This paper is a draft version of: Marques, J., Paez, D. y Abrams, D. ( 1998 ) Social identity and intragroup differentiation as subjective social control. En: J F Morales, D Paez, J C Deschamps and S Worchel (Eds), Current Perspectives on Social Identity and Social Categorization. New York: Sage (pp 124-142) Social Identity and Intragroup Differentiation: the “Black Sheep Effect” as a function of subjective social control José M. Marques Dario Paez University of Porto University of the Basque Country Dominic Abrams University of Kent at Canterbury This chapter draws from four theoretical and empirical sources: the social identity and self-categorisation framework (e.g. Hogg, 1992; Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1992; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987) which, for simplicity, we herein designate as “SIT framework”; ideas recently set forth by Marques and Paez (1994) on the subjective dynamics of intragroup differentiation based on research on the “black sheep effect” and related to the Durkheimian perspective on social control and deviance; and research by Sherif and Hovland (1961) on attitudes and judgment. Its aim is to propose a cognitive-motivational framework to explain why people differentiate more strongly among ingroup than outgroup members as shown in the “black sheep effect”. Research on this effect has addressed those situations in which normative and counter-normative ingroup and outgroup members are made salient to the subjects, to show that people tend to, respectively, upgrade and downgrade ingroup members who bolster and oppose normative ingroup standards, as compared to outgroup members. The black sheep effect has been assigned to subjects’ attempt to legitimate the overall ingroup’s positiveness, by derogating those ingroup members who, in opposing the ingroup’s normative standards, threaten such positiveness. This view is consistent with the SIT framework (cf Marques and Paez, 1994). However, a full explanation of the black sheep effect requires qualification of some SIT assumptions as well as the proposal of some complementary processes which, in our view, better substantiate its emergence. The specific goal of this chapter is to distinguish between the notion of “group norm” as a descriptive principle of intergroup differentiation, i.e. of cognitive clarity (e.g. Hogg, 1992; Turner et al, 1978) and the notion of “group norm” as a prescriptive standard whereby ingroup members anchor their judgments of other ingroup members in order to ascertain, not the intergroup distinctiveness, but rather the legitimacy of the ingroup’s superiority (Marques & Paez, 1994). In this vein, we shall speak of descriptive norm to refer to the former, and prescriptive norm to refer to the latter kind of process. Whereas the descriptive norm stands more for a cold concomitant of social categorization, the prescriptive norm would emerge as a hot consequence of such categorization, particularly when norm violation becomes salient within the ingroup (Forsyth, 1995). Attitudes towards a behavior, feeling or way of thinking refer to the individual evaluative judgement, and norms refer to the group level - to the group modal or mean attitude towards a behavior, etc. Attitude is the internal side of the social influence process and norms are the group level of social influence ( Kenny and Lavoie, 1985). Litterature on attitude and judgement and on social sharing or
Transcript
This paper is a draft version of: Marques, J., Paez, D. y Abrams, D. ( 1998 ) Social
identity and intragroup differentiation as subjective social control. En: J F Morales, D
Paez, J C Deschamps and S Worchel (Eds), Current Perspectives on Social Identity
and Social Categorization. New York: Sage (pp 124-142)
Social Identity and Intragroup Differentiation: the “Black Sheep Effect” as a
function of subjective social control
José M. Marques Dario Paez
University of Porto University of the Basque Country Dominic Abrams
University of Kent at Canterbury This chapter draws from four theoretical and empirical sources: the social identity and self-categorisation framework (e.g. Hogg, 1992; Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1992; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987) which, for simplicity, we herein designate as “SIT framework”; ideas recently set forth by Marques and Paez (1994) on the subjective dynamics of intragroup differentiation based on research on the “black sheep effect” and related to the Durkheimian perspective on social control and deviance; and research by Sherif and Hovland (1961) on attitudes and judgment. Its aim is to propose a cognitive-motivational framework to explain why people differentiate more strongly among ingroup than outgroup members as shown in the “black sheep effect”. Research on this effect has addressed those situations in which normative and counter-normative ingroup and outgroup members are made salient to the subjects, to show that people tend to, respectively, upgrade and downgrade ingroup members who bolster and oppose normative ingroup standards, as compared to outgroup members. The black sheep effect has been assigned to subjects’ attempt to legitimate the overall ingroup’s positiveness, by derogating those ingroup members who, in opposing the ingroup’s normative standards, threaten such positiveness. This view is consistent with the SIT framework (cf Marques and Paez, 1994). However, a full explanation of the black sheep effect requires qualification of some SIT assumptions as well as the proposal of some complementary processes which, in our view, better substantiate its emergence.
The specific goal of this chapter is to distinguish between the notion of “group norm” as a descriptive principle of intergroup differentiation, i.e. of cognitive clarity (e.g. Hogg, 1992; Turner et al, 1978) and the notion of “group norm” as a prescriptive standard whereby ingroup members anchor their judgments of other ingroup members in order to ascertain, not the intergroup distinctiveness, but rather the legitimacy of the ingroup’s superiority (Marques & Paez, 1994). In this vein, we shall speak of descriptive norm to refer to the former, and prescriptive norm to refer to the latter kind of process. Whereas the descriptive norm stands more for a cold concomitant of social categorization, the prescriptive norm would emerge as a hot consequence of such categorization, particularly when norm violation becomes salient within the ingroup (Forsyth, 1995). Attitudes towards a behavior, feeling or way of thinking refer to the individual evaluative judgement, and norms refer to the group level - to the group modal or mean attitude towards a behavior, etc. Attitude is the internal side of the social influence process and norms are the group level of social influence ( Kenny and Lavoie, 1985). Litterature on attitude and judgement and on social sharing or
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interpersonal attitude expression and validation is reviewed from this perspective, as a complement to understand normative influence processes. Another major goal is to set a model to explain what happens between the two processes: informational descriptive and normative prescriptive. To us, the basic question thus is: through what kinds of mechanisms do individuals step from a descriptive norm which generates intergroup differentiation and identification to the ingroup, to a prescriptive norm according to which such identification is regulated and reinforced?
The SIT Framework
Social Differentiation, Social Attraction, and the Metacontrast Principle
Among other well-known assumptions, the SIT framework states that, in social life, people attempt to achieve cognitive clarity by exaggerating intergroup differences and intragroup similarities (Hogg, 1992; Doise, Deschamps & Meyer, 1978; Tajfel, 1969, 1978; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963). This process of perceptual accentuation is associated with self-stereotyping. When self-stereotyping occurs, the ingroup becomes fully representative of the self (Turner, 1981). Social identity is an outcome of this self-stereotyping process, in that, depersonalized self-perception generates on a cognitive self-representation which encompasses only those attributes shared within the ingroup, to the detriment of the idiosyncratic features of the self or those features which create some similarity between the self and the outgroup. These attributes correspond to an ingroup prototype (Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994; Oakes & Turner, 1990; Turner et al, 1987), i.e., in defined contexts, they simultaneously create the highest similarity among members of the same group, and the maximum differentiation between members of opposing categories.
According, for instance, to Hogg (1992), group prototypes fulfill structuring and emotional functions. The structuring function of group prototypes is related to social differentiation and intragroup assimilation, in that it allows individuals to perceive the social world in terms of meaningful, differentiated units, while generating perceived interchangeability among group members. In the case of the ingroup, such interchangeability includes the self. Because the self is assimilated to the ingroup prototype, this prototype becomes associated with an emotional function. Indeed, because, when the group is cognitively salient, a positive orientation towards the self becomes intrinsically equivalent to a positive orientation towards the group. Therefore, attraction to the self becomes social attraction, or attraction to the ingroup. An important implication of this function is that attraction within the group is not an outcome of interpersonal attitudes among group members, but rather, the result of an attraction towards the group position which best contributes to social differentiation. Because the self is assimilated to this prototype, the cognitive representation of the group becomes a mediator of a positive orientation towards the self.
According to Turner et al (1987; cf also Hogg, 1992; Hogg & McGarty, 1990) the cognitive construction of group prototypes, may be operationalized in terms of a metacontrast: given a distribution of group member positions on relevant intergroup dimension (for instance, a personality attribute or an attitudinal response-scale), a metacontrast ratio can be found for each group member, so that the group’s most prototypical member is the one who occupies the position which simultaneously
maximizes intergroup differences and intragroup similarities. The metacontrast ratio of each member (MCRk) can be computed as follows (Hogg, 1992; Hogg & McGarty, 1990; Turner et al, 1987):
Ó n
I=1 Ik - Oi __________________ n MCRk= ____________________ Ó m
I=1 Ik - Ii __________________ m-1 where:
Ik=position of ingroup member k on the dimension
Oi=positions of outgroup members on the dimension
Ii =positions of remaining ingroup members on the dimension
m=total number of ingroup members
n=total number of outgroup members
The Metacontrast and Rejection of Group Deviants
Basic motivation for the metacontrast logic is uncertainty reduction - in fact, Hogg &
Abrams (1994) desmise the "warm" self-esteem motivation approach of SIT by a "cold"
cognitivistic motivation of uncertainty reduction. In fact, metacontrast principe explain
descriptive fit, as the authors acknowledge, but, it is a less a satisfactory mechanism to
explain normative fit - related to the content and to the "correct" side of the position of
group members and prototypes. In fact, as we will show by means of a mental
experiment, metacontrast can nont explain black sheep effect.
As Hogg (1992) pointed out, the metacontrast notion has two main features. One such
feature is that it allows to easily determine the prototypical-normative position of each
group, that is, what, at the outset, we described as a denotative norm of group clarity.
The second feature is that it shows that the normative group position increases as the
group mean becomes extreme, and that such an increase is higher than an increase in
the group mean. These two features can be easily stated in the example of Figure 2,
below. One might be tempted to see the black sheep effect, mainly the rejection of
ingroup deviates as a direct outcome of the metacontrast principle: the metacontrast
corresponds to a principle according to which individuals are motivated to construct
clear-cut intergroup differentiations, and, therefore, collapse group members to their
prototypes; therefore, ingroup deviates would be disliked, because they negatively
contribute to intergroup differentiation (i.e. provokes cognitive uncertainty). By the
same token, outgroup members who are normative to (viz, typical of) their group
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would be better liked than outgroup deviates.
In this vein, the descriptive component of social differentiation would readily become a
prescriptive one. As Hogg (1992) stated, “when a specific social identity is the salient
basis for self-conception, self-perception and conduct become ingroup stereotypical and
normative, perceptions of relevant outgroup members become outgroup stereotypical,
and intergroup behaviour acquires --to varying degrees, depending on the history of
relations between the groups-- competitive and discriminatory properties” (pp. 90-91).
However, this statement does not clearly spell out the relationship that exists between
social categorization and the assignement of value to the characteristics that insure the
ingroup’s positive distinctiveness. Developing on this idea, Hogg (1992) carries on by
stating that “highly non-prototypical in- or outgroup members will be disliked,
particularly if, by being non-prototypical, they are actually being prototypical of the
other group. This may explain the strong negative attitudes that exist towards traitors
and ‘black sheep’”(p.103).
One should notice, however, that the relationship between intergroup differentiation
and rejection of ingroup deviates, as found in black sheep studies (see Marques and
Paez, 1994 for a recent thourough review) is not that this idea is not entirely
straightforward. These studies show, on the one hand, that rejected ingroup deviates do
not necessarily occupy outgroup prototypical positions, but contribute negatively to
ingroup positivity. On the other hand, socially desirable outgroup members --who,
according to the above quotation, would be ingroup prototypical provoking cognitive
confusion and, therefore, as strongly disliked as were undesirable ingroup members--
were moderately evaluated. Finally, some of these studies showed that outgroup
members who behave similarly to ingroup members, and then also provokes cognitive
uncertainty, actually are positively judged, mainly when a prescriptive norm is salient
to the subjects - it is dificcult to explain these results by a motivation to reduce
uncertainty and confusions between groups (Abrams’s study). In brief, although the
explanation provided by Hogg (1992) appears elegant and parsimonious in light of the
basic principles of the SIT framework, it seems necessary to add more complex
explanatory principles to it. Namely, it seems more likely that the black sheep effect
occurs due to a perceived threat to the legitimity of the superior position of the ingroup
prototype (an emotional response to a norm violation), than to a lack of intergroup
distinctiveness.
In others words, rejection of deviant correspond not to "cold" logic associated to
reduction of uncertainty or cognitive clarity, but, to the normative and "warms"
processes by wich groups precibe what is "ougth" to do - and not simply to describe
their prototypical position or what "we are doing".
Referent Informational Influence, Intragroup Differentiation, and the “Black Sheep
Effect”
Associated with the above mentioned functions is a process of referent informational
influence (Turner, 1991; Turner and Hogg, 1987): as individuals internalize or
cognitively construct the ingroup prototype and assimilate themselves to it, they
conform to this prototype in terms of their attributes and behaviour, in relevant group
settings (Hogg, 1992). Therefore, referent informational influence is process whereby
perceived ingroup attributes are internalized as norms defining the appropriate features
and behaviour standards of the social self (Turner, 1991).
The “Black Sheep Effect” and the Metacontrast Principle
The explanation proposed by Marques and Paez (1994) draws from the general
assumptions of the SIT framework. However, it differs from this framework in one
basic process which deserves to be discussed. It clearly stands out from the first section
that the SIT framework may offer one explanation for the black sheep effect (Footnote
1). Namely, it would state that socially undesirable (viz. non-prototypical) ingroup
members would be disliked, because they contribute negatively to the clearness of
group boundaries. In turn, socially desirable (viz. prototypical) ingroup members
would be liked, since they bolster such clearness. As Hogg (1992, p. 103) pointed out,
“people should have a more positive attitude towards those others who are relatively
more than less prototypical, and therefore should like both ingroupers who are
ingroup-prototypical and outgroupers who are outgroup-prototypical. Of course,
highly non-prototypical in- or outgroup members will be disliked, particularly if, by
being non-prototypical, they are actually being prototypical of the other group. This
may explain the strong negative attitudes that exist towards traitors and ‘black sheep’”.
The important issue in Hogg’s statement, above, is that, in assuming that the subjects’
judgments were only aimed to enhance intergroup differentiation (to accomplish
uncertainty cold cognitive motivation), one should necessarily expect subjects to express
more unfavourable feelings towards undesirable ingroup and desirable outgroup
members as a negative reaction to those who threaten the intergroup boundaries, and to
express more favourable feelings towards those who bolster such boundaries, i.e.
desirable ingroup and undesirable outgroup members. This would help them
perceiving clear-cut boundaries between the groups, and would function as a means to
generate clarity and meaningfulness in their social identity: those members (ingroup or
outgroup) who do not attune to their group’s norm hence hindering social
distinctiveness, would be rejected, whereas members normative to their groups hence
emphasizing distinctiveness, would evoke favourable reactions.
In brief, intergroup situations would correspond to the following cognitive operations:
(1) people would exaggerate intergroup differences and intragroup similarities while
engaging in a self-stereotyping process. This would help them to perceive clear-cut
boundaries between the groups and would function as a means to generate clarity and
meaningfulness in their social world including their social identity; (2) such perception
would be anchored on group prototypes, that is, normative positions upholding
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intergroup differentiation and intragroup similarity, as given by group representations
reified in their most prototypical members; (3) the judgmental outcome of this process
would be two-fold: those members (ingroup or outgroup) who occupy normative
positions, and therefore contribute to a clear-cut ingroup distinctiveness would be liked,
whereas counter-normative members who hinder such distinctiveness would be
rejected. This final point bears close implications for evidence on the “black sheep
effect”.
Indeed, an explanation based on a search for intergroup differentiation and clarity of
group boundaries may partly account for more negative judgments of undesirable than
of desirable ingroup members, but does not seem to explain the entire phenomenon.
One reason is that this explanation is a cold cognitive one, that does not explain more
self-ésteem related warm motivation. Another reason is that this explanation does not
take into account active life of a group, that not only share a label and where subjects
infer prototypical positions, but where subjects pollarize descriptive judgement, and
more important where subject becames involved in "moral judgements" and
comittement - related to group goals and group regulation. More empirically precise,
the black sheep effect studies never showed that outgroup members who are counter-
normative in light of ingroup standards (i.e. socially undesirable, outgroup-prototypical
outgroupers) are judged as favourably as are normative (i.e. ingroup-prototypical)
ingroupers, or, at least, that the former are judged more favourably than desirable (i.e.
ingroup.prototypical) outgroup members. Instead, it was consistently found that
socially desirable ingroup members are judged more favourably then socially
undesirable outgroup members.
In brief, it is not clear whether engaging in the black sheep effect is imediately aimed
only to the cold cognitive aim of increase intergroup distinctiveness. It seems to us that,
in line with the explanation proposed by Marques and Paez (1994), subjects may be
more imediately concerned with warranting the legitimacy of ingroup norms, hence
warranting a moral, an evaluative superiority of the ingroup. On accepting this idea, we
need to establish the process through which this phenomenon occurs. One possibility is
that the black sheep effect is really a direct function of the metacontrast descriptive fit
principle. Imagine, for instance, the distribution of members of groups A and B with 3
members each, on attribute X as depicted in Figure 1. By separately computing the
metaconstrast ratios for each group (MCRa and MCRb), one can conclude that members
A1 (MCR=4.00) and B1 (MCR=8.00) are prototypical of their groups, i.e., they occupy
the groups’ normative positions on the scale, whereas members A2 (MCR= -1.46) and
B3 (MCR= -5.33) would be the less typical, or more counter-normative, of their groups.
------------------------------------------------
Insert Figure 1 about here
------------------------------------------------
There is, however, a worth noting feature in this example: Groups A and B would
include, each, one member closer to the other group -- these are, respectively, members
A2 and B3. Notice, however, that member A2 (scale position=1) is farther from his
group prototype (scale position=6) than is member B3 (scale position=3) from Group B’s
prototype (scale position=2). Yet, the metacontrast ratio of member A2 (-1.46) would
still be closer to group A’s prototype (4.00) than would be the metacontrast ratio of
member B3 (-5.33) to group B’s prototype (8.00). As far as we see, the metacontrast
notion does not allow one to predict the emergence of the black sheep effect. As Hogg
(1992) pointed out, an instance of social behaviour corresponding to the specific case of
member A2 in our above example (a highly non-prototypical instance of his social
category) would be uncommon, “since categorization of individuals as ingroup
members accentuates their prototypicality, and highly non-prototypical ‘members’ are
likely to be categorized as outgroupers or non-ingroupers” (p.103).
Typically, in the black sheep effect studies, subjects are presented with four targets,
according to a 2(ingroup vs outgroup member) x 2(socially desirable vs socially
undesirable member) factorial design. The general pattern of results, is a strongly
positive evaluation of the socially desirable ingroup member, a strongly negative
evaluation of the socially undesirable ingroup member, and moderate evaluations of
both the socially desirable and the socially undesirable outgroup members. But, on
accepting Hogg’s contention, one would consider the black sheep effect as an outcome
of judgments of one ingroup member (the “socially desirable ingroup member”) and of
three outgroup or non-ingroup members (the “socially desirable outgroup member”,
the “socially undesirable outgroup member”, and the “socially undesirable ingroup
member”). Taking our example of Figure 1, and assuming that group A is the ingroup,
Hogg’s claim would be supported by one of two judgmental outcomes. The first one is
that member A2 would be judged more favourably than, for instance, member B2, who
occupies exactly the same scale-position. In this case, the judgmental outcome would be
led by the group tag associated to the members, to the detriment of these members’
positions on the stimulus scale. This would correspond to a top-down, or deductive
judgmental process (e.g. Fiske and Taylor, 1993; Tajfel, 1969). Because of his/her tag,
member A2 would have been cognitively assimilated to the A ingroup prototype --
member A2 would thus be perceived as a member of group A. This process would very
much correspond to the perceptual accentuation process found, for instance, by Tajfel
and Wilkes (1963).
The second judgmental outcome, supportive of Hogg’s argument is that member A2
would be evaluated as negatively as members B2, B3, and B1. In this case, the judgment
would be more strongly affected by the members’ positions, and their status as
members of group A or B would be an outcome of these positions. This would have
more of an inductive, or bottom-up, process. Because of his/her scale position, member
A2 would be cognitively assimilated to the B outgroup prototype --member A2 would
thus have been perceived as a member of Group B. Still, no matter which of the two
outcomes would emerge, they both would have important implications. The first
implication is that group member A2 could be derogated relative to members A1 and
A3 (either because of his/her less typical cognitive ingroup status, or to his/her
cognitive outgroup status), but there is no sound reason to expect this member to be
derogated relative to members B1, B2, and B3. Most likely, judgments would show an
interaction between the category label (A or B) and group members’ positions, such that
members A1 and A3 would be judged more favourably than the remaining. If the
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former possibility held, member A2 would be judged less positively than the remaining
members of group A and more positively than the members of group B. If the latter
possibility held, member A2 would be judged less positively than members A1 and A3
and as negatively as group B members. But, in no case, could one expect member A2 to
be more derogated than group B members.
Clearly, none of the two alternatives accounts for the black sheep effect. Indeed, in
accepting an elementary explanation of the black sheep effect based uniquely on the
metacontrast principle, one could not account for the fact that “outgroup members” or
“non-ingroup members” (e.g. group member A2) are evaluated even more negatively
than other outgroup members (e.g. group members B1, B2, and B3). A prognosis based
on our model would state that member A2 would be more strongly rejected than
members B1, B2 and B3, because this member would be perceived as an ingroup
instance. Therefore, we assume that group judgments are primarily deductive. In the
example of Figure 1, member A2 would be more judged according to the A ingroup tag.
As a result, this member would be strongly derogated exactly because he/she would
represent a higher threat to the social self than would other non-ingroup or outgroup
members. Clearly, this assumption needs theoretical elaboration.
In discussing the antecedents and consequences of the “black sheep effect”, Marques
and Paez (1994) drew from the general principle underlying referent informational
influence. However, they started from the assumption that, in everyday life, people
accept the normative principle that one should conform to ingroup standards, not only
because they best differentiate among groups, but perhaps more importantly, because
these standards should be “by definition”, the best or even the only ones acceptable
(what we are ougth to do). From this starting point, they established a parallel between
rejection of ingroup deviates as found in the black sheep effect studies, referent
informational influence, and Festinger’s (1950) model of group pressures towards
conformity.
To put it shortly, Festinger (1950), proposed that affiliation in groups fulfills two basic
functions, a social reality function, i.e. uncertainty avoidance through selective
affiliation with those who share similar beliefs, and a locomotion function, i.e.
facilitation of goal achievement through affiliation with those people who share similar
goals which could not be accomplished by the isolated individual. Parsimoniously (see
Bales classic work for instance), we can posit two group goals: an expressive or moral -
to have a collective "good face" - and an instrumental one - to perform succesfully some
goal. This process would be insured within the group through two forms of social
control, which Jones and Gerard (1967) designated as informational, and normative
influence. Informational and normative influence would be generated by the fact that
group members become interdependent, because they need each other both in order to
ascertain consensus about relevant issues and to coordinate action for the purpose of
goal achievement (cf also Cartwright and Zander, 1968). In other words, because
subjects not only share a label and a passive similar position, but, because they became
an structured collective with a common activity. As a result, any failure on the part of a
group member either to comply with the group’s majority opinions or with social
coordination for goal achievement would motivate the other members to exert
pressures upon them in order to restore the group’s functionality. This idea formed the
basis for research showing that people in small groups generate consensual opinions
(e.g. Festinger, Schachter & Back, 1950) and reject deviant members who resist group
pressures to comply with the group’s position on a relevant matter of opinion (e.g.
Schachter, 1951) or intentionally fail to contribute to group’s goal achievement (e.g.
Jones and DeCharms, 1967). This research further shows that increases in group
homogeneity or in the discrepancy between the majority and the deviant stand increase
the majority’s pressures towards uniformity (e.g. Levine, 1980; Levine & Pavelchak,
1984; Moreland & Levine, 1982; Shaw, 1976). On the other hand, as we have argued,
some historical sociology researches shows that following witchcraft social cohesion
improves (Hamilton & Rauma, 1995).
Following in part McKirnan (1980), informational influence is related to the structural
aspect of social norm, that is the cognitive core content and distinctivennes of behavior
and traits associated to the group. Informational influence and prototypical information
are the “external” and internal side of this social processes. Normative influence is
related to the range and evaluative component of the norm. The range of variation of
trait and behavior around the prototype mean that norm are conceived of as latitude of
aceptable behaviour and characteristics. This aspect is associated to the evaluative
component.i.e. elicitation of affective reaction and regulatory responses when norms are
violated. Normative influence is the external version and prescriptive cognitions are the
internal side of this processes. Informational influence requires only cold self
categorization and differenciation, and normative influence requires affective and value
ladden social identification, occurring when informational influence is established
(polarization et normes). This may be an explanation of what occurs at the emotional-
cognitive level in the small group research.
In line with recent reinterpretations of this process by authors like (Hogg, 1992; Hogg
and Abrams, 1988) and Turner (1990; Turner and Hogg, 1987), we argued that findings
in small group behaviour, including rejection of group deviates, can be more
parsimoniously assigned to a basic process of social attraction and referent
informational influence, than to interpersonal attraction between group members, or, to
the classic processes of informational and normative influence -the basic antecedents of
group behaviour traditionally accepted by the “social cohesion” approach. Indeed,
because in the black sheep effect studies, subjects reject deviate ingroup members
without prior interpersonal acquaintance or face-to-face interaction, this rejection
cannot be assigned to interpersonal attraction or similarity as accepted by traditional
“group-cohesion approach” (cf Hogg, 1992). However, we think that a categorization
per se, being an important step, is not enough. In fact, facing a black sheep subjects are
forced to became immerged in a mini group crisis and conflict. This crisis elicits creative
cognitive process aimed to solve not uncertainty reduction task, but to mantain a
satisfactory collective self-esteem.
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In this vein, we argued that self-stereotyping would generate two basic phenomena:
first, it would increase the perception of group homogeneity to an extreme, since the
representation of the group would amount but to a prototype; second, and as a
consequence, the individual’s perceptual field would be engulfed by the single and
absolute goal of maintaining or enhancing social identity. Therefore, social identity
would become a subjective group rationale, i.e. the group’s unique and absolute reason
of existence from the individual’s standpoint. This would generate a state of perceived
absolute interdependence as particular phenomenological relationship between the self
and the ingroup.
Absolute Interdependence and Subjective Control
Such a relationship would, in turn, motivate the individual to exert subjective control
over ingroup members in order to sustain a sense of legitimacy of the ingroup’s
superior position relative to other groups. A threat to such legitimacy, and hence to the
self, would arise with any perceived lack of conformity within the ingroup in light of
the relevant ingroup standards. As a result, people would attempt to subjectively exert
control over ingroup members, especially over those who threaten the overall
positiveness of the group and its relative superiority over the outgroup: “self-
stereotyping encompasses a perceived interdependence between the individual and the
ingroup members, in defining the social self according to [ingroup] stereotypical
standards. Clearly, the only "group goal" one can reasonably think of in these
circumstances, is the maintenance or the enhancement of social identity. That is, if social
categorisation entails a sense of interdependence between the self and the
representation of other ingroup members, then the perception of social desirability of
any ingroup member would contribute towards a positive social identity. This would
explain approval of likable ingroup members as found by studies on the black sheep
effect. Concomitantly, one may suppose that those ingroup members who do not attune
to the standard levels necessary to promote a favourable self-definition, become
embarrassing, and instigate aversive reactions. To summarize, in the case of the
cognitive group, whereas upgrading likable ingroup members would come as a
subjective reward, derogation of unlikable ingroup members would fulfill a function
similar to that fulfilled by pressures towards uniformity in the case of small groups”
(Marques and Paez, 1994, pp.60-61) or to witchtcrafts in middle ages societies (Hamilton
& Rauma, 1995).
In brief, self-categorization, referent informational influence, and perceived absolute
interdependence among ingroup representatives, would trigger a cognitive
representation, or an “implicit theory” of group processes in the individual’s mind. This
is why we proposed the notion of “group dynamics of the mind” to draw a parallel
between the black sheep effect as a subjective active, not passive, process of “reward” of
socially desirable ingroup members and “punishment” of socially undesirable ones, and
the similar process traditionally observed in small-group research, wherein people
reject or derogate group members who deviate from the group mainstream. As can be
seen, the notion of “norm” used in the Marques and Paez (1994) framework
encompasses that proposed by Turner and colleagues, since it would correspond to the
definition of the acceptable ingroup position on a social comparison dimension.
However, this framework adds a prescriptive component to it: individuals would be
normative not only in terms of a “descriptive” definition of their group in terms of a
prototype (a cognitive parallel, for instance, to Jones and Gerard’s, 1967, notion of
“informational influence”), but also in terms of a “prescriptive” demand for compliance
with this prototype (a cognitive parallel to Jones and Gerard’s, 1967, notion of
“normative influence”). This prescriptive demand is associated not only to affiliative
motives, as usually assumed, but also to collective self-enhancement motive and to the
internalization of norms (Luthanen & Crocker, 1992; Cialdini, Kallgreen and Reno,
1991).
A Two-Step Process for Self-Categorization and Rejection of Ingroup Deviates
In brief, we may propose that referent informational influence may involve both
denotative and prescriptive cognitions regarding ingroup members, the former being
aimed at generating intergroup distinctiveness, and the latter being aimed to insure a
perception of cognitive control over ingroup members, or subjective uniformity in light
of ingroup relevant standards, and hence, to ascertain such distinctiveness.
------------------------------------------------
Insert Figure 2 about here
------------------------------------------------
To summarize, the basic idea underlying the process depicted in Figure 2 is that
derogation of some ingroup members occurs when, following social categorization, (1)
individuals know the normatively appropriate behaviour to be adopted by ingroup
members in order to protect a positive intergroup differentiation, and (2) some ingroup
members are perceived as not observing these behaviour requirements. Notice that, in
line with this idea, one should adopt the “prototype” notion to refer a value according
to which ingroup and outgroup are best differentiated and their respective members are
best assimilated to the group, i.e. as the outcome of “denotative cognitions”., related to
structural componenents of the norm, both prototypical or core attribuetes and
distinctivennes Complementarily, the “norm” notion is referred to as a cognitive tool
for social control among ingroup members, i.e. as a “prescriptive cognition”, that is the
latitude of acceptable attributes and evaluative reaction to deviation from tone
standard. As a result, once the judgmental context activates contrasting category-labels,
self-categorization occurs along with a “denotative” metacontrast. This corresponds to
Level 1, which represents the classical process of intergroup differentiation and social
discrimination. But when a prescriptive dimension is added to the ingroup-outgroup
differentiation, such that an intragroup distinction becomes salient and threatens
intergroup differentiation, subjects derogate ingroup members who do not comply with
the ingroup standards. This corresponds to Level 2. In this vein, Level 2 would
correspond to a subjective effort intended to legitimize the differentiation occuring at
1
Level 1 and to warrant the ingroup’s uniformity with regard to the prescribed standards
that sustain ingroup’s superiority.
Prescriptive Norms as a Frames of Reference
Although this model may allow to state the general process according to which
individuals simultaneously show ingroup biases and derogate ingroup members, it still
does not provide any definite operationalization of how these judgments occur. One
such operationalization which appears quite coherent with the above stated view may
be found in the classical literature on attitudes and judgment, specifically, in work by
Sherif and Hovland (1961). In fact, their work can be conceived as aimed towards
clarifying the mechanism what we called normative cognitions (norms as latitudes of
acceptable behaviour Sherif & Sherif, 1969).
According to Sherif and Hovland (1961), the expression of an attitude towards an object
(e.g. rejection of ingroup members) depends on a process of placement of this object on
a frame of reference, or a continuum comprising other objects similar to and different
from it. If, for instance, a militant of a racist group was asked an opinion about the
forming of mixed race couples, the person would, probably, start the process by
recollecting previously known positions on the matter, and comparing these positions
with each other, along some meaningful dimension. Still according to these authors, the
individual would then place his or her own position on the top of the dimension. The
judgmental outcome would, thus be a function of the establishment a continuum of
value ranging from one known extreme to the opposite one, followed by the definition
of the normative position advocated by the person, and the comparison of the object of
judgment to this normative position.
The person’s normative position would serve as an anchor point against which the
other positions would be appraised and ranked according to a process of assimilation
and contrast: those positions close to the anchor point would be perceived as more
similar to it, whereas positions afar from the anchor point would be perceived as more
different from it, than they objectively are (Sherif and Hovland, 1961). The anchor point
should, therefore help define the person’s latitude of acceptance (the scope of positions
susceptible to generate agreement) and latitude of rejection (the range within which
would be placed positions generating disagreement) and generate the cognitive
construction of discrete categories (accepted vs rejected positions) instead of the
continuum in which they are objectively placed.
Hovland, Harvey and Sherif (1957, in Sherif and Hovland, 1961) illustrated this process
in study in which they presented their subjects with nine sentences ranging from
strongly favouring to strongly opposing the sale and consumption of alcoholic
beverages. Subjects were to report their attitudinal extremity by marking the two
sentences with which they agreed and disagreed the most. From the remaining
sentences, subjects were also to indicate those which they considered acceptable, and
those they considered as inacceptable, as a means to determine, respectively, their
latitudes of acceptance and of rejection. A first set of results indicated that extreme
subjects presented larger latitudes of rejection and smaller latitudes of acceptance than
did moderate subjects: extreme subjects, both pro- and anti-prohibition considered less
sentences as acceptable, and more sentences as unacceptable, than did moderate
subjects. Subjects were later asked to rate a tape-recorded speech advocating a moderate
position towards alcoholic beverages. The results showed that, contrary to moderate
subjects, extreme subjects perceived the message as advocating a position contrary to
their own: Anti-prohibition subjects viewed the speech as pro-prohibition and pro-
prohibition subjects viewed the speech as anti-prohibition. Among other conclusions,
Sherif and Hovland (1961) proposed that a strong level of ego-involvement with an
issue increases one’s acceptance threshold and, by the same token, decreases one’s
threshold of rejection. Black sheep effect can be conceived off, from this perspective, as
the effect of an ego-involved judgement about an ingroup member performing counter-
attitudinal behavior or out of norm behavior.
The correspondence between this process and those discussed thus far is self-evident.
First, intergroup differentiation may correspond to the placement of ingroup members
in the latitude of acceptance and of outgroup members in the latitude of rejection of a
continuum corresponding to a relevant, meaningful intergroup dimension. Second,
referent informational influence may correspond to a process based on the
establishment of an anchor point on that continuum, this anchor point being the
perceived ingroup norm. In addition, assuming that social identification generates a
stronger ego-involvement with the ingroup than the outgroup, one may expect ingroup
latitudes of rejection to be larger that outgroup’s and, by the same token, ingroup’s
latitudes of acceptance to be smaller than outgroup’s. For instance, partially confirming
this idea, subjects request more most information about a positive target and take more
time of decision to classify a subject as member of the ingroup - the so called ingroup
overexclusion phenomenon (Leyens, Yzerbit and Schadron, 1994). Figure 3 attempts to
exemplify such a process.
------------------------------------------------
Insert Figure 3 about here
------------------------------------------------
In Figure 3.a. one can see the representation, from the standpoint of one hypothetical
member of Group A, the positions occupied by three ingroup (A1, A2, A3) and three
outgroup members (B1, B2, B3), along a dimension of value correlated with social
categorization. By operating a metacontrast, the person would accentuate the
similarities between ingroup members, so that they all fell within the threshold of the
latitude of acceptance, and between outgroup members who fall in the latitude of
rejection. However, if, as displayed in Figure 3.b., the person recognized that the
position adopted by A2 fell below the threshold of a the latitude of rejection, and
perceived A2 as an ingroup member, the rejection threshold would significantly
decrease, because A2 would put social identity largely more at stake than would B1, B2,
and B3. As a result, A2 would be positioned even lower than would the former
outgroup members. By the same token, an outgroup member who clearly fell within the
region of acceptance (i.e. an ingroup-normative outgroup member), would be positively
1
evaluated because the endorsement of ingroup standards by outgroup members would
reinforce the legitimacy of the former, even though such a member contributed
negatively to the descriptive intergroup contrast (Footnote 2). This would be an instance
of a contrast effect based on ingroup favouritism (cf Marques, 1990).
Some evidences support the idea that black sheep effect can be conceived off as an ego-
involved judgement about an ingroup member performing counter-attitudinal behavior
or out of norm behavior.
Branscombe, Wann, Noel and Coleman (1994) confirmed that black sheep effect (more
negative evaluation of a disloyal ingroup member than a disloyal outgroup member)
appears when ego-involment is important and when affective involvement is
important- when identification with the ingroup is high. When identification with the
ingroup is low a moderate and positivity biais effect emerge (more negative evaluation
of outgroup disloyal member and moderate evaluation of ingroup disloyal member). Is
important to remark that self-categorization was valid for both types of subjects - they
were evaluating reactions to their university basketball team and it is perfectly
reasonable to assume that all subjects self-categorize themselves as members of
university and that all supporters of the basketball teams can be considered as mebers
of this ingroup. Difference was not self-definition, but affective involvement or ego-
involvement. Low identification subjects react as subjects having a weak or moderate
attitude towards a social issue or group, and at the opposite, we can consider that high
involvement react as subjects with a polarized or extreme attitude. For Sherif, an
individual may be said to be oego-involved when the issue touches on strong values
and in the self-system. This type of ego-involvement is different from outcome relevant
involvement and impression relevant involvemente and we are dealing only with the
first one (Perloff, 1993). Ego-involvement usually is related to attitude polarization or
extremity. As we know empirically repeated expression of attitude produces a
polarization in attitudes and polarization is stronger when others group members
validate each other's attitudinal expression. In other terms, repeated creative expression
of attitude and others validation of them (Brauer et al.,1995), on one hand, and punition
to deviant , that is itself an expression of attitude and comittement to a group norm
(i.e.of loyalty) as is posit theoretically with some empirical support, are social influence
processes related to attitude and group polarization - and attitude extremity can be
conceived of as the internal aspect of the external construction of a clear moral norm (i.e.
clear and high treshold of acceptance and low level of rejection). Level 1 of our model is
the equivalent of a simply self-categorization and weak attitude formation, associated to
a descriptive norm. Level 2 is the equivalent of self-categorization affective ladden (i.e.
identification) and strong attitude, related to prescriptive norms.
Finnaly, confirming the Durkheimian idea of the central role of menace to social
identities as a factor fueling normative regulation, Branscombe et al. (1993) found that
the black sheep effect was greatest in the threat condition (social group loss) than in a
non threat condition (social group win). Evaluations of disloyal and loyal group targets
differed more, first one derogated and second one better evaluated, when the threat of a
loss was present than when the affective activation was lower ( absence of threat and
group wins). Historical research also confirms central role of threat in eliciting
normative regulation and black sheep effect. A wellknown historical researcher saids:
"La révolte protestante provoqua naturellement un surcroît d'aversion pour l'heresie,
considérée comme le mal supreme...On retrouve ici cet elément constitutif de toute
mentalité obsidionale: le traître de l'intérieur est pire que l'enemi du dehors. Il faut le
sortir de sa cachette, l'éliminer en priorité et aucun chatiment n'est assez dur pour lui "(
Delumeau, 1993, pp.514-515).
Conclusions.-
We have distinguished descriptive norms as a cold concomitant of social categorization,
and prescriptive norm as a warm consequence of such categorization. One mental
experiment suggest that the metacontrast principe explain descriptive fit, but is an
unsatisfactory mechanism to explain the black sheep effect, one instance of normative fit
- related to the content and to the "correct" side of the position of group members.
Prescriptive norm is the the group expression of members subjective ego-involvement
attitude. By respect to the affective ladden or warm character of prescriptive norms,
data showing that higher identification (different from cold selfcategorization and more
related to value involvement) is an antecedent of extreme derogation of negative
ingroup and that salience of group norm provokes a similar effect exists. Threat to social
identity appears to be a factor reinforcing extreme derogation of negative ingroup
members. Prescriptive norms are conceived off as frames of reference or subjects
internalization of norms as latitudes of acceptable behavior. Black sheep effect is
explained as an instance of ego-involved or value relevant judgement, by which subjects
has a lower treshold of rejection of ingroup outliers and lower treshold of acceptance of
outgroup positive members. Overexclusion phenomenon is mentioned as a partial
empirical support of these ideas. A parallel is established between cold self-
categorization and weak attitudes, with larges latitudes of acceptance of negative
ingroup members, related to simply ingroup favoritism and moderation in judgement
of negative members and, on the other hand, warm self-categorization, strong attitudes
with lower latitudes of acceptance of negative ingroup members, and black sheep effect
or ingroup extreme judgement of negative members.
Repeated expression and active sharing of opinions and ideas is one of the main
processes related to attitude polarization (passing from weak attitudes to strong
attitudes and from descriptive norms to prescriptives norms) and we speculate that this
group dynamic can be repeated in a intrapersonal level by means of repeated mental
punition of deviant. Threat to social identities because of potential negative evaluation
is another factor eliciting use of norms as prescriptive cognitions. Drawing from the
Durkheimian tradition, we posit that norm violation and rejection of deviant is not only
a consequence, but very often an antecedent of the awarenness of a norm and the
construction of their prescriptive character. Following Vygotski's ideas, norm appears
first as an interpersonal process of social regulation, and then becames internalized as a
form of internal regulation, and norm internalized as a polarized attitude retain a "quasi
social" character in Vygotski's terms. From this perspective normative influence is not
related only to public compliance based on self-esteem motives, nor is informational
influence related to private acceptance based on motives of knowledge and accuracy
1
(Hogg & Abrams, 1993). Both normative and informational influence have a public
aspect related to evaluative and cognitive needs, and both might be internalized when
group becames a relevant reference group. Public aspects are not the opposite of
internal one: public compliance is not the opposite of private acceptance, but the first
one is a previous stage of the second one. Some evidence confirms than in a first stage
"external" aspects form the basis for internal processes. Litterature on self-perception
theory and attitude formation suggest that in a first stage subjects infer their evaluative
positions from their behavior, in particular when subjects do not posses well-defined
prior attitudes - few prior experiences with respect to attitude issue or object
(Taylor,1975). On the other hand, confirming the relevance of interpersonal process,
litterature on the relationship between intention and behavior also suggest that norms
or external peer social influence is sometimes more important than attitudes orienting
behavior, and that prior behavior also predicts behavior. Attitudes and subjective norms
are usually positively related (Vallerand et al.,1992). Strong attitudes formed through
direct experience best predict behaviors. Brief, direct experience probably related to
social influence and peer pressure is an important predictor of both behavior and of
strong attitudes guiding behavior (Zimbardo & Leippe,1991). In Vygotski's conception,
evaluative laddened behavior toward an instance (i.e.rejecting a black sheep) is a
phenomenon of the transition from the public interpsychic to intrapsychic, a processes
from the social collective activity of the subject to his more individualized activity (i.e.
formation of an internal prescriptive norm or polarized attitude towards a
desirable/undesirable behavior, thinking or feeling state). This pattern of development
is common to all the "higher psychological functions" (Vygotski, 1977). Some
sociological and social psychological data support partially our ideas, but we are aware
that we need to show that derogating repeatedly deviant conduct to higher group
identification, self definition as group member and strong comittment to group norms.
Ó n
I=1 Ik - Oi __________________ n MCRk= ____________________ Ó m
I=1 Ik - Ii __________________ m-1
References
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Figure Captions
Figure 1.
A Two-Step Process of Inter- and Intra-Group Judgment
Figure 2.
Metacontrast Ratios of Hypothetical Group Member Distributions Along an Attribute.
Figure 3.
Inter- and Intra-Category Differentiation on a Normative Frame of Reference
1
Fig 2
attribute X
7 6 5 4 3 2 1
GROUP A: A3 A1 A2
GROUP B: B3 B1 B2
MCRa 2.29 4.00 -1.46
MCRb -5.33 8.00 5.33
Fig. 3
a. “Metacontrast” positions
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 (+) A3 A1 A2 (-)
B3 B1 B2
ingroup outgroup b. Ingroup “Subjective Control” + “Outgroup Metacontrast” positions
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 (+) A3 A1 A2 (-)
ingroup latitude of acceptance
ingroup latitude of rejection
B3 B1 B2 outgroup latitude of acceptance outgroup latitude of
rejection
1
Fig. 1
1. Social categorization and intergroup salienc e. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
2. Intergroup salience an d subjective control
STIMULUS SETTING Fit
(Comparative (Normative)
inter-category salience denotative cognitions
META- CONTRAST
self-stereotyping and perceived interchangeability between self
and ingroup norm
violation? secure social identity
(ingroup bias)
social identity as ´social reality`and superordinate goal
perceived absolute interdependence and ´common
fate
ingroup norm awareness
SUBJECTIVE GROUP DYNAMICS
derogation of ingroup deviates
Legitimization of positive social identity
Footnotes
1. Actually, several alternative explanations can be indirectly found in the literature,
one of which is the classical outgroup homogeneity effect. We contrasted this explanation with one derived from SIT elsewhere (Marques, 1990, 1993; Marques and Paez, 1994).
2. Notice that, by the same token, an outgroup member who felt on P1’s normative position should be upgraded, since such a member would contribute, perhaps even more than an ingroup member, to the legitimacy of the ingroup’s normative position. This standpoint is clearly at odds with the differentiating function assigned, for instance, by Hogg (1992; cf also Turner et al, 1987) to the metacontrast, but is coherent with the idea that intragroup judgments function as a means to legitimize the ingroup’s position. In a recent study (Marques and Abrams, in preparation) it was found that outgroup members who adopt the ingroup’s normative position may be judged as favourably as normative ingroup members when intragroup differences are endowed with a prescriptive status. However, when such differences are merely descriptive, subjects evaluate atypical ingroup members (i.e. ingroup members different from themselves) more favourably than they evaluate atypical outgroup members (i.e. outgroup members similar to themselves).
