theories to explore how the genesis and impact of the

hip hop movement in Medellín could be interpreted. The thesis will be divided into two parts: Firstly,

in seeking to understand the evolution of the movement, attention will be made to the historical and

political context in which the movement emerged, stressing the importance of agents and the fluidity

of processes. Equally, focusing on the unique features of the movement, youth and popular culture

within this context will also enhance our understanding of why and how hip hop emerged as a force

for resistance and change in the city-region.

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METHODOLOGY

The first task in hand is to understand how the movement emerged by surveying the historical,

socioeconomic and political circumstances in Medellín in the 1980s and 1990s. Applying Armstrong

and Bernstein’s plural agent model against empirical evidence will enable the discussion to transcend

a purely state-centric position. For this reason, Political Opportunity models have been discounted in

hypothesizing about the emergence of the movement. Drawing on Armstrong and Bernstein’s model

as mode of analysis of the hip hop movement will ensure that the significance of a variety of agents

will be given due emphasis. Thus the differing roles of, and the relationships between, civic society,

the state and illicit actors will be examined to understand the conditions for mobilization. Similarly,

synthesising this model with culture, identity and emotion theories as proposed by Goodwin, Jasper,

Polletta and Gould will also facilitate our understanding of the evolution of the movement.

Secondly, the thesis will attempt to survey the movement’s impact on the social, cultural and political

terrain, and assess the differing motivations underpinning the developing relationship between state

and the movement since the election of Sergio Fajardo and Medellín’s political transformation in the

years since 2004. Examining concurrently the trajectories of three hip hop organizations will provide

empirical evidence to measure the significance of the movement.

The observation that dissent is not directed at the state will be considered, drawing on and adapting

the work of Armstrong and Bernstein (2008).Gamson(1990;1998), Melucci and Lyyra’s (1998)work

will allow us to explore the impact of the movement at both a societal and cultural level. Likewise, the

political impact will also be addressed by examining a range of interactions between the state and the

movement. Thus, Giugni and Passy’s assertions on ‘conflictual-cooperation’ (1998:85-89) and

Giugni’s ‘incorporation’ and ‘transformation’ (1998: xiv-xx) will be tested to understand the nature

and outcomes of these interactions with the state. Examining the impact of the movement of the

political terrain will illustrate how movements can both be influenced by and, in turn, influence the

institutional arena. Similarly, perspectives advanced by political opportunity theorists can provide a

suitable framework to explore the relationship between the state and social movements today. These

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interactions will also reveal an important background for understanding the movement’s outcomes

and trajectories.

Thirdly, building upon the work of Melucci and Lyrra (1998) on culture in social movement, this

thesis will argue that hip hop is a counter culture in which dissent is manifested through the creation

of distinct values and norms in daily life, whilst rejecting dominant norms and values determined by

illicit actors. Fourthly, linking culture to social protest, it will be argued that artistic practices can play

a fundamental role in social change and dissent. Much social movement literature regards artistic

practice as a mere accompaniment to mobilization. For example, music is seen to be a supplement for

other conventional expressions of dissent, or is employed as an aid to further a movement’s interests

or goals.

These hypotheses will be tested against empirical evidence drawn from both primary and secondary

sources. The research will draw upon academic literature, government documents and statistics, media

reports, interviews, videos, documentaries, song lyrics, artists’, NGO and government websites, and

social media pages to empirically support and contextualise these theoretical frameworks.

These questions emerged from both personal and professional observations of the hip hop movement

following my first visit to Medellín, in 2010. During this time I have developed personal and

professional relationships with key actors in the movement which has enabled me to gain an insight

into hip hop culture in Medellín. Whilst this has given me unparalleled access to my subject of study,

it has also created some challenges. Firstly, analysing the actions and behaviours of acquaintances and

friends has proved to be testing. Their work inspired me to write this thesis. However, the nature of

this task requires analytical awareness and critical analysis of their organizations.

Secondly, despite having a good relationship with these organizations, obtaining interviews was

challenging. Some expressed scepticism about participating in academic research as they do not wish

to be represented in this way or are experiencing ‘research fatigue’. For example, Crew Peligrosos

gave me an interview for this thesis. However, they stated they did not want the content of the

interview to be released into the public domain as they did not want to be represented in this way.

21

Thus, the interview was subsequently deleted. However, photographs from my visits to Medellín,

have been included in this study.

It is hoped that by synthesizing theoretical hypotheses and testing them against empirical data a

nuanced account of the hip hop movement in Medellín can be achieved. Chapter 1 will explore the

historical context in which the movement evolved and advance the multi-actor model to account for

the emergence of the movement during this period. Chapter 2 will explore how and why hip hop

developed into a suitable tool for social dissent and transformation in Medellín in the early 1990s.

Chapter 3 will discuss appropriate frameworks to measure the impact of the movement since the

election of Sergio Fajardo in 2004. Chapter 4 will survey the diverse (political, social and cultural)

impacts and trajectories of three hip hop organizations operating in the city. In particular, attention

will be given to the interactions between the movement and political elites to understand the

movement’s trajectory and impact. Chapter 5 will discuss how the movement could be classified on

the social movement spectrum. Finally, the conclusion will advance the idea of art as a form of social

protest and action, a ‘hidden transcript’ available to civil society in repressive contexts.

22

CHAPTER 1 GRAFFITI, GANGS WITH GUNS AND THE STATE: BEYOND THE STATE CENTRIC

APPROACH.

THE DECLINE OF THE STATE.

Medellín has been deeply enmeshed in the complex conflicts which have plagued Colombia for over

half a century. However, the 1980s was a critical period for the city, marked by political instability,

industrial decline, the rising dominance of drug cartels supplying an increasingly demanding crack

cocaine market in the US and the growing presence of criminal and paramilitary groups (Andreas et al

1991, Salazar & Jaramillo, 1992). The scourge of drug gangs, militias, hitmen (sicarios) and right

wing paramilitaries1 coupled with political corruption and clientelism in the city resulted in the

weakening of state authority, especially in terms of justice, security and law and order. (Hylton, 2010:

349– 352, Alcaldía de Medellín 2011:38-43, Baird 2013). The 1980s saw the decomposition of the

state as Medellín ‘was transformed by the infiltration of nacrotrafficking into all areas of its social and

institutional life’ (Riaño Alcalá 2010:3).

This decomposition meant that the state apparatus was almost non-existent in the poorer districts on

the periphery of the city which had become the battlefields of Medellín (Rozema 2007, Riaño Alcalá

2010, Baird 2013). Concurrently, these areas were becoming increasingly populated due to the influx

of displaced people fleeing from armed conflict in rural areas. Given their explosive, unplanned

growth and lack of state control, these districts were known as the informal city. In the absence of the

state and the rule of law, the informal city set the scene for the execution of private justice and

lawlessness. These areas were controlled by paramilitary groups, drug cartels and other illegal actors

who fought turf wars, settled feuds and imposed their authority by physical force and extortion

(Rozema 2007, Alcaldía de Medellín, 2011:38). As a response to the violence, some communities

organized community self-defence associations to socially cleanse the neighbourhood of petty crime,

drugs and gangs. However, the cycle of violence continued with revenge killings, disputes over jobs,

betrayals and internal group disagreements. As Jorge Melguizo, Secretary for Social Development in

1 For a detailed explanation of the diverse violent actors in Medellin see R.Ceballos (2000).

23

the city (2005-2007) acknowledged, ‘Cuando el estado no llega a una zona, entonces los delincuentes,

las guerrillas y los paramilitares se la toman.’ (Organisation of American States 2011).

The presence of these illicit actors resulted in the disruption of normal civic life as community spaces

became no-go areas for residents. The daily episodes of violence and the continued threat of violence

created a culture of fear (Riaño Alcalá 2010: 138) Commenting on the impact of the rise of gangs on

everyday life, Angel, a member of the self defence association, Los Capuchos noted that ‘…everyone

shut themselves up in their houses after six in the evening… Locked up indoors you’d hear them

shooting the hell out of each other.’ (Salazar 1990: 50).

Illicit actors also provided social and employment benefits as a means of gaining loyalty from local

communities and consolidating their power. For example, the Medellín Cartel headed by Pablo

Escobar undertook typical state functions by building hospitals, houses, roads, sports grounds and

schools as well as providing employment through construction projects, (Salazar 1990:64, Nieves

1997, McIlwaine and Moser 2004:54, Riaño Alcalá 2010: 45). As the president of La Junta de Acción

Vecinal in Comuna 9, Wberney Zabala, remarked ‘Se dedicó a ayudarle a la gente pobre de Medellín

donde el Estado nunca llegaba’ (La Nacion: 2011). Thus, illicit actors, such as the Medellín Cartel,

behaved as a proxy state, asserting their authority repressively and in certain areas constructing much

needed infrastructure where the state was absent.

THE STATE AS A PERPETRATOR, COLLABORATOR AND CHALLENGER

Far from acting as the protector of civil society the Colombian state has been directly complicit in

episodes of violence through corruption and collusion with illicit actors, notably the selling of arms to

gangs and taking bribes from criminal organizations (Salazar 1990, Ortiz, 1991, Cepeda Ulloa 1994,

Bagley, 2001, Riaño Alcalá 2010, Bedoya, 2010). However, the 1992 Villatina Massacre, in which 8

civilians were murdered by members of the Colombian Police Force is a clear example of state

violence.

Whilst the state was culpable of overt acts of violence against the civilian population, it could be

suggested that the state was also indirectly involved in illicit actor violence given its inability or

24

reluctance to perform the vital functions of maintaining law and order and justice. This is not to

suggest that the state was completely inactive: the police did undertake raids, carry out arrests and

prosecute gang members. However, police action was sporadic and largely ineffective as gang

members could bribe the police, judges or the guards to be released from jail (Bagley 1988, Salazar

1990, Ortiz 1991, Alcaldía de Medellín 2012:22). Equally, because gang members were easily

replaced in the illicit economy the criminal justice system did little to break the cycle of violence in

these years. Although the withdrawal or weakness of the state could be interpreted as inactivity, the

decision not to act in the face of illicit actor dominance constitutes an action on its part. Thus, given

these levels of corruption, decomposition and consequent inaction it could be suggested that the state,

was, in effect, a constant accomplice and facilitator of illicit actor violence throughout this period.

When state agents did attempt to curtail illicit actors, it was met with increased levels of violence. The

Medellín Cartel’s campaign against the state apparatus intensified by the late 1980s, characterised by

the bombing of aircraft, shopping centres and the assassination of judges police, journalists and

politicians, most notably the Governor of Antioquia, Antonio Roldán Betancur in 1989. Such acts of

violence led to a more robust response from the national government in the early 1990s and what was,

in effect, an attempt to regain its legitimacy and authority in the face of rising drug cartel dominance

and terrorism. In particular, the agreement to extradite suspected Colombian criminals to the USA for

trial and the passing of a new Constitution show the national government’s desire to curb the power of

illicit actors.

The 1991 Colombian Constitution was characterised by a strong degree of decentralisation such as the

election of mayors and senators by popular vote to ensure new checks and balances on the ailing state.

Concurrently the national government under President Cesar Gaviria attempted to re-legitimize the

state by repairing the relationship between the state and civil society through the creation of the

Consejería Presidencial in 1990. The Consejería aimed to ‘repay the social debt’ owed by the state to

society by financially supporting grass roots projects and community initiatives such as the creation of

the NGO Paisa Joven (Alcaldía de Medellín 2011: 43).

25

In this way, it is apparent that the state was something of a political chameleon in the 1990s,

simultaneously adopting roles as a collaborator, a perpetrator and a challenger to illicit actor violence

and dominance. These blurred and entangled facets of the state illustrate the complex internal power

struggles within a state apparatus infiltrated and influenced by illicit actors. As Bob Jessop (2011)

remarks there are multi centres of power (political, economic, social and cultural) operating in society

that are not merely confined to the state. The way that illicit centres of power operated within and

alongside the state apparatus in Medellín support this hypothesis. The fluid and contradictory

behaviour of the Colombian state during the 1980s and 1990s, also supports Goodwin and Jasper’s

contention that Political Opportunity theory regards ‘structural factors as invariant’ and devoid of

agency (2003: viii). Whilst some leaders within the political elite, such as Luis Carlos Galan

challenged illicit actor dominance (which resulted in his assassination), other actors, such as the

military and the Elite Police colluded with right wing paramilitaries and criminal gangs (Ortiz; 1991,

Bagley 2001:13). This demonstrates the importance of viewing the state as multi-layered, comprising

of diverse actors with often opposing agendas. Viewing the state as a fluctuating and varied set of

agents rather than a fixed, rigid structure helps us to account for its contradictory behaviour. It also

raises interesting questions concerning how we can understand the role of the state in relation to the

emergence of the hip hop movement in Medellín.

Because the state was a direct perpetrator of violence and a facilitator of illicit actor violence in this

way, it played a key role in the emergence of the hip hop movement. However, it is important to

understand this role within a wider set of long-term dynamics, not just those predominant in the

1990s, given that Medellín has been a site of conflict for over sixty years. Therefore attributing state

sponsored violence or lack of action to combat it as the sole motivation for mobilization is incorrect.

Given this, it is necessary to explore the role of the state in relation to other agents if we are to

understand how these interactions between various agents, including the state facilitated the

emergence of the hip hop movement. The escalation of violence provoked by the national

government’s capture of Pablo Escobar in 1993 and the resulting shift in the balance of power

amongst illicit actors was a significant factor in the evolution of the movement. Similarly, the

26

continued collaboration of agents within the institutions of local government with illicit actors

provided a context in which community groups organized to combat the effects of violence.

In this way a contradictory pattern developed in which the local state’s continued withdrawal and

collusion in Medellín itself, and the national state’s war against the Medellín Cartel combined to

provide a key factor in the emergence of the hip hop movement. I would contend that the state

impacted in three ways during this period. Firstly, through collusion and withdrawal, local and

national government agents objectively and subjectively facilitated violence. Secondly, the power

vacuum left by the downfall of the Medellín Cartel led to the intensification of violence. Thirdly, the

state’s inability and reluctance to curb the cycle of violence, as part of the wider legacy of conflict in

the country, strengthened a political culture of civic participation and community problem solving.

However, these observations must be understood in relation to other agents, notably civil society and

illicit gangs during the 1990s.

THE STATE OF PLAY: ADVANCING MULTI ACTOR APPROACHES

Political Opportunity theory assumes that the state’s behaviour sets the condition of possibility for

social movements to emerge (McAdam, D, S, Tarrow, and C, Tilly. (2001). Tarrow defines

opportunities as a ‘perceived probability that social protest actions will lead to success in achieving a

desired outcome…‘which are created when’ institutional access opens’ (Tarrow 2011; 160). Threats

regarded as ‘the risks and costs of action or inaction’ are also significant in accounting for

mobilization (Tarrow 2011; 160). However, in the case of Medellín neither opportunities nor threats

were present at the time of the movement’s inception. Institutional access was not open given the

withdrawal of the state in these areas. Equally, it is arguable that given the assassination of high

profile citizens who challenged the power of illicit actors, the risks and costs of action were much

greater than inaction. In this situation Political Opportunity theory cannot adequately account for

mobilization and leaves open the question why sections of civil society eventually decided to mobilize

and act in the 1990s despite such unfavourable conditions. If the state was the determining factor in

the development of hip hop movements then, arguably, the movement would have emerged in the

27

1980s as this period marked the beginning of the decomposition of the state and the rise of dominant

illicit actors in Medellín. The hip hop movement could also have emerged during this period to protest

at the state’s collaboration and failure to act against the surge in violence. Thus, opportunities in the

initial stages of the decline of the state and the emergence of illicit actors would have been more

favourable than at the height of violence in the early 1990s. Thus, the fact that hip hop groups did not

emerge until the 1990s clearly illustrates that mono-actor state centric theories do not account for the

development of hip hop groups. Rather, it was a combined set of events and strategies involving

multiple actors that determined the evolution of the hip hop movement in the 1990s.

Armstrong and Bernstein (2008) seek to address some of the deficiencies in both Political Opportunity

models and New Social Movement literature. Their multi-institutional model considers how

movements may mobilize and effect change in varying social fields or institutions. They suggest that

non-state agents within civil society such as religious institutions, education, and business

organizations may be both the cause of contention and the site of transformation. As well as

broadening their definition of the institutional terrain and context, Armstrong and Bernstein interpret

power in both material and cultural terms. By extending the notion of power to culture and

acknowledging the role of non-state institutions in mobilization this approach improves our

understanding of movements that do not target the state nor attempt to effect change in an overtly

political manner. Highlighting the dialectical relationship between institutions and the creation of

material and cultural power, Armstrong and Bernstein argue that ‘…institutions are where distinctions

made by individual social actors are translated into social boundaries … [and]…where classification

systems are anchored and infused with material consequences.’ (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008: 84).

Redefining conceptions of power and institutional forms in society in this way proposes a new

definition of social movements and political structures. Using this analytical framework, a social

movement can be interpreted as a collective challenge to ‘constituted authority’ that targets other

agents rather than structures to effect cultural or material change (Snow 2004: 11, Armstrong and

Bernstein 2008: 84). Conceptualising political actions in this way has consequences on how we view

constituents who mobilize and how we understand the range of their repertoires for dissent and

28

change. If we accept that the target may be a non-state agent and that challenging authority could be

cultural as well as political as usually understood, our definition of a movement will invariably alter

along with our understanding of its form and evolution.

THE RISE OF RAP

Whilst the exact date of the arrival of hip hop music in Medellín is contested, there is a broad

agreement amongst artists in Medellín that it had emerged by the mid-1980s as an exported US youth

culture. (Caminante, J 2010, TEDx Talks 2010, TEDx Talks. 2012). By the 1990s a number of the

conditions existed in Medellín that turned hip hop into a social movement.

Firstly, in the early 1990s at the height of the violence (with an average 5,885 reported murders per

year during 1990-1992) US hip hop music and films re-emerged in Medellín with the arrival of

television in the peripheral barrios. This provided marginalised young people with access to new

forms of culture and avenues for expression. Secondly, in the late 1980s/early 1990s there was a shift

in the perception of hip hop as purely a black cultural expression to a broader depiction of the realities

of ghetto life, thus enabling the participation of other ethnic groups, such as Latinos into hip hop

culture. (Tickner 2008:124) Concurrently, the late 1980s-early 1990s marked the transformation of

hip hop in the US from a purely cultural to a more social and political force. Hip hop community

organizations emerged which focused on issues of social justice and poverty, a development stage

described by Malone and Martinez Jr as ‘social creation and institutionalization’ (2010: 537-539).

Thirdly, the death of Pablo Escobar and the fall of the Medellín Cartel in 1993 created a power

vacuum. Initially this led to an intensification of violence as multiple illicit actors engaged in micro

conflicts to capitalise on the decline of the Cartel. The collapse of the Medellín Cartel not only

resulted in a bloody redistribution of territorial control but also a diversification of illicit actor activity

and services (Hylton 2010: 346 – 348, Riaño Alcalá 2010: 3). Fourthly, by 1989, violence was

increasingly adolescent in nature, typified by the teenage sicario, with the average victim of violent

death aged 14-20. The age of victims of violence had fallen dramatically since 1986 when the

average age of victims of violent deaths was 35-45(Salazar 1990: 111).

29

Figure 1 Murder rate in Medellín per 100,000 residents, 1980-2012: Source Alcaldía de

Medellín.

Simultaneously, sections of civil society noted for high active levels of youth participation (perhaps

due in part to the increasing adolescent nature of the violence) sought to address issues of chronic

violence in the community (Riaño Alcalá 2010:3). During the 1990s there was a significant growth in

a wide range of local, regional and national social movements representing various educational,

religious, community, youth and business groups (Fernandez et al; 2004, Alcaldía de Medellín, ;

2011, 42, Alcaldía de Medellín, 2012; 20). The hip hop movement evolved as part of these currents

in parallel with other collective opponents of organized criminal violence in Medellín, such as the

performing arts organizations, Nuestra Gente, the community organization CoVida, and the youth

network Red Juvenil. Significantly, this period marked a departure in the approach of these civic

society organizations towards violence, seeing a shift from direct intervention and conflict resolution

to a focus on prevention and resistance (Baird, 2013:33). This was most apparent in a new emphasis

within these currents which aimed to create an alternative to the violence rather than directly

challenging it.

This cultural shift within civic society is a significant feature in the development of the hip hop

movement. It also raises the question of why civil actors adopted new repertoires for mobilization and

collective activity. One explanation might be found in the social impact of violence in Medellín.

30

Commenting on the situation in the city at the beginning of the 1990s, M.C Medina, gives an insight

into the psychological and social effects of conflict:

‘…los barrios estaba en guerra… en lo que respiraba en la ciudad era rabia y miedo…mucho temor de conocer a la gente.’ (Babble Fish Productions 2010)

M.C Medina’s words illustrate people’s response to the conflict were emotional (‘anger and fear’). He

also reveals how violence altered social reality, negatively impacting on daily social interactions

within their community. Fear is a theme that is repeatedly used in literature to capture the mood of

Medellín in the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, the term ‘cultures of fear’ would lend itself well to Medellín

during this period (Rozema 2007, Riaño Alcalá 2010, Alcaldía de Medellín 2011, 2012,). As Riaño

Alcalá notes, cultures of fear refers to ‘…an imposed way of life that regulates daily communications,

responses to fear, strategies of resistance and social memory to account for the systemic presence of

fear’(2010:137). The evidence of forced displacements, forced recruitment into criminal gangs, death

threats, kidnappings, territorial controls, murders, and forced disappearances provide clear examples

of a culture of fear in Medellín.

However, as Riaño Alcalá notes, presenting cultures of fear as merely as the aggregate of a series of

events or external actions, does not allow us to consider how social actors and individuals internalize

or respond to them (2010:137). The increased levels and nature of the violence in the late 1980s-early

1990s, such as bombings in public spaces, and the role of youth in this violence revealed an

unexpected and appalling situation, provoking a ‘moral shock’ which contributed to the intensification

of cultures of fear. (Jasper, 1997). In Medellín, civil society responded to this intensified culture of

fear by creating new strategies, namely prevention and resistance. This extract from the Nuestra Gente

website captures how a culture of fear and anger towards the stigmatization of young people led to the

evolution of their organization.

‘Eran los años de 1987, nuestra ciudad Medellín, aquejada por la indolencia de la guerra

entre carteles no dejaba espacio para el sosiego, estas pulsiones mortíferas no permitían que

niños, jóvenes y adultos permanecieran en la calle, ya que el toque de queda no oficial entraba

en vigencia cada día y a toda hora; las calles se fueron oscureciendo, el temor se apoderaba de

las gentes, la muerte se agazapaba en las esquinas esperando el corazón de un joven, que por

31

el hecho de vivir en la comuna ya cargaba con el estigma del sicario, del violento asesino en

moto, del ‘Pelaíto (jóvenes) que no duró nada’, del ‘No Nacimos Pa'semilla’; y aquí sí vale

decir que la vida no valía nada.

En medio de la muerte y la tristeza causada por la barbarie, surge este proceso creativo

denominado Corporación Cultural Nuestra Gente…hace posible que algunos jóvenes de las

comunas de Medellín, opten por el arte y la cultura como una oportunidad de generar

espacios de alegría y vida.’(Nuestra Gente 2007).

These accounts of Medellín in the late 1980s underscore the importance of emotional responses to

violence and the cultures of fear. Amplified feelings of anger, terror, and sadness were catalysts for

new strategies of prevention and resistance employed by civic society, and the mobilization of a new

wave of civil peace movements, including the hip hop movement.

Useful comparisons can be made between the experiences of the gay community in the USA and

those of the communities in the peripheral areas in Medellín, especially in the ways that emotions and

subjective factors play an important role in both individual activism and collective mobilization.

Deborah Gould’s work (2004:155-175) on the rise of the ACT UP movement in the USA in the 1980s

highlights these processes. The 1986 US Supreme Court’s Hardwick ruling, which upheld Georgia’s

sodomy law criminalizing sexual acts between homosexuals, led to a moral shock for the gay

community. Simultaneously, the gay and lesbian community were experiencing a social, political and

health crisis due to the AIDS epidemic which led to further concerns and outrage. Similarly, AIDS

sufferers faced increasing stigmatization and ostracism, typified by the legislation to dismiss HIV

positive employees or introduce mandatory testing and quarantine (Gould 2004:165-167). It was as a

result of this culture of fear and moral panic, combined with heightened, emotional feelings of

persecution and marginalization amongst gays that ACT UP was born.

During the late 1980s/early 1990s Medellín witnessed a comparable series of moral shocks. The

intensification of violence, exemplified by bombings and high profile assassinations, together with the

phenomenon of teenage victims and perpetrators created a moral shock. The assassination of high

32

profile politicians, such as the Minster for Justice, Rodrigo Lara Bonilla by teenage hit men created a

moral panic about poor male youth and violence (Riaño Alcalá 2010:45-46). This led to public and

media outrage and a widespread sense of despair. It also resulted in the stigmatization of poor male

youth and the wider community in the peripheral barrios. Young males were labelled as sicarios and

the neighbourhoods and areas where they gathered informally were regarded as the breeding ground

for hit men (Riaño Alcalá2010:47-48). This stigma further ostracised the already excluded

communities in the ‘informal city’ on the periphery of Medellín (Alcaldía de Medellín 2011; 40,

Riaño Alcalá 2010:47-48).

This negative stereotyping also created a self-fulfilling prophecy leading to increased youth violence

which simultaneously resulted in fear, anger, sadness and the normalisation of sicario culture amongst

sections of young people. In this highly charged situation many inhabitants of the barrios accepted

and internalized these interpretations which increasingly helped shape their own perceptions of

themselves and the social reality within which they lived (Salazar 1990: Ortiz 1991).The saying ‘No

nacimos pa semilla’ coined by youth in the peripheral barrios and the shift in the definition of the

word sicario reflect these perceptions of social reality at the time (Ortiz, 1991). The word sicario (hit

man) which became to mean young hit man (Oritz 1991). Paradoxically this febrile atmosphere also

produced new counter narratives which consciously rejected externally engendered stereotypes and

facilitated the development of new strategies for prevention and resistance to violence.

These developments provided fertile soil in the late 1980s for the formation of groups such as La

Alianza led by the artist Quintana (considered to be one of the pioneers of the hip hop movement)

which promoted hip hop as a tool for social change in Medellín. Quintana has been credited for

setting up the first hip hop school for young people in the city, based on a philosophy that art could

facilitate peace. His messages of resistance led to his murder and the group dissolved (Cultura y

Libertad Medellín 2011).However, other groups such as Clika Underground founded in 1990,

Sociedad FB7/Republica UND founded in 1993, El Laberinto founded in 1997 and Crew Peligrosos

33

founded in 1999, followed in Alianza’s footsteps making hip hop as a form of social protest and

resistance2.

Outlining the context in which hip hop movements evolved has exposed the weakness of state-centric

theories in understanding the movement in Medellín. In contrast, the multi-institutional model

provides a framework to understand both the emergence of the movement and its particular

orientation towards violence. Equally, considering the significance of emotions in mobilization has

added another enriching dimension to interpretation of the emergence of the hip hop movement in the

1990s. However, important questions remain about the nature of the movement. Why did hip hop

emerge as a significant movement rather than remaining just a youth subculture? Above all, why did

actors from the wider community choose this form of mobilization as a vehicle for dissent and a

means of social change?

2 See Crew Pelgrisos sala de prensa (2013). SociedadFB7. (2013b), El Laberinto. (2009) listed in the bibliography.

34

CHAPTER 2: WHY HIP-HOP? PROTESTA A TRAVÉS DEL PARCHE

Hip hop emerged in the early 1970s amongst black urban youth living in marginalised New York

communities such as the Bronx (Rose 1994, Stapleton, 1998, Jefferies 2011:1, Tickner 2008, Malone

& Martinez, Jr, 2010). The four elements of hip hop (djing, break dancing, MCing and graffiti)

emerged as tools with which marginalised young people expressed dissent, formed alternative

identities and depicted and made sense of their everyday social reality. As Tickner notes, hip hop is

unique in

‘…the way it relates to everyday life. In reflecting on poverty, inequality, exclusion, and

discrimination; claiming a positive identity based on these conditions; and offering musical,

linguistic, and corporal tools for commenting on them, it transcends the bounded sites where

it is practiced and participates in a symbolic network that circulates globally. However,

hiphop is also markedly local, in that lived experience is rearticulated in the contents of rap

lyrics, which speak to the daily concerns of its practitioners; and in graffiti and breakdancing,

which occupy and re-signify the streets and neighbourhoods where they are performed.’

(2004:1)

Such observations illustrate why hip hop can be a suitable tool for resistance and a manifestation of

dissent.

As hip hop emerged in New York at a time of socio-economic crisis resulting in the ghettoization and

alienation of urban black youths (Rose1994 27-33, Jefferies 2011:1), hip hop in Medellín also evolved

in a time of acute social upheaval, punctuated by a spiralling (youth)murder rate, terrorism,

displacement, political corruption and chronic poverty. Thus, despite the disparate historical, political,

economic and social features of 1970s New York and 1990s Medellín, parallels can be drawn between

the emergence of hip hop at times of youth social upheaval and urban crisis in the two cities.

Young people have played a salient role as both perpetrators and victims of Medellín’s violence,

accounting for over 40,000 homicides since 1987 (Yarce 2007).3 Young males, in particular, from the

3 Victims are aged between 14-26 years old.

35

poorer neighbourhoods with limited life chances have been targeted by criminal gangs and drug

cartels as potential recruits lured by the culture of easy money and status (Ortiz,1991, Suarez

Rodriguez et al 2005:205). As Riaño Alcalá suggests, life itself in Medellín in the 1980s and early

1990s was a commodity, with young men willing to kill for a price (2010:2). Poor young men were

stigmatised by the media associated with the image of the hit man on a moped . Reflecting on the

perception of youth at this time MC Medina of Comuna 6 remarks:

‘… los jóvenes un estigma permanente porque para la ciudad todos éramos sicarios… todos

enseñamos algo de las pandillas eso es lo que los medios de comunicación dijeron pero también había

mucha gente haciendo arte en este momento.’ (Babble Fish Productions 2010).

M.C Medina’s words reveal a nexus between the labelling of young people as criminals and the

significance of artistic endeavours employed by the very same people. The fact that he elects to

contextualise the creation of art against this backdrop of negative perceptions of youth, demonstrates

that he positions art as a form of resistance. Artistic processes are deployed to challenge these

dominant perceptions of youth perpetrated by the media. Choosing to use ‘pero’ and ‘también’ in the

above statement, illustrates the contrasting, but related themes in the sentence, illustrating that he sees

the production of art and acts of criminality as opposing cultures operating in parallel.

The notion that art is a tool for resisting negative labels is also evidenced in a book about graffiti in

Medellín published by La Casa de las Estrategias which claims that graffiti has provided youth with a

means of not falling into stereotypical representations in debates on violence (2012:1). Within this

framework, art can be regarded both as a tool of defiance against the culture of criminality and a

challenge to the dominant perception of poor male youth advanced by the popular press and other

powerful agents (Garces Montoya 2010c:43). Therefore hip hop culture can be understood as an

instrument with which marginalised youth in Medellín transmit an alternative image to these

stereotypes of poor young men as criminals. Moreover, as Rose suggests in oppressive contexts in

which marginalised people have limited and unfeasible strategies and outlets to directly challenge

dominant groups, culture can manifest itself as an expression of rage, defiance and to mock powerful

actors (Rose 1994: 99).

36

The song ‘Juan Pepito’, by Cultura y Libertad (Rapculturaylibertad. 2013) provides an example of

such mockery and defiance through music. The song, a tragic comedy based on a children’s clapping

rhyme, tells the story of the decline and death of a young boy who becomes involved in drugs and

gangs. The song charts the demise of the child as he engages in criminality, ending with his funeral in

adolescence. The video begins with rappers dressed as middle aged house wives, sweeping their

houses and gossiping about the death of Juan Pepito. The tone of the video is light-hearted, tongue-in-

cheek with rappers undertaking various characters as the story develops, yet also providing a covert

and powerful means of ridiculing criminal culture.

Marginalised youth oppressed by powerful cohort of illicit armed actors have limited means to

challenge them. Direct confrontation is not a viable strategy as it could result in displacement,

violence or death. Thus, at times hip hop has taken on the role as a subtle instrument of defiance.

Moreover, in this context of illicit agents, traditional and overt forms of social dissent, for example,

demonstrations or civil disobedience would not be a feasible strategy as the dominant agents operate

outside normative institutional channels. Thus, defiance, having evolved in accordance with the limits

of possibility available to marginalised youth facing violent illicit actors, is masked.

This subtle form of resistance is an example of what Rose refers to as a ‘hidden transcript’, a

clandestine discourse formulated by oppressed social groups that implicitly challenges hegemony

(Rose 1994:99-100). Examples of this ‘hidden’ transcript are best evidenced in the lexis often used by

hip hop crews that is associated with war or struggle. Song titles such as ‘En medio de la guerra’ by

Sociedad FB7, (SociedadFB7 2013a) ‘Almas en guerra’ by C15 (Caminante, J. 2012), ‘el guerrero de

microfono’ by ESK-Lones (TheAcme CreW 2012) illustrate references to struggle and conflict. This

reoccurring theme of ‘guerra’ is clearly a declaration of resistance against the elite actors in both

literal and figurative terms.

Cultural leader Jackgo from Comuna 1 provides a good example of hip hop as such a hidden

transcript. Jackgo lives in a poor area

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‘…‘donde la ley es otra’ y no se van a ir frontalmente contra los criminales, entonces su labor social

es ofrece ‘otra opción’: ¿Qué armas tenemos frente a este conflicto? Mi arma es el aerosol, mi arma es

el micrófono, mi arma es los pasos de break que enseño’ (La Casa de las Estrategias 2012:92)

Like the references to war in songs, Jackgo chooses language related to war to contextualise his role

as a hip hop artist. In doing this, he considers his weapons in this war to be the four elements of hip

hop, a microphone and spray paints. Framed in this way hip hop is conceived as a force of resistance,

subtly challenging this dominant culture of violence prevalent in the poorer barrios of Medellín.

Despite the apparent subversive nature of the narrative, the number of murders and threats made

against artists in Comuna 13 shows that its meaning is clearly understood, especially by the targets of

their art. In 2012, sixty hip hop artists were forced to flee after receiving threats from a gang. The

gang purportedly interpreted the production of a music video entitled ‘La Furia de las Pandillas’ as an

attack on them (Ojo de Gatos Films 2014). However, the artists insisted it was not a critique of the

gang and that it was a misunderstanding (Minuto30 2010). Since 2009, twelve hip hop artists have

been murdered in Comuna 13 with the most recent murder being that of a 14 year old rapper in

January 2014 (El Espectador 2014a). Some NGOs, civil movements, such as the Instituto Popular de

Capacitación and media reports have claimed that violent actors have particularly targeted hip hop

artists and their message of peace (Caracol 2012).

However, this has been contested by some artists and other NGO organizations, such as Corporación

Jurídica Libertad, who have claimed that artists have not been targeted for being artists, but rather for

being young in Comuna 13 (Hidalgo, Arias. W 2014). Whilst some of the motives for these murders

are unclear, others reflect the wider dynamics of Comuna 13 (La Semana 2011). For example, rapper

Daniel Alejandro Sierra Montoya was murdered in 2011 for crossing an ‘invisible border’ (El

Espectador, 2011b). Invisible borders are informal territorial markers that indicate an area controlled

by different gangs. Non-gang members moving outside of their local area into territory controlled by

another gang can result in death. Equally, refusing to join a gang can result in murder. In 2012, Robert

Steven Barrera was allegedly killed for refusing to join a gang (Hidalgo, Arias. W; 2014). These cases

illustrate that the motivation for the murders of artists is complex. They can be attributed to prevailing

38

issues in Comuna 13, such as territorial control and gang recruitment or as a resistance to violent

gangs. However, the threat of violence against hip hop artists does raise questions about the extent to

which hip hop is a completely hidden transcript as Rose suggests.

Given that predominantly young males have been the protagonists in Medellín’s conflicts, it is logical

that hip hop emerged as a powerful tool for challenging hegemonic perceptions of poor youth.

However, hip hop culture also serves as a tool for resistance as the next section will illustrate.

Furthermore, examining hip hop culture as a form of dissent will enable us to understand how it can

be a force for social change.

RECLAIMING THE BARRIO: HIP HOP AS RESISTANCE AND DISSENT

The presence of illicit armed actors and their power struggles in the peripheral barrios of Medellín

resulted in violence being played out in public spaces. Community spaces were transformed into

battlegrounds between rival gangs or as sites of executions by hit men. Hip hop in Medellín is a public

and collective activity. It occupies parks, squares, school playgrounds and the streets to give new

positive meaning to the public spaces that have been engulfed by violence. Consequently, in this

context hip hop allows marginalised people to carve their own space into a landscape dominated by

violence. In this way it defies Lifestyle Movement theory assertions that hip hop is a private,

individual choice to frame and construct identity (Haenfler, R., Johnson, B. & Jones, E. 2012). Hip

hop schools are the most overt examples of this public and collective action. The schools were set up

to teach children and young people the four elements of hip hop. Operating in public, outside spaces

they create what Rose terms an ‘open-air community centre’ which allows youth to transform their

locality through the ownership of space (Rose 1994:22).

Graffiti functions in a similar manner by providing the most obvious manifestations of spatial

ownership through public images reflecting artists’ individual or collective interpretation of daily life

in the barrio. Graffiti artist ‘Eyes’ illustrated this when he remarked that ‘quiero representar nuestra

vivencia porque es lo más importante’ (Casa de las Estrategias 2012:68). The use of the pronoun

39

‘nuestra’ reveals that graffiti is not always focused on individual representation. It can also be a

symbolic process of collective expressions of shared and lived experiences. The use of the collective

pronoun could variously be interpreted as ‘our’ experiences referring to the hip hop crews or the

wider community.

In a similar vein reflecting this theme of collective and lived experiences, ‘El Perro’ from Comuna 13

framed graffiti as a ‘… revolución, es formación de artistas y es museo abierto en el barrio.’(Casa de

las Estrategias 2012:40).Therefore, in creating an open air museum for the barrio, graffiti not only

constructs and recounts collective experiences from the perspective of the imagined community, it

also gives new historic meaning and identity to public spaces. It provides marginalised agents with the

means to interpret and shape their own locality, rather than having it imposed upon them by dominant

actors, such as the illicit agents, the state or the popular press. Furthermore, creating or arguably

reclaiming public spaces in which to construct an alternative social reality constitutes an act of

defiance or, as El Perro remarks, a revolution.

40

Figure 2: Graffiti in Comuna 1. Source the author

41

Figure 3 Graffiti works in Medellín, by Comuna and social strata. Source: Casa de las Estrategias,

2012.

As Figure 3 suggests an interesting geographical relationship between graffiti and violence in

Medellín. The map shows pieces of graffiti by comuna. The red dots represent pieces of graffiti whilst

the red lines depict a cluster of pieces. From the map, there are clusters of graffiti in Popular (Comuna

1) Aranjuez (Comuna 4), La Castilla (Comuna 5) La Candelaria (Comuna 10), San Javier (Comuna

13) and Guayabal (Comuna 15). These comunas have endured some of the worse episodes of violence

and consistently register the highest levels of murder, displacements and other human rights abuses

according to Personería de Medellín data (Personería 2011, 2012, 2013). Whilst there is no clear

causal relationship and it would be wrong to attempt to correlate high levels of illicit activity to the

strong presence of graffiti in these comunas, this map certainly adds a degree of credibility to the

hypothesis that graffiti can act as a form of spatial resistance.

Music also vocalises this appropriation of space and a strong sense of habitus with lyrics often making

reference to the barrio. For example, the song by Crew Peligrosos ‘Esto tiene la suyo’

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(Crewpeligrososmusic 2013) is littered with references to locality. In the video for the song, Aranjuez

(Comuna Four) and the city of Medellín is referenced both lyrically and aesthetically throughout the

video. The area of Aranjuez, in the north of Medellín, is a violent area, with the fourth highest murder

rate, high incidence of human rights abuses and widespread poverty (Personería de Medellín 2012:

18, 74,139). The locality is apparent in the first verse with the rapper stating that ‘Medallo esta

marcado’. (Medallo is a local name for Medellín). Having framed the song in Medellín, the artists

continue to make references to locality. However, as the song develops they become more

geographically specific focusing on their Comuna:

‘Soy del norte,

del barrio donde hay buenos cortes la B

94,

Aranjuez es el soporte’ (Crewpeligrososmusic 2013)

At this point in the video, the artist removes his cap which has the word ‘Aranjeuz’ written on it and

points to the word. In doing this, the artist highlights the significance of this word ‘Aranjuez’ and his

desire to transmit this to the audience. Similarly, a shot of a local bus with the word ‘Aranjuez’ further

demonstrates the significance of locality. Further aesthetic references are made to Medellín with

members of the crew wearing t-shirts and caps ’Calles de Medellín’. The repetition of these overt

visual and verbal references to locality suggests that this is a key element of the song. This gesture of

emphasising locality can be understood as a means of appropriating space by transmitting an

alternative, positive view of ‘Aranjuez’ and its young residents to a local, national and global

audience. Stressing the locality and the imagined community in the song can also be interpreted as a

means of challenging negative perceptions of Aranjuez as constructed by powerful external, and thus

antagonistic, agents such as the media and the state (Anderson 1991). Thus, hip hop culture

challenges cultural and social hegemony of the media and other powerful institutions by transmitting

another image of youth through graffiti or local hip hop parches (hangouts).

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Equally, creating spaces for hip hop also facilitates the building of community youth relations and

collective identity in barrios fractured by turf wars and rival gangs as it

‘… constituya espacios de solidaridad y encuentro entre hermanos de barriada… para que se generen

espacios en los que jóvenes de las comunas reconozcan lugares comunes de encuentro, espacios

donde nosotros los jóvenes tengamos la palabra y con ella nuestra herramienta de visibilización frente

al mundo.’(Cultura y Libertad 2010).

This statement, from the hip hop network Cultura y Libertad’s website, illustrates the process of

appropriating space in the barrio is also an act of youth empowerment. It is a means of determining

one’s own culture and visibly displaying this culture and identity to the wider community and the

world. In this way, the construction of this space defies and challenges hegemony in several guises.

Firstly, this space can provide an alternative space for youth in their free time and physically

removing them from the lure of illicit actor recruitment. Secondly, hip hop culture allows young

people to shape the landscape of the barrio in the face of illicit actor control. Thirdly, defiance is

articulated by creating and nurturing an alternative culture of non-violence through workshops and

socialization into an alternative type of social organization. It is to this process of creating an

alternative culture that we now turn.

HIP HOP AS A COUNTER CULTURE. ‘HIP HOP IS MY ART. HIP HOP IS MY LIFE’4

Within these appropriated hip hop spaces children and young people are socialised into an

alternative culture. ‘Cultural education’ is focused on the four elements of hip hop and the

philosophy of non-violence. Thus children and young people learn and reproduce an

alternative culture to gang culture.

However, as Alexander 2003 and Hays 2000 have noted culture can be both constraining

and transformative. Thus, whilst hip hop culture may provide an alternative to gang culture,

there are also similarities between them. For example, hip hop members develop a collective

sense of identity as part of a group, a crew or family which mirrors collective identities

4 Quote taken from graffiti sketch at a hip hop school in Comuna 15.

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fostered in criminal gangs (Rose 1994:34). Belonging to a group can provide the benefits of

the support, friendship and loyalty which are often important for adolescents as they make

the transition to adulthood (Stretesky & Pogrebin, 2007:88).Thus, despite the socialization

into disparate norms and values, belonging to hip hop crews or criminal gangs can provide

the same emotional support and sense of belonging. Furthermore, as Vigil (1988a: 63)

acknowledges being part of a gang enables ‘members to internalize and adhere to alternative

norms and modes of behaviour and play a significant role in helping…youth acquire a sense

of importance, self-esteem and identity.’ Salazar also notes the importance of gang culture

in forming identity and social cohesion (1990:123-124)

Whilst Salazar and Vigil’s analysis is focused on violent gangs in Medellín and the USA, it

can be contended that the socialization into a hip hop group produces similar outcomes in

terms of a sense of importance, self–esteem, identity and social cohesion. Therefore,

drawing upon the parallels between hip hop culture and criminal gang culture, will facilitate

our understanding as to why hip hop is a suitable alternative culture for youth (with a

particular focus on males) in the peripheral areas. Firstly, the prevalence and consequences

of gang culture will be examined.

In the peripheral barrios young people experience high levels of unemployment (exacerbated by the

stigmatizing and stereotyping of poor young men as sicarios) and socio-economic deprivation. This

leads to very limited life chances and legitimate opportunities for male youth (Riaño Alcalá 2010:48).

Thus, in this context, ‘being employed’ by a criminal gang can be an attractive prospect (Suarez

Rodriguez et al 2005:204-205).

Drug cartels’ contacts with the US resulted in the exposure of these peripheral barrios to a consumer

culture. This encouraged material aspirations which were unattainable through legitimate channels

given the high levels of inequality and poverty in these areas. This emerging consumer culture was

typified by showing off material wealth in the form of fashion, brands, houses and cars to affirm

oneself as part of the nouveau riche (Salazar 1990: 120, Ortiz 1991, Riaño Alcalá 2010: 47). 5

5 Henry Arteaga also makes reference to this in his TEDx Talk 2010.

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However, the economic benefit of joining a gang is not the only appeal; the status and power attached

to belonging to a gang, access to training and using guns are also attractive to adolescent and youth

adult males (Ortiz 1991,Riaño Alcalá 2010: 45-46).

Indeed, Baird’s research on gang culture in the peripheral barrios of Medellín reveals that this culture

of consumerism, status and power are consistent with local, established masculinities which are

characterised by traits of economic power, toughness, respect and leadership (2013:11). Thus, this

version of masculinity is often typified by gang participation as men seek channels to construct

identities in accordance with local expectations and within the limitations of their socio-economic

reality. Riaño Alcalá account of the Calientes in Barrio Antioquia illuminates how gang activities and

language ‘…reinforce warrior values and a model of masculine heroism’ (2010: 88). Ortiz (1991) also

notes how the cultural acceptance of gangs and sicarios can be understood as part of a legacy of

Colombia’s violent past and the inheritance of cultural norms regarding violence and masculinity.

Thus, it is apparent that violence as an expression of masculinity is woven into the cultural fabric of

the barrios. Similarly, the changing role of women since the 1960s and the increasing tendencies

towards emasculation of /in Colombian society have also impacted on the construction of masculine

identities.

Traditional male identities are increasingly unrealistically attainable due to the feminist movement

and growing inequalities between rich and poor within Colombian society. However, participation in

criminal gangs provides a route for the construction and reinforcement of traditional male identities.

(Cleaver, 2002; Barker, 2005). Activities undertaken by gangs provide spaces for overt expressions

and constructions of these traditional local masculine identities: combined with symbolic and violent

action, these expressions of violence provide an opportunity to attain status amongst peers (Anderson

1999). Being part of a gang allows members to construct and act out local masculine identities by

playing the role of the sicario, paramilitary, criminal or drug dealer (Baird, 2013: 97-101). These roles

demonstrate power and economic success, thus allowing gang members to attain status and

recognition within their local community, especially amongst women (Riaño Alcalá 2010:53).

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In many respects hip hop culture acts as a substitute for gang based socialization as it mirrors these

expressions of local masculine identities. Hip hop crews and gangs both provide an arena which

allows young males to demonstrate and learn masculine traits in accordance with local gender role

expectations. However, masculine values are manifested through diverse expressions. Therefore hip

hop can be understood as a variant of existing local masculinities. Whilst it reproduces the core values

of local masculinities, it alters the ways they are manifested. Thus, hip hop simultaneously reinforces

aspects of local masculine culture whilst challenging the normalised culture of violence. In this way

hip hop culture concurrently reinforces and alters established versions of masculinity. Hip hop artists,

to a certain degree, are constrained by established versions of masculinity, but they are also able to

alter this masculine culture characterised by a culture of non-violence.

The four elements of hip hop exemplify this function of constraining and transforming masculine

culture. MCing, graffiti, djing and breakdancing all provide opportunities for the non-violent

expressions of local masculinity. Break dancing is an expression of physical strength as complex

moves require athleticism and thus could be understood as an articulation of the masculine value of

aggression. Furthermore, break dancing battles between crews also provides a competitive arena in

which participants can demonstrate aggression and be accorded status amongst their peers for

particular moves or their victory in a non-violent, if aggressively ritualized, competition (Banes

2004:14, Schloss 2009).

In the same vein, being recognised as a talented graffiti artist because of an innovative painting style

or the risk sometimes involved in painting in public spaces also elevates the status of the artist

amongst their peers. Similarly, as rapper, El Flacho comments improvised verbal eloquence

(toasting), an ability to rap to complex rhythms, boasting to an audience and orally belittling your

opponent in public MC battles also provides an opportunity for status and recognition (Caminante

2011b). These ‘battles’ constitute non-violent expressions of competition and confrontation which

satisfy the construction and positive affirmation of local versions of masculinity. They provide an

arena in which male youth learn about aggression, physical strength, assertiveness and leadership

from older hoppers. In these ways hip hop culture acts in a similar, if non-violent way, to gang culture

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by providing avenues for the formation, articulation and the affirmation of prevalent versions of

masculinity.

Figure 4 MC Battle Comuna 13: Source Un-Convention

Indeed, the creation of the hip hop organization Zulu Nation, founded by a former gang member

Africa Bambaataa, which sought to provide alternatives to non-criminal activities for former gang

members, is a representative case in point. Similarly, some prominent members of Medellín’s hip hop

scene, such as El Flacho and El Perro are former gang members who give credence to the hypothesis

that there is a certain level of continuity between hip hop crews and criminal gangs. Fernando (1994)

supports this view when he notes that hip hop allows youth to fight with creativity rather than guns. In

this way hip hop challenges the normalisation of violence that emerged in the late 80s-early 1990s,

and attempts to act in a transformative way. However, hip hop culture also simultaneously reinforces

local masculine traits, and can thus reinforce less positive aspect of barrio culture, such as ‘traditional’

gender roles and relationships.

Consequently, it would be impossible to discuss hip hop as a form of masculine identity without

discussing female participation in this culture. Garces Montoya’s (2010a) work on female hip hop

artists in Medellín seeks to understand how hip hop appeals to women given that it is an expression of

local perceptions of masculinity (2010a, 47). The study reveals that hip hop contests local perceptions

of femininity and reconstructs new female identities. Through interviews with several prominent

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female artists, hip hop is framed as challenging established female values resulting in conflicts

between families, friends and boyfriends (2010: 48, 50-52).

Furthermore, traditional perceptions of femininity held by male artists have also hindered female hip

hop artists as they are often judged on their looks rather than their talent (2010:52). Therefore, female

artists have to work hard to be accepted by their male counterparts. Given that perceptions of

masculinity and femininity cannot be divorced, Garcia Montoya’s research on female hip hop artists

illustrates local aspects of masculinity and male identities. Discussing female participation in an

apparently masculine space suggests a challenge to local accounts of hip hop as purely an expression

of masculinity, and therefore supports the notion of hip hop, in these aspects at least, as a suitable

substitution for established local masculine identities.

Given this, the few women that are involved in the hip hop movement are negotiating new forms of

femininity and in turn are altering perceptions of masculinity. Mc Natrix highlights this theme by

suggesting that…’una mujer hip hop no responde a la estructura tradicional, entonces tienen que

enfrentarse a sus propios límites y superarlos…se convierte en una mujer combativa que no se

conforma’ (quoted in Garces Montya 2010a: 52). Her words reveal a nexus between hip hop and

female empowerment as she overcomes her limits, breaks with traditional (patriarchal) structures and

becomes a fighter. The tone of her language could be interpreted as aggressive and powerful,

characteristics not normally associated with female identities in the peripheral barrios. Thus, just as

hip hop has provided a space for the construction and articulation of a modified version of local

masculinities, it could be argued that the perceived masculine nature of hip hop has also provided a

space for women to contest established femininities and reconstruct new female identities. Given this,

the potential for behavioural change and shifts in cultural codes facilitated by hip hop has another

dimension encompassing not only non-violent norms and values but also affecting gender identities

and roles as well.

Socialisation into these non-violent manifestations of masculinity provides a foundation for the

development of distinct norms and values which foster a culture and sense of collective identity.

Names, language, gestures and fashion are the most apparent articulation of a distinct culture. Hip hop

49

groups reinforce collective identities through names that usually contain lexis related to collectivity,

such as ‘crew’,’ klan’, ‘red’ or ‘familia’ or more original names like ‘Sociedad FB7, familia del barrio

7 (7 represents the number of original members of the group) or El Laberinto ELC (en las calles). The

appropriation of a name by a group provides both a private and public affirmation of collectivity by

signalling publicly membership and belonging to a particular group. Similarly, logos, websites and

social media also act as aesthetic markers of collective identity.

Within this collective, members also carve out individual identities, assuming a particular role as a DJ,

MC, producer, break dancer or graffiti artist. Individuals select an artistic name or are given one by

their peers in recognition for a particular skill or characteristic. For example, the graffiti artist ‘Eyes’

of Crew Peligrosos was given this name by his peers as he developed his own writing style by

observing other artists’ work (Casa de las Estrategias 2012:64).

These aesthetic symbols have become synonymous with hip hop. They are the visual representations

that are understood within the group, other hip hop groups and the wider community. Thus, the

aesthetics of hip hop have emerged as another facet of this resistance to social and cultural hegemony.

Names, fashions and logos are visual manifestations of dissent as they are indicators of one’s

affiliation to hip hop culture rather than to gang culture or another culture. Thus, oversized t-shirts,

baggy jeans, baseball caps and trainers are more than a fashion statement or part of a youth subculture

style; they are part of this narrative of resistance and an expression of an alternative culture .6 These

aesthetic symbols enable individuals to be identified by their hip hop crews, other crews, the wider

community, the media, the state and criminal gangs as a hip hop artist which in Medellín has become

associated with a culture of peace and positive change (El Espectador 2012, Sanchez, 2012, Giraldo

Aragno 2013).

Thus, aesthetic and linguistic are overt signs of difference and belonging to the ‘other’. However,

these markers are part of a wider culture of distinct norms and values that are produced within hip hop

spaces. Children and young people are socialized into alternative norms and values to that of the

6 Whilst this style may also be associated with fashions appropriated by Chicano gangs in the US, in Medellin this style is associated with hip hop culture as stated by Henry Arteaga of Crew Peligrosos. See British Council (2014).

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culture of easy money and violence offered by illicit agents. In this way, hip hop culture can be

regarded as a toolkit to inform behaviour and one’s understanding of reality (Swidler 1986). Hip hop

organizations allow young people and children to be socialized into an alternative culture based on

non-violence and good standards of behaviour. For example, children and young people have to be

diligent students and maintain good relationships with their friends and family in order to attend the

Crew Peligrosos’ Cuatro Elementos Escuela in Comuna 4. Thus, hip hop schools provide more than

just artistic training in the four elements of hip hop. They also focus on social and life skills. As 14

year old break dancer B-Boy Kritical notes in the documentary ‘In the streets of Medellín’

‘La escuela no se trata solo de baile y hip hop, se trata también de la vida cotidiana. ’ (Babble Fish

Productions 2010).

Similarly, by virtue of being in a non-violent environment, children and young people are removed

from a culture of violence and the lure of illicit activity. Breakdancer Hellstyle, aged 12,

acknowledged this by commenting that

‘…viniendo acá me ayudar alejarme de muchos peligrosos que hay en la calle… si no

estuviera acá, digamos, que estaría andando en la calle y pasaría cosas peores o estaría

metiéndome en cosas más malas…’ (Babble Fish Productions 2010).

These accounts illustrate how hip hop culture attempts to be a daily articulation of social change

challenging the cultural status quo based on illicit activity and violence. Children and young people

are socialized into a culture based on peace, tolerance and co-existence as well as stressing the

importance of education.

Given that young people are the intended participants in this process of social change, it is logical that

the discourse of the hip hop schools is not laced with typical political rhetoric. However, this is not to

suggest that children are unaware of their social reality and the options available to them. Indeed, the

children in the documentary ‘In the streets of Medellín’ demonstrated a degree of social

consciousness. When explaining their reasons for joining the hip hop school, the children refer to the

‘dangers in the street’ and the possible negative consequences for them. Acknowledging that hip hop

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culture provides an alternative option to violence and criminality is evidence of conscious-raising

within the movement, and its potential for resistance and social change.

Furthermore, children are given positive role models in the form of hip hop leaders who are accorded

status for their artistic abilities within the hip hop fraternity and the wider community in Medellín. (El

Colombiano 2012b, La Semana 2012a). These hip hop leaders provide younger members with

positive alternative role models to the local gang leaders. Some artists have performed abroad at

events such as SXSW in the USA, won national music awards, performed with established artists,

such as Juanes and are making a living from their art. (Gobierno del Estado de Tamaulipas.2011,

Shock.com.co. 2012, SXSW 2013). Such accomplishments provide positive incentives and motivate

younger children and teenagers to seek to emulate this success. In the same vein, children and young

people are given a space in which their aspirations are nurtured and realised as children are developed

as artists. Indeed, Henry Arteaga of Crew Peligrosos explains that one of the aims of the Cuatro

Elementos School in Aranjuez is to develop children and young people professionally so that they can

make a living from hip hop (Babble Fish Productions 2010). This cultural entrepreneurial spirit

demonstrates how hip hop can offer children and young people long term economic benefits as well

as social and cultural opportunities.

The concept of peace and non-violence is referenced on the websites and Facebook pages of many

groups (Cultura y Libertad, Elite Red de hip hop, El Laberinto ELC, Crew Peligrosos, Sociedad FB7),

and forms part of the groups’ biography (see also Garces-Montoya: 2007, 9). In positioning

themselves in this way, the groups demonstrate that their music is a form of resistance to violence,

emerging as a response to gang culture or ‘frente a la guerra’. Similarly, in promoting values of peace

and rejecting violence as part of the group’s narrative on their websites demonstrates an entrenched

commitment to social change.

Thus, in the context of Medellín, hip hop has evolved to become a model of social change and an act

of defiance for youth in peripheral areas. It has provided them with a tool to contest negative

stereotypes and stigmas imposed upon them by dominant agents by presenting youth as artists,

cultural leaders, teachers and pacifists. Equally, hip hop has enabled youth to appropriate public space

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in which they can nurture an alternative culture, shape collective memory and reinforce shared

experiences. Furthermore, hip hop culture also fosters a sense of collective identity and camaraderie

as well as providing support networks.

In the same vein, these spaces are avenues for resistance, allowing young artists to indirectly

challenge illicit actor hegemonic culture in a subtle form, both literally and figuratively through their

music, language, gestures, names and dress. In this way hip hop is an articulation of resistance against

a culture of criminality and violence, illustrating that it is more than a cultural phenomenon, a

Lifestyle Movement or a youth subculture.

Thus, whilst hip hop groups may not manifest their dissent or realise social change through

conventional methods adopted by other social movements, this does not suggest that resistance is not

evident. The movement has responded to the conditions of possibility set by dominant agents

operating outside the parameters of institutional politics, (either as a corrupt or withdrawn state or as

criminal gangs), and their covert and unorthodox modus operandi reflects this.

Similarly, given the role of youth in illicit violence and criminality, the development of an alternative

culture had to appeal to this demographic and social group. Hip hop culture is attractive to young

males as it offers an outlet for the formation, articulation and affirmation of local masculine values.

The goal of the hip hop movement is violence prevention, thus the movement targets children and

teenagers. It is the prevailing threat of violence and the preventative nature of the movement that also

explains why a popular youth culture, rather than a more conventional social movement, emerged and

acts as a viable channel for social change. This chapter examined how and why hip hop emerged as a

tool for resistance and social change in Medellín in the 1990s. The following chapter will lay the

theoretical foundations to assess the trajectory and wider impact of the movement.

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CHAPTER 3: MEASURING IMPACT: FRAMEWORKS AND ISSUES

Before we attempt to examine the impact of the movement, it is necessary to discuss models and

issues related to measuring outcomes. As social movement scholars have noted measuring impact is

often a neglected and complex area of study (Guingi 1998, 2008, Tarrow 2011). The challenge for

scholars is to find causality between incidents of social change and the actions of a social movement

(Tarrow 2011:215-217, Guingi 2008:1583). Given this, much literature has tended to focus on policy

outcomes as a measure of the consequences of mobilization in Western democracies.

Attempting to measure the impact of the hip hop movement in Medellín poses several challenges. For

example, attributing causality to decreases in violence and the movement’s impact would be an

obvious measure given the movement’s aims. However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt

to collate a relationship between decreased incidences of violence/youth participation and the

presence of hip hop culture in the locality.

Measuring peace building poses several challenges. Firstly, the movement seeks to physically remove

children from the threat of illicit activity. Thus, there is a focus on prevention and resistance. Whilst,

hip hop schools and graffiti can be understood as markers of success in the appropriation of space,

measuring their impact on children at risk of recruitment from gangs is more problematic. Given that

the focus is on prevention, that is targeting children before they join a gang, it is beyond the feasibility

of this thesis to measure the success of this outcome as the motivations for (not) joining a gang are

multi-causal. Therefore participation in the hip hop movement may have been inconsequential to a

young person rejecting gang culture or merely a factor in a wider set of dynamics. Thus, seeking to

hypothetically attribute causality between participation in the hip hop movement and rejection of gang

culture would be flawed as it oversimplifies structural and cultural variables. As Baird’s (2011)

research on participation in gangs in Medellín concludes, a cluster of individual circumstances such as

parenting and home life, influence of friends and siblings, role-models, family history, educational

attainment and religion were significant in rejecting or embracing gang culture

Equally, measuring social psychological outcomes, such as consciousness raising and personal

identity have also been discarded as a viable measurement of impact. This is due to the limitations for

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data collection and analysis by a lone researcher and the complexity of measuring subjective concepts.

Notwithstanding, from a social psychological perspective, the interviews with children and young

people in the documentary ‘En las calles de Medellín’ (Babbe Fish Productions 2010) and ‘Musica

resiste’ (Alarcón & Sánchez, (2010 a,b). are perhaps indicative of consciousness raising.

Similarly, personal and biographical consequences of social movements which Giugni defines as’ the

effects on the life-course of individuals who have participated in movement activities, effects that are

at least in part due to involvement in those activities’ (2008 1588-1589) have been disregarded as a

viable outcome to assess given the limitations of time.

Therefore, in order to assess the outcomes and understand the trajectories of the movement, political

and cultural features will be explored. Borrowing Giugni’s definition, political outcomes can be

understood as the impact a movement has on its political environment (2008:1583). This has typically

led to the assessment of policy change in the institutional sphere. Cultural outcomes will focus on

cultural production in media discourse. Synthesising political and cultural outcome frameworks seeks

to provide a nuanced account of a heterogeneous set of behaviours and outcomes of the movement.

Gamson’s (1990) typology of acceptance will be utilised to measure the political outcomes of the hip

hop movement. Acceptance is present when social movements are acknowledged by political elites as

legitimate actors and thus gain new advantages. New advantages are defined as new benefits for a

movement (1990:29). The degrees to which movements are accepted or gain new benefits could be an

indication of incorporation or transformation. Incorporation refers to the integration of a movement

into the existing political structure which does not fundamentally alter prevailing structural

arrangements (Giugni 1998 xiv). In contrast, transformation is regarded as provoking change in social

and political structures.

Equally, Gamson’s (1998) work on cultural change, drawing upon public discourse, particularly mass

media, will enable us to assess cultural change through perceptions of the movement by the media, the

government, the wider community and illicit actors. Measuring outcomes have been elected in this

way as they provide appropriate frameworks to evidence empirically political and cultural changes.

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Melucci and Lyyra’s model on outcomes of social movements, drawing on the intersection of

political, social and cultural will be tested (1998:218-223)

Before assessing the outcomes of the hip hop current, it is necessary to distinguish between intentional

and unintentional outcomes, As Giugni argues (1999:XX), a movement may not (fully) achieve or

indeed fail to achieve demands. However, as a consequence of social protest, the movement may

inadvertently produce change that are not necessarily related to their original demands. Therefore,

these by-products of social action are often significant thus merit consideration

Thus, having established the theoretical terrain, the following chapter will employ these frameworks

to discuss the trajectories and outcomes of three organizations in the hip hop movement.

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CHAPTER 4: ASSESSING OUTCOMES: HIP HOP MOVEMENTS IN THE ‘TRANSFORMED’ MEDELLÍN.

Since the emergence of the hip hop groups in the early 1990s, Medellín has undergone a radical

transformation both politically and ascetically. The Colombian government has attempted to end a

long-running civil war through peace talks with the left wing FARC guerrilla group which have

continued to the present day.

It was against this backdrop of increased stability and decreasing levels of violence that in 2003, the

mathematician turned politician Sergio Fajardo was elected Mayor of Medellín. In 2004, Sergio

Fajardo implemented the Development Plan 2004-2007, a holistic strategy that sought to transform

Medellín by promoting, equality and social and political participation (Alcaldía de Medellín 2004).

The construction of public spaces, innovative participatory budgeting (in which local communities

decide how funds are allocated) and local planning initiatives underscore how the Development Plan

was committed to tackling inequality whilst promoting transparent and accountable governance. As a

result of these initiatives, Medellín gained an international reputation as the most innovative city for

its urban and social transformation (Citigroup Inc.2013).

Murder rates have fallen significantly since peaking at 381 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants in 1991 to

38 deaths per 100,000 in 2013 (Medellín Como Vamos 2013). However, micro-conflicts amongst

illicit agents are still present, with an estimated 140 criminal gangs (mainly linked to drug trafficking)

operating in many areas of the city (Instituto Popular de Capacitacion, 2009).Furthermore, despite the

implementation of the Development Plan, according to a UN report, inequality in the city increased

15% between 1990 and 2010, (Tellez, Oliveros. V. 2013). The prevailing issues of poverty and

security perhaps illustrate the limited success of the Development Plan.

Thus, it is apparent that Medellín has undergone significant structural changes in the past decade, with

power differentials shifting from illicit centres of power to the state. However, whilst illicit agents’

power may have diminished, their prevailing existence continues to disrupt civic life and normalised

democratic practices. Extortion, forced displacement, disappearances, forced recruitment, violence

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and the existence of invisible borders demonstrates that illicit actors still wield power (albeit to a

lesser degree than in the 1980s/1990s) in Medellín7.

These recent political developments, a decline in violence coupled with the continued existence of

armed groups and inequality, pose some questions regarding the trajectories of the hip hop movement.

How has the movement responded to both this concurrent change and continuity? How has the

movement been affected by Fajardo and his successor’s cultural policies? Has the movement affected

political, cultural and social spheres? What do interactions with the state reveal about the impact and

trajectory of the movement? These questions will be addressed in the following case studies.

7 See Personeria de Medellin 2013 for further details.

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CASE STUDY 1: JEIHHCO OF LA ELITE/C15/ESCUELA KOLACHO.

In contrast to other hip hop movements in the city, the emergence of La red Elite de hip hop in 2002

can be understood as a direct response to Operación Orion. Operación Orion was a military offensive

ordered by President Uribe on guerrillas which led to a disputed number of civilian deaths, detentions,

disappearances and displacements in Comuna 13. As leader and director, Jeison Alexander Castaño

(also known as Jeihhco Caminante) of La Elite, C15 and Escuela Kolacho recalls that, ‘La Elite’ was

created with the help of the Asociación Cristiana de Jóvenes de Medellín (ACJ/YMCA).The

Asociación Cristiana de Jóvenes de Medellín invited rappers in Comuna 13 to a meeting in the

aftermath of Operación Orion. The aim of the meeting was to teach young people about peace

building, non-violent resistance, politics and the origins of hip hop (TEDX Talks 2012).With the

support of the ACJ-YMCA, the young people formed La Elite red de hip hop, with the firm intention

of creating a participatory process to empower young people (TEDX Talks 2012).

Since 2004, La Elite/C15 has organized the ‘Revolucion sin muertos’ annual hip hop festival which

aims to promote peace and co-existence. Furthermore, the hip hop collective established the Escuela

de hip-hop Kolacho in 2010 in memory of their bandmate MC Kolacho who was murdered. In 2013

they performed in Morocco (Cancillería, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. 2013). Jeihhco has

spoken at numerous international events about hip hop culture in Comuna 13 (TEDx Tigre 2014). In

2014, with the support of the YMCA, Juanes’ Fundacion Mi Sangre and La Alcaldía, the organization

opened a new school building ‘La casa de la esculea Kolacho’ (ADN Medellín 2014). The school also

received 100 million pesos from Beyonce’s foundation in 2013 (Noticias Caracol; n.d).

The unconventional origins of La Elite/C15 merit further examination. It provides an example of an

engineered evolution of a social movement by a formal institution, an NGO that has an agreement

with the state. This begs the question to what extent was the evolution of La Elite part of a peace

building ‘hearts and minds’ strategy in the aftermath of Operación Orion which had seriously

damaged the perception of the state in the community. The role of ACJ-YMCA was crucial in the

genesis of the hip hop movement in Comuna 13 by mobilizing youth. Similarly, ACJ-YMCA set the

agenda for hip hop as a process of non-violence resistance and has provided financial support and

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guidance for projects. Therefore, given the nature of its conception, La Elite/C15 could be regarded as

a product of an NGO and ultimately state’s agenda. The NGO’s aims require a degree of convergence

with the state in order to operate in a particular territory. Given this, La Elite/C15 was an excellent

candidate for incorporation, acceptance, and beneficiaries of new advantages from inception.

Access to new advantages is best evidenced by financial support. The ‘Revolucion sin muertos’

festival has received funding from the participatory budgeting scheme. The participatory budgeting

initiative promotes civic-state relations, transparent governance and civic democracy as communities

decided how government funds should be allocated (Alcaldía de Medellín 2010). However, research

undertaken by Gomez on the participatory budgeting scheme concluded that successfully obtaining

funds is a complex process for community groups given the technical knowledge and due diligence

process involved (Gómez Hernández 2007). Therefore, developing C15 with the guiding hand of the

ACJ-YMCA has enabled the movement with the infrastructure, resources, knowledge and ability to

access government funding.

Similarly, C15’s success in gaining funding from NGOs and celebrity charities such as Beyonce

(Beyonce 2013) provide further examples of acceptance and new benefits. Successful engagement

with a range of formal public and private entities exemplifies C15’s legitimacy and status within these

circles. It is possible to suggest that their relationship with formal institutions facilitated new benefits

in the form of celebrity funders.

Concurrently, C15’s geographical location also sets favourable conditions for interactions with formal

institutions. As Comuna 13 has been identified as one of the most deprived and violent areas in the

city, it has enjoyed higher levels of government investment as well as support from NGOs. The

topography of Comuna 13 as a site for disputes between gangs, a legacy of state withdrawal and

political violence, coupled with deprivation has made it a priority for the Alcaldía. Such factors are

significant threats to the state’s legitimacy and ultimately its stability. In this context, engaging with

youth, in this case hip hop artists can be understood as a means of expediting the state’s legitimacy

against the legacy of political violence, withdrawal and corruption. Therefore the state’s agenda has

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facilitated interactions between formal institutions and civic agents leading to recognition and new

benefits for organizations, such as C15/La Elite.

As Melucci and Lyyra’s suggest social change can be evidenced by challenging and exposing

structured power thus, the nature of the relationship between the social movement and the target will

be hostile. Whilst this assertion assumes centres of power lie in institutional politics, this observation

can be adapted to understand structured power in Comuna 13 to include illicit actors. In this way,

C15’s discourse of peace (and the wider hip hop movement in Medellín) can be understood as

challenging illicit actor hegemony of violence. Thus, the relationship between the hip hop movement

and illegal agents can be deemed antagonistic. The response to the hip hop movement by illicit actors

serves to illustrate how the movement is affecting or is perceived to be affecting power structures in

the community. In 2012, following the murder of the artist ‘El Duke’, a video was released in his

honour. Consequently, hip hop artists were threatened by gangs who interpreted the song lyrics and

video as a challenge to their authority (Minuto30 2012).This warning led to approximately 60 artists

temporarily fleeing the area for their own safety after receiving threats from gangs (Personería de

Medellín 2012:32, Radio Nacional Colombia.2012).

This incident reveals two important points about the relationship between the movement and centres

of power. Firstly, La Elite/C15’s relationship with illicit centres of power can be understood as

antagonistic. By contrast, this incident illustrates that C15’s relationship with the state is not overly

antagonistic. The movement in Comuna 13 reported the threats they had received from gangs to the

Alcaldía, therefore highlighting an expectation of assistance. However, they did not make demands on

the state to take specific action.

At a press conference concerning the threats made by gangs, Jeihhco commented that ‘… Las

autoridades, la gente de la policía, todo el tema militar está llegando a nuestros territorios a acabar. El

orden es acabar con los combos, acabar con el narcotráfico, nadie está llegando para proteger’

(Minuto 30 2012). This can be interpreted as a criticism of state policy in Comuna 13 as Jeihhco

alludes to the need to focus on protection rather than direct intervention. However, Jeihhco does not

explicitly make demands on the state. Indeed, he only makes vague references to the authorities,

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police and the military rather than the state or the Alcaldía. Rather it appears as if he is distancing the

Alcaldía from ‘la gente de la policia o el tema militar’ and the order to ‘acabar’. Equally, the

indefinite pronoun ‘nadie’ is ambiguous and open to interpretation. Given the gravity of the situation

and his captive media audience one might expect his discourse to be more direct in an attempt to

influence the state to act or to mobilize civic society.

Furthermore, his lack of clarity and ambiguous lexis contrast with his usual discursive style. Jeihhco’s

presentation at TEDx Tigre in October 2013 is a representative case in point (TEDx Tigre 2014). In

the presentation ‘Revolucion sin muertos’ Jeihhco is critical of Uribe’s Operation Orion referring to it

as state terrorism and an action which delegitimized the state. This utterance demonstrates a

competent command of political rhetoric to overtly condemn the national government’s actions. In

contrast to this, Jeihhco also refers to developments in Medellín during the presentation. He notes that

the last few administrations have invested in culture and have supported artists, therefore endorsing

recent local government policy.

Thus, the motivation for these contrasting discourses styles merits further examination. Why is

Jeihhco articulate and explicit in his criticism of Uribe, but is apparently ambiguous when discussing

the security situation in Comuna 13 under Gaviria’s tenure in 2012? It is possible to suggest that

refraining from explicitly condemning the local government’s actions through vague references to the

lack of protection was a calculated decision. Jeihhco, sought to preserve his relationship with the

Alcaldía thus did not want to overly antagonise Gaviria’s administration. Therefore, whilst he is

forthright in openly criticising Uribe’s military strategy in Comuna 13, he is cautious to overtly

condemn the Alcaldía’s actions. This could be attributed to the long-standing support La Elite/C15

has received from the local government. Thus Jeihhco is aware that attacking or making demands on

the Alcaldía could have wider negative consequences for the progression of the movement.

In this way, Jeihhco’s performances in the public arena can be regarded as both explicitly and

implicitly antagonistic and complimentary towards the state. Varying degrees of criticism are directed

at the local and national government. This apparently ambivalent discourse could be regarded as an

example of what Giugni and Passy have coined ‘conflictual co-operation’ (1998:85-89). This term

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refers to the interactions between the state and social movements to achieve a common goal.

However, given the power differentials in operation, this relationship is not equal. The state is more

powerful than the social movement and thus is able to advance its agenda more effectively. Therefore,

in order to readdress this imbalance, social movements are resourceful; adopting fluid equivocal

strategies which combine co-operation and hostility concurrently. (Giugni & Passy 1998:85-89).

Jeihhco’s discourse of peace compliments the state’s aim of stability and legitimacy, thus there is

cooperation over the intended ends. However, as the handling of the forced displacement of artists

and the use of military force against the civilian population demonstrates, the hip hop movement and

the state do not always agree on the course of action. This can result in ‘conflictual co-operation’.

SETTING OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE AND PUBLIC AGENDA:

Melucci and Lyrra draw upon Gamson’s work (1998) on cultural change through media discourse as a

suitable framework to measure a social movement’s outcomes. The mass media is a vital arena for

agents of change and those they seek to influence (civic society, political, business, NGO, education,

and religious entities). The media provides a space for the articulation of goals and presentation of the

movement’s activities. This may result in the transformation or creation of new perceptions of the

movement, potentially impacting on resources, influence and membership. Such accomplishments

could be considered as cultural changes that are realised in media discourse. These cultural changes

may be evidenced by attitudes towards the movement and the production of intentional or

unintentional outcomes for the movement.

Concurrently, cultural shifts played out in the media can also produce political change. Political elites

also operate in this arena to affect public perception and understand the public mood to shape policy

and political strategies. Thus, the reporting of a movement’s activities and the perceptions of the

movement advanced by the media may influence political change. Media presence of a movement

may lead to interactions between social movements and political elites. In this way, political change

could be informed by cultural transformation in public discourse. Notwithstanding, this relationship

between cultural and political change can also occur in reverse. Political developments can also

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provide the stimulus for cultural change in media discourse given that political elites perform and

influence media space. Their active involvement in affecting media discourse as a part of their

political agenda is an important dynamic to consider. The political-cultural relationship will be

explored when we examine evidence of political change.

Broadly speaking, analysis of the representation of the Medellín hip hop movement in the local,

national and international media reveals a positive narrative. Media discourse frames hip hop culture

as a peaceful, non-violent movement offering young people an alternative through art. This positive

status accorded to hip hop artists is further evidenced in language employed to describe artists. Media

reports refer to artists as ‘cultural leaders, cultural managers, educators, trainers, managers for peace.

(El Colombiano 2010, 2012a, 2012b, El Espectador 2012a, Giraldo Arango 2013). This positive

representation of hip hop artists, contrasts with the negative perceptions of poor youth as sicarios

advanced by the media in the 1980s/1990s. This would therefore suggest the hip hop movement have

communicated successfully their aims and strategies to a wider audience. Furthermore, this shift could

also be evidence of cultural change.

Gamson’s model of measuring cultural change in the media and an acceptance of a movement’s

legitimacy in public discourse will be employed to assess Jeihhco’s (C15’s) representation in the

media. Gamson defines media standing as ‘…gaining the status of a regular media source whose

interpretations are directly quoted’ (1998:68). From analysis of 76 news reports on hip hop in

Medellín, from local media such as El Colombiano, El Tiempo, Teleantioquia, national media, such as

La Semana, Radio Cadena Nacional and Caracol and international media, such as the Observer, The

Guardian(UK), El Pais (Spain) and El Nuevo Herald (USA) Jeihhco enjoys good media standing. He

is directly quoted in 29 media reports on a variety of topics, including the death of hip hop artists, his

social and cultural work, the situation in Comuna 13, an invitation to a Madonna concert, a donation

from Beyonce to La Escuela Kolacho and his reaction to the construction of a university in Comuna

13. The number of occasions and the breadth of themes he has been quoted on illustrates acceptance

and currency.

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A recent article published in March 2014 in the local newspaper ‘El Colombiano’ entitled ‘La 13 pide

ingenierios a Universidad de la paz’is an illuminating example of this achieved cultural power

(Martinez Arango 2014). The article focuses on plans to build a university and includes direct quotes

from the Deputy Mayor for Education and Culture and the rector of the ITM (Instituto Tecnologico

Metropolitano). However, Jeihhco is also directly quoted as a representative of the community in the

article. Mainstream media have identified Jeihhco as a significant and legitimate agent to represent the

hip hop movement and the wider community.

Therefore at a local, national and international level, the coverage given to Jeihhco (whether being

framed as a human interest story or as a legitimate source to comment on a particular theme)

illustrates the accomplishment of ‘achieved cultural power.’ (Gamson 1998:69).

Notwithstanding, given the close relationship between Jeihhco and formal institutions, I would

contend that this achieved cultural power is a product of incorporation. Integration into the

institutional political arena is the precursor of this media standing. Jeihhco’s success in the media

gallery is a new advantage produced by his longstanding relationship with formal institutions.

Jeihhco’s work has been promoted on local government websites, such as CulturaE (Medellín Cultura.

(n.d). This clearly illustrates acceptance by political elites. Jeihhco’s participation in such events has

also given him a platform to nurture his media standing. Thus, in this way his relationship with local

government entities has provided an arena for his media standing to flourish.

Jeihhco’s personal trajectory as a disadvantaged youth from Comuna 13 to being recognised as one of

the outstanding leaders in Colombia (alongside former Mayor Alonso Salazar Jamillo) provides

further evidence of legitimacy in public discourse (El Colombiano; 2012b, La Semana; 2012a).

Equally, from a political perspective Jeihhco’s narrative serves a wider agenda. His discourse of

nonviolence complements dominant frames advanced by the state as it seeks legitimacy and stability.

Therefore Jeihhco is invited to partake in certain activities which enables greater media exposure.

Consequently, this leads to favourable exposure and acceptance in discourse given the state’s

endorsement of Jeihhco’s work. Thus this apparent ‘achieved cultural power’ through engagement in

media discourse can be understood as a political mechanism. Raising Jeihhco’s profile through

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acceptance in media discourse perpetuates not only his legitimacy in the community but also that of

the state’s. Jeihhco’s narrative can be translated into political currency for the state as it can be

utilised to transmit a positive image of the state to a community that has experienced state sponsored

violence, and neglect. Articles about the hip hop school or his personal achievements often make

references to the support he has received from an agreement with the Alcaldía, the local planning

policies or the participatory budgeting scheme (AND Medellín 2014). In this way, Jeihhco’s narrative

lends itself to promoting an image of the state as a trusted, receptive and open agent.

Equally, directly quoting Jeihhco’s endorsement of government plans reaffirms his position in the

community whilst simultaneously promoting the state’s actions to the wider community. This

reciprocal PR, reinforces both Jeihhco’s and the Alcaldía’s standing as legitimate and significant

agents to civic society.

Thus, it is apparent that Jeihhco has achieved acceptance by political authorities typified by his

participation in the political arena. This acceptance has resulted in new advantages, notably, funding,

supporting and media standing. Furthermore, given the evolution of Jeihhco’s organization,

incorporation into the political arena was likely. However, we now turn to another organization that

evolved more organically to assess their impact.

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CASE STUDY 2: CREW PELIGROSOS: CULTURAL ENTREPRENEURIALISM AND ACCIDENTAL

SOCIAL CHANGE PROCESSES IN ASSOCIATION WITH ADIDAS, RED BULL AND G-SHOCK.

Crew Peligrosos was founded in 1999 in Comuna 4 (Aranjuez) by Henry Arteaga who, inspired by hip

hop films, discovered hip hop culture as a new way of expression. The Crew started to create art as an

alternative offer to violence. Hip hop became, according to Arteaga, ‘un proyecto de vida’ (British

Council Colombia 2014). As the Crew began to grow, Henry approached the local high school to ask

if the Crew could use the premises to practise. Given the numbers of young people who would turn up

to the Crew’s practice sessions eager to learn moves, they decided to set up the Cuatro Elementos

Escuela in 2004. The Crew currently mentor over 400 children and young people in Aranjuez a week

and in smaller numbers across the city (British Council Colombia 2014). Since 2005, they have also

organised a hip hop festival in Aranjuez, HIP4. The festival also seeks to promote the professionalism

of the local scene and to provide educational workshops on cultural management. (Garces Montoya,

2014: 93-94)

Crew Peligrosos have also attracted commercial sponsorship from international brands, such as

Addidas, G-Shock and Red Bull (Alvaritogomez. 2011, Red Bull Colombia 2014 see figure 5).

Similarly, Crew Peligrosos have performed at various international festivals including, the prestigious

SWSX festival in the USA in 2013(SXSW.2013). They have also supported artists such as, Calle 13

and Beyoncé in Medellín.

Figure 5 Crew Peligrosos watch design for G-Shock source: http://Medellín,

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hiphop.com/lifestyle-g-shock-celebro-sus-30-anos/

As well as enjoying commercial success, Crew Peligrosos have also participated in government

events, such as Art in Resistance at the British Council, Colombia, and Encuentro Nacional de

Responsables de Cultural and Congreso Central organised by the Colombian Ministry of Culture

(British Council Colombia 2014, Ministry of Culture of Colombia 2014a, 2014b).

Crew Peligrosos provide an interesting case study for social movement scholars as their trajectory is a

blend of commercial ambition which resulted in inadvertent social change processes. This can perhaps

be explained by their drive to innovate and professionalise their cultural practices. Arteaga has stated

that the Crew sought to create their own Latin style, rather than simply imitate US Hip Hop (British

Council Colombia 2014). Given this, their focus is on producing new sounds and styles. Similarly, the

Crew have been entrepreneurial, forging opportunities with international brands, which has provided

financial support and exposure in Colombia and abroad.

Concurrently, Crew Peligrosos also engage with government institutions. The Crew have received

funding from the Local Planning and Participatory Budgeting schemes as well as the use of the Plaza

Mayor Conference Centre for the HIP4 festival (Rojas Perez 2014). Likewise, they have been invited

by the Ministry of Culture to tour the country to share their cultural experiences (British Council

Colombia 2014). In addition to this they have participated in cultural events organized by the local

and national government to discuss their hip hop school model (Ministry of Culture of Colombia

2014a, 2014b). Thus, such activities indicate a degree of co-operation with formal institutions on a par

with Jeihhco of C15. This also indicates that Crew Peligrosos have also been accepted by political

elites.

However, participation at government events is not publicised on the Crew’s Facebook page or

website. This could be explained by their commercial ambitions. The Crew seek recognition as

professional hip hop artists rather than specific acknowledgement for their social endeavours. This

was evidenced during a presentation at the British Council Colombia, Art in Resistance. Arteaga was

keen to stress that the Crew do not ‘remove children from violence’, this is an indirect consequence of

attending the hip hop school. He also stated that he did not agree with the direction in the film

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(presented at the event) in which young students reinforced this idea of the hip hop school removing

children from the dangerous streets. However, he conceded that if this is how they viewed the hip hop

school, then it was a valid perspective. (British Council Colombia 2014).This reveals that Crew

Peligrosos are not comfortable with the perception of them as producers of social change.

Indeed, it could be contended that social change processes have been facilitated unintentionally. The

hip hop school emerged as a consequence of the Crew’s personal ambitions to create hip hop to find

alternatives for themselves. It did not evolve as a conscious decision to create a space to offer

alternatives for young people. The way in which the school developed accidently could explain why

the Crew are reluctant to openly promote their activities as stimulating social change.

This illuminates the importance of considering the intention and the attainment of a group’s aims.

Crew Peligrosos’ aim was to make hip hop as a means of expressing themselves and finding

alternative offers violence for themselves. It was their ‘proyecto de vida’. Thus their initial

motivations for creating the Crew were purely self-serving. However, as a secondary effect of this,

they inadvertently created a space (the school) for other young people in their barrio. Thus, the Crew

unwittingly induced social change processes in their locality as the young people in the video shown

at the British Council event testified. This shows that it is paramount to evaluate both aims and

unintentional outcomes as indicators of impact.

Given that the Crew’s aim is to pursue a career in music their narrative is less politicised compared to

C15’s. Whereas C15 frames their hip hop schools in the context of promoting peace against a

backdrop of war (C15 2009), Crew Peligrosos make a vague reference to peace. This is illustrated on

Crew Peligrosos website where hip hop is explained as MC + Graffiti + B Boys + DJ = Paz

4Elements Escuela (Crew Peligroso Sala de Prensa 2013).Electing the word ‘peace’ is an ambiguous

term given its overuse in popular culture, therefore this lexis can be considered less political than the

language selected by C15. Jeihhco’s organisation makes reference to their political and social aims on

their websites, employing semantics with political connotations. Equally, another hip hop

organization Cultura y Libertad state the aim of the organization is to create ‘socio-political

alternatives’ or ‘revolutionary hip hop that is committed to social struggle’ (Cultura y Libertad 2010).

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Similarly, C15’s narrative on their Facebook page is also constructed with references to the war in

Colombia and their aim to reconstruct the barrio (C15, 2009).

Thus, it is apparent that there is a divergence in what Crew Peligrosos and the other hip hop groups

examined in these case studies seek to achieve. Accordingly this is reflected in the way they present

themselves and the strategies they employ. Crew Peligrosos are keen to stress their artistic style and

their professionalism, demonstrating their aim is a career in music, something that Arteaga expressed

in the documentary ‘En las calles de Medellín’ (Babble Fish Productions 2010).

However, whilst they may not seek to influence the political terrain, their presence at cultural and

social government events, and agreements with the Ministry of Culture and NGOs to set up schools in

the Antioquia province illuminates their impact in this arena (British Council Colombia 2014). Thus,

Crew Peligrosos has inadvertently affected government policy by providing a model for cultural

initiatives. Furthermore, this also illustrates that formal institutions regard the Crew as producers of

social change which can account for them having been invited to participate in the abovementioned

activities.

The Crew’s ability to engage with formal institutions can be understood as both a consequence of

their commercial viability and their social actions. For Crew Peligrosos interacting with governmental

institutions serves as an opportunity to gain resources for events and future projects or to network

with potential contacts with could potentially enhance the Crew’s prospects. In this way, the Crew’s

rationale for engaging with formal institution gives credence to Resource Mobilization theories

advanced by McCarthy and Zald (1977). Resource Mobilization perspectives argue that a movement’s

interactions and strategies are influenced by the need to acquire resources to maintain the movement.

Given that the Crew’s aim is to make a living from hip hop, I would contend that these interactions

can be understood as business opportunities, facilitating access to resources for events, travel abroad

and commercial opportunities. For example, Crew Peligrosos have been invited to commercial and

export events. They were selected to attend a Bogota Chamber of Commerce event which gave artists

to network with business to form commercial partnerships (Camera de Comercio Bogota 2013).

Equally, they were promoted by the Ministry of Culture at Womax, the World Music Expo in

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2013( Lasso Fuentes 2013)., This underscores not only the commercial value for Crew to develop

relationships with formal institutions, but also is also indicative of acceptance as a commercial viable

venture by business and political elites.

This acceptance of the Crew as a commercially successful hip hop group has also been presented in

the mainstream media. However, earlier sparse media coverage given to Crew Peligrosos positions the

group as an alternative to violence (Rojas 2009, Botero 2010). Similarly, articles reporting the ‘Peace

One Day’ initiative in Comuna 13 in September 2010 also mention Crew Peligrosos along with La

Elite as groups participating in this concert for peace (El Colombiano 2010).

However, since 2011 as Crew Peligrosos began to engage in commercial ventures, the media has

shifted to reflect this. The transformed narrative presented in mainstream media centres on Crew’s

musical accomplishments, relationships with brands and style of hip hop. Mainstream media reports

since 2011 have reported the launch of their album ‘Medayork’, their performances and the airing of

‘La Mera

Vuelta’ the road trip documentary made by Red Bull and the Music magazine Shock (Botero, 2013, El

Espectador 2014b).

Using Gamson’s model of media standing, of the 31 reports collated from local, national and

international media sources which reference Crew Peligrosos, Henry Arteaga is directly quoted or

interviewed in nine reports. This shows that Crew Peligrosos enjoy a good level of media standing,

comparable to that of Jeihhco’s/C15’s.

Notwithstanding, it is important to note the contrasting focus of media standing of these two hip hop

groups. Media reports which mention or quote Jeihhco, are usually commentaries on hip hop as a tool

for social change in the context of urban violence, reports on the murder of hip hop artists or human

interest stories recounting Jeihhcco’s personal history. On the contrary, the majority of media reports

on Crew Peligrosos are filed in the entertainment or culture section with minimal or no reference to

the school or the social change element of the group. Indeed, media sources label them as the new

representatives of Colombian rap, the most important Colombian group at the moment and focus on

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the distinct sound of the group. (Shock.com.co 2012). It is therefore apparent that, both of these hip

hop groups have obtained cultural acceptance, albeit within distinct spheres, reflecting the diverse

developments and outcomes for the groups.

Beyoncé’s concert in Medellín in 2013 is an illuminating example of the diverse trajectories of these

hip hop groups and how they are represented in the media. The media reported that C15 and children

from the Escuela Kolacho were invited to the concert to meet Beyoncé and received a donation for the

school, thus affirming the social aims and the acceptance of C15/Escuela Kolacho as agents of social

change. In contrast, the media also reported that DJ Rat Race of Crew Peligrosos opened Beyonce’s

show, thus affirming Crew’s acceptance as credible commercial artists (RCN La Radio 2013).

How can we account for these diverse trajectories given that both of these groups emerged in similar

socio-economic conditions and as a means of providing an alternative to violence? It is possible to

observe several distinct features between these groups. The emergence of La Eilte/C15 in Comuna 13

was heavily engineered by the NGO ACJ/YCMA which established them as an artist movement

focused on promoting non-violent resistance and peace building in the wake of government military

operations. In contrast, Crew Peligrosos, emerged independently of formal institutions, as an

alternative offer to violence created by and for a group of young people in Comuna 4. However, Crew

Peligrosos have stressed the importance of professionalism and innovation in art and the desire to

make a living from hip hop. Unlike C15, Crew Peligrosos initially did not have access to formal

support and resources, despite obtaining pockets of funding for projects, such as Hip4. Thus, they had

to be more entrepreneurial, diversifying their labours in order to earn a living from hip hop.

Furthermore, the focus on the quality and the desire to produce a unique sound is also key to

explaining the diverse paths taken by these groups. This drive to innovate, to fuse genres of dance and

music has led to a more commercially viable offering.

Crew Peligrosos’ debut album Medayork offers an insight into the commercial ambitions of the group.

Firstly, the album was produced by Toy Selectah, formerly of the hip hop group, Control Machete,

who enjoyed success in the USA and Latin America. Selectah’s experience in producing mainstream,

commercially successful hip hop for an international market, could explain why he was chosen to

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produce the album. Secondly, the title of the album, fusing the words Medellín and New York, could

be understood as further evidence of this attempt to appeal to a wider Latin audience (both in Latin

America and the USA) with disposable incomes to consume music. Thirdly, an examination of the

melody and lyrics demonstrates a more commercially appealing sound. The track ‘Medayork’

(Crewpeligrososmusic 2011) begins with the following words:

Hip Hop you don’t stop,

Hip hop you don’t stop

Hip hop you don’t stop

P flavour en el mic

The song begins with the repetition of the words ‘hip hop, you don’t stop’ for the first 15 seconds of

the song which could be interpreted as a double commercial ploy. The use of repeated words and

melodies is a tested strategy in commercial music to make the song memorable to the listener.

Furthermore, by choosing to sing these repeated phrases in English enhances its commercial value for

a wider and/or international audience.

In the same vein, releasing the album on I-Tunes in the US, UK, and Colombia also illustrates their

commercial ambitions. This also provides a rationale for the use of English in their songs as they seek

to expand their appeal to an audience beyond the barrios of Medellín, Colombia or the Spanish

speaking world. Reflecting on their decision to release the album on I-Tunes, Arteaga states that ‘…

hemos podido cautivar el mercado colombiano.’(Botero 2013). Electing the word ‘market’ rather than

audience or fans supports this apparent business orientated mentality.

Moreover, the album is priced at $5.99 which is nearly 10% of the average monthly Colombian salary,

(Peters 2013) an indication that such a pricing model is aimed at a demographic with a disposable

income rather than typical hip hop fans in the peripheral barrios of Medellín. Indeed, the success of

this apparent strategy to appeal to a wider audience is illuminated by a comment on the Colombian I-

Tunes website. A user review on the website states that he would not consider himself a hip hop fan,

but ‘Medayork’ is an excellent album with a unique sound (I-Tunes. n.d).

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Thus measuring Crew Peligrosos’ impact presents an unusual case. Their trajectory illustrates that

both intentional and unintentional outcomes have resulted in dual acceptance. Their intentional aims

have been realised given their acceptance as commercially successful artists by the media, the

government, brands, the music industry and music fans. However, this pursuit of commercial success

created a secondary unintentional consequence, a social change process. Thus, the emergence of a hip

hop school as a by-product of the groups’ ambition has led to their accidental acceptance as a

legitimate producer of social change. This would also explain the portrayal of less politicalised

narratives which frames hip hop as peace or bacano (cool) as they seek to promote a commercially

attractive image of a cool lifestyle rather than a social struggle. This would account for their

reluctance to accept that through the hip hop schools remove children and young people from

violence. It could also explain their refusal to participate in this research project given that the project

focuses on hip hop in Medellín as a social movement, thus, further framing their hip hop in the

context of social protest and action.

However, whilst the Crew may be reluctant to acknowledge their social impact on their locality, they

are willing to co-operate with government, NGO and educational institutions who have engaged with

them for this reason. This appears to be contradictory. Agreeing to partake in such activities indicates

the Crew’s acceptance of this label as a producer of social change accorded by formal institutions,

thus perpetuating this perception, whilst simultaneously seeking to distance themselves from the

notion that their hip hop school removes children from violence. Notwithstanding this co-operation

can be regarded as a tactic to gain resources and enhance the Crew’s success.

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CASE STUDY 3: RED CULTURA Y LIBERTAD.

Cultura y Libertad is a network of collectives, schools and hip hop groups operating across the city of

Medellín and the nearby areas of Itagüí, Bello and Envigado. It was founded by El Mocho of El

Laberinto in 2007, who has been involved in the hip hop movement and schools since the 1980s

(UnConvetion n.d).The network seeks to work together to promote hip hop culture as a means of

creating alternatives for young people in the context of conflict and social struggle. Since 2010 the

network has organised the Annual Hip Hop Appreciation Week, an event which seeks to share ideas

and knowledge and consolidate hip hop culture as a tool for peace and societal development (Cultura

y Libertad 2010). Cultura y Libertad has received government funding for these events through the

participatory budgeting scheme as well as support from the Museum of Modern Art and the museum

of Antioquia.

While Cultura y Libertad has enjoyed support from formal institutions, they are not a regularly funded

organization like Escuela Kolacho. The organization is run by volunteers utilising public space.

Despite this, they have achieved a degree of acceptance as a legitimate facilitator of social change

evidenced by the support, (albeit limited) they have received from government institutions.

Furthermore, the organization is mentioned in a government report on youth organizations in the city

which examined the characteristics and impact of youth movements in Medellín. The 2009 report

included Cultura y Libertad, Crew Peligrosos (HIP 4) and La Elite activities, thus further

demonstrating that these organizations have, in varying degrees, been acknowledged by formal

institutions as promoting democracy and social well-being. (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2009:1-2)

However, interactions with formal institutions are sporadic, unlike Crew Peligrosos and C15, Cultura

and Libertad are not invited to speak about their hip hop organization at national or international

cultural events, nor do they engage with the Alcaldía on cultural policy. Thus, it is apparent that they

do not enjoy the same status as Crew Peligrosos or C15 in the political arena. Therefore, despite

running hip hop schools and sharing the same values as other hip hop groups, Cultural y Libertad

have achieved limited acceptance by political institutions. Such a discrepancy in impact in the

political arena warrants further reflection,

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Whilst it is apparent that the Alcaldía is willing to engage with civic society to implement policy, this

process of engagement requires careful selection. Therefore, despite the fact that Cultura y Libertad’s

aims of promoting nonviolent alternatives for youth compliment the state’s objectives of enhancing

democracy, this is not necessarily a precursor for successfully engaging with the state. This is

illuminated by the fact that despite similar goals and practices to C15 and Crew Peligrosos, Cultura y

Libertad have not enjoyed the same levels of interaction with the state.

As Giugni and Passy underscore certain conditions can facilitate cooperation between movements and

the state (1998; 90-91). Governments are more likely to engage with movements that have strong

leadership and organizational processes that emulate their own (1998:91 Hobsbawn 1959; Gamson,

1990). This hypothesis lends itself well to understanding the varying degrees of interactions between

the state and hip hop organizations in Medellín. Cultura y Libertad is an informal network, comprised

of volunteers, various collectives, groups and hip hop schools operating across the city. In this way

the management of the movement is fragmented, lacking clear leadership and robust organization. In

contrast, Crew Peligrosos and C15 both have strong centralised leadership in the form of Henry

Arteaga and Jeihhco which has been conducive to co-operation with the state. Their ability to

successfully interact with business, NGOs and government entities to gain funding and partnerships

also demonstrates their professionalism and formalization.

Cultura y Libertad’s organic structure might not only account for their limited interactions with the

state, but it may also account for their minimal media coverage. An analysis of media reporting on hip

hop, employing Gamson’s model illustrates that Cultura y Libertad have not attained ‘achieved

cultural acceptance’, with only three media reports covering the organization since 2007. Such poor

media coverage, starkly contrasts with Jeihhco’s and Crew Peligrosos.

The three articles reported on the movement’s Annual hip hop appreciation week event in 2011 and

2012. All of these mainstream media reports included direct quotes from members of the organization

which could be indicative of media standing, although the frequency of media coverage would negate

this. Furthermore, the article from El Mundo (Gil Garcia 2011) includes a quote from the academic

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Montoya Garces who states the significance of the event for the movement. This quote holds some

currency as it underscores the acceptance of hip hop as a movement rather than a youth culture by the

academic community. It also lends itself to the legitimization of the movement to a wider audience

outside of academia. In this way, the article evidences a degree of cultural acceptance, within the field

of academia and the media.

A further quote in El Colombiano in 2012 also illustrates the movement’s desire to be accepted by

formal institutions. Commenting on the Alcaldía’s support for the hip hop event, Leandro Arango

remarks that it is a significant achievement as it demonstrates that formal institutions consider Cultura

y Libertad as a social force (El Colombiano 2012a). This clearly illustrates that Cultura y Libertad

seek recognition from the state for their social actions and therefore they are not averse to interactions

with the state. Thus, this adds further credence to the hypothesis that it is Cultura y Libertad’s

structural composition that does not lend itself to interactions with the state rather than the

movement’s attitude towards the state.

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From the street to the corridors of power

On the most rudimentary level, it could be argued that the hip hop movement has failed to achieve its

primordial objective of securing peace given the enduring presence of illicit gang violence and human

rights abuses in Medellín. Given the complex nature and multi-actor involvement in the conflict, the

movement’s aim is extremely ambitious. However, this is not to suggest that the movement has been

insignificant. As the above case studies reveal the movement has impacted on social, cultural and

institutional political spheres. Thus, unintentional impact has been significant.

As evidenced in the case studies, unintentional impact has manifested as interactions with the state.

Such an observation begs the question why does the state choose to engage with the movement? As

Willkes (1992) notes in complex modern societies, the state requires new repertoires to ensure

legitimacy given that state violence and state run media are ineffective tools for control. Thus, the

state requires news strategies for legitimacy and stability. Civil society holds valuable knowledge and

information that can facilitate the state’s governance. In this way, civil agents can be powerful

instruments of legitimacy for the modern state.

This has been acknowledged by the Alcaldía de Medellín that noted ‘…el Estado no puede resolver

los problemas solo, que la búsqueda de soluciones no es de su exclusiva competencia’ (Alcaldía de

Medellín 2012:20). Therefore, Medellín’s transformation requires civic society to mobilize in order

to’ propiciar nuevamente una dinámica de encuentro ciudadano y dialogo democrático’. This

observation illuminates Willkes contention that modern states require co-operation from civic society

to facilitate governance. In the case of Medellín, whereby the state’s authority has been threatened by

a variety of armed agents, the role of civic society in enhancing stability and effective state

governance is paramount.

The recent structural developments vis-à-vis state-civic relations in Medellín serve to illustrate this.

Active citizenship and participatory democracy can be understood as the state’s attempts to

legitimatize itself against a backdrop of sustained periods of withdrawal. By including civic society in

the governance process, the state also promotes stability in the face of illicit actor challenges.

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Examining these unintentional outcomes highlights an interesting feature of the movement. Unlike

most other social movements, interaction in the political arena has evolved as an unintentional

outcome of the movement’s actions. The unique circumstances under which the movement emerged

can account for this. In the context of an absence state and the presence of illicit actors, the movement

opted for autonomy, creating an alternative space and culture as a form of protest.

This behaviour is consistent with other sections of civic society in Medellín, who, in the absence of a

legitimate polity, mobilized to organize community self-defence organizations or community

organizations to prevent violence (Riaño Alcalá 2010, Salazar 1990). Similarly, this notion of

autonomy from institutions and community problem solving may be a consequence of Colombia’s

violent past. For over 60 years Colombia has endured internal enmeshed conflicts, demonstrating the

inability of the state to effectively govern within normalised democratic parameters. This legacy of an

ineffective and withdrawn state has led community organizations to circumvent the state and seek

their own solutions to social problems. During a public event ‘Preparémonos para la paz’

(Gobernación de Antioquia 2013) organized by the Antioquia regional government in 2013, residents

of Comuna 13 supported this assertion. The local residents expressed a belief that peace would be

constructed in the community and not through government led initiatives. One resident remarked with

reference to the ongoing talks between the Colombian government and the FARC that peace would

not be achieved in La Habana, it would be constructed in the community working on a daily basis

with young people.8Therefore such an attitude towards solving social problems could serve to explain

why hip hop movements have not overtly targeted the state to achieve their demands of peace.

Indeed, this culture of community problem solving has impacted on institutional politics through

interactions between political elites and cultural community groups. As previously noted, cultural

community and youth organizations mobilized as a response to the escalating violence in the 1990s.

Pilar Riaño Alcalá (2010) notes that the 1990s witnessed the emergence of significant cultural

movements, such as rap, rock, hip hop and punk, offering a counter culture to gang culture

(2010:160). This civic action caught the attention of the NGO Corporación Regional which called a

8 Field notes July 2013.

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meeting to discuss the conflict in the north-east of the city in 1990 (Alcaldía de Medellín 2011:41).

This dialogue between civic society, Corporación Regional, religious groups, academics and

government representatives was co-ordinated by the academic Alonso Salazar. Salazar was a founding

member of Corporación Regional and had undertaken sociological research on urban violence. Thus

Salazar had witnessed first-hand the dynamics of (youth) violence and associated social problems in

the barrios of Medellín in the 1990s.

Furthermore, through his work with Corporación Regional Salazar was also exposed to civic society

responses, their repertoires for resisting and preventing violence through music and culture.

Commenting in 1990, Salazar was critical of the state, noting that ‘despues de diez años de haberse

dado la alerta general sobre el fenómeno del sicariato y de las bandas juveniles, el Estado no ha

realizado ningún programa integral para frenarlo…’ (Alcaldía; 2011, 41). This comment reveals an

understanding of the importance of integrated state strategies to address the issues of sicarios and

gangs, observations that are illuminated in his work on urban violence in Medellín (Salazar 1990).

Therefore, I would also contend that this exposure to the realities of violence coupled with an

understanding of the effective civic responses in the form of youth art and cultural groups amongst

others, was an important component in the drafting of political strategies of Compromiso Ciudadano,

the independent civil movement founded by Sergio Fajardo and Alonso Salazar in 1999 (Alcaldía de

Medellín 2011: 8).

Compromiso Ciudadano launched Fajardo’s successful mayoral campaign offering alternative

political solutions to transform Medellín (Jaramillo Zaluga 2008) which led to him taking office in

2003 with Salazar as his successor in 2008. During a speech in 2011, Mayor Salazar, makes

references to the diverse cultural and artistic processes in the communities of Medellín. Supporting

Wilkes’s contention, Salazar notes that these civic processes in the 1990s generated knowledge that…

en tal manera en 2003 Sergio Fajardo ganó la Alcaldía de Medellín lo que tiene es un paquete muy

importante de las propuestas de la sociedad civil…’ (Salazar 2011). Given this, it is possible to

suggest that the hip hop movement in the 1990s, as part of a wider group of cultural and artistic

agents, through their articulation of resistance, unintentionally impacted the future political terrain

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under the tenure of Fajardo and Salazar. Thus, in this context, it could be contested that the movement

played a fundamental role in transforming political institutions and policy in the last decade.

This is further evidenced by Salazar’s admission that ‘El tema de violencia tratamos de neutralizarlo

fortaleciendo muchos expresiones independientes de la estética musical del rappers, los hip

hoppers…’ (Salazar 2011). This comment unequivocally underscores the administration’s belief that

the hip hop movement is an effective tool in violence prevention and resistance, and a legitimate

producer of social change. This indicates acceptance of the movement in political spheres. This

therefore can account for the new advantages gained and varying degrees of incorporation of the

abovementioned hip hop organizations into institutional politics. Similarly, in this way, the

movement’s actions have impacted on political policy and budgeting as the Alcaldía is keen to

strengthen these independent processes. This tenet therefore accounts for the success hip hop

movements have had in accessing support from the Alcaldía. Furthermore, following Giugni’s models

of measuring outcomes, it is possible to suggest that the movement has been transformative and

incorporated. Arguably status enjoyed by the Ministry of Culture within the Alcaldía, reflected in the

budget and status enjoyed by the department could be indicative of the hip hop movement’s influence

(Paredes 2011). The influence of the movement in policy-making is indicative of the movement’s

incorporation into this policy framework.

Transformation and incorporation can be understood as consequences of the prevailing violence in

Medellín and interactions with allies who later engaged in politics. The Development Plan sought to

deal with issues of inequality, lack of opportunities and poverty. However, as the Alcaldía has

recognised the state is not capable of solving all of these issues, civic society is an important agent in

Medellín’s transformation. Therefore, in this context the hip hop movement compliments the state’s

aim of stability by providing non-violent alternatives. Furthermore, the state’s visible support for the

movement serves to promote the notion of positive state interventionism which is particularly

important in the peripheral barrios that have endured a legacy of political violence or/and a withdrawn

political apparatus.

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Such interactions between the state and the hip hop movement complimenting Giugni and Passy’s

(1998:84-84) contention that social movements do not always engage antagonistically with the state.

Indeed, the hip hop movement has developed cooperative relationships to achieve their demands

whilst facilitating the state’s agenda. The degrees of co-operation between the movement and the state

were exemplified during a misunderstanding last year in which a mural in homage of a murdered

artist was removed by authorities. The hip hop movement criticised the move, leading to an invitation

from the Alcaldía to discuss the situation with graffiti artists. The Administration admitted it had

made a mistake (El Tiempo, 2013). These negotiations resulted in an agreement to create designated

spaces for graffiti and better communication between both parties to avoid such a misunderstanding

arising again (Arango Martinez, Rodrigo 2013, El Tiempo, 2013). Thus, it is apparent that the state is

keen to engage with the movement to resolve issues which demonstrates the cordial relationship

between the two parties and the importance of the relationship for the state. Furthermore, the

willingness of the movement to dialogue with the Alcaldía on this issue also illustrates co-operation

and incorporation of the movement within the political institutional sphere.

In contrast to many social movements, the hip hop movement does not threaten the state. On the

contrary, its aims for peace, align with the state’s desire for stability. Therefore the state is keen to

engage with the movement as the current enhances the state’s stability. Similarly, interactions with the

state has benefited the movement. It has provided the movement with material benefits, including

equipment, funds for events and opportunities to perform abroad and immaterial benefits, such as

status, awards and national and international recognition. This support has enhanced the movement,

facilitating their offer as an alternative to violence, thus promoting stability. Furthermore, engaging

positively with the movement, has provided the state with a channel to rebuild civic-state relations in

neglected barrios, thus contributing to the legitimacy of the state. In this way, it could be contended

that the organizations within the movement are, to varying degrees institutionalised. Given that they

enhance the state’s legitimacy and stability, the movement has been integrated into the state’s strategy

to combat illicit actor violence.

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CHAPTER 5: A fragmented movement: Diverse trajectories and outcomes

From the case studies, several observations can be made concerning consistency in the movement.

The commercial ambitions and success of Crew Peligrosos underscore a marked contrast to Cultura y

Libertad’s grassroots social and political rhetoric and practise. Similarly, Jeihhco’s trajectory carved

out by NGO and government agendas differs from the organic evolution of Cultura y Libertad and

Crew Peligrosos. Cultura y Libertad and C15 position their raison d’etre in the context of

transforming society through hip hop departs from Crew Peligrosos reluctance to accept the label of

producers of social change.

However, as Tilly has remarked social movements are not coherent groups and lack continuity (1999;

256). Therefore differing origins, evolutions and modus operandi do not negate the presence of a hip

hop movement. Fundamentally, amongst these groups there is a common aim, and a common social

grievance. They are committed to peace, facilitating non-violence spaces for expression and

advancing hip hop culture as a way of life. This is best evidenced in the hip hop schools programme

employed by these three groups and a shared identity as a ‘hopper’ visible by symbols, language and

clothing. Furthermore, there is a sense of community amongst these organizations, with groups

collaborating on projects. For example, Crew Peligrosos and La Elite (C15) supported Cultura y

Libertad’s Annual hip hop appreciation week in 2011(Cultura y Libertad 2010). Similarly, La Elite

(C15) and Crew Peligrosos performed together the Peace One day event in 2010 (El Colombiano

2010). In this way, I would contend that the groups constitute a movement, albeit fragmented, but

with shared overarching aims of peace and a belief that hip hop culture is a mechanism to achieve

social change.

Reflecting on these aims raises the question how can the hip hop movement in Medellín be

understood on the spectrum of social movements. The movement in Medellín partly contest Watkins’

observation that the hip hop movement is a unique because it manifests as popular youth culture and

thus does not appear to be overtly political. The social and political rhetoric of Cultura y Libertad and

C15 framing hip hop against war and social struggle exemplify this. Furthermore, the movement in

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Medellín has demonstrated that hip hop can have political impact, inspiring policy and institutional

transformation as part of a wider cultural movement.

However, I would suggest that this influence on the political landscape is not the most outstanding

feature of the hip hop movement in Medellín as hip hop culture has impacted on the political sphere in

varying degrees in Senegal, Bolivia and Cuba. The uniqueness of the hip hop movement in Medellín

concerns the articulation of social protest and its interactions with centres of power. The hip hop

movement does not seek to directly challenge centres of power unlike other social movements, new

rights based movements or classed based old social movements, who aim to influence centres of

power and change their behaviour.

In contrast, the hip hop movement’s social protest is more subtle, it is not explicitly directed at a

particular agent; protests are against violence. Consequently, they do not make demands on the

centres of power to achieve their social aims, rather they elect to circumvent the centres of powers to

enact an alternative social reality to realise change.

This position is born out of structural circumstances as overtly challenging illicit centres of power

operating outside of normalised democratic processes would be counterproductive for the movement.

The threats received by artists which led them to go into hiding as a result of a video illustrate this

point clearly. Similarly, given the legacy of a corrupt/withdrawn state and the complexity of

Colombia’s conflict, the movement does not regard the state as a viable target for social protest or as a

driver for change. This culture of civic problem solving evidence in the creation of an array of

community organizations in the 80s and 90s, is assumed by the hip hop movement. In this way

protest/change is entrenched in daily life, and the adoption of hip hop values as articulated in the hip

hop declaration of peace.

Parallels could be drawn with gay, HIV/AIDs, environmental and feminist movements as these rights

based movements tend to articulate social change process in the public sphere in daily life. However,

this is often accompanied by a set of formal political demands, such as changes to legislation/policy or

the enactment of new legislation. In contrast, the three case studies have illuminated that the hip hop

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movement does not make demands on the state, rather it has developed a cordial relationship with the

state complimenting the state’s ambitions of stability and legitimacy.

The hip hop movement presents itself as a suitable candidate to quash this potential insurgency as its

aims of peace and non-violent resistance (given its focus on younger generations). Given that hip hop

is a popular youth culture it appeals to an impressionable young demographic who are at risk of being

recruited by gangs, therefore it undertakes a preventative role, seeking to reduce the cycle of violence.

The support given to the hip hop movement and the admission by the Alcaldía that hip hop promotes

social cohesion and co-existence appears to support this. In contrast to Political Opportunity theories

assumptions that movements respond to new political opportunities, the evidence suggests that the hip

hop movement, created their own political opportunities, by unwittingly influencing institutional

politics. This influence led to increased opportunities for the movement evidenced by the financial

and strategic support given to the movement by the Alcaldía.

Attempting to classify the movement requires reflection on several characteristics of the current. The

hip hop movement emerged in the peripheral barrios amongst socio-economically disadvantaged

youth, thus those involved in hip hop tend to pertain from low social classes. However, despite

pertaining from similar social strata, the movement cannot be considered a class based movement

comparable to agrarian, miner or workers movements in the region that emerged as a response to neo

liberal policy. The hip hop movement does not articulate class politics, their struggle is not material

based nor do they exhibit class consciousness.

Notwithstanding, material circumstances did contribute to the emergence of a culture of criminality

and violence which subsequently stimulated the evolution of the hip hop movement. Furthermore, the

movement has articulated an awareness of the relationship between socio-economic deprivation as a

trigger for the culture of easy money and violence. Therefore, the movement has attempted to counter

this through artistic training, cultural entrepreneurism and the socialization into an alternative culture

and moral code. However, the genesis of the movement was a response to violence and the desire for

peace rather than concrete demands for improved material conditions. Therefore, it is apparent that the

85

movement does not share the essential features of material struggles advanced by ‘old’ social

movements.

The hip hop movement’s demands for peace could be considered comparable to peace, anti-war or

human rights movements that have been classified as rights based ‘new’ social movements. Indeed,

hip hop movement share some common features with new social movements. Like new social

movements, the hip hop movement seeks to transform society through shifts in culture and identity.

Similarly, new social movements tend to focus on a single issue or a set of issues affecting a particular

social group, such as women or gay people. In the case of the hip hop movement there is a tendency

to focus on youth.

Despite presenting with some similar characteristics, the hip hop movement is at a divergent with

most social new movements. Firstly, as Ofle (1985) noted, new social movements have by-passed the

state in favour of affecting culture and identity in civic society. Whilst the hip hop movement seeks

social transformation through culture, this modus operandi emerged due to constraints imposed by

armed centres of powers and the nature of violence rather than a concerted effort to articulate culture

and identity rights for a social group at a societal level.

Similarly, the presence of a corrupt or withdrawn state further prevented the articulation of social

protest through normalised political means, thus the civic sphere was the only viable space to voice

social dissent. Equally, given that the aim of achieving social change is focused on preventing youth

involvement in violence, the means has to appeal to this demographic which is why culture emerged

as a suitable tool for dissent. Echoing Rose’s notion of hidden transcripts (1994), the means,

determined by a blend of circumstances are not blatantly political, however the ends of securing peace

can be regarded as a political demand. Thus, I would contend that several factors, notably the

presence of illicit actors, prevalence of youth involvement in violence and a corrupt or withdrawn

state, led to civic actors adopting hip hop culture as a repertoire for social change through prevention

and resistance in the civic sphere.

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The hip hop movement, like other ‘new’ social movements is also concerned with a single issue, the

end of conflict and securing peace. Equally at first glance, it appears to be a youth movement given

that it seeks to recruit children and young people and provide a space for them. However, I claim that

this focus reflects the preventative nature of the movement. Engaging with children and young people

before they become involved in gangs is a means of breaking the cycle of violence, but this does not

indicate a disregard for other social groups. Indeed, securing peace is an urgent issue that transcends

social groups. The Hip Hop Declaration provides a code of behaviour which outlines other demands

such as social justice and equality, however the hip hop movement has advanced the call for peace

most vehemently.

Indeed this demand for peace can be understood as an articulation of the right to life. The right to life

is the most fundamental of natural rights. However, against a backdrop of illicit actor conflicts, it has

been threatened evidence by the numbers of disappeared and murder victims in the city. Since

Medellín’s transformation, during the period 2004-2012 there were 11,703 reported murders

according to the Personería de Medellín, thus demonstrating prevailing violence (Personería de

Medellín 2013). In this way, the hip hop movement’s call for peace can be interpreted as a demand for

the right to life. Therefore the movement could be understood as a citizen rights movement, seeking to

achieve the universal right to life rather than seeking to make gains for a particular social group.

Given the movement’s preventative nature, it is primarily aimed at attracting young people as an

alternative to gangs; however, the founders of the hip hop scene in the 1990s are still committed to the

movement today. Thus, this culture has an enduring appeal to an older demographic. Similarly,

parents take their children to the hip hop schools and participate in the running of the schools9, as do

the local high schools who allow the movement to use their premises. This demonstrates wider

support for the movement beyond a single constituent.

Whilst the movement aims to attract children and young people this is not indicative of a movement

articulating rights for a certain social group as the issue of violence transcends a particular social

group. This is merely a reflection of a preventative strategy to achieve long term peace. Indeed,

9 Based on observations during a field trip to Cultura y Libertad’s school in Comuna 15, July 2013.

87

children and teenagers are not the primary victims and perpetrators of violence. According to

Personería 59% of murder victims in 2012 were aged 18-32. The majority of victims (90%) were

males who were not primarily involved in gangs and criminal activities. The motives for the murders

were attributed to crossing ‘invisible borders’, refusing to join a gang, non-payment of illegal taxes

and extortion, disobeying orders, reporting criminal activity to the authorities, personal disputes and

domestic problems (2013;17). The array of motives for murder and the fact that the majority of the

victims were not part of a gang illuminates that violence affects the wider community and is

interwoven into daily life.

These observations also lead us to consider the wider social impact of murder as it does not solely

affect the victim. Morrall describes this as a knock-on effect that penetrates society in varying degrees

(2006; 126). Furthermore, given that the majority of murders in Medellín have been attributed to

criminal gangs, the consequences for the family and society are intensified. For example, the murder

of a family member by a gang could have psychological and economic repercussions for their family,

as well as other possible outcomes such as forced displacement or fear of further reprisals.

Furthermore, from a societal perspective, gang related murders can lead to further disputes,

retaliation, a breakdown in community relations and turf wars, thus perpetuating violence that

penetrates the local area.

Similarly, a 2009 government report on the dynamics of violence also highlighted that the majority of

victims during the period 2005-2009 came from socio-economic stratum 2 and 3 (low and medium

low). Equally, high murder rates are not confined to a particular geographical area within the city with

the greater number of reported murders in 2012 taking place in Comunas 8, 10, 13 and 15, areas with

populations that are classified as social strata 1-4 (low-low and medium).(Alcaldía de Medellín

2009b)

The characteristics of murder in Medellín underscores that it affects differing social classes, ages,

districts and the majority of victims do not belong to criminal gangs. These features illuminate that

violence perforates all sectors of society. Given this, the hip hop movement’s calls for peace can be

understood as a demand for the universal right to life, a citizen right which emerged in the

88

enlightenment period, forming the basis of modern political philosophy, advanced by Thomas Paine’s

The Rights of Man during the French Revolution (Paine 2000).

89

CONCLUSION: ART AS PROTEST

This thesis has attempted to demonstrate how and why hip hop culture emerged as a social movement

in the city of Medellín in the 1990s. Responding to the limited avenues for dissent and change,

coupled with a target audience of youth, this popular culture emerged to challenge a culture of

normalised violence by offering an alternative based on the hip hop philosophy of peace. Thus, this

purported countercultural movement against a background of a withdrawn state and illicit actor

violence can be understood as a political movement.

This remark reveals an important interpretation of hip hop as a social movement. It questions the

tendency in social movement approaches to dichotomise cultural and political movements. Reflecting

upon theoretical disagreements between Political Opportunity and Cultural approaches, Jasper and

Goodwin suggest that this can be partially attributed to the choice of movements scholars have

studied. Political Opportunity scholars have focused on movements that demand legal or political

rights. In contrast, cultural scholars have tended to study new social movements, that is the

mobilization of constituents who articulate the rights and identities of particular social groups who

already enjoy full citizenship rights (Jasper and Goodwin; 2009,13-14). The hip hop movement

exposes the limitation of this trend. The hip hop movement is a political-cultural movement

articulating political and legal rights through cultural mechanisms, thus it challenges both dominant

schools of thoughts. However, in defence of these approaches, this split could be a consequence of an

inclination to study social movements in stable democracies and post-industrial contexts.

The context in which hip hop emerged and the nature of the social grievance set the conditions under

which culture creation through art was a political act. Thus a political current masquerades as a

culture movement given the constraints/opportunities of external agents.

The case of the hip hop movement in Medellín also highlights how artistic practice can be a

fundamental repertoire for dissent and social change processes. Social movement scholars have

started to focus their attention on the significance of artistic practice in social movements. Futrell et

al’s (2006) work on white power music scenes highlights how music can be utilised by movements to

90

provide safe spaces to articulate political views, to create an emotional attachment and collective

identity amongst members of the movement. Consideration has also been given to the ways in which

music can be a resource for social movements, a tool to facilitate the achievement of long term aims,

such as financial support, recruitment and to nurture collective identity (Corte & Edwards 2008).

Similarly, Roy (2010, 8-9) notes that social movements tend to adopt music as a means of attracting

new members or to boost morale and loyalty of existing members. Thus music is part of a recruitment

and retention strategy. Moreover, social movements, can utilise ‘popular culture to align their

message to a broader culture to bring audience closer to themselves’ (Roy; 2010, 9).

Eyerman and Jamison (1998) make an important contribution to the debate, framing music as an

important element in the formation of social movements. Making reference to the relationship

between folk music and the Civil Rights movement in the USA in the 1960s, Eyerman and Jamison

consider the interaction between music and social movements to be an important element in cultural

transformation as music lends itself to the popularization of beliefs, ideas and ways of life conceived

in the movement. Social movements therefore become knowledge producers, creating identity and

meaning for its members and wider society.

However, my contention would move beyond that by arguing that art can be a central component in

the formation of knowledge production and cultural transformation. It is not merely a vehicle to

transmit a movement’s beliefs or ideas that compliments existing forms of protest. Neither is it simply

a powerful accompaniment to a social movement, an activity or is part of a conscious strategy to

recruit members, galvanise existing support bases or gain resources. Rather music/art can be a

defining feature of dissent and as a channel for social change. It can be salient in the emergence,

development and survival of the movement as well as paramount to wider cultural transformation.

Thus the creation of art can indeed be the ends and not merely the means.

For example, a comparison of the civil rights movement and folk music and the hip hop movement

illuminates the use of music as a means and music as an ends. The civil rights movement in the USA

emerged in the mid-1950s and incorporated folk music in the 1960s as part of their cultural project to

galvanise existing members(Roy; 2010, 8). Therefore, folk music was not a factor in the movement’s

91

genesis nor was it part of the movement’s repertoire for dissent or social change. In contrast, hip hop

culture was fundamental to the emergence of the hip hop movement. The four elements of hip hop are

the protagonist in the formation and existence of the movement; it does not take a supporting role as

the movement attempts to advance its aims. Its aims are rooted in the practice of hip hop culture.

Therefore hip hop culture is essential to the existence and consolidation of the movement as well as

determining the articulation of dissent and change. Politically charged lyrics or graffiti depicting

social reality are strategies for dissent and social transformation. The movement’s raison d'etre is the

production of art as part of an alternative culture which challenges and ultimately changes the status

quo. In sum, without hip hop culture, these movements in Medellín would not exist, or certainly they

would not exist in this form.

Indeed, the hip hop movement may have developed like punk subculture in Medellín which was co-

opted by drug gangs in the 1980s (Riaño Alcalá 2010; 159-160). Consequently the movement’s

method of dissent and articulation of counter culture and identity would manifest themselves

differently. Thus, musical genres may (re)emerge in parallel with social movements and can be

incorporated by the movement to enhance its wider aims. However; in the case of hip hop in Medellín

it is apparent that artistic expression cannot be divorced from the very existence and nature of the

movement.

Therefore, this aspect of artistic practice as a form of social dissent and transformation reveals a

relatively under researched dimension of social movement literature. Social movement literature has

neglected art as a social movement focusing rather on creativity as a subsidiary of a movement or

framing social action as a counterculture movement. Thus little attention has been given to artistic

movements that are concerned with advancing political or legal rights.

Indeed, such neglect may reflect a lack of research on social movements operating in undemocratic

contexts, such as dictatorships or communities living in war. I would contend that in such

circumstances whereby channels for open political and social dissent are limited or not viable, art can

emerge in the public arena as a ‘hidden transcript’ a subtle instrument of social change. Therefore

further research is needed on how artistic expression can evolve as a ‘political’ social movement.

92

Addressing this deficiency in social movement literature would allow us to understand how repressed

civic actors can mobilize and create social change.

93

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