+ All Categories
Home > Documents > Three Attacks, Many Process Variations and One …...Power Analysis Attacks • Often non-intrusive...

Three Attacks, Many Process Variations and One …...Power Analysis Attacks • Often non-intrusive...

Date post: 11-Jun-2020
Category:
Upload: others
View: 1 times
Download: 0 times
Share this document with a friend
26
Never Stand Still Faculty of Engineering Computer Science and Engineering Never Stand Still Faculty of Engineering Computer Science and Engineering Three Attacks, Many Process Variations and One Expansive Countermeasure International Workshop on Cybersecurity Darshana Jayasinghe, Angelo Ambrose, Aleks Ignjatovic, Sri Parameswaran
Transcript
Page 1: Three Attacks, Many Process Variations and One …...Power Analysis Attacks • Often non-intrusive and invasive • First proposed by Kocher in 1998 – Simple power analysis –

Never Stand Still Faculty of Engineering Computer Science and Engineering

Click to edit Present’s Name

Never Stand Still Faculty of Engineering Computer Science and Engineering

Three Attacks, Many Process Variations and One Expansive CountermeasureInternational Workshop on Cybersecurity

Darshana Jayasinghe, Angelo Ambrose, Aleks Ignjatovic, Sri Parameswaran

Page 2: Three Attacks, Many Process Variations and One …...Power Analysis Attacks • Often non-intrusive and invasive • First proposed by Kocher in 1998 – Simple power analysis –

School of Computer Science and Engineering

AES Unprotected AES Circuit

3

Plaintext Key

SubByteShiftRows

Mix ColumnsAdd Round Key

SubByte

ShiftRows

Add Round Key

Ciphertext

N-1

Plaintext 128 bits ; Key 128, 192 or 256 bitsAES - 128 N=10AES - 192 N=12AES - 256 N=14

Page 3: Three Attacks, Many Process Variations and One …...Power Analysis Attacks • Often non-intrusive and invasive • First proposed by Kocher in 1998 – Simple power analysis –

School of Computer Science and Engineering

Power Analysis Attacks• Often non-intrusive and invasive• First proposed by Kocher in 1998

– Simple power analysis– Differential power analysis– Correlation power analysis– Mutual information analysisMany more …..

Power consumption

Plaintext, Key,Ciphertext

Page 4: Three Attacks, Many Process Variations and One …...Power Analysis Attacks • Often non-intrusive and invasive • First proposed by Kocher in 1998 – Simple power analysis –

School of Computer Science and Engineering

Simple Power Analysis• Widely used against Asymmetric-key algorithms

embedded.com

RSA Implementation

Page 5: Three Attacks, Many Process Variations and One …...Power Analysis Attacks • Often non-intrusive and invasive • First proposed by Kocher in 1998 – Simple power analysis –

School of Computer Science and Engineering

Differential Power Analysis Attacks -DPA

If b0=0; M0 = ∑𝒏𝒏=𝟏𝟏𝑵𝑵 𝑷𝑷𝒏𝒏

If b0=1; M1 = ∑𝒕𝒕=𝟏𝟏𝑻𝑻 𝑷𝑷𝒕𝒕

R = 𝑴𝑴𝟎𝟎

𝑵𝑵– 𝑴𝑴𝟏𝟏

𝑻𝑻

Pt Key Pt⨁key Binary μW

3F 00 3F 00111111 50

6E 00 6E 01101110 34

07 00 06 00000110 32

48 00 48 01001000 27

29 00 29 00101001 36

B3 00 B3 10110011 25

83 00 83 10000011 20

M0 =

M1 =

34

50

+

+

32

36 25 20

27+

++R = 𝟗𝟗𝟗𝟗

𝟗𝟗– 𝟏𝟏𝟗𝟗𝟏𝟏

𝟒𝟒R = 1.75

Key0 255

|R|

Pt Key Pt⨁key Binary μW

3F 01 3E 10001110 50

6E 01 6F 01101111 34

07 01 06 00000110 32

48 01 49 01001001 27

29 01 28 00101000 36

B3 01 B2 10110010 25

83 01 82 10000010 20

Pt Key Pt⨁key Binary μW

3F 05 3A 00111010 50

6E 05 65 01100101 34

07 05 07 00000111 32

48 05 4D 01001101 27

29 05 2C 00101100 36

B3 05 b6 10110110 25

83 05 86 10000110 20

Page 6: Three Attacks, Many Process Variations and One …...Power Analysis Attacks • Often non-intrusive and invasive • First proposed by Kocher in 1998 – Simple power analysis –

School of Computer Science and Engineering

Pt Key Pt⨁key HW(S(Pt⨁key)) μW

3F 00 3F 5 50

6E 00 6E 6 34

07 00 06 4 32

48 00 48 3 27

29 00 29 4 36

B3 00 B3 5 25

83 00 83 5 20

Pt Key Pt⨁key HW(S(Pt⨁key)) μW

3F 01 3E 4 50

6E 01 6F 3 34

07 01 06 6 32

48 01 49 5 27

29 01 28 3 36

B3 01 B2 5 25

83 01 82 3 20

0

0.01

0.02

0.03

0 1e 3c 5a 78 96 b4 d2 f0

Corr

elat

ion

Coe

Pt Key Pt⨁key HW(S(Pt⨁key)) μW

3F 05 3A 1 50

6E 05 65 4 34

07 05 07 4 32

48 05 4D 5 27

29 05 2C 4 36

B3 05 b6 5 25

83 05 86 6 20

Correlation Power Analysis Attacks -CPA

r = ∑𝒊𝒊=𝟏𝟏𝒏𝒏 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊−�𝑿𝑿 (𝒀𝒀𝒊𝒊−�𝒀𝒀)

∑𝒊𝒊=𝟏𝟏𝒏𝒏 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊−�𝑿𝑿 𝟐𝟐 ∑𝒊𝒊=𝟏𝟏

𝒏𝒏 (𝒀𝒀𝒊𝒊−�𝒀𝒀)𝟐𝟐

Page 7: Three Attacks, Many Process Variations and One …...Power Analysis Attacks • Often non-intrusive and invasive • First proposed by Kocher in 1998 – Simple power analysis –

School of Computer Science and Engineering

Attack on Standard AES Circuit

Page 8: Three Attacks, Many Process Variations and One …...Power Analysis Attacks • Often non-intrusive and invasive • First proposed by Kocher in 1998 – Simple power analysis –

School of Computer Science and Engineering

• CPA can only detect linear dependencies

• Shannon's entropy is used to calculate the mutual information

• Often the key convergence rate falls behind the CPA

Mutual Information Analysis Attacks

9

Hypothetical power consumption

Obs

erve

d po

wer

cons

umpt

ion

Source: Wikipedia

プレゼンター
プレゼンテーションのノート
Higher the mutual information, higher the probability of a particular key guess
Page 9: Three Attacks, Many Process Variations and One …...Power Analysis Attacks • Often non-intrusive and invasive • First proposed by Kocher in 1998 – Simple power analysis –

School of Computer Science and Engineering

• Logic 1 Logic 2

Yokohama 06

Basics of Algorithmic Balancing

0 1 1 0

CMOS WDDL by Tiri 07

AES AES

Page 10: Three Attacks, Many Process Variations and One …...Power Analysis Attacks • Often non-intrusive and invasive • First proposed by Kocher in 1998 – Simple power analysis –

School of Computer Science and Engineering

Balancing : MUTE AES• Proposed by Ambrose for a processor based environment

Page 11: Three Attacks, Many Process Variations and One …...Power Analysis Attacks • Often non-intrusive and invasive • First proposed by Kocher in 1998 – Simple power analysis –

School of Computer Science and Engineering

Back to AES CircuitAssume:

Page 12: Three Attacks, Many Process Variations and One …...Power Analysis Attacks • Often non-intrusive and invasive • First proposed by Kocher in 1998 – Simple power analysis –

School of Computer Science and Engineering

State 2

2 Way BalancingState 1

Page 13: Three Attacks, Many Process Variations and One …...Power Analysis Attacks • Often non-intrusive and invasive • First proposed by Kocher in 1998 – Simple power analysis –

School of Computer Science and Engineering

4-way or Quadruple BalancingState 1

State 2

Can prove the same for timing

Page 14: Three Attacks, Many Process Variations and One …...Power Analysis Attacks • Often non-intrusive and invasive • First proposed by Kocher in 1998 – Simple power analysis –

School of Computer Science and Engineering

QuadSeal-4

Page 15: Three Attacks, Many Process Variations and One …...Power Analysis Attacks • Often non-intrusive and invasive • First proposed by Kocher in 1998 – Simple power analysis –

School of Computer Science and Engineering

Attack on QuadSeal

Visible Key bytes

Page 16: Three Attacks, Many Process Variations and One …...Power Analysis Attacks • Often non-intrusive and invasive • First proposed by Kocher in 1998 – Simple power analysis –

School of Computer Science and Engineering

Process Variation

• Path imbalances• Aging effects. Process

Variation

Inter-die Intra-die

18

プレゼンター
プレゼンテーションのノート
Is a considerable threat for balancing techniques Becomes important when width of the transistor is < 65nm
Page 17: Three Attacks, Many Process Variations and One …...Power Analysis Attacks • Often non-intrusive and invasive • First proposed by Kocher in 1998 – Simple power analysis –

School of Computer Science and Engineering

… ,L6 ,L5 ,L4 ,L3 ,L2 ,L1.,L6 ,L5 ,L4 ,L3, L2 ,L1

19

Page 18: Three Attacks, Many Process Variations and One …...Power Analysis Attacks • Often non-intrusive and invasive • First proposed by Kocher in 1998 – Simple power analysis –

School of Computer Science and Engineering

QuadSeal Against Process Variation

• Each core(Din, Kin), (Din, Kin), (Din,Kin)and (Din,Kin)• 24 inputs combinations• 63-bit LFSR repetitiontime of (263-1)

• Running at 50 MHz, (5, 849 years more precise)

20

Enable Signal

Page 19: Three Attacks, Many Process Variations and One …...Power Analysis Attacks • Often non-intrusive and invasive • First proposed by Kocher in 1998 – Simple power analysis –

School of Computer Science and Engineering21

Page 20: Three Attacks, Many Process Variations and One …...Power Analysis Attacks • Often non-intrusive and invasive • First proposed by Kocher in 1998 – Simple power analysis –

School of Computer Science and Engineering

CPA attacks

Page 21: Three Attacks, Many Process Variations and One …...Power Analysis Attacks • Often non-intrusive and invasive • First proposed by Kocher in 1998 – Simple power analysis –

School of Computer Science and Engineering

How Efficient is the swapping?

23

Page 22: Three Attacks, Many Process Variations and One …...Power Analysis Attacks • Often non-intrusive and invasive • First proposed by Kocher in 1998 – Simple power analysis –

School of Computer Science and Engineering

CPA attacks

Page 23: Three Attacks, Many Process Variations and One …...Power Analysis Attacks • Often non-intrusive and invasive • First proposed by Kocher in 1998 – Simple power analysis –

School of Computer Science and Engineering

Software Implementation of QuadSeal

• Microblaze is a 32 bit soft processor by Xilinx• 32 bit input 32 bit output; 232 entries (4 GB)• But only 256 entries will be used• Composite SubByte table as a Hardware IP

• Pre-clear ? – After each table lookup, data lines are refreshed by loading 00000…0 (32’h0)

• Throughput X/4

25

Microblaze

Control FPGA

SASEBO GII

VirtexV

PC

プレゼンター
プレゼンテーションのノート
(32 bit or 64 bit) Identical timing characteristics (neglected process variations)
Page 24: Three Attacks, Many Process Variations and One …...Power Analysis Attacks • Often non-intrusive and invasive • First proposed by Kocher in 1998 – Simple power analysis –

School of Computer Science and Engineering

Devices we target and attacks we prevent!

• DEVICES– ASIC– FPGA– Software on 32-bit Processors– Extensible Processors

• ATTACKS WE PREVENT– Differential Power Analysis Attacks (DPA)– Correlation Power Analysis (CPA)– Mutual Analysis Attacks

Page 25: Three Attacks, Many Process Variations and One …...Power Analysis Attacks • Often non-intrusive and invasive • First proposed by Kocher in 1998 – Simple power analysis –

School of Computer Science and Engineering

An Example Attack Setup

Page 26: Three Attacks, Many Process Variations and One …...Power Analysis Attacks • Often non-intrusive and invasive • First proposed by Kocher in 1998 – Simple power analysis –

School of Computer Science and Engineering

Thank you!


Recommended