Topicality - Northwestern 2013 Starter Packet

8/13/2019 Topicality - Northwestern 2013 Starter Packet

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USFG



USFG = three branches

The USFG is the three branches

USAgov No Date http://www.usa.gov/Agencies/federal.shtml

U.S. Federal Government: The three branches of U.S. government—legislative, judicial, and executive—carry outgovernmental power and functions.

The USFG is comprised of the legislative, executive and judiciary branches

USLegal no date http://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty

over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the

legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The

US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all

the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers

assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.



United States=states and territories

United States definition

American Heritage 9 [The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition, updated

2009, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/United+States]United States or United States of America Abbr. U.S. or US or U.S.A. or USA¶ A country of central and northwest North America

with coastlines on the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. It includes the noncontiguous states of Alaska and Hawaii and various

island territories in the Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean. The area now occupied by the contiguous 48 states was originally

inhabited by numerous Native American peoples and was colonized beginning in the 16th century by Spain, France, the Netherlands, and

England. Great Britain eventually controlled most of the Atlantic coast and, after the French and Indian Wars (1754 -1763), the Northwest

Territory and Canada. The original Thirteen Colonies declared their independence from Great Britain in 1776 and formed a government under

the Articles of Confederation in 1781, adopting (1787) a new constitution that went into effect after 1789. The nation soon began to expand

westward. Growing tensions over the issue of Black slavery divided the country along geographic lines, sparking the secession of the South and

the Civil War (1861-1865). The remainder of the 19th century was marked by increased westward expansion, industrialization, and the influx of

millions of immigrants. The United States entered World War II after the Japanese attack (1941) on Pearl Harbor and emerged after the war as

a world power. Washington, D.C., is the capital and New York the largest city. Population: 302,000,000.



Substantial



Substantial Increase – Contextual cards

Doubling engagement in three years is a substantial increase

Indo-US Business 9 [Indo-US Business, bimonthly publication by New Media Communication Pvt. Ltd. and the

Indo-American Chamber of Commerce, “Report: Target $320 bn by 2018: Mission Possible,” May-June 2009,http://www.newmediacomm.com/publication/indo_us/mayjun09/report.html]

This report has been prepared in the context of new governments in both countries and examines the potential of bilateral economic

engagement in the next 10 years.¶ The report says: “Considering that India, a country with a GDP of around $1 trillion, accounts for a mere 1.3 percent of US trade, there is

substantial potential to increase bilateral trade. The two countries should set a target of doubling bilateral trade

every three years, which would mean a trade level of $320 billion by 2018, an eight-time increase over nine years. It is also recommended to set in place a Comprehensive

Economic Cooperation Agreement covering both goods and services.”¶ The report emphasizes that Indo-US economic relations in the next years can attain the following dimensions:¶ •Strategic shift from high-technology trade to frontier technology India and USA can be close partners in expanding knowledge frontiers in science and technology, including space, robotics,

nuclear energy, defense, etc. and their business applications. India can play a key role in signature multi-country projects in space, ocean ography, polar exploration, etc.¶ • R obust trade inmass-market and niche products Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement, including goods, to be set in place to take advantage of complementary competitiveness. Set a target of

$320 billion in ten years, with robust bilateral investments leading the way for high volume turnover. Quality and safety would be the basis for exchange.¶ • High interface in services tradeStrong bilateral engagement across diverse services sectors. This would involve significant liberalization of the Indian services economy on the one hand, and easy movement of personnel

across borders on the other.¶ • Preferred investment destinations Scale up mutual investments massively. An investment treaty should be rapidly negotiated. US investors should have a

leading role in the economic transformation of India. US companies can emerge as key partners for Indian business.¶ • Building infrastructure in India India needs over $475 billion in

investments over the next five years to sustain a high growth rate of 8-9 percent. The US private sector can find a big opportunity in the next decade in India's need for capacity building in

infrastructure. Collaboration in this regard would prove to be a mutually beneficial partnership.¶ • Collaboration on clean energy and climate change India's rapid development makes it one of

the fastest-growing energy users and carbon emitters. US is the largest energy user and highest carbon emitter after China. Both countries can collaborate closely on energy security,

emissions, efficiency, and renewable energy as well as on global discussions on mitigating climate change.¶ • Collaboration in healthcare: US and India to collaborate in making healthcare

more affordable and accessible worldwide. Healthcare market in India was nearly at $ 38 billion in 2007, expected to grow at 15 percent per annum to reach $ 79 billion by 2012. Tremendous

opportunities can be found in providing healthcare services, building healthcare infrastructure and developing related technologies.¶ • Seamless cross-continental cooperation in knowledge

economy sectors India and the US to be anchors for global interaction in sectors such as biotechnology, nanotechnology, drug development, renewable energy, green products, etc. R&D,

innovation, and academic collaborations to be close and continuous, rooted in strong IP protection.¶ • Strong cooperation in education and academia Participation in each other's higher

education and research sectors. Centers of educational excellence should open campuses in the other country to offer students the best of education in their place of residence. This would

also enable high-level continuous exchange of professors, researchers and academics, and cross-cultural educational interchange.¶ • It is crucial to enga ge the private sectors of both countries

in a strong partnership at all enterprise and sector levels. Governments can guide and aid private sector partnerships.¶ Though India-US economic relations have moved into a new phase of

intensive interaction since 2000, the recent Indo-US nuclear agreement can act as a springboard for a new trajectory of bilateral economic engagement.¶ Global Economic Crisis &

Opportunities¶ The global economic crisis, which has hit the US hard, creates a new opportunity for both sides to not only leverage each other's advantages, but also provide mutually support.

While the US seeks markets for its industry products, India needs technology and expertise for faster development and global integration. In the medium term, protectionist measures must be

avoided. Over the longer term of 10 years, India and the US can become much more significant economic partners.¶ To ensure that the synergies of both countries complement each other,

the governments need to address internal barriers to trade and investment. India needs to undertake pending reforms to open up sectors of interest to US businesses and improve the

investment climate. Similarly, the US must work towards reducing barriers for trade and investments from India and facilitate freer movement of professionals between the countries. The US

must view India as a strategic partner and rank it high in its economic priorities.¶ Following Measures Are Needed:¶ • A Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement to cover goods and

services¶ • A Bilateral Investment Treaty¶ • Opening up of key sectors such as retail and higher education in India to FDI¶ • Freer movement of people under H1-B visa scheme¶ • The privatesectors of both sides must be an integral part of the new engagement. Industry associations on both sides must take the lead in overcoming the information barrier, building brand relevance,

and forging new business ventures.¶ • Cooperation must shift to interaction between regions, industry sectors, and enterprises of all sizes.¶ Though India has felt the impact of the global

meltdown in terms of falling production and exports, the situation is not alarmingly dire so far due to high savings and investment rates, consistent internal demand, low exports in relation to

GDP, and strong measures to counteract the crisis. Recovery in India is expected to be faster and steeper than the global norm.¶ In the US, mitigation and containment is the immediate

urgency. Indicators are expected to show positive signs from the third quarter of 2009. A crisis of demand, following on the heels of financial and confidence seizure, will be the key factor to be

resolved, going forward. Within this scenario, US companies may consider it profitable to examine opportunities in India's infrastructure and consumer durables sectors.¶ It is important that

the US and India do not indulge in protectionist measures and lower each other's market access. Proposals that limit H1-B visas, create non-tariff barriers to trade, mandate use of local

products, etc should not dominate for a protracted period. Business should be left unfettered to re-energize respective economies.¶ It may be reiterated that substantial

increase in economic engagement would require intensive policy measures on both sides. More particularly, India would

need to progress much faster on overall trade and economic liberalization and reforms to facilitate greater participation of overseas businesses in its economy. Areas that need to be

addressed include agriculture, infrastructure, direct and indirect taxes, investment facilitation, administrative procedures, financial sector, services including retail trade, mining, etc

China substantially increased economic engagement with Africa

GAO 13 *“Sub-Saharan Africa: Trends in U.S. and Chinese Economic Engagement,” Feb 7 2013,

http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/652045.txt]China ’ s economic ties with sub - Saharan Africa, including its rapidly rising trade and investment in the region, have drawn global attention.

While U.S. trade with the region has also increased, the United States has generally focused on providing development and humanitarian

assistance to African countries, directing more than a quarter of its foreign economic assistance to the region in 2010. Since 2001, China

has substantially increased its economic engagement with sub - Saharan African coun tries, with strong growth

in both imports and exports. According to some observers, China ’ s foreign assistance and investments throughout Africa

since that time have been driven in part by the Chinese government ’ s desire to obtain a share in Africa ’ s natural

resources as well as by its interest in establishing diplomatic relations with countries in the region. V arious U.S. officials and members of the

U.S. business community have questioned whether China ’ s role in the region is affecting U.S. interests and opportunities for U.S. firms in sub -

Saharan Africa.

Means a fifteen-fold increase in ten years is substantial…

GAO 13 *“Sub-Saharan Africa: Trends in U.S. and Chinese Economic Engagement,” Feb 7 2013,

http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/652045.txt]



U.S. and Chinese Trade in Goods with Sub-Saharan Africa Increased from 2001 to 2011: ¶ China overtook the United States as sub-Saharan

Africa's largest trading partner in 2009. The United States' and China's total trade in goods with sub-Saharan Africa increased each year from

2001 through 2011, except in 2009 when total trade declined during the global economic crisis (see figure 3).[Footnote 42] During that year,

China's trade declined by less than the United States', and China overtook the United States as sub-Saharan Africa's largest trading partner. For

the United States, growth in imports accounted for 80 percent of growth in total trade from 2001 through 2011; for China, growth in imports

accounted for 56 percent of growth in total trade for the same period. China's exports overtook U.S. exports in 2003, with the value of China's

exports almost triple the level of U.S. exports in 2011. ¶ Figure 3: U.S. and Chinese Total Trade, Imports, and Exports of Goods to Sub-Saharan

Africa, 2001-2011: ¶ [Refer to PDF for image: 3 multiple line graphs] ¶ Total trade in goods: ¶ Year: 2001; ¶ United States: $29.1 billion; ¶

China: $8.6 billion. ¶ Year: 2002; ¶ United States: $24.7 billion; ¶ China: $9.8 billion. ¶ Year: 2003; ¶ United States: $33.6 billion; ¶ China:

$15.1 billion. ¶ Year: 2004; ¶ United States: $46.1 billion; ¶ China: $24.0 billion. ¶ Year: 2005; ¶ United States: $62.4 billion; ¶ China: $32.2 billion.

¶ Year: 2006; ¶ United States: $73.2 billion; ¶ China: $44.9 billion. ¶ Year: 2007; ¶ United States: $83.4 billion; ¶ China: $59.0 billion. ¶ Year: 2008;

¶ United States: $106.7 billion; ¶ China: $86.8 billion. ¶ Year: 2009; ¶ United States: $63.1 billion; ¶ China: $70.6 billion. ¶ Year: 2010; ¶ United

States: $83.3 billion; ¶ China: $100.7 billion. ¶ Year: 2011; ¶ United States: $96.0 billion; ¶ China: $127.4 billion.



Increase



Must be pre-existing

Only pre-existing policies can be increased

Buckley et al, 06 - attorney (Jeremiah, Amicus Curiae Brief, Safeco Ins. Co. of America et al v. Charles Burr et al,

http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/06-84/06-84.mer.ami.mica.pdf )First, the court said that the ordinary meaning of the word “increase” is “to make something greater,” which it believed shou ld not “be limited to cases in which acompany raises the rate that an individual has previously been charged.” 435 F.3d at 1091. Yet the definition offered by the Ninth Circuit compels the opposite

conclusion. Because “increase” means “to make something greater,” there must necessarily havebeen an existing

premium, to which Edo’s actual premium may be compared, to determine whether an “increase” occurred. Congress could have provided

that “ad-verse action” in the insurance context means charging an amount greater than the optimal premium, but instead chose to define adverse action in terms of

an “increase.” That def -initional choice must be respected, not ignored. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392-93 n.10 (1979) (“*a+ defin-ition which declares

what a term ‘means’ . . . excludes any meaning that is not stated”).Next, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that because the Insurance Prong includes the words “existing or applied for,” Congress inte nded that an “increase in any charge”for insurance must “apply to all insurance transactions – from an initial policy of insurance to a renewal of a long-held policy.” 435 F.3d at 1091. This interpretationreads the words “exist-ing or applied for” in isolation. Other types of adverse action described in the Insurance Prong apply only to situa tions where a consumer

had an existing policy of insurance, such as a “cancellation,” “reduction,” or “change” in insurance. Each of these forms of adverse action presupposes an already-

existing policy, and under usual canons of statutory construction the term “increase” also should be construed to apply to

increases of an already-existing policy. See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (“a phrase gathers meaning from the words around it”) (citation

omitted).



Need not be pre-existing

Increase does not require a pre-existing amount

Reinhardt 5 – U.S. Judge for the UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT (Stephen, JASON

RAY REYNOLDS; MATTHEW RAUSCH, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.;HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants-Appellees., lexis)Specifically, we must decide whether charging a higher price for initial insurance than the insured would otherwise have been charged because

of information in a consumer credit report constitutes an "increase in any charge" within the meaning of FCRA. First, we examine the

definitions of "increase" and "charge." Hartford Fire contends that, limited to their ordinary definitions, these words apply only when a

consumer has previously been charged for insurance and that charge has thereafter been increased by the insurer. The phrase, "has previously

been charged," as used by Hartford, refers not only to a rate that the consumer has previously paid for insurance but also to a rate that the

consumer has previously been quoted, even if that rate was increased [**23] before the consumer made any payment. Reynolds disagrees,

asserting that, under [*1091] the ordinary definition of the term, an increase in a charge also occurs whenever an

insurer charges a higher rate than it would otherwise have charged because of any factor--such as adverse credit

information, age, or driving record 8 --regardless of whether the customer was previously charged some other rate.According to Reynolds, he was charged an increased rate because of his credit rating when he was compelled to pay a rate higher than the

premium rate because he failed to obtain a high insurance score. Thus, he argues, the definitions of "increase" and "charge" encompass the

insurance companies' practice. Reynolds is correct.

“Increase" means to make something greater. See, e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) ("The action, process, or fact

of becoming or making greater; augmentation, growth, enlargement, extension."); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN

ENGLISH (3d college ed. 1988) (defining "increase" as "growth, enlargement, etc[.]"). "Charge" means the price demanded for goods or services.

See, e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) ("The price required or demanded for service rendered, or (less usually) for goods

supplied."); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH (3d college ed. 1988) ("The cost or price of an article, service, etc.").

Nothing in the definition of these words implies that the term "increase in any charge for" should be limited to cases in which

a company raises the rate that an individual has previously been charged .



Requires a net increase

The plan must increase engagement relative to the status quo

Rogers 5 Judge, STATE OF NEW YORK, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

RESPONDENT, NSR MANUFACTURERS ROUNDTABLE, ET AL., INTERVENORS, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 12378, **; 60 ERC(BNA) 1791, 6/24, lexis[**48] Statutory Interpretation. HN16While the CAA defines a "modification" as any physical or operational change that "increases" emissions,

it is silent on how to calculate such "increases" in emissions. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4). According to government petitioners, the lack of a statutory

definition does not render the term "increases" ambiguous, but merely compels the court to give the term its "ordinary meaning." See Engine

Mfrs.Ass'nv.S.Coast AirQualityMgmt.Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 124 S. Ct. 1756, 1761, 158 L. Ed. 2d 529(2004); Bluewater Network, 370 F.3d at 13; Am.

Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Glickman, 342 U.S. App. D.C. 7, 215 F.3d 7, 10 [*23] (D.C. Cir. 2000). Relying on two "real world" analogies,

government petitioners contend that the ordinary meaning of "increases" requires the baseline to be calculated from a

period immediately preceding the change. They maintain, for example, that in determining whether a high-pressure weather system

"increases" the local temperature, the relevant baseline is the temperature immediately preceding the arrival of the weather system, not the

temperature five or ten years ago. Similarly, [**49] in determining whether a new engine "increases" the value of a car, the

relevant baseline is the value of the car immediately preceding the replacement of the engine , not the value of the car

five or ten years ago when the engine was in perfect condition.

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To make greater

Increase means to make larger or greater

Cambridge Dictionary, 8 (“increase”, 2008,

http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=increase*1+0&dict=A)to become or make (something) larger or greater ¶ The opposite of increase is decrease.

Increase means to make greater

Dictionary.com http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/increase

to make greater, as in number, size, strength, or quality; augment; add to: to increase taxes.



Its



Possessive

“Its” is possessive

American Heritage 9 [The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition, updated

2009, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/its]its (ts)¶ adj. The possessive form of it.¶ Used as a modifier before a noun: The airline canceled its early flight to

New York.



Related to

“Its” means of, belonging to, or associated with

Collins English Dictionary 3 http://www.thefreedictionary.com/its

its [ɪts]¶ determiner¶ a. of, belonging to, or associated in some way with it its left rear wheel

“Its” means of or related to

Merriam Webster no date http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/its

of or relating to it or itself especially as possessor, agent, or object of an action <going to its kennel> <a child proud

of its first drawings> <its final enactment into law>



Engagement



Must provide positive incentives

The distinguishing feature of engagement is the use of positive incentives

Haass 2k [Richard N. Haass, VP and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, PhD from Oxford

University, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies program at Brookings, PhD in Politics from OxfordUniversity, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies,” Survival, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000,http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer%20haass/2000survival.pdf] The term ‘engagement’ was popularised in the early 1980s amid controversy about the Reagan administration’s policy of ‘constr uctive

engagement’ towards South Africa. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. Except in the few instances where the US has

sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably ‘engages’ states and actors all the time simply by interacting with them. To be a

meaningful subject of analysis, the term ‘engagement’ must refer to something more specific than a policy of ‘non-

isolation’. As used in this article, ‘engagement’ refers to a foreign-policy strategy which depends to a significant

degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives. Certainly, it does not preclude the simultaneous use of other

foreign-policy instruments such as sanctions or military force: in practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies,

particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the distinguishing feature of

American engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the

behaviour of countries with which the US has important disagreements.

Engagement implies offering incentives for changes in behaviour

Borer 4 [Dr. Douglas A. Borer, PhD, Visiting Professor of Political Science at the US Army War College, “Problems

of Economic Statecraft: Rethinking Engagement,” Chapter 12, U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security

Policy and Strategy, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/strategy2004/12borer.pdf]

Visiting Professor of Political Science, Department of National Security and Strategy, US Army War College

The policy of engagement refers to the use of non-coercive means, or positive incentives, by one state to alter the

elements of another state’s behavior. As such, some scholars have categorized engagement as a form of appeasement. 21 However, I concur with

the view articulated by Randall Schweller that, while engagement can be classified in generic terms as a form of appeasement, an important qualitative difference

exists between the two: “Engagement is more than appeasement,” he says:¶ It encompasses any attempt to socialize the dissatisfied power into acceptance of the

established order. In practice engagement may be distinguished from other policies not so much by its goals but by its

means: it relies on the promise of rewards rather than the threat of punishment to influence the target’s behavior. . . . The

policy succeeds if such concessions convert the revolutionary state into a s tatus quo power with a stake in the stability of the system. . . . Engagement is

most likely to succeed when the established powers are strong enough to mix concessions with credible threats, to use sticks

as well as carrots. . . . Otherwise, concessions will signal weakness that emboldens the aggressor to demand more. 22



Economic Engagement



Expansion of economic ties

Economic engagement is the expansion of economic ties with an adversary – it

includes conditional and unconditional policies

Kahler 6 [Miles Kahler, Rohr Professor of Pacific International Relations at the UC San Diego Graduate School ofInternational Relations and Pacific Studies, PhD in Government from Harvard, and Scott Kastner, Assistant

Professor of IR at the University of Maryland, PhD in Political Science from UC San Diego, “Strategic Uses of

Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait,” Journalof Peace Research, September 2006 vol. 43 no. 5 523-541]

Economic engagement—a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the

behavior of the target state and effect an improvement in bilateral political relations—is the subject of growing, but still

limited, interest in the international relations literature. The bulk of the work on economic statecraft continues to focus on

coercive policies such as economic sanctions. The emphasis on negative forms of economic statecraft is not

without justification: the use of economic sanctions is widespread and well-documented, and several quantitative studies have shown that

adversarial relations between countries tend to correspond to reduced, rather than enhanced, levels of trade (Gowa 1994; Pollins 1989). At the

same time, however, relatively little is known about how widespread strategies of economic engagement actually are: scholars disagree on this

point, in part because no database cataloging instances of positive economic statecraft exists (Mastanduno 2003). Furthermore, beginning with

the classic work of Hirschman (1945), most studies in this regard have focused on policies adopted by great powers. But engagement policiesadopted by South Korea and the other two states examined in this study, Singapore and Taiwan, demonstrate that engagement is not a

strategy limited to the domain of great power politics; instead, it may be more widespread than previously recognized.¶ We begin by

developing a theoretical framework through which to examine strategies of economic engagement. Drawing from the existing literature, our

framework distinguishes between different forms of economic engagement, and outlines the factors likely to facilitate or undermine the

implementation of these different strategies. With this framework as a guide, we then examine the strategic use of economic

interdependence—focusing in particular on economic engagement—in three East Asian States: South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. We use

these case studies to draw conclusions about the underlying factors that facilitate the use of a strategy of economic engagement, that

determine the particular type of engagement strategy used, and that help to predict the likelihood of success. Because our conclusions are

primarily derived inductively from a small number of cases, we are cautious in making claims of generalizability. Nonetheless, it is our hope that

the narratives we provide and the conclusions that we draw from them will help to spur further research into this interesting yet under-studied

subject.¶ ECONOMIC ENGAGMENT: STRATEGIES AND EXPECTATIONS¶ Scholars have usefully distinguished between two types of

economic engagement: conditional policies that require an explicit quid-pro-quo on the part of the target country,

and policies that are unconditional. Conditional policies, sometimes called “linkage” or economic “carrots,” are the

inverse of economic sanctions. Instead of threatening a target country with a sanction absent a change in policy,

conditional engagement policies promise increased economic flows in exchange for policy change. Drezner’s

(1999/2000) analysis of conditional economic inducements yields a set of highly plausible expectations concerning when conditional strategies

are likely to be employed, and when they are likely to succeed. Specifically, he suggests that reasons exist to believe, a priori, that policies of

conditional engagement will be less prevalent than economic sanctions. First, economic coercion is costly if it fails (sanctions are only carried

out if the target country fails to change policy), while conditional engagement is costly if it succeeds (economic payoffs are delivered only if the

target country does change policy). Second, states may be reluctant to offer economic inducements with adversaries with whom they expect

long-term conflict, as this may undermine their resolve in the eyes of their opponent while also making the opponent stronger. Third, the

potential for market failure in an anarchic international setting looms large: both the initiating and the target states must be capable of making

a credible commitment to uphold their end of the bargain. These factors lead Drezner to hypothesize that the use of economic carrots is most

likely to occur and succeed between democracies (because democracies are better able to make credible commitments than non-democracies),

within the context of international regimes (because such regimes reduce the transactions costs of market exchange), and, among adversaries,

only after coercive threats are first used.¶ Unconditional engagement strategies are more passive in that they do not

include a specific quid-pro-quo. Rather, countries deploy economic links with an adversary in the hopes that

economic interdependence itself will, over time, effect change in the target’s foreign policy behavior and yield a

reduced threat of military conflict at the bilateral level. How increased commercial and/or financial integration at the bilaterallevel might yield an improved bilateral political environment is not obvious. While most empirical studies on the subject find that increased

economic ties tend to be associated with a reduced likelihood of military violence, no consensus exists regarding how such effects are realized.

At a minimum, two causal pathways exist that state leaders might seek to exploit by pursuing a policy of unconditional engagement:

economic interdependence can act as a constraint on the foreign policy behavior of the target state, and economic

interdependence can act as a transforming agent that helps to reshape the goals of the target state.



Includes conditional and unconditional

Economic engagement can be conditional or unconditional

Govindasamy 7 [Dr. Geetha Govindasamy, Senior Lecturer in the Dept of East Asian Studies at the University of Malaya,

PhD from Monash University, “South Korea’s Engagement of North Korea: Policy Consideration and Challenges,”http://portalfsss.um.edu.my/portal/uploadFolder/pdf/JAPAN%20NORTH%20KOREA%20RELATIONS%20FLUCTUATING%20BET

WEEN%20ENGAGEMENT%20AND%20CONTAINMENT.pdf] The basic postulation was that as inter-Korean relations economically strengthen, political relations with North Korea would improve and military tensions would

abate. More importantly, external economic support would aid in bringing economic reconstruction of the North, and in the long term, stimulate political stability

on the Korean Peninsula. In this case, economic engagement refers to the economic assistance provided primarily by South Korea to

the North. Reciprocity was not expected, nor did it play a part in the policy implementation. ¶ The Case for Engagement ¶ In order to

understand why engagement was chosen as a strategy, one has to examine how such a strategy works. The policy of engagement in international relations

refers to using positive incentives by one state to influence the behaviour of another . In practice, implementing

engagement relies heavily on economic incentives in order to promote ties and influence the behaviour of other

states. A successful engagement policy is premised upon the following assumptions: ¶ It encompasses any attempt to socialize the dissatisfied power into

acceptance of the established order. In practice engagement may be distinguished from other policies not so much by its goals

but by its means: it relies on the promise of rewards rather than the threat of punishment to influence

the target’s behaviour…The policy succeeds if such concessions convert the revolutionary state into a status quo power with a stake in the stability of

the system…Engagement is most likely to succeed when the established powers are strong enough to mix concessions with credible threats, to use sticks as well as

carrots…Otherwise, concessions will signal weakness that emboldens the aggressor to demand more.4¶ On the other hand, Keohane and Nye (2000: 10-11) suggest

that economic interdependence should be understood in terms of asymmetrical power. Such interdependence provides sources of i nfluence for all states in their

dealings with others, either to use an issue as a bargaining chip or to affect various other issues. Additionally there exist conditional and

unconditional economic engagements.5 Conditional engagement promises incentives in return for policy

changes. Drezner argues such conditional economic engagements work between adversaries when threats are unsuccessful. Alternatively,

unconditional economic engagement is designed to induce interdependency. It is expected, over time, such a

strategy will culminate in the desired policy in the adversary’s behaviour.



Includes private sector

Economic engagement is government aid, philanthropy, remittances and capital flows

Peterson 12 [Dr. Mark Peterson, PhD, Associate Professor of Marketing at the University of Wyoming,

“Sustainable Enterprise: A Macromarketing Approach,” google books+ Aid in the Context of Total Overseas Economic Engagement¶ Since 1950, support for aid has gone up and down. But since 9/11,

support for aid has surged as governments of developed countries became keen to stabilize the development of poor countries during the fight

against global terrorism (Riddell,, 2007, p. 5). The total aid given by developed country governments to developing countries doubled from $52

billion in 2001 to $100 billion in 2005.¶ But government aid is just one part of the total economic engagement of developed

countries with developing countries. Figure 14.1 depicts private investment, official flows, remittances, and private philanthropy of

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and development (OECD) countries to developing countries from 1999 to 2009 (Hudson Institute,

2011, p. 15). As shown, official flows to developing countries was the top component in overall economic engagement

in 1991, but in 2009, it was only the third-leading element in overall economic engagement at $120 billion. Private investment (foreign

direct investment by firms) topped all elements in 2009 at $228 billion, while remittances (money sent back home from

expatriates working overseas) came in second at $174 billion. Private philanthropy came in fourth at $53 billion in 2009 using the

more complete data of the Hudson Institute’s Center for Global Prosperity (CGP). ¶ The character of economic engagement of developed

countries with developing countries can be better understood by examining the case of the United States. Table 14.3 presents the sources of

net economic engagement with developing countries in 2009. U.S. official development assistance (government flows) for 2009

accounted for 13% of total economic engagement with developing countries. The remaining 87% of economicengagement with developing countries came from private sources. Private philanthropy in all its forms accounted for 17%,

while remittances (going mostly to Latin America) accounted for the largest portion at 40%, followed by private capital flows

at 31%. Behind the increase in private philanthropy was the proliferation and strengthening of NGOs. Notably, giant aid agencies, such as

Save the Children, Oxfam, the Red Cross, CARE, and Catholic Relief Services have budgets in the hundreds of millions of dollars each year

(Riddell, 2007, p. 9).



Must be economic

Economic engagement requires economic incentives – the plan is

political/military/cultural engagement

Haass 2000 [Richard N. Haass, VP and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, PhD fromOxford University, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies program at Brookings, PhD in

Politics from Oxford University, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, pp 4-6, google books]

Architects of engagement strategies have a wide variety of incentives from which to choose. Economic

engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to

technology, loans, and economic aid.12 Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties, whether

they be trade embargoes, investment bans, or high tariffs that have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target

country. In addition, facilitated entry into the global economic arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most potent

incentives in today’s global market.13¶ Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to

regional or international institutions, or the scheduling of summits between leaders—or the termination of these benefits.

Military engagement could involve the extension of International Military Educational Training (IMET) both to strengthen respect for civilian

authority and human rights among a country’s armed forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships between Americans and young foreign military officers.14

These areas of engagement are likely to involve working with state institutions, while cultural or civil society engagement is likely to entail building people -to-people

contacts. Funding nongovernmental organizations, facilitating the flow of remittances, establishing postal and telephonelinks between the United States and the target country, and promoting the exchange of students, tourists, and other nongovernmental people

between the countries are some of the incentives that might be offered under a policy of cultural engagement.



Must be positive/Excludes sanctions

Economic engagement requires carrots, not sticks

Michael Mastanduno, government professor, Dartmouth, 2003, The Strategy of Economic Engagement:

Theory and Practice, in Edward D. Mansfield and Brian M. Pollins, eds, Economic Interdependence andInternational Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate, p. 184-5Much of the attention in political science to the question of i nterdependence and conflict focuses at the systemic level, on arguments and evidence linking the

expansion of economic exchange among states on the one hand to the exacerbation of international conflict or the facilitation of international cooperation on the

other. The approach taken in this chapter focuses instead at the state level, on the expansion of economic interdependence as a tool of state craft. Under what

circumstances does the cultivation of economic ties, that is, the fostering of economic interdependence as a

conscious state strategy, lead to important and predicable changes in the foreign policy behavior of a target state?

Students of economic statecraft refer to this strategy variously as economic engagement, economic inducement, economic

diplomacy, positive sanctions, positive economic linkage, or the use of economic “carrots” instead of sticks. Critics of the strategy call it

economic appeasement.



Must be unconditional

Economic engagement is distinct from offering a quid pro quo

Celik 11 [Arda Can Çelik, graduate M.A in political science and international relations at Uppsala University

Sweden, “Economic sanctions and engagement policies,” http://www.grin.com/en/e-book/175204/economic-sanctions-and-engagement-policies]

Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the target state .

Engagement policies differ from other tools in Economic Diplomacy. They target to deepen the economic relations

to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and f inally seeks economic interdependence. This interdependence

serves the sender state to change the political behaviour of target state. However they cannot be counted as carrots

or inducement tools, they focus on long term strategic goals and they are not restricted with short term policy

changes.(Kahler&Kastner,2006) They can be unconditional and focus on creating greater economic benefits for both

parties. Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting institutionalized mutual trade thus

mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoi d possible militarized and non militarized conflicts.

Secondly it gives a leeway to perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement

policies as follows “’It is a policy of deliberate expanding economic ties with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of

target state and improve bilateral relations’’.(p523-abstact).It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term

economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance(1977)in a way that ‘’the direct andpositive linkage of interests of states where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others in the same direction’’ ¶ Although, much of the

literature focuses on the effectiveness of economic sanctions, economic engagement strategies have rapidly

gained momentum and gathers more and more attention(Kahler&Kastner,2006). Kirshner(2002) states that handful of studies examine the

Hirchmanesque effects of economic relations and engagement policies therefore engagement policies are newly emerging alternative strategies against the

economic sanctions. This literature is a composition of liberal and realist approaches. Liberals underline that Effectiveness of engagement policies are valid and

ascending. On the other hand, Realists criticise the potential of engagement policies and does not give credits to the arguments of engagement strategies.¶ Liberal

Approach ¶ Literature of liberal school points out that economic engagement policies are significantly effective tools for sender and target countries. The

effectiveness leans on mutual economic and political benefits for both parties.(Garzke et al,2001). Ecenomic engagement operates with trade

mechanisms where sender and target country establish intensified trade thus increase the economic interaction

over time. This strategy decreases the potential hostilities and provides mutual gains. Paulson Jr (2008) states that this mechanism is highly

different from carrots (inducements). Carrots work quid pro quo in short terms and for narrow goals. Economic

engagement intends to develop the target country and wants her to be aware of the long term benefits of shared

economic goals. Sender does not want to contain nor prevent the target country with different policies. Conversely; sender works deliberately to improve the

target countries’ Gdp, trade potential, export-import ratios and national income. Sender acts in purpose to reach important goals. First it es tablishes strongeconomic ties because economic integration has the capacity to change the political choices and behaviour of target country. Sender state believes in that economic

linkages have political transformation potential.(Kroll,1993)



EE must be conditional



1NC – EE must be conditional

Economic engagement is a subset of conditional engagement and implies a tit-for-tat

exchange

Shinn 96 [James Shinn, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia at the CFR in New York City and director of the council’smulti-year Asia Project, worked on economic affairs in the East Asia Bureau of the US Dept of State, “Weaving the

Net: Conditional Engagement with China,” pp. 9 and 11, google books+ In sum, conditional engagement consists of a set of objectives, a strategy for attaining those objectives, and tactics(specific policies) for implementing that strategy.

The objectives of conditional engagement are the ten principles, which were selected to preserve American vital interests in Asia

while accommodating China’s emergence as a major power.

The overall strategy of conditional engagement follows two parallel lines: economic engagement, to

promote the integration of China into the global trading and financial systems; and security engagement, to

encourage compliance with the ten principles by diplomatic and military means when economic incentives do not

suffice, in order to hedge against the risk of the emergence of a belligerent China.

The tactics of economic engagement should promote China’s economic integration through negotiations on

trade liberalization, institution building, and educational exchanges. While a carrots-and-sticks approach

may be appropriate within the economic arena, the use of trade sanction to achieve short-term political goals isdiscouraged.

The tactics of security engagement should reduce the risks posed by China’s rapid military expansion, its lack of transparency, the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and transnational problems such as crime and illegal migration, by engaging in arms

control negotiations, multilateral efforts, and a loosely-structured defensive military arrangement in Asia.8

[To footnotes]

8. Conditional engagement’s recommended tactics of tit-for-tat responses are equivalent to using carrots and

sticks in response to foreign policy actions by China. Economic engagement calls for what is described as

symmetric tit-for-tat and security engagement for asymmetric tit-for-tat. A symmetric response is one that counters a move by China in

the same place, time, and manner; an asymmetric response might occur in another place at another time, and perhaps in another manner. A

symmetric tit-for-tat would be for Washington to counter a Chinese tariff of 10 percent on imports for the United States with a tariff of 10

percent on imports from China. An asymmetric tit-for-tat would be for the United States to counter a Chines shipment of missiles to Iran with

an American shipment of F-16s to Vietnam (John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A critical Appraisal of Postwar American National

Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, (1982). This is also cited in Fareed Zakaria, “The Reagan Strategy of Containment,” PoliticalScience Quarterly 105, no. 3 (1990), pp. 383-88).

Vote negative

a) Limits – the embargo means there’s a near-infinite range of “one exception” affs –

conditionality forces the aff to find deals that Cuba would accept

b) Ground – unconditional engagement denies us “say no” and backlash arguments

which are a crucial part of the engagement debate



2NC Limits evidence

There are tons of unilateral measures the US could take

CSG 13 [Cuba Study Group, a non-profit, non-partisan organization, comprised of business and community leaders of Cuban

descent who share a common interest and vision of a free and democratic Cuba, “Restoring Executive Authority Over U.S. Policy Toward Cuba,” Feb 2013, http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=45d8f827-174c-4d43-aa2f-

ef7794831032]4. Additional Steps the U.S. President Can Take to Promote Change in Cuba¶ While we wait for Congress to act, the Executive Branch should

exercise its licensing authority to further safeguard the flow of contacts and resources into the Island, encourage independent economic and

political activity, and further empower the Cuban people. To that end, the Cuba Study Group proposes that the President pursue the following

measures:¶ i) Modify Remittance and Export Limitations: Increase the $3,000 limit on remittances that can be carried to Cuba by

authorized travelers and expand the types of goods that travelers may legally take to Cuba to support micro

entrepreneurs. Fewer limitations in these areas will make it easier for U.S. travelers to provide seed capital and in-kind contributions for

start-ups.¶ ii) Authorize Travel by General License for NGOs and Allow Them to Open Cuban Bank Accounts: Regulations

enacted on January 28, 2011 allow U.S. full- and part-time university staff to travel to Cuba by general license. These regulations also allow U.S.-

based academic institutions to open accounts in Cuban banks with funds to support their educational programs in Cuba. A similar license for

foundations and NGOs whose mission involves support for micro and small businesses would also help support this growing segment of civil

society.¶ iii) Establish New Licenses for the Provision of Services to Cuban Private Entrepreneurs: The President could build on

existing authorizations that allow U.S. persons and institutions to pay individual Cuban scholars musicians and artists for their work. New

licenses could extend to additional groups, such as artisans or farmers, and authorize a greater scope of activities such as recording, publication,

distribution, etc.¶ iv) Authorize Imports of Certain Goods and Services to Businesses and Individuals Engaged in Certifiably

Independent Economic Activity in Cuba: The President could authorize the importation of limited types of Cuban-origin goods and

services under general or specific licenses, particularly when such authorizations could be justified as providing support for the Cuban people or

democratic change in Cuba. For example, the President could authorize imports from private producers or allow U.S. persons to directly engage

and hire Cuban professionals.¶ v) Authorize Export and Sale of Goods and Services to Businesses and Individuals Engaged in

Certifiably Independent Economic Activity in Cuba: Amend existing licensing policy to establish a presumption of approval for specific

items deemed to support the U.S.-stated policy goal of promoting independent economic activity on the Island. Since 2000, legislation has

allowed the export of a broad range of agricultural products and a limited range of medicines and medical devices. This should be expanded to

include other inputs in demand by indepen - dent businesses, including—but not limited to—good such as art supplies, food

preparation equipment, bookkeeping materials, and basic electronic equipment and software required for retail sales and business

administration.¶ vi) Authorize the Sale of Telecommunications Hardware in Cuba : Current U.S. regulations, as amended by the

Obama administration in 2009, allow for donations of some telecommunications equipment, thereby recognizing that these goods by

themselves do not violate the embargo. The next step should be to allow for the sales of those same goods inside the Island. Along with thoseprovisions, changes should also allow for the provision of general travel licenses for research, marketing and sale of those goods.¶ vii)

Authorize the Reestablishment of Ferry Services to Cuba : Current U.S. regulations allow both “aircraft and vessels” to serve Cuba

as an exception to the U.S. embargo against the Island. The use of chartered aircrafts to transport Cuban-Americans and other licensed U.S.

travelers to and from Cuba has long been authorized by the U.S. Department of Treasury. The next step should be to reestablish safe and

secure chartered ferry services to transport the same categories of passengers to and from Cuba. Ferry service offers an affordable alternative

to airline travel to Cuba and would allow an increase in the amount of goods that Cuban-Americans and other licensed travelers may legally

take to Cuba to support their families and micro entrepreneurs.¶ viii) Simplify the Provision of Controlled Commodities, such as Computers and

Laptops Direct the Department of Commerce to provide more detailed guidance for individuals to determine whether or not controlled

commodities, such as laptops and printers, qualify under the general export waiver.¶ ix) Allow Licensed U.S. Travelers Access to U.S.-

Issued Debit, Credit, and Pre-Paid Cards and Other Financial Services While on Authorized Travel in Cuba: Currently, U.S. travelers to Cuba

have no access to U.S. bank accounts, credit cards, debit cards or other basic financial services. With few exceptions, U.S. travelers are forced to

carry cash with them to Cuba. Allowing U.S. travelers access to electronic payment systems would help ensure their safety and security while

being on the Island. Moreover, authorizing new electronic payment systems would facilitate the Administration’s goal of promoting people-to-

people contacts and facilitating private economic activity by safeguarding the transfer of money from U.S. residents to relatives and

independent entrepreneurs on the island.¶ x) Review Cuba’s Designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism: Cuba’s status on the StateDepartment’s list of state sponsors of terrorism has been subject to debate for more than a decade. The President should order a

comprehensive, apolitical review to determine whether this designation reflects the reality of Cuba today.¶ xi) Develop an expanded bilateral

agenda with a range of specific topics of mutual interest : Agenda should include topics such as the resolution of property claims to help foster

an environment of dialogue, problem- solving and trust building— thereby helping to set the stage for an eventual normalization of relations.



AT Doesn’t solve limits

We solve limits – only a narrow range of carrots would be viable

Drezner 99 [Daniel Drezner, Assistant Prof of Political Science at CU-Boulder, former John M. Olin National

Security Fellow at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, PhD in Political Science from Stanford,The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations, pp 27-28]The rest of the chapter considers the implications of relaxing some of the model’s technical assumptions. What happens when states realign

their position in the international system, altering conflict expectations? The model predicts that it will increase the likelihood of a coercion

event, but reduce the sender country’s ability to extract meaningful concessions from the target. What happens when dem ands become non-

negotiable? The model predicts that stalemates over indivisible issues are more likely to occur between adversaries than allies, leading to

prolonged sanctions imposition. How do senders choose between economic coercion and economic inducements to

influence the target. The model argues that senders will be far more willing to use inducements with allies than

adversaries. Carrots as well as sticks are of limited use against adversaries; only under a narrow set of

circumstances will the sender prefer to offer a carrot over accepting a stalemate outcome. This result suggests that

without the willingness to use brute force, even great powers are constrained in their ability to influence an adversary’s

behavior.



--AT That’s not about a QPQ

Wrong – his model refers to QPQs as “economic inducements” or “carrots”

Drezner 99 [Daniel Drezner, Assistant Prof of Political Science at CU-Boulder, former John M. Olin National

Security Fellow at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, PhD in Political Science from Stanford,The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations, pp 50-51]

Choosing between carrots and sticks¶ One objection to the notion of inflexible demands is that if side-payments are an option, it is always possible

to cut a deal to avoid a costly deadlock.29 Until now, the conflict expectations model has ignored the other options in the p olicy-maker’s tool kit. This section

introduces a strategy of economic inducements to see how states choose among their policy options.¶ Figure 2.4 displays a modified version of

the coercion game that I will call the statecraft game. In this variant, Sender has the additional option of proffering a carrot to an

attached demand. If the target rejects the carrot, the outcome is the status quo.30 If the target accepts, the

outcome is tradeoff (TO). Target surrenders demand D, but gains the value of the carrot, τ. Sender gains D, but loses

the cost of the carrot , σ. The values of σ and τ are not necessarily equal. If, for example, the carrot is expanded trade concessions, or loan guarantees, the

sender’s cost is less than the target’s benefit.



AT No Affs/Say No

Wrong – affs could lift sanctions in exchange for incremental reforms – solves even if

Cuba says no

Haass 00 – Richard Haass & Meghan O’Sullivan, Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Studies Program, “Terms ofEngagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies”, Survival, 42(2), Summer, p. 15-16

Rather than maintaining the status quo, the US should simultaneously pursue two forms of engagement with Cuba. First, it should

actively seek out Castro’s willingness to engage in a conditional relationship and to chart a course towards more satisfactory

relations. It should attempt to strike a dialogue with Castro in which reasonable benefits are offered to him in return for

reasonable changes. Rather than accentuating the desire for a regime change or immediate democratic elections, US policy-

makers should make lesser goals the focus of their policy, as the more ambitious the demands, the less likely Castro is

to enter into a process of engagement. For instance, the release of political prisoners and the legitimisation of political

parties might be offered in exchange for the selected lifting of elements of the embargo. Regardless of Castro’s

reaction to such an approach, benefits would accrue to the United States. If Castro accepted this dialogue, US policy would be

seen as pushing forward real political liberalisation on the island; if Castro rejected these attempts, America would still

ease tensions with its European allies by demonstrating it was willing to take a more flexible line towards Cuba.



AT W/M

The plan is unconditional engagement

Haass 2000 [Richard N. Haass, VP and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, PhD from

Oxford University, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies program at Brookings, PhD inPolitics from Oxford University, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, pp 4-6, google books]

Another form of unconditional engagement takes a broader perspective, by regarding inducements offered to civil

society and the private sector over time as playing an important role in creating openings for cooperation further down the road.

In these unconditional strategies, certain initiatives or changes in U.S. policy toward the country are made without

necessarily expecting, or even soliciting, reciprocal acts from the regime. This form of engagement may be implemented by

nongovernmental actors, such as the programs sponsored by the National Endowment for Democracy that promote democracy and the development of institutions

in many authoritarian regimes. Alternatively, this engagement may entail explicit modifications to U.S. policy, as occurred with Cuba

in March 1998 and January 1999. By allowing licensed sales of food and agricultural inputs to independent entities in Cuba, by easing travel and

financial restrictions, and by promoting communication between America and the island, the United States sought to buttress

the development of civil society and the private sector in Cuba.9 In doing so, the United States hoped to build momentum leading to greater

political changes, which would facilitate U.S.-Cuban cooperation in the future, perhaps many years down the road.



Exts EE=Conditional

Engagement implies offering incentives for changes in behaviour

Borer 4 *Dr. Douglas A. Borer, PhD, Visiting Professor of Political Science at the US Army War College, “Problems

of Economic Statecraft: Rethinking Engagement,” Chapter 12, U.S. Army War College Guide to National SecurityPolicy and Strategy, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/strategy2004/12borer.pdf]

Visiting Professor of Political Science, Department of National Security and Strategy, US Army War College

The policy of engagement refers to the use of non-coercive means, or positive incentives, by one state to alter the

elements of another state’s behavior. As such, some scholars have categorized engagement as a form of appeasement. 21 However, I concur with

the view articulated by Randall Schweller that, while engagement can be classified in generic terms as a form of appeasement, an important qualitative difference

exists between the two: “Engagement is more than appeasement,” he says:¶ It encompasses any attempt to socialize the dissatisfied power into acceptance of the

established order. In practice engagement may be distinguished from other policies not so much by its goals but by its

means: it relies on the promise of rewards rather than the threat of punishment to influence the target’s behavior. . . . The

policy succeeds if such concessions convert the revolutionary state into a status quo power with a stake in the stability of the system. . . . Engagement is

most likely to succeed when the established powers are strong enough to mix concessions with credible threats, to use sticks

as well as carrots. . . . Otherwise, concessions will signal weakness that emboldens the aggressor to demand more. 22

That implies a quid pro gquoDe LaHunt, 6 - Assistant Director for Environmental Health & Safety Services in Colorado College's Facilities

Services department (John, “Perverse and unintended” Journal of Chemical Health and Safety, July-August, Science

direct)

Incentives work on a quid pro quo basis – this for that. If you change your behavior, I’ll give you a reward. One could say

that coercion is an incentive program – do as I say and I’ll let you live. However , I define an incentive as getting something you

didn’t have before in exchange for new behavior, so that pretty much puts coercion in its own box, one separate from

incentives. But fundamental problems plague the incentive approach. Like coercion, incentives are poor motivators in the long run, for at least

two reasons – unintended consequences and perverse incentives.

Contextual evidence – economic engagement describes economic incentives tied to

demands for change

Wright 6 *Rebecca Wright, J.D. student at the Boalt Hall School of Law at UC Berkeley, “Finding an Impetus forInstitutional Change at the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights,” 24 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 463, lexis+

The potential effectiveness of tying economic incentives to demands for institutional change is evident from

developments made within Europe. Members of the EU benefit greatly from financial integration with other members and from the

increased levels of investment and grants that flows from membership. The criteria for EU membership requires candidates to achieve "stability

of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities." n129 Turkey is just one

country that [*489] has made significant domestic reforms so that it can qualify for membership, moving away from a history of ethnic conflict.

Human Rights Watch's 2005 report on Turkey notes how: "Since 1999, the promise of E.U. membership has supported a dynamic process of

reform." n130 Thus, in Turkey's case, the desire to benefit from the financial gains of the EU has resulted in the evolution of domestic

institutions.¶ Obviously, if African states did not care about economic development, such rewards would be less likely

to make them change their priorities and allow the Court to develop. For, as Yitan Li and A. Cooper Drury have stated, economic

engagement with countries that are poor and need reform is only effective when a state "ties its future to

economic development and world trade." n131 Fortunately, there has been a great push within Africa in the last five years to

improve economic conditions. In a meeting between European and African experts in December 2004, the AU made a statement that: "Neverbefore has Africa been so determined and resolute in her attempt to enhance socio-economic conditions on the continent." n132 Over the last

ten years, a number of regional economic organizations have been created in Africa, including the Economic Community of West African States

(ECOWAS), n133 the Southern African Development Community (SADC), n134 the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), n135 and the

African Development Bank (AfDB). n136 Recently, African leaders have also created the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD),

n137 an organization with the goal of eradicating poverty, promoting sustainable development and increasing Africa's participation in the

process of globalization. NEPAD has been heralded as a welcome development by the international community. The G8, for example, produced

an African Action Plan when NEPAD was formed that was "designed to encourage the imaginative effort that underlies the NEPAD and to lay a

solid foundation for future [*490] cooperation." n138



2AC EE=Conditional

We meet – the plan integrates Cuba into trade with the U.S.

C/I: economic engagement provides economic incentives to shape behavior – it can be

conditional or unconditional

Haass 2k [Richard N. Haass, VP and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, PhD from Oxford

University, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies program at Brookings, PhD in Politics from OxfordUniversity, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies,” Survival, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000,

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer%20haass/2000survival.pdf] The term ‘engagement’ was popularised in the early 1980s amid controversy about the Reagan administration’s policy of ‘constr uctive engagement’ towards South

Africa. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. Except in the few instances where the US has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably

‘engages’ states and actors all the time simply by interacting with them. To be a meaningful subject of analysis, the term ‘engagement’

must refer to something more specific than a policy of ‘non-isolation’. As used in this article, ‘engagement’ refersto a foreign-policy strategy which depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives.

Certainly, it does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign-policy instruments such as sanctions or military force: in practice, there is often considerable

overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the distinguishing feature of

American engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the

behaviour of countries with which the US has important disagreements.¶ Today’s rapidly globalising world, no longer beset by Cold

War competitions, creates new possibilities for engagement as a foreign-policy option. In particular, the growing recognition of the drawbacks of punitive policies in

this new environment has spurred a search for alternative strategies. There are increasing doubts about the wisdom of using sanctions, particularly when exerted

unilaterally in a globalised world economy, to dissuade problem regimes from their agendas. Not only has the record of sanctions in forcing change been poor, but

the costs of such policies to civilian populations and American commercial interests has often been substantial. Just as fait h in sanctions has been shaken, the limits

of military force have been exposed: despite relentless bombings, Saddam Hussein remains in power, and events in Kosovo demonstrate how even the most

carefully orchestrated military campaign can result in serious collateral damages.¶ Moreover, the dissolution of Cold War alignments has both opened new

opportunities for engagement strategies and created new rationales for them. Due to the heightened economic vulnerability and strategic insecurity of former

Soviet allies, the incentives that the US can offer have new potency. At the same time, because America’s allies are freer to shape their foreign-policy agendas

subject to their own desires, the US needs to seek out policies with appeal which extends beyond rigid American preferences. During the 1990s, many of America’sclosest allies in Europe revealed a preference for using incentives rather than punitive actions to achieve foreign-policy goals.2 ¶ Many different types of

engagement strategies exist, depending on who is engaged, the kind of incentives employed and the sorts of objectives pursued. Engagement may be

conditional when it entails a negotiated series of exchanges, such as where the US extends positive inducements

for changes undertaken by the target country. Or engagement may be unconditional if it offers modifications in US

policy towards a country without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow . Generally, conditional engagement is

geared towards a government; unconditional engagement works with a country’s civil society or private sector in the hopes of promoting forces that will eventually

facilitate cooperation.¶ Architects of engagement strategies can choose from a wide variety of incentives. Economic engagement might offer

tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans and

economic aid.3 Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties such as trade embargoes,

investment bans or high tariffs, which have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country.

Facilitated entry into the economic global arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most potent

incentives in today’s global market. Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to regional

or international institutions, the scheduling of summits between leaders – or the termination of these benefits. Military

engagement could involve the extension of international military educational training in order both to strengthen respect for civilian

authority and human rights among a country’s armed forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships between Americans and young foreign military officers.

While these areas of engagement are likely to involve working with state institutions, cultural or civil-society

engagement entails building people-to-people contacts. Funding nongovernmental organisations, facilitating the

flow of remittances and promoting the exchange of students, tourists and other non-governmental people

between countries are just some of the possible incentives used in the form of engagement.

Prefer our interpretation

-Aff ground – explicit QPQs won’t work

Pascual et al 9 [Carlos Pascual, VP and Director of Foreign Policy @ Brookings; Vicki Huddleston, Visiting Fellow @ Brookings; Gustavo Arnavat,

Attorney at law; Ann Louise Bardach, Author/Journalist at UC Santa Barbara; Dr. Ramon Colás, Co-Director, Center for the Understanding of Cubans of African

Descent; Dr. Jorge I. Domínguez, Vice-provost for international Affairs and professor of Mexican and Latin American politics and Economics @ Harvard; Daniel

Erikson, Senior Associate for U.S. policy and Director of Caribbean programs at Inter-American Dialogue; Dr. Mark Falcoff, resident Scholar Emeritus @ AEI; Dr.



Damián J. Fernández, Provost and Executive VP at Purchase College; Dr. Andy S. Gomez, Nonresident Senior Fellow at Brookings, Assistant provost at the University

of Miami and Senior Fellow at the institute for Cuban and Cuban American Studies; Jesús Gracia, Former Spanish Ambassador to Cuba; Paul Hare, Former British

Ambassador to Cuba; Francisco J. (Pepe) Hernández, president, Cuban American National Foundation; Dr. William LeoGrande, Dean, School of public Affairs,

American University; Dr. Marifeli pérez-stable, Vice president for Democratic Governance, Inter-A merican Dialogue; Jorge r. piñón, Energy Fellow, Center for

Hemispheric policy, University of Miami; dr. Archibald ritter, Distinguished research professor Emeritus, Department of Economics and Norman paterson School of

international Affairs, Carleton University; Andrés rozental, Nonresident Senior Fellow, The Brookings institution, Former Deputy Foreign Minister of Mexico; Carlos

saladrigas, Co-Chairman, Cuba Study Group, “CUBA:A New policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement,” April 2009, http://www2.fiu.edu/~ipor/cuba-

t/BrookingsCubaReport-English.pdf]

Medium-Term Initiatives¶ The second basket of initiatives is distinct from the first because it moves beyond enhancing the

ability of Cubans to take a more proactive and informed part in their society and government. The initiatives in the

second basket seek to build a foundation for reconciliation by beginning a process of resolving long-standing differences. A number

of these initiatives could serve as incentives or rewards for improved human rights, the release of political prisoners, and greater freedom of

assembly, speech and rights for opposition groups and labor unions. initiatives that fall within this category include allowing

Cuba access to normal commercial instruments for the purchase of goods from the United States. ¶ None of the

initiatives, however, should be publicly or privately tied to specific Cuban actions. As the Cuban government is

on record as rejecting any type of carrot-and-stick tactic, it would be counterproductive to do so. Rather, the United

States should decide the actions that it wishes to take and when to carry them out. Doing so will give the president

maximum flexibility in determining how and when to engage.

-Neg ground – they destroy link uniqueness because the embargo is already a QPQ

Astor 12 *Michael Astor, Editor at Associated Press, “UN once again votes to condemn Cuba embargo,” Nov 13

2012, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/un-once-again-votes-condemn-cuba-embargo]

The United States has made clear that although some restrictions on travel and remittances have been eased under the Obama

administration it is not prepared to lift the sanctions entirely until the communist-run nation enacts more far-reaching

political and economic reforms.¶ Ronald D. Godard, a senior U.S. adviser for western hemisphere affairs, defended the

embargo as a "one of the tools in our overall efforts to encourage respect for the human rights and basic freedoms

to which the United Nations itself is committed."

-Predictability – Haass has clear intent to define, whereas Shinn just says conditional

engagement could be economic

Competing interpretations cause a race to the bottom – default to reasonability – T

should be a check on abuse, not a strategy



Toward



In the direction of

Toward means in the direction of


2009, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/toward]1. In the direction of : driving toward home.

Toward means in the direction of

Michigan Supreme Court 1914 [Michigan Reports: Cases Decided in the Supreme Court of Michigan,

Volume 180, Google Books]Under 3 Comp. Laws, § 11510 (5 How. Stat. *2d Ed.+ § 14559), providing that “any person who shall discharge without injury to any other

person, any firearm, while intentionally, without malice, aimed at or toward any person, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,” etc., acts carelesslydone, without design to do mischief, are punishable.¶ 2. Same—“Toward”—Construction of Statute.¶ It is sufficient, in a prosecution for

violating the statute, to show that the accused was making use of a rifle pointed in the direction of a passenger on a car and discharged the

weapon in that direction, without striking any one. The word “toward” means in a course or line leading in the direction of.



With regard to

Toward means with regard to


2009, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/toward]4. With regard to; in relation to: an optimistic attitude toward the future.



Country Names



Cuba

Refers to the republic of Cuba

Collins English Dictionary 3 [Collins English Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged,

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Cuba]Cuba *ˈkjuːbə]¶ n¶ (Placename) a republic and the largest island in the Caribbean, at the entrance to the Gulf of Mexico:

became a Spanish colony after its discovery by Columbus in 1492; gained independence after the Spanish-American War of 1898 but remained

subject to US influence until declared a people's republic under Castro in 1960; subject of an international crisis in 1962, when the US

blockaded the island in order to compel the Soviet Union to dismantle its nuclear missile base. Sugar comprises about 80 per cent of total

exports; the economy has been devastated by loss of trade following the collapse of the Soviet Union and by the continuing US trade embargo.

Language: Spanish. Religion: nonreligious majority. Currency: peso. Capital: Havana. Pop.: 11 190 000 (2001 est.). Area: 110 922 sq. km (42

827 sq. miles)

Refers to the territory of the Cuban state

China-Cuba Double Taxation Prevention Treaty 1

http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n6669073/n6669103/n11809672.files/n8688298.pdf

b) the term “Cuba” means the national territory comprising the Island of Cuba, Isla Juventud, the other islands and

adjacent keys, the internal waters and the territorial sea in the limits defined by its internal law and the airspacewhich extends over them, including the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone adjacent to the

territorial sea, over which the Cuban state exercises its sovereignty rights and jurisdiction by virtue of its internal law and in

accordance with international law;

Refers to the Cuban government and its political subdivisions, agencies and

instrumentalities

11th Circuit 99 [183 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 1999), MARLENE ALEJANDRE, individually and as personal

representative of the Estate of Armando Alejandre, deceased, MIRTA MENDEZ, as personal representative of the

estate of Carlos Alberto Costa, deceased, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. TELEFONICA LARGA DISTANCIA DE PUERTO

RICO, INC.; MCI INTERNATIONAL, INC.; et al., Garnishees-Appellants,

https://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/183/183.F3d.1277.99-10225.html]

In this garnishment action,

the district court permitted the plaintiffs to collect a portion of their judgments against the Republic ofCuba (the "Cuban Government") and the Cuban Air Force by garnishing certain debts owed to a Cuban telecommunications company. Because we conclude that this company is an entity separate from the Cuban Government, we vacate

the judgment of the district court and remand this case with instructions to dissolve the writs of garnishment. ¶ I.¶ 2¶ This case grows out of a decision by the Cuban Government, carried out by pilots of the Cuban Air Force, to shoot down two unarmed civilian airplanes over

international waters on February 24, 1996. Three citizens of the United States and one non-citizen were killed in the attack. On October 31, 1997, the personal representatives of the estates of the three citizens, plaintiffs herein, brought actions in the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Florida seeking monetary damages from the Cuban Government and the Cuban Air Force. Although neither defendant entered an appearance, the district court conducted a trial in order to determine whether the plaintiffs had satisfactory evidence to support their

claims. See 28 U.S.C. 1608(e) (1994) (prohibiting default judgment against foreign sovereign unless plaintiff establishes claim "by evidence satisfactory to the court"). ¶ 3¶ On December 17, 1997, the district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs and awarded them compensatory

damages of $49,927,911 against the Cuban Government and Cuban Air Force, as well as punitive damages of $137,700,000 against the Cuban Air Force alone.1 See Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1253-54 (S.D. Fla. 1997) [hereinafter Alejandre I]. In an opinion

accompanying the judgment, the court found that the defendants were not immune from the plaintiffs' suits because the Cuban Air Force (as an agent of the terrorist-sponsoring Cuban Government) had committed an act of extrajudicial killing by shooting down the airplanes. See 28

U.S.C. 1605(a)(7) (Supp. II 1996); Alejandre I, 996 F. Supp. at 1247-48. The court also concluded that the defendants were substantively liable to the plaintiffs, under a theory of respondeat superior, for the actions of the Cuban Air Force pilots who shot down the airplanes. See Pub. L. No.

104-208, 589, 110 Stat. 3009-172 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. 1605 note (West Supp. 1999)); 28 U.S.C.A. 1606 (West Supp. 1999) (providing that a non-immune foreign state "shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances"); Alejandre

I, 996 F. Supp. at 1249.¶ In an effort to collect a portion of this judgment against the Cuban Government and the Cuban Air Force, the plaintiffs filed a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)2 and Fla. Stat. ch. 77.03 (1997) requesting that post-judgment writs of garnishment be issued to

the following companies (the "garnishees"): AT&T Corp.; AT&T of Puerto Rico, Inc.; Global One Communications, L.L.C.; IDB WorldCom Services, Inc.; MCI International, Inc.; Telefonica Larga Distancia de Puerto Rico, Inc. ("TLD"); WilTel, Inc.; WorldCom, Inc. (collectively, the "carrier

garnishees" or the "carriers"); the Chase Manhattan Corporation and its subsidiaries; and Citigroup Inc. and its subsidiaries. On December 9, 1998, the district court granted the motion and directed the clerk to issue the requested writs. Each writ asked the garnishee to serve an answer

stating whether it was indebted to "the Cuban Air Force or the Republic of Cuba (including any of its agencies, entities, or instrumentalities), . . . and in what sum."3 The garnishees answered the writs by stating, inter alia, that they were indebted to Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de

Cuba, S.A. ("ETECSA").4 They also claimed that their debts to ETECSA were not subject to garnishment for several reasons, including: (1) that ETECSA was a separate entity not responsible for the debts of the Cuban Government; and (2) that the writs were void because the plaintiffs had

failed to get a license to garnish ETECSA's property as required by the Cuban Assets Control Regulations ("CACR"), 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (1998). See 31 C.F.R. 515.203(e) (1998). The plaintiffs replied by denying the garnishees' claims and by affirmatively asserting that any indebtedness owed to

ETECSA constituted an indebtedness to the Cuban Government.¶ 5¶ On February 4, 1999, the carrier garnishees filed a joint motion to dissolve the plaintiffs' writs of garnishment pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 77.07(2) (1997).5 ETECSA, which had been served with a notice of garnishment as

required by Fla. Stat ch. 77.055 (1997), filed a similar motion to dissolve on February 8. These motions asked the court to dissolve the writs on several grounds, including those raised in the garnishees' answers. The district court conducted a bench trial on these motions and on the

garnishment pleadings.6 Rather than calling witnesses, all parties provided the court with factual background information through affidavits. ¶ 6¶ These affidavits contained the following relevant information regarding the relationship among ETECSA, the Cuban Government, and the

carriers. Prior to a transition period that began in August 1994, the telephone system in Cuba was operated by Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba ("EMTELCUBA"), a wholly-owned alter ego of the Cuban Government's Ministry of Communications.7 Between March and September

1994, all of the carriers except TLD and AT&T of Puerto Rico signed Operating Agreements with EMTELCUBA to provide international telecommunications services between Cuba and the United States. In November 1994, the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control

("OFAC") granted these carriers licenses under the CACR that permitted them to make payments to EMTELCUBA as required by the Operating Agreements. See 22 U.S.C.A. 6004(e)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1999) (authorizing the issuance of such licenses); 31 C.F.R. 515.418(a), 515.542(c) (1998)

(implementing this authorization). Each license provided, in pertinent part: ¶ 7¶ All necessary transactions are hereby authorized incident to the execution and performance of the Operating Agreement [the carrier] has negotiated with Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba

("EMTELCUBA") for the provision of telecommunications service between the United States and Cuba. ¶ 8¶ This license authorizes all necessary transactions in connection with the transfer to Cuba of funds representing Cuba's share of compensation due for its portion of the jointly

provided international telecommunications service . . . . ¶ 9¶ Meanwhile, on June 28, 1994, ETECSA was incorporated as a mixed enterprise under the provisions of a 1982 Cuban law. ETECSA's stock was held by the following entities at the time of trial: 51% by Telefonica Antillana, S.A. (a

Cuban company); 6.68% by Banco Financiero Internacional, S.A. (a Cuban company); 1% by Banco Internacional de Comercia, S.A. (a Cuban company); 29.29% by STET International Netherlands N.V. (a Dutch subsidiary of the publicly-owned company Telecom Italia S.p.A.); and 12.03% by

Universal Trade and Management Corporation (a Panamanian company). The three Cuban companies, which together held 58.68% of ETECSA's stock, are apparently owned or controlled by the Cuban Government.8 On August 17, the Executive Committee of the Cuban Council of

Ministers granted ETECSA an administrative concession to render public telecommunications services in Cuba. Under the terms of this concession, ETECSA was granted the exclusive right to supply national and international telephone and data transmission services for twelve years. ¶

10¶ One result of this exclusive concession was that, between January and April 1995, each of the carriers that had an Operating Agreement with EMTELCUBA signed a document entitled "Amendment to Transfer Rights and Obligations." Each document, which EMTELCUBA and ETECSA

also signed, stated that the signatories agreed to transfer all rights, obligations, and interests of EMTELCUBA under the Operating Agreements to ETECSA. They also agreed to release EMTELCUBA from any future rights, obligations, and interests under the Agreements. ETECSA

subsequently negotiated additional Operating Agreements with TLD and AT&T of Puerto Rico; these two carriers received licenses from OFAC that permitted them to make payments to ETECSA9 under the Agreements. These Operating Agreements (whether transferred from EMTELCUBA

or negotiated by ETECSA itself) were the source of the carriers' indebtedness to ETECSA. ¶ 11¶ After reviewing this factual information and holding a hearing on February 16, 1999, the district court issued an opinion disposing of the motions to dissolve and the issues raised by the

garnishment pleadings. See Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (S.D. Fla. 1999) [hereinafter Alejandre II]. As an initial matter, the court concluded that the carriers' debts were owed to ETECSA (rather than directly to the Cuban Government itself) and that the Cuban

Government's control over ETECSA was insufficient to render ETECSA responsible for the Government's debt to the plaintiffs. See id. at 1334-39. Nevertheless, the court held ETECSA responsible for the Government's debt on the ground that a contrary holding would unjustly prevent the

plaintiffs from collecting their judgment and would override the legislative policy in favor of broadening the assets that may be executed upon to compensate victims of terrorist attacks. See id. at 1339. The court also held that 28 U.S.C.A. 1610(f)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1999), which the

President had not waived, permitted the plaintiffs to garnish amounts owed ETECSA without first obtaining a license under the CACR. See id. at 1327-34.10 Therefore, the court denied the motions to dissolve and ordered that all amounts owed ETECSA in the possession or control of the

garnishees be garnished in aid of execution of the plaintiffs' judgment against the Cuban Govern ment. See id. at 1343. This appeal followed.¶ II.¶ 12¶ The central question that we must answer on appeal is whether ETECSA is an entity separate from the Cuban Government, and

therefore not responsible for the Government's debt to the plaintiffs. Our review of the district court's decision to hold ETECSA responsible for this debt is guided both by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), 28 U.S.C. 1602-11 (1994), and by principles of Florida garnishment

law.¶ A.¶ 1.¶ 13¶ The FSIA is the exclusive source of subject matter jurisdiction over all civil actions against foreign states. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434-35, 109 S. Ct. 683, 688, 102 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1989); Hercaire Int'l, Inc. v. Argentina, 821

F.2d 559, 563 (11th Cir. 1987). Under section 1604 of the FSIA,11 a foreign state is immune from the jurisdiction of federal or state courts unless one of the statutory exceptions to immunity applies. See 28 U.S.C. 1605, 1607 (1994) (listing the exceptions); see also 28 U.S.C. 1330(a) (1994)

(granting district court jurisdiction over civil action against non-immune foreign state). In addition, section 1609 renders the property in the United States of a foreign state immune from execution or attachment (including garnishment12) unless sections 1610-11 provide otherwise.

Because section 1603(a) declares that the term "foreign state" includes an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in section 1603(b), such agencies and instrumentalities also enjoy immunity from suit and execution. The district court found that ETECSA was a government

instrumentality because the Cuban Government owned or controlled the companies that held a majority of ETECSA's stock. See 28 U.S.C. 1603(b)(2) (1994); Alejandre II, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1336. This ruling is not challenged on appeal. ETECSA's property in the United States is therefore

immune from garnishment unless an exception applies.13¶ 14¶ The exception upon which the plaintiffs relied below is 28 U.S.C. 1610(a)(7) (West Supp. 1999),14 which provides: ¶ 15¶ The property in the United States of a foreign state, . . . used for a commercial activity in the United

States, shall not be immune from attachment in aid of execution . . . upon a judgment entered by a court of the United States . . . [if] the judgment relates to a claim for which the foreign state is not immune under section 1605(a)(7), regardless of whether the property is or was involved



with the act upon which the claim is based.¶ 16¶ The last requirement of this exception is clearly met here, as the plaintiffs' underlying judgment against the Cuban Government related to a claim from which the Government was not immune by virtue of section 1605(a)(7). Thus,

assuming arguendo that the amounts owed to ETECSA are property in the United States used for a commercial activity therein,15 these amounts are not immune from garnishment if ETECSA constitutes a "foreign state" for purposes of this exception. This question might appear to be

easily answered: ETECSA is an instrumentality as defined by section 1603(b), and section 1603(a) declares that the term "foreign state" under the FSIA includes an instrumentality, so ETECSA is a "foreign state" under section 1610(a)(7). The Supreme Court's decision in First National City

Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 103 S. Ct. 2591, 77 L. Ed. 2d 46 (1983) [hereinafter Bancec], however, teaches that things are not that simple.16 ¶ 17¶ According to Bancec, "[t]he language and history of the FSIA clearly establish that the Act was not

intended to affect the substantive law determining the liability of a foreign state or instrumentality, or the attribution of liability among instrumentalities of a foreign state." Id. at 620, 103 S. Ct. at 2597. Instead, government instrumentalities enjoy a presumption of separate juridical

status vis-a-vis the foreign government to which they are related. While Bancec applied this presumption for purposes of determining whether an instrumentality could be held substantively liable for the debts of its related foreign government, subsequent decisions have also applied it in

determining whether an exception to immunity that applies to the government may be attributed to the instrumentality as well. See id. at 613, 103 S. Ct. at 2593 (considering whether Citibank could set off value of branches nationalized by Cuban Government against amount Citibank

owed to presumptively separate Cuban instrumentality); Hercaire, 821 F.2d at 564-65 (considering whether waiver of immunity by foreign government also operated to deprive presumptively separate instrumentality of immunity).17 We must consider, therefore, whether this

presumption may be overcome in order to make ETECSA's assets the property of a "foreign state" (i.e., the property of the Cuban Government), thus rendering the exception to immunity in section 1610(a)(7) applicable to ETECSA and making ETECSA substantively liable for the

Government's debt to the plaintiffs. See Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 793 (2d Cir. 1984).¶ 18¶ In Bancec, the Supreme Court highlighted two situations in which a plaintiff may overcome the presumption of separate juridical status enjoyed by an instrumentality. First, when

a corporate entity is so extensively controlled by its owner that a relationship of principal and agent is created, the Court observed that one may be held liable for the actions of the other.18 Second, the Court recognized the broader equitable principle that the doctrine of corporate entity

will not be regarded where to do so would work fraud or injustice or defeat overriding public policies. See Bancec, 462 U.S. at 629-630, 103 S. Ct. at 2601-02. In either situation, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the instrumentality is not entitled to separate recognition. See

Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Letelier, 748 F.2d at 795.19 ¶ 2.¶ 19¶ These principles of foreign sovereign immunity provide much of the context necessary for our review of the district court's decision. Given the procedural

posture of this case, however, we must also be guided by relevant principles of Florida garnishment law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a); Buck Creek Indus., Inc. v. Alcon Constr., Inc., 631 F.2d 75, 76 (5th Cir. 1980).20 ¶ 20¶ In their replies to the garnishees' answers, the plaintiffs asserted that

the amounts owed by the garnishees to ETECSA were subject to garnishment on the ground that any indebtedness owed to ETECSA constituted an indebtedness to the Cuban Government. We interpret this assertion as a claim that ETECSA is an alter ego of the Cuban Government. Under

Florida law, when a plaintiff (judgment creditor) seeks to garnish a debt owed to an entity that was not a party to the underlying judgment on the ground that the entity is an alter ego of the judgment debtor, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating the alter ego relationship. See

Live Supply, Inc. v. C&S Plumbing, Inc., 402 So. 2d 505, 506-07 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981);21 Reeves v. Don L. Tullis & Assocs., 305 So. 2d 813, 815 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) (placing burden on plaintiff to prove truth of allegation made in reply to garnishee's answer). This burden is consonant with the

burden faced by a plaintiff who seeks to overcome an instr umentality's presumptively separate juridical status on th e ground that the first situation mentioned by the Bancec Court ap plies. See supra note 18.¶ 21¶ In order to determine whether the plaintiffs carried their burden in this

case, we must assess their arguments from the perspective of the Cuban Government. Florida law provides that when a plaintiff holding a judgment serves a writ of garnishment upon a garnishee, the plaintiff steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor and can assert only the rights that

the judgment debtor could have asserted against the garnishee. See Hughes Supply, Inc. v. A.C. Elec. Corp., 145 F.R.D. 590, 593 (M.D. Fla. 1993); Reeves, 305 So. 2d at 815-16. Thus, if a contractual debtor-creditor relationship between the garnishee and the judgment debtor is terminated

by a non-fraudulent novation that obligates the garnishee to a third party and eliminates the judgment debtor as a party to the contract, the plaintiff has no right to garnish sums owed by the garnishee to the third party. See Reeves, 305 So.2d at 816. ¶ B.¶ 1.¶ 22¶ With these principles

in mind, we consider the district court's decision to hold ETECSA responsible for the Cuban Government's debt to the plaintiffs. The court disregarded the presumptively separate juridical status of ETECSA by invoking the second situation mentioned in Bancec: that the corporate entity will

not be regarded where to do so would work fraud or injustice or defeat overriding public policies. The court did not rely upon the fraud element of this rule, and indeed there appears to be no evidence in the record that would support a finding of fraud. For example, the plaintiffs made

no showing that the apparent novation that transferred the rights and obligations of EMTELCUBA (an alter ego responsible for the debts of the Cuban Government, see supra note 7) under the Operating Agreements to ETECSA was entered into for the purpose of insulating payments

made under those Agreements from garnishment by the Cuban Government's creditors. Instead, the court rested its decision on concerns about injustice and public policy. The core of the court's legal rationale was that failing to disregard ETECSA's separate status ¶ 23¶ not only would

prevent [the plaintiffs] from collecting their court-ordered final judgment for the victims of a grave violation of international law, but also would override the clear legislative policy against such terrorist attacks and in favor of broadening the property which may be executed [upon] to

compensate for them.¶ 24¶ Alejandre II, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1339. In particular, the court concluded that 28 U.S.C. 1610(f)(1)(A) constituted an "express[] legislative commitment to subject the property of a government instrumentality to attachment or execution to satisfy a judgment

against [a] terrorist foreign state." Id.¶ 25¶ Upon reviewing this rationale de novo, we conclude that it is not a sufficient basis for overcoming the presumption of separate juridical status that ETECSA enjoys. While the district court's concern about the injustice of preventing plaintiffs

from collecting their judgment is understandable,22 this concern is present in every case in which a plaintiff seeks to hold an instrumentality responsible for the debts of its related government. Allowing the Bancec presumption of separate juridical status to be so easily overcome would

effectively render it a nullity. We recognize that the district court made an effort to distinguish this case based upon th e gravity of the underlying violation of international law. Given the absence of any evidenc e that ETECSA was involved in the violation, howev er, we fail to see how this

distinction is relevant to the question of whether ETECSA's separate juridical status should be overcome. ¶ 26¶ With regard to the district court's public policy concerns, we agree that recent enactments evince a congressional policy against terrorist attacks and in favor of making

additional property of governments that sponsor terrorism (such as Cuba) available to compensate victims of such attacks. We disagree, however, with the district court's conclusion that Congress - in section 1610(f)(1)(A) - took the further step of overriding the Bancec presumption of

separate juridical status by making instrumentalities responsible for the debts of their related terrorist-sponsoring governments.23 Section 1610(f)(1)(A) provides: ¶ 27¶ Notwithstanding any other provision of law, . . . any property with respect to which financial transactions are

prohibited or regulated pursuant to [certain statutes, including those authorizing the CACR,24] . . . [or any] license issued pursuant thereto, shall be subject to execution or attachment in aid of execution of any judgment relating to a claim for which a foreign state (including any agency or

instrumentality of such state) claiming such property is not immune under section 1605(a)(7). ¶ 28¶ The effect of this section is not to subject property claimed by the instrumentality ETECSA to execution in order to satisfy the plaintiffs' judgment against the Cuban Government, but to

allow the plaintiffs to execute upon property claimed by the Government itself in order to satisfy their judgment (which relates to a claim from which the Government was not immune by virtue of section 1605(a)(7)) without first obtaining a license under the CACR. See 31 C.F.R.

515.203(e). Congress has previously demonstrated in the FSIA context that it knows how to express clearly an intent to make instrumentalities substantively liable for the debts of their related foreign governments.25 Absent such a clear expression, which does not appear in section

1610(f)(1)(A),26 we see no reason to interpret that section as contravening Congress' original understanding that the FSIA "[is] not intended to affect the substantive law determining the liability of a foreign state or instrumentality, or the attribution of liability among instrumentalities of

a foreign state." Bancec, 462 U.S. at 620, 103 S. Ct. at 2597. ¶ 2.¶ 29¶ Having concluded that the district court erroneously disregarded ETECSA's separate juridical status on the ground that the second situation mentioned in Bancec applied, we turn to the question of whether the

plaintiffs may instead overcome ETECSA's separate status under the first Bancec situation - that is, whether the plaintiffs carried their burden under Florida law of proving the alter ego relationship between the Cuban Government and ETECSA. After considering the affidavits submitted by

the parties, the district court held that the plaintiffs had not carried their burden. See Alejandre II, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1339 ("Although their relationship may bear some similarities to that between a principal and an agent, the Court does not conclude that the relationship between theGovernment of Cuba and ETECSA is so similar that the [Bancec] presumption of independent juridical status is overcome."). We agree. Indeed, when the situation is viewed from the perspective of the Cuban Government (in whose shoes the plaintiffs stand), it would be difficult to come

to any other conclusion.¶ 30¶ Suppose, for example, that the Cuban Government sued AT&T Corp. on the ground that AT&T had failed to pay it (through EMTELCUBA, its alter ego) certain sums that allegedly became due under the Operating Agreement in 1996. AT&T surely would

defend on the ground that while it would have owed such sums to the Government had they become due in 1994, the Government no longer had any right to the sums because ETECSA succeeded to EMTELCUBA's rights and obligations under the Operating Agreement in early 1995. In

order to prevail, then, the Government would have the burden of convincing the court to swallow the argument that the substitution of ETECSA for EMTELCUBA under the Agreement had been a purposeless and ineffectual act by which the Government merely changed its name to

"ETECSA" while remaining the real party in interest. The plaintiffs face exactly the same burden in this case, and we find that this argument is too difficult to digest. ¶ 31¶ Nevertheless, the plaintiffs contend that we must

conclude, as a matter of law, that ETECSA is an alter ego of the Cuban Government because ETECSA receives payments from

the carriers under the OFAC licenses.27 In support of this contention, the plaintiffs point out that the relevant statute authorizes the President to "provide for the issuance of licenses for the full or partial payment to Cuba of amounts

due Cuba as a result of the provision of telecommunications services." 22 U.S.C. 6004(e)(3)(A). Not surprisingly, the sections of the CACR that implement this statute and the licenses issued by OFAC thereunder include similar language. See 31 C.F.R. 515.418(a), 515.542(c). The plaintiffs

argue that these references to "Cuba" mean that the licenses do not permit the carriers to make payments to any entity other than the Cuban Government.28 By making and accepting payments under these licenses, therefore, the carriers and ETECSA are supposedly estopped to deny

that ETECSA is an alter ego of the Government.¶ 32¶ We reject this argument for two reasons. First, while the term "Cuba" is not specifically defined in the statute, the

CACR define it to include "any political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof ." 31 C.F.R. 515.301 (1998) (defining "foreign country"); see also 31 C.F.R.

515.201(d) (1998) (stating that the term "designated foreign country" means Cuba). Thus, the garnishees' payments to "Cuba" under the licenses could be lawfully made to the separate

instrumentality ETECSA rather than to the Cuban Government itself . In addition, we note that the licenses issued to all of the carriers authorize more than merely payments to "Cuba";

they also authorize all necessary transactions incident to the performance of the Operating Agreements that the carriers negotiated with EMTELCUBA.29 Because these Agreements provide that the expression "EMTELCUBA" includes that entity's successors, all necessary transactions with

its successor ETECSA are apparently authorized as well.



Mexico

Refers to the United Mexican States


http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Mexico]Mexico *ˈmɛksɪˌkəʊ]¶ n¶ 1. (Placename) a republic in North America, on the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific: early Mexican

history includes the Maya, Toltec, and Aztec civilizations; conquered by the Spanish between 1519 and 1525 and achieved independence in

1821; lost Texas to the US in 1836 and California and New Mexico in 1848. It is generally mountainous with three ranges of the Sierra Madre

(east, west, and south) and a large central plateau. Official language: Spanish. Religion: Roman Catholic majority. Currency: peso. Capital:

Mexico City. Pop.: 99 969 000 (2001 est.). Area: 1 967 183 sq. km (761 530 sq. miles) Official name United Mexican States Spanish

name Méjico

Refers to the territory of the United Mexican States

Mexico-Russia Income Tax Treaty 4 www.nalog.ru/html/docs/in/mex/mexin.doc

the term "Mexico" means the territory of the United Mexican States in the terms expressed in its Political Constitution,

including its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf where the United Mexican States exercises its sovereign rights and

jurisdiction in conformity with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, of 1982;



Venezuela

Refers to the Republic of Venezuela

US Tax Convention with Venezuela 2K http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/venezu.pdf

1. For the purposes of this Convention, unless the context otherwise requires: a) the term “Venezuela” means the Republic ofVenezuela;

Refers to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela


http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Venezuela]

Venezuela *ˌvɛnɪˈzweɪlə]¶ n¶ 1. (Placename) a republic in South America, on the Caribbean: colonized by the Spanish in the 16th century;

independence from Spain declared in 1811 and won in 1819 after a war led by Simón Bolívar. It contains Lake Maracaibo and the northernmost chain s of the Andes

in the northwest, the Orinoco basin in the central part, and the Guiana Highlands in the south. Exports: petroleum, iron ore, and coffee. Official language: Spanish.

Religion: Roman Catholic majority. Currency: bolívar. Capital: Caracas. Pop.: 24 632 000 (2001 est.). Area: 912 050 sq. km (352 142 sq. miles) Official

name Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

Refers to the territory of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

Venezuela-UAE Double Taxation Prevention Treaty 10

http://www.mof.gov.ae/En/AboutMinistry/Departments/Documents/%D8%A5%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82

%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B2%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%20%D8%A

7%D9%84%D8%B6%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A/Venezuela%20%28ENG%29%20DTA.pdf

a) the term "Venezuela" means in its geographical sense, the territory of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, including its

land territory, islands, lakes and rivers, internal waters and waters included within the straight base lines adopted by the Bolivarian

Republic of Venezuela, its territorial sea and the air space over these areas, as well as the exclusive economic zone and

the continental shelf beyond the exclusive economic zone, over which the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

exercises in accordance with its legislation and international law, sovereign rights or jurisdiction;



Or



Exclusive

“Or” means one or the other

Quirk 93 (Randolph, Professor of Linguistics – University of Durham, and Sidney Greenbaum, “A University

Grammar of English”, http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/conjunctions.htm) OR To suggest that only one possibility can be realized, excluding one or the other: "You can study hard for this exam or

you can fail." To suggest the inclusive combination of alternatives: "We can broil chicken on the grill tonight, or we can just eat leftovers. To

suggest a refinement of the first clause: "Smith College is the premier all-women's college in the country, or so it seems to most Smith College

alumnae." To suggest a restatement or "correction" of the first part of the sentence: "There are no rattlesnakes in this canyon, or so our guide

tells us." To suggest a negative condition: "The New Hampshire state motto is the rather grim "Live free or die." To suggest a negative

alternative without the use of an imperative (see use of and above): "They must approve his political style or they wouldn't keep electing him

mayor."

http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/conjunctions.htm#above

http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/conjunctions.htm#above



Not Exclusive

The word “or” is only exclusive if the two options are already mutually exclusive

Smith 13 [Dr Peter Smith, former member of the Philosophy Dept at Cambridge, “ Disjunction: Why did the

inclusive “OR” become the convention?” http://math.stackexchange.com/questions/366122/disjunction-why-did-the-inclusive-or-become-the-convention]

Velleman could be read as saying that (i) in English, "or" has two meanings when used as a propositional connective, one

corresponding the familiar inclusive disjunction of formal logic, the other expressing exclusive disjunction, but (ii) there's

a special convention that in mathematical English, "or" is used only in the first way. Hence the OP's question -- why the special convention in

maths?¶ But (i) is arguably just wrong. Although it is not infrequently said that "or" is semantically ambiguous, a much smoother theory

seems to be that "or" is in fact semantically unambiguous, meaning inclusive disjunction, and on those occasions

where we hear/read a message "A or B" as also conveying "but not both", the additional implicature is either

pragmatic (not semantic) or invokes prior knowledge that A excludes B.¶ Note for example that in the sort of cases

typically invoked to supposedly illustrate the uses of exclusive "or", it would -- on the semantic story -- be a

contradiction to add "or both" whereas it normally seems like a coherent cancelling of a pragmatic (typically Gricean)

implicature. Note again that 'either ... or' in English seems to have a uniform semantic negation, 'neither ... nor ...' (which couldn't be the

negation if 'or' is exclusive). And so it goes.

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