1 May 11, 2016 Title: Philippine Social Movements: Challenging the Rule of the Oligarchy* Teresa S. EncarnacionTadem, PhD** Introduction The overthrow of President Joseph E. Estrada in 2001 seemed to be another defining moment in the history of social movements in the Philippines as these continued to play a key role in what was billed as EDSA 2. But the bigger challenge which emerged however seemed to be the role of social movements in pushing for the democratization process under the Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo Administration from 2001 to 2010. This period marked the continuation of “elite democracy” in the country and a continuing test of t he strategies taken by social movements in confronting this. These include participation in electoral politics as well as alliances with political elites, engagement as well as confrontation with government and the pursuit of armed and unarmed struggles among others. The former refers specifically to the continuing left insurgency movement in the country as represented by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), its military arm, the New People’s Army (NPA) and its illegal united front, the National Democratic Front (NDF). The latter, on the other, hand, refers to the other left ideological blocs in Philippines society. Although there are other players in Philippine social movements, those mainly involved in the left movement or left ideological/political blocs have generally defined the nature of social movements in the country. As defined by Heywood (2007, 308), A social movement is a particular form of collective behavior in which the motive to act springs largely from the attitudes and aspirations of members, typically acting within a loose organizational framework… A movement is different from spontaneous mass action (such as an uprising or rebellion) in that it implies a level of intended and planned action in pursuit of recognized social goals. Not uncommonly, social movements embrace interest groups and may even spawn political parties, trade unions and socialist parties, for instance, as part of a broader labor movement. *Paper to be presented in the 24 th World Congress of Political Science, International Political Science Association (IPSA). “Politics in a World of Inequality”. Poznan, Poland, 23-28 July 2016. **The author is Professor of Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines, Dalian.
Transcript
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May 11, 2016
Title: Philippine Social Movements: Challenging the Rule of the Oligarchy*
Teresa S. EncarnacionTadem, PhD**
Introduction
The overthrow of President Joseph E. Estrada in 2001 seemed to be another defining
moment in the history of social movements in the Philippines as these continued to play a key role
in what was billed as EDSA 2. But the bigger challenge which emerged however seemed to be
the role of social movements in pushing for the democratization process under the Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo Administration from 2001 to 2010. This period marked the continuation of
“elite democracy” in the country and a continuing test of the strategies taken by social movements
in confronting this. These include participation in electoral politics as well as alliances with
political elites, engagement as well as confrontation with government and the pursuit of armed and
unarmed struggles among others. The former refers specifically to the continuing left insurgency
movement in the country as represented by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), its
military arm, the New People’s Army (NPA) and its illegal united front, the National Democratic
Front (NDF). The latter, on the other, hand, refers to the other left ideological blocs in Philippines
society. Although there are other players in Philippine social movements, those mainly involved
in the left movement or left ideological/political blocs have generally defined the nature of social
movements in the country.
As defined by Heywood (2007, 308),
A social movement is a particular form of collective behavior in which the motive to act
springs largely from the attitudes and aspirations of members, typically acting within a
loose organizational framework… A movement is different from spontaneous mass action
(such as an uprising or rebellion) in that it implies a level of intended and planned action
in pursuit of recognized social goals. Not uncommonly, social movements embrace
interest groups and may even spawn political parties, trade unions and socialist parties, for
instance, as part of a broader labor movement.
*Paper to be presented in the 24th World Congress of Political Science, International Political Science Association
(IPSA). “Politics in a World of Inequality”. Poznan, Poland, 23-28 July 2016.
**The author is Professor of Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the
Philippines, Dalian.
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Presently, Philippine social movements continue to be defined in class terms which is
associated with old social movements, i.e., labor and peasant movements as against the elites. The
split in the CPP-NDF-NPA as brought about, by among others, differences in the analysis of
Philippine society as well as strategies to pursue in a period of “democratization” with the advent
of the 1986 People Power Revolution ushered in new forms of struggles.1 Movements which have
emerged from this has been referred to as new social movements (NSMs). These NSMs have
given more emphasis to non-class issues such as the rights of women and indigenous peoples.
Although these issues continue to address material concerns it also brings forth non-class aspects
such as “a broader set of values associated with gender equality and opposition to patriarchy” as
in the case of the women’s movement (Heywood 2007, 308) as well as an assertion of one’s
identity which is also shared by the indigenous people’s movement with emphasis on ethnicity and
a better quality of life as in the case of the environmental movement. These movements in the
Philippine combine both class and non-class concerns giving priority to both of these. In terms of
its ideological stance, NSMs are identified with the New Left as “it challenges prevailing social
goals and political styles, and embraces libertarian aspirations such as personal fulfillment and
self-expression”. CPP-NPA-NDF members who continued to support the old Left’s priority to the
class struggle with the armed struggle as the priority means of attaining this are referred to as the
“reaffirm” or “RA” faction of the CPP-NPA-NDF. Those who oppose this, on the other hand, are
referred to as the “rejectionists” or “RJ” factions. The “RJs” believe among others that armed
struggle need not be the priority in attaining one’s goals and a faction of them also do not believe
that the armed struggle could be only attained in the countryside but also in the urban area. More
importantly, non-class issues are as important as class concerns. These developments in Philippine
social movements seem to reflect the emergence of what is referred to as the “New Left” which
Comprises thinkers and intellectual movements (prominent in the 1960s and early 1970s) that
sought to revitalize socialist thought by developing a radical critique of advanced industrial
society. The New Left rejected both “old” left alternatives: Soviet-style state socialism and
de-radicalized western social democracy… Common themes nevertheless included a
fundamental rejection of conventional society (“the system”) as oppressive, a commitment to
personal autonomy and self-fulfillment in the form of ‘liberation’, disillusionment with the role
of the working class as the revolutionary agency, and a preference for decentralization and
participatory democracy (Heywood 2007, 308).
Thus, NSMs identified with the New Left, have focused on “organizational structures that stress
decentralization and participatory decision-making and have also developed new forms of political
activism” (Heywood 2007, 308). As what also characterized Philippine social movements, what
has emerged is “new politics” which turns away from ‘established’ parties, interest groups and
representative processes towards a more innovative and theatrical form of protest politics”
(Heywood 2007, 309). This has generally been seen in the anti-globalization and anti-capitalist
movements as epitomized by the “Battle of Seattle’ in 19992 as participated in by Filipino activists.
1Please see Tadem, Teresa S. Encarnacion and Jorge V. Tigno, “Philippine Social Movements after Martial Law” in
Tadem, Teresa S. Encarnacion and Noel M. Morada, Editors. 2006. Philippine Politics and Governance.
Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines, Diliman, pp. 43-62. 2The Battle of Seattle of 1999 occurred during the WTO Seattle Ministerial Meeting due to the growing global
discontent over liberalization. “The said meeting was interrupted by massive protests by many cause-oriented groups
carrying a broad range of issues, including economic, environmental, social and even cultural concerns. The protests
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Thus, one has the concern for class issues at the local as well as transnational level, but the form
of struggle has changed.
In all of these, the question which perennially emerges is to what extent have these old
NSMs successfully pushed further the democratization process in the Philippines? This paper
seeks to examine this by looking into the issues which have confronted Philippine social
movements from 2001 to 2013, spanning the Arroyo Administration and the current administration
of Benigno Simeon Aquino (2010 to the present) and examining how these issues have been
analyzed. Secondly, it will discuss the strategies which have been used to attain these goals and
objectives as well as the factors which have facilitated as well as hindered these. These will be
examined using the political process theory which looks into three important aspects which helps
determine the success or failures of social movements, that is, the political opportunity structures,
both internal and external, which have given impetus to social movements struggles, the manner
in which issues have been framed and the resources available for movement mobilization towards
desired objectives and goals.
I. Issues and Concerns confronting Philippine Social Movements from 2000-2013
The issues and concerns confronting Philippine social movements from 2000 to 2013 may be
categorized into two major themes which are important in laying down the foundations of the
democratization process. These are “good governance” and “redistributive economic policies”.
Good governance generally refers to solving the problems related to political concerns such as
addressing massive corruption and the creation of an environment of peace and stability. Related
to the latter, is the issue of human rights. As for redistributive economic policy concerns, these
mainly refers to development programs which are able to address poverty and the glaring socio-
economic inequalities in the country. These include the implementation of a genuine agrarian
reform program and affordable social services such as health and education. Good governance
issues thus seem to relate to non-class issues as issues of corruption and peace and stability as well
as human rights cut across classes in society. And as for the second concern of redistributive
economic policy, these directly addresses the problems of the big gap between the rich and the
poor. Philippine reality, however, points out that the concern for good governance and
redistributive economic policy are not mutually exclusive. That is, the reason why there is a lack
of good governance in the country is because of the wide gap between the rich and the poor as a
result of the absence of a redistributive economic policy. This can only be attributed to the
continuing control of wealth in Philippine society by only a few as epitomized by the continuing
dominance of political dynasties in the country which has bred patriominialism.
A. Social Movements in the Context of a Patrimonial State
Thus, the challenges which confront social movements can best be seen in context of the
Philippines as a patrimonial state where “practically everything depends explicitly upon personal
considerations…” (Weber 1968, 104). The following represent some of the essential features of a
patrimonial state. The exchange of resources from political officials to their associates (i.e.,
outside the meeting were matched inside by a brewing sense of dissatisfaction among many developing countries over
the provisions as well as the implementation of different agreements” (Bernabe and Quinsaat 2009, 26).
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cronies); policies that tend to be particularistic rather than universalistic in nature; the rule of law
is secondary to the “rule of man”; and political officials tend to blur the boundaries between the
public and private realms (Budd 2005, 58). The adverse effects of a patrimonial state can well
best be seen in the important institutions of government, i.e., the executive and the legislature. As
pointed out
Personal connections and considerations penetrate the legislatures of patrimonial states as well.
Legislation tends to deal predominantly with particularistic issues, rather than issues of
national significance. Furthermore, with the entire system revolving around the distribution of
the pork barrel, the executive’s power is enhanced at the expense of the legislature (Budd 2005,
42).
The issue of the pork barrel fun came into scandalous light in August 2013 when a
businesswoman Janet Lim-Napoles was accused of allegedly masterminding the channeling of
funds worth P10 billions of 28 lawmakers’ Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) or pork
barrel, into “ghost projects through bogus nongovernment organizations (NGOs)” (Slaveries,
2013, A20 and Tubeza and Uy, 2013, A1 & A20). The amount which the congressman or senator
received rose to 60 per cent in kickback as compared to previously. The rest wentto Napoles and
her gang and nothing reached the supposed beneficiaries (Inquirer Research and Salaverria 2013,
A6). According to the Commission on Audit Chair Grace Pulido-Tan was “spit and connections”
(laway lang ang puhunan at koneksyon) were all the capital you needed (Cabacungan 2013, A13).
Under the current Aquino Administration, despite its daan matuwid (straight path) slogan,
crony capitalism. As revealed by data released by The Economist, the Philippines “moved up to
third place on a list of countries where so-called ‘crony sectors’ accounted for a big chunk of the
gross domestic product (GDP)…” (de Vera 2016, A2). As expounded by The Economist, crony
capitalism – or “rent-seeking”, as economists call it - “shades from string-pulling to bribery. Much
of it is legal, but all of it is unfair. It undermines trust in the state, misallocates resources and stops
countries and true entrepreneurs from getting rich (de Vera 2016, A2).
A. Good Governance Concerns
Patrimonialism thus continues to breed corruption which continues to be a major concern
of social movements. Social movements played an important role in ousting President Joseph
Estrada in January 2001 because of his involvement in a jutting, a multi-million-peso illegal
gambling racket. This was just fifteen years after the fall of the corrupt dictator Marcos. “Estrada,
along with Marcos, has been included in Transparency International’s list of the world’s top ten
corrupt leaders in the contemporary era. He is said to have embezzled US$78-80 million in less
than three years of being in power” (Quimpo 2009, 7). The change of leadership, however, did
not bring about a change in the elite structure of Philippine society and Estrada’s successor,
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was embroiled in a series of corruption scandals.3 Due to
3These included among others: The IMPSA kickbacks; The AFP comptroller hidden wealth case; The Jose Pidal
scandal; The COMELEC-Mega-Pacific computerization deal; The fertilizer scam; The North and South Rail projects;
The cheating in the 2004 presidential elections; The distribution of cash gifts in Malacanang; The NBN-ZTE
bribery scandal; and The PNDP ‘euro generals” (Quimpo 2009, 7).
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these corruption scandals, a Pulse Asia survey conducted in late 2007, Filipinos revealed that
Arroyo has been “the most corrupt” among five Filipino presidents in the past 21 years, surpassing
even Marcos and Estrada” (Quimpo 2009, 7).
In the context of a patrimonial state, therefore, corruption is viewed by social movements
as part of a bigger societal structural problem of elite domination. Thus, the country continues to
have the longest and only existing communist armed insurgency in the region. During the post-
martial law period, the peace movement in the country have sought to push for peace talks between
the CPP-NPA-NDF and the Philippine government. The problem, however, is that the NDF
continues to see the peace initiatives as only secondary or complementary to the more strategic
goal of attaining total victory through a protracted people’s war (Ferrer 2006, 145). As for the
Philippine military, it continues to view with mistrust the communist insurgents. Thus, closely
associated with the peace movement is the human rights movement whereby the country continues
to witness the summary execution of alleged members of the left movement by the military.
Peace talks, however, have made headway between the Government of the Philippines
(GPH) government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front). In October 2012, a Bangsamoro
Framework of agreement was forged between the GPH and the MILF. Negotiations were
undertaken to provide for its implementations the most prominent of which is the annex on wealth
sharing.4 These led to the formulation of the BangsaMoro Basic Law (BBL).5 Prominent social
movements’ players performed key roles in this process. The GPH chief negotiator who forged
the peace agreement with Mohaquer Iqbal, the MILF chief peace negotiator was Marvic Leonen,
an academic-activist even during the martial law period for the rights of indigenous peoples and
an environmentalist. Leonen who was also former Dean of the University of the Philippines
College of Law was appointed as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court when then peace
agreement was forged. His role as chief negotiator to see the implementation of this peace
agreement is University of the Philippines professor of political science Miriam Coronel-Ferrer,
who like Leonen, was an activist during the martial law years and who became a prominent
member of the peace movement in the country during the post-martial law period. Overseeing this
whole process is Teresita Quintos Deles, another prominent peace activist who is currently the
head of the Office of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPPAP)
overseeing this whole peace negotiations between the GPH and the MILF.
The peace process with the Moro insurgents brings to light the concerns of social
movements not only for the economic but also issues of identity and ethnicity. Moreover, this
should also include the rights of indigenous peoples, who unlike the Moros, have the arms as strong
bargaining leverage for their rights. Thus, the peace movement has also advocated for the tri-
people’s perspective of the Moro people composed of Christians, Muslims and lumads (indigenous
peoples in Mindanao) (Wadi 2005). The passage of the BBL, however, was aborted because on
January 25, 2015, 44 Special Action Force (SAF) troopers who were on an anti-terrorist mission
4Please see Miriam Coronel-Ferrer, Chapter 13: The Search for a Viable Autonomy in Muslim Mindanao/Southern
Philippines.) 5The BBL stands for Batayang Batas para sa Rehiyon Autonomia ng BangsaMoro. n passed, would establish a
proposed new autonomous political entity known as the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, replacing the current
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. If this is passed, it would establish a proposed new autonomous political
entity known as the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, replacing the current Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao. //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangsamoro_Basic_Law. Accessed February 15, 2016.
were killed in a clash with Moro rebels in Mamasapano, Maguindanao. As a result a number of
the lawmakers responding to public clamor who were angered by the Mamasapano , as it was
referred to, did not pass the BBL (Rappler.com 2015). This became known as the Mamasapano
tragedy.
The issue of identity is also most prominent in the country’s women’s movement which
forwards an encompassing conception of political engagement that spans “the personal and
the political.” which confronts the question of power in both the reproductive and the
productive spheres, underscoring the need to intervene in private and public arenas of
political contention (Santos 2010, 132).
B. Redistributive Economic Policy Concerns
The lack of good governance provides the overarching framework for the absence of radical
redistributive economic policies. This is highlighted in the failure of the government’s watered
down Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Policy (CARP), initiated in 1987. This is not surprising
given a country where 20% of the population control 80% of the country’s agricultural lands
(Almojueal 1992, 41). A breakthrough was made through the redistribution of the land in
Hacienda Luisita, a property belonging to the Cojuangco family of President Aquino. Hacienda
Luisita which was previously exempted from CARP under the stock option to the farmer clause,
an example of privately-owned lands which up till now, due to resistance from all landowners,
have not yet been all distributed. As for government lands which have all been redistributed to the
farmers, problems which emerge include the lack of agricultural support for the farmers. What
continues to be a perennial problem therefore is the farmers continue to fall victims to usurers and
the cartels.
As for the non-class issues concerning the rights to women and the indigenous peoples, the
absence of radical redistributive policies further aggravates their marginalized positions in society.
Environmental degradation has also been largely blamed on elites engaged in logging and mining
activities in cahoots with multinational corporations. Moreover, despite the country’s impressive
6 per cent growth rate in 2012, the National Statistical Coordination Board reported that the
poverty incidence has remained unchanged from 2006 to 2012. This therefore highlights a jobless
growth and the need for an inclusive growth (Aldaba 2013, A14). Such a situation helps to explain
the glaring socio-economic inequality whereby in 2011, only 40 families accounted for the 76%
of the country’s gross domestic product (AFP 2013, A11).
Neo-liberalism in a period of globalization. The major concern of social movements
involved in development work is their critique of the neo-liberal development paradigm with
emphasis on the market, liberalization and privatization which has led to the cutting down of social
and welfare services particularly seen in the sectors of education and health. Those who have
borne the brunt of this is the working –class while the peasantry has suffered immensely with the
decline in the agricultural sector due to cheaper agricultural products from abroad. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the peasant movement continues to be unrelenting in its demand to take
agriculture out of the WTO (Bernabe and Quinsaat 2009, 5). Its call has been joined in by other
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social movements’ players such as the women and environmental movements and small and
medium-enterprises who have been adversely affected by the monopoly of multinational
corporations in a period of globalization. The fair trade movement, for example, seeks to bring
safety nets to small- and medium-based enterprises which compete with big corporations in a
period of globalization. Such a situation is further aggravated by developing countries who still
have to bear the burden of the debts they have to pay. In the Philippines, the Freedom from Debt
Coalition (FDC), which has formed in 1989, has continually campaigned to put a cap on the debt
service payments which rose from USD3.5 billion in 1990 to USD10.2 billion in 2003 (Araneta
2006). The debt issue also comes in light of the harsh Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The SAP has generally brought forth severe
conditionalities which call for the cut down of social services as well as the streamlining of
government which has led to the laying off of hundreds of workers. This, however, has not brought
forth about the development needed and has only widened the gap between the rich and the poor.
In 2016, despite the settlement of the Marcos’ debt, FDC continues to pursue its call for
the government to address the country’s debt problem. As noted by the CSO Social Watch
Philippines “of the P3-trillion government budget for 2015, as much as P812 billion or 13 percent
went to debt repayment” (Tadem 2016a, A16). Although the government argues that it is able to
effectively manage its debt payments, FDC argues that the budget which goes to debt payments
would be of better use for vital social services such as education and health (Tadem 2016b).
II. Social Movement Strategies in Period of Continuing Elite Domination
Under the Arroyo and Aquino Administrations, one continues to witness the close link of the
country’s social movements with the rest of civil society. In general, civil society is referred to as
an arena of social and political life autonomous from state domination, where progressive
values and political practices can be articulated, counter-hegemonic institutions can be
created, which can nurture and nourish, the creation of autonomous political actors who
are able to articulate and defend their interests, propose alternative projects for structuring
the state and society, and transform the relations of state and society (FOPA 1993, 170).
Civil society, particularly during the post-martial law period has spawned civil society
organizations (CSOs) which are considered as
part of social movements comprising amorphous and fluid groups in which the bonds are
common grievances or conviction, and shared goals for societal and policy change (rather
than structures). They connect people with causes through developing communities of
interests around shared conditions” (Clark 2003, 4).
Non-governmental organization (NGOs) and political organizations (POs), whose members and
constituencies are also its beneficiaries, continue to be prominent players in social movements in
general and in civil society in particular. These are “private, non-profit volunteer organizations
whose primary aim is to influence publicly some form of social change. Generally, NGOs are more
formal and professional rather than domestic social movements, with legal status and paid
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personnel” (Khagram, Riker and Sikkink, 2002, 6). In the Philippines, their emergence have been
very much linked with the mainstream left movement during the martial law period.6
A distinctive trait of social movements in the Philippines continue to be their being organized
and shaped by the political blocs they belong to.
Although the term “political bloc” is a generic designation for any group engaged in political
action in the Philippine setting, it is popularly used in reference to organizations which embrace
ideological belief systems that are seen as alternatives to paradigms of those who hold state
power. They are often called “revolutionary groups”, “ideological forces”, groups belonging
to the Philippine Left, and are customarily classified according to ideological framework they
subscribe: communism, national democracy, socialism, democratic socialism and social
democracy (Abba 1997, 272).
Most dominant of these blocs remain to be the national democrats which through the post-
martial law years, particularly, with the split in 1992 of the CPP-NPA-NDF, have splintered and
continue to splinter into several groups. Among these splinter groups include the popular
democrats, social democrats, democratic socialists and socialists. These groups “have their
respective ideological moorings, programs, priorities, traditions, subcultures and organizational
networks even though collectively they form the ranks of the Philippine Left (Ferrer 1997, 5-6).
A. Political Process Theory and Social Movements Strategies7
Given the political context of Philippine politics and the natures of its social movements,
the political process theory enables one to understand the factors which help to shape social
movement organizations and strategies in attaining their goals and objectives (Klandermans and
Staggenborg 2002, x). The others are the mobilizing structures, collective action frames and
repertoires of contention which social movements utilize to attain their objectives (Klandermans
and Staggenborg 2002, x). These POs have also served as source for resource mobilizatioin
whereby “collective actors and their allies and targets differ in terms of the resources they
command, their preparedness to make resources available and their ability to pursue their resource
effectives (Klandermans and Staggenborg 2002, x).
The democratization process albeit under a patrimonial society has provided major POS
and resource mobilization venues for social movements to pursue their advocacies as seen in the
following manner:
Pursuing advocacies through the electoral process. The electoral process continues to
be an arena whereby social movements seek to push further the democratization process. The
party-list system which was introduced in the 1987 Philippine Constitution paved the way for the
6Please see Tadem, Teresa S. Encarnacion and Jorge V. Tigno. 2006. “Philippine Social Movements after Martial
Law” in Tadem, Teresa S. Encarnacion and Noel Morada. Editors. Philippine Politics and Governance: Challenges
to Democratization and Development. Quezon City: Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines,
Diliman, pp. 43-62.
7Please also see Tadem 2015.
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participation of the marginalized sectors in society. As noted, “the party-list system has opened
the door for the new, progressive political elites, whereas the previous institutionalized politics of
the Philippines had not allowed leftist or progressive elements to enter” (Park 2008, 122). This
electoral system allows the marginalized sectors of society to win three seats in Congress if it could
get 6% of the votes cast for its party-list party. Among the leading parties identified with the left
movement which continue to perform well in the elections are Bayan Muna, (Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan or New Nationalist Alliance) which is closely associated with the CPP-NPA-NDF and
Akbayan (Citizen Action Party) and Sanlakas (Uphold People’s Power and Democracy) both of
which are identified with the “RJ” faction of the left movement. Because they are able to get more
than 6% of the votes but can only avail of three seats, Bayan Muna has also produced “satellite
parties” such as the women’s group coalition, GABRIELA (General Assembly Binding Women
for Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership and Action) and its youth arm Anakpawis (“child of
sweat”) belonging to the Makabayan (Nationalistic) bloc of party-list representatives (Salaverria
and Cabacungan 2013, A8). In the 2016 national elections, Gabriela ranked as No. 2 in the part-
list groups garnering 4.31% of the votes which translates to 3 seats. Bayan Muna, which ranked
no. 14 in the party-list groups, however, only earned 1.87% of the votes cast which equals 2 seats.
Akbayan also suffered the same fate as Bayan Muna, although it ranked no. 12, it only earned
1.88% of the votes cast for the party-list group which is equal to 2 seats (Uy 2016, A1&A4).
Obtaining government positions through elite alliances. Another POS and resource
mobilization venue which continues to open up for social movements is the pursuit of their
advocacies through the executive, i.e., attaining government positions through alliances with the
elites. This was seen under the Corazon Aquino (1986-1992) and Ramos (1992-1998)
Administrations whereby social democrats were able to hold positions in government. It was,
however, only under the Estrada Administration (1998-2001) and onwards whereby members of
the “RJ” faction of the left movement were able to hold Cabinet positions in government. This was
because unlike Corazon Aquino and Ramos, Estrada was open to left movement members from
the “RJ” faction, who were closely identified with the CPP before, to join his government. An
example of this included was former NDF leader Horacio “Boy” Morales, his Secretary of
Agrarian Reform. Under the Arroyo Administration, the social democrats, e.g., Corazon Soliman
as Secretary of Social Welfare and Development and Teresita Quintos Deles as head of the Office
of the Philippine Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) who were marginalized under the Estrada
Administration came back to power as they played a crucial role in the 2001 EDSA 2 people power
revolt which ousted President Estrada.
Under the current Aquino Administration (2010 to the present), social democrats like
Soliman and Quintos Deles continue to hold the positions of Secretary of the Department of Social
Work and Development and head of the OPAAP respectively. A new faction of the left movement
in government, Akbayan, identified with the “RJ” faction currently hold key positions in
government. This was the “reward” given to the movement due to its support for Aquino’s
presidential campaign. Akbayan consist of social democrats which carry the democratic socialist
line. These are “organized into Pandayan para sa Sosyalistang Pilipino (PANDAYAN) and the
Partido Democratiko Sosyalista ng Pilipinas (PDSP), the bulk of the independent democrats, which
include former NDs and members of the Movement for Popular Democracy (MPD) evolved into
a socialist organization through BISIG (Bukluran sa Ikauunlad ng Isip at Gawa or Movement for
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the Propagation of Social Thought and Action (David 1997, 279). No member of the “RA” faction,
which advocates for the armed struggle, have yet to part of the government administration.
The formation of alliances, networks and coalitions. The political dispensation from
2001 to the present also continues to provide political and resource mobilization opportunities for
social movements during this period to pursue the formation of alliances, networks and coalitions
with other social movement players. An example of this is the NGO Freedom from Debt Coalition
or FDC which emanated from the mostly progressive forces which “were mostly left-of-center
forces that were once engaged in the anti-dictatorship struggle. The years of struggle against the
Marcos dictatorship provided them the necessary experience and networks” (Ariate and Molmisa
2009, 30). The political blocs which constituted FDC carried with them their respective mass base.
These included people’s movements, for example, Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN),
which is identified with the CPP-NPA-NDF, the social democrats Bansang Nagkakaisa sa Diwa
at Layunin (BANDILA) (Country United in Thought and Action), the independent socialists
Bukluran sa Ikauunlad ng Sosyalistang Isip at Gawa (BISIG) (Movement for the Propagation of
Social Thought and Action) as well as NGOs, for example, the National Economic Protectionism
Association (NEPA) which in itself is an alliance of various political blocs. The members also
represent the different sectors in society, for example, workers, peasants, overseas Filipino workers
(OFWs) and women (Tadem 2009b, 226). The composition of the leadership of the political blocs
of FDC were mainly from the middle class based in urban centers. This enabled the FDC to possess
and access a high degree of professional and technical competencies to deal with the debt issue.
(Tadem 2009b, 227).
FDC’s major objective is
To propose an alternative debt policy and it has three basic calls: debt moratorium on foreign
debt services payments; selective repudiation of loans which did not benefit the Filipino people
and to limit foreign debt service payments to no more than 10 percent of export earnings to
enable the country to finance its economic recovery (Ariate and Molmisa 2009, 30 & 34).
The collective action frame as defined by the FD is seen in its targets which are the
international financial institutions (IFIs), i.e., the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank which are sources of the loans accrued by the dictatorship. FDC’s trajectory is
not only national but also international. Thus, in the process, from being a national coalition,
the FDC has become an important actor in forming and leading the current transnational effort
for debt relief particularly for onerous loans (Ariate and Molmisa 2009, 26). This has led FDC
to head the secretariat for the transnational movement Jubilee South which is spearheading an
international campaign for a debt moratorium.
Coalitions in a period of globalization. Such alliances, networks and coalitions which have
been a rich source for POS and resource mobilization was further reinforced with the adverse effect
of globalization on the country’s economy. This has led to the emergence of anti-World Trade
Organization (WTO) or anti-liberal coalitions. An example of this is the Alayna Agrikultura
(Agricultural Alliance), a coalition of agricultural producers, which includes vegetable growers,
livestock and poultry raisers, crop farmers, fisherfolks, and rural women’s groups (Bernabe and
Quinsaat 2009, 23). These groups
11
have lobbied the government to address, among other things, the problem of excessive
importation. In particular, the alliance called on the government to increase tariffs on selected
agricultural commodities and to ban important when there is sufficient domestic production
(Bernabe and Quinsaat 2009, 23).
In relation to this, the Battle of Seattle of 1999 gave the momentum for the emergence of
a broader anti-globalization movement in the country, i.e., the Stop-the-New-Round (SNR)
coalition. Its main objective was to derail the 2003 Fifth Ministerial Meeting of the WTO in
Cancun whereby “international civil society called upon governments for a moratorium on any
new issues on further negotiations that expound the power of the WTO and review and rectify the
deficiencies of the system and the WTO regime itself” (Third World Network 1999). The SNR
garnered a broad coalition,
The SNR garnered a broad coalition, an indication that the issue appealed to the Left. The
SNR consisted of broad coalitions with at least thirty-six organizations, six individuals,
and seventeen endorsers, that is, informal members who did not take part in the coalition
due to the lack of resources. These included NGOs that dealt with concerns, such as
governance and macroeconomic issues, environment and sustainable development,
agrarian reform, agriculture and rural development, as well as labor, and peasant and
fisherfolks issues. Like the FDC, it drew strength from its broad membership of NGOs as
well as political blocs that were defined by the nuances of their Left ideological leanings,
such as BISIG, Kilusan para sa Pambansang Demokrasya /(KPD) (Movement for National
Democracy) and the Sandigan ng Lakas at Demokrasya ng Sambayanan/SANLAKAS
(Uphold of People’s Power and Democracy) It also enjoyed the support of multisectoral
coalitions, Global Network-Philippines as well as of regional organizations, for example,
FOCUS on the Global South Philippines (FOCUS) (Tadem 2009b, 237).
Because of the 1992 split in the CPP-NPA-NDF, absent from this coalition are social
movement players, CSOs and NGOs identified with the “RA” faction which also left the FDC
coalition. The SNR highlighted the nature of the anti-globalization movement, in general, which
was horizontal rather than hierarchical. This is characteristic of new social movements. It also
possessed “… rich transnational ties which span from an informal type of formation to signify
shared aims and comradeship… all of which bring together various actors to develop international
lobbies and platforms on their specific issues” (Quinsaat 2009, 73). These have also resulted into
the strengthening of people-to-people relations.
The institutionalization of government-social movement’s cooperation. Asides from
strengthening people-to-people cooperation, the institutionalization of social movements
cooperation with government in key policy-making processes has provided another potent source
of POS and resource mobilization. An example of this was seen under the Arroyo Administration
in the agricultural sector through the Task Force on WTO Agricultural Agreement on the WTO or
TF-WAAR which was organized by the Department of Agriculture in 1998 and included
stakeholder groups and industry associations. The TF-WAR was formed to serve as a consultative
body that can provide directions to the department in negotiations on the WTO. The DA formed
the TF-WAAR in response to criticisms that the agency did not consult and involve stakeholders
in the formulation of the Philippines’ position and negotiating agenda during the Uruguay Round.
12
“The absence of stakeholders’ participation in the formulation of the country’s schedule of
concessions has been identified as one of the main reasons why market access commitments are
more than what the specific commodity subsectors can bear” (Bernabe and Quinsaat 2009, 24).
The task force is composed of farmers groups, nongovernment organizations, as well as
industry and stakeholders associations with in the agricultural sector. Other members of
the task force include representatives from various government agencies such as the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), and the National Economic and Development
Agency (NEDA), among others (Bernabe and Quinsaat 2009, 24).
The TF-WAAR, which became TF-WAR in 2001,
can be characterized as pursuing a strategy of “negotiated support”. That is, they are not
pursuing a strategy of excessive cooperation with the government nor a strategy of
excessive obstructionism, i.e., noncooperation with government out of ideological
differences. In pursuing this “negotiated” strategy, they are able to challenge the
executive’s particular policy details, rather than to merely reject their ideological grounds
(Corrales 2004, ii).8
Despite being members of TF-WAR, civil society actors continue to pursue other
strategies, e.g., joining the massive demonstrations and protest actions against the WTO,
as in the case of farmers groups. Other TF-WAR members, like the sugar bloc, on the
other hand, have colleagues from their organization lobbying for better quotas for their
products in Washington (Tadem 2009a, 49).
The cooperation of social movements with economic policy-makers, is due to the presence
of what Borras (1998) refers to “reformist” technocrats – those who are not hardcore neoliberals
and are open to other paradigms.
This enables those who are critical of neoliberal policies to form alliances with the
“reformist” technocrats who are also referred to as “institutional activists”, who although
are part of the state apparatus assure civil society of open channels for dialogue and
facilitated interaction with well-disposed key individuals. Some of these allies are party to
the engagement process as well, which may imply that the persona of the leader determines
how a government agency is responsive to civil society (Quinsaat 2006, 50).
B. Incremental Gains of Social Movements9
Increments have been gained by social movements in the various strategies they have
pursued among which are the following:
8Interview with a TF-WAR member, September 3, 2009 in Tadem, Teresa S. Encarnacion. 2009. “Popularizing
Technocratic Decision-Making: The Formulation of the Philippine Negotiating Position in the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture”. Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies, Volume 24, Nos. 1-2, pp. 35-60. 9Please also see Tadem 2015.
13
Conscientization on advocacy issues. Social movements have generally played a key role
in conscienticizing the public concerning their various issues of advocacy. Through the FDC, the
Filipino people were made aware of the nature of the country’s debt problem. At one time, a survey
conducted revealed that 52 percent of the Filipinos surveyed during that particular period were
aware of the debt problem and 70 percent were concerned with how the debt problem was being
handled (Tadem 2000b, 232). Conscientization of advocacy issues is also addressed to
policymakers. As pointed out, although famers’ organizations and civil society groups, loss of the
GATT debate, they have highlighted “the general state of unpreparedness and inability of the
sector to compete in the world market. In response the government assured farmers that it would
provide the necessary safety nets in the form of improved support services to help promote global
agricultural competitiveness” (Bernabe and Quinsaat 2009, 22). Conscientization of advocacy
concerns have also been helped by transnational social movements carrying on the same
advocacies of Philippine social movements. This was seen for example when the crisis in the WTO
highlighted in the Battle of Seattle in 1999, emboldened developing countries like the Philippines
to take on a more defensive stance in the negotiations. During the Fifth WTO Ministerail meeting,
Philippine head of delegation and then-Department of Agriculture of Trade and Industry (DTI)
Secretary Manuel Roxas, issued a statement declaring that “no deal is better than a bad deal”
(Manila Bulletin 2003).
Strengthening of people-to-people networks and coalitions. These efforts are part and
parcel with the headway which Philippine social movements have made in strengthening people-
to-people networks and coalitions which have been a fruitful source of resource mobilization. This
has helped in furthering the democratization process in the Philippines through the nurturing of
particular anti-globalization advocacies. These included the following: 1) The plight of workers
such as migrant contract workers as exemplified by the campaigns of the Asian Migrant Center;
2) the rights of workers as exemplified by the campaigns of the Asian Monitor Research Center
(AMRC); 3) Human rights and social issues as exemplified by the Asian Cultural Forum for
Development (ACFOD); 4) Gender and women’s concerns as advocated by the Committee for
Asian Women (CAW) which organizes research studies and conducts seminars on gender issues;
5) international campaigns against biotechnology as exemplified by the campaigns of the Manila-
based Southeast Asia Resource Institute for Community Education (SEARICE); 6) social
development as exemplified by the campaigns of Social Watch Asia, part of the international NGO
coalition which monitors implementation by governments of the Copenhagen Social Summit; and
7) the environment as exemplified by the campaigns for Greenpeace International has also
established a Southeast Asian branch in Bangkok (Tadem and Tadem 2003, 183-184).
The anti-corruption campaign. Social movements have also gained grounds in
complementing their conscientization efforts with action. The anti-corruption campaign, for
example, gained a boost when the social democrats in the Arroyo Administration were among the
7 Cabinet Secretaries and 3 Bureau Directors consisting mainly of key technocrats in her Cabinet
resigned in July 2005. This was because of wire-tapped tapes revealing President Arroyo
instructing through her cellphone the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Commission
Virgilio Garcillano to pad the votes so she could win at least by 1 million votes giving her a
formidable mandate over her chief presidential opponent Fernando Poe. This was during the
counting of the ballots in the May 2004 national elections and Garcillano was at that time based in
Lanao del Norte, Mindanao (Tadem 2008, 147). This became known as the “Hello Garci” scandal
14
and the resigned government officials became known as the “Hyatt 10” as they announced their
mass resignation at the Hyatt Hotel. Such a situation came at the heels of a series of massive
corruption scandals a number of which involved the First Gentleman Miguel Arroyo and his
cronies. The “Hyatt 10” together with other social movement and civil society players led a series
of mass demonstrations against President Arroyo asking her to resign. Although this did not lead
to her resignation, her popularity rating plunged with nearly 8 out of 10 Filipinos wanting Arroyo
out of Malacanang, the seat of government, even before her term has ended (Burgonio and AP
2005, A1). The sentiment expressed in this survey was seen in the 2010 presidential elections
where the Administration candidate Gilberto Teodoro, Arroyo’s Secretary of Defense placed a
measly fourth behind the candidacy of three opposition candidates – Senators Benigno Simeon
Aquino, Manuel Villar and former President Joseph Estrada with all of them raising the corruption
issue against Arroyo. The Hyatt 10 together with other social movement players campaigned for
the presidential candidacy of Aquino who won by a landslide. His presidential candidacy came
about with the death of his mother, democracy icon Corazon in August 2009.
Social movement players have also pursued their anti-corruption advocacy. Most recently,
Bayan Muna has actively interrogated government officials concerning the pork barrel fund
scandal involving Lim-Napoles (Esguerra 2013, A8). This has led to a massive outcry as was seen
in the “Million People March to Luneta” on August 26 leading President Aquino to abolish the
pork barrel three days before this protest action (Ubac, Burgonio and Esguerra 3012, A1).
Gaining of influential allies in the executive. Social movement players have also gained
influential allies in government which have enabled them to be part of the policy-making process.
This, for example, can be seen in the fair trade movement where the Philippine Free Trade
Organizations (FTOs) have active participation with government instrumentalities. The
Department of Trade and Industry regional office, for example, have played a crucial role in
helping out the Advocate of Philippine Trade Fair Inc. (AFPTI). This was during the counting of
ballots in the May 2004 national elections (Cabilo 2009, 146).
Social movement and legislative advocacy. Social movements have also looked at the
legislature as a venue by which they could institutionalize their advocacies. In the case of the
women’s movement, therefore, they have helped in drafting women-friendly bills that addressed
the “private” arena that feminist thought were not given due importance – violence against women
that include rape, prostitution, and sex trafficking and representative health rights among others.
Class issues such as land ownership was re-examined and the “gender lens” was applied onto what
was classically a Marxist issue of production (Santos 2010, 133). The most prominent and
contentious of this was the enactment of the Reproductive Health Law which was supported by
the Aquino government, the majority of the congressmen and senators and the business community
but was vigorously opposed by the influential Catholic Church hierarchy.
Institutionalizing cooperation with government. Institutionalization of social
movements’ advocacy was also sought in the executive. An example of this was the participation
of civil society in the TF WAR which
was further enhanced when the DA hoping to augment the technical skills they have
already possessed, actively sought their expertise in negotiations. This also prevented civil-
society actors from merely being a “face” in the negotiation process as they were made to
15
actively implement the country’s negotiating position in the AoA through the TF-Core
Group (TFCG). The DA also took on the takes of developing its own technical expertise
by involving civil-society members in the conceptualization and implementation of the
agriculture sector’s negotiating position.10
Intervening at the global level through government cooperation. This has enabled
social movement players in the TF-WAR to play an active role in framing the Philippine concerns
“in a national manner that the members of the coalition blocs like the Group of 20 Developing
Countries and the Alliance on Strategic Products and the Special Safeguard Mechanism (more
popularly known as the G33) bloc, where the Philippines could identify with”.11
III. Challenges Confronting Social Movements12
Despite these incremental gains, Philippine social movements are still confronted with
arduous challenges of which are the following:
Continuing dominance of political dynasties. The country continues to be dominated by
political dynasties as was seen in the last May 2013 national elections. “As for the anti-dynasty
clause in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, traditional political elites have successfully blocked the
legislation and implementation of the constitutional provision on anti-dynasty with their collective
resistance (Park 2008, 128). Moreover, there is an increasing trend toward more democratic and
effective local government, some parts of the country are still governed by traditional politicians
who use patronage and coercion. These are also supported by a culture that tolerates such “old-
style” politics and is marked by the absence of strong civil-society groups (Park 2008, 128).
Weak electoral leverage and perverse resource mobilization. This may also help to
explain why although prominent social movement players have won seats in the legislature through
the party-list system like Bayan Muna and Akbayan
the party-list members have been unable to build an independent political force, neither finding
their own niche in political society nor forming an advance base for the progressive camp of
civil society. Some have been co-opted into the old political elites. They compromise with the
trapos13 and make concessions, even to the point of relinquishing their own ideologies and
agendas (Park 2008, 123).
Initially, NGOs and civil society members identified with the left received the support of
traditional politicians or trapos who wanted to increase their political clout in Congress. But
10Interview with a key trade negotiator, February 1, 2008. 11Interviews with the following: Member of the Philippine Delegation to the Sixth Ministerial Conference of the
World Trade Organization, January 24, 2008; Member of the TF-WAR, January 22, 2008; Special Trade
Representative to the Philippine Mission to the WTO, January 31, 2008; Key trade negotiator, February 1, 2008; Jose
Maria Zablate, and Former Executive Director, Philippine Sugar Millers Association, March 13, 2008 in Tadem,
Teresa S. Encarnacion. 2009. “Popularizing Technocratic Decision-Making: The Formulation of the Philippine Negotiating Position in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture”. Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies,
Volume 24, Nos. 1-2, pp. 35-60. 12Please also see Tadem 2015. 13 Trapo is a Spanish word which means “dirty rag”.
16
through the years, these traditional politicians decided to run their own party-list parties which was
epitomized when President Arroyo’s son, Juan Miguel or “Mikey” headed the Ang Galing (The
Great party-list party for the well-being of security guards, a concern which he had never worked
for in the past. Such a situation for the progressive party-list parties was further aggravated with
their facing increasing stiff competition from right-wing civil society groups participating in this
electoral process particularly from evangelical and charismatic church movements whose
constituency comes from the lower classes as was seen during the May 2007 national elections.
Examples of these party-list groups are BUHAY (Buhay Hayaan Yambong), CIBAC (Citizens
Battle Against Corruption) which is the party list party of Jesus is Lord and Alagad, the party of
the influential and powerful Iglesia ni Kristo which all made it to the top of the party-list system
vote (Tadem 2008, 145-146). Aggravating this situation is through the years, “many politicians
belonging to political dynasties have been reinventing themselves over the years through the party-
list groups” (Santos 2016, A3)14.
Because civil society could not make headway through the party-list system, the major left
ideological blocs during the 2010 national elections decided to support the presidential candidacies
of the top contenders. Asides from Akbayan supporting the presidential candidacy of Aquino,
Bayan Muna and SANLAKAS supported Manuel Villar and Joseph Estrada for president
respectively. In exchange for support Aquino, Akbayan was able to raise PhP110 million for its
national electoral campaign in May 2010 of which PhP 17 million came from Aquino’s siblings
and cousins (Tiglao 2012, A11). In the 2016 elections, Bayan Muna latched on to the presidential
candidacy of Senator Grace Poe while Akbayan stuck it out with the Aquino Administration and
supported its presidential candidate and former Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) Manuel Roxas III. Both Poe and Roxas lost to Rodolfo Deterge, mayor of
Davao City. Duterte, however, has strong links with CPP founder Jose Ma. Sison who was his
teacher in Lyceum University. Such links has made Duterte more sympathetic to the NPA in Davao
City.
Aggravating such a situation is when these new political elites from progressive civil
society also behave like traditional politicians whereby they “indulge in political privileges,
concessions, material benefits, and pork-barrels, which had long been considered exclusive to the
old traditional oligarchy” (Park 2008, 122). The party-list representatives also tend to pursue
interests and agendas of the particular sector or organization that they belong to instead of the
“universal benefit” of the broader society (Park 2008, 123). Or worst, there are also party-list
members who crafted bills which did not even carry out the interest of the sector they were
representing respectively, their own personal interests. Such a reality is mirrored in the experience
of Akbayan with the Aquino administration has brought about dissent and divisions within its own
ranks. Members of Akbayan have left the party due to their disgust with the manner in which the
Aquino Administration has not addressed the problem of poverty, widening gap between the rich
and the poor as well as the issue of crony capitalism Walden Bello resigned as Akbayan
representative in Congress because of his disagreement on how President Aquino handled the
Mamasapano massacre.
14Examples of this are Serbisyo sa Bayan Party (SBP) of whom the first nominee is Ricardo Belmonte Jr., nephew of
Speaker Feliciano Belmonte and the Development Dedicated to Agriculture and Fisheries, Inc. (ADDA) whose first
nominee is Grace Kristine Singson Meehan, daughter of Ilocos Sur. Rep. Eric Singson (Santos 2016, A3).
17
Cooptation vs. cooperation in government. The issue of cooptation vs. cooperation is
also a concern with social movement players accepting positions in government. Soliman, for
example, reveals two quite telling factors about the nature of interaction that took place. There is
already an implicit evidence of the ways that civil-society incorporation was very much the product
of networks of clientelism and bargaining. Her government position in the Arroyo Administration
as Secretary for Social Work and Development was a “reward” for her role as coordinator of the
network that acted as a secretariat, i.e., KOMPIL II which consisted of NGOs and POs – to oust
Estrada from power. This was part of the “rewards” which were distributed by Arroyo’s dominant
forces in the new government (Reid 2008, 27). Moreover, there was no evidence of the existence
of mechanisms for facilitating participation within the government on the basis of distinct
programs and policies (Reid 2008, 28). This was, for example, what happened to Karina
Constantino-David, an academic-activist and NGO practitioner who was appointed by Arroyo as
head of the Civil Service Commission and who became highly critical of the president due to
accusations of massive corruption in government involving the leadership among others.
Constantino-David previously headed the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
under the Estrada Administration where she resigned from government when she saw that
President Estrada was favoring the real estate developers who were not happy with the advocacies
Constantino-David was advocating. Such a practice of rewarding members of progressive groups
with position in government continues in government continues as was seen when Akbayan party
members were given positions in the current Aquino Administration in exchange for supporting
the president in the May 2010 elections. Its members who are in the executive are in the executive
are Commission on Human Rights Chair Loretta Rosales, National Anti-Poverty Commission
Chair Joel Rocamora, Presidential Adviser on Political Affairs Ronald Llamas, his deputy Ibarra
Gutierrez. In addition, Akbayan has two members in the House of Representatives (Salaverria
2012, A1). Because of this, the 14-year old Akbayan critics led by its foe Bayan Muna have urged
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disenfranchise the former because of its more
powerful stature given its coalition with President Aquino’s political party and access to
Malacanang. Moreover, given their current status of power, they cannot be considered as
representing the interests of the marginalized sector (Salaverria 2012, A1). There is also a growing
criticism among members of the left movement concerning their colleagues as well as friends in
Akbayan working for the Aquino Administration. An example of this is President Aquino’s refusal
in pushing for the Freedom for Information (FOI) bill. They are confronted with Akbayan members
who although are for the bill do not want to push it as it may lead to the president assuming a hard
line position.
The absence of a feasible left alternative. What emerges in all of these is the failure of
the progressive social movements to present a feasible left alternative which will distinguish it
from what is being offered by the traditional politicians at the moment. As pointed out,
The collapse of the socialist experiment in the Eastern Bloc and the ascendance of
neoliberalism on a global scale also presented grave problems to the Left. It meant not
just the collapse of a certain type of socialism (the statist type practiced by the Eastern
Bloc) but the negation of all strands and variants of socialism as well. All over the world,
socialism (of any kind) was increasingly losing its appeal as an alternative paradigm.
(Abbao 1997, 275)
18
The 1997 Asian financial crisis as well as the 2008 global economic crisis, however, gave
the biggest rebuke to the failings of the capitalist system. It was an opportunity to come out with
an alternative but nothing came of it. What seems to persist at the moment is whether the party
(ies) which the various left political blocs are supporting should be ideological or not. In 1996,
Francisco Nemenzo of BISIG opined that that “the new party should make itself distinguishable
from traditional parties by ensuring that socialist ideals are embodied in its program and practices,
otherwise, there is no point in building it”.15 Pandayan chairperson Fernando Aldaba, on the other
hand is wary that projecting Left-identified programs and personalities may lessen the possibility
of drawing in non-ideological forces.”16
The latter seems to be the position which Akbayan has pursued as it has won the confidence
of the Aquino Administration meriting its members with various positions in government. There
is, however, the nagging question of the principles and advocacies it continues to fight for. For
example, one of its prominent leaders, Walden Bello, when he was a Congressman for the Akbayan
party-list, was one of the most vocal critic of neo-liberalism and is one of the acknowledged leaders
of the World Social Forum, an anti-globalization arena. Akbayan, by supporting the current
Aquino Administration, however, is party to the government’s continuation of neo-liberal policies.
Upon Aquino’s ascendancy to the presidency, Bello posed a challenge to the President and his
technocrats if the leadership will reverse his mother’s neo-liberal policies that has killed Philippine
agriculture and industry (Uy 2010). Despite the perpetuation of such policies, Bello however,
continued to support the current Administration until his resignation as Akbayan member of the
House of Representative in March 11, 2015.17 He, however, remains to be a member of Akbayan.
The absence of left alternative was made more prominent in the 2016 national elections, where
Ana Theresia Hontiveros of Akbayan, in her third try for the senatorial race has secured her spot
in the top 12 in the senatorial list of winners. Hontiveros, however, campaigned as former
PhilHealth administrator of the Aquino Administration bannering the health issue and the gains
which the Aquino administration has done in this area. There is thus no differentiating what the
Akbayan policy is from that of the current government’s.
Because of this, the absence of a feasible left alternative that could address poverty and
socio-economic inequalities there seems to be no choice for the great majority of the Filipino
people but to join the exodus of the lower and middle classes to join the ranks of the Overseas
Filipino Workers (OFW). For those who cannot leave, they have opted to join independent church
groups and charismatic movements for their “salvation”. This, however is not mutually exclusive
as OFWs have joined the chapters of Philippine charismatic movements abroad (Tadem 2008, 144-
145).
Military harassment and killings of left activists. Aggravating all of these is the failure of
peace negotiations between the Philippine government and the communist insurgents. Under the
Arroyo Administration (2001-2010), the military gained ground because of the question of the
President Arroyo’s legitimacy ascending into power via the 2001 EDSA 2 people power revolt
15Interview with Francisco Nemenzo, August 11, 1996 (Abbao 1997, 281). 16Interview with Fernando Aldaba, July 10, 1996 (Abbao 1997, 281) 17Bello’s resignation from Akbayan was because he believed that President Aquino was involved in a brazen cover-
up of the Mamasapano military operation. This military operation led to the death of 44 Special Action Force troopers,
18 Moro Islamic Liberation fighters and 5 civilians dead (Inquirer.net, 11 March 2015).
19
and aggravated with the “Hello Garci” scandal. Her political vulnerability led her to rely on the
military for its support. Thus, a culture of impunity as instigated by the military continued to
prevail. As of March 15, 2007, 833 leftist activists have been murdered according to the human
rights group Karapatan (Tupas et.al. 2007, 17). One of those accused by leftist groups of
perpetuating these killings is retired major general Jovito Palparan particularly for those committed
in Central Luzon when he was regional military commander there (Uy 2007 A1). Palparan has
therefore been called berdugo (the “butcher”). As for the journalists critical of the Macapagal-
Arroyo administration, there have been 51 killed since 2001 (Doronila 2007 A1). Next to Iraq, the
Philippines is reputed to have the most journalists killed and the country is not even in war
(Doronila 2007a A3). (See Tadem 2008). Arbitrary arrests by the military have also ensued of
suspected leftist activists as was seen in their arrest on February 6, 2010. The military forces
accused them of illegal possession of firearms and explosives and violation of the election gun
ban. Called the “Morong 43”, the military accused them of being communist rebels holding a
meeting, while the group said they were community health workers holding a seminar. On
President Aquino’s behest, they were released from detention 10 months later as the evidence
uncovered against them were taken through an illegal search, arrest or interrogation and thus must
be excluded form trial (Dizon 2013, A11).
Conclusion
The current challenge to social movements remains to be the need for good governance in
order to push for the democratization process. This continues to be blamed on patrimonial politics
which breeds corruption and exacerbates poverty and socio-economic inequalities. These concerns
cut across class and non-class conflicts. The former is epitomized with the persistence of the
communist insurgency while the latter is highlighted in the moro insurgency. Headway has been
made in peace talks with the MILF with prominent members in the social movement playing a
crucial role in the negotiating process. As with the case of the moro insurgents, class and non-
class issues are also not mutually exclusive and are found in the concerns for women, indigenous
and environmental movements among others. This provides the overarching framework of an
economic policy which is not redistributive as highlighted with the failure of a comprehensive
agrarian reform program (CARP). Aggravating this situation are the persistence of the neo-liberal
policies of government with emphasis on the market, liberalization and privatization leading to the
cutting down on social services and welfare in key areas of education and health. In an era of
globalization, such a development paradigm has been further intensified. A major adverse impact
of this is the decline of the country’s agricultural sector.
In understanding social movements in the Philippines, one has to comprehend these
through the nature of the political blocs they are generally identified with. These political blocs
have formed their own CSOs and NGOs or have linked with other CSOs and NGOs to pursue their
strategies under a period of elite democracy. Thy have taken the form of both the old and new
social movements in terms of their issues and concerns as well as organizations. Under the Arroyo
and Aquino Administrations, the following political opportunity structures paved the way for the
attainment of their goals and objectives among which are the following: Pursuing advocacies
through the electoral process; obtaining government positions through elite alliances; formation
of alliances and networks and coalitions within the social movements locally as well as
transnationally as given impetus in a period of globalization; and the institutionalization of social
20
movements cooperation with government. These political opportunity structures were also
translated into resource mobilization for social movements in their attempt to achieve their goals.
What is also seen here is that social movements, combine contentious, e.g., participation
in the anti-WTO demonstrations as well as non-contentious politics through electoral politics and
alliances with elites through appointments in government positions. Their collective action frames
were most clearly seen in the anti-globalization movement which raised the adverse impact of
globalization on governance and economic policies not only on agriculture but also in other sectors
in society affecting women, the environment, small- and medium-scale industries among others.
The other issue which captured the consciousness of the Filipino people was the anti-corruption
campaign against the Arroyo Administration. Its success was seen in the overwhelming electoral
victory of President Aquino.
Among the major increments gained by social movements in the process were the
following: 1) Conscientization of the public and the government on their advocacy issues; 2) The
strengthening of people-to-people networks and coalitions; 4) Gaining of influential allies in the
executive; 5) Institution of social movement advocacies in the legislation; 6) Institutionalizing
of cooperation in executive agencies; and 7) Intervening in policy-making at the global level
through government cooperation Despite these incremental gains though formidable challenges
still lay ahead which include the following: 1) The continuing domination of the elite; 2)
Cooptation of social movement players by the elites through the electoral process and through their
appointments into government positions; 4) The absence of a feasible left alternatives; and, 5)
Military killings of activists.
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