Title: Realizing Global Justice: Theory and Practice Date: 19–22 June 2013 Venue: University of Tromsø Universitetsveien 29 Breivika NO - 9037

Norway TEO-H6 6.303/Auditorium 3

From the airport: Taxi: 15 min/NOK 160,00 Bus: Number 42 to UNN/UiT 30 min/ NOK 40,00 From the city center: Taxi: 15 min/ NOK 160,00 Bus: Numbers 20,21 30 min/ NOK 40,00

Map: www.maps.google.com Campus map: en.uit.no/inenglish/map Taxi: Phone 03011/ SMS: 41 56 29 59 Bus: Phone 17/http://www.177.no/

Official language: English Conference Website: www.uit.no/pdj/rgj Host: University of Tromsø Organizers: Associate Professor Kjersti Fjørtoft Assistant Professor Tor Ivar Hanstad

PhD Candidate Melina Duarte Contact: pdjconferences@hsl.uit.no

The Pluralism, Democracy, and Justice (PDJ) research group of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Tromsø invites you to participate in the conference Realizing Global Justice: Theory and Practice to be held on 19–22 June 2013 at the University of Tromsø, Norway. The conference is intended as a meeting place for friendly discussions and conjoint learning among students, young researchers and internationally renowned researchers such as Professor Philippe Van Parijs (Catholic University of Louvain), Professor Thomas Pogge (Yale University), Professor Gerard Delanty (University of Sussex), Professor Tove Pettersen (University of Oslo), and Associate Professor Eva Erman (Uppsala University). The University of Tromsø, the northernmost university in the world, was included among the world’s top universities by the Academic Ranking of World Universities in 2010. Moreover, the university was pleased and honored to have Noam Chomsky as a guest lecturer at a meeting held in September 2012 demonstrating our engagement in an open and meaningful debate on global justice issues. The conference will also be a great opportunity to explore the capital city of the Arctic, a place full of culture and history, surrounded by incredibly beautiful fjords and mountains. At the time of the conference, it will be possible to enjoy the midnight sun. During the conference days, you are also invited to admire the photography exhibition “The Claims of Justice”, by the Brazilian photographer, Rodolfo Gil. A very inspiring experience, indeed!

Velkommen til Tromsø! The Organizers. More details about the University: www.uit.no More details about Tromsø: www.visittromso.no

Recently, purely theoretical approaches on global justice have been challenged by philosophers and political theorists who defend a more practical or realistic approach to this issue. Nevertheless, the debate has been regarded either as excessively abstract with no implications on current life or as excessively restricted to the discussion about policies and institutions. In principle, both positions may be understood not as opposed to each other, but, rather, as complementary ones. However, making them compatible with one another is not an easy task, especially when moral and legal issues are taken into account simultaneously. The Brazilian photographer, Rodolfo Gil, has managed to capture this ambiguity in his picture called “The bench”, this brochure’s cover photo. Beside the beggar, there is a vacant place. The beggar is claiming for justice right here and right now. His claim for justice is then based on the experiences of injustice. In the vacant spot, however, we have a place of sheer contemplation where the claim for justice is based on the ideal of the virtue. Let us then try to imagine our arguments considering both sides of the picture: with and without the beggar. Whichever side we choose, this exercise will undoubtedly contribute to the discussion. Thus, we expect to promote a fruitful debate on the convergence between the theoretical and the practical approaches on global justice. We encourage papers: * Arguing for or against the theoretical approach. * Arguing for or against the practical approach. * Exploring or rejecting the possibility of convergence between them.

Abstracts must be submitted 1.5 spaced and should contain between 300-500 words. They must be submitted by 15 May 2013. Due to place limitations, qualified abstracts sent in before deadline will have higher chances of acceptance. In order to favor the organization of the sessions, participants are requested to highlight the main topic of their contribution and the contribution type (paper or poster presentation). The main topics are: distributive justice, transactional justice, corrective justice, gender justice, citizenship, cosmopolitanism, Human Rights, multiculturalism and plurality, and climate justice. This information should be indicated at the top of the page. In order to facilitate blind review at the selection process, all personal information should be removed from the text. A separate file, sent along with the abstract submission registration, should contain a short biography of the author: name, title, current affiliation, research interest, and the most relevant publication in the field. The two files (abstract and short biography) must be sent to: pdjconferences@hsl.uit.no The abstracts will be reviewed by two referees within one month after submission. We wish you good work and hope to meet you in Tromsø soon!

Oral presentation cannot exceed twenty minutes. After all the presentations in the session, a debate will be opened for about one hour.

Registrations are automatic for those presenting a paper or a poster, but compulsory for listeners. Registrations are free of charge and subject to availability of places. Listeners are not allowed to apply for financial support for trip and accommodation. Register online at: www.uit.no/pdj/rgj

All keynote speakers and chairs of sessions will have all their expenses covered by PDJ and the University of Tromsø. If your paper is accepted, but you have no other financial support for your trip and/or accommodation, you may apply for that through PDJ. To apply, please, fill in the form in appendixes I and/or II, and send it/them by 15 May to pdjconferences@hsl.uit.no PDJ will book hotel rooms for those who have their expenses covered. However, each participant is responsible for buying his or her own travel tickets. Please save both your boarding pass and receipt in order to have your trip expenses covered. NB: Due to economic limitations, a very few number of applications for financial support will be accepted. The PDJ does not accept applications after the conference.

Without financial support from PDJ, you may choose the best accommodation for you at: http://www.visittromso.no/en/Accommodation/ Please, note that all of the main hotels are located in the city center. Therefore, bus or taxi services will be needed.

www.norwegian.com

http://www.flysas.com/en/uk/

Certificate of attendance will be issued by the University of Tromsø to all participants who attend more than 75% of the conference sessions. Those presenting papers or posters will additionally receive a certificate of participation. ECTS: students who would like to get ECTS points for this conference may use the certificate of attendance – which will contain information about the conference length – to apply for points at their home universities (please, check out your home university regulation before applying for ECTS). The certificates will be sent by mail or e-mail within two months after the conference.

*All titles are available at Akademisk Kvarter (Bookstore at the University).

Van Parijs, Philippe, Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Delanty, Gerard, The Cosmopolitan Imagination: A Social Critic Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Pettersen, Tove, Comprehending Care. Problems and Possibilities in The Ethics of Care, Rowman& Littlefield, 2008. Erman, Eva & Bekman, Ludvig, Territories of Citizenship, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. Pogge, Thomas, Politics as Usual: What lies behind the Pro-Poor Rhetoric, Cambridge & Malden: Polity Press, 2010.

Philippe Van Parijs studied philosophy, law, political economy, sociology and linguistics at the Facultés Universitaires Saint Louis (Brussels) and the Universities of Louvain, Oxford, Bielefeld and California (Berkeley). He holds doctorates in the social sciences (Louvain, 1977) and in philosophy (Oxford, 1980). He is professor at the Faculty of economic, social and political sciences of the University of Louvain (UCL), where he has directed the Hoover Chair of economic and social ethics since its creation in 1991. He has also been a special guest professor at the KuLeuven’s Higher Institute for Philosophy since 2006. From 2004 onwards he was for several years a Regular Visiting Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University. And from 2011 onwards, he will be a Senior Research Fellow at Nuffield College and Visiting Professor at the University of Oxford. He also held visiting positions at the Universities of Amsterdam, Manchester, Siena, Québec (Montréal), Wisconsin (Madison), Maine (Orono), Uruguay (Montevideo) and Aix-Marseille, the European University Institute (Florence), the Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow), the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Beijing), the Catholic Faculties of Kinshasa (Congo), All Souls College (Oxford), Yale University, Sciences Po (Paris), the Autonomous University of Barcelona and the École normale supérieure (Paris). He was awarded an honorary doctorate by Laval University (Québec). His books include Evolutionary Explanation in the Social Sciences (London & Totowa NJ 1981), Le Modèle économique et ses rivaux (Genève 1990), Qu’est-ce qu’une société juste? (Paris 1991), Arguing for Basic Income (London 1992, ed.), Marxism Recycled (Cambridge 1993), Real Freedom for All (Oxford 1995), Sauver la solidarité (Paris 1995), Refonder la solidarité (Paris 1996), Solidariteit voor de XXIste eeuw (Leuven 1997), Ethique économique et sociale (Paris 2000, with C. Arnsperger), What’s Wrong with a Free Lunch? (Boston 2001), Hacia una concepcion de la justicia global (Medellín 2002), Cultural Diversity versus Economic Solidarity (Brussels 2004, ed.), L’Allocation universelle (Paris 2005, with Y. Vanderborght), Just Democracy. The Rawls-Machiavelli Programme (Colchester, 2011) and Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World (Oxford, 2011). Source: www.uclouvain.be

Gerard Delanty is Professor of Sociology and Social & Political Thought at the University of Sussex, UK. He is currently the head of the Department of Sociology at this University and director of the Centre of Social and Political Thought. He defines himself as an interdisciplinary sociologist with an interest in social theory and the cultural analysis of social and political questions. Most of his work concerns, in one way or another, the implications of globalization for the analysis of the social world. Professor Delanty has written eleven books, many of which have been translated into several languages, and edited seven. He has published over 100 papers on various issues in social and political theory, European identities, globalization, nationalism and the cultural and historical sociology of modernity. He went to Sussex University in September 2007, having been previously a Professor of Sociology at the University of Liverpool, where he was since 1996. Professor Delanty has lectured extensively throughout the world and held visiting professorships at Deakin University, Melbourne in 2006, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan, in 2000, and York University, Toronto in 1998. He studied sociology and philosophy at University College Cork, Ireland graduating with the B.A. in 1982, M.A. in 1984 and PhD in 1987. In 1985/6, he was a DAAD Fellow at Frankfurt University. Source: www.sussex.ac.uk/profiles

Tove Pettersen is professor of philosophy at the Faculty of Humanities, University of Oslo, Norway. She specializes in feminist philosophy, moral philosophy and ethics, particularly in the ethics of care and the existential ethics of Simone de Beauvoir. She is also working with the history of philosophy, political philosophy, phenomenology, existential philosophy and postmodern philosophy. She received her Dr. Art. in philosophy at the University of Oslo in 2004 with a Ph.D. dissertation on the ethics of care. She completed her M.A. in the History of Ideas on postmodern philosophy, and she has also studied Political Science and Economics at the University Oslo. In 2004-2006 she was granted a Postdoctoral Fellowship in order to work with Simone de Beauvoir’s ethics, and she was also the Director of Research at the Ethics Program, University of Oslo. Pettersen has been teaching philosophy at the University of Oslo since 1990. Source: www.hf.uio.no/ifikk/personer

Eva Erman is Associate Professor at Uppsala University and Chief Editor of Ethics & Global Politics Journal. Erman’s research interest focuses on political philosophy; metaethics; democratic theory; discourse theory and discourse ethics; global democracy and global governance; and human rights. In 2012 Erman was a visiting research fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Melbourne, invited by head of school professor Adrian Little, collaborating with Terry Macdonald (Feb-March). In 2010 she was a visiting research fellow at LSE Global Governance, at London School of Economics and Political Science, invited by the director of the centre, Professor David Held (Feb-May). Erman has recently published several articles and books on the field. The books include Political Equality in Transnational Democracy co-edited by Sofia Nästrom (2013) and Territories of Citizenship, co-edited by Ludvig Beckman (2012) by Palgrave Macmilian. She is currently working on the following projects: (1) Democracy Beyond the Nation State? Transnational Actors and Global Governance (www. transdemos.se) and (2) Cosmopolitan Citizenship. Source: www.statsvet.uu.se/PersonalInfo

Thomas Pogge is Leitner Professor of Philosophy and International Affairs at Yale, Professorial Fellow at the Australian National University, Research Director at the Oslo University Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature (CSMN) and a member of the Norwegian Academy of Science. Having received his PhD in philosophy from Harvard, Thomas Pogge has published widely on Kant and in moral and political philosophy His recent publications include Politics as Usual (2010); Kant, Rawls, and Global Justice (Chinese, 2010); Hacer justicia a la humanidad(2009); World Poverty and Human Rights (2008); Global Justice and Global Ethics co-edited (2008); The Health Impact Fund co-authored with Aidan Hollis (2008); John Rawls: His Life and Theory of Justice (2007); and Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right edited (2007). Supported by the Australian Research Council, the BUPA Foundation and the European Commission, Pogge’s current work is focused on a team effort toward developing a complement to the pharmaceutical patent regime that would improve access to advanced medicines for the poor worldwide (www.healthimpactfund.org).

Source: http://sydney.edu.au/sydney_ideas/lectures/2012/professor_thomas_pogge.shtml

Program Day 1: 19 June 2013 9h-9h30: Registration at TEO-H6 AUD3 (See campus map) 9h30-10h: Welcome from Jan Harald Alnes, Head of the Department of Philosophy, and from Tor Ivar Hanstad, Temporary Head of the PDJ Research Group 10h-12h: 1st Session: Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice Chair: Michael Morreau

Cosmopolitan Dissonance and Global Justice Marin Beroš

Cosmopolitan tensions – D. Held and J. Habermas problems with Kant’s idea of perpetual peace Rafał Wonicki

Compatriot Partiality and Cosmopolitan Justice Rachelle Bascara

Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, and Social Justice in Multinational Contexts Marc Woons 12h-13h: Lunch* 13h-14h30: Prof. Gerard Delanty (University of Sussex) – The Prospects of Cosmopolitanism and the Possibility of Global Justice Chair: Tor Ivar Hanstad 14h30-15h: Coffee Break 15h-17h30: 2nd Session: Multiculturalism and Plurality Chair: Erik Christensen

What is Moral Injury and When is it Morally Wrong? Axel Honneth, Saba Mahmood and the Danish Cartoons Jonas Jakobsen

The Public Recognition of Islamic Identity: Honneth, Ghannouchi, multiculturalism, and plurality Karim Sadek

Vision of Justice in the Future of Humanity Morteza Khorrami

Free Speech and Moral Responsibility Odin Lysaker

Secular and Religious Arguments in the Public Sphere: The Critique of the Divide Tomasz Jarymowicz 18h: Cocktail Reception at the University of Tromsø** Day 2: 20 June 2013 9h-10h30: 3rd Session: Citizenship and Migration Chair: Percy Oware

Migration, Cosmopolitanism and Equality of Opportunity: A proposal Yusuf Yuksekdag

Who should be granted asylum? Noa Nogradi

National Membership: A Question of Individual Choice Melina Duarte 10h30-11h: Coffee break 11h-12h30: Associate Prof. Eva Erman (University of Uppsala) – Global political legitimacy beyond justice and democracy? Chair: Øyvind Stokke 12h30-13h30: Lunch* 13h30-15h30: 4th Session: Transactional Justice Chair: Espen Gamlund

Tax policy and transactional justice – a study of the relationship between tax policy, illicit financial flows, and inequality – the effect it has on both developed and developing countries, and some proposed solutions Krishen Mehta

Trade as a Site of Justice Andrew Walton

Redistribution Without Egalitarianism: Left-Libertarianism and the Global Political Economy Luca J. Uberti

Beliefs about Social Justice and Public Policy in Brazil and the United States: an empirical investigation Nicole Kuhn, Daniela Goya Tocchetto, Sabino da Silva Pôrto Júnior, Willian Adamczyk

15h30-16h: Coffee break 16h-17h: 5th Session: Distributive Justice Chair: Andrew Walton

Studding Two Islamic Strategies for Solving the Problem of Distributive Justice Mohsen Nouraei

A (Non-Ideal) Global Basic Structure Sabrina Martin 17h-18h – 6th Session: Corrective Justice Chair: Roar Anfinsen

Exit Afghanistan: A Just War or Western Nihilism in a World Without Meaning? Tor Ivar Hanstad

Isolation, marginalization, and crime: (In)discipline in Abu Dhabi’s “Industrial City” Surajit Chakravarty, Ahmed Bani Hammad Day 3: 21 June 2013 9h-10h: 7th Session: Gender Justice Chair: Trygve Lavik

Accommodating Religious Demands and Gender-Justice Concerns: Indian State Practices after the Shah Bano Judgment Sushmita Nath

Rearticulating the Experience of War in Anonyma: Eine Frau in Berlin Holger Pötzsch

10h-10h30: Coffee Break 10h30-12h: Prof. Tove Pettersen (University of Oslo) – Who Cares about Global Justice? On Realizing a Globalized Ethics of Care Chair: Kjersti Fjørtoft 12h-13h: Lunch* 13h-16h: 8th Session: Human Rights Chair: Jonas Jakobsen

From the Basic Right to Subsistence to the Exceptional Right of Necessity Alejandra Mancilla

Grounding Human Rights: Interests, Justification, Resonance Andrés Carlos Luco

Lives Rendered Invisible: The Downsides of Realizing Human Rights Awareness Through Social Media Mladjo Ivanovic

What concessions toward political feasibility can an ethically justifiable intellectual property regime make? Cristian Timmerman Short break – 15 min

John Rawls’ the Law of Peoples – is his account of human rights informed by practice? Grethe Netland

Global justice, human rights, and democratic legitimation Kjersti Fjørtoft 16h30-17h: Coffee break 17h-18h: 9th Session: Climate Change Justice Chair: Tomasz Jarymowicz

Moral Duties and Climate Change Espen Gamlund

Climate Change denial and the Freedom of Speech Trygve Lavik 19h30 – Conference Dinner at Clarion Hotel*

Day 4: 22 June 2013 9h-10h: 10th Session: Linguistic Justice Chair: Stephen Wolfe (to be confirmed)

Human Dignity and Human Rights: Better Apart? Manuel Toscano

Linguistic Territorial Regimes: The Right Answer to the Wrong Question Maren Behrensen 10h-10h30: Coffee Break 10h30-12h: Keynote speaker: Prof. Philippe Van Parijs (Catholic University of Louvain) – Global Justice and the European Union Chair: Manuel Toscano 12h-13h: Lunch 13h-14h30: Keynote speaker: Professor Thomas Pogge (Yale University): Setting the Post-2015 Agenda Chair: Melina Duarte Final Remarks: Invitation to the PDJ conference 2014: Tomasz Jarymowicz Acknowledgments: Melina Duarte * Free of charge for all participants presenting a paper or chairing a session at the conference. Listeners and accompanying persons can purchase their meals directly in the restaurant. Lunch at the University will cost around NOK 60 and the dinner at Clarion Hotel will cost around NOK 280. Alcoholic drinks are not included. ** The Cocktail Reception is free of charge for all participants.

Program Expanded version

(The abstracts and short biographies are the authors’ responsibility) Day 1: 19 June 2013 9h-9h30: Registration at TEO-H6 AUD3 (see campus map, page 3) 9h30-10h: Welcome from Jan Harald Alnes, Head of the Department of Philosophy, and from Tor Ivar Hanstad, Temporary Head of the PDJ Research Group 10h-12h: 1st Session: Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice Chair: Michael Morreau

Cosmopolitan Dissonance and Global Justice Marin Beroš*

Contemporary cosmopolitanism, owing to its complex historical development, is heterogeneous idea, a composition of several, sometimes opposed modes of cosmopolitanism. Two of the foremost are ethical cosmopolitanism, which advocates equality of all people on the basis of their shared humanity; and cultural cosmopolitanism which supports the view that cultural differences are important and that they should be valued and protected. The dissonance that is created between two modes, in which one side endorses individual equality and the other protects cultural diversity, reflects the tension that also emerges inside the liberal theory between the rights and freedoms of the individuals and the rights and freedoms of the groups. And this tension also has important consequences on the way we envision the global justice – in the evolving global society, should we prioritize justice on the individual level or the one on the level of already existent communities? This essay will find its starting point in the work of John Rawls whose “A Theory of Justice”, revived the topic of justice in the 20th century political philosophy. Although his theory was centered on the bounded political community, “A Theory of Justice” provoked numerous responses that have made the global justice an important issue in the contemporary political philosophy. Influenced by the comments he received, Rawls also joined the growing debate on global justice by expanding his theory in “The Law of Peoples” onto global community. This essay will present and elaborate the basic characteristics both of his works, alongside with the reflections of some of his critics, such as Charles Beitz, Thomas Nagel, Brian Barry or Amartya Sen. Finally, it will examine the influence of cosmopolitan idea on the issue of impartiality that is central to the thinking about global justice and assess how cosmopolitan dissonance affects the constitution of efficient and just global institutional system. *Marin Beroš is PhD Candidate at the University of Zagreb and Research Assistant at the Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pillar in Zagreb, Croatia.

Cosmopolitan tensions – D. Held’s and J. Habermas’ problems with Kant’s idea of perpetual peace Rafał Wonicki*

In my presentation I will focus on the comparison of the two theories of cosmopolitanism that stem from Kant’s enlightenment concept of perpetual peace. Therefore, the main thesis of my presentation concerns the tensions within the modern projects of global justice (Held’s idea of cosmopolitan democracy and Habermas’ idea of postnational constellations) and how we can avoid such tensions referring to Kant’s idea of cosmopolitan right. For Kant, cosmopolitan right is another formulation of the categorical imperative in its practical utterance. It means that cosmopolitan right is a moral right and, as a moral universal principle, it is at the same time a moral obligation. According to it, if people are equal and free not only as citizens of the state but also as citizens of the world (which is a universal assumption) they will accept the others as equal reasonable human beings and will not violate the minimal conditions of coexistence with them. Contemporary thinkers try to modify the Kantian approach by including to their analyses the facts of pluralism, diversity, democracy and national state. Attachment of these elements to Kantian structure, however, causes a problem with tension between ethical and political spheres. According to Held, for example, we cannot ensure Kant’s perpetual peace if the economic and social standards of citizens’ lives are protected at the international level. This is why he proposes a political strategy of a globally guaranteed basic income, something unacceptable in Kant’s theory. According to Habermas, on the other hand, Kant does provide a satisfactory explanation of how the permanence of the confederation of states could be guaranteed without the legally binding character of an institution similar to the state constitution. However, due to different historical situation in Kant’s and contemporary times Habermas - in order to show the actualization and validity of Kantian political and ethical thought at the international level - is forced to modify Kant’s approach to international law. Thus, he deduces the idea of uncoerced communication from Kant’s categorical imperative and acknowledges it as a necessary condition for establishing a global public sphere. In such a sphere where the public use of reason is dialogical, critical and reflexive, everybody is equal and has some degree of influence on global decisions (common ethical basis). I claim that again it is not a Kantian understanding of cosmopolitan right. In the summary of my presentation, I answer the question of why the use of Kant’s ideas of perpetual peace and cosmopolitan right is still valid and important today and how by referring to Kant’s power of judgment we can avoid problems of Held’s and Habermas’ theories. *Rafał Wonicki is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Philosophy at the University of Warsaw and Assistant Professor at the Political Academy of Science, Poland.

Compatriot Partiality and Cosmopolitan Justice Rachelle Bascara*

This paper attempts to demonstrate a way in which compatriot partiality could be conducive to the realization of cosmopolitan demands of distributive justice. Cosmopolitans who argue that compatriot partiality is like racial partiality captures something correct about the content and structure of compatriot partiality. However, I shall argue that the analogy should not lead us to comprehensively reject compatriot partiality. A closer examination of the development of slavery and racism contains a plausible justification for some compatriot partiality, given certain conditions.

By appealing to an objective moral framework, we can justify compatriot partiality on the same grounds that black liberation movements and affirmative action have been justified. Hence, given cosmopolitan demands of justice, compatriot partiality is justified if and only if the people it identifies are members of the global poor. This justification is, however, incomplete because it justifies partiality towards oppressed groups per se. We need to further address the issue of how Person A, qua national of Country A, is justified in helping her compatriots in Country A over similarly oppressed non-compatriots in Country B. I shall argue that Person A’s partiality towards her compatriots admits further vindication because such partiality is part of an oppressed group’s project of economic self-emancipation. People who are sympathetic to Thomas Pogge’s cosmopolitan account of how developing countries are institutionally subjugated by our global economic order should be able to appreciate the economic oppression that I am alluding to. Finally, I point out three benefits in my justification for compatriot partiality. First, my justification does not universally justify compatriot partiality. Given that compatriot partiality is like racial partiality, it is important to emphasize that compatriot partiality, like affirmative action, is not the right universal moral code for how we should live together. The justified partiality for and between members of oppressed groups is only a temporary measure designed to level an unlevel playing field. Second, my account is in line with the liberalism underlying cosmopolitan theory. Justifying compatriot partiality on the grounds that I have identified facilitates the creation of a collective entity, which is conducive to the development of a democracy. Third, because my account does not require significantly countervailing established social institutions and takes our human psychology into consideration, it is in accordance with the cosmopolitan’s commitment to the realizability of global justice theories. * Rachelle Bascara received her BA in Philosophy from the University of the Philippines in 2006 and her MA in Philosophy from the University College London in 2009. From 2010 to 2011, she was a Visiting Student at the Philosophy Department of the University of California, Berkeley. She is currently working towards her Philosophy MPhil Stud at Birkbeck College, University of London. Her main areas of research are in social ontology, ethics, and political philosophy. Her thesis focuses on justifying moral responsibility in Thomas Pogge’s cosmopolitan imperative.

Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, and Social Justice in Multinational Contexts Marc Woons*

Tension in mainstream debates between cosmopolitans and liberal nationalists is not only overstated, but also overlooks richer possibilities for promoting social justice beyond national borders. Tan (2004) suggests liberal nationalists correctly support national cultures as vital for individual freedom, but arbitrarily limit cosmopolitanism to simply humanitarian aid. Because scarce resources are unfairly distributed, national power imbalances jeopardizes the national security of some. Economic redistribution between national groups must follow according to a global Rawlsian basic structure that maximizes the situation of the worst off. Yet, Tan hastily adopts liberal nationalism. He inherits its narrow understanding of national protection based on cultural difference. In demanding economic redistribution, Tan fails to question existing state structures and even less to question the dominant global economic paradigm. This is both normatively and practically problematic for pushing social justice beyond national borders.

Normatively, cosmopolitan liberalism overlooks nationalism’s political and economic dimensions. Like liberal nationalists, Tan seeks to protect cultural difference and not political difference. “Cultural” groups are often not seeking to preserve their difference inasmuch as they wish to enjoy the same self-determination enjoyed by nation-states. This is based on more fundamental democratic claims to “determine its own future as free as possible from external interference or domination by another nation or collection of nations” (Murphy 2001: 374). The onus shifts onto liberal nationalists to defend the power of existing states. Consistency demands that they must provide equal access to self-determination as a national political-democratic right as opposed to the much more limited cultural-preservation right. The opposite would be akin to Canada and the United States merging because of cultural convergence. Liberal nationalists overestimate the separateness of culture and economic spheres. Cosmopolitan liberals lack a normative space for economic pluralism that allows weaker national communities the protection they need to pursue economic activities vital for national survival. Though it is a fact that globalization has seen a global economic regime emerge that is difficult to resist or hide from, for many the idea of national recognition also involves – at least initially – protection from the assimilatory forces that come from external economic pressures. This seems contrary to Tan, who believes economic redistribution allows national groups to compete fairly in global markets. Such a view seems like economic assimilation – a scary fact for national groups whose culture has little in common with the dominant global economic paradigm. Supporting political and economic dimensions is a necessary precondition for realizing global justice. This need not entail tolerance for nonliberal regimes, nor does it lead to conservative cosmopolitanism. It simply suggests that social justice requires recognizing greater national pluralism as a first step toward promoting richer, meaningful, and therefore lasting forms of cosmopolitan redistribution. It allows for greater convergence than those that only allow for special rights based on the preservation of cultural differences. *Marc Woons is FWO Doctoral Fellow & Junior Researcher at the KU Leuven & the Research Foundation Flanders. His research interests are nationalism, indigenousness, social justice, and cosmopolitanism. Woons’ latest publication is: Woons, M. 2013, “Taking the Road Less Travelled: Indigenous Self-Determination and Participation in Canadian Institutions”, Federal Governance, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 14-35. More information about him at: http://marcwoons.com 12h-13h: Lunch* 13h-14h30: Prof. Gerard Delanty (University of Sussex) – The Prospects of Cosmopolitanism and the Possibility of Global Justice Chair: Tor Ivar Hanstad 14h30-15h: Coffee Break 15h-17h30: 2nd Session: Multiculturalism and Plurality Chair: Erik Christensen

What is Moral Injury and When is it Morally Wrong? Axel Honneth, Saba Mahmood,

and the Danish Cartoons Jonas Jakobsen*

This paper compares and discusses the notion of ‘moral injury’ in the works of Saba Mahmood and

Axel Honneth. Mahmood uses this notion to analyse a specific kind of Muslim pain – a wound that

hurts when Muslims’ ‘being in the world’ is disturbed – and she takes the Danish ‘cartoon

controversy’ to be a paradigmatic example of how such injury is inflicted upon Muslims in secular

Europe. Axel Honneth, by contrast, uses the notion of moral injury to analyse how human beings (and

not just Muslims) are vulnerable to misrecognition simply in virtue of being normatively oriented and

intersubjectively interdependent.

I criticize Mahmood’s claim that the moral injury felt by (many) Muslims when confronted with

hurtful expressions about the prophet is unintelligible to non-Muslims and to secular culture and

thought. Against this view I argue that Muslim injury in cases like the Danish cartoon controversy is

not just ‘intelligible’ across cultural and religious divides, it can also be analyzed in a richer and more

complex way through Honneth’s vocabulary of misrecognition, moral injury and ‘struggle for

recognition’.

I also criticize Mahmood for failing to explain whether she thinks that religiously injurious

expressions are always wrong or whether there was something special about the Danish cartoons that

justifies her call for ‘ethical sensibility’ in this case. By contrast, Honneth’s ethico-political vision of

democratic solidarity allows us to make a contextual argument about why the publication of (some of)

the Danish cartoons was morally problematic, without committing ourselves to the untenable view that

religious sensibilities must always be protected against injury.

*Jonas Jakobsen is a Research Fellow at the Department of Philosophy, University of Tromsø, Norway, and the subeditor of the Norwegian Journal of Philosophy [Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift]. Jakobsen’s research interests are social and political philosophy, multiculturalism, secularism and the ‘post-secular’ and Islamic political thinking. Jakobsen’s most recent publication is “Religion and (Mis)recognition: Axel Honneth and the Danish Cartoon Affair” in Alnes and Toscano: Varities of Liberalism. Contemporary Challenges. Cambridge Scholars Publishing (forthcoming). He is writing the dissertation: Inclusion, Critique and Islam in Europe: An applied Analysis of Jürgen Habermas’s theory of Deliberative Democracy.

The Public Recognition of Islamic Identity: Honneth, Ghannouchi, multiculturalism, and plurality Karim Sadek*

Since Hegel’s mutual recognition alternative to Hobbes’s individual self-interest as the basis for social relations, notions of ‘recognition’ and ‘identity’ have occupied an increasing space in political life and discourse. Today, a whole range of political debates, arguments, and activism get clustered under the category of "identity politics," "politics of recognition" or "multiculturalism." What characterizes this form of political theorizing and activity is a focus on protecting and securing the political freedoms of specific social groups organized around some aspect of their identity (culture, religion, gender, class, race, etc.). Due to a range of events on the global scene, questions such as: "how to understand Islamic identity?", "how to normatively grasp the demand for the public recognition of Islamic identity?", and "how to respond to such demands?" have gained practical urgency.

In this paper I attempt to answer these and related questions by conducting an encounter between Axel Honneth's recognition-based theory and Rached al-Ghannouchi (Tunisian Islamic political thinker and leader of An-Nahda Movement, which won the first democratic elections post Arab uprisings) dissident thought as representative of a trend in Islamic revivalism. More specifically, this paper investigates the ability of Honneth's theory to explain and evaluate the demand for the public recognition of Islamic identity. Drawing on Ghannouchi's thought I reconstruct his social and political demands in terms of a demand for the public recognition of Islamic identity. I also argue that to fully and properly capture Ghannouchi's demand for recognition, we should distinguish between a negative and a positive interpretation of that demand. I then show that while Honneth's theory succeeds in capturing and addressing the demand for the public recognition of Islamic identity understood negatively, it fails to do so with the positive construal of that demand. This failure, however, can be remedied. By way of doing so I draw on two of Honneth's sympathetic critics: Bart van Leeuwan and Maeve Cooke. The upshot of following the recommendations of those critics is expanding Honneth's model to include a fourth form of recognition (difference-respect) and supplementing it with a processual determination of ethical value in the public sphere. This upgraded version of the recognition model is capable of both normatively grasping Ghannouchi's demand and adequately responding to it. The outcome of this encounter between Honneth and Ghannouchi not only empowers the recognition model, but also allows for a deeper and more nuanced understanding of Ghannouchi's demands for the public recognition of Islamic identity. The paper will conclude by drawing the implications of that encounter on how to understand multiculturalism and plurality. *Karim Sadek received his PhD in Philosophy from Georgetown University (Washington D.C., USA) in August 2012, where he defended the dissertation entitled: Islamic Democracy: the Struggle for and Limits of Recognition. Since September 2012 Sadek has been a Mellon Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Arts and Humanities at the American University of Beirut, Lebanon. His research interests are religion and politics, specifically, the intersection between contemporary critical theory, democratic theory, and contemporary Islamic political thought.

Vision of Justice in the Future of Humanity Morteza Khorrami*

The idea of final triumph of peace and justice on evil force, conflict and global spread of the religious faith, the full deployment of human values, constitute a utopia and the ideal society is discussed by many of religions. Thus, mankind has always been waiting for a savior and has received good tidings for coming of Great Savior at the end of Time. Of course, various persons were introduced as the Promised Savior by different religions, but all of the religions share in this fact that the future of humanity is very bright and promising and the future will belong to the righteous and justice. In this article entitled "Vision of justice in the future of humanity", which is written with descriptive – analytic method, the author tries to show the vision of global justice in the end of Time. The opinion of various religions such as Judaism, Christianity, Zoroastrianism, Islam and even idolatry about the Great Savior and the justice status in his era in the world will be discussed and the viewpoint of Muslims and specially Shiites, which is explained clearly in their scripts, will be depicted. Current human responsibility towards this golden era will be discussed, too.

Based on paper finding, religious doctrine promises that a heaven person and sacred character will come as a reformer of the world. In his era, humanity will be saved from tyranny, oppression and inequality and the earth will be filled with peace, security, justice and equity. As well as promoting justice, truth and spreading religion in the world, economic, scientific, political and moral development will be occurred. * Morteza Khorrami is Instructor at the Department of Islamic studies, Islamic Azad university, branch Qaemshahr and Ph.D. Quran and Hadith Science, Islamic Azad University, Branch science and research, Tehran, Iran.

Free Speech and Moral Responsibility Odin Lysaker*

In this paper I wish to investigate how to strike the right balance between ethics and law in the free speech debate in post-terror Norway. In the public discourse, two accounts of free speech have been addressed. On the one side, a liberal stance argues that the citizens’ legal right to free speech should not be regulated, unless the utterances break laws concerning discrimination. On the other, a ‘social responsibility’ argument holds that the free speech law should be limited due to experience of hate speech. As these two approaches seem to be conflicting rather than complementary, it is significant to raise the question whether there is an affinity between free speech and moral responsibility. I agree with those who hold that the liberal approach contains a ‘blind spot’ with regard to other considerations than legal ones. Still, I will argue that there are convincing reasons for keeping the liberal justification. In this paper, therefore, I shall introduce to the notion of the ethics of expression, which refers to what I take to be the ethical responsibility of the public use of free speech. By this, I mean the individual responsibility of fellow citizens in their social relationships of recognition. Hence, the premise of this argument is to understand free speech as a social action, namely the practice of mutual recognition and thus interaction. Although it may sound plausible to claim that law should be supplemented by ethics with regard to free speech, which thus involves a ‘liquid’ relationship between ethics and law, it is highly contested from which source such an ethical account may be drawn. Here, I shall argue that in order to be able to serve as a form of moral responsibility which should be applicable to collective cases of social interaction, this normative grounding must move beyond the citizens’ personal values in the private sphere. The reason why this is so is due to the ‘fact of pluralism’ as with regard to personal identities and ‘thick’ values in democracies characterised by complexity and globalisation. Thus, it must somehow be established a bundle of ethical guidelines which can be at work as a formal infrastructure of the freedom of expression that is ‘thin’ enough to work as a normative justification which may be shared by all citizens. In what follows, I will highlight five such ethical guidelines which I take to be the basis of which the ethics of expression is established, namely the motivation of the speech act, the content, rhetoric, the range of the of the utterance, and its consequences. *Odin Lysaker (University of Agder) is an Associate Professor and holds a PhD in Philosophy. He is currently part of the NECORE research project, which will analyse identity, values, and free speech in post-terror Norway. Lysaker’s main research interests are ethics, political philosophy, and social philosophy. His previous research includes recognition theory with regard to human dignity, cosmopolitan justice, and irregular migration.

Secular and Religious Arguments in the Public Sphere: The Critique of the Divide Tomasz Jarymowicz*

Although political philosophers have always been aware of unreasonable secular arguments, it is religious arguments who have received the most attention so far. What if we try thinking about religious and secular unreasonable arguments in terms of their similarities? First of all, there does not seem to exist a great divide between secular arguments and religious arguments in the public sphere. Citizens have a variety of arguments to offer in the public sphere both secular, quasi-religious and religious ones. Furthermore, religious and secular unreasonable reasons can strengthen each other or at the very least they can converge. Thus they can work together to remove certain issues from the realm of politics onto the level of exception. What may be the practical and normative consequences of this shift in thinking about religious and secular unreasonable arguments together? First of all, political theorists would avoid the accusation of being oversensitive to religion and not critical enough to secular unreasonable arguments. Secondly, we could also focus on why certain issues are problematized in certain ways instead of explaining everything away in terms of intensity of beliefs. Thirdly, we would be able to see similar mechanisms behind secular and religious unreasonable reasons such as substituting pseudo morality or scientism respectively for politics. From the normative point of view, we should stop being focused so much on the entry requirements of public reason and start analysing how democratic dialogue should proceed since it is only through this dialogue that the consequences of arguments offered become clear. Although political philosophers have always been aware of unreasonable secular arguments, it is religious arguments who have received the most attention so far. What if we try thinking about religious and secular unreasonable arguments in terms of their similarities? First of all, there does not seem to exist a great divide between secular arguments and religious arguments in the public sphere. Citizens have a variety of arguments to offer in the public sphere both secular, quasi-religious and religious ones. Furthermore, religious and secular unreasonable reasons can strengthen each other or at the very least they can converge. Thus they can work together to remove certain issues from the realm of politics onto the level of exception. What may be the practical and normative consequences of this shift in thinking about religious and secular unreasonable arguments together? First of all, political theorists would avoid the accusation of being oversensitive to religion and not critical enough to secular unreasonable arguments. Secondly, we could also focus on why certain issues are problematized in certain ways instead of explaining everything away in terms of intensity of beliefs. Thirdly, we would be able to see similar mechanisms behind secular and religious unreasonable reasons such as substituting pseudo morality or scientism respectively for politics. From the normative point of view, we should stop being focused so much on the entry requirements of public reason and start analysing how democratic dialogue should proceed since it is only through this dialogue that the consequences of arguments offered become clear. *Tomasz Jarymowicz is a Research Fellow at the Department of Philosophy, University of Tromsø. His primary research interests are deliberative democracy and public sphere, justifications of freedom of speech as well as ethics of citizenship. He also focuses his attention on feminism and the relationship between Political theory and rhetoric. He received his Master's Degree with merit from the university

of Wroclaw, Poland. Currently Jarymowicz is pursuing research on autonomy-based justifications of absolute theories of freedom of speech. 18h: Cocktail Reception at the University of Tromsø**

Day 2: 20 June 2013 9h-10h30: 3rd Session: Citizenship and Migration Chair: Percy Oware

Migration, Cosmopolitanism, and Equality of Opportunity: a proposal

Yusuf Yuksekdag* This study is committed to the ways and means to defend a ‘more' cosmopolitan realization of certain policy implications, in the case of immigration. The raison d’être of this study is the idea that the current debate over open versus closed borders suffers from at least one major shortcoming for the both parties of the debate. The first shortcoming concerns, how the advocates of closed borders like Christopher H. Wellman assign a moral significance to freedom of association despite the moral arbitrariness of one’s birth place in the current system of nation-states. That is because the borders serve as a means to distribute economic opportunities that limit resources and advantages into territorial borders whereas it restricts other individuals in certain ways to have access to those opportunities on a morally arbitrary basis. The second shortcoming, on the other hand, is that most of the liberal cosmopolitan accounts neglect the unfavourable consequences of their open borders argument – which take it as a means to compensate people in need –, such as the effects of medical brain drain on the lives and the opportunities, like the access to basic healthcare in this instance, of the members of the source countries. Thus, whether or not a state has a right to control its territories, the borders, as “institutions,” are reflections of the global inequality of opportunity as much of the territorial boundaries of the society. This is because, the international voluntary immigration signifies an inequality of opportunity between individuals; and inequality of opportunity combined with arbitrary border control does vindicate a perspective of cosmopolitan justice outlook towards the issue. My general view is that moral cosmopolitanism is an important alternative as an ethical standpoint while reasoning about just immigration policies. Although different interpretations exist, I argue that the features of moral cosmopolitanism will best reflect on morally significant reasons in the development and justification of just immigration policies to the all addressees of the issue; which will take the interests of would-be immigrants, along with the interests of the members of both host and source countries in respect to their opportunity. I do not provide a well-formed immigration policy here, yet I believe the account provided here is more feasible in considering phenomena such as brain drain.

*Yusuf Yuksekdag is PhD Candidate in Applied Ethics at the Centre for Applied Ethics, IKK, Linköping University, Sweden. His research interests are ethics of migration, global justice, cosmopolitanism, and modern political thought / Media ethics. Yuksekdag’s last publication is : 2012 ‘Moral Cosmopolitanism and the Right to Immigration’, Public Reason 4 (12): 262-72.

Who should be granted asylum?

Noa Nogradi*

This paper examines whether states have a moral duty to grant asylum, and the normative theories on towards whom this duty exists, or “who is the rightful refugee”. The current international asylum regime, outlined in the Geneva Convention and Protocol, seems to endorse the view that states have a duty only towards persecuted persons. The Convention enumerates specific grounds — ethnicity, nationality, religion, political opinion, or social group membership — based on which persecution is recognized (the so-called “nexus clause”). Claimants who cannot demonstrate a realistic risk based on one of the recognized grounds are unlikely to be granted asylum. This paper asks whether the Convention’s restricted preference towards persecuted persons is normatively justifiable. I intend to prove that available justifications of the persecution criteria also apply to grounds currently lacking both de jure, and de facto recognition. The ground of my main concern is gender-based persecution. While gender-based harm could be understood as belonging under the political, or the social group ground, in practice these are the weakest grounds, exactly because of their resilience; additionally, there is no binding text commanding recognition of gender-based persecution as belonging under either ground. The paper also scrutinizes the concept of persecution. The first section of this paper introduces the dominant discourses of ethics and political philosophy concerning asylum and refuge, giving a short summary of the partiality-impartiality debate (based on Matthew Gibney), and the different arguments on what makes a “rightful refugee”. The arguments introduced are classified into two main streams of thought: authors basing their justification on the factual neediness of claimants (such as Peter and Renata Singer, and Joseph Carens), and those basing their justification on political conceptions of legitimacy and membership (such as Andrew Shacknove, David Owen and Matthew Price). Counter-arguments critiquing these approaches are also introduced. The second section is devoted to evaluate and examine the normative justifiability of the current regime’s exclusive preference towards the persecuted based on the arguments and implications of the theories presented previously. In reviewing the meaning and justifiability of the current regime, a set of gender-oriented considerations and feminist arguments re-implemented from other debates —such as those concerning the public-private dichotomy and the tension between multiculturalism and feminism — are also included. The conclusion shows that although the current regime’s exclusive preferences towards the persecuted are normatively justifiable (based mainly on Price’s, and to some extent, Owen’s arguments), the nexus clause’s enumeration of grounds is hardly so; especially the exclusion of gender as a ground.

*Noa Nogradi is MA in Political Philosophy at Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona. Her research interests are gender justice, human rights and women’s human rights, global justice; procedural, institutional and policy proposals to realize global justice.

National Membership: A Question of Individual Choice

Melina Duarte* By “national membership” I understand the right to enter, settle in, work in and engage politically in the territory of a (post-Westphalian) sovereign state. National membership does not necessarily equal citizenship: National members include not only resident citizens, but resident aliens, temporary residents and irregular immigrants. If enjoying national membership is a question of individual choice, the fragmented categorization just mentioned becomes superfluous In such contexts there would be no irregular immigrants anymore and no distinction between resident aliens and temporary residents. We would have citizens, residents and visitors. Visitors are tourists and transients who have no intention of residing in the visited country and as such are not entitled to national membership. The possibility for a resident to become a citizen must be open, as has often been advocated by universalists, but this is not my concern in this paper. My concern is with residents being able to keep their foreign citizenship and have the full political rights (voting and eligibility rights at all levels) as national members. Citizenship has many dimensions, and many of these dimensions concern personal attachment related to a culturally biased identity. Accordingly, I argue that residents do not need to abdicate these personal attachments to be able to acquire full political rights in their hosting country. Turkish people living in Germany do not need to become German citizens to be able to acquire political rights, and Maghrebian people do not need to become French citizens to be able to acquire political rights, for example. The contemporary sovereign states are committed to multiculturalism and plurality, and this commitment must be reflected in their practices. Currently, in the best scenario, residents acquire the right to vote at subnational levels after a period of living in the hosting country. In the Scandinavian countries, for instance, these residents are not only EU members or citizens of countries with reciprocal political rights, but every resident. However, to grant political rights at the subnational level to these residents is far from a satisfactory solution to the problem, since most decisions on immigration policies are not taken at this level. This implies that denying voting and eligibility rights at all levels to the residents means denying their self-legislative capacity and their right not to be subject to any arbitrariness of the law. In this sense, residents are not free persons, and an injustice is being committed with them as if it could avoid another injustice with the former citizens – as if the engagement of residents would be unjust to people who, through the self-legislating act, acquire the right to control their surroundings. However, we cannot ignore the fact that residents do not arrive as intruders, as invaders, in the hosting country. Their engagement with the new community is already an act of subordination since they are (temporarily) submissive to the new laws they did not themselves participate in determining. This act of subordination will be precisely what will make granting political rights to the residents at all levels not unjust to the former citizens. * Melina Duarte is PhD Candidate at the University of Tromsø. In 2007 she received a BA in Philosophy from Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. In 2010 she earned a Master degree in “German and French Philosophy in the European Context” in three prestigious universities: at UTM

in France, at UCL in Belgium and at LMU in Germany. Melina has scientific papers in Portuguese and in French published in national and international Journals and a book in German published online by Europhilosophie Éditions. She is part of the Editorial Board of the Journal Acta Universitatis Carolinae from the University Charles of Prague for its special issue called Interpretationes and she regularly publishes articles of dissemination of philosophy in Brazilian newspapers. 10h30-11h: Coffee break 11h-12h30: Associate Prof. Eva Erman (University of Uppsala) – Global political legitimacy beyond justice and democracy? Chair: Øyvind Stokke 12h30-13h30: Lunch* 13h30-15h30: 4th Session: Transactional Justice Chair: Espen Gamlund

Tax policy and transactional justice – a study of the relationship between tax policy, illicit financial

flows, and inequality – the effect it has on both developed and developing countries, and some proposed solutions

Krishen Mehta* Taxes formalize our obligations to each other. They define the inequalities we accept and those that we collectively seek to redress. In the modern world, taxation is the social contract that defines what governments and societies can or cannot do. This paper will provide a microcosm of the fiscal challenges that exist (from the standpoint of transactional justice), and the opportunities that may be available to address them. At present we have a global economy but no global set of rules. In the absence of such rules, we enable companies to take advantage of whatever regulatory arbitrage that may exist in order to maximize the return on capital. This deprives both developed and developing countries of much needed capital to meet social and infrastructure needs, to address social inequality, and to prepare for a better future for its citizens. Transactional justice, as it relates to the functioning of a more just tax system, is not served under the global system that exists today. The paper will address certain fault lines in the operation of the global economy, and will propose some solutions on what can be done about them. It will explain how the current use of tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions have a negative effect on societies globally. It will examine how international rules of conduct relating to banking transparency, exchange of information, use of tax havens, and integrated financial reporting can help overcome some of these problems, and restore at least some equity to global trade. A case will also be made for a World Tax Authority (WTA) to address issues of transactional (in) justice. While we have many organizations such as WTO, WHO, World Aviation Forum, Interpol, and so on, we currently do not have a World Tax Authority that can address some of these challenges.

Just as the WTO sets the rules for international trade, a WTA could protect national tax policies from the harmful effect of tax havens and tax competition. It could provide a forum for dispute resolution. It could also set the stage for an alternate form of taxation, such as unitary taxation, formula apportionment, or another approach that may be more just or equitable than the current system. In summary, the proposed paper would look at transactional justice from the perspective of global taxation, and provide some solutions to the fault lines that exist today. A set of posters or a brief video would be prepared for the conference, and then a paper prepared or publication at a later date. *Krishen Mehta is a former partner with PricewaterhouseCoopers and currently Senior Advisor to Tax Justice Network. He is collaborating with Professor Thomas Pogge of Yale University on an edited book on the subject of tax and social justice. Mehta is currently also on the advisory board of Aspen Institute's business and society program in New York, the Asia Advisory Council of Human Rights Watch, and is a trustee of the Social Science Foundation. He is also a trustee of the Institute of Current World Affairs in Washington, DC, and is one of the founding directors of Asia Initiatives, a US 501(C)(3) organization. Krishen has an undergraduate degree in Engineering, a Masters in Business, and is a US CPA.

Trade as a Site of Justice Andrew Walton*

It is widely believed that global trade, and the global economic order more generally, are implicated in injustice. However, it is much less clear how exactly we should understand the idea of ‘trade justice’. It is sometimes suggested that trade should be analysed as either or both a subject and site of justice sui generis. These ideas suggest, respectively, that there are standards of justice relevant to trade in virtue of the particular purpose and nature of this institution and that there is an inherent reason to apply some such standards within the institution of trade directly. This paper defends an alternative thesis, primarily with respect to the latter issue. To wit, that we should approach the question of trade as a site of justice in a holistic, instrumental fashion. We should, in other words, be focused on exploring the extent to which different trade regimes work with other institutions, to uphold, together, broader, non-domain-specific, demands of justice. Trade, the paper argues, may be an appropriate site of justice, but not in virtue of some notion of ‘trade justice’. It is in virtue of the appropriate relationship between justice and trade.

*Andrew Walton is Assistant Professor in Political Theory at the Department of Political Science, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland. Walton is currently Visiting Fellow in Programme for the Study of International Governance , Genève, Switzerland.

Redistribution Without Egalitarianism: Left-Libertarianism and the Global Political Economy

Luca J. Uberti* Left-libertarianism – the attempt to nest leftist policy prescriptions onto libertarian normative principles – has come under sustained attack on account of its alleged incoherence. In response, I attempt to develop a defense of state intervention in the economy – including market regulation and redistributive taxation – by mobilizing a purely libertarian theoretical apparatus. In other words, I

develop a theory of “redistribution without egalitarianism” that is arguably immune to the charge of incoherence. I do so by way of a defense and extension of Eric Mack’s account of the “Self-Ownership Proviso”, which is firmly anchored within the bounds of traditional libertarian theory, and yet opens up the possibility to derive leftist policy implications. Since according to Mack severe deprivation of extra-personal resources amounts to a de facto violation of the self-ownership rights of the deprived, the effective institutional protection of self-ownership requires more-than-minimal state functions. I attempt to unveil the full range of institutional and policy implications of this argument, which Mack himself suppresses or fails to spell out exhaustively. In particular, Mack’s conclusion that his proviso will have limited applications in a (non-ideal) competitive market order is wrong. Mack’s claim is tacitly premised on a specific, yet questionable, empirical account of the global political economy: namely neo-liberal theory, which holds that the free market system is the economic regime that is most conducive to poverty alleviation. However, I show that, if we assume in the background a structuralist political economy – which sees global capitalism as inherently conducive to the perpetuation of unemployment and severe deprivation on a global scale – Mack’s proviso emerges as systemically violated in the non-ideal world. On an appropriate empirical understanding of global capitalism, even the economic regime most favoured by libertarians is shown to be in violation of self-ownership rights (construed à la Mack). I then argue that my application of Mack’s proviso to global capitalism supplies a libertarian justification for the toolbox of statist and social-democratic development policies that libertarians and neo-liberals have traditionally opposed on anti-interventionist grounds, and that remain largely illegal under existing international rules. I also argue that a thoroughgoing application of Mack’s proviso is likely to provide a libertarian rationale for weakening intellectual property protection, and institutionalizing a global redistributive tax. Lastly, I defend my account of interventionist libertarianism from the criticisms recently moved against the left-libertarian project, showing that (at least) my account is immune to such criticisms. The paper’s overall aspiration is to reveal the inherently progressive character of libertarian theory and rescue libertarianism from its current academic marginalization. *Luca J. Uberti studied philosophy and political theory at King’s College London and the London School of Economics and Political Science. He then worked as a Research Fellow at an overseas campus of the Rochester Institute of Technology (American University in Kosovo, Economics Unit) for two consecutive academic years. While at RIT/AUK, Luca has taught political theory and done research on economic development in post-war Kosovo. In the area of political theory, he is mostly interested in theories of economic justice (in particular libertarianism and Marxism), although his main area of work is currently the political economy of development. His paper entitled “Good and Bad Idealizations in Political Theory” has recently been accepted in THEORIA: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy (Wiley), while a paper on Locke’s monetary theory is forthcoming in the Spring 2013 issue of the Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics (Erasmus University Rotterdam). Another paper on Kosovo was recently accepted in New Political Economy (Taylor & Francis).

Beliefs about Social Justice and Public Policy in Brazil and the United States: an empirical investigation

Nicole Kuhn, Daniela Goya Tocchetto, Sabino da Silva Pôrto Júnior, Willian Adamczyk*

Different societies have contrasting views on the fairness of social competition and the role of the government. Such varied perceptions lead to different public policy choices – and, in their term, these policies will influence people’s behaviors and perceptions, in a reciprocal movement. Numerous authors have explored this subject of the fairness of public policies. Due to its vast scope and increasing political relevance, we focus our attention on distributive and redistributive policies and their relation with social beliefs. Firstly, we will investigate the currently held beliefs about social justice in Brazil. In a second step, we will explore the correlation amongst social beliefs and distributive policies in Brazil, while analyzing that correlation in the light of the liberal egalitarian theories of distributive justice. Finally, we will compare our findings with those encountered by Alesina & Angeletos (2004) and Ku & Salmon (2012), among others, in their studies regarding these correlations in the United States. The analysis of empirical and theoretical data in the fields of economic justice and moral philosophy allows us to perceive several correlations. One of those, encountered by Alesina and Angletos (2004), is that societies which believe that luck and connections are important usually choose high levels of taxes redistribution, while the opposite happens to societies that value most individual effort. Moreover, Ku and Salmon (2012) determine that tolerance for income inequality tends to be lower in the former scenario and higher in the latter. These relations have been studied in multiple countries and repeatedly found in empirical research. One of those countries is the United States, an example of low redistribution and relatively laissez faire politics. Regarding Brazil, nevertheless, no previous extensive studies have to date (and the authors knowledge) been made. Relying on behavioral, economic, political and philosophical approaches, we will study the Brazilian case and verify which theories apply to it. To sum up, the present work aims at analyzing and comparing the relation between social beliefs and distributive policies in Brazil and in the United States, providing further understanding in the field of distributive justice. *Daniela Goya Tocchetto is PhD Candidate in Political Philosophy at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul and University lector of Economics at ESPM (www.espm.br). Her main research interest is Human Development, especially in the areas of public policy and theories of justice. Her most recent publication in the field is: TOCCHETTO, Daniela G.; PÔRTO JÚNIOR, S. S. (2012) Justiça distributiva em Rawls e Nozick: uma investigação experimental. In: Ana Carolina Fonseca; Eduardo Pohlmann, Gabriel Goldmeier. (Org.). Ética, política e esclarecimento público: ensaios em homenagem a Nelson Boeira. Porto Alegre: Editora Bestiário, p. 91-112.

*Nicole Kuhn is Undergraduate student in International Relations at ESPM (www.espm.br). Her main research interest is global justice and international relations.

*Sabino da Silva Pôrto Júnior is Professor of Economics at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. His main research interest is Regional Economics, especially in the following areas: polarization, Markov chains, and endogenous growth. His most recent publication is : CUSINATO, Rafael T.; MINELLA, André; PÔRTO JÚNIOR, S. S. (2012) Output gap in Brazil: a real-time data analysis. Empirical Economics. Online, p. 05 April 2012.

* Willian Adamczyk is Undergraduate student of Economics at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. His main research interest is the area of public policy and theories of justice, experimental economics and rationality issues.

15h30-16h: Coffee break

16h-17h: 5th Session: Distributive Justice Chair: Andrew Walton

Studding Two Islamic Strategies for Solving the Problem of Distributive Justice Mohsen Nouraei*

A great amount of available literature about justice researching in both system of thought of Islam and the West is allocated to distributive justice. Some scholars such as Plato, Aristotle, Thomas, Hume, Kant, Farabi, Avicenna, Algazel, Ibn-Khaldun, and also contemporary scholars such as Rawls, Nozick, Tabatabai and Sadr tried to present a clear and acceptable definition of it as well as explaining its concept. The writer believes that as we cannot ignore their success in this field, we cannot conceal the ambiguous points of the mentioned definitions as well. At least, one of the most basic problematic ambiguities of the defining justice as: “giving each his right” or according to Aristotle: “equal treatment with equals and unequal treatment with unequal” and also in view of owls: "justice as fairness" is their lack of content criterion. Clearly stating, although these definitions want every owner to achieve his right, they don’t specify clearly any criteria for their entitlement and don’t tell us specifically that who are equal and who are not? What is the criterion of equality and entitlement? Suggesting two distinct concepts of merit and entitlement by liberal thinkers for solving this problem also cannot be regarded as an appropriate solution. This problem reaches its peak when we want to pursue justice on a global scale, because proponents of liberalism, socialism and Islam have basic differences in explaining the concept of entitlement and determining the deserving person. In a descriptive- analytical way, this article tries to access a strategic proposal for solving mentioned problem. The authors intend to answer the question: what is the specific strategy of Islam for determining the criterion of justice? The research findings suggest that there are at least two specific strategies: referring to commonalities of religions, and intellectual statements. Islam emphasizes on convergence of religions and on their harmony in most areas and recognizes the wisdom as an internal prophet and a divine endowment that the validity of some of its commands is considered as the counterpart of the religion but rather as its section. The suitable applying of these two strategies can give us hope for realization of agreement on determining the criterion and identifying examples. *Mohsen Nouraei is Assistant Professor, Department of Quran And Hadith, Faculty of Theology and Islamic studies- University of Mazandaran, Babolsar, Iran. Books published: 1. The Historical Current of Juristic Exegeses History, Evolution and Samples, 2012, Mashhad, Razavi University Of Islamic Sciences , (Author). 2. Manifestation Of The Quran in the EPIC Of Ashura , 2006 , Mashhad , Razavi University Of Islamic Sciences , (Author). Articles published: 1. Studding The Interpretive Rule of Application and Adaptation (With Emphasis on its Adaptation in the Life of Ahl-al-Bayt AS, 2012 , Specialized Journal Of Razavi University , vol. 13 no. 42 , Issn: 1608-2370, (Author).

A (Non-Ideal) Global Basic Structure Sabrina Martin*

My purpose is to explore and elucidate part of the global justice debate that concerns the idea of a global basic structure. Focusing on the basic structure as the subject of justice has tended to lead theorists to make a choice: either there is no global basic structure and therefore obligations of justice remain domestic only—the statist position—or there is sufficient institutional basis at the global level to warrant affirming a basic structure global in scope, meaning that duties of justice must also be global—the cosmopolitan position. Recent literature, however, has pointed out that this might be a false choice between denying and asserting the existence of a global basic structure. The dichotomy arises largely from the assumption that a basic structure must exist before the demands of justice can arise. Thus, the problem of cosmopolitanism versus statism might be circumvented if we can prove that justice requires the establishment of a basic structure to fulfill its demands. Two aspects of the cosmopolitans’ quest for a global basic structure have been problematic. First, by assuming that a basic structure is a precondition for the demands of justice to arise, it limits their ability to assert that justice is global in scope. Second, focusing primarily on distributive justice rather than remembering the lexical priority of Rawls’s two principles of justice has tended to obscure more fundamental problems with the debate. In this paper, I do not work under the assumption that there is an existing global basic structure, but rather focus on the more philosophically-interesting questions of, if, and under what circumstances, one might arise. Additionally, I make no normative comment on whether or not we should adopt a global basic structure, only how to understand it and what conditions might give rise to the need for one. There are two main claims that I make in this paper. First, I claim that on a Rawlsian understanding of the basic structure, justice does not require one before its demands arise, but rather that under certain conditions, justice can require that a basic structure be established as an essential part of fulfilling its demands. This has the benefit of not restricting the scope of justice to the domestic sphere. Thus, the second claim is about determining, from a practice-dependent, non-ideal starting point what those “certain conditions” are. Specifically, I argue that when currently-existing global institutions begin impacting the freedom of individuals to interact against a fair backdrop and pervasively impact life chances, then the demands of justice will arise and we will need to establish a global basic structure. This paper, then, also has implications for the ideal/non-ideal theory debate, because I argue that the best way to globalize the basic structure is to begin from a non-ideal starting point. *Sabrina Martin recently completed her MSc in Political Theory at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and will be starting a PhD/JD emphasizing justice in international trade in Fall 2014. The paper submitted is taken from her MSc dissertation, which received distinction from the LSE.

17h-18h – 6th Session: Corrective Justice Chair: Roar Anfinsen

Exit Afghanistan: A Just War or Western Nihilism in a World Without Meaning? Tor Ivar Hanstad*

Along with her allies, Norway has decided to withdraw the main part of her forces from Afghanistan. In Faryab province, where the Norwegian forces had their primary area of operation, the withdrawal has already taken place, starting 1st October 2012 when the Norwegian built camp in Meymaneh was taken over by the Afghan security forces. We have now reached a stage in the history of the ISAF operation where the debate shifts from being concerned with questions of present “in operation” issues (e.g. “are we doing the right things?”), and over to questions of a more historical character (e.g. “was the operation a success?”). Hence, we have now entered the stage when history of this operation is about to be written. And, as usual, the process of history writing unfolds once again as a contest between perspectives that struggle for hegemony. In the wake of the ongoing withdrawal of Norwegian forces, we have, and are, presented with various narratives of how the Norwegian effort in Afghanistan should be interpreted. The most telling contrast so far has been the significant discrepancy between the (so far) official, Norwegian narrative and what seems to be the emerging situation in the Faryab province after the Norwegian withdrawal. On several occasions, the Norwegian Minister of Defense has steadily portrayed the Norwegian part of the ISAF operation as a success, referring to results like the weakening of the Taliban (“no more a threat in Faryab”), the improved condition of the Afghan security forces, the improved living conditions for civilians in Faryab and so on. This is contrasted by an equally steady increase in violence by the Taliban after the Norwegian forces withdrew. This, at least so far, raises the key question about the ISAF operation and the war in Afghanistan in general, namely, did we do any good there, and, is the justness of the war now being decided by the actual outcome of the war? In this paper I will address these questions and analyze the war in Afghanistan and its preliminary outcome in the light of Just War Theory (JWT). I will focus mainly on the jus ad bellum and the jus post bellum sides of the theory, and pay a special attention to the ad bellum criteria of “reasonable hope for success”. I will argue that the character of the war in Afghanistan, which has been, according to Rupert Smith, a “new war” in the sense that it is fought “amongst the people”, makes it extremely difficult to fulfill the criteria of “reasonable hope for success” due to the extreme difficulty in formulating clear goals of the end state. Hence, the lack of a clear end state makes this type of war inclined to what I call “nihilistic war”. I argue that the lack of clearly articulated goals can deprive the war of its meaning, making it an activity more like that of light-nihilism/passive nihilism than of determined, strategic actions like those we find in the history of the “old wars”. I also argue that the contrast between the (so far) official Norwegian narrative about the war in Afghanistan, and what is (so far) happening in the Faryab province, could be taken as a sign of the vagueness concerning the goals/end state. Finally, I argue that whether the war in Afghanistan is deemed just or not, will depend on its outcome. This makes it too early to conclude on the issue, which in turn, further emphasizes the problem with “new wars” and the problems of clear goals/end state. *Tor Ivar Hanstad is Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Tromsø. Hanstad’s main research interests are political philosophy and ethics. Under the heading of political philosophy his main interests are political realism, liberalism, international politics, security politics and the use of war and warfare in international relations. In ethics the main interest is on the ethics of war. Hanstad is also working on the approach of nihilism in both political philosophy and ethics. He

is currently writing the dissertation: Taking Warfare out of War: On Nihilism and Western Warfare after the Cold War.

Isolation, marginalization, and crime: (In)discipline in Abu Dhabi’s “Industrial City” Surajit Chakravarty, Ahmed Bani Hammad*

Cities in booming oil economic of the Gulf region have been both celebrated and criticized for their urbanism and style of growth. Relatively little attention, however, has gone towards the lived spaces at the street and neighborhood levels. The “Industrial City” of Musaffah in suburban Abu Dhabi, is home to about 400,000 blue-collar workers, mostly from South Asia. While many of them live in “labor villages” (a euphemism for all-male dormitories), others have to find space in “caravans” (shipping container boxes converted into housing units). These individuals, mostly men, arrive with low educational levels, in debt, unaware of local laws, and unable to manage finances. Their jobs demand grueling work in harsh conditions. There is little potential for growth, and they rarely see their families. They adapt to sharing rooms with people from vastly different cultures, even as they adapt to a neighborhood where they share space with uses such as car and truck repair workshops, light manufacturing units, warehouses, garbage collection sites and auto crushing facilities. Some stay in these conditions for decades. Crime is on the rise in Musaffah, as the growing community, finds itself caught in a peculiar set of economic and social circumstances. This study, based on (i) crime statistics, (ii) interviews with key informants (including the police, judges, and scholars), (iii) a survey of the residents, and (iv) our own observations, advocates understanding and addressing the underlying causes of crime, rather than depending only on policing and architectural design to discipline criminal behavior. A few simple and relatively affordable interventions are proposed, that could make a difference in the lives of the workers and could help bring down crime rates. These include skills development (language, math, law etc.), art practices and reintegration with the city. We argue that these humane and compassionate policies could bring about an improvement in the quality of life of Musaffah residents, and reduce costs of law enforcement in the long run. The case also has a contribution to make to the discussion on the relationship between theory and practice, to which the call for papers alludes. The case illustrates how it is not necessarily theory that precedes practice. A predetermined course of action, approach, or outlook can be rationalized by assembling appropriate theories. We step away from orthodox ideas in the fields of architecture and urban design, such as “defensible spaces” (Newman, 1972) or “broken windows theory” (Wilson and Kelling, 1982). These concepts tend to enable society to shirk responsibility for crime by focusing on the design of physical space rather than the economic conditions or social relations that lead to crime. Rather, we view crime as a symptom of systemic issues related to the treatment of labor. Thus we attempt to go from empirical research to theory, and then to policy prescription, in the hope that this will lead to positive change.

*Surajit Chakravarty is Assistant Professor of Urban Planning at ALHOSN University in Abu Dhabi. In 2010, he received his PhD in Policy, Planning and Development from the University of Southern California. He also holds a Master’s degree in Urban Planning from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. His research interests include community planning, economic development, public space, ethnic enclaves, and urbanization in the developing world.

*Ahmed Bani Hammad is a student of Urban Planning at ALHOSN University in Abu Dhabi. His academic interests include crime, social aspects of planning and urbanization in the Gulf region. Later this year Ahmed will be traveling to UK to pursue a Master’s degree in Criminal Justice.

Day 3: 21 June 2013 9h-10h: 7th Session: Gender Justice Chair: Trygve Lavik

Accommodating Religious Demands and Gender-Justice Concerns: Indian State Practices after the

Shah Bano Judgment Sushmita Nath*

In this paper I examine a new turn in the practice of multiculturalism in India observed by legal and political theorists who have challenged the long standing argument of multiculturalists that personal laws in India inhibit “gender-equalizing” changes. In the empirical field, this turn in the practice of multiculturalism came with the promulgation of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The Muslim Women’s Act (MWA for short) however, has a tainted past, and the constitutional validity of this Act was challenged through several writ petitions filed immediately after its promulgation in May, 1986. This Act which till date attracts several pejorative adjectives like ‘anti-women,’ ‘unconstitutional’ etc. was introduced by the Rajiv Gandhi led Congress government in the wake of the furore created by the Shah Bano judgment in 1985 (AIR 1985 SC 945). This Act, following the dictates of Islamic Law, sought to circumscribe the rights of divorced Muslim women who, before the promulgation of the Act, could seek sanctuary under the secular law of the state to be prevented from vagrancy and destitution. The MWA demonstrated to the multiculturalists in India and abroad that religious demands and gender-justice demands are incommensurable. However, scholars like Flavia Agnes, Werner Menski, and Narendra Subramanian have argued that the way MWA has unfolded shows that Muslim Personal Law can be gender-just. These scholars observe a new turn in multiculturalism in that the demand placed by religion on women through the promulgation of MWA has not meant abridgment of their democratic rights. The MWA has been viewed by them as more salutary for women, as this codified Islamic law prevents destitution of women more effectively than the corresponding secular law of the state. Following this new turn in multiculturalism in India, in this paper, by analyzing case law on the maintenance of divorced Muslim women in the High Courts and the Supreme Court of India after the promulgation of MWA in 1986, I examine the claim that the MWA is a gender-just personal law. I thereby examine how the Indian judiciary has balanced the demands of religion and gender justice in delivering judgments on maintenance for Muslim divorcees who are governed by their religious law after the enactment of the Muslim Women’s Act in 1986. *Sushmita Nath is PhD candidate at the Centre for Political Studies (CPS), School of Social Sciences (SSS) in Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. In July 2012 she submitted her M.Phil. dissertation titled ‘Is Multiculturalism Good for Women? An Analysis of Indian State Practices in the aftermath of the Shah Bano Judgment’. Nath’s article entitled “Accommodating Religious Demands

and Gender-justice Concerns: Indian State Practices after the Shah Bano Judgment” is accepted for publication in the peer-reviewed journal: ASIEN – The Journal on Contemporary Asia.

Rearticulating the Experience of War in Anonyma: Eine Frau in Berlin Holger Pötzsch*

Situating itself in the field of cultural memory studies, this paper traces the slow emergence in German historical discourse of the narrative of an anonymous German woman who survived the battle for, and occupation of, Berlin in 1945. I will, firstly, conceptualize the historical condition of the Anonyma as a precarious liminal sphere of transition between competing sovereignties that dislodged her political status as citizen and reconstituted her as rightless bare life in the sense of Agamben. Secondly, I direct focus to the relationship between the personal story of the Anonyma and a historical Master narrative pertaining to the period. The paper argues for a close connection between the woman’s form of resistance that aimed at replacing unchecked rape with a form of coerced prostitution to reassert limited control over the borders of her body, and the negative reception her diary received after a first publication in Germany in 1959. Her story implicitly challenges a hegemonic discourse of war that treats mass rape as mainly an assault on the nation’s male defenders and that silences the victims’ traumatic experiences with reference to collective guilt and individual shame or treason. *Holger Pötzsch, PhD, is a Post-Doctoral research fellow at the Department of Culture and Literature at Tromsø University (UiT), Norway. He is associated to the Border Culture research group at the HSL-faculty. Pötzsch’s field of research includes audio-visual representations of war (in particular the war film), film and cultural memory, and the discursive construction of borders and boundaries through popular culture. His dissertation focused on the productive and disruptive potentials vested in shared locations and border-crossing characters in war films where he applied a combination of discourse theoretical approaches to reception and cognitive film theory. He has published in journals such as Memory Studies, Media, War & Conflict, International Review of Education, and Nordicom Review and has contributed to anthologies at Routledge, Univ. Press of Kentucky, Wallflower Press, and others. 10h-10h30: Coffee Break 10h30-12h: Prof. Tove Pettersen (University of Oslo) – Who Cares about Global Justice? On Realizing a Globalized Ethics of Care Chair: Kjersti Fjørtoft 12h-13h: Lunch* 13h-16h: 8th Session: Human Rights Chair: Jonas Jakobsen

From the Basic Right to Subsistence to the Exceptional Right of Necessity

Alejandra Mancilla* Confronted with the high toll of human lives that global poverty takes today, and the widening gap between the rich and the poor, a growing number of contemporary moral theorists and political philosophers have posed the question of what moral duties wealthy countries and individuals owe to the poor. Their answers could be divided in two main camps. Justice cosmopolitans, on one hand, emphasize our duties to build just institutions at the global level that stop harming the worse-off. On the other hand, assistance cosmopolitans emphasize our duties towards the needy, regardless of any past or present responsibilities that we may also have toward them. Both sides, in sum, focus almost exclusively on what the better-off ought to do to fix global poverty, leaving almost entirely aside the question of what the needy – like the beggar in Rodolfo Gil's picture – may do for themselves to get out of their plight. In this paper I advance an answer to this question which, I believe, is a necessary complement to the perspective where the materially privileged seem also to be the morally anointed to address the plight of the needy. My claim is that, if we accept that there is such a thing as a basic right to subsistence, then we should also accept that, given certain conditions, an agent in need has a right to take and use someone else's resources to get out of his plight. This is what in the old philosophical parlance was called a “right of necessity”; namely, a moral prerogative of every individual to resort to self-help if that was the only way to guarantee his preservation. I propose four inidividually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions: the resources are accessible, the agent is not responsible for her plight, the owner of the resources taken is not in a similar or worse situation of need in the same relevant respect, and it is a last resort. Although this right is formulated as an exception to the standing laws and moral norms, I conclude by suggesting that there might be more cases than what we think in our world today where it may be legitimately claimed. *Alejandra Mancilla is Post-doctoral Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature (CSMN), University of Oslo. Her research interests are global justice, human rights, rights to land and natural resources, environmental and animal ethics. She recently published the article “Noncivil disobedience and the right of necessity”, in Krisis, Journal for Contemporary Philosophy 2012 (3): 3-15.

Grounding Human Rights: Interests, Justification, Resonance Andrés Carlos Luco*

This essay integrates two accounts of the moral foundations of human rights. It is argued that the resulting resonance account of human rights can solve problems that beset the two accounts it unifies. First, interest-based accounts hold that human rights are moral demands for the protection of certain interests that nearly all human beings share, and that are necessary for nearly any minimally decent life (Griffiths 2008, Nickel 2007, Tasioulas 2007). Second, justificatory accounts hold that human rights are moral demands for the adequate justification of coercive social and political institutions (Forst 2010).

As Allen Buchanan (2012) notes, interest-based accounts of human rights have difficulty offering a rationale for human rights against “soft” discrimination. This is discrimination that does not harm one’s interests so severely that one cannot lead a decent life (e.g., unequal pay for men and women). To correct this, I contend that interest-based accounts of human rights must be augmented by a principle of impartiality which demands similar respect for the similar interests of persons, regardless of one’s social identity. On the other hand, I argue that justificatory accounts of human rights cannot do without a concept of human interests; otherwise, such accounts could not ground human rights against grossly injurious forms of discrimination that do threaten the possibility of a decent life. Extreme asymmetries in power and status have been coherently—if not adequately—justified in terms of a functioning division of responsibility to family and society. For example, in communities which condone the killing of women in the name of honor, women are regarded as carriers of family honor. If that honor is compromised, it is the responsibility of men to recover it, while it is the responsibility of women to accept the rule of men—and, if the men deem it necessary, to die. If justifications of coercive social and political institutions are to be adequate, they must recognize that the similar interests of persons are worthy of similar respect and protection. Accordingly, women’s interests in their lives should not be viewed as an expendable resource for preserving family honor, if men’s interests in their lives are not viewed as such. The result of the foregoing synthesis between interest-based and justificatory accounts of human rights is called the resonance account. That name highlights another virtue of the account: namely, the idea that similar interests of persons deserve similar concern and protection resonates with ideas of human dignity shared in cultures around the world (Schmitz & Sikkink 2002, 2013; Simmons 2009). Consequently, this idea plays a powerful role in shaping international political practice (Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink 2013). Since the politics of human rights are conducted heavily through discourse, persuasion, and socialization, an adequate account of the moral foundation of human rights should contribute to the global diffusion of human rights norms. The resonance account meets this criterion by serving as an effective norm of global public reason. *Andrés Carlos Luco is Assistant Professor at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. His research interests are meta-ethics, moral psychology, normative ethics and political philosophy.

Lives Rendered Invisible: The Downsides of Realizing Human Rights Awareness through Social Media

Mladjo Ivanovic* Over the past 60 years, we have seen how the concept of human rights has evolved from within an abstract philosophical discourse to the dominant moral language of our time. But despite its apparent moral force and extraordinary proliferation through diverse resolutions, declarations and conventions, there is a sense of tacit resignation not only because the codification and enforcement of these rights are usually motivated by events of devastating human brutality and suffering, but also because mere institutional ratification doesn’t provide much protection to the ones who need it the most. Taking into account that most encounters between human rights abuses and Western audiences (who can provide direct relief) occur through portrayals in media, one can ask a disheartened question: to what extent does public acknowledgment of mass atrocities lead to an improved respect and sustained commitment to the protection of human rights and humanity as a

whole? Since the grounds for dissatisfaction with the current status of human rights and humanitarian aid can be found in an asymmetry between the complexity of the phenomena that they aim to address and an increasingly indifferent public towards distant human suffering, one should acknowledge at the outset that an aim towards a successful conception of human rights culture must redefine the nature and range of responsibilities (and harms) that would at least reveal structural and symbolic obstacles for their concrete acknowledgment, implementation and protection. In order to address this problem, this paper has three principal aims. First, it challenges one of the central tenets of human rights advocacy, namely, the belief that exposure to images and stories of human rights abuses lead to direct activism that would stop such abuses. This widespread conviction that the awareness of gross violations of human rights has a mobilizing effect on an audience seems almost commonsensical, and yet as a number of past mass atrocities have made clear, a stable relation between public representation of human suffering and political action does not always exist. Second, in order to rethink the relation between individual and collective responsibilities when confronted with systematic injustices (a relation established through individual participation/omission in collectively generated harms), the paper suggests that an analysis of specific historical social and cultural practices will not only have to tell us how social processes of subject-formation shape individual agency, but also reveal the contexts under which human deprivation fails to be acknowledged as a moral injury. Finally, the paper suggests how it may be possible to overcome social processes that further cultivate and maintain a desensitized/detached agency, and motivate the public body to acknowledge and meet their obligations. Taking into account that indifference and patterns of exclusion feed on cross-cultural and historical contingencies, a better understanding of these complex connections will help to uncover the network of intentions that guides atrocities, and to clarify the unevenly shared responsibilities of those who cause these events (as well as those who witness or benefit from them). *Mladjo Ivanovic is presently a doctoral student of philosophy at Michigan State University. As a scholar, his research interests are in Social and Political Theory with a particular emphasis on the intersections of Critical Social Theory, Sociocultural Anthropology and Global Justice discourse. A native of Bosnia, Ivanovic’s work is often motivated by the conflicts surrounding the demise of former Yugoslavia, as such experiences help him to bring the concepts of human rights, violence, responsibility and justice into vivid reality. He has presented papers at a number of academic conferences both in the United States and abroad. Additionally, he has been a central figure in designing a new online certificate program for international professionals that deals with issues tied to Global Justice, and has been key in developing a successful proposal to host an NEH seminar on development ethics at MSU in the summer of 2013. Ivanovic’s dissertation project deals with the relationship between public representation, dehumanization, responsibility, and possible ways of social transformation. He recently published the article “Medusa’s Gaze and the Other: Prosthetics and Aesthetics of Social Exclusion” in The Horizons of Otherness ed. Nika Skof, Gornja Radgona: Apriori, 2012.

What concessions toward political feasibility can an ethically justifiable intellectual property regime make?

Cristian Timmerman* A wide range of proposals to alleviate the negative effects of intellectual property (IP) regimes is currently under discussion. In some of them a radical restructure of the way innovations are incentivized is plead for. Many groups however have taken the task of drafting proposals that make wide concessions in order to be politically feasible – Thomas Pogge’s Health Impact Fund a well-known and heavily criticized example. While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights clearly states that human rights should be secured progressively and not independently, some objects secured by human rights are more willingly given up than others. Lowering the global disease burden is a priority target in most of the proposals currently under discussion, while other fundamental interests, like the right to participate in the advancement of science and a democratic establishment of research agendas are often seen as targets that can be set aside. As a consequence, contributive justice and the right to self--‐determination are suddenly undermined and perceived as an impediment to secure wider access to essential medicines. Intellectual property can conflict with human rights in multiple ways. However patent holders have considerable liberty in how to license out their inventions; responsible licensing behaviour can reduce harm significantly. Despite this, some conflicts are unavoidable, especially when there are no alternatives to an invention, or when people are dependent on the research output and postponed access has a catastrophic result. Economic incentives are often at odds with a more democratic drafting of research agendas or generally with keeping scientific enterprises more open. After identifying the different concessions five major proposals to alleviate the negative effects of IP make, I will describe the main arguments made to support such a decision. Here it becomes important to distinguish between the different ways a human right is violated, ignored or demoted. While some parties would only consider deliberate interventions to qualify as a human rights violation, other groups aim at eliminating any impediments for people to enjoy the freedoms guaranteed by human rights law. Restraints that discourage people to enjoy some rights due to high avertable risks or simply just demotivate in pursuing certain freedoms due to the excessive undeserved advantage others enjoy, should according to the latter be removed. To finalize, having shown which rights those concessions violate, I will assess them according to three different criteria: basic needs, the human rights framework and the rights of future generations. * Cristian Timmermann received his Magister Artium degree at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munich. He joined the Applied Philosophy Group at Wageningen University in September 2009. Since then he has been working on his dissertation titled “Life Sciences, Intellectual Property Regimes and Global Justice” which is expected to be submitted by July 2013. He is also a researcher at the Dutch Centre for Society and the Life Sciences situated at the Radboud University in Nijmegen, a member of the Dutch Research School in Practical Philosophy (OZSE), and since December 2011 also part of the PhD student council. Part of his research was undertaken as a visiting scholar at the University of Manchester and the Fondation Brocher in Geneva. Timmermann, Cristian (2013), Sharing in or benefiting from scientific advancement? Science And Engineering Ethics, doi:10.1007/s11948-013-9438-3. Short break – 15 min

John Rawls’ the Law of Peoples – is his account of human rights informed by practice?

Grethe Netland* John Rawls’ the Law of Peoples (1999) is first and foremost meant as a guideline for the foreign policy of liberal democracies. More broadly, it also represents Rawls’ thoughts on how “reasonable citizens and peoples might live together peacefully in a just world”, and is as such a contribution to theories of global justice. The grounding building block in Rawls’ theory is 8 principles of justice that a society must support in order to qualify as either liberal or decent. All liberal and decent societies are, in Rawls’ theory, members of the Society of (well-ordered) Peoples. One of the goals of Rawls’ theory is that more and more peoples gradually qualify for membership, and the more peoples that qualify, the more just the world will become. One of the 8 principles is “to honor human rights”. As a grounding principle, the honoring of human rights is an important aspect of the Law of Peoples, and ‘human rights’ is a recurrent topic in Rawls’ theory. Rawls’ account of human rights is, however, substantially criticized. The critics typically claim that Rawls ascribes to the human rights a much too narrow role and that his list of human rights is too short. Much of this criticism is expressed on the background of contemporary human rights practice: by comparing the actual role(s) the human rights play internationally and the human rights lists that actually exist, the critics argue that Rawls’ human rights account is much too defensive. They criticize Rawls for not taking practice into consideration, and thus, they seem to mean, that his theory would have been strengthened if he had done so. James Nickel is a representative for these critics. Nickel argues that contemporary human rights practice is theoretically interesting. Thus, he thinks that Rawls’ account of human rights misses important aspects by not taking practice into consideration. Nickel’s point of departure for his criticism is that Rawls treats the question of ‘honoring the human rights’ as a matter of either/or. Nickel contests this dichotomy by arguing that much goes on in the middle space between honoring and not honoring the human rights. His point is that, since many societies have a mixed human rights record, it is not always possible to place them as either compliant to or non-compliant to human rights. And thus, it is not plausible to say (as he thinks Rawls does) that membership in the Society of Peoples is dependent on an either/or approach to the honoring of human rights. I shall discuss Nickel’s criticism, asking in particular (1) to which extent he is right in claiming that Rawls does not take contemporary human rights practice into consideration (2) to which extent a stronger focus on practice would have strengthened Rawls’ theory. My working hypothesis’ is that (1) even if Rawls did not write a theory with contemporary human rights practice as a starting point, there is more practice in LoP than Nickel believes there is (2) Rawls’ theory would have been strengthened if he had been more explicit about its relation to human rights practice. *Grethe Netland is PhD student in Philosophy at Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Art and Ideas, University of Ideas, University of Oslo, Norway.

Global justice, human rights, and democratic legitimation Kjersti Fjørtoft’*

The Law of Peoples by John Rawls is an extension of a liberal conception of justice developed for democratic societies to a society of peoples. A main goal for such an extension is to specify how far liberal peoples should go in order to tolerate non-liberal peoples. Liberal peoples should tolerate that non-liberal, but decent peoples, organize their politics and laws in a way that are not in line with traditional democratic thought and do not respect a the full list of human rights. However, respect for basic human rights is a condition for being a part of the society of peoples, but his list of human rights is quite restricted. In order not to be consistent with the liberal principles of legitimacy, Rawls suggests that international cooperation should rely on principles of justice not derived from the liberal concept of person, or a particular theory of human nature. The subject for justice in Rawls theory of international justice is peoples, not persons. Peoples are not required to ascribe equal right to political participation to all citizens. Nor are they required to promote gender equality and freedom from discrimination on the basis of ethnicity and social class. Individuals are neither secured basic social rights as health, education, free choice of employment, nor are they secured decent housing and nutrition condition. The primarily function of the narrow list of human rights is to justify rules of intervention and to establish and preserve stable relations on an international level. Human rights are given an instrumental function aimed at protecting stability, rather that ensuring people basic political rights, social welfare and moral equality. In this paper I argue that Rawls’ attempt to justify a concept of justice in the concept of peoples, not persons, results in a conception of human rights that will suffer from a deficit of justice. I also argue that it is possible to justify a conception of human rights in basic human needs or interests without being inconsistent with the liberal principles of legitimacy. *Associate Professor Kjersti Fjørtoft is the head of the research group "Pluralism, Democracy, and Justice" and the head of the project awarded in 2010 by the Norwegian Council, "Justice in Conflict". She wrote her PhD on The relationship between the political and non-political in Rawls’ political liberalism. Fjørtoft is particularly interested in political liberalism, theories of justice, justice and gender, human rights, global justice and question concerning democracy and equality. She has published articles on political liberalism, the capabilities approach, recognition and redistribution and the relationship between gender, ethic of care and ethic of justice. 16h30-17h: Coffee break 17h-18h: 9th Session: Climate Change Justice Chair: Tomasz Jarymowicz

Moral Duties and Climate Change Espen Gamlund*

In this paper I discuss what moral duties, if any, climate change gives rise to. The standard approach among philosophers is to argue that our duties with regard to climate change must be negative: duties to refrain from those activities that cause climate change to happen, that is, activities that

produce greenhouse gas emissions. While I agree that climate change primarily gives rise to negative duties, I believe that the standard approach fails to address the issue of what kind of duties they are. This is important because it is necessary to determine with some precision what demands morality can reasonably place on us when it comes to climate change. Regarding this point, I will defend the position that our duties with respect to reducing climate change should be regarded as imperfect. I argue that my account of negative imperfect duties affords a way of mitigating the moral demands of climate change while at the same time recognizing the duty as binding in the sense that we cannot escape it just by appealing to ends or priorities of our own. *Espen Gamlund is associate professor of philosophy at the University of Bergen. He obtained his PhD from University of Oslo in 2009, with a thesis on the ethics of forgiveness. His research interests are in ethics and political philosophy, with a special focus on issues in applied ethics. Gamlund is currently involved in a research project on priorities in global health. He has published papers on forgiveness, Spinoza and environmental ethics.

Climate Change denial and the Freedom of Speech Trygve Lavik*

The claim I defend in this talk is: Society should put restrictions on the 'climate change denial’ industry's right to free speech. The central arguments are: (1) The contribution from the denial industry to the public debate is not useful to mankind, and (2) the public debate on climate scepticism, as induced by the denial industry, brings harm to others. Arguments supporting 1: The overall strategy of the climate change denialists is to produce doubt, hence utterances are not useful to mankind. Mill defends free speech as the best means for producing more truth; it is declared useful because he thinks it increases the sum of justified beliefs. I claim that the opposite is the case in the current climate debate, so my argument is a millian, utilitarian one. Against this one might argue: Mill claims that silencing an untrue utterance is like robbing from mankind the possibility to challenge, reconsider, and perhaps reaffirm our true views. On the other hand: Mill claims that, although we should allow utterances which turn out to be false, we should only accept utterances which are sincerely meant. I think there is good reason to doubt the sincerity of the denial industry. When argumentation succeeds in proving a climate denialist’s claim to be false, climate denialists do not respect “the unforced force of the better argument”. Climate change denialists merely reiterate their false claims whenever the chance arises. The result of this activity for the public is not “clearer perception and livelier impressions of truth”, but instead doubt and distrust. Moreover, Mill defines utility as “grounded on the permanent interests of a man as a progressive being”. This is not compatible with the nature of denialism, which has been defined as “the automatic gainsaying of a claim regardless of the evidence for it”. Argument supporting 2: The public debate on climate change, as induced by the denial industry, postpones necessary political action. Thus the debate itself bring harm others, notably people in developing countries and future generations. Against this one might argue: Mill claims that opinions “simply circulated through the press” cannot harm other people. Only utterances which directly provoke violence in a heated atmosphere should be prohibited. I argue that the exceptional nature of the climate crisis can be more characterized as a heated situation in which certain utterances may lead to massive harm to others, than as a civilized debate in the press over regular issues such as Darwinism, abortion rights and the death penalty.

* Trygve Lavik is Associate professor at the Department of Philosophy, University of Bergen, Norway. He received a PhD degree from the University of Tromsø (2001). His research interests are theory of knowledge, political philosophy and environmental ethics. 19h30 – Conference Dinner at Clarion Hotel*

Day 4: 22 June 2013 9h-10h: 10th Session: Linguistic Justice Chair: Stephen Wolfe

Human Dignity and Human Rights: Better Apart? Manuel Toscano*

Regarded as a revered platitude for years, human dignity has been placed under philosophical scrutiny nowadays. While much of the controversy about the meaning and uses of the concept was launched in bioethics, discussions have reached the role of dignity in human rights talk. Human dignity is commonly understood as the cornerstone of human rights. So, according to the framers of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), human dignity was meant to explain why human rights have rights and international human rights legal instruments solemnly declare that human rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person. However, there are reasons to call into question if human dignity can serve as the ground of human rights. So, Schroeder (2011) argues that the two notions are better separated because human dignity aggravates, instead of solving, the justification problem for human rights. In the presentation I will look into some arguments for revising the close relationship between human dignity and human rights. *Manuel Toscano is Professor of Ethics and Political Philosophy at the University of Malaga, Spain.

Linguistic Territorial Regimes: The Right Answer to the Wrong Question

Maren Behrensen* My paper takes its starting point from Philippe van Parijs’ account of linguistic justice, most recently elaborated in his eponymous book, published in 2011. I argue that while van Parijs’ account does imply a right to linguistic secession—establishing a linguistic territoriality regime (LTR) within a different LTR or a plurilingual state—he fails to spell out the ethical and political consequences of this right. Philosophical accounts of the right to secede are commonly divided into just-cause theories and primary-right theories. This gives us three different ways to understand a right to linguistic secession, all of which are hinted at in van Parijs’ work: (1) All linguistic communities have a primary right to establish an LTR. The exercise of this right requires a democratic majority who wishes for an LTR, and it is contingent on the ability of the linguistic community to shoulder the costs of establishing an LTR: linguistic communities who can’t shoulder these costs have no claim to receive external support. (2)

All non-anglophone linguistic communities have just cause to establish an LTR in order to resist the spread of English as a global lingua franca. (3) Some linguistic communities have just cause to establish an LTR in order to resist and reverse the influence of a national language or the language of a former colonial oppressor, where speakers of the repressed language have suffered serious disadvantages and punishment for using their language. Only 2) is spelled out in detail by van Parijs; the alleged injustice of the global spread of English is in fact his main concern. I argue that this spread does not constitute an injustice, and that with regard to existing LTRs—mostly nation-states—van Parijs’ account offers nothing these states haven’t already been doing for decades. With regard to 1), I argue that conceiving linguistic secession as a primary right leads into a dilemma: It is either incompatible with democratic principles or deeply insensitive to historical injustices. The dilemma results from the difficulty of determining whose voices should count when deciding on secession: only those in the linguistic community that wishes to secede, or all of those whose interests might be affected by the secession. I suggest then that 3) is the most plausible normative understanding of linguistic secession, as well as a good descriptive model for understanding actual linguistic secessions, such as that of Québec from Canada, the Baltic States from the Soviet Union, or Catalonia from Spain. It is not without problems, however, and it raises the interesting question of whether immigrant communities might have “just cause” against the existing LTRs they have moved into. *Maren Behrensen is Post-doctoral researcher at the Centrum för tillämpad etik, Linköpings universitet, Sweden. Her research interests are ethics of migration, philosophy of gender and sexuality, social and personal identity. Her paper “Linguistic Secession: An Answer to Which Question?” is currently under review at Philosophy & Public Issues for a special issue on secession. 10h-10h30: Coffee Break 10h30-12h: Keynote speaker: Prof. Philippe Van Parijs (Catholic University of Louvain) – Global Justice and the European Union Chair: Manuel Toscano 12h-13h: Lunch 13h-14h30: Keynote speaker: Professor Thomas Pogge (Yale University): Setting the Post-2015 Agenda Chair: Melina Duarte Final Remarks: Invitation to the PDJ conference 2014: Tomasz Jarymowicz Acknowledgments: Melina Duarte

* Free of charge for all participants presenting a paper or chairing a session at the conference. Listeners and accompanying persons can purchase their meals directly in the restaurant. Lunch at the University will cost around NOK 60 and the dinner at Clarion Hotel will cost around NOK 280. Alcoholic drinks are not included. ** The Cocktail Reception is free of charge for all participants.

Campus Map University of Tromsø

29. Non-experimental Science Building (Teorifagbygget) – is divided into six houses:

House 1. Department of Philosophy, 5th floor. House 2. Mix Kiosk House 3. Library for Law and Psychology House 4. Faculty of Law, HUM: Centre for Sami language technology , Art history House 5. SVF: Institute for Psychology and Institute for Social Anthropology, Visual Cultural Studies, House 6. Auditorium 3. Venue of the conference.

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The Pluralism, Democracy and Justice Research Group was founded in 2010 and consists of both scientific staff and PhD Candidates at the Department of Philosophy at the University of Tromsø. The group members work on issues concerning deliberative democracy, pluralism, cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism, redistributive justice and global justice, the use of public reason, and human rights. The research group is running the project “Justice in Conflict” funded by the Norwegian Research Council (2012-2015) and promotes several workshops and conferences focusing on justice in global contexts. PDJ wishes to thank all keynote speakers, chairs of sessions, collaborators and all participants in the conference. We hope to meet you again in 2014 at the next conference which will be on Free speech, Public Deliberation, and Global Affairs. Confirmed keynote speakers for 2014 are Prof. Carol Gould, Prof. David Held, Prof. Chirstian Røsboll, and the PDJ member, Prof. Andreas Føllesdal.

www.uit.no/pdj

Collaborators: Espen Gamlund (University of Bergen) Trygve Lavik (University of Bergen) Tove Pettersen (University of Oslo) Andrew Walton (University of St. Gallen) Manuel Toscano (University of Malaga) Áurea Motta (University of Barcelona) Liège Frainer Barbosa (English Editor)